## OFF

### NC – Long

#### The ethical frame of justice is inseparable from a moral emphasis of blame and righteous anger. Both of those presume the existence of discrete essential individuals for injustice to be acted by and on which is conceptually incorrect. Evil does not come from individual essence but arises from external conditions. Blame and moral anger poisons their epistemology because they manifest confused thinking.

Carpenter 17 Carpenter, Amber, works in ancient Greek and classical Indian philosophy, with a topical focus on the metaphysics, epistemology and moral psychology underpinning Plato’s ethics and Indian Buddhist ethics, taught or held visiting research appointments at the University of York, St Andrews, Cornell, Oxford, the University of Melbourne and Yale University. BA (Yale), PhD (Kings College London). "Ethics without Justice." A Mirror Is for Reflection: Understanding Buddhist Ethics (2017).

What is fundamentally and most illuminatingly wrong with anger, on the Buddhist view, is not that it confuses our thinking, but that it manifests confused thinking. That is, anger is cognitively rich, but it is never apt. Anger is the particular form that misapprehension of reality takes under certain circumstances. As an embodiment of confusion, experiencing anger tends to reinforce the confused ways of thinking that enable it to arise in the first place—and this will be quite apart from the question of the tendency of anger to cause me to make prudentially bad judgments about what to do. So on the Buddhist view, anger is bad simply because it is suffering and it causes suffering. But these are both rooted in a prior cognitive fault, for anger cannot arise without a false way of seeing the world; and insofar as it has cognitive content at all, it embodies and reinforces that confused cognition.

It will be no surprise that the fundamental misapprehension of reality underwriting anger (as so many things) is a false belief in self. Candrakīrti is explicit: “For Bodhisattvas, those who see the absence of self, Agent, object, time, and manner of the wounds—All things are like the image in a glass. By understanding thus, all torments are endured” (MA 3.3). And we see this claim already in the suttas, where a false sense of self gives rise not just to unhappiness generally (Alagaddūpama Sutta, MN.i.130ff.), but specifically to divisiveness and hostility between people (Tittha Sutta, Ud. 70ff.).24

Both Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva introduce impersonal metaphysics into their respective anti-anger homilies, with the idea that correctly seeing the selflessness of reality removes the necessary preconditions for anger to arise: “Since states last but a moment’s time, those aggregates, by which was done the odious act, have ceased, so now what is it you are angry with? Whom shall he hurt, who seeks to hurt another, in the other’s absence?” (Vism. IX.22).

We will consider Śāntideva’s treatment more closely.

17.4.  The Course of Bodhicarya¯ vata¯ ra VI

Śāntideva begins with the easy cases: gadflies and mosquitoes, thirst and cold (BCA 6.15–16). He frames this with the practical attitude he aims to instill in place of the counter-productive anger we may be prone to: “If there is a remedy, then what is the use of frustration? If there is no remedy, then what is the use of frustration?” (6.10).

He then turns to the truly difficult cases—those wherein we feel our anger is justified. We can easily recognize the silliness and futility of getting angry at falling branches or failed harvests. But anger is more difficult to dislodge when we mistakenly judge (1) ourselves (or those we care about) to be harmed; (2) to have been harmed by some responsible agent; and (3) not to be ourselves responsible for the harm. Śāntideva does not argue, Stoic-wise, that there is no harm done, really—at least he does not try to sweep away all cases with that particular broom.25 Rather the mistake that we must actively identify and undo if we are to dislodge our attachment to anger is the judgment that I am being made to suffer by someone else, who, as responsible, should be held to account (is a fitting target of revenge). In effect, Śāntideva draws on what is already established regarding the easy cases and explicitly recommends that we see all possible cases in a similar light. And this is where the bile comes in: “I am not angered at bile and the like even though they cause great suffering. Why be angry at sentient beings, who are also provoked to anger by conditions?” (6.22). Śāntideva is explicitly refusing to distinguish personal from impersonal causes, placing all occasions for anger into a common, mutually conditioning field.

