### 1

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust and may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of the resolution – violation is preemptive – if they just wanna gain offense from the fiated consequences of their implemented advocacy, the shell goes away

#### Private entity is defined by

Cornell Law n.d. “private entity” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501> TG

1. In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space and appropriation

OST 66 “2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1499th plenary meeting, Dec 19, 1966, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html> TG

ARTICLE II. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – post facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months and locks us into a predictable null set of monolithic criticisms that are susceptible to the perm. Fairness is an impact –

#### a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity which they’ve ceded validity to by participating,

#### b] probability – individual ballots can’t alter subjectivity even if long term clash over a season can, but they can rectify skews which means the only immediate impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins,

#### c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 3] TVA – their aff but not extra T

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

#### Reject definitions not read in the 1AC – allows them to hide infinite arguments and gives them more than 6 minutes

#### No Arbitrary roles of the ballot- the judge should vote for the side that produces the best material consequences. A] Anything else moots 6 minutes of AC and lets the neg choose a self-serving starting point for discussion. B]– playing the game key to effective resistance strategies

### 1NC

#### NASA is preserving resources by leveraging private partnerships

Miriam **Kramer 21**, author of Space, “NASA's plans for the future hinge on the success of private companies,” Axios, 12-7-2021, https://www.axios.com/nasa-private-spaceflight-plans-5a5710e6-5223-4da3-8c5d-5a712e1d862e.html

The private space players who will drive NASA's plans for the coming decade are declaring themselves and defining the stakes. Why it matters: NASA plans to focus on getting people to Mars and the Moon, and its deep space exploration **ambitions hinge on the agency** **being able to successfully hand over major operations in low-Earth orbit to private companies.** The space agency hopes companies will build private space stations that its astronauts can use and to continue to buy space on private rockets for launching its satellites and other payloads to orbit and beyond. NASA's "big experiment" right now is to test where these commercial partnerships work, the Planetary Society's Casey Dreier told Axios. What's happening: Last week, NASA announced it would award multimillion-dollar contracts to three teams of commercial space companies to start designing and building privately operated space stations.

#### Plan forces spending trade-offs that crush effective Earth sciences --- risks catastrophic climate change

**Haymet 7** (Tony, Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography – University of California, San Diego, Mark Abbott, Dean of the College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Science – Oregon State University, and Jim Luyten, Acting Director – Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, “The Planet NASA Needs to Explore”, Washington Post, 5-10, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/AR2007050902451.html](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve))

Decades ago, a shift in NASA priorities sidelined progress in human space exploration. As momentum gathers to reinvigorate human space missions to the moon and Mars, we risk hurting ourselves, and Earth, in the long run. Our planet -- not the moon or Mars -- is under significant threat from the consequences of rapid climate change. Yet the **changing NASA priorities will threaten exploration** here **at home**.

NASA not only launches shuttles and builds space stations, it also builds and operates our nation's satellites that observe and monitor the Earth. These satellites collect crucial global data on winds, ice and oceans. They help us forecast hurricanes, track the loss of Arctic sea ice and the rise of sea levels, and understand and prepare for climate changes.

NASA's budget for science missions has declined 30 percent in the past six years, and that trend is expected to continue. As more dollars are **reallocated** to prepare for missions back to the moon and Mars, sophisticated new satellites to observe the Earth will be **delayed, harming Earth sciences.**

The National Academy of Sciences has noted that the Landsat satellite system, which takes important measurements of global vegetation, is in its fourth decade of operation and could fail without a clear plan for continuation. The same is true for the QuikSCAT satellite, which provides critical wind data used in forecasting hurricanes and El Niño effects.

In January, a partnership of university and NASA scientists demonstrated that climate change and higher ocean temperatures were reducing the growth of microscopic plants and animals at the heart of the marine food web.

Their analysis was based on nearly a decade of NASA satellite measurements of ocean color, which unfortunately are at risk of being interrupted for several years.

