**1**

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should implement and publicly articulate a cross-domain deterrence doctrine that threatens, in response to attacks on U.S. space assets:

#### -- retaliation against land- air- and sea-based C3ISR and RSTA\* assets

#### -- retaliation designed to undermine the protected national information spaces of adversaries.

#### The United States federal government should publicly support an international norm against any use of force in space.

\*C3ISR = command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; RSTA = reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and attack

#### The CP’s doctrine eliminates adversary incentives to strike U.S. space assets---framing retaliation as automatic means it’s not perceived as escalatory. Solves the case.

King Mallory 18, Senior Researcher at the RAND Corporation, 2018, “New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence,” <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE259/RAND_PE259.pdf>

Enablers: Of all the domains of military operations examined in this paper, the contributors toward successful deterrence identified in the classic texts appear to be least present in space. China demonstrated an ability to attack U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) and in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Beijing demonstrated its ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations with U.S. satellites, in 2016. Russia demonstrated similar capabilities in 2015 and 2016.40 Both China and Russia have thus made it clear that they have the capability to carry out and may be contemplating crippling blows on U.S. space-based assets at the outset of a conflict. Because of their potentially devastating impact, the United States might be forced to take strong countermeasures in reaction to such attacks. Given this fact, a strike on U.S. space-based assets at the outset of a crisis may betray a high appetite for risk on the part of U.S. opponents. An opponent with a high appetite for risk is more difficult to deter.41

Types of deterrence: Because the balance of power in space is being challenged by Russia and China with the implicit threat of a first strike, general deterrence in space can be said to be low, even if the threat of opponent attack is not imminent. As it has demonstrated its own ability to shoot down satellites in LEO, the United States has a medium-level capability for immediate deterrence in space. This capability is not high because the United States does not appear to be able to shoot down GEO satellites or satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO). Because potential aggressors depend less on space for warfighting than the United States does, opportunities for direct deterrence appear to be low.42 As the United States is currently hard pressed to defend its own satellites, let alone those of others, opportunities for extended deterrence in space seem limited as well.43

Surprise: Given the lift required to get to GEO (where such U.S. crown jewels as the Space-Based Infrared System and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Nuclear Command and Control [NC2] satellites are located), it is unlikely that strategic surprise can be achieved by launching a sneak attack on these assets. The infrared signature accompanying the launch of a missile fired for this purpose would probably be detected, and the missile’s trajectory could then be mapped. The same is not true of air-launched antisatellite (ASAT) attacks on objects in LEO or of attacks by maneuverable exo-atmospheric kill vehicles launched before the outbreak of a conflict. Because it can retaliate against LEO satellites, the United States’ ability to avoid tactical surprise is not low, even if opponent GEO and HEO satellites may remain out of reach.

Technology: In space, the attacker-to-target ratio refers to the number of ASAT weapons required to kill an opponent satellite. Strategic slack refers to the availability of a reserve satellite stockpile and of a capacity to surge launch such replacement satellites. In space, both the attacker-to-target ratio and strategic slack appear to be low: A single ASAT shot can take out a high-degree vertex in the network of U.S. military satellites. Stocks of replacement satellites, substitute capabilities, and surge launch capacity do not appear to be high.

Doctrine: Although the United States has of late made it clear that it will retaliate against attacks in space, the type and severity of attack that would elicit a response have not been specified, nor has the kind of response that would ensue. There is thus no fully articulated and widely disseminated strategy for deterring attacks in space. The United States has not formally laid out strong “red lines” for deterrence in space that might shape future norms for acceptable behavior by spacefaring nations. U.S. deterrent strategy in space therefore lacks both salience and clarity.44 Due to the fact that U.S. statements concerning intervention thresholds remain fuzzy, the credibility and reputation of U.S. declaratory deterrence policy in space must be judged to be low.

It might be argued that, on its own, the objective fact that core U.S. interests are at stake in space will deter opponents from a first strike, regardless of U.S. doctrine. However, the United States (1) depends on space-based assets for modern warfighting capabilities, (2) has failed to demonstrate its ability to continue to function with degraded support from space, and (3) has failed to identify ensuing retaliatory punishment significant enough to eliminate opponents’ considerable incentive to carry out a first strike. Arguably, in the absence of clarity and an indication of political will about the kinds of retaliation that an aggressor may expect to encounter from the United States, a sober-minded aggressor may therefore objectively conclude that the short-term advantages and benefits expected from attacking U.S. space-based assets outweigh the expected costs.