The Metaphysical Turn

Then Śāntideva emphasizes this very fact—and so starts doing metaphysics: “All offences and vices of various kinds arise under the influence of conditions, and they do not arise independently” (6.25). There is nothing—not any supposed Self, autonomous and free, nor some other primordial principle, nor any particular part of reality—that wishes itself into being. Nothing can be responsible for its own arising, nor therefore for its particular quality or character when it does arise. Of course some evils arise due to wicked intentions, and others do not; but that wicked intention did not choose to be, any more than a flower chooses to grow. In both cases, there are causes and enabling conditions and innumerable factors which are responsible for the item picked out. The direct implication of the sheer generality of the claim is that, if we are going to go in for the business of determining responsibility or fault, we will inevitably become mired down in an interminable exercise in futility. Better not to start down that road at all.

The critique of the substantiality of persons in particular (vv. 26–31) should show us a way of looking at the world, others, and our own experiences such that “Whose fault is it?” is not the decisive and pressing question that arises.

And so Śāntideva recommends in light of this, “Therefore, upon seeing a friend or an enemy committing a wrong deed, one should reflect, ‘Such are his conditions,’ and be at ease” (6.33).

Why should we “be at ease” here? And does this mean that we should not, when it is in our power, prevent people from doing wrong? This may look like another reductio of the anger-eliminativist position (or the same again in new words). For if someone is about to do wrong, “at ease” is precisely what I ought not feel, particularly if I have any sense of justice.

In fact, it is precisely one’s sense of justice—with its fault-finding and blaming, its righteous indignation and its insistence on the splendid isolation of the individual will for forensic purposes—that this little exercise in impersonalism is meant to erode. This is where, as above, the Buddhist can only concede the point. Yet consider precisely what this “eroding of our sense of justice” amounts to when achieved by this route. By insisting on the embeddedness of all causes, and by refusing to distinguish one kind as special, Śāntideva removes any warrant for that special moral emotion, blame. I can, without difficulty, recognize that it is this stick, held by this hand, impelled by that malicious impulse, provoked by this or that perception in conjunction with this or that memory and cognition, each of which, by regarding them in this way, I acknowledge to have their own causes, which I can only guess at and which may—well, why not?—include indigestion. This is not a problem, and indeed is the very activity toward which our attention has been redirected. Seeing the stick-wielder as impelled by malice, say, does not absolve him of responsibility (moral responsibility—the only sort needing absolution), because I am not even asking the question of responsibility. The lack of control he has over the malice is not exonerating, but it is pitiable; to lack control, and be riven with afflictive emotions, is suffering. Notice the emphasis on concern for suffering in the immediately following verses (6.34–38). Addressing myself to the situation in this way, I do indeed see the aggressor in the same way I see reality as a whole, and myself within it—namely, under the aspect of suffering (sub specie doloris). But precisely because there is no further fact to find here, no further cause of agitation and distress, I can focus entirely on the pragmatic question of what is to be done.

#### Focusing on individuals as our rubric of analysis is the root of nationalist violence and the callous destruction of the biosphere. Ethical frameworks moving away from dualism and selfishness are required to preserve humanity.

Loy 17 David R Loy, former Besl Professor of Ethics/Religion and Society at Xavier University, teacher in Sanbo Kyodan Buddhism. M.A. in Asian philosophy from the University of Hawaii in 1975, and Ph.D. in philosophy in 1984 from the National University of Singapore. “Are Humans Special?” Tikkun, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter 2017, <http://www.davidloy.org/downloads/Loy%20Are%20Humans%20Special.pdf>.

One uniquely human characteristic, emphasized by Buddhism, is that we can develop the ability to “dis-identify” from anything and everything, letting go not only of the individual sense of separate self but also of collective selves: dissociating from dualisms such as patriarchy, nationalism, racism, even species-ism (“we’re human, not lower animals”). Meditation develops such nonattachment, yet the point of such letting-go is not to dissociate from everything but to realize our nonduality with everything.