Sea levels are rising, and the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free in summer. The buildup of carbon dioxide in the oceans threatens to make them more acidic, which may in turn hinder the ability of some types of marine life, including corals, to build their shells and skeletons. **We must learn** as much as we can **to assess** these **threats and develop solutions.**

Satellites provide coverage of vast, remote regions of our planet that would otherwise remain unseen, especially the oceans, which play an important role in climate change. Without accurate data on such fundamentals as sea surface height, temperatures and biomass, as well as glacier heights and snowpack thickness, we will not be able to understand the likelihood of dangers such as more severe hurricanes along the Gulf Coast or more frequent forest fires in the Pacific Northwest.

Climate change is the **most critical problem** the Earth has ever faced.

Government agencies and the private sector, as well as individual citizens, need to better grasp the risks and potential paths of global climate change. Mitigating these risks and preparing for the effects of warming will require scientific understanding of how our complex planet operates, how it is changing, and how that change will affect the environment and human society.

John F. Kennedy's brilliant call to put a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s set an arbitrary deadline, but the deadline we face today is set by nature. NASA must continue to play a vital role in helping find ways to protect our planet for (and perhaps from) its intelligent life. Exploration of space is a noble quest. But we can't afford to be so starry-eyed that we overlook our own planet.

#### Warming is inevitable but adjusting government policy can address the worst effects – specifically, for sea level rise. US responses are modeled globally.

**Economist 17**, "How government policy exacerbates hurricanes like Harvey," Economist, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21727898-if-global-warming-were-not-enough-threat-poor-planning-and-unwise-subsidies-make-floods

THE extent of the devastation will become clear only when the floodwater recedes, leaving ruined cars, filthy mud-choked houses and the bloated corpses of the drowned. But as we went to press, with the rain pounding South Texas for the sixth day, Hurricane Harvey had already set records as America’s **most severe deluge** (see Briefing). In Houston it drenched Harris County in over 4.5trn litres of water in just 100 hours—enough rainfall to cover an eight-year-old child. The fate of America’s fourth-largest city holds the world’s attention, but it is hardly alone. In India, Bangladesh and Nepal, at least 1,200 people have died and millions have been left homeless by this year’s monsoon floods. Last month torrential rains caused a mudslide in Sierra Leone that killed over 1,000—though the exact toll will never be known. Around the world, governments are grappling with the threat from floods. This will **ultimately** be about **dealing with climate change**. Just as important, is **correcting short-sighted government policy** and the perverse incentives that make flooding worse. Judgment day The overwhelming good news is that storms and flooding have caused far fewer deaths in recent decades, thanks to better **warning systems** and the construction of **levees, ditches and shelters**. The cyclone that struck Bangladesh in 1970 killed 300,000-500,000 people; the most recent severe one, in 2007, killed 4,234. The bad news is that storms and floods still account for almost three-quarters of weather-related disasters, and they are becoming more common. According to the Munich Re, a reinsurer, their number around the world has increased from about 200 in 1980 to over 600 last year. Harvey was the third “500-year” storm to strike Houston since 1979. At the same time, floods and storms are also becoming more **costly**. By one estimate, three times as many people were living in houses threatened by hurricanes in 2010 as in 1970, and the number is expected to grow as still more people move to coastal cities. The UN reckons that, in the 20 years to 2015, storms and floods caused $1.7trn of destruction; the World Health Organisation estimates that, in real terms, the global cost of hurricane damage is rising by 6% a year. Flood losses in Europe are predicted to increase fivefold by 2050. One cause is **global warming**. The frequency and severity of hurricanes vary naturally—America has seen unusually few in the past decade. Yet the **underlying global trend** is what you would expect from climate change. Warmer seas **evaporate faster** and warmer air can hold more **water vapour**, which releases energy when it condenses inside a weather system, feeding the **violence of storms** and the **intensity of deluges**. Rising **sea levels**, predicted to be especially marked in the Gulf of Mexico, **exacerbate storm surges**, adding to the **flooding**. **Harvey** was unusually devastating because it suddenly gained strength before it made landfall on Friday; it then **stayed put**, dumping its rain on Houston before returning to the Gulf. Again, that is consistent with models of a **warmer world**. **Poor planning** bears **even more blame**. Houston, which has almost no restrictions on **land-use**, is an extreme example of what can go wrong. Although a light touch has enabled developers to cater to the city’s rapid growth—1.8m extra inhabitants since 2000—it has also led to concrete being laid over vast areas of coastal prairie that used to absorb the rain. According to the Texas Tribune and ProPublica, a charity that finances investigative journalism, since 2010 Harris County has allowed more than 8,600 buildings to be put up inside 100-year floodplains, where floods have a 1% chance of occurring in any year. Developers are supposed to build ponds to hold run-off water that would have soaked into undeveloped land, but the rules are poorly enforced. Because the maps are not kept up to date, properties supposedly outside the 100-year floodplain are being **flooded repeatedly**. **Government failure adds to the harm**. Developing countries are underinsured against natural disasters. Swiss Re, a reinsurer, says that of the $50bn or so of losses to floods, cyclones and other disasters in Asia in 2014, only 8% were covered. The Bank of International Settlements calculates that the worst natural catastrophes typically permanently lower the afflicted country’s GDP by almost 2%. America has the opposite problem—the federal government subsidises the insurance premiums of vulnerable houses. The National Flood Insurance Programme (NFIP) has been forced to borrow because it fails to charge enough to cover its risk of losses. Underpricing encourages the building of new houses and discourages existing owners from renovating or moving out. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, houses that repeatedly flood account for 1% of NFIP’s properties but 25-30% of its claims. Five states, Texas among them, have more than 10,000 such households and, nationwide, their number has been going up by around 5,000 each year. Insurance is meant to provide a signal about risk; in this case, it stifles it. Mend the roof while the sun shines What to do? Flooding strengthens the case for **minimising climate change**, which threatens to make wet places wetter and storms stormier. Even those who doubt the science would do well to see action as an **insurance policy** that pays out if the case is proven. However, that **will not happen fast**, **even if all countries**, **including America**, **sign up to international agreements.** More immediately, therefore, politicians can **learn from Houston**. Cities need to protect **flood defences** and **catchment areas**, such as the **wetlands around Kolkata** and the **lakes in and around Pokhara in Nepal**, whose **value is becoming clear**. Flood maps need to be up to date. Civil engineers, often starved of funds and strangled by bureaucracy, should be **building and reinforcing levees and reservoirs now**, before it is too late. The NFIP should start to charge market premiums and developing countries should sell catastrophe bonds. All this is a **test of government**, of **foresight** and the ability to withstand the lobbying of homeowners and developers. But politicians and officials who **fail the test** need to realise that, sooner or later, they will **wake up to a Hurricane** Harvey **of their own**.

