# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – T

#### Interp: Topical affirmatives must only defend the implementation of a law that defends Resolved: the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the *topic* should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### “Appropriation of outer space” is exclusive and permanent

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13 quoting Smith 92, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### “Outer space means”

**Vereshchetin 06** [Vladlen, former Member of the ICJ, Chairman of the International Law Commission, and Professor of International Law] “Outer Space,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, <https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Outer_Space.pdf>, 2006 RE

A. Definition of the Term ‘Outer Space’

1 The term ‘outer space’, like several other basic notions of space law (‘outer space activity’, ‘space flight’, ‘space object’), although frequently used in space agreements and other space law instruments, has never been defined by them. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the objective difficulty for the States concerned to agree on legal definitions in the context of rapidly developing technology and their apprehension that legally binding definitions might restrict their sphere of operation.

2 The absence of a formal definition of outer space does not mean that no general perception exists as to what is meant by outer space, even if the use of the term in natural sciences and in law may not always be exactly the same. It should be remembered that there is no definitive physical boundary between atmospheric space and extra-atmospheric space, the transition from one to the other being gradual. Although at 100 km the density of the air is but one millionth of what it is at sea level, for natural scientists these two regions of space, in some respects, may be perceived as one single whole. However, with the launching of the first satellite in 1957 the notion of outer space became inextricably linked with the exploration and uses of space by means of man-made spacecraft (→ Spacecraft, Satellites, and Space Objects). The physical and technical factors are directly relevant to the legal regulation of the region of space concerned. The atmospheric space of the earth and most of the activities in this space fall within the ambit of → Air Law. The space beyond the atmosphere is governed by space law. The ‘spatial’ element of each of the two above-mentioned branches of law is reflected in their denominations: the first being known as air (ie atmospheric) law, the second as space law, often referred to as outer space (ie extra-atmospheric) law.

3 The legal regimes governing → airspace and outer space are fundamentally different. Thus, logically and jurisprudentially it is necessary to know where air space ends and outer space begins. In theory, there must be no ‘outer’ boundary of application of space law, since outer space itself is limitless, but in practice space law, keeping pace with the development of space technology, does not purport to regulate space activity beyond the solar system (see Art. 1 Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3]). At the same time, ‘celestial bodies’ of the solar system, other than the earth, but comprising the Moon, are included in the legal notion of outer space (→ Moon and Celestial Bodies). This follows from the title and text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ([signed 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967] 610 UNTS 205) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

#### Violation – they defend watching the world burn down

#### TVA- defend space appropriation as a tool of colonialism by which states can export antiqueer violence abroad – you can still include performance and the criticism. Disads to the TVA prove neg ground and no right to a perfect 1ac

#### Switch side debate – critiques of liberalism and performance can be read on the neg – solves dogmatism by testing different viewpoints

**Vote Neg – The resolution is the only common stasis point that anchors negative preparation. Allowing any aff deviation from the resolution is a moral hazard which justifies an infinite number of unpredictable arguments with thin ties to the resolution. Because debate is a competitive game, their interpretation incentivizes affirmatives to run further towards fringes and revert to truisms which are exceedingly difficult to negate—this asymmetry is compounded by their monopoly on preparation**

#### That outweighs – The competitive incentive from debate creates pressures for research and focused clash which generates important skills and makes debate a training ground for future work. The impact Successful movement organizing is analogous to mainstream politics – it requires skilled organization, negotiating relationships, strategic leadership, and proto-institutionalism – sacrificing debate as training ensures we never translate opinion into political power, but requiring the aff defend contestable positions linearly increases debate’s capacity for movement advocacy as they get more predictable

Han and Barnett-Loro 18 [Hahrie Han, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara. Carina Barnett-Loro, Climate Advocacy Lab, San Francisco. To Support a Stronger Climate Movement, Focus Research on Building Collective Power. December 19, 2018. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2018.00055/full]

Building public will to address the climate crisis requires more than shifting climate change opinion or engaging more people in activism (Raile et al., 2014). By many measures, the climate movement today is stronger than ever: more people taking actions, more financial resources, and deeper concern. Nonetheless, despite increasingly widespread popular demand for sensible climate solutions (Leiserowitz et al., 2017; Hestres and Nisbet, 2018) and broad organizational infrastructure to support climate activism across most Westernized democracies (Brulle, 2014), public will that translates into the political power needed to effect meaningful change has been elusive (McAdam, 2017). Even the 2014 and 2017 People's Climate Marches that drew hundreds of thousands to the streets, demonstrations in support of the Paris Climate Accords, and large-scale acts of civil disobedience in opposition to the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines have resulted in only short-lived campaign victories. Nearly 10 years after the failure to pass comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation at the federal level, experts largely agree there is “little hope” existing policies are sufficient to address the scale of the crisis (Keohane and Victor, 2011).

How can research help bridge the gap not only between opinion and action, but also between action and power? Many articles in this special edition examine the question of the conditions that make it more likely individuals will take action around climate issues. Indeed, the gap between opinion and action is well-known (Kahan and Carpenter, 2017), and burgeoning research in many fields of social science seeks to bridge it (Rickard et al., 2016; Doherty and Webler, 2016; Feldman and Hart, 2018). One of us works for the Climate Advocacy Lab, which supports field experimentation through direct funding and in-kind research assistance to build our collective understanding of the most effective strategies for moving people into action.