One way of looking at the threat to U.S. and allied military satellites is to disaggregate those platforms’ functions and to examine which ones are most susceptible to attack and which forms of attack are most effective. Figure 3 compares functions of satellites (communication, reconnaissance, targeting, assistance in navigation, surveillance, and NC2) against various methods or targets of attack (dazzling of satellites with lasers, attempts to jam transmissions, creating fields of debris in space that might damage satellites, permanently blinding satellites with lasers, destroying satellites with various types of kill vehicles, and disabling or destroying one or more of the space-based components of the U.S. nuclear kill chain).45 The check marks indicate that the method of attack would apply to the function. The black lines are notional escalation thresholds below or to the right of which the forms of attack or the military satellite function put at risk by such an attack might be important enough to warrant a military response.46 The matrix gives a rough indication of the activities and actors of potentially greatest concern in the bottom-right quadrant and suggests that satellite surveillance and targeting functions and the kinetic destruction and jamming of satellites may be the greatest threats faced in space.

In-domain deterrence: In-domain deterrence of attacks in space might be achieved by denying the opponent the benefits sought. The wartime pooling of allied commercial and military satellite services is a form of denial that could be used to expand extended deterrence to space. Over a period of 15 to 20 years, the future topology of the United States’ network of military satellites might be shaped more proactively than it has been to date. The goal would be to create a connected network in which information flows efficiently. A connected network will decay gracefully under attack, thereby remediating the significant current risk that the network of U.S. military satellites will fail catastrophically when subjected to directed attack.47 Combining this reshaping of the network with a more even distribution of capabilities across satellites and a surge launch capacity (reducing the probability of tactical surprise) might make the space domain a contributor to crisis stability, rather than a detractor from it.48 In space, in-domain deterrence by the threat of punishment might include a counterattack on the aggressor’s military satellites. A capability to attack opponent satellites in HEO and GEO would boost the credibility of such a threat. An alternative approach might be an international collective security agreement that considers an attack on one ally’s military satellite systems an attack on all. The aggressor would face the prospect of collective retaliation.

Cross-domain deterrence: As in the Cold War, U.S. and allied armed forces can also deter attacks in space through patterns of annual exercise and training behavior that demonstrate to potential aggressors that they are increasingly able to function with degraded support from space. Disaggregation of the functions carried out by satellites of the kind shown in Figure 3 allows nonstrategic functions for which there are air-, land- or seaborne substitutes to be identified with a view to off-loading some share of those functions from U.S. military satellites in the future. Exercises and the off-loading of noncritical communications functions from satellites onto a connected Pacific Ocean seabed fiber optic network are both examples of cross-domain deterrence by the threat of denial.49

Cross-domain deterrence by threat of punishment consists of retaliation designed to achieve a countervailing impact or effect in other domains equivalent to the one that the aggressor intended to achieve by attacking the deterrer in space. Kinetic or nonkinetic attacks on adversary command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) and reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and attack (RSTA) assets in the land, air, and sea domains are ways of blinding the aggressor and disorganizing its command and control. Such attacks would have an effect on the aggressor similar to that intended by an attack on U.S. space-based assets. Kinetic attacks of this kind would cause loss of life and would likely be considered escalatory by opponents. It is, however, in the U.S. national interest to increase the likelihood that adversaries conclude that retaliation of this kind is inevitable and therefore not intended to be escalatory. Doctrine and exercises could impress this point upon adversaries. In a turnaround play, cross-domain punishment might also be achieved by threatening to attack adversary infrastructure in the land and cyber domains that is designed to ensure regime survival in the face of key long-term political vulnerabilities.