#### The impact’s global war

Eric **Holthaus 15**, editor at rollingstone magazine citing James Hansen, former NASA climatologist, "The Point of No Return: Climate Change Nightmares Are Here," Rolling Stone, accessed 10-23-2016, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-point-of-no-return-climate-change-nightmares-are-already-here-20150805

On July 20th, James Hansen, the former NASA climatologist who brought climate change to the public's attention in the summer of 1988, issued a bombshell: He and a team of climate scientists had identified a newly important feedback mechanism off the coast of Antarctica that suggests mean sea levels could rise 10 times faster than previously predicted: 10 feet by 2065. The authors included this chilling warning: If emissions aren't cut, "We conclude that multi-meter **sea-level rise** would become **practically unavoidable**. **Social disruption** and **economic consequences** of such large sea-level rise could be **devastating**. It is not difficult to imagine that conflicts arising from **forced migrations** and **economic collapse** might make the planet **ungovernable**, **threatening the fabric of civilization."**

## k

#### Rejection of the specific details of political engagement is not radical – it continues the prevailing mode of leftist cynicism that eviscerates alternatives to existing state power

Burgum 15 (Samuel, PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Warwick and has been conducting research with Occupy London since 2012, “The branding of the left: between spectacle and passivity in an era of cynicism,” *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 19, Issue 3)