That human beings are the only species (so far as we know) that can know it is a manifestation of the entire cosmos opens up a possibility that may need to be embraced if we are to survive the crises that now confront us. Instead of continuing to exploit the earth’s ecosystems for our own supposed benefit, we can choose to work for the well-being of the whole. That we are not separate from the rest of the biosphere makes the whole earth our body, in effect, which implies not only a sp cial understanding but also a special role in response to that realization. As the Metta Sutta declares: “Let one’s thoughts of boundless love pervade the whole world— above, below, and across — without any obstruction, without any hatred, without any enmity.”

To ask whether the universe itself is objectively meaningful or meaningless is to miss the point— as if the universe were outside us, or simply there without us. When we do not erase ourselves from the picture, we can see that we are meaning- makers, the beings by which the universe introduces a new scale of significance and value.

The Responsibility of Being Special

If we are special because of our potential, we must choose. We are free to derive the meaning of our lives from delusions about who we are—from dysfunctional stories about what the world is and how we fit into it—or we can derive that meaning from insight into our nonduality with the rest of the world. In either case, there are consequences.

The problem with basing one’s life on delusions is that the consequences are unlikely to be good. As well as producing poetry and cathedrals, our creativity has recently found expression in world wars, genocides, and weapons of mass destruction, to mention a few disagreeable examples. We are in the early stages of an ecological crisis that threatens the natural and cultural legacy of future generations, including a mass extinction event that may lead to the disappearance of half the earth’s plant and animal species within a century, according to E. O. Wilson—an extinction event that may include ourselves.

What needs to be done so that our extraordinary co-creative powers will promote collective well-being (collective in this case referring to all the ecosystems of the biosphere)? Must we evolve further—not biologically but culturally—in order to survive at all? From a Buddhist perspective our unethical tendencies ultimately derive from a misapprehension: the delusion of a self that is separate from others, a big mistake for a species whose well-being is not separate from the well-being of other species. Insofar as we are ignorant of our true nature, individual and collective self-preoccupation naturally motivates us to be selfish. Without the compassion that arises when we feel empathy—not only with other humans, but with the whole of the biosphere—it is likely that civilization as we know it will not survive many more generations.

In either case, we seem fated to be special. If we continue to devastate the rest of the biosphere, we are arguably the worst species on earth: a cancer of the biosphere. If, however, humanity can wake up to become its collective bodhisattva—undertaking the long-term task of repairing the rupture between us and Mother Earth—perhaps we as a species will fulfill the unique potential of precious human life.

#### Individuation is a fantasy that scaffolds gender hierarchy.

Judith Butler, Comparative Literature @ Berkeley, ’20, “The force of nonviolence: The ethical in the political.” Verso Books, 2020. 36-42.

Let us, then, try a different story. It begins this way: every individual emerges in the course of the process of individuation. No one is born an individual; if someone becomes an individual over time, he or she does not escape the fundamental conditions of dependency in the course of that process. That condition cannot be escaped by way of time. We were all, regardless of our political viewpoints in the present, born into a condition of radical dependency. As we reflect back on that condition as adults, perhaps we are slightly insulted or alarmed, or perhaps we dismiss the thought. Perhaps someone with a strong sense of individual self-sufficiency will indeed be offended by the fact that there was a time when one could not feed oneself or could not stand on one’s own. I want to suggest, however, that no one actually stands on one’s own; strictly speaking, no one feeds oneself. Disability studies has shown us that in order to move along the street, there must be pavement that allows for movement, especially if one only moves with a chair or with an instrument for support.9 But the pavement is also an instrument for support, as are the traffic lights and the curb stops. It is not only those who are disabled who require support in order to move, to be fed, or indeed, to breathe. All of these basic human capacities are supported in one way or another. No one moves or breathes or finds food who is not supported by a world that provides an environment built for passage, that prepares and distributes food so that it makes its way to our mouths, a world that sustains the environment that makes possible air of a quality that we can breathe.

