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#### Settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers. The appropriation of land turns Natives into ghosts and chattel slaves into excess labor.

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### Feminist strategizing is parasitic on Indian land and strengthens settler colonial relations – only a decolonization first strategy can liberate oppressive structures

Grande 4 (Sandy, Associate Professor of Education at Connecticut College, Ph.D., Kent State University, Fellow in the Holleran Center for Community Action and Public Policy, member of the EPA’s National Environmental Justice Advisory Council’s Indigenous People’s Work Group, “Red Pedagogy”, pg. 148-150)

The aim of this analysis was to determine the state and prevalence of¶ whitestream feminism in the contemporary feminist terrain. As it turns out, it not¶ only appears to be alive and well but also thriving as the dominant discourse. Indeed,¶ the voice of whitestream feminism and its resistance to theorize at the intersection¶ of economics, labor, production, and exploitation is so predominant¶ that it raises the question: Who gains from abandoning the problems of labor?¶ One possibility is that it allows white middle-class women to deny that¶ their increased power and access has come at the expense of poor women and¶ women of color. This reality compels Ebert to draw a distinction between¶ emancipatory pedagogies, which explain how exploitative relations operate¶ in the everyday lives of people so that they can be changed, and liberatory¶ pedagogies, which privilege the desiring subject at the center of their politics,¶ protecting the material interests of the powerful and propertied classes.¶ In this light, Lather's resistance to "totalizing" and "universal" categories (and¶ her subsequent assertions of indeterminacy) is revealed as a "legitimization of¶ the class politics of an upper-middle-class Euroamerican feminism obsessed¶ with the freedom of the entrepreneurial subject" (Ebert 1996b, 31). Driven by¶ the capriciousness of postmodern and post-structural theories, such feminisms¶ ultimately dismiss the political imperatives of radical critique and its commitment¶ to the collective emancipation of all peoples, privileging instead the desires¶ of the white, bourgeois, female subject. As an indigenous woman, I understand¶ this discourse as a "theory of property holders" and until whitestream feminists¶ "come clean" about their participation in the forces of domination, indigenous¶ and other colonized women will continue to resist its premises.¶ AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN'S RESISTANCE:¶ TOWARD A THEORY OF INDIGENTSTA¶ Since most indigenous women link their subjugation to colonization and recognize¶ the integral participation of white women in this project, they have¶ consistently voiced their misgivings about the feminist movement. Their resistance¶ is also buttressed by the "widely shared belief that American Indian¶ women do not need feminism" (Bataille and Sands 1984). Indeed, while patriarchy¶ may be a salient feature in the structural oppression of women in¶ Western societies, many indigenous societies reveal an overall de-emphasis¶ on virtually all relations of domination and submission (Klein and Ackerman¶ 1995). As Maltz and Archambault (1995, 247) note, in societies where relations¶ of prestige and hierarchy are virtually absent, "the ability to dominate¶ others does not tend to be a major basis for determining status," and "the¶ (more specific) control of men over women is not a major theme." On the¶ contrary, matrilineal, matrilocal, and matriarchal structures tend to be the historical¶ norm for many indigenous societies.1 4 In addition to the differences in¶ social and political structures, indigenous societies differ in their religious¶ and cosmological systems. Specifically, in contrast to the patriarchal structures¶ of Christianity dominant in Western societies, indigenous belief systems¶ demonstrate clear patterns of gender balance and female empowerment.¶ As a result of the above social and political structures, many indigenous¶ women share historical memories and contemporary experiences of women¶ as warriors, healers, spiritual leaders, clan mothers, tribal leaders, council¶ members, political activists, and cultural proprietors, and thus, already live¶ with a sense of their own traditional "feminist" agency. Thus, while such¶ women may occupy a marginalized space in the whitestream distortions of¶ U.S. history, they have always held prominence in the histories, collective¶ memories, oral traditions, and ceremonial spaces of their own tribal nations.¶ This historical legacy of reciprocity, shared governance, and female spiritual¶ empowerment fuels the belief among indigenous women that they do not¶ need "liberation" since they have always been "liberated" within their own¶ tribal structures (Bataille and Sands 1984).¶ In addition to the historically situated and shared presumption that they do¶ not need feminism, indigenous women experience an inherent disjuncture between¶ the contemporary feminist and indigenous political projects. Lorelei¶ DeCora Means, a Minneconjou Lakota, AIM activist, and cofounder of the¶ Women of All Red Nations (WARN), articulated the roots of this disjuncture¶ in a speech delivered during International Women's Week at the University of¶ Colorado at Boulder:¶ We are American Indian women, in that order. We are oppressed first and foremost¶ as American Indians, as peoples colonized by the United States of America,¶ not as women. As Indians we can never forget that. Our survival, the survival¶ of every one of us—man, woman, child—as Indians depends on it.¶ Decolonization is the agenda, the whole agenda, and until it is accomplished,¶ it is the only agenda that counts for American Indians. It will take every one¶ of us—every single one of us—to get the job done. We haven't got the time, energy or resources for anything else while our lands are being destroyed and¶ our children are dying of avoidable diseases and malnutrition. So we tend to¶ view those who come to us wanting to form alliances on the basis of new and¶ different or broader or more important issues to be a little less than friends, especially¶ since most of them come from the Euroamerican population which¶ benefits most directly from our ongoing colonization, (cited in Jaimes 1992,¶ 314)¶ Means's powerful words not only assert the primacy of the decolonization¶ agenda but also allude to the ways other social agendas —whitestream feminism—¶ depend upon and benefit from the continuation of the colonialist¶ project.¶ Indigenous Hawaiian activist Haunani-Kay Trask (1996) similarly speaks¶ of the inherent tensions between the feminist and indigenous political projects,¶ recounting her foray in women's studies as a graduate student. After¶ leaving academia and resuming her role as an Indian activist, Trask reports¶ how the deep contradictions between indigenous struggles for land, language,¶ self-determination, and the feminist political project compelled her to abandon¶ feminism. She writes:¶ [Als I decolonized my mind . . . feminism appeared as just another haole [Western]¶ intrusion into a besieged Hawaiian world. . . . Their language revolved¶ around First World "rights" talk, that Enlightenment individualism that takes for¶ granted "individual" primacy. . . . It viewed the liberal state as the proper arbiter¶ of rights and privileges. It accepted capitalism as the despised but inevitable¶ economic force. And finally it insisted on the predicable racist assumption that¶ all peoples are alike in their common "humanity"—a humanity imbued with Enlightenment¶ values and best found in Euro-American states. . . . We are the colonized;¶ they are the beneficiaries of colonialism. That some feminists are oblivious¶ to this historical reality does not lessen their power in the colonial equation.¶ (Trask 1996,909,911)¶ Trask positions the concerns of "haole" feminism as not only different from¶ those of Native Hawaiian women but also as contradictory, noting (like¶ Means) that haole feminists don't just benefit from the colonization of Native¶ peoples, but depend on it.¶ American Indian scholar and activist Janet McCloud (cited in Jaimes 1992,¶ 314) similarly calls attention to "progressive" feminist's failure to account for¶ the benefits accrued by the continued occupation of indigenous lands. She¶ writes:¶ [S]o let me toss out a different kind of progression to all you . . . feminists out¶ there. You join us in liberating our land and lives. Lose the privilege you acquire¶ at our expense by occupying our land. Make that your first priority for as long¶ as it takes to make it happen . . . but if you're not willing to do that then don't¶ presume to tell us how we should go about our own liberation, what priorities¶ and values we should have. Since you're standing on our land, we've got to¶ view you as another oppressor trying to hang onto what's ours.¶ McCloud goes on to suggest that calls for American Indian women to "join"¶ the feminist movement are tantamount to asking them to participate as¶ "equals" in their own colonization.