Rather than the Situationist spectacle, then, I argue that the reason those on the left are rendered post-politically impotent to bring about change is not because we are deceived, but because we enact apathy despite ourselves. In other words, the relationship between the resistive subject and ideology is not one of false consciousness, but one of cynicism: we are not misdirected by shallow spectacles, but instead somehow distracted by our cynical belief that we are being “distracted”. In this section, I begin by outlining the concept of cynicism as it has been theorised by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. This then leads us to an analysis of the cynical position adopted by Brand’s critics, which I argue actually demonstrates more political problems on the part of the left than those suggested by Brand himself.¶ For Sloterdijk, cynicism is an attitude that emerges right at the centre of the enlightenment project, where, in contrast to a modernist illumination of truth, “a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence” (1987, p. 22). Rather than the promised heightened consciousness of science that would allow us to see the hidden essential truths behind appearances, the very conception of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia)3 instead creates a widespread mistrust and suspicion of every appearance. Subsequently, “a new form of realism bursts forth, a form that is driven by the fear of becoming deceived or overpowered … everything that appears to us could be a deceptive manoeuvre of an overpowering evil enemy” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 330). The surface becomes suspect and the subject therefore retreats from all appearances: judging them to be spectacles that are seeking to oppress through falsity. The result is cynicism.¶ Subsequently, this leads Sloterdijk to his well-known paradoxical definition of cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” which he describes as a “modernized, unhappy consciousness on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain … it has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, probably was not able to, put them into practice” (1987, p. 5). In other words, in the search for a higher consciousness behind appearances, the subject is paradoxically “duped” by their very suspicion of being duped. Furthermore, because the subject thinks they “know” that appearances are just a mask, they disbelieve the truth when it does appear. Like the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, they fancy themselves to know what is right in front of their eyes (that the emperor is nude and vulnerable) yet they choose “not to know” and don’t act upon it (they still act as if the emperor is all-powerful). As such,¶ cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular hidden interest hidden behind the ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. (Žižek, 1989, p. 23)¶ The audience to the parade of power can see that the emperor is not divine – just a fragile human body like the rest of us – yet they cynically choose not to know and objectively retain his aura. They congratulate themselves on “knowing” that Brand is a trivial spectacle, yet they choose to remain apathetic towards his calls for action.¶ As such, the dismissive reaction to Brand reveals a regressive interpassive tendency of the left to subjectively treat ourselves as “enlightened” to authentic politics and yet objectively render ourselves passive. In a kind of defence mechanism, the left believes that it¶ can avoid becoming the dupe of the latest fashion or advertising trend by treating everything as a matter of fashion and advertising, reassuring ourselves as we flip through television channels or browse through the shopping mall that at least we know what’s really going on. (Stanley, 2007, p. 399)¶ The critics disbelieve Brand, distrusting his motives and seeing him as inauthentic, yet they continue to “believe” objectively in their own marginalisation. As such, the cynical left believe they are dismissing shallow spectacle in the direction of a stronger authentic radicalism, yet what their “doing believes” is the maintenance of their apathetic position. More precisely, it maintains the attitudes of left melancholy and anti-populism.¶ The problem of “left melancholy” points towards the forever-delayed search for authenticity on the part of a cynical left that is in mourning. Coined by Walter Benjamin (1998), the concept points towards “the revolutionary who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present” (Brown, 1999, p. 19). Suffering from a history of defeat and embarrassment, the left persist in a narcissistic identification with failure, fetishising the “good old days” and remaining faithful to lost causes. As Benjamin himself points out, the cynical kernel of this attitude is clear, as “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge … but in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its consumption in order to redeem them” (1998, p. 157). In other words, the sentiment is a deliberate self-sabotage that takes place even before politics proper has a chance to begin or “the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (Žižek, 2001, p. 146).¶ This then leads us to the second problem of leftist cynicism: anti-populism. As a result of melancholia, the left has developed the bad habit of prejudging all instances of popular radical expression (such as Brand’s) as necessarily flawed. However, to return to Dean again, she points out that this aversion to being popular and successful is a defining feature of a contemporary left, who prefer to adopt an “authentic” underdog position in advance than take risks towards political power. As she argues, “we” on the left see “ourselves” as “always morally correct but never politically responsible” (Dean, 2009, p. 6) prepositioned as righteous victims and proud political losers from the outset. What this cynicism towards instances of popular radicalism ultimately means, therefore, is that any concern for authenticity is ultimately a regressive one, a defence mechanism for a left that “as long as it sees itself as defeated victims, can refrain from having to admit is short on ideas” (Dean, 2009, p. 5). Such an attitude means never risking potential failure and residing in the safety of marginal righteousness.¶ It is the contention here, therefore, that both melancholia and anti-populism can be seen in the cynical reaction to Brand’s radicalism. Somewhat ironically, Brand (2013) even recognised these problems himself when he wrote in his *New Statesman* piece that¶ the right seeks converts while the left seeks traitors … this moral superiority that is peculiar to the left is a great impediment towards momentum … for an ideology that is defined by inclusiveness, socialism has become in practice quite exclusive.¶ Automatically, then, the left denounce Brand and self-proclaimed “radical left-wing thinkers and organisers” bitterly complain how he is getting so much attention for the arguments they have been making for years (for example, Park & Nastasia, 2013). The left maintain distance and label Brand trivial, yet such a distance only renders these critiques even more marginal and prevents them from becoming popular, effective or counter-hegemonic.¶ As Žižek has pointed out, the political issue of cynicism is “not that people ‘do not know what they want’ but rather that cynical resignation prevents them from acting upon it, with the result that a weird gap opens up between what people think and how they act”, adding that “today’s post-political silent majority is not stupid, but it is cynical and resigned” (2011, p. 390). In terms of Brand, this blanket cynical melancholy is typical of the left’s distrust of anything popular, rendering them “like the last men” whose “immediate reaction to idealism is mocking cynicism” (Winlow & Hall, 2012, p. 13). Proponents of a radical alternative immediately adopt caution with the effect of forever delaying change, holding out for that real and authentic (unbranded) struggle and therefore denying it indefinitely.

