### T comes before tricks

You did it first, the aff already made the choice before the debate to be untopical making it harder on the neg, t comes before 1ar theory bc the 1ac determines the fairness of the round. education ows. Their evidence was written by a person from their own school and is going to flow to what they want for shah

### Topicality

### Any Well-Being

#### Medicine Includes anything that leads to physical, mental, or social well being

John Walford Todd 9/7/20 [Encyclopedia Britannica, “Medicine”] [DS]

Medicine, the practice concerned with the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease.

The World Health Organization at its 1978 international conference held in the Soviet Union produced the Alma-Ata Health Declaration, which was designed to serve governments as a basis for planning health care that would reach people at all levels of society. The declaration reaffirmed that health, which is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, is a fundamental human right and that the attainment of the highest possible level of health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realization requires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector.

In its widest form, the practice of medicine—that is to say, the promotion and care of health—is concerned with this ideal.

#### Medicine promotes health and wellbeing

Medicine is the field of health and healing. It includes nurses, doctors, and various specialists. It covers diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease, medical research, and many other aspects of health.

Medicine aims to promote and maintain health and wellbeing.

Conventional modern medicine is sometimes called allopathic medicine. It involves the use of drugs or surgery, often supported by counseling and lifestyle measures.

Alternative and complementary types of medicine include acupuncture, homeopathy, herbal medicine, art therapy, traditional Chinese medicine, and many more.

Fields of medicine

Modern medicine has many fields and aspects. Here are some of them.

Clinical practice

A clinician works with patients in a health setting.

A clinician is a health worker who works directly with patients in a hospital or other healthcare setting. Nurses, doctors, psychotherapists, and other specialists are all clinicians.

Not all medical specialists are clinicians. Researchers and laboratory workers are not clinicians because they do not work with patients.

The physician assesses the individual, with the aim of diagnosing, treating, and preventing disease using knowledge learned from training, research, and experiences, and clinical judgment.

Biomedical research

This area of science seeks ways to prevent and treat diseases that lead to illness or death.

Biomedical scientists use biotechnology techniques to study biological processes and diseases. They aim to develop successful treatments and cures.

Biomedical research requires careful experimentation, development, and evaluation. It involves biologists, chemists, doctors, pharmacologists, and others.

Medications

This field looks at drugs or medicines and how to use them.

Doctors and other health professionals use medications in the medical diagnosis, treatment, cure, and prevention of disease.

Surgery

Surgical procedures are necessary for diagnosing and treating some types of disease, malfomation, and injury. They use instrumental and manual means rather than medication.

A surgeon may carry out a surgical procedure to remove or replace diseased tissue or organs, or they may use surgery to remove tissue for biopsy. Sometimes, they remove unwanted tissue and then send it for diagnosis.

Medical devices

Health professionals use a wide range of instruments to diagnose and treat a disease or other condition, to prevent a worsening of symptoms, to replace a damaged part — such as a hip or a knee — and so on.

Medical devices range from test tubes to sophisticated scanning machines.

Alternative and complementary medicine

Ayurveda is an ancient healing art and a form of alternative medicine.

This includes any practice that aims to heal but is not part of conventional medicine. Techniques range widely. They include the use of herbs, manipulation of “channels” in the body, relaxation, and so on.

Alternative and complementary do not have the same meaning:

Alternative medicine: People use a different option from the conventional one, such as using relaxation measures to improve headaches, rather than pain relief medication.

Complementary medicine: People add another treatment option to a main treatment. For example, they may use relaxation as well as pain relief medication for a headache.

Alternative and complementary therapies are often based on traditional knowledge, rather than scientific evidence or clinical trials.

Examples include homeopathy, acupuncture, ayurveda, naturopathic medicine, and traditional Chinese medicine.

Clinical research

Researchers carry out investigations to find out which diseases are present, why they occur, what can treat or prevent them, what makes them more likely to happen, and many other aspects of health.

Clinical trials are one aspect of clinical research. They aim to find out if a therapy — often a drug — is safe and effective to use when treating a specific condition.

The most effective way to demonstrate the effectiveness of a drug or technique is to carry out a double-blind, random, long-term, large clinical human study.