Dependency can be defined partly as a reliance on social and material structures and on the environment, for the latter, too, makes life possible. But regardless of our quarrels with psychoanalysis—and what is psychoanalysis but a theory and practice with which people quarrel— perhaps we can say that we do not overcome the dependency of infancy when we become adults. That does not mean that the adult is dependent in the exact same way that the infant is, but only that we have become creatures who constantly imagine a self-sufficiency, only to find that image of ourselves undermined repeatedly in the course of life. This is, of course, a Lacanian position, articulated most famously by the “mirror stage”—the jubilant boy who thinks he stands on his own as he looks in the mirror, and yet, watching him, we know that the mother, or some obscured object support (trotte-bébé), holds him in front of the mirror as he rejoices in his radical self-sufficiency.10 Perhaps we can say that the founding conceits of liberal individualism are a kind of mirror stage, that they take place within an imaginary of this kind. What support, what dependency, has to be disavowed for the fantasy of self-sufficiency to take hold, for the story to start with a timeless adult masculinity?

The implication of this scene, of course, is that it would seem that masculinity is identified with a phantasmatic self-sufficiency, while femininity is identified with the support she provides, a support regularly disavowed. This picture and story lock us into an economy of gender relations that hardly serves us. Heterosexuality becomes the presumptive frame, and it is derived from the theory of mother and child, which is but one way of imagining the relations of support for the child. The gendered structure of the family is taken for granted, including, of course, the obscuring of the mother’s labor of care and the full absence of the father. And if we accept all this as the symbolic structure of things rather than merely a specific imaginary, we accept the operation of a law that can only be changed in incremental fashion and over a very long time. The theory that describes this fantasy, this asymmetry, and this gendered division of labor can end up reproducing and validating its terms, unless it shows us another way out, unless it asks about the scene prior to, or outside of, the scene—the moment, as it were, before the beginning.

#### Sustaining the fantasy of the self produces a pattern of racial violence that accords with a historic-racial schema.

Judith Butler, Comparative Literature @ Berkeley, ’20, “The force of nonviolence: The ethical in the political.” Verso Books, 2020. 82 -87.

Foucault anticipates that critics from the field of political theory will ask about his account of life. He retreats from this debate, perhaps fearing that it would commit him to a vitalism or to a foundationalist account of life that precedes contract, sovereignty, and the biopolitical.8 “All this is a debate within political philosophy that we can leave on one side,” he writes, “but it clearly demonstrates how the problem of life came to be problematized within the field of political thought.”9 The issue cannot quite be set aside, but this is not because there are assumptions about the form of life that precede the domain of power. Rather, in my view, power is already operating through schemas of racism that persistently distinguish not only between lives that are more and less valuable, more and less grievable, but also between lives that register more or less emphatically as lives. A life can register as a life only within a schema that presents it as such. The epistemological nullification or foreclosure of the living character of a population—the very definition of a genocidal epistemology—structures the field of the living along a continuum that has concrete implications for the question: Whose are the lives that are worth preserving, whose lives matter, whose lives are grievable?