#### Capitalism causes extinction – only the alt can fight back

Escalante 19. Alyson, “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge.” 9/8/2019. [https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge](https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/), DKP

Part 4: For Science, For Victory So, why does all this matter? What is at stake in an attempt to outline the Marxist Epistemology? The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction. Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition. The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry. The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world. The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat. The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight. Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win. There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### The alternative is communist organizing. The question is not about degrees of shared concern, but the direction of our political energies

Thomas 13. Peter Thomas is a Lecturer in History of Political thought at Brunel University @ London [“The Communist Hypothesis and the Question of Organization,” 2013, *Theory and Event 16*, URL: muse.jhu.edu/article/530491]//vikas

The Communist Hypothesis The debate on the ‘Idea of Communism’ that emerged in 2008 following Alain Badiou’s analysis of the electoral victory of Sarkozy, drawing upon a longer history of vindications of communism over the last 30 years, was quickly greeted with enthusiasm by prominent theorists from a wide range of leftist political traditions. **This discussion** also **seems to have stimulated a renewal of the energy and engagement that had marked the most creative dimensions of** the **alternative globalization and anti-war movements** straddling the millennium. After the impasses those movements confronted in what was sometimes seen as an ‘interregnum’ at the beginning of the global economic crisis, the affirmation of the ‘Idea of Communism’ – or perhaps even more so, **the** more precise notion of a **‘Communist Hypothesis’** – **offered the possibility of** a renewed **collective** research project into the viable forms of contemporary political struggle. Unexpectedly and audaciously, **the** positive **programme of communism**, and not simply negative resistance to capitalist crisis, **became the horizon within which we could comprehend and meet the challenges of the present.** As an ideological intervention, the merits of this discussion are remarkable: it has given rise to a wide ranging international discussion of the notion of communism that did not occur even at the height of the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, still struggling against the overdeteminations of the new world order rhetoric of the 1990s. What still remains more difficult to ascertain, however, is the nature of these discussions’ relationship to the organizational debates that have emerged in the wake of Occupy, international anti-austerity protests and the ‘actually existing’ revolutionary movements of our times. Some important contemporary theorists have argued that the discussion of the idea of communism should keep a distance from immediate organizational questions. In particular, Badiou has strongly resisted the notion that the affirmation of communism should necessarily be accompanied by a renewed consideration of the role of the political party, as decisive agent of that idea’s realization, which he instead regards as an historically superseded instantiation of ‘communist invariants’ that are today searching for a new mode of historical existence. By far the most widespread response, however, has been the proposal that **a coherent investigation of the meaning of communism today necessarily requires a** reconsideration of the nature of political power, of political organization, and, above all, of the party-form. Žižek, for instance, has long argued that a politics without the party is nothing more than a form of ‘politics without politics.’ More recently, Jodi Dean has emphasized that the reproposition of the party-form is the horizon within which the debate on communism can become intelligible to itself. Far from the caricature of homogenous or ‘totalitarian’ unity, Dean argues that **the party** – and the Leninist party in particular – **should be understood as constituting a** ‘vehicle for maintaining **a specific gap of desire, the** collective desire **for collectivity**’ (Dean 2012, 207). She further argues that **such a dynamic has already been evident** in the achievements of Occupy, whatever the ‘anti-verticalist’ claims sometimes made on its behalf. In a related vein, Jan Rehmann (2013) has argued that the nascent counter-hegemonic dimensions of Occupy, alongside regroupment processes on the European left, have prepared the ground for a serious reproposal of the question of the mass political party. In particular, Rehmann argues that **a renewal of the party will involve experimentation in new party forms**, **including** notions such as those of a ‘mosaic left’ (Urban 2009) or **a ‘connective party’** (Porcaro 2012). These are positions close to those advocated by one of the original proponents of the debate on communism, the sadly departed Daniel Bensaïd, who repeatedly argued over many years that **the concept of the party remains central to any coherent reflection on the nature and form of politics in the contemporary world**, whether or not the word ‘party’ itself is used to describe those processes of unification, coordination and decision. For Bensaïd, it is the specificity of the overdetermined field of political relations and its irreducibility to the social that continually reproposes the question of the party-form – not as a solution, but as a problem that each upsurge of social and political struggle involving diverging and sometimes conflicting component elements inevitably confronts. This constitutive tension generates the need for continuous interpretative and analytical labor, in the attempt to discover the party-form adequate to the specificity of the social movements to which it gives expression, at the same time as it transforms them by translating their demands into the distinctive register of politics (Bensaïd 2002, 112 et sq). Above all, however, it has been practical experience of the contradictory processes of left regroupment on an international scale – **from reconfigurations over the last decade on the Latin American left**, **to** the varying success of coalition parties in Europe such as **Die Linke in Germany, Izquierda Unida in Spain, Syriza in Greece and the Front de Gauche in France**, **to** the tentative emergence of new political **formations across North Africa and the Arab world** – **that has firmly placed the question of the party back on the contemporary agenda.** **The communist horizon** thus now **confronts its own horizon of intelligibility** not simply in a discussion of the party-form, but in the dialectical relation between such theoretical debates and the organizational innovations of the real movements of today, to paraphrase the now oft-quoted words of the German Ideology, that aim to abolish **the** present state **of affairs** (MECW 5, 49). The Horizon of the Party-Form In this text, I want to explore some of the consequences of the notion of a communist hypothesis in relation to these organizational debates, and in particular, to the emerging debate regarding the adequate party-form for radical politics today. First, I will argue that the sometimes obscure organizational implications of the generic affirmation of communism become clearer when we situate this discussion historically, as a transposition and continuation ‘by philosophical means’ of some of the central debates of the alternative globalization movement. For despite the exaggerated claims to novelty of both friend and foe alike, **the debate on communism did not emerge from nowhere**. Rather, I argue that it should be understood as representing the displacement into a theoretical register of central themes of the previous sequences of struggles against the ‘new world order’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the same way, the **new movements that have fortuitously coincided with the debate on communism** – student movements across North America and Europe from 2009 onwards, the global wave of Occupy, the ongoing Arab revolutions and growing anti-austerity movements around the world throughout 2012 – **represent not a return or rebirth of history, but its revenge.** They should be understood as **expressions of the accumulation, displacement and transformation of tendencies from the previous cycle of mass struggles that that have been** surreptitiously **burrowing away**, like Marx’s old mole, under the surface of what we can now see was only an apparent and decidedly temporary pacification of the ‘interregnum’ of the middle years of the last decade. The ‘spontaneous rediscovery’ by the moment of Occupy of the aporiai that plagued the alternative globalization and anti-war movements, however, indicate a substantial continuity of unresolved problems across the different conjunctures of the ebbs and floods of the social and political movements of the last 15 years. **As a formalized response and proposed resolution to some of these themes**, **the** discussion of communism can help **to** clarify **both the** strengths and limits **of these debates**, particularly those that are still strongly operative in the post-Occupy conjuncture. Second, I then aim to explore some significant models of organization that emerged in previous periods in which the renewal of communist politics was closely linked to attempts to rethink the party-form. For from the Manifesto of the Communist Party onwards, communism, as word, idea and hypothesis, has always been inseparably tied to the forms of political organization necessary for its realization: in the terms of the classical Marxist debates, the ‘question of organization’ [die Organisationsfrage]. The models that I will consider are, first, the notion of the ‘compositional party’ derived from the experience of Italian operaismo, recently – and perhaps surprisingly – reproposed in Hardt and Negri’s Commonwealth; second, **the conceptualization of the party as a ‘laboratory’ in which a unitary ‘political subject’ could be forged**, theorized most coherently in the work of the early Lukács; and third, Gramsci’s call for the formation of a ‘modern Prince’ as a harnessing of the inherent conflictuality of political modernity in a constituent party-form. Each of these models can be regarded as a mirror in which we can see reflected some of the challenges of the organizational questions that have marked both the alternative globalization movement and the rebellions and revolts of today. Hardt and Negri’s notion of a compositional party composed of ‘insurrectional intersections’ of irreducible singularities responds to the problem of thinking the party-form in a period of the proliferation of demands and movements grounded in diverse experiences of capitalist exploitation and oppression. Lukács’s proposal of the party as a laboratory for the forging of a totalizing political subject poses the question of the party-form as one of the unification and coordination of political initiatives. Both of these models, I will argue, ultimately **confront the limitations of a political formalism**, **which runs the risk of invoking a political party-form as the resolution of** the **contradictions of** the **social practices that are** thereby **interpellated** as its subaltern content. **Gramsci’s** modern Prince, on the other hand, **integrates both compositional and totalizing dimensions**, **while avoiding the temptation of a formalistic resolution of the contradictions that are the necessary preconditions** – and enduring challenge – **of political organization.** Rather than the elimination of difference, the assertion of identity **or** the **dominance of political form over social content**, the modern Prince represents the outlines of **a party-form that would be** capable of valorizing contradiction and conflict, harnessing them **as the motor of** its totalizing **development**. In these sense, the modern Prince can be understood as **a proposal for a type of ‘expansive’ party-form that might be able to respond productively to the challenges of contemporary movements.**

## Case

### fw

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1. Only util respects equality by giving the same weight to all- side constraints unduly favor those *directly harmed*. They also freeze actions since states *always violate some rights*, have no unified intention, and all actions have some non-zero risk of violating a side-constraint.

#### 3. Degrees of wrongness- if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, it’s *not as bad* as breaking a promise to take a *dying person* to the hospital- only consequences explain why the second one is *much worse* than the first.

#### 4. Disregarding material violence is a form of abstraction that reifies concrete structures of domination; moral absolutism is epistemically suspect and justifies complicity in oppression- threats to security preclude the *moral idealism* presupposed by other theories and life is a prerequisite to their impacts.

#### 5. Extinction outweighs *under any framework*- moral uncertainty and future gens.

**Pummer 15** — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World,” Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of **disagreement** in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is **at least one thing** it is **reasonable** to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is **very important** to **reduce the risk** that **all intelligent beings** on this planet are **eliminated by an enormous catastrophe**, such as a **nuclear war**. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the **happiness** or **well-being** of possible future people is **just as important** as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how **reducing existential risk** is **easily the most important thing in the whole world**. This is for the familiar reason that there are **so many people** who could exist in the future – there are **trillions upon trillions**… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that **reducing existential risk** is **arguably the most important thing** in the world, **even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people**. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live **very long** and **very high quality lives**. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is **not the view that the latter don’t matter**. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics** must be concerned in part with **promoting the good**, from an **impartial point of view**. They’d thus imply very **strong reasons to reduce existential risk**, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account **moral uncertainty**. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among **minimally plausible ethical views** that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also **deontologists**, **virtue ethicists**, and **sophisticated egoists** should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were **90% sure** that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have **pretty strong reason**, from the standpoint of **moral uncertainty**, to **reduce existential risk**. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the **most important thing in the world**. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be **acting very wrongly**.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)