Arguably, one of the greatest weaknesses of certain U.S. adversaries is that they lack true democratic political legitimacy and accountability. Because of this vulnerability, these opponents seek to create protected national “information spaces”50 in which their government administration alone creates and controls the dominant political narrative disseminated by domestic mass media. The creation of such protected spaces prevents the widespread dissemination of facts at variance with or contradictory of incumbent regime narratives. A protected information space prevents the dissemination of information about regime violations of the rule of law, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence that are potentially threatening to long-term regime survival. The United States and its allies can exploit this weakness by mapping the network of instruments by which opponents create a protected information space51 and threatening, in the event of conflict, to attack these assets either by cyberattack or with ordnance. The United States and its allies can deter an opponent preemptive first strike on U.S. space-based assets at the outset of a conflict by threatening a response that would put the adversary regime’s long-term survival at risk by destroying its control over its protected domestic information space.

The United States might further deter attacks in space by proactively penetrating the defenses of the adversaries’ protected information space. Modernizing a successful Cold War strategy, resources can be focused and pooled to provide objective, factual round-the-clock television news programming directly from satellites into television set-top boxes in opponent countries. This action might enable objective facts at variance with opponent government narratives to be widely disseminated to adversary mass audiences. In addition to potentially threatening long-term regime survival, providing such dissonant pieces of factual information to adversary mass domestic television audiences can make it more difficult for opponents to sustain, let alone dominate, the political narrative either domestically or internationally—that is, to win the information war—during times of crisis.52

**2**

#### The plan creates an international SSA architecture that excludes China---that’s perceived as a significant denial of their global status ambitions and an aggressive move to shore up deterrence against them

Anthony J. Mastalir 9, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, MA in Organizational Management from George Washington University, MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, MA in Airpower Art and Science from Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, August 2009, “The US Response to China’s ASAT Test: An International Security Space Alliance for the Future,” https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=708811

Space leaders must also acknowledge the inherent deterrent value in sharing space surveillance with a global audience. General Shelton explains that “if our adversaries know that we know what’s going on in orbit, then they’re going to be constrained.” 35 To this end, the United States ought to consider including China as a space surveillance partner. China’s ambitious plans in space will continue to drive requirements for an increasingly sophisticated space surveillance network. Furthermore, China’s overall economic growth continues to climb at an unprecedented rate, surpassed only by the rate at which China has increased defense spending.36 If major space-faring nations express interest in an international space alliance designed to ensure collectively the protection of global space assets through shared awareness, there is little doubt China will want to join. China’s desire for international prestige and relevance takes precedence over its desire to become a major space power, and from China’s perspective, the latter enables the former. As General Kehler notes, “When you get better situational awareness; when you have the capability to attribute; our view is that you are enhancing deterrence. It is becoming clearer to all that there’s not a way to make an on-orbit activity look like an anomaly or a technical problem. It informs what a whole range of response options might be.”37 Consequently, the United States’ best option in response to China’s space weapons program may be to join together to lift the veil of obscurity shadowing orbital operations.

#### Rising powers only act aggressively when they’ve just had their status ambitions denied

Hal Brands 18, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10/24/18, “Danger: Falling Powers,” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/24/danger-falling-powers/>

There is, then, no disputing that rising powers can have profoundly disruptive effects. Yet such powers might not actually be the most aggressive or risk-prone type of revisionist state. After all, if a country’s position is steadily improving over time, why risk messing it all up through reckless policies that precipitate a premature showdown? Why not lay low until the geopolitical balance has become still more favorable? Why not wait until one has surpassed the reigning hegemon altogether and other countries defer to one’s wishes without a shot being fired? So while a rising revisionist power may be tempted to assert itself, it should also have good reason to avoid going for broke.

Now imagine an alternative scenario. A revisionist power—perhaps an authoritarian power—has been gaining influence and ratcheting its ambitions upward. Its leaders have cultivated intense nationalism as a pillar of their domestic legitimacy; they have promised the populace that past insults will be avenged and sacrifices will be rewarded with geopolitical greatness and global prestige. Yet then the country’s potential peaks, either because it has reached its natural limit or because of some unforeseen development, and the balance of power starts to shift in unfavorable ways. It becomes clear to the country’s leadership that it may not be able to accomplish the goals it has set and fulfill the promises it has made, and that the situation will only further worsen with time. A roll of the iron dice now seems more attractive: It may be the only chance the nation has to claim geopolitical spoils before it is too late.