#### Their defense of Haraway’s conception of cyborg reflects a universalizing Western mythologization of neutrality and identity that props up colonization

Schueller 05 [Malini Johar. "Analogy and (white) feminist theory: Thinking race and the color of the cyborg body." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 31.1 (2005): 63-92.]

I point to the similarities between Haraway’s cyborg theory and theories of several other poststructuralists in order to suggest that there is nothing inherently subversive for feminism about such theorizing unless the theory can be shown to have specific, material, and located ramifications (a fact Haraway seems to have partially recognized in Modest\_Witness [1997a], which I will briefly discuss at the end of this essay). Indeed, as Susan Bordo suggests, **the epistemological jouissance suggested by the image of the cyborg denies locatedness and fantasizes itself as a postmodern “dream of everywhere”** (1990, 136, 144–45).10 Here it is important to distinguish between locatedness and a simple celebration of the local as endless possibility. I am not advocating what Manuel Castells (1997) describes as a defensive and retrenched localism (manifested most disturbingly in the “not in my backyard” ideal) in the face of globalization as a basis for feminist identity but rather a relationship to materiality and sociopolitical specificity as a basis for theorizing, much in the manner of Castells’s own analyses (1997, 61–62). In arguing for a relationship to locatedness, I am taking a stance about critical responsibility in a postcolonial world. As third-world environmentalists such as Vandana Shiva (1997) and subaltern studies historians have demonstrated, **policies and political concepts of postcolonial nations cannot be understood through universal** (read: Western) **concepts alone, even though local concepts need to be related to the global.** Witness Shiva’s call for international legal ecological policies based on an understanding of indigenous knowledges and Partha Chatterjee’s (1986) critique of the Western idea of nation as inapplicable to postcolonial countries. In the United States, **critical race theorists have argued for what legal theorist Richard Delgado** (1995) **terms the call to context, which challenges the traditional juridical preference for universalism over particularism and abstract principles over perspectivism.** This is particularly important, Delgado points out, in normative discourse such as civil rights (1995, xv). **Feminists and gender theorists might simply repeat the universalizing knowledge claims of colonialism by celebrating an ahistorical and acontextual blurring of boundaries**. For instance, might the blurring of racial boundaries be an obfuscation of the systemic racial oppression and racial hierarchies that continue to affect women’s lives? I will return to this point shortly, but for the moment I want to suggest that **neocolonial and imperial knowledge claims can be contested only through theories derived from located knowledge.** Indeed, my own arguments for context-specific theory derive in part from Haraway’s own paradigm of situated knowledge. Positing an alternative to a value-free relativism that she declares to be the “perfect mirror twin of totalization” (1988, 584), Haraway suggests an alternative that is “partial, locatable, critical knowledg[e] sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology” (584). “Our problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a nononsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared” (579). It is in the spirit of Haraway’s own call for partial and locatable knowledge that I propose to examine the relationship between Haraway’s concept of the cyborg and the women of color who figure so prominently in the essay. Such an analysis will also reveal the problematic nature of the concept of woman of color as used by Haraway. I have already mentioned the overly celebratory nature of Haraway’s cyborg myth as a means of resisting the domination of a thoroughly technologized information culture and as a description of that culture. Haraway writes, “By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism: in short, we are cyborg. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. . . . This chapter is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (1991, 150). **The cyborg enables a productive blurring of the binaries such as male/female, self/other, and culture/nature that have sustained Western cultural hierarchies**. Just as the cyborg provides the means whereby to resist repressive dichotomies through unnatural fusions and illegitimate couplings, Haraway suggests that the political constituency of women of color provides a means of constructing a political solidarity out of coalition and affinity rather than out of essential identity. **Unlike identities based on sameness or unity, this postmodern identity is premised on “otherness, difference, and specificity”** (Haraway 1991, 155). Chela Sandoval’s (1984) model of oppositional consciousness, which suggests a mode of articulation seized by those denied stable identities of race or gender, demonstrates to Haraway the subversive potential of the coalition of women of color (1991, 174). Thus **women of color becomes for Haraway a cyborg identity**, “a potent subjectivity **synthesized from fusions of outsider identities**” (1991, 174). By the end of the essay, the analogous relationship of women of color to the illegitimate and hybrid fusion of the cyborg is clear. Haraway moves to delineate aspects of the cyborg myth by looking at “two overlapping groups of texts . . . constructions of women of color and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction” (1991, 174). What follows are illustrations of subversive political identities formulated by women of color such as Audre Lorde and Cherrı´e Moraga and feminist science fiction writers such as Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delaney, James Tiptree Jr., Octavia Butler, and Vonda McIntyre. Following a partial trajectory of Haraway’s complex essay still leaves us with a few nagging questions: Why are women of color needed in order to formulate a cyborg myth centrally based on the monstrous fusion of human and machine? Who are the women of color referred to in the essay? Let us attempt to answer the second question first. Clearly the term women of color (it usually appears in quotation marks in the essay) alludes to radical African American, Latina, Native American, and Asian American feminists who constituted themselves as a group apart from white U.S. feminists. Sandoval’s (1984) formulation of oppositional consciousness, which Haraway cites, was preceded by the formation of Kitchen Table/ Women of Color Press and the publication of the influential anthology This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, edited by Moraga and by Gloria Anzaldu´a in 1981. Subsequently, the term women of color gained widespread critical and pedagogical usage. Let us now see how Haraway explains the first question raised above. Haraway sees the writings of women of color as postmodern resistance writing or cyborg writing. Like all colonized groups, women of color seize the power to write in order to resignify hegemonic Western myths: “The poetry and stories of US women of color are repeatedly about writing, about access to the power to signify; but this time that power must be neither phallic nor innocent. . . . Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. . . . Figuratively and literally, language politics pervade the struggles of women of color” (Haraway 1991, 175). Haraway’s claims for the writings of women of color are similar to the arguments of scholars who see minority writing or postcolonial writing as resistance writing alone. However, **such an argument not only reifies the very binaries of center and margin, colonizer and colonized, that Haraway as poststructuralist wishes to blur but also homogenizes, through a colonial imperative, the margin itself, a tactic strongly critiqued** by feminists like Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991, 51). Let us revisit, for a moment, the two groups of texts Haraway compares: constructions of women of color and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction. One includes a variety of texts (presumably including autobiographies, novels, poetry, and drama) by a racially marked group, while the other deals with grotesque bodies in a specific genre. One would be hardpressed to find similar generalizations about white U.S. women’s writings, but women of color become fair game here, as did all third-world texts in Fredric Jameson’s much contested claim about these texts being national allegories (1986). Here I would argue in similar fashion to Aijaz Ahmed ([1987] 1992) that many texts by women of color are not about access to the power to signify or about subverting either the central origin myths of Western culture or myths of original innocence. Texts like Jade Snow Wong’s Fifth Chinese Daughter ([1950] 1989), Le Ly Hayslip’s When Heaven and Earth Changed Places (1989), and Bharati Mukherjee’s Jasmine (1989), for instance, affirm to an extent the binaries of Western rationality, modernity, and progress and Eastern irrationality, prejudice, and backwardness. Furthermore, the very assumption that texts by U.S. women of color are centrally about subverting Western myths suggests that minority texts are significant only insofar as they relate to the center. Many texts by U.S. women of color—Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987) and Fae Myenne Ng’s Bone (1993) are powerful examples—are not fundamentally about subverting Western myths. And simply to suggest that writings about women of color are “repeatedly about writing” is simply to reiterate the discursive postmodern truism that all fiction is metafiction. Moreover, the very distinction between women of color and feminist science fiction writers begs the obvious question: Is Butler (who is included in the category of feminist science fiction) not a woman of color?

#### The conception of identity outline by Haraway and is a line of flight moves through the graveyard of the Native – the de-territorialization of the human wanders haunted by ghosts which scream in terror demand an outright refusal of the 1AC