There is less attention, however, to the question of how those actions might translate into political influence. The challenge is this: in most cases, the null assumption is that activism becomes power at scale: that collective action is merely the sum of its parts, and the more people who take action, the more likely a movement is to achieve its goals. All things being equal, it is true that more is better (Madestam et al., 2013). Additional research, however, shows that for our stickiest social problems (like climate change), simply having more activists, money, or other resources is not sufficient to create and sustain the kind of large-scale change needed (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Canes-Wrone, 2015). Instead, we need a social movement that translates our actions into power. Social movements are a set of “actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” (Amenta et al., 2010). Instead of focusing only on resources, movements focus on power. Instead of focusing only on individual action, they focus on collective action. To become a source of power, collective action must be transformative.

How, then, do we build the kind of movements that generate the collective action necessary to shift existing power dynamics? For scholars, what research can help advocates understand how to translate individual actions into the powerful, and transformative collective action necessary to create change? To examine this question, we co-hosted a conference that brought social scientists together with climate advocates in the United States. At this convening, movement leaders argued that to better support building a robust climate movement, research should move beyond traditional public opinion, communications, messaging, and activism studies toward a greater focus on the strategic leadership and collective contexts that translate opinion and action into political power. This paper thus offers a framework, described in Table 1, for synthesizing existing research on movement-building and highlighting the places where additional research is needed. We hope this framework can help focus more future research on the collective, relational contexts and strategic leadership choices necessary to generate collective action that translates into power. In describing the framework, we draw on Slater and Gleason's (2012) typology to show what we know and do not know about supporting movement actors seeking to make more impactful choices.

Assessing the State of Research on Climate Movement Building

How do movement leaders translate supportive public opinion and grassroots activism into political influence? Answering this question rests on first understanding a few key points about social movements. First, movements operate in an environment of uncertainty. For the climate movement, everything from oil spills to hurricanes, domestic elections to international treaties, legal decisions, and market forces can affect the terrain they must navigate. Movement leaders cannot directly control many of these things. Second, policy change is not power. A given policy change will not automatically effect change in the world consistent with movement interests (Hacker, 2004). Moreover, policies can be easily overturned, as exemplified by the transition from Obama to Trump, and immediate rollback of key policies including the Clean Power Plan, restrictions on drilling and mining on public lands, and coal ash protections. To create lasting power, movements need broad constituencies that persist through the ups and downs and whims of different administrations. Third, there is no direct line from activism to power, because power is a dynamic relationship between movements and their targets. To wield power, movements use their resources to act on the interests of political decision-makers (Hansen, 1991). In fact, some research suggests the advocacy group resources most predictive of large-scale policy change are relationships with decision-makers—more so than lobbying money, campaign contributions, or the number of grassroots members (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Some argue that the climate movement's failure to build and sustain the kind of constituency that would pressure decision-makers contributed to the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in 2010 (Skocpol, 2013).

Given these three factors—persistent uncertainty, the need to focus on power not policy, and the complex interests of movement targets—what are the questions movement leaders need to answer to build a more effective climate movement? We argue that most research has focused either on documenting trends in the political environment in which movements work or on questions of how the movement can focus on building more of its resources (such as more supportive public opinion or more activists). Those questions are important. Particularly in today's uncertain, dynamic political environment, however, we also need research on strategy: how do movements create the leadership capacities and organizational (or “meso-level”) conditions needed to navigate uncertain political situations and shifting relationships, and thus translate resources to power?

Organizations that have successfully wielded power in other issue areas can be instructive in showing why understanding strategic leadership and meso-level, collective contexts matters. Consider the gun debate in the United States. Polls show strong public support for stricter regulation of guns, advocates like Michael Bloomberg have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the fight, and protests have brought millions of people into the streets for gun control. Nonetheless, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has been more effective in translating its activists and resources into political power. Why? First, leaders within the NRA undertook an intentional campaign to build an ardent constituency of gun owners that was willing to stand together, again and again, through ups and downs of any political fight, to support gun rights. As recently as the early 1970s, the NRA supported sensible gun regulations. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a group of hardline conservatives took control of leadership of the organization (Melzer, 2009). To build constituency, they used three key tactics: widespread benefits provided to gun owners from the national organization, strong appeals to identity, and a complex latticework of interpersonal relationships sustained at the local level (LaCombe, forthcoming). Second, leaders strategically leveraged this constituency to negotiate relationships with the Republican Party. The recurrent ability of leaders to deliver support from this constituency for policymakers became the basis through which the NRA built high-level relationships with elected officials and the Republican Party, thus cementing its hold over gun policy in the United States. By linking base-building with elite politics, the NRA transformed the political dynamics around gun rights.

#### Filter their impacts through predictable testability ---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

#### Fairness comes first

#### 1 – Fairness is necessary for useful debates—it lets the aff train with the heavy bats of prepared negative strategies which internal link turns their ability to advocate change outside of debate. It enables both teams to more effectively challenge injustice and support movements for change. If debate is key to their movement, their aff has to be debateable. Only we have advanced criteria about how you can weigh between relative proposals and determine debatability in the first place.