To ask the question is to confront from the start this particular “historic-racial schema”—a term prominently used by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks—a schema that functions as a form of perception and projection, an interpretive casing that enfolds the black body and orchestrates its social negation. In fact, Fanon distinguishes between the historic-racial schema and the “racial-epidermal schema” (which fixes an essence to black life), but it is the first that seems to bear a direct relation to the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a “corporeal schema” and to the schemas of racism that bear on grievability. A corporeal schema, for Merleau-Ponty, is the organization of tacit and structuring bodily relations with the world, but it is also the operation of constituting oneself within the terms made available by that world. The historic-racial schema, according to Fanon, is to be found at a deeper level, and it comes to disrupt the idealized corporeal schema proposed by Merleau-Ponty.10 The elements of the historic-racial schema are provided by what he calls “the white man”—a figure for the powers of racism that cast black bodily experience of the world into “certain uncertainty.” On the one hand, a “third-person consciousness” enters into a “first-person consciousness,” so one’s very mode of perception is riven by another consciousness. Who is seeing when I am seeing, and when I see myself, am I seeing only through the eyes of another? On the other hand, the corporeal schema describes ways of composing oneself from the elements of the world: Fanon describes this aspirational “schema” as “a slow composition of my self as a body in the middle of a spatial and temporal world.” The powerful figure of what he calls “the white man” is the one “who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, and stories.”11 So, as he writes, he retells having been written or woven by the third person, and we see on the page the slow struggle of self-composition that follows upon the decomposition of the bodily schema through the working of racism. It is at the level of the bodily experience of oneself in a world, where that schema is taken apart, expropriated, inhabited, occupied, and decomposed.

Of course, Fanon uses the first and the third person, figures such as the black man and the white man, to articulate this idea of the schema. But the historic-racial schema is broader and more diffuse than those particular figures. In fact, such a schema bears upon the living and embodied life of populations and so provides a critical supplement to Foucault’s reflections on anti-black racism and biopower. Such a historic-racial schema also precedes and informs policies on world health, hunger, refugees, migration, culture, occupation and other colonial practices, police violence, incarceration, the death penalty, intermittent bombardment and destruction, war, and genocide. Although Foucault identifies “state racism” at the end of these lectures as one of the central instruments for the management of the life and death of populations, he does not tell us precisely how racism works to establish relative values for different lives. There is, of course, a clear sense that some populations are targeted by modes of sovereign power and that there is a “letting die” orchestrated by biopower, but how do we account for the differential ways in which lives and deaths matter or fail to matter? If we take racialization as a process by which a racial schema is materialized in the very perception of whose life matters and whose does not,12 then we can proceed to ask: How do such differentiated modes of perception enter into military and policy debates regarding targeted populations and incarcerated peoples? And in what ways do they operate as a set of uncritically accepted presuppositions—racial schemas—in our own debates about violence and nonviolence?

At the close of “Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault opens up the possibility that populations who are precarious or abandoned are not yet constituted as subjects of rights, and that in order to understand who they are—that is to say, the way they are constituted within the political field— we need an alternative to the model of the subject. This opens a direction to think about state racism as well as the modes of agency and resistance that emerge from a population that can be described neither as an individual nor as a collective subject; but sadly, that direction did not end up being the path that Foucault would take.13

Perhaps that abandoned project might still be revived: if, as Foucault has argued, under sovereign power a subject has a right to life only on the condition that the subject is constituted as a rights-bearing subject, then under conditions of biopower, a population has a claim to life on the condition that that population is registered as potentially grievable. That is my thesis, my way of offering a supplement to Foucault by bringing Fanon to bear on the question of how racial schemas enter into the racial figurations of what is living, of the racial phantasms that inform the demographic valuations of who is grievable and who is not, whose lives ought to be preserved and whose can be expunged or left to die. Of course, there is a vast continuum of grievability, and populations can be grieved in one context and remain unmarked in another; and some modes of grieving may be acknowledged while others are dismissed or go unrecognized. And still, the dominant schemas by which the value of life is allocated rely on a modulation of grievability, whether or not that metric is ever named.