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Byrd performs **an outright** refusal **that** short circuits the **colonial and postcolonial comportments of politesse**, which allow genocidal Western thought to continue uninterrupted. **Byrd’s interrogation of the “colonial nostalgia”** latent **in** poststructural and nonrepresentational forms of thought like **Deleuze and Guattari’s** rhizome **is an explicit example of how the violence of white nonrepresentational theory creates an immediate space of impasse for Indigenous**, decolonial, Black, and abolitionist intellectual **traditions**. As Byrd argues, the **Deleuzian and Guattarian** rhizome assumes its errant, untraceable, and de/reterritorializing path through Native genocide. The **rhizome obtains** its metaphorical **and theoretical** elasticity from **the** discursive genocide **of Indigenous peoples.** The territory of maneuver or ground that the rhizome gains its bearing on is unwittingly or perhaps indifferently anchored in the disavowal of the Indigenous ancestral claims, history, presence, and ongoing relationship with the land in North America. **Deleuze and Guattari covet the** free-range and bloody movements **in the West, described as a land of “Indians without Ancestry”** primarily **because they** do not have to contend with the presence of Indigenous peoples and their prior relationships (ancestors) to the land and space through which they move and clear as nomads. There are no existing people to which Deleuze and Guattari have to be accountable. Therefore, **their own and others’ self-actualizing, free-form whiteness can proceed unimpeded**. The rhizomatic West— terra nullius— is without a people, history, or a cosmology to navigate. Byrd’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s reproduction or transit of the “Indian” in their book A Thousand Plateaus limns some of the methods in which colonialism and modes of conquest are enacted on behalf of the selfactualization of white subjects who produce nonrepresentational theory. In fact, Byrd argues that **the “Indian is the ontological prior through which poststructuralism functions.”**28 Byrd traces the appearance or deployment of the Indian as a simulation or “present absent” in Jacques Derrida’s and then **Deleuze and Guattari’s work**, which **creates space for the white subject and the** unending frontier. Byrd also argues that nonrepresentational theory heralded as a liberatory path beyond the subject is colonialist. Byrd indicts Deleuze and Guattari’s use of Leslie Fiedler’s work in order to invoke the American West and the Indian as exceptional cases that inspire rhizomatic movement through the notion of an ever- receding frontier.29 It is colonialist on (at least) two accounts: in its need to render the Indian already and inevitably (ontologically) dead as “it” has no ancestors or living community to whom one needs to be accountable; and in its invocation of the vanishing “Indian,” which opens up the possibility of an “ever-receding frontier” and inspiration for the metaphor of the rhizome. **This** logic and mode of conquistador thought undergirds the **Deleuzian and Guattarian ethos of experimental and** rhizomatic lines of flight. Their nonrepresentational theory of lines of flight are only possible as **a form of white self actualizing posthumanism due to the death of Indigenous peoples** and their excision from the Earth/land. **White posthumanism and its flows and lines of flight are made possible** through Native death. Because of this, Byrd haltingly stops the reader’s momentum as she critiques Deleuzoguattarian and poststructuralist tendencies that often emerge in postcolonial work. Rather than allow the preemptive rejoinder that white and some postcolonial scholars use, such as “I know that theorist X did not consider race or was racist, but he enables us to do XYZ with his work,”30 **Byrd** instead **cuts off Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics** at the path. As Byrd anticipates that following Deleuze and Guattari will end in genocide, she allows the reader the time and space to let this reality sink in and consider a different route than the normative impulse and course of action that is to repair Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Byrd’s work slows us down and brings us to a point of impasse and a resting place where one can slow down, stop, and make a choice to stay put or move forward with the dismissive, whimsical, white conceit that tolerates Native death. **Byrd’s refusal allows the reader to feel the** violent puncture **of the nonrepresentational gash that it tries to disavow.** Byrd gives her reader the space and time to say, “Yes, I understand your attempt to evade signification and thus representation but it is not compelling enough for me to overlook the reality that it requires Native genocide.” The way that Byrd’s and others’ decolonial work brings these kinds of tensions and violence to a head enables us to make other kinds of analytic and conceptual choices. The reader is allowed to think and then say, “If this line of thought requires Indigenous death, why even venture down it? What could one possibly repair or salvage of it?”

#### This assumes the best version of their argument – even if the conception of “Human” is elastic the clearing of indigenous land is pre-figured by structural opposition

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of Maryland at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* Volume 3 Number 1, footnote 43 included in curly braces, modified) gz

