# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – Th

#### Interp: If a debater inserts brackets into their evidence, then they must say right before the evidence that “this evidence is bracketed” and why it was bracketed

#### Violation – their Gewirth card is heavily bracketed and they didn’t explicitly say it was or why it was bracketed

#### Vote neg for academic honesty- modifying the words of authors, even if it’s subtle modification, changes perception of the arguments since it is taken as the author’s words instead of the debaters. Explaining that your evidence is modified is most honest since the judges know that the words are sometimes your own and can call for evidence to resolve any persuasion bias. Otherwise you are representing your words as qualified authors, which is a blantant violation of academic honesty. At worst it is net better for norm setting because judges can call for evidence and find egregious brackets and thus disregard the evidence.

#### Academic honesty is a voting issue to drop the debater -

#### a) It calls into question everything else. If they would lie about their evidence then anything else they may have said could be a lie as well and should be disregarded, which functions the same way as any fairness claim- you cannot accurately determine whether or not their arguments are legitimate.

#### b) Side constraint- It doesn’t matter if they are a really good debater on any layer, if they cheated they should lose.

#### Use competing interps on theory – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### No RVIs:

#### 1. Logic- aff doesn’t win for proving they’re fair or educational

#### 2. Chilling effect- debaters won’t read legitimate theory for fear of losing to a prepped-out counter-interp- proliferates abuse

#### 3. Substantive education- RVIs force a collapse to theory which crowds-out substance

### 1NC – DA

#### The Debt Ceiling expansion gives Democrats two months to finalize and pass Biden’s spending package – every moment is necessary to resolve intraparty disputes

Cochrane 10/7 Cochrane, Emily. Emily Cochrane is a correspondent based in Washington. She has covered Congress since late 2018, focusing on the annual debate over government funding and economic legislation, ranging from emergency pandemic relief to infrastructure. "Senate Leaders Agree to Vote on Short-Term Debt Ceiling Increase." N.Y. Times, 7 Oct. 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/debt-ceiling-senate.html.

Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, announced that he reached an agreement with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, to raise the federal borrowing limit through early December. “We have reached agreement to extend the debt ceiling through early December, and it’s our hope that we can get this done as soon as today.” “Republican and Democratic members and staff negotiated through the night in good faith. The pathway our Democratic colleagues have accepted will spare the American people any near-term crisis.” Video player loading Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, announced that he reached an agreement with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, to raise the federal borrowing limit through early December.CreditCredit...T.J. Kirkpatrick for The New York Times Oct. 7, 2021Updated 3:17 p.m. ET WASHINGTON — Top Senate Democrats and Republicans said on Thursday that they had struck a deal to allow the debt ceiling to be raised through early December, temporarily staving off the threat of a first-ever default on the national debt after the G.O.P. agreed to temporarily drop its blockade of an increase. Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York and the majority leader, announced that he had reached an agreement with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the minority leader, to clear the way for a vote as early as Thursday on a short-term extension, with potentially as few as 11 days left before a possible default. The movement came the day after Mr. McConnell partly backed down from his refusal to allow any such increase to move forward, offering a temporary reprieve as political pressure mounted to avoid being blamed for a fiscal calamity. “It’s our hope that we can get this done as soon as today,” Mr. Schumer said on Thursday morning on the Senate floor. But one day after Mr. McConnell indicated that Republicans would stand aside and allow the short-term increase to advance, he and his top deputies were laboring on Thursday to ensure his members will put aside their objections and clear the path for a vote. “We gotta see if the deal is done,” President Biden told reporters during a trip to Illinois. “I’m not sure of that yet.” The agreed-upon bill would boost the legal debt cap by $480 billion, which the Treasury Department estimates would be enough to allow the government to continue borrowing through at least Dec. 3. The current debt limit was reinstated at $28.4 trillion on Aug. 1, and the Treasury Department has been using so-called extraordinary measures to delay a breach of the borrowing cap since then. The agency estimated that the government would no longer be able to pay all of its bills by Oct. 18, once those fiscal accounting maneuvers were exhausted. Without congressional action before then, economists and lawmakers have warned of catastrophic economic consequences, including the U.S. government having to choose between making payments on the interest on its debt or sending out Social Security checks and other crucial assistance. The legislation under consideration on Thursday did not offer a hard deadline for when cash would run out, and it would not restart the Treasury Department’s ability to employ extraordinary measures, such as curbing certain government investments, a Treasury official said. Some Republicans said they thought the set dollar figure would ensure the limit would not be reached again until at least January. The actual “X-date” will be determined by tax revenues that the government receives and expenditures that it must make near the end of the year. Making such projections has been especially difficult this year because the pandemic relief programs that are in place have made it harder to predict when money is coming and going. “There is no way to predict with any precision exactly how much you would need to increase the debt limit by to get to a certain date,” said Shai Akabas, the director of economic policy at the Bipartisan Policy Center, an independent think tank. But in aiming for Dec. 3, the deal may position the next debt limit fight to overlap once again with negotiations over avoiding a government shutdown, as funding is set to lapse on that same day if Congress does not approve new spending legislation beforehand. Democrats hope nearly two additional months will give them space to focus on finalizing and enacting most of President Biden’s domestic agenda, including hammering out an array of intraparty disagreements over an expansive multi-trillion-dollar social safety net and climate change package. In raising the prospect of a stopgap extension on Wednesday, Mr. McConnell had said that Republicans would allow Democrats to use normal procedures to consider it. But that commitment appeared in doubt on Thursday afternoon, as Republicans privately objected and leaders toiled to line up the votes needed. Should even one senator demand a recorded vote, at least 10 Republicans would be needed to join every Democrat to muster the 60 votes needed to move the bill forward. Image The movement on debt ceiling negotiations came the day after Senator Mitch McConnell backed down partially from his refusal to allow any such increase to move forward. Credit...T.J. Kirkpatrick for The New York Times “We’re having conversations with our members and kind of figuring out where people are, but, as you might expect, this is not an easy one to whip,,” said Senator John Thune of South Dakota, the No. 2 Republican. He added that, “in the end we’ll be there, but it will be a painful birthing process.” Some Republicans were wary of angering their base by allowing the bill to move forward, especially after former President Donald J. Trump issued a statement on Wednesday that attacked Mr. McConnell for “folding to the Democrats.” Mr. Trump seemed to be pressuring Republicans to force a showdown in the face of a looming default, saying that Mr. McConnell had “all of the cards with the debt ceiling, it’s time to play the hand.” Even if Republicans clear the way to allow the measure to pass, it does nothing to address the crux of the partisan stalemate over the debt. Most notably, Republicans have not dropped their demand that Democrats ultimately use an arcane and time-consuming budget process known as reconciliation to lift the debt ceiling into next year. Democrats are currently using that process to steer around Republican opposition and push through a sprawling domestic package that would address climate change, expand the social safety net with more health care and education benefits, and increase taxes on the wealthy and corporations. “The pathway our Democratic colleagues have accepted will spare the American people any near-term crisis,” Mr. McConnell said on the Senate floor. The extension, he added, also means “there’ll be no question they’ll have plenty of time” to use the reconciliation process to approve a long-term increase.

#### Pushing the plan takes time, energy, and political capital away from domestic legislation – big pharma and EU allies

Bhadrakumar 5/9 M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat. "Biden’s talk of vaccine IP waiver is political theater." Asia Times, May 9, 2021, asiatimes.com/2021/05/bidens-talk-of-vaccine-ip-waiver-is-political-theater.

On the other hand, Biden, whose political life of half a century was largely spent in the US Congress, is well aware of the awesome clout of the pharmaceutical companies in American politics. From that lobby’s perspective, the patent waiver “amounts to the expropriation of the property of the pharmaceutical companies whose innovation and financial investments made the development of Covid-19 vaccines possible in the first place,” as a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security puts it. The US pharmaceutical industry and congressional Republicans have already gone on the offensive blasting Biden’s announcement, saying it undermines incentives for American innovation. Besides, the argument goes, even with the patent waiver, vaccine manufacturing is a complex process and is not like simply flipping a switch. Senator Richard Burr, the top Republican on the US Senate Health Committee, denounced Biden’s decision. “Intellectual property protections are part of the reason we have these life-saving products,” he said. “Stripping these protections only ensures we won’t have the vaccines or treatments we need when the next pandemic occurs.” The Republican senators backed by Republican Study Committee chairman Jim Banks propose to introduce legislation to block the move. Clearly, Biden would rather spend his political capital on getting the necessary legislation through Congress to advance his domestic reform agenda rather than spend time and energy to take on the pharmaceutical industry to burnish his image as a good Samaritan on the world stage. Conceivably, Biden could be counting on the “text-based negotiations” at the WTO dragging on for months, if not years, without reaching anywhere. The US support for the waiver could even be a tactic to persuade pharmaceutical firms to back less drastic steps like sharing technology and expanding joint ventures to boost global production quickly. So far Covid-19 vaccines have been distributed primarily to the wealthy countries that developed them, while the pandemic sweeps through poorer ones such as India, and the real goal is, after all, expanded vaccine distribution. Biden is well aware that there will be huge opposition to the TRIPS waiver from the United States’ European allies as well. The British press has reported that the UK has been in closed-door talks at the World Trade Organization in recent months along with the likes of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Singapore, the European Union and the US, who all opposed the idea.