#### 2 – Unpredictability causes debaters to latch onto un-vetted ideals as political end-points—there are an infinite number of unintended pitfalls to the aff. A well-prepared negative is better able to identify those and nudge the aff towards improvement—this turns solvency.

### 1NC – K

#### The 1AC is a presentation sentimental politics which promises that empathetic identification will reshape not only debate, but the world and actualize an ethics of care. That produces pain as a prophylactic from our violence toward otherness reliant on an economy of victimization.

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(Lauren, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” *American Literature*, Vol. 70, No. 3, *No More Separate Spheres!* (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)

What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are trans- historical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence**.** Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

#### Instead, engage in an analysis of the 1ac in order to unsettle and dismember the violent assumptions of sovereignty that overdetermine the political. The solution to our problems is not “well we just haven't found the right kind of debate-centric activism to make everything ok”, but instead we should start with the question of why the 1ac, why debate activism at all?

#### Berlant and Edelman 14

(Lee, Professor of English at Tufts, Laura, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, “Sex, or the Unbearable,” Page vii-x, sr)

The following chapters approach the scene of relationality by focusing on the “negativity” that can make it so disturbing. Negativity for us refers to the psychic and social incoherences and divisions, conscious and unconscious alike, that trouble any totality or ¶ fixity of identity. It denotes, that is, the relentless force that unsettles the fantasy of sovereignty. But its effects, in our view, are not just negative, since negativity unleashes the energy that allows for the possibility of change. So too “nonsovereignty,” a term to which we’ll return, invokes the psychoanalytic notion of the subject’s constitutive division that keeps us, as subjects, from fully knowing or being in control of ourselves and that prompts our misrecognition of our own motives and desires. At the same time, nonsovereignty invokes a political idiom and tradition, broadly indicating questions of self-control, autonomy, and the constraints upon them. To encounter ourselves as nonsovereign, we suggest, is to encounter relationality itself, in the psychic, social, and political senses of the term. For that reason, this book attends to those moments when negativity disturbs the presumption of sovereignty by way of “an encounter,” specifically, an encounter with the estrangement and intimacy of being in relation. Sex is exemplary in the way it power- fully induces such encounters, but such encounters exceed those experiences we recognize as sex. ¶ These dialogues explore such encounters while simultaneously recording and performing one. It could be no other way. Relationality always includes a scenic component, a fantasmatic staging. It puts into play reaction, accommodation, transference, exchange, and the articulation of narratives. Just what an encounter entails, however, remains for us unresolved. As it must. For an encounter refers to an episode, an event, its fantasmatic scene, and the myriad misrecogni- tions that inform the encounter and define its limit. Our various ways of theorizing such encounters with relation shape our different views of the political and affective consequences of social embeddedness. We are constantly asking, What do our distinctive responses to each other and our cases tell us about the structural conditions that pro- duce the encounter with nonsovereignty in the first place? ¶ Though the negativity inseparable from the sexual encounter comes to the fore most insistently in the final chapter of this book, it makes itself felt repeatedly in the dialogues that follow. For en- counter in all its ambiguity shapes the experience of sex, giving rise to various forms of response, including, as the first two chapters suggest, optimism and reparativity. We wonder throughout these dialogues whether it is possible to endure the experience of rela- ¶ tion in the absence of optimism for bearing or surmounting what overwhelms us in ourselves and in each other. Is optimism, in fact, invariably at work in negativity? Or, conversely, is optimism a dis- avowal of what’s unbearable in negativity? Do we even mean the same thing by optimism? This book attempts to hold such ques- tions steadily in view. Even where we disagree with each other in the ways that we address them, though, we proceed together through the breaks and divisions that enable conversation, politics, and the creation of new social forms. ¶ Sex, or the Unbearable is thus an experiment in the forms of theo- retical production. It proceeds from the belief that dialogue may permit a powerful approach to negativity, since dialogue has some of the risk and excitement we confront in the intimate encounter. Not for nothing does the oed list “communication” and “conver- sation” as the primary meanings of intercourse. In its dialogic struc- ture, then, this book takes shape as collaboration, argument, and exploration at once. It belongs to an experimental genre in which theory, politics, and close textual analysis encounter the pedagogical necessity of responding to the provocations of otherness. Dialogue commits us to grappling with negativity, nonsovereignty, and social relation not only as abstract concepts but also as the substance and condition of our responses—and our responsibilities— to each other. ¶ Reimagining forms of relation entails imagining new genres of experience. These chapters try to extend the generic contours of theoretical writing by making exchange, dialogic give-and-take, a genuine form of encounter. By that we mean that throughout this book we try to attend not only to what we can readily agree upon but also to what remains opaque or unpersuasive about the other’s ideas, what threatens to block or stymie us. Resistance, miscon- struction, frustration, anxiety, becoming defensive, feeling mis- understood: we see these as central to our engagement with each other and to our ways of confronting the challenge of negativity and encounter. Far from construing such responses as failures in the coherence or economy of our dialogues, we consider them indis- pensable to our efforts to think relationality. An academic culture in the United States still dominated by the privilege of the monograph only rarely affords occasions for critics to converse with each other ¶ in print. That may reflect conversation’s low place in the hierarchy of literary genres. Structurally determined by interruption, shifts in perspective, metonymic displacements, and the giving up of con- trol, conversation complicates the prestige of autonomy and the fic- tion of authorial sovereignty by introducing the unpredictability of moving in relation to another. One never can know in advance to what one’s interlocutor will respond or what turns the conversa- tion may take through the associations of a single word. We are aware that what we’re saying here sounds a lot like what we say about sex—and that, of course, is the point. As the book proceeds, the structural resonances among sex, politics, and theory become ever more insistently the focus of our analysis.

### 1NC – DA

#### Russia’s international ambitions are low now due to space sector failures. AFP 19

AFP 5/28/19 (Agence France-Presse - international news agency headquartered in Paris, “Moscow, we have a problem: theft plagues Russia’s space sector,” https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3012088/moscow-we-have-problem-theft-plagues-russias-space)

With millions of dollars missing and officials in prison or fleeing the country, Russia’s space sector is at the heart of a staggering embezzlement scheme that has dampened ambitions of recovering its Soviet-era greatness. For years, Moscow has tried to fix the industry that was a source of immense pride in the USSR. While it has bounced back from its post-Soviet collapse and once again become a major world player, the Russian space sector has recently suffered a series of humiliating failures. And now, massive corruption scandals at state space agency Roscosmos have eclipsed its plans to launch new rockets and lunar stations. “Billions (of roubles) are being stolen there, billions,” Alexander Bastrykin, the powerful head of Russia’s Investigative Committee – Russia’s equivalent of the FBI – said in mid-May. Investigations into corruption at Roscosmos have been ongoing “for around five years and there is no end in sight,” he added. In the latest controversy, a senior space official appears to have fled Russia during an audit of the research centre he headed. Yury Yaskin, the director of the Research Institute of Space Instrumentation, left Russia for a European country in April where he announced his resignation, the Kommersant paper reported. He feared the discovery of malpractice during an inspection of the institute, according to the newspaper’s sources. Roscosmos confirmed that Yaskin had resigned but did not clarify why. His Moscow institute is involved in developing the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS designed to compete with the American GPS system. Corruption has particularly affected Russia’s two most important space projects of the decade: GLONASS and the construction of the country’s showpiece cosmodrome Vostochny, built to relieve Moscow’s dependence on Baikonur in ex-Soviet Kazakhstan. Almost all major companies in the sector, including rocket builders Khrunichev and Progress, have been hit by financial scandals that have sometimes led to prison sentences for large-scale fraud. Russia’s Audit Chamber, a parliamentary body of financial control, estimated that 760 billion roubles (around US$11.7 million) was misappropriated from Roscosmos in 2017, or nearly 40 per cent of the total misappropriated from the entire economy that year. Roscosmos said that “eradicating corruption” is one of its “primary goals”, adding that it regularly cooperates with investigations by the authorities. In mid-April, President Vladimir Putin stressed the need to “progressively resolve the obvious problems that slow down the development of the rocket-space sector.” “The time and financial frameworks to realise space projects are often unjustified,” the Russian leader Rebooting the space sector is a matter of prestige for the Kremlin. It symbolises its renewed pride and ability to be a major global power, especially in the context of increased tensions with the United States.

#### Space cooperation with the U.S. boosts Russia’s diplomatic leverage and international prestige

Juul 19 (Peter - senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, “Trump’s Space Force Gets the Final Frontier All Wrong,” 3/20/19, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/trumps-space-force-gets-the-final-frontier-all-wrong/>)

But funding isn’t everything, and in the new geopolitical context, democracy must be seen to work effectively. When it comes to space exploration, that means ratcheting back U.S. space cooperation with Russia as well as forgoing any equally intimate cooperation with China and its secretive space agency. The fact that the head of Russia’s space agency remains under U.S. sanctions for his role in Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine illustrates the hazards involved in working with autocracies in space. Deep cooperation with autocratic powers in space gives autocracies a major point of diplomatic leverage over the United States, and more generally allows them to poach unearned international prestige by working on goals set and largely carried out by the United States. In today’s world, there’s no reason for the United States to give Russia or China this sort of standing by association.

#### Increased international prestige lays the foundation for Russian territorial expansion and foreign policy aggression

Gurganus 19 (Julia - nonresident scholar with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Eugene Rumer - senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, “Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective,” 2/20/19, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067)