In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in. In this sense, the dynamic bears a resemblance to the famous Davies J-Curve theory of revolution, wherein a populace is held to be more inclined to revolt not when it is maximally oppressed but rather when raised expectations are shown to be in vain.

Obviously, rational analysis does not always prevail in world politics. Rising states can become intoxicated with their own strength; they may simply get tired of waiting to attain the status they desire; or some domestic pressure may impel leaders to act dangerously. But revisionists whose power has begun to decline, or who have hit a rogue bump in the road, may not feel that they even have the option of waiting.

#### That causes aggression against Taiwan, Japan, and in the SCS---independently collapses the U.S. alliance system

Hal Brands 18, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10/24/18, “Danger: Falling Powers,” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/24/danger-falling-powers/>

By contrast, the Chinese leadership still seems to have a “time is on our side” mindset. Even as Beijing’s energy and assertiveness have surged, Chinese leaders have proven less risk-acceptant than their Russian counterparts. They have remained satisfied to advance China’s aims through small, incremental steps—such as island-building and coercion in the South China Sea—rather than dramatic, aggressive lunges. Yet even Chinese leaders cannot be confident that the country’s upward trajectory will continue unbroken for very much longer.

In a geopolitical sense, Chinese officials must worry about whether the country’s window is opening or closing with respect to issues like Taiwan. For while China has greater military capability than ever before to pursue reunification through forcible means, Taiwanese support for peaceful unification is at rock-bottom levels, the development of a distinctive Taiwanese national identify becomes more unmistakable every year, and the political pendulum in Taipei is clearly swinging away toward greater resistance to Chinese pressure.

There are also warning lights flashing—perhaps flashing in the distance, but flashing nonetheless—when it comes to the fundamentals of Chinese power. Economic growth has been broadly declining for at least a decade (although it may have ticked upward slightly last year), according to official government estimates that are almost certainly inflated. China suffers from astronomic debt levels and has seen dizzying volatility in its stock market, both of which may be precursors to bigger economic troubles ahead. The demographic problems China confronts are even more severe than Russia’s: The rapid aging of the population will strain social spending, inhibit growth, and confront Chinese leaders with sharper guns-versus-butter trade-offs.

Beneath the façade of stability imposed by increasingly repressive governance, moreover, dissatisfaction with a corrupt and autocratic elite is increasing: Chinese officials stopped publicly reporting the number of “mass incidents” in 2005, but the frequency of such incidents is widely believed to be rising. If the drastic domestic security measures taken in areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet are any indication, major sections of the country seem to be seething with discontent. Add in the fact that China’s behavior is stirring greater fears not just in Washington but throughout the Asia-Pacific and beyond, and Beijing may soon find itself dealing with greater geopolitical pushback, including the development of military capabilities designed specifically to neutralize the leverage provided by China’s own build-up. As unlikely as it may seem right now, it is entirely possible that sometime in the next decade or two, Chinese leaders may have to face a future that is not so bright and shining as seems the case now.

When this happens, will Beijing become more or less aggressive on the global stage? The answer may well be “more.” Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders have been promising that the nation is on the verge of achieving national rejuvenation, that it can now take center stage in world affairs. The regime has assiduously stoked Chinese nationalism; it has staked out inflexible positions on maritime disputes and other issues; it has even begun to issue soft deadlines for reunification with Taiwan. It has done so on the assumption that the continued growth of national power will enable Beijing to make good on its pledges and back up its demands.

If that assumption does not hold, if the “Chinese Dream” begins to elude its dreamers, Chinese leaders may be tempted to take more dramatic steps rather than admitting that they cannot deliver. In these circumstances, an attempt to retake Taiwan by force or coercion, to teach Japan a lesson in the East China Sea, to break Vietnamese or Filipino resistance in the South China Sea, or to rupture America’s alliance system in the Asia-Pacific would still be highly dangerous. But these initiatives might come to seem more attractive than simply remaining passive while Beijing’s relative power fades.

Robert Kaplan has put it aptly: If a confident China has been pursuing a “methodical, well-developed” strategy of revisionism, an insecure China could shift to “daring, reactive, and impulsive behavior.”10 Limiting the damage done to U.S. interests by a rising China will be a test of epic dimensions for American policymakers. But the moment of peak danger in the relationship may actually come when China starts to fade from its own wishful trajectory.

#### All those scenarios risk escalation to full-scale nuclear war

Michael O’Hanlon 20, senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution; and Gregory B. Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and a fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS, 1/14/20, “ROCKS, REEFS, AND NUCLEAR WAR,” https://amti.csis.org/rocks-reefs-and-nuclear-war/

As the 2020s begin, the world can breathe a collective sigh of relief that the United States has so far avoided a major military crisis with China. Over the past decade, China challenged the lawful rights of U.S. partners and allies in the western Pacific, built massive artificial island bases in the disputed Spratly Islands, and actively sought control over all the waters, seabed, and airspace of the South China Sea. Yet the United States has maintained its access to those waters, deterred any major Chinese use of force against its neighbors, and helped support the efforts of Japan to maintain administrative control over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. U.S. strategy has been notably less successful in preventing China from robbing Southeast Asian partners, including U.S. ally the Philippines, of their resources and rights in the South China Sea. But the United States has at least slowed China’s advance while avoiding war.

It would be unwise, however, to assume that the status quo is stable. Deterrence has not failed—yet. China is unlikely to do something as brazen as forcefully denying U.S. Navy or commercial ships access to the South China Sea, attacking American or Japanese bases, or intentionally sinking Filipino sailors in disputed waters. But Beijing continues to probe and test U.S. and allied resolve, provoking low-level crises which could easily escalate. Current U.S. strategic thinking could trigger disproportionate responses that would cause such crises to spiral out of control. That is the way World War I began a century ago—and it could happen again.

War games seem to confirm these historic lessons. One of us has taken part in numerous simulations over the last five years asking seasoned experts and officials to role-play how Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and American leaders might respond to crises in the South and East China Seas. The results are typically sobering. Some end in a rapid Chinese fait accompli, such as the seizure of a disputed island with minimal cost, while U.S. and allied leaders dither. This type of scenario would lead to considerable damage to international norms, U.S. alliances, and American national security.

Even more simulations rapidly escalate into full-scale conflict, bringing China and the United States to the doorstep of nuclear war over stakes that no rational observer would consider worth it. The U.S. national security community tends to view the ability to defeat China (or Russia) in combat wherever an ally might be attacked as an essential goal. Direct defense or prompt reversal of any aggression, no matter how small, are the foundational principles of current strategy. Article 5 of the NATO treaty and similar mutual defense commitments to Japan and the Philippines treat all aggression as an equally existential threat. So in a scenario involving a Chinese landing on the Japanese-administered Senkakus or a threat to the Sierra Madre—a derelict Philippine navy ship intentionally ran aground at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys and now housing a dozen soldiers—American strategic culture most often leads to the conclusion that kinetic action to retake a seized feature or outpost is justified to avoid abandoning an ally and damaging U.S. credibility.

But such an escalation, while it should be kept as an option, would be fraught. It might end quickly, amounting to little more than a skirmish, or large-scale conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers could ensue. Both sides would have powerful political incentives to escalate further. Military warning and communications systems might be targeted through cyberattack or other means in a way that sowed confusion. Escalation control could not be guaranteed—history and military scholarship strongly suggest as much, and many war games corroborate it.

## Case

### Scenario 1

#### None of their cards actually say that a war will happen

1. Bowman and thompson proves alt causes – recent moves by russia proves treaties falling now and militarization happening now

#### Their scenario is pre-Ukraine – China is no longer working closely with Russia because they don’t want to get caught up in sanctions or international backlash

Jones 3/1 – [Andrew, “Russia looks to China for collaboration in space but faces isolation over Ukraine invasion,” 3/1/2022, Space News https://spacenews.com/russia-looks-to-china-for-collaboration-in-space-but-faces-isolation-over-ukraine-invasion/]

HELSINKI — Roscosmos is looking to China as a supplier of vital space industry components and a partner in missions following the invasion of Ukraine, but sanctions could still heavily impact any new plans.