If Byrd’s refusal is a first- order engagement and argument, then Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s interrogation of the spatial vocabularies of the human and colonialism is a second- order analysis and practice of refusal, one that reroutes us and makes us ask new questions. As Smith has argued in her classic work *Decolonizing Methodologies*, “there is a very specific spatial vocabulary of colonialism which can be assembled around three concepts: (1) the line, (2) the centre, and (3) the outside.”33 The Deleuzian and Guattarian line of flight then also emerges from the colonial spatial imaginings of the colonizer. Within Western ideas and philosophical conceptions of temporality and spatiality, like Deleuze and Guattari’s line, time and space have been categorized and imagined as entities that can be measured. In Smith’s account, “Space came to be seen as consisting of lines which were either parallel or elliptical.”34 Rather than escaping the reterritorializing capture of colonial and state power, Deleuzian and Guattarian “lines of flight” coalesce with the line’s emergence as a way to map “territory, to survey land, to establish boundaries, and mark the limits of colonial power.”35 While not intended to mark boundaries or colonize Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the line of flight, rhizomatic and violent movements to produce a land of Indigenous peoples without ancestors continues rather than ruptures colonial violence.36 As Deleuze and Guattari attempt to move away from an “I” or “a subject,” through the use of nonrepresentational and nomadic “lines of flight,” they successfully resurrect the human through the geo- epistemology of the “line.” Within humanist cognitive frames, lines emerge in response to chaos. The line, which seeks to separate “order” from “chaos,” falls into formation with what Sylvia Wynter identifies as “the structural oppositions” that order humanist thought.37 Even the “line of flight” establishes a linear/nonlinear structural opposition that demarcates the “order” of the invisible white “self” in opposition to the “chaotic” realm of the dead Indigenous and Black “nonbeing.” The line in all of its Deleuzian and Guattarian “molar, molecular, and nomadic” iterations is a humanist geospatial and epistemic configuration. The molar lines that make smooth space do so through the clearing of Indigenous peoples (clear to smooth) in order to produce a colonial grid of order. Deleuze and Guattari even fret over the potential susceptibility of the molecular (a more supple and ambiguous line not so prone to segmentation and rigidity) and the liberatory line of flight to become susceptible to the pull of the state. In A Thousand Plateaus, one can sense the anxiety they have about the molecular and nomadic line of flight. There is one last problem, the most anguishing one, concerning the dangers specific to each line. There is not much to say about the danger confronting the first [molar line], for the chances are slim that its rigidification will fail. There is not much to say about the ambiguity of the second [molecular line]. But why is the line of flight, even aside from the danger it runs of reverting to one of the other two lines, imbued with such singular despair in spite of its message of joy, as if at the very moment things are coming to a resolution its undertaking were threatened by something reaching down to its core, by a death, a demolition?38 The “something” that is reaching down and can be found in its core are the very traces of the human. Humanist secular thought that emerged from the fifteenth- century conquest and enslavement of Native and Black peoples produced the geometry of the line. The line is a way or an episteme used by the human to distinguish self from the other and produce the very structural oppositions that Sylvia Wynter names as essential to the human and its various genres. Smith’s deconstruction of the geo- epistemologies of “the center, the line,” and the “outside” poses questions and prods Western critical theory in ways that Western theory has yet to do itself, particularly about its subjectless and more specifically nonrepresentational moves. In addition to Wynter’s structural oppositions, it is also productive to think about how Wynter’s “beyond” has us contend with the underlying epistemes that make the human possible. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson’s engagement with Wynter’s “beyond” also interrogates the call to transcend the human. In a recent GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Jackson asks what it means when Black life is asked to make this transcendent move.39 Finally, I more carefully consider the work of Amber Jamilla Musser, who makes room for Deleuze and Guattari’s influence while being skeptical of and drawing attention to the specific ways that affect, sensation, and other nonrepresentational theories end up hailing and producing subjects even as they try and avoid systems of representation. GETTING ON AND BEYOND Throughout Sylvia Wynter’s body of work, particularly the portion that Greg Thomas calls the “beyond” work,40 Wynter attends to the epistemic, aesthetic, performative, and moral technologies such as structural oppositions, which are needed in order to write the human as an exclusive mode of being. Sylvia Wynter is concerned with getting rid of the epistemic systems and orders of knowledge (e.g., biological determinism, economic rationalization, performances, and epistemes) that make the very emergence of exclusionary categories like the human possible. Without getting rid of these systems or artifacts, even if the category of the human is eliminated from language, it will be replaced with something else as long as biological determinism, economic rationalization, oppositions, and lines continue to order and govern thought. The problem with the human is its scaffolding, not the category itself. The emergence of the human and specifically the