In this type of study, researchers compare the effect of a therapy or drug in with either a placebo, no treatment, or another therapy or drug.

Psychotherapy

Counseling, cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), and other forms of “talking cure” can be helpful for people with conditions that affect their mental health, ranging from depression to stress to chronic pain.

Physical and occupational therapy

These treatments do not involve medication, although a person may use medication alongside them.

Physical therapy can help improve strength and flexibility in people who have a condition that affects their musculoskeletal system.

Occupational therapy can teach people new and better ways to do things physically. A person who has had a stroke, for example, may benefit from learning again how to walk, using techniques that perhaps they did not use before.

Other fields of medicine include pharmacology and pharmacy, nursing, speech therapy, medical practice management, and many more.

#### Interpretation—the aff may not specify types of medicine

#### Bare plurals imply a generic “rules reading” in the context of moral statements

**Cohen 1** — (Ariel Cohen, Professor of Linguistics @ Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, PhD Computational Linguistics from Carnegie Mellon University, “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars”. Journal of Semantics 18: 183-209, Oxford University Press, 2001, accessed 12-7-20, HKR-AM) \*\*BP = bare plurals

**According to the rules and regulations view**, on the other hand, **generic sentences do not get their truth or falsity as a consequence of properties of individual instances**. Instead, **generic sentences are evaluated with regard to rules and regulations, which are basic, irreducible entities in the world**. **Each generic sentence denotes a rule; if the rule is in effect,** in some sense (different theories suggest different characterizations of what it means for a rule to be in effect), **the sentence is true, otherwise it is false**. **The rule may be physical, biological, social, moral, etc.** **The paradigmatic cases for which this view seems readily applicable are sentences that refer** **to** conventions, i.e. **man-made, explicit rules and regulations**, such as the following example (Carlson 1995: 225):

(40) Bishops move diagonally.

Carlson describes the two approaches as a dichotomy: one has to choose one or the other, but not both. One way to decide which approach to choose is to consider a case where the behavior of observed instances conflicts with an explicit rule. Indeed, Carlson discusses just such a case. He describes a supermarket where bananas sell for $0.49/lb, so that (41a) is true. One day, the manager decides to raise the price to $1.00/lb. Immediately after the price has changed, claims Carlson, sentence (41a) becomes false and sentence (41b) becomes true, although the overwhelming majority of sold bananas were sold for $0.49/lb.

(41) a. Bananas sell for $0.49/lb.

b. Bananas sell for $1.00/lb.

Consequently, Carlson reaches the conclusion that the rules and regulations approach is the correct one, whereas the inductivist view is wrong.

While I share Carlson’s judgements, I do not accept the conclusion he draws from them. Suppose the price has, indeed, changed, but the supermarket employs incompetent cashiers who consistently use the old price by mistake, so that customers are still charged $0.49/lb. In this case, I think there is a reading of (41a) which is true, and a reading of (41b) which is false. These readings are more salient if the sentence is modified by expressions such as actually or in fact:

(42) a. Bananas actually sell for $0.49/lb.

b. In fact, bananas sell for $1.00/lb.

**BP generics**, I claim, **are ambiguous: on one reading they express a descriptive generalization, stating the way things are. Under the other reading, they carry a normative force, and require that things be a certain way.** When they are used in the former sense, they should be analysed by some sort of inductivist account; **when they are used in the latter sense, they ought to be analysed as referring to a rule or a regulation.** The respective logical forms of the two readings are different; whereas the former reading involves, in some form or another, quantification, **the latter has a simple predicate-argument structure: the argument is the rule or regulation, and the predicate holds of it just in case the rule is ‘in effect’.**

#### Rules readings are always generalized – specific instances are not consistent. Cohen 01

**Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf**

**In general, as, again, already noted by Aristotle, rules and definitions are not relativized to particular individuals; it is rarely the case that a specific individual¶ forms part of the description of a general rule.¶** Even DPs of the form a certain X or a particular X, which usually receive¶ a wide scope interpretation, cannot, in general, receive such an interpretation in the context of a rule or a definition. This holds of definitions in general, not¶ only of definitions with an IS subject. The following examples from the Cobuild¶ dictionary illustrate this point:¶ (74) a. A fanatic is a person who is very enthusiastic about a particular¶ activity, sport, or way of life.¶ b. Something that is record-breaking is better than the previous¶ record for a particular performance or achievement.¶ c. When a computer outputs something it sorts and produces information as the result of a particular program or operation.¶ d. If something sheers in a particular direction, it suddenly changes¶ direction, for example to avoid hitting something.