#### Package is sufficient, necessary, and the last opportunity to solve climate change – extinction

Leber 10/7 Leber, Rebecca. Rebecca Leber covers climate change for Vox. Before joining Vox, she was an environmental reporter at Mother Jones, where her investigations exposed government corruption and fossil fuel industry disinformation. She has worked as a staff writer at Grist, The New Republic, and ThinkProgress. A dozen more outlets have published her work over her decade as a climate journalist. "A last chance for US climate action: Democrats’ Build Back Better and infrastructure bills." Vox, 7 Oct. 2021, www.vox.com/22685920/democrats-infrastructure-build-back-better-climate-change.

The United States — the largest carbon polluter in history — is closer than it’s ever been to taking sweeping and lasting action on the climate crisis. The bad news is that if Democrats can’t pull it off, they may never get another opportunity like this — and the planet certainly won’t. Democratic leaders are trying to pass two major pieces of legislation — the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill and the up to $3.5 trillion Build Back Better Act — that they say can slash US pollution by up to 45 percent in the coming decade. In the outlined Build Back Better Act, Congress would flex its power to transform the electricity sector so that it runs on mostly clean energy, steer the transportation sector toward electric vehicles, and finally take action on methane pollution, one of the most harmful greenhouse gases. But there have been many recent moments when the precarious dealmaking in Congress seemed close to falling apart. One of the biggest sticking points has been with West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin, who has questioned the party’s approach to passing both bills simultaneously. “What’s the urgency that we have?” Manchin asked on CNN’s State of the Union in late September. In part because of Manchin’s opposition, even progressive leaders have begun to manage expectations, signaling the ultimate bill will be less ambitious. Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont suggested that the $3.5 trillion figure would see some “give and take.” The package is likely to shrink to $2.3 trillion or less, the New York Times reported on Wednesday. So what is the urgency? Democrats only have one year before midterm elections could take away their narrow majorities in the House and Senate. That would leave them powerless to pass any legislation without help from Republicans. At the same time, the planet faces a rapidly closing window to avert the worst catastrophes of global warming. Every fraction of a degree will translate into lives and livelihoods lost. The world can’t afford another decade of American inaction, and what Congress does next will help determine the future of the climate. A last chance for Democrats Historically, the president’s party loses seats in Congress in midterm elections. Next November, Democrats could lose their narrow control of Congress if they lose even one Senate seat or more than a few House seats. “The middle of that Venn diagram — when we have leaders who care about science and we still have that window of opportunity — is now,” said Lena Moffitt, campaign director at the climate advocacy group Evergreen Action. Democrats in Congress are also relying on a roughly once-a-year process, known as budget reconciliation, to try and push the Build Back Better Act through the Senate. Reconciliation allows them to pass a budget with a simple majority, instead of the 60 votes that are usually required in the Senate. There might not be time or political will to make a similar move in 2022. And some Democrats remain unwilling to eliminate the Senate filibuster, which is the other way they could pass progressive policies. In short, if the historical pattern holds, Democrats may not get another chance under President Biden — or even this decade — to take serious action on climate. Some Republicans have been hinting at taking climate change more seriously, but much of the party’s leadership continues to downplay and deny climate science. The next time the US has an opening like this, climate change will likely be dramatically worse — and that much harder to stop. A flooded street of shops at night reflecting the lights in the water. Hurricane Ida caused record flooding in New Jersey in September. Climate change is already intensifying extreme weather such as tropical storms and heat waves. Anadolu Agency via Getty Images The best chance for the global climate Climate scientists have warned that once the atmosphere warms more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, we will live in a drastically changed world. If countries, corporations, and individuals don’t take immediate action to reduce pollution, the world may hit that grim milestone in just 10 years. Over the long term, if the world continues on its current polluting path, the world will warm more than double that amount, risking catastrophes humanity has never had to confront. The window to chart a new course is rapidly closing. And the world’s “last, best chance” to take decisive collective action is less than a month away, as John Kerry, who serves as President Biden’s climate envoy, has said. In early November, world governments will gather in Glasgow for the United Nations climate conference, COP26. Following up on the Paris climate accord, countries will pledge more ambitious pollution targets and tackle the challenge of financing a worldwide transition to clean energy. The US bears the most responsibility of any country for global warming, having released 20 percent of the world’s greenhouse pollution since 1850. Today, the country ranks second in emissions behind China. But the US also has the power to magnify its impact if it leads by example, or if it flexes its influence on the global economic system, for example by affecting global prices of fossil fuels by ending government subsidies. Climate experts say progress at the COP26 conference depends on the United States proving it can do its part, for symbolic as well as practical reasons. This is the first year the US officially returns to global negotiations after former President Donald Trump withdrew the country from the Paris climate accord. Now, Biden has to lead by example by showing that the country can swiftly change direction for good, demonstrating progress on its national pledge of cutting emissions 50 to 52 percent by 2030. “There is this sense of exhaustion about how long is it going to take for one of the biggest emitters in the world to do its fair share,” said Rachel Cleetus, the clean energy policy director at the Union of Concerned Scientists. It’s unclear whether Congress will deliver on climate-change legislation by the time the international community meets in Glasgow. But any steps forward would send “a very important signal that can really help catalyze more ambition from other countries,” Cleetus said.

### 1NC – NC

#### 1 - Only the consequences of any action should be analyzed because [a] only they are measurable and verifiable [b] only consequences have an intrinsic impact on others such as harm or death.

#### 2 - The goodness of a consequence should be measured through hedonism because [a] everyone can feel the goodness of pleasure and badness of pain in some form [b] all other goods collapse to pleasure – eg freedom matters because it lets agents pursue their own ends but those ends matter to us because they terminate in some sort of desirable pleasure.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being.

#### Science proves non util ethics are impossible

Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University

(The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

#### Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util

Goodin, 1995 **(**Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

#### Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Pummer 15

(Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

## Underview

### NC – AT: Underview

#### They get 1ar theory but it’s not DTD- 1ar gets infinite prep time and first and last speech, abuse is self-imposed b/c they could always better develop the shell in the 1ar, over-punishment- reading theory cancels out the abuse, and no reason short speech means drop the debater- just get more efficient, short shells already force 2n split

#### Securitization creates value to life

Booth 5 [Ken, visiting researcher - US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22]

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life-determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to the extent their life choices and changes are taken away; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats – whether these are the lack of food for one’s children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming – the capacity to have some choice about living differently – consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is not synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security–and security is always relative –gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely surviving as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

## Framing

### NC: AT Civic Republicanism

#### 1. The AC framework can only be justified in terms of consequences- that means it collapses to direct utility calculation

#### 2. Non-domination collapses to non-interference- the subject that is non-dominated is free only because their nonbeing dominated is a way of ensuring that they will not be interfered with in the future

#### 3. Non-domination is absurd- you could live in a community where everyone’s life is regulated down to the tiniest detail but always in strict accordance with commonly-known, non-arbitrary rules and procedures

#### 4. “Non-arbitrary” is arbitrary- they have no way to explain how we consider power “arbitrary”

#### 5. Non-domination is incomplete

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[Charles. "A Critique of Philip Pettit's Republicanism." Philosophical Issues 11 (2001): 229-43. Accessed August 21, 2020. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3050602>]

Pettit's republican conception of freedom has many attractive features, some of which I have already indicated. It would unwise, however, to conclude that non-domination constitutes the true meaning of political freedom. A number of distinct values, none of them negligible, have taken the name of "freedom", and our concern ought to be, not to determine which of them captures freedom's essence, but to recognize the differences between these ideals, chart their connections, and figure out whether one of them is of greater importance than the others. Berlin himself saw things this way. He had no intention of arguing that negative liberty (as he understood it) forms the whole of freedom. His aim was to point out the difference between non-interference and self rule as well as to show that a single-minded devotion to the latter conception of freedom, pursued at the expense of the negative freedoms enshrined in individual rights, can have totalitarian consequences. In Berlin's eyes, the positive freedom involved in democratic self-government was also an important value, though one having chiefly an instrumental basis as the best means for protecting the rights of the individual.

I do not sense that the same spirit of value-pluralism informs Pettit's own examination of freedom. To be sure, freedom from domination represents an important value, and Pettit has shown how its contours differ significantly from those of non-interference and self-rule. He also has presented good reasons for attributing to this republican ideal a more fundamental role in our political thinking than the other two ideas of freedom. Pettit may well be right that democratic self-government draws its chief rationale from the need to abolish relations of domination, and that ceasing to live at the mercy of powerful individuals and interests is of far greater moment than simply living unobstructed by others. But freedom from interference is not nothing. Some laws, however just they may be (one need only think, for example, of tax codes), may require me to give up some of my freedom to do as I please which I may reasonably regret having to surrender, even if on balance I judge it to be for the best. Pettit seems often to suggest -- to my mind, wrongly -- that such freedom is not really a value at all.

#### 6. The framework is circular

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Pettit contends that determining the interests which state power can pursue on a non-arbitrary basis is a question which only the political deliberation of the citizens themselves can ultimately decide (Pettit 1997, pp. 56, 63). This position is no doubt attractive. But it gives rise in turn to a further question, namely, that of the principles which ought to govern this collective deliberation. In the absence of both institutional and normative structures that are already in place, debate will lead to no result, or the outcome will have no claim to being fair and just.

### NC – AT: Contention

#### Intellectual property is an inalienable personal right of economic use – reducing protections causes domination

**Pozzo 6** Pozzo, Riccardo. “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property.” Trans/Form/Ação, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 11–18., doi:10.1590/s0101-31732006000200002. SJ//DA recut SJKS recut Cookie JX

Corpus mysticum, opus mysticum, propriété incorporelle, proprietà letteraria, geistiges Eigentum. All these terms mean **intellectual property, the existence of which is intuitively clear because of the unbreakable bond that ties the work to its creator.** The book belongs to whomever has written it, the picture to whomever has painted it, the sculpture to whomever has sculpted it; and this independently from the number of exemplars of the book or of the work of art in their passages from owner to owner. The initial bond cannot change and it ensures the author authority on the work. Kant writes in section 31/II of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Why does unauthorized publishing, which strikes one even at first glance as unjust, still have an appearance of being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be reproduced (by someone in legitimate possession of a copy of it), so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse of the publisher to the public, which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate from the author to do so (praestatio operae), and this is a right against a person. The error consists in mistaking one of these rights for the other” (Kant, 1902, t.6, p.290). The corpus mysticum, **the work considered as an immaterial good, remains property of the author on behalf of the original right of its creation. The corpus mechanicum consists of the exemplars of the book or of the work of art. It becomes the property of whoever has bought the material object in which the work has been reproduced or expressed.** Seneca points out in De beneficiis (VII, 6) the difference between owning a thing and owning its use. He tells us that the bookseller Dorus had the habit of calling Cicero’s books his own, while there are people who claim books their own because they have written them and other people that do the same because they have bought them. Seneca concludes that the books can be correctly said to belong to both, for it is true they belong to both, but in a different way **The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other.** In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). **He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right.** In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to **intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name”** (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. **He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library.** In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use. In Publishing Considered anew, Reimarus considered on the contrary copyright in its patrimonial aspects as a limitation to free trade: “What would not happen were a universal protection against pirate publishing guaranteed? Monopoly and safer sales certainly do not procure convenient price; on the contrary, they are at the origin of great abuses. The only condition for convenient price is free-trade, and one cannot help noticing that upon the appearance of a private edition, publishers are forced to substantially lower the price of a book” (Reimarus, 1791a, pp.402-3). Reimarus admitted of being unable to argue in terms of justice. Justice was of no bearing, he said, for whom, like himself, considered undemonstrated the author’s permanent property of his work (herein supported by the legislative vacuum of those years). What mattered, he said, was equity. In sum, Reimarus anticipated today’s stance on free use by referring to the principle that public interest on knowledge ought to prevail on the author’s interest and to balance the copyright. Moreover, Reimarus extended his argument beyond the realm of literary production to embrace, among others, the today vital issue of pharmaceutical production on patented receipts. “Let us suppose that at some place a detailed description for the preparation of a good medicine or of any other useful thing be published, why may not somebody who lives in places that are far away from that one copy it to use it for his own profit and but must instead ask the original publisher for the issue of each exemplar?” (Reimarus, 1791b, t.2, pp.584). To sum up, Reimarus’s stance does not seem respondent to rule of law. For in all dubious case the general rule ought to prevail, fighting intellectual property with anti-monopolistic arguments in favor of free trade brings with itself consequences that are not tranquilizing also for the ones that are expected to apply the law. **By resetting literary texts, one could obviously expurgate some errors. More frequently, however, some were added, given the exclusively commercial objectives of the reprints. The valid principle was, thus, that reprints were less precise than original editions, but they were much cheaper for the simple reason that the pirate publisher had a merely moral obligation against the author and the original publisher. In fact, he was not held to pay any honorarium to the author upon handling over the manuscript, nor to paying him royalties, nor to pay anything to the original publisher. The** only expense in charge of the pirate publisher was buying the exemplar of the original edition out of which he was to make, as we say today, a free use.

#### Aff leads to rampant counterfeiting, which causes domination of consumers – both the cards in their contention say that safe access to meds and treating consumers matter

IPKey 21 (IP Key – Run by EUIPO and the European Commission to provide news coverage and scientific knowledge concerning intellectual property rights, “Intellectual Property and Keeping Medicines Safe”, https://ipkey.eu/en/south-east-asia/news/intellectual-property-and-keeping-medicines-safe, 2 February 2021, EmmieeM)

If you are what you eat, and bad diets lead to bad health, imagine what unsafe medicines can do.

We ask today, why the provenance of vaccines has attracted so much attention when the origin of medicines we take, in some cases, every day and without even thinking, is not questioned at all? How do we know we can trust medicines readily available on the market from seemingly legitimate sources? Where does intellectual property (IP) come into all of this and why is a proper IP application and registration process important?

The global race to develop vaccines to fight the spread of COVID-19 has understandably captured the attention of the public worldwide. People of all generations and with little or no expertise in clinical trials have followed the process keenly, wishing and willing together that science can provide the answer to stopping the pandemic so what was called ‘normal’ life can return. This public interest has also rightly scrutinised the testing that is designed to make sure that these vaccines are safe and this same focus is thankfully putting medicines under the spotlight more broadly.

When we talk about medicines, they are universally understood to mean a drug or other preparation for the treatment or prevention of a disease or illness. In essence, they serve to keep us feeling healthy, or make us feel better. But what about when they achieve the exact opposite, when they are in fact harmful, or even fatal? The cause is usually because of fake and counterfeit medicines. This is because something they both have in common is the lack of rigorous inspections by public authorities that seek to guarantee the safety of medicines for widespread use.

What’s more, the proliferation of both kinds of these illegal medicines is worsened by a critical fact. Previously, they used to mainly be related to ‘lifestyle’ medicines, but now, even innovative or critical life-saving medicines, such as medicines that tackle cardiovascular diseases, are being increasingly created and are entering the market without official IP application and registration processes.

But if they are both illegal and both cause harm, what’s the difference between fake and counterfeit medicines? Fake medicines pass themselves off as real, authorised medicines but they may actually contain ingredients that are of low quality or in the wrong dosage. Since they have not passed through the necessary evaluation of quality, safety and efficacy as required by authorisation procedures, they can be a major health threat. Counterfeit medicines, in contrast, are those medicines that do not comply with intellectual and industrial property rights, such as registered trade marks or patent rights. But it is important to stress, this is not just an IP issue. In the vast majority of cases (90%) they can also be harmful to a patient’s health, according to a study recently released by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on ‘Trade in Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Products’. The World Health Organization (WHO) also shared in the 2017 report, ‘WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring System for Substandard and Falsified Medical Products’, that the estimated number of children who may die from pneumonia each year after consuming counterfeit medicines is between 72 000 and 169 000.