The historic-racial schema that makes it possible to claim, “This is or was a life,” or, “These are or were lives,” is intimately bound up with the possibility of necessary modes of valuing life: memorialization, safeguarding, recognition, and the preservation of life. (“This is a life worth living, worth preserving”; and “These are lives that ought to be given the condition to live and to be registered and recognized as lives.”) The phantasmagoria of racism is part of that racial schema.14 We can see how it works as a thought sequence crystallized in the moving images that enter into deliberation processes to negate the life claim of the person whose life is at stake—how the phantasmagoria of racism operates within the metric of grievability. It does so, for instance, in the sequence in which a person, such as Eric Garner in the United States in 2014, is put into a police choke hold, and then audibly announces he cannot breathe and visibly can be seen to be unable to breathe, and it is registered by everyone at the scene that he will not survive the prolongation of that police choke hold, which then, after the announcement, strengthens to become a stranglehold, strangulation, murder. Does the police officer who strengthens the hold to the point of death imagine that the person about to die is actually about to attack, or that their own life is endangered? Or is it simply that this life is one that can be snuffed out because it is not considered a life, never was a life, does not fit the norm of life that belongs to the racial schema; hence, because it does not register as a grievable life, a life worth preserving? Or when Walter Scott, in South Carolina in 2015, turned his back to the police, unarmed, clearly frightened, and ran in the opposite direction from them—how did he become phantasmagorically turned around, made into a threatening figure to be killed? Perhaps there, in the moment of decision or action that belongs to a race-war logic: the police person believes it is their own life, rather than the other’s, that is endangered. And perhaps this is simply the violent moment of a biopolitical apparatus, a way of managing that life unto death. In that case, the black man is simply there, vulnerable to being killed, and so he is killed, as if he is prey and the police are hunters. Or consider Trayvon Martin, killed by George Zimmerman who was subsequently acquitted, but also Marissa Alexander, in that same district, who was sentenced to twenty years for attempting to defend herself against sexual assault.

So, when unarmed black men or women, or queer and transgendered people, have their backs turned to police and are walking or running away, and they are still gunned down by police—an action often defended later as self-defense, even as a defense of society—how are we to understand this? Is that turning of the head or walking or running away actually an aggressive advance anticipated by the police? The police person who decides to shoot, or who simply finds himself shooting, may or may not be deliberating; but it surely seems that a phantasm has seized upon that thought process, inverting the figures and the movements he sees to justify in advance any lethal action he may take. The violence that the policeman is about to do, the violence he then commits, has already moved toward him in a figure, a racialized ghost, condensing and inverting his own aggression, wielding his own aggression against himself, acting in advance of his own plans to act, and legitimating and elaborating, as if in a dream, his later argument of self-defense.

Of course, the frame for this violence has to be expanded to include forms of violence that target race and gender at once, and so to reveal that sometimes the violence against black women, in particular, takes place in different scenes, in different sequences of events, and with differing consequences. The report “Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality against Black Women,” published in July 2015 by the Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies, led by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw and Andrea Ritchie, makes clear that nearly all of the main examples in the media illustrating police violence against black people in the United States involve black men, establishing that the dominant frames for understanding anti-black racism and police violence operate within a restrictive gender framing.15 Calling for “a gender-inclusive approach to racial justice,” Crenshaw has independently drawn attention to the way that black women are overpoliced and underprotected, but also to how their injuries and deaths are not as fully documented or registered, even within those social movements explicitly focused on opposing police violence.16

Contemporary European racism perhaps takes different forms, but the efforts to block migrants to Europe are in part rooted in the desire to keep Europe white, to safeguard a nationality that is imagined to be pure. It hardly matters that Europe has never been exclusively white, since the idea of European whiteness is a fantasy that seeks to be realized at the expense of a living population that includes people from North Africa, Turkey, and the Middle East. If we follow Foucault on biopower, and read him together with Achille Mbembe on necropolitics,17 then we can approach analytically the policies that reproduce this metric of grievability. The thousands of migrants who have lost their lives in the Mediterranean are precisely lives that are not deemed worthy of safeguarding. Those waters are monitored for the purposes of trade and maritime safety; there is often cell coverage. So, how many countries have to disavow responsibility in order for those people to be left to die? Even if we could track the decision not to send help to boats in distress to this or that functionary from a European government, we would not quite grasp the large-scale policy that effectively lets populations die, that would rather let them die than let them in. On the one hand, these are decisions, and we can track who is accountable for deciding in this way; on the other hand, the metric of grievability is built into these decisions in such a way that migrant populations are ungrievable from the start. We cannot lose those who cannot be grieved. They are treated as beyond losing, already lost, never living, never having been entitled to life.