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how bare plurals are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### The upward entailment and adverb quantification determine whether a bare plural is generic or existential

**Leslie and Lerner 16** [Sarah-Jane, PhD Princeton director of the Program in Linguistics, and Adam, Postgraduate Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton] "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/ 4-24-2016 RE

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

(1) a. Tigers are striped.

b. Tigers are on the front lawn.

(2) a. A tiger is striped.

b. A tiger is on the front lawn.

(3) a. The tiger is striped.

b. The tiger is on the front lawn.

**The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers**: a group of tigers in (1b), some individual tiger in (2b), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in (3b)—a beloved pet, perhaps. **In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general.** There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.

**The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning**; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind.

**There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term.** Consider our examples above. In (1b), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in (1a) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (1a) does not entail that animals are striped, but (1b) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

**Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1a) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (1b) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence** (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### This applies to the res – 1] Upward entailment test – “wto members ought to reduce medicines” doesn’t entail that “wto members ought to reduce ” because there are tons of other medicine that perhaps shouldn’t be banned even if medicine should be 2] Adverb test -- “states usually ought to ban medicine” doesn’t substantially change the meaning of the resolution

#### They have to win counter-definitions to both our Cohen and Leslie evidence—if we win a violation for either it proves they are outside the bounds of the topic

#### Violation—they specified []—there are other medicine that they don’t ban

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision – if we win definitions the aff is not topical. The resolution is the only predictable stasis point for dividing ground—any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Predictable limits—specifying medicine offers huge explosion in the topic since there are potentially infinite medicine that could come into existence in the future which creates incentives to race to the margins and cherrypick scifi nonsense like the Death Star aff which have no neg ground. Limits explodes neg prep burden and draws un-reciprocal lines of debate, where the aff is always ahead, turns their pragmatics offense

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for—there’s no way for the negative to know what constitutes a “reasonable interpretation” when we do prep – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom, proliferating abuse

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.

### Util fw

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### 1] Only it can explain degrees of wrongness- it is worse to break a promise to not save a dying friend’s life versus breaking a promise to meet for lunch- only consequentialism can explain why the first is worse

#### 2] Risk breaks all non-consequentialist moral theories since all actions have some non-zero chance of violating some deontological side-constraint, e.g. there is some uncertainty whether any given action fulfills a promise or stops a theft- that prevents evaluation of potential harms- only util solves- it can weigh probability times expected value

#### 3] Actor spec-

#### A] Agent-dependent theories cannot apply to social institutions- there are circumstances in which we must rank options that do not implicate individual choices- institutions are only judged on their ability to bring about good states of affairs across a broad set of domains including to agents that change the identity of the institution which non-consequentialism cannot evaluate- that collapses to consequentialism

#### B] Gov’ts have to aggregate since all collective actions require trade-offs that benefit some and worsen others- side-constraints freeze action and render ethics inoperable- takes-out and turns calc indicts- consequentialism is hard but not impossible, it’s empirically false since we calculate all the time, and the alt is no action which is worse

#### 3] Extinction o/ws under any framework- moral uncertainty and future gens

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 4] Util is a lexical pre-req to any other framework-

#### A] Threats to bodily security and life preclude other moral frameworks- moral actors can’t effectively act in non-ideal conditions which undermines their framework

#### B] Death ontologically destroys the subject and precludes the possibility of agency- rejection of life cannot be accepted because it is the basis of all other moral theories

### Comparative worlds

#### Use a comparative worlds paradigm to evaluate the round. This means you should vote for whoever has the better world. Prefer:

#### 1. “Resolved” is legislative

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.