overrepresentation of the human as man depends on the continual reproduction of and sometimes destruction of oppositional frames— in order to replace a structural oppositional with another. Wynter contends that “all founding oppositions . . . express the fact that humans as organized orders not only struggle against the opposing “chaos,” but have need of it as well, not only destroying but also continually creating it.”41 Over the course of Wynter’s work, there is a protracted discussion about the usefulness of the opposition “order/chaos” as a primary ordering force, which has persisted throughout time yet makes adjustments to what it posits as abject difference or the chaotic outside of man at any given moment. Within the secular human’s mode of man, the ordered self, culture, or “we” needs the chaotic, not- us, or them in the Negro [the Black] and the Indian in order to know itself as culture—Logos, Reason—and therefore as human. The human as man, in its ordered, rational, gendered, sexed, European, bourgeois form, needs chaos in order to secure a self, even as what is human changes. While the human as man may become elastic and more diverse (as proletariat and woman), it still requires an outside. It still requires chaos, even if those who were previously a part of the realm of chaos enter into the zone of order. It is within this lineated orbit of chaos and order that even nonrepresentational poststructuralist theories retain the trace of the human as a narrow ordering line of the self (even in subjectless guise). The line is but one geo- epistemology of white posthumanist thought. The Deleuzoguattarian “lines of flight,” even as a nomadic line though supposedly not attached to a self or a subject, carry the specter and trace of the human in the ordering and disciplining colonial lines of flight of conquest. As Wynter argues, there are often reversals of the order and hierarchies of structural oppositions; the reversals fail to actually overcome and annihilate the need and desire for structural opposition as an actual order of knowledge.42 While “natural man” may prevail over ecclesiastical, clergical, or theological man, natural or rational man still needs to create himself as the center or norm in relation to those who lack rationality and reason (the Black and Native). Similarly, poststructuralist theory may prevail over structuralist narratives that center the self or the “I”; however, the impulse to kill and create the Indian without ancestors alongside crafting a new self- annihilating posthumanist subject is still part of the order of knowledge of structural opposition. The selfless, subjectless, posthuman still persists as the realm of life because of the annihilation of Indigenous and Black life. Within critical theories, Black and Native people are rendered structuralist (or modernist and dead) as white self-actualizing subjects disguise themselves as rhizomatic movements that transcend representation and the human. Epistemes such as the line segregate the chaotic realm of death (Black and Native) from the poststructuralist realm of life (white transcendence) through structural opposition marked with blood. The line is a humanist geo-form and geo-episteme, which makes the kinds of segmentation that structural oppositions are based on possible.43 {43. Even if Deleuze and Guattari’s line is molecular and perhaps not segregating, separating, or dividing, it is bringing things together into categories, orders, taxonomies of chaos, and order as it sutures and gathers matter.} Humans must perceive and come to some social or human agreement that lines even exist in the social (cultural) and natural world. Even in Deleuze and Guattari’s ideal scenario in which lines are drawn and (re)drawn again outside the state’s mandates, someone (as a subject) must still render them as an outside to something.

#### Thus, the only alternative is decolonization.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

*when you take away the punctuation*

*he says of*

*lines lifted from the documents about*

*military-occupied land*

*its acreage and location*

*you take away its finality*

*opening the possibility of other futures*

-Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

#### The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16

(Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213, JKS)

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

### 1NC – CP

#### We advocate for the 1AC without the use of the term Anthropocene.

#### Its competitive and legitimate – it does less than the 1AC – the entire aff is a criticism of the way we describe space with impacts about colonization – using settler descriptions of the world turns their entire advocacy. No stable action means the entire 1AC is the plan and we should get to negate the AFFs choices. They get infinite prep time to choose each word carefully – any other interp is arbitrary and justifies the aff not being held accountable for their rhetoric.

#### The term “Anthropocene” to describe our current era whitewashes Eurocentric violence and erases black and indigenous struggle by framing all humans as responsible for modernity

Grove 16- Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai‘i Mānoa [Jairus, Boston Review, “Jairus Grove response to Jedediah Purdy,” <https://bostonreview.net/forum_response/jairus-grove-response-nature-anthropocene/>, DKP]

Unlike many who appeal to the Anthropocene simply to advance the cause of geoengineering, Jedediah Purdy begins with an assessment of our political condition. Still, he fails to appreciate the nature of the geopolitics responsible for the crisis we face. If we are to take up his noble call for an ecological democracy, we must acknowledge that the violence done to our planet has largely been perpetrated not by all humans but by a select group of Europeans. The Anthropos—the human species as such—is not to blame. Properly named, our era is not the Anthropocene but the Eurocene.

It was a European elite that developed a distinctively mechanistic view of matter, an oppositional relationship to nature, and an economic system indebted to geographical expansion. The resulting political orders measured success by how much wealth could be generated in the exploitation of peoples and resources. The geological record bears the mark of this European assemblage of hierarchies. Understanding the forces of Europeanization—the forces of racial superiority, economic hegemony, and global resettlement—is essential to understanding how the planet got to this point, and how “we” could possibly become democratic.

Purdy and others claim there are two reasons for renaming the last few centuries to mark a new geological era. The first is a matter of accuracy: there is significant evidence that humans have contributed to climate change. The second is a matter of consciousness raising: renaming the Holocene is essential to raising awareness that humans are responsible. Yet on both counts, we should reconsider what we mean by “human.” It would be more accurate, and go further in raising awareness, to acknowledge the grossly disproportionate impact Europeans have had on our planet. This is not just another hyperbolic jeremiad against European peoples: Purdy’s invitation for global democratic thinking requires a geological history and name that foregrounds what really stands in the way of such a future.

As Purdy points out (unlike Paul Crutzen and others), the “human” footprint involves much more than just carbon dioxide. On a geological time scale, the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide are dwarfed by those of radioactivity and are comparable to those of plastic, the modern waste product par excellence. If the Anthropocene is meant to name the scale of human impacts on the planet, it should refer not only to warming but also to cooling the earth, and Europeanization has done both at levels that even China’s current growth cannot match.

Beginning in 1610, a small-scale ice age took hold of the planet when a wilder arboreal nature took back what had been inhabited land: some 20 million people killed by the European invasion of the Americas resulted in vast reforestation of the North and South American continents. The providence spoken of by those who arrived was not God but syphilis, influenza, and the number of other species that went along for the ride. Waves of well-armed European explorers and settlers leveraged the devastation for their own gain. There is no way to know how many languages, cities, ideas, cosmologies, and ways of inhabiting the world were lost in this genocide and terraforming of the Americas.

The history of nuclear weapons is also predominantly European. The bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, is only the beginning of this story. In the years that have followed, more than 2,000 nuclear weapons have been tested, about 97 percent of which were detonated by European powers. Those detonations do not appear as tests from the perspectives of the Marshallese or Western Shoshone. A seventy-year nuclear war has spread cancer, incinerated sacred lands, and made other spaces uninhabitable on a temporal scale several orders of magnitude more condensed than the lifespan of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The nuclear powers of the Eurocene—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel—possess 97 percent of the 15,800 nuclear weapons around the planet. The beleaguered state of the arms control agenda means self-annihilation is still a very real possibility.

## Case

### 1NC – Case

#### The identitarian 1+1=? mathematics of the cyborg leaves identity unchanged and limits the possibility for radical change.

Currier 03 [Dianne. "Feminist technological futures: Deleuze and body/technology assemblages." Feminist Theory 4.3 (2003): 321-338.]

While **the figure of the cyborg**, and the manifesto in general, have done much to propel feminist scholarship into a creative engagement with questions of technology and subjectivity, I would argue that it ultimately **fails to make the break with the logic of identity** which Haraway rightly identifies as crucial. This is apparent in one aspect of the cyborg’s ætiology – the intersection of bodies and technologies. **The seamless intermingling of bodies and technologies**, enabled by the common coding of each as information, **is central** to the figure of the cyborg. For Haraway, it is the cyborg, as the product of these intersections, that defies classification as organic or nonorganic, human or machine. However, as Kirby (1997) suggests, what remains problematic is that **in order to fabricate the hybrid and intermingled cyborg one must first begin with the discrete component entities which are precisely those elaborated within the logic of identity.** That is, in the construction of a cyborg, technologies are added to impact upon, and at some point intersect with a discrete, non-technological ‘body’. **While a limitless range of mutations and variations might emerge** from such meetings, I would, however, argue that **to proceed on the basis of an engagement between bodies and technologies which is primarily prosthetic**, as Kirby points out, **effectively reinscribes the cyborg into the binary logic of identity** which Haraway hopes to circumvent. Within Haraway’s work **in the formulation of the cyborg a body pre-exists as a singular entity, to which a range of technological artifacts and/or processes are appended, which then reformulate that body and its associated identity beyond the bounds of conventional categories of Human or Man.** **Tools are applied to bodies** – ‘communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies’ (Haraway, 1991: 164) – **in a formula that posits them as initially discrete categories**. Thus, **in so far as the hybrid cyborg is forged in the intermeshing of technology with a body, in a process of addition, it leaves largely intact those two categories** – (human) body and technology – **that preceded the conjunction.** **Haraway’s ‘disassembled and reassembled’ recipe for cyborg graftings is utterly dependent on the calculus of one plus one, the logic wherein pre-existent identities are then conjoined and melded. The cyborg’s chimerical complications are therefore never so promiscuous that its parts cannot be separated even if only retrospectively.** (Kirby, 1997: 147) This original demarcation of the components of the hybrid functionally reinstates the human, grounded in an non-technological organic body as a stable site that cannot be retrospectively conjured away by a subsequent seamless interface of shared coding. In proposing the cyborg as hybrid, Haraway reiterates precisely the categorical demarcation of human and machine she is attempting to dissolve. And the logic through which those categories are articulated in a relation of binary opposition to each other remains. **Thus the cyborg is framed as different from the preceding forms of Human bodies and nonhuman technologies which give rise to it. Its difference is accounted for as variation or mutation, that is in a relation to a central figure, the Human, in a reiteration of the logic of identity.** That the logic of identity is problematic for feminist theory on a range of fronts has been convincingly and comprehensively argued elsewhere.1 I would argue that these difficulties are especially acute for feminists such as Haraway who are interested in re-conceptualizing technology as a facilitating agent for new and transformed futures. Not only does the logic of identity erase difference, including sexual difference, but to the extent that it is a deterministic framework it forecloses any possibility of radical and unexpected change. As Grosz (2000) has argued, the ability to think the new requires an open-ended, non-deterministic conceptual horizon within which the unpredictable and unexpected, the novel may appear and in which the future is not already predicted and determined in a relation to the past/present. Such a horizon must not be bound by determination, in which all emergent formations are explained in relation to existing ones, but must instead accommodate the ‘disconcerting idea of unpredictable transformation, upheavals in directions and arenas which cannot be known in advance and whose results are inherently uncertain’ (Grosz, 2000: 215). To think radical transformation, then, requires a conceptual horizon that will allow for the emergence of novelty, innovation or radical change – the new.2 Clearly a logic such as that of identity, where difference is always already situated in relation to the same, circumscribes the appearance of the new and radically different. **As long as bodies and technologies are thought through only the determinist framework of identity, their combination cannot give rise to radically transformed new configurations**. In the last instance, any mutant formation remains articulated within the dominant framework and its difference understood only in relation to the forms – human and technological – that preceded it. Transformation is short-circuited in a formulation in which emerging configurations are explicable only in terms of difference from preceding forms and, thus, articulated in relation to the same. Given the many disclaimers to the contrary, it is ironic that the cyborg is perhaps the most recent of Cartesian recuperations. Haraway’s insistence that ‘the cyborg skips the step of original unity’ forgets that it is against the unity of ‘the before’, the purity of identity prior to its corruption, that the cyborg’s’ unique and complex hybridity is defined. (Kirby, 1997: 147)

#### The cyborg is tied the Darwinian and Malthusian project of white supremacy. Transhumanism’s political project inevitably results in a genocide of the most marginalized.

Keller 18 [Celine. “Why The Zombie Haunts The Cyborg - Unveiling The Inherent Racism of Transhumanism @Re:Publica 2018 #rp18.” Krustelkram, 10 May 2018, [www.krustelkram.com/utopian-dreaming/transhumanism-zombies-cyborgs-sylvia-wynter](http://www.krustelkram.com/utopian-dreaming/transhumanism-zombies-cyborgs-sylvia-wynter).]

So, let’s talk about Transhumanism. 10. Most people, **Transhumanists** included, would probably **say**, Transhumanism is the belief that **the human self and body can be improved by merging it with technology and through it**, ultimately, **transcend** its mere **humanity**, becoming immortal. Transhumnists believe that if the singularity becomes real before we are anywhere close to this goal, that humans would be utterly unprepared to compete with their own creation. And to understand the fear they are spreading, it’s important to highlight one little word in this last sentence: compete. **Because the Enlightenment not only gave rise to the scientific method, that brought us physicalism and stripped human consciousness of any agency, it also gave rise to Darwin’s theory of evolution and Malthus concept of natural scarcity. In short, it reduced individual and collective human life to competition in Darwin’s famous “struggle for existence.” And when you elevate this “struggle for life” to an ideology, what you get is libertarians. So, behind the shiny surface of the transhumanist cyborg dream, that’s exactly what I found** . For example, Max More, who calls himself the founder of modern Transhumanism and who created “the proactionary principle.” A principle that turns consumers into lab rats, by claiming that innovation and becoming immortal is so important, that there should be no regulation on putting whatever product, you may come up with, immediately on the market. And in case, an innovation or untested medicine, ends up hurting anyone, you just pay with profits gained for those human “damages”. Or take billionaire Peter Thiel, who allegedly funds experiments of harvesting and transfusing young people’s blood to help old, rich people live longer. Or Professor Steve Fuller, who claims that people, who oppose diverting public resources to developing life extension technologies, should be seen as zombies. And that the most attractive option to deal with Zombies, has always been killing. But, **since genocide is still politically controversial, to say the least, Transhumanists are therefore stuck with having to convince these “underdeveloped,” less valuable humans to become “fully alive.” It’s not only a despicable social darwinism, that it reveals it self here, but the surprising fact that despite Transhumanists being stark Darwinists, they seem to believe in a purpose of life.** For Fuller, becoming alive, becoming conscious, is to recognise humanities purpose or end goal, to overcome death and become immortal. And this is surprising, because if you take the perspective of Darwinism, you would try to avoid talking about a human goal or purpose. Because the fundamental idea in Darwinian thinking is, that the purposes were sort of discovered, as things evolved. Selecting certain kinds of routine behaviour, because they were “good,” or providing an advantage for winning the “struggle for life”. 11. So, what I tried to show so far, is, that this, our dominant scientific world view, reducing us to biological machines, has left us with a gaping hole inside. Transhumanists included. Most of us, have a hard time finding a meaning in life, so much so, that now, even people who elevate the essence of this reduction, as their sole purpose, start inventing a supernatural being, to worship or be afraid of, just to find a meaning. And I think, what makes itself visible here, is, that humanity has always relied on telling itself a story. A story of a supernatural order, responsible for the laws that govern our world and its power structures. **The Transhumanist’s need to prove that consciousness is physical, is like trying to prove, once and for all, that physicalism’s ‘conscious biological machines’ is, really all we are. And Darwinism’s tabu of thinking about, why and what for, we have evolved to have consciousness, a consciousness, that makes us storytellers that constantly seek for a meaning, reveals itself as the contradiction that it is. And Science becomes visible as yet another belief system, one with churches that worship a new god, created by humans, but as unstoppable, and almighty as all the ones we known before.**12. But this blurring of science with religion, not only becomes visible in Transhumanism’s fierce technological determinism. It also shows itself in all of us. How we helplessly watch how technology eats our rights, welfare and privacy. And in our cynicism and refusal to imagine anything different. If we are merely biological machines, fighting over resources and who gets to procreate, we won’t make it, we all know that. **So, what does it mean, when the most hopeful future in the public mainstream, is abandoning earth to colonise Mars, or becoming immortal uploading our minds into machines? How many of us and who, will get to live that dream?** 13. A couple weeks ago I listened an interview with Jordan Peterson, where he claims, that if one enforced “true” equality, what would follow, is, that people would loose their reason for living. And that all, there would be left, is suffering. Suffering. It’s such a remarkable statement, and I don’t think he is referring to physical pain here, but what in religious terms might be called, a suffering of the human soul. He seems to be convinced that there cannot be any other meaning or purpose in life, except the “natural” self-interested Darwinian fight. I think, understanding this pain, is important, because what humanity needs, isn’t any more fighting, but persuasion and a better story. A story against all common sense, of a world in which human bodies, built cities, made and used bridges, telephones and telegraphs, the internet, the web…all without ever being conscious of what they are doing. A zombie world, but a zombie world that finally wakes up. Sylvia **Wynter holds that the huge problem humanity is facing right now, is** the challenge **to envision** a new science, **a “science of the word.**” 14. A challenge **comparable to** the one made by **Copernicus** **when**, against the hegemonic Christian worldview, **he declared that the earth moves**. And with this realisation, undermined the church’s entire plan for salvation. This is a challenge **where we will have to come to realise, the importance of our stories**. 15. For, the beauty of Darwinian thinking, is, not only, that one gets a tool for understanding the world, but, also, maybe even more importantly, a way of how to define “good.” And **Wynter reminds us**, that “**good” as well as “purpose,” were once words, which meaning and value were defined by the church.** She shows, that **our societies were always defined by mirroring the laws of a**n **half scientific, half imagined supernatural order, and that the relationship between religion and** the secularisation (and with it **science), needs to be understood historically, as a story**. **If we want a future, where the answer to the question of who we are, includes everyone, we need to understand how for the first time the Western ‘Man’ became an overrepresentation for what it means to be human.** We need to understand, how in medieval Christian Europe a scholastic order dictated the concept of ‘Man’ in theological terms. **Dividing humanity for the first time, into “True Christian Selves” and their ‘untrue Others’.** **And how this story of who we are, in a struggle for power, got already reinvented twice.** The **first** time **during the Renaissance, when Humanism was born, and Christians set sail to explore and colonise** the world. **Establishing** the first **racial hier**archy, this time **by reinventing the divide based on a by-nature-difference of rationality**. **And** how **200 years later**, the **Enlightenment**, **with** its reductionism, **Darwin and Malthus**, then, **demanded the second reinvention**. Because the combination of Darwin’s theory of evolution, with Malthus concept of “Natural Scarcity,” not only **cemented and naturalised a racial hierarchy but amplified who would be othered, and pushed on the less valued side of the human divide. Because from then on, it included anyone, unable to master this law of nature. Anyone who, no matter how hard they tried, would never be a Western “Man”, the dys- selected, the poor, women, anyone different**. 16. But, we **humans are not only regulated by our genes, neither are we mere machines. We are what Wynter calls “Homo Narrans,” storytelling, hybrid beings.** And **the stories we tell condition not only our behaviour, but how we do science and study nature.** We need to recognise the ambiguity of our current situation, that is neither religious, nor secular. Because if the current configuration of the relationship between religion and secularity, is a contingent, historical development, rather than a lawlike historical necessity. Then as all contigent, historical developments, it can change. 17. So, yes, the zombie world is possible. But just like a story, like a magic spell, could turn us humans into zombies. Zombies, who feel hope and powerless, not knowing why they are doing what they are doing, but following a supernatural script. Those zombies can awaken, and throw away this script. Because they come to realise, that who makes a script reality, is us. And finally, **we can re-imagine what it means to be human. Not by becoming transhuman, reinventing another divide, but by becoming human. By re-enchanting humanism and creating a new, post secular world. A Humanism without divisions and degrees, that includes everybody, and ushers a new world where science supports our meaning**. Because what really makes us so special and different from other beings, is that we are storytellers. Storytellers who always have been, collectively, creating the future. So, if we want this zombie world to finally awaken, to get out of this nightmare, all we have to do, is realise, that being human is a praxis. Come alive!

#### Psychoanalysis is false

Epstein 11 [Charlotte. The University of Sydney, NSW, Australia. 06/2011. “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics.” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 327–350]

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from **social psychology** is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, ‘group self’, which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) ‘the state is simply a “group Self” capable of group level cognition’. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR’s **fallacy** of composition surfaces most clearly. Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state Wendt’s bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see nota­bly, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to **psy­chological theories**, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behav­iour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt’s ‘Ego’) behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human char­acteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual’s basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006). For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state’s adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and val­ues, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as ‘in-’ or ‘out-group’ members and, from there, for orientating states’ self–other relationships. Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other ‘non-rational’ phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of inter­national politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recog­nition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states. The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost **mecha­nistic**, approach to non-rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the **pre-social** dimension of the concept of **self** that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respec­tive languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since posi­tive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer’s (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: posi­tive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination. Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee’s ‘desire to belong’ in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where mean­ing is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War con­text, ‘identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the “Other”’. Perhaps so; but not if what ‘the other’ refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l’Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart’s (2006: 94) capitalization of the ‘Other’ actually holds. The individual self as a proxy for the state’s self Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entre­preneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more sus­ceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour. To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is **literally** considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a **proxy** for the state, the ‘self’ of that person has been consistently taken as the **reference** point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt’s states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has con­sistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. **It has never ques­tioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place.** That is, what is left unexamined is this **assumption** is that what works for individuals **will work for states too.** This is IR’s central **fallacy of composition**, by which it has persistently **eschewed** rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear dem­onstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on **little more than a leap of faith**, or indeed an analogy.