All of these forms of taking life or letting life die are not just concrete examples of how the metric of grievability works; they wield the power to determine and distribute the grievability and value of lives. These are the concrete operations of the metric itself, its technologies, its points of application. And in these instances, we see the convergence of the biopolitical logic of the historic-racial schema with the phantasmagoric inversions that occlude the social bond: what may appear as an isolated act of violence or as the expression of an individual psychopathology shows itself to be part of a pattern, a punctual moment within a reiterated practice of violence. That practice relies upon and consolidates a racial schema in which aggression becomes justified through a logic that draws upon the phantasmagoric inversion of aggression, functioning not only as a potential defense, but as the effective moralization of murder—a racial schema in which the living status of the migrant, who fails to be registered within the perceptual field of the grievable, is already snuffed out, because from the start, such a life was not worth safeguarding and did not register as a life.

#### The alternative solves their theory of the psyche – you can vote neg to re-think their psychoanalytic deconstruction via the lens of Buddhism to refuse their Western insistence on speaking thru the self

Loy, 96. (‘Wisdom Cloud’ David Loy, American Author and Professor in the Sanbo Kyodan Japanese Zen Buddhism, MA in Asian Philosophy from Univ of Hawaii, PhD in Philosophy, Senior Teacher in Phil Department of Singapore Univ, Professor of Philosophy and Religion @ Bunkyo University, and Besl Chair of Ethics/Religion & Society with Xavier University. “Beyond Good and Evil? A Buddhist Critique of Nietzsche” Asian Philosophy, Volume 6, No 1. March 96. [KevC])

Existential psychologists such as Ernest Becker believe that our primary repression is not sexual wishes, as Freud thought, but the awareness that we are going to die. [[4]](http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ENG/loy1.htm" \l "4) This is closer to Buddhism, yet the anatman doctrine implies a subtle although significant distinction between fear of death and dread of the void: our worst problem is not death, a fear which still keeps the feared thing at a distance by projecting it into the future, but the more immediate and terrifying (and quite valid) suspicion each of us has that 'I' am not real right now.

 Sakyamuni Buddha did not use psychoanalytic terms, yet in trying to understand the Buddhist denial of self we can benefit from the concept of repression and the return of the repressed in symbolic form. If something (a mental wish, according to Freud) makes me uncomfortable, I can ignore or 'forget' it. This allows me to concentrate on something else, but what is not consciously admitted into awareness tends to irrupt in obsessive ways -- as symptoms -- that affect consciousness with precisely those qualities it strives to exclude. What does this imply about anatman?

    Buddhism analyses the sense-of-self into sets of impersonal mental and physical phenomena, whose interaction creates the illusion of self-consciousness, i.e. that consciousness characterises a self distinct from the world it is conscious of. The death-repression emphasised by existential psychology transforms Freud's Oedipal complex into what Norman Brown calls an Oedipal project -- the attempt to become father of oneself, i.e. one's own origin. The child wants to conquer death by becoming the creator and sustainer of its own life. [[5]](http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ENG/loy1.htm" \l "5) Buddhism shifts the emphasis: the Oedipal project is better understood as the attempt of the developing sense-of-self to attain autonomy, like Descartes' supposedly self-sufficient consciousness. It is the quest to deny one's groundlessness by becoming one's own ground: the ground (socially conditioned and maintained yet nonetheless illusory) we know as being an independent, individual subject.

    If so, the Oedipal project derives from our intuition that self-consciousness is not something 'self-existing' but a mental construct. As with Nietzsche, consciousness is more like the surface of the sea: dependent on unknown depths that it cannot grasp because it is a manifestation of them. The problem arises when this conditioned consciousness wants to ground itself, i.e. to make itself real. If the sense-of-self is a

 construct, it can realise itself only by objectifying itself in some way in the world. The ego-self is this never-ending project to objectify oneself, something consciousness can no more do than a hand can grasp itself or an eye see itself.