. Elsewhere, long-term conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, or the unfinished business of post-conflict reconstruction, such as in the Balkans, have presented Russia with opportunities to insert itself and create new facts on the ground. In the United States and Europe, growing political divisions, the proliferation of information providers, and popular frustration with governing elites in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis have exposed targets for Russian interference. Russian agents did not cause these long-term conflicts or cleavages inside Western societies, but they have used them to advance their goals, which vary depending on the circumstances. In many instances, the Kremlin has relied on a diverse toolkit that creates the appearance of operating one step removed from the Russian government (through a range of actors including state-owned corporations such as Rosatom and Rosneft, private security companies such as the Wagner Group, organized crime syndicates, hackers, and information operation organizations such as the Internet Research Agency). Western perceptions of post-Soviet Russia have been heavily affected by the country’s economic and political implosion and foreign policy retreat during the 1990s. Against that backdrop, the ambition and dynamism of Russian foreign policy since Putin’s 2012 return to the presidency appears to be a relatively new phenomenon. It isn’t. Moscow’s post-2012 foreign policy fits comfortably in the long-standing historical and intellectual tradition of Soviet and even pre-Soviet Russian foreign policy. THE TROIKA OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY Contemporary Russian foreign policy displays the unmistakable presence of three centuries-old drivers of Moscow’s posture on the world stage. Chief among these drivers is Russia’s quest for strategic depth and secure buffers against external threats, which, considering the country’s geography and absence of natural protective barriers between it and neighboring powers, has guided its geographic expansion. Along with physical insecurity and expansion, the second key driver of Russian foreign policy has been its ambition for recognition as a great power, which the Kremlin has long seen as necessary for legitimizing its geographic conquests and geopolitical ambitions. The third driver, related to the first two, is Russia’s complicated relationship with the West, which combines rivalry with the need for cooperation. These recurrent themes are important. They highlight the degree to which Russian foreign policy in the Putin era is a continuation of many pursuits that are, by turns, decades- and centuries-old and were embraced by previous Russian governments regardless of their political persuasion. The historical record also performs an important legitimizing function for the citizens of the Russian state, which is less than three decades old, cementing the state’s claim to be the heir to a long, illustrious tradition dating back centuries. References to this tradition thus legitimize the Putin government’s ambitious overseas pursuits and present them as a matter of historical continuity and as an integral part of what Russia is. GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGIC DEPTH It is hard to overestimate the role of geography as a driver behind Russia’s foreign policy. The Russian state and its security policy have been shaped by the absence of natural geographic barriers—oceans, rivers, or mountains.2 Geography has shaped Russian identity and its rulers’ understanding of security throughout the entire existence of the Russian state. Throughout the centuries, contemporary Russia, the Soviet Union, imperial Russia, and the principality of Muscovy have all faced the challenge of securing a vast stretch of territory from neighbors perceived to be hostile to the west, south, and east. To secure its territory, the Russian state acquired more territory, which, in turn, had to be secured from ever-present external threats of one kind or another. In the words of historian Stephen Kotkin, “Whatever the original causes behind early Russian expansionism—much of which was unplanned—many in the country’s political class came to believe over time that only further expansion could secure the earlier acquisitions. Russian security has thus traditionally been partly predicated on moving outward, in the name of preempting external attack.”3 The loss of territory, as was the case after the two great dislocations Russia experienced in the twentieth century—first after the 1917 revolution and the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and later after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union—resulted in a profound sense of Russian insecurity and a renewed quest to regain strategic depth. Regaining that depth was the key task of the Soviet government as soon as the country began to recover from the trauma of the revolution and the civil war, and again after Moscow regained a measure of strength after the collapse of the 1990s. GREAT POWER AMBITIONS The quest for recognition as a great power has been both the result of Russia’s geographic expansion and its driver. Geographic expanse was and is, in the eyes of Russian leaders, central to their claim to recognition as a great power. Such recognition, in turn, has been needed to lend a veneer of legitimacy to territorial conquests. Perhaps precisely because they have had to struggle repeatedly for such recognition, Russia’s rulers have been particularly sensitive to any suggestion that Russia does not belong in the ranks of major powers. In the mid-nineteenth century, Russian historian and writer Nikolay Danilevsky complained about Russia’s unfair treatment by Europe, which had turned a blind eye to Prussian and Austrian aggression against Denmark following the annexation of two Danish provinces yet criticized Russia’s efforts to protect the rights of its coreligionists in “barbaric” Turkey.4 Danilevsky’s complaint was, in effect, a precursor of Putin’s lament about the West’s double standards in dealing with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the severing of Kosovo from Serbia.5 For the leaders of the independent Russia that emerged from the Soviet collapse, the Soviet and Russian imperial legacy appeared to serve as both an inspiration and a justification for their claim to great power status. They found ample philosophical rationales for their claim. In the words of noted Russian political philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, empire and great power status constitute the essence of Russian identity even when the country is experiencing challenges and setbacks, in large part because of its spiritual and material wealth.6 As early as 1993, the official Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation included, among other foreign policy priorities, the objectives of “furthering integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States” and ensuring Russia’s active role on the world stage as a “great power.”7 With Primakov’s rise to the helm of the Russian foreign policy establishment in 1996, great power ambitions again became the Kremlin’s driving force. In his first news conference as foreign minister, Primakov said, “Despite the present difficulties, Russia was and is a great power and its foreign policy should correspond with that.”8 Putin embraced this vision when he became president in 2000, and it has served as a cornerstone of his leadership ever since. Of particular importance to the Putin government has been the military record of the Russian state and its numerous conquests. Putin issued a presidential order in 2012 reconstituting the Russian Military-Historical Society.9 Long-serving Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky has been an active patron of the society as well. The expansion of the Russian state by force of arms—including numerous victories over Poland, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and Central Asia—make up an integral part of the foundational narrative of the contemporary Russian state. This narrative is reinforced by a sprawling state propaganda apparatus, official government activities, and educational curricula. Several historical events are featured prominently in this narrative. Russia’s defeat of Napoleon has been treated as a uniquely important event because of its significance to the European order in the nineteenth century, as well as for being an accomplishment that cemented Russia’s status as a great power. The victory over Nazi Germany in World War II is treated as the crowning achievement of the Soviet state, which saved not just the Soviet Union and Europe but the whole world from fascism. This triumph presently makes up the most important part of Russia’s national narrative. As a whole, this legacy provides both the justification and the motivation for Russia to pursue its ambitions not just around its vast periphery but well beyond its shores. UNEASY RELATIONS WITH THE WEST Moscow’s uneasy relationship with the West for centuries has been one of the most prominent features of its foreign policy. On the one hand—from Peter the Great’s founding of the new Russian capital on the Baltic shores to Catherine the Great’s engagement with leading European Enlightenment thinkers of the day, Czar Alexander I’s securing Russia’s place in the circle of major European powers to Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of the Soviet Union’s hold on Eastern Europe—Russia long has been an integral part of Europe and its political and security fabric. On the other hand, throughout Russian history since the time of Peter the Great, Russian elites, political thinkers, and cultural figures have questioned Russia’s European choice and relationship with Europe. In a more recent and very telling sign of that ambivalence, Foreign Minister Lavrov wrote in 2016 that, over the centuries, Russia has seen itself as part of Europe and the West, as better than the West, as different and unique from the West, and as representing a crucial link between the East and the West.10 The biggest obstacle that has kept Russia from having a closer and more stable relationship with Europe, according to Lavrov, has been Europe’s inability or unwillingness to simply let Russia be Russia, and its insistence on having Moscow conform to European norms—something that no Russian leader or the people of Russia would ever accept. Moscow’s claim to great power status has derived from its victories in the West, against Napoleon and Hitler. But Russia’s biggest setbacks too have been delivered by the West—in the Crimean War and in the Cold War—and these setbacks remain the biggest drivers of Moscow’s security and defense policy.11 As was the case during the Cold War, Russian policy toward the West has long had an important ideological dimension. During the Soviet era, the ideological competition was between Soviet communism and democratic capitalism. After a relatively brief period when Russia attempted to join the West, Moscow has embraced an overtly anti-Western ideology. Communism has been replaced by a mix of nationalist, authoritarian, and state-capitalist ideas as an alternative to the West’s notion of liberal democratic capitalism. The concept of Russia as a besieged fortress facing hostile Western designs and influences is a key tool the regime uses to mobilize the political support of Russian elites and ordinary citizens alike. OLD HABITS DON’T DIE In addition to a legacy of complicated geopolitics, great power ambitions, and a difficult relationship with the West, the new Russian state has inherited from its Soviet predecessor a time-tested foreign policy toolkit. While some elements of this toolkit fell into disuse early in the post-Soviet period when Russia was struggling with a series of domestic crises, these tools have been taken up again by the country’s foreign policy and national security establishment as Moscow has returned to the world stage as an increasingly assertive actor. George Kennan wrote in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”: . . . the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry . . . and it can afford to be patient. These precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities . . . Its [the Soviet Union’s] political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. . . . The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.12 Russian foreign policy in the Putin era fits Kennan’s description from more than half a century ago. The Kremlin’s approach has involved the relatively low-cost, limited use of military force in combination with other nonmilitary instruments of national power. Information operations, propaganda and disinformation, cyber operations, trade embargoes, and a vast array of other tools have been integrated into what has become commonly known as hybrid warfare. The current policy discussions in Western capitals often create the impression that Moscow has come up with a fundamentally new toolkit. In reality, an extensive reliance on such tools has long been a feature of Russian domestic politics and foreign policy.

#### Russian territorial expansion causes nuclear war with the U.S. and NATO

O’Hanlon 19 (Michael – PhD from Princeton in Public and International Affairs and currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, “The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes,” p. 34-37, 4/30/19, Dartmouth Libraries)

As such, the United States and NATO partners would undoubtedly feel intense pressure, at the first sign of visible preparations for attack by Russia, to disable Russia’s surveillance and command and control capabilities and to preempt any missiles or aircraft or submarines before they could get within range of the target. That could, of course, entail direct attacks against airfields, ports, and other facilities on Russian soil, not just those that happened to be directly involved in the Baltic state occupation. In other words, NATO might strike first, rather than leave itself vulnerable to ambush. In light of the alliance’s consensus decision-making procedures, that possibility seems unlikely—but it must also be remembered that this scenario is premised on a situation in which Russian forces occupy at least a small swath of NATO territory, so certain thresholds would already have been crossed by enemy action. Regardless, the stage would be set for an extremely dangerous dynamic. If any initial conventional engagements went against its interests, Russia might also consider limited nuclear employment options. Indeed, some of its strategists currently entertain an “escalate to de-escalate” concept that would attempt to intimidate NATO allies into reversing their plans. Russia might detonate a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere to create a powerful nuclear-induced electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could prove lethal to air defense radars, military communications systems, and much civilian infrastructure over a region many hundreds of kilometers in radius. A Russian EMP burst using a high-altitude nuclear weapon would be an extremely provocative and risky move, to be sure.57 But some Russian leaders could argue that it was not strictly speaking a nuclear attack, since no humans would be killed by the direct explosive effects of such a weapon—and thus might delude themselves into thinking it was a relatively low-risk option. In fact, the risks could be very high. Some types of EMP attacks (or even cyberattacks) by Russia could disable large chunks of the U.S. or European electricity grids for many months.58 A severe attack of this type might even lead to a U.S. nuclear response, in light of the new nuclear doctrine of the Trump administration.59 Beyond the EMP option, Russia could use nuclear weapons directly against ships that carried military equipment, missile defense radars, or other capabilities. Indeed, it threatened to target nuclear missiles at any Danish ships joining the U.S.-led missile defense effort in 2015. Again, the provocation would be enormous—but the direct human stakes might be fairly limited, since only dozens of sailors, or at most a couple hundred, might be on a given naval vessel.60 Moscow might, perhaps delusionally, think the risks were acceptable. Of course, there would be enormous significance and risk to crossing the nuclear threshold in any way. But if weapons were used against isolated military targets (as both sides contemplated in various ways during the Cold War), Moscow again might convince itself, rightly or wrongly, that escalation risks could be tolerated and managed. That might be particularly true for attacks limited to the kinds of target sets that posed disproportionate vulnerability and dependence for NATO. These could include cargo ships at sea, rail marshaling yards where train tracks change gauge (necessitating unloading and reloading) at the Poland-Lithuania border, or particularly weak bridges without nearby alternative routes.61 If Russia could limit NATO fatalities to hundreds of sailors and not itself present any target sets that were characterized by a similar combination of relatively high military importance and relatively great separation from vulnerable civilian populations, NATO might not have a good recourse. Moscow might hope as much, at least—and so elect to roll the dice. Such a decision would be reckless and foolish, but perhaps not beyond the pale of how human beings have behaved historically in wars they felt they were otherwise likely to lose. The Outcome of the Scenario: Toward a Net Assessment With all these factors in motion, how would this kind of conflict likely play out? A NATO military response to the postulated Russian aggression seems very likely. Perhaps evidence of its preparations to move forces into position to defend its ally and liberate its territory from Russian occupation would be enough to catalyze a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. If not, however, the stage would be set for the possible eruption of World War III. Russia might try to impede a deployment through cyber-, space, and other such attacks, which would likely only slow the deployment, not stop it. Thus escalation could easily result.62 Once shots were fired, NATO would be unlikely to back down. Not every nation would necessarily send significant military forces, to be sure, but some key countries would probably remain resolute. Much more likely than acceptance of defeat would be a redoubled commitment to complete the mission—and, if Russian nuclear weapons had been used by that point, even in a limited attack, to respond in kind. Put differently, if Russia did choose to try to physically prevent the deployment of large forces into eastern NATO territory in likely preparation for a counterattack, there would be two possibilities. If that attempt failed, a showdown in the east on land would still loom. If it succeeded, NATO would then face a momentous decision: accept defeat, or reinforce dramatically with conventional forces (perhaps after a period of repairing damage and building more equipment and weaponry, depending on how many losses it had already suffered), or escalate to the nuclear level. In situations of this sort, the parties to the conflict might find themselves living scenarios like those that nuclear theorists pondered throughout the Cold War. They could be engaged in behavior that Thomas Schelling might have described as “the threat that leaves something to chance” or that Herman Kahn might have placed on the lower rungs of a nuclear escalation ladder that reached potentially to all-out war.63 American planners saw these kinds of escalatory ladders and options as ideas that might serve U.S. interests; thus it would not be too surprising to see Russian planners invoke them now.64 And whatever the dangers during the deployment phase, they would snowball during any actual maneuver warfare in eastern Europe. For example, it is entirely imaginable that an operation designed to liberate a Baltic state from a Russian occupation would trespass onto Russian territory to cut off supply lines and possible reinforcements.65 Moscow may or may not simply take NATO’s word that it has no designs on the country’s government. In other words, it might even fear that NATO’s counteroffensive could aspire to regime change in Russia. It may or may not have a clear picture of the kind of attack it is experiencing, as command and control systems would be compromised in the course of conventional battle, quite possibly including those systems commonly used for nuclear weapons.66 I conclude that, for a hypothetical conflict occurring sometime in the near future, enough uncertainties exist to make the outcome of the war somewhat unpredictable. One cannot simply assert that NATO’s numerous advantages guarantee a victory. The Baltics’ exposed geographic location, NATO’s limited means of deploying reinforcements to the region reliably, Russia’s options in domains ranging from cyberspace to outer space, and the possible use of nuclear weapons even in just a limited, tactical role make it uncertain that NATO could confidently expect victory despite collectively outspending Russia by more than ten to one in the military arena. For example, it is not clear that the United States could safely send most of its major ocean transport vessels to ports of debarkation and unload supplies there in the face of a conventional military threat. And if it lost a substantial fraction of its top-line supplies and ships to Russian attacks in its first attempt, the United States might need time to prepare for a second effort, which might then have to begin further west in Europe where disembarking and marshaling of forces could be carried out more safely, before those forces gradually made their way eastward. NATO would probably win such a conventional war, but it could take many months or even years. And even then, the deep uncertainties associated with possible nuclear escalation make it unclear whether victory could even be meaningful. Few would say that a few thousand square kilometers of Baltic territory logically warrant nuclear risks. But human beings are not always logical. Nuclear brinkmanship over a limited-war scenario in eastern Europe would not be unthinkable, based on what we know of history and human nature. And if nuclear weapons were ever used, even in small numbers at first, all bets are off as to where and how the conflict would end.

#### Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

## Case

### 1NC – Framing

#### Body politics is bad -

#### 1] Authenticity testing – it’s actively violent to force debaters to put their identities on the line for ballots – it leads to forced outing and authenticity competitions where your personal life becomes ground for the other team – that makes debate violent, hostile, and disincentivizes participation which turns their arguments and marginalizes minority debaters – err heavily aff because we shouldn’t have to prove that some debaters have embodied politics they don’t want to share, because doing that would defeat the purpose – this is an independent reason to vote aff even if we lose everything else

#### 2] It’s bad politics – debaters in high school obviously don’t have an immediate influence on politics – BUT, in simulating federal action, we get the comparative and political skills to advocate change – that’s all our stuff from framework – cross apply it here – if we win that debating plans is good, then we win this argument because their arg trades off with that focus in favor of personalized testimonials that lead nowhere

#### AT: Limits – their interp explodes limits

#### AT: Marginalized Voices DA – anyone can choose to discuss their identity on the aff, and discussing grounded activism on the neg solves inclusion of voices by minorities

#### AT: “Basic Politics” – this is nonsense and there’s no warrant for serial policy failure – engaging broader political discussions is critical to create inclusive innovations in the public sphere

#### Empathy DA – we should be able to talk about people outside of our immediate subject positions – forcing the aff to focus on their lived experience forecloses the development of inter-community empathy because it mandates a prioritization on one’s personal identity and experiences over others – empathy is good – it’s necessary to create inclusive spaces and ethical subjects

### 1NC – Case

#### Collective institutional effort is key to change public consciousness – fights in the LGBT community have created measurable change

James Esseks 15, The Daily Beast, "How to Win the Fight for Trans Rights", 2015, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/23/how-to-win-the-fight-for-trans-rights.html

This loss, and this resurgence of hate, is a reminder of how much is left to do on transgender rights. To move forward, we need to change the way America understands transgender people. The LGBT movement’s experience on the marriage issue can be a guide, at least in part, for how we can win this fight, too.¶ In the movement for transgender equality, just as for marriage equality, changing public opinion is the ultimate goal. We must create the environment in which meaningful policy change can take hold.¶ We won the freedom to marry because our collective work, over the course of decades, changed how America thought about same-sex couples. We started from a place where anti-gay stereotypes dominated any public discussion about gay people. People said we were pedophiles. They said that we didn’t have committed relationships like straight people do, that we were only focused on sex, and that we literally had no love in our lives. All of those stereotypes were reasons that, for decades, marriage was an impossible achievement, even something that we were advised not to ask for.¶ But the LGBT movement changed all of that. The first step was getting the country to talk about gay people and marriage. We did that by forcing the topic onto the front pages of the newspapers by daring to sue over it, then advocating in legislatures, and often having to fight against regressive ballot initiatives at the polls. Even when we lost—and we lost a lot for many years—we were in the media. We were on the country’s agenda.¶ Having earned the country’s attention, we needed to find ways to show everyone the reality of the lives of same-sex couples, rather than the negative stereotypes to which the country was addicted. We focused on the love and commitment at the center of our relationships and broke down anti-gay stereotypes little by little. We built consensus throughout the country by spreading those stories about love.¶ After we changed people’s opinions and squashed the unfounded fears that gay parents would harm kids, we started to win the fight for marriage based on the opposite concern, that not allowing same-sex couples to marry would be bad for their kids. The new framing, of course, had been true all along—the stability and economic protections that can come with marriage can indeed help the couple’s children.¶ When we ultimately won marriage equality in the courts, we were making exactly the same arguments that had lost in the courts a few years prior. What changed was neither the soundness of arguments nor the persuasiveness of our advocacy, but rather the shift in public understanding of who gay people are.¶ Educating America can have the same kind of transformative effect on the movement for transgender rights and LGBT non-discrimination protections that it had on the fight for marriage. Houston has shown just how much America doesn’t understand about transgender people, just how in the sway of anti-trans stereotypes much of the country still is. And that’s what we need to change.¶ The good news is that America is now engaged in an intensive remedial course about transgender people. The American conversation about transgender people is light years ahead of where it was even at the start of this decade. Caitlyn Jenner and Laverne Cox have become household names. Of course, the reality is that transgender people have been a part of the LGBT movement from the start and have been fighting for decades, but hadn’t made it to living room televisions and dinner table conversations all across the country until very recently.¶ And we’ve seen significant advocacy for transgender rights focused not only on addressing the many pressing problems faced by transgender people, but at explaining to the country what transgender people’s lives are like. For instance, the U.S. Department of Education recently found that a suburban Chicago school district engaged in unlawful discrimination by barring a high school girl from the girls’ locker room just because she is transgender.¶ The ruling takes an enlightened, compassionate position on equality for transgender youth and sets an example for the rest of the country about how all transgender people should be treated. And that case, as well as many others, has opened the eyes of countless people all across the country about how difficult it is to be transgender in America.¶ We need more of that. We need everyone to understand that transgender people are our neighbors, our bankers, our pilots, our waitresses, our doctors. Transgender people are human beings who want and deserve to live a safe life free from discrimination. We need people to care about transgender people and the staggering rates of suicide, harassment, and violence they face.¶ It’s this education that is going to help us pass the non-discrimination laws we need and that’s going to help us

protect those laws from repeal at the ballot box. It’s the education that’s going to enable courts to rule with compassion in cases about the rights of trans people. And it’s ultimately the education that is going to win the soft spot in America’s heart for the transgender Americans who are currently suffering so much.