Russian space agency head Dmitry Rogozin told Russian media Feb. 26 that sanctions imposed by Western countries would hit supplies of microelectronics necessary for spacecraft.

“With all our efforts to promote the Russian national microelectronic industry… it is impossible to produce everything,” Rogozin said, adding that, “We have excellent relations with China … and we will solve these problems.”

Russia is understood to have turned to Chinese state-owned aerospace companies for alternatives following sanctions imposed in 2014 in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. But the invasion of Ukraine is having far greater repercussions.

Reuters reported Feb. 27 that China so far does not seem to be helping Russia avoid sanctions. Chinese banks and other entities could face sanctions themselves and loss of access to the U.S. financial system by doing business with Russia, the report states.

China has been seen as trying to balance its response to the Ukrainian conflict. Beijing is urging restraint and has declined to describe Russia’s actions as an invasion, but appears to be careful to avoid being caught in the repercussions faced by Russia.

“China and Russia are comprehensive strategic partners of coordination. Our relationship features non-alliance, non-confrontation and non-targeting of any third party. China’s position on the Ukraine issue is consistent. We always decide on our position and policy based on the merits of the matter itself,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said in a regular press conference Feb. 28, underlining that Moscow and Beijing were not allies.

“I think China increasingly finds itself in between a rock and a hard place,” says Matti Nojonen, a professor of Chinese culture and economy at the University of Lapland, noting that while Beijing has moved toward a closer relationship with Moscow, nearly the whole world community is turning against Russia.

“I think they [China] are very carefully monitoring now what they’re doing and what kind of reactions this has created. I think it must have surprised China how this united all the Western powers … and now it turns out that even countries like Kazakhstan are turning and criticizing what Putin did.” Nojonen told SpaceNews.

#### 3. No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic.

Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success.

Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes.

Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns.

Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict.

Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris.

Other forms space war will take

Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations.

Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically.

Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

### Scenario 2

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

#### U.S. hegemony provokes blowback aggression due to status insecurity, sanitizes imperialism, and dooms international cooperation---decline spurs a great power concert that solves war and existential threats.

Pampinella 19, Stephenis Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz (Stephen, January 23rd, “The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy,” *The Disorder of Things*, <https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/>, Accessed 10-25-2021)

Why Liberal Internationalism Will Fail (Again)

But in recent weeks, mainstream US foreign policy experts have provided their own spin in progressive internationalism. Advocates and practitioners of a traditional hegemonic foreign policy have sought to co-opt progressive internationalism in a series of essays which argue for the necessity of American power and global influence. These writers embody the post-Cold War centrist foreign policy coalition of liberal internationalists and neoconservatives. For them, that the greatest threat to the democratic “free” world created by the United States remains the autocratic governance model of Russia and China. While Washington should pursue cooperation on transnational governance issues where possible, they argue it cannot do so at the expense of making security concessions which would reward revisionist behavior by great power rivals. As in the past, American exceptionalism remains the identity narrative justifying a return to US hegemony, with Anglo-American norms serving as the basis for hegemonic socialization and cooperation.

The internationalist disposition is a reminder of why a mere social democratic twist on US hegemony will fail to provide actual security for the United States and its allies. Establishment voices continue to rely on state-centric assumptions about IR and ignore how state identities and interests are a function of their relationship with each other. Or, as Jennifer Mitzen and Michelle Murray might argue, the revisionist intentions of Russia and China are a product of their ontological insecurity. A hegemonic United States defending an Anglo-American order denies them recognition of their own great power identities and their right to participate in all deliberations about global order. From this perspective, we should challenge the implicit assumption made by Anthony Blinken and Robert Kagan that Russia is revisionist by nature. An internationalist perspective suggests that Russia has adopted those intentions in relation to a Wilsonian United States which seeks domination over Moscow and the transformation of its political system. The same is true for China, which rejects being cast as a “responsible stakeholder” by Washington which would eventually accept democracy following its internal transformation by global capitalism. In other words, the very terms of US relations with these states over the past 25 years is the source of their revisionist intentions, and not some essentialized feature of their domestic politics.

Further, a liberal exceptionalist narrative that contrasts “Eastern autocracy” with “Western freedom” masks how the United States has perpetuated its own systems of illiberal dominance throughout its history. Those same structures of oppression are the greatest threat to contemporary US democracy and also serve as glaring evidence of US hypocrisy. In his defense of American exceptionalism, Jake Sullivan represents institutional racism as a bug rather than a feature of the American political system by emphasizing the liberal ideals of the Founders and casting Donald Trump’s white ethnonationalism as an aberration. But this telling of the American story whitewashes the long history of an exclusive, white ethnic US identity dating back to the early 19th Century and its role in generating the modern United States. Scholars of American political development and US history have long demonstrated that institutions of slavery and land conquest constituted US society and made possible its economic prosperity rather than some kind of intrinsic tendency toward freedom.

Fast-forward to the present: liberal exceptionalism further denies how economic globalization made possible the rise of authoritarianism. Nils Gilman and David Klion rightly argue that the kleptocratic alliance between autocrats and oligarchs is the true threat to democracy and rule of law. Their ability to concentrate political and economic power has been enabled by the emergence of an integrated global market that privileges the freedom of capital over the needs of ordinary people, one created by the United States when liberal internationalism went global after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Finally, attempts to revive US hegemony will doom transnational efforts to deal with existential non-state threats.

## Solvency

CNSA has the resources and means to expand Chinese programs, they would move forward post plan

#### Chinese entities are unprofitable, pale in comparison to the U.S. and have ZERO experience —Harker in green

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The rivalry between the US and China, whose space program has surged over the last two decades, is what most people mean when they refer to the 21st-century's space race. China is set to build a new space station later this year and will likely attempt to send its taikonauts to the moon before the decade ends. But these big-picture projects represent just one aspect of the country’s space ambitions. Increasingly, the focus is now on the commercial space industry as well. The nation's growing private space business is less focused on bringing prestige and glory to the nation and more concerned with reducing the cost of spaceflight, increasing its international influence—and making money. “The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be complementary to the state,” he says. What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly. China has seen an opportunity. A [2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/the-space-industry-will-be-worth-nearly-3-trillion-in-30-years-bank-of-america-predicts.html) estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the country’s future. “In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson. The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West. How did China get here—and why? Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](http://www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry. “Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.” As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a [2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding. And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike. Making friends The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders. “China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

**\*\*1AC EVIDENCE STOPS\*\***

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often very cagey about what its national program is even up to. And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says. Other challenges None of these new companies are yet profitable, and it will be quite some time before they are. “There isn’t any sign of indication that this industry will flop,” says Hines. “But many experts do think a lot of these companies will go out of business.” Apart from the challenge of attracting customers outside China, many companies are still trying to figure out who exactly their customers ought to be. American companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin had billionaire founders ready to burn cash to take on large risks, push past big failures, and finally get off the ground. And while a Chinese billionaire entered the industry last year, “there is no Chinese Elon Musk to push these riskier ventures forward,” says Hines. It’s also unclear whether Chinese companies, even those supported by wealthy backers, will have that appetite for risk. Zheng says one thing Spacety has offered is exceptional transparency with clients for whom it is developing satellites—something that’s still uncommon for Chinese firms. “Many of them have no kind of spaceflight experience,” he says. “They want to see and learn what goes on, but the large companies won’t allow for that. We’re different.” Lastly, China needs to figure out a legal framework that can guide the commercial industry in more explicit terms, and specify what’s allowed and what is not. It is the only major space power without a specialized space law. (The American version is Title 51 of the United States Code.) While the hope is that free enterprise can generate innovation, national governments are still liable for whatever space activities a country’s private companies conduct. There’s a need to license and approve these missions, ensuring that governments know what they’ve signed up for. Despite all this, China’s space industry is rolling forward. These new startups haven’t just adopted American business practices—they’ve also begun to embrace American startup culture as a way to foster business relationships and grow. During my video call with Spacety’s Zheng, the company’s Beijing CEO, Yang Feng, briefly dropped in to say hello, on his way back from a party where he’d been schmoozing and enjoying drinks with many peers and partners in the industry. “It’s part of the way we do business now,” Zheng said. “Innovation is not just new technology itself—it’s also a new way of doing things.”