    The consequence of this perpetual failure is that the sense-of-self has, as its inescapable shadow, a sense-of-lack, which it always tries to escape. In deconstructive terms, the ineluctable trace of nothingness in our non-self-present being is a feeling of lack. The return of the repressed in the distorted form of a symptom shows us how to link this basic yet hopeless project with the symbolic ways we try to make ourselves real in the world. We experience this deep sense of lack as the feeling that 'there is something wrong with me,' but of course that feeling manifests, and we respond to it, in many different ways. In its 'purer' forms lack appears as an anxiety that gnaws on one's very core. For that reason such anxiety is eager to objectify into fear of something, because then we have ways to defend ourselves against feared things.

The problem with objectifications, however, is that no object can ever satisfy if it is not really an object we want. When we do not understand what is actually motivating us -- because what we think we want is only a symptom of something else (our desire to become real, according to my interpretation of Buddhism) -- we end up compulsive. Then the neurotic's anguish and despair are less the result of symptoms than their source; those symptoms are necessary to shield him from the tragedies that 'normal' people are better at repressing: death, meaninglessness, groundlessness.

The ultimate problem is not guilt but the incapacity to live. The illusion of guilt is necessary for an animal that cannot enjoy life, in order to organise a life of non-enjoyment. [[6]](http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ENG/loy1.htm" \l "6)

## OFF

### T – Long

#### Interp: the aff may only claim offense from the hypothetical implementation of Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Appropriation” is “large-scale extraction of space resources.” Comprehensive analysis proves

Leon 18 [Amanda, JD from UVA] “Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources” Vol. 104:497, Virginia Law Review, <https://www.capdale.com/files/24323_leon_final_note.pdf>, 2018 RE

Employing the treaty interpretation tools of ordinary meaning, preparatory materials, historical context, state practice, and state interpretation offers many possible understandings of the obligations imparted by Articles I and II of the OST. For example, while the ordinary meaning of “use” could reasonably include the exploitation of materials, the meeting summaries of the Fifth Session of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Sub-Committee make clear that no consensus was ever reached regarding whether “use” includes large-scale exploitation of space resources, let alone fee-simple ownership and the ability to sell commercially. State practice dealing with extraterrestrial samples also sheds little light on the confusion, as the examples cited all deal instead with scientific samples of limited quantity. The international community’s rejection of the Moon Agreement also fails to bring clarity. While on the one hand the rejection could be read as a rejection of the idea that the OST prohibits private property rights, it could also be read as a rejection of the common heritage of mankind doctrine. Finally, the prospect of private venture space mining and extraterrestrial resource extraction remained far off and futuristic at the time of the Treaty’s negotiation, making drawing legal conclusions about the legality of these revolutionary activities extremely difficult.

Overall, however, the Treaty’s structure and its purposes (preserving peace and avoiding international conflict in outer space) ultimately indicate that private property rights in space resources are prohibited by Article II’s non-appropriation principle, at least until future international delegation determines otherwise (like in the Antarctic). The Treaty’s structure confirms this interpretation. Article I lays down a general rule for activity in space. Subsequent articles of the Treaty then lay out more specific requirements of and qualifications to this general rule. Much like Article IV restricts the use of nuclear weapons in space, Article II restricts the use of space in ways that might result in potentially controversial property claims. Historically, claims to mineral rights have resulted in just as contentious conflict as those over sovereign lands. Treaty efforts to avoid conflicts in Antarctica and the high seas reflect similar sentiments. The Soviet Union’s representative even hinted at this structural relationship between Articles I and II during Treaty negotiations.232 In light of the imminent need to ease Cold War tensions, the potential for conflict over property, and the final structure of the Treaty, this Note concludes that the large-scale extraction of space resources is incompatible with the non-appropriation principle of Article II of the OST.233 As a result, the United States’ provision of property rights to its citizens to possess, own, transport, use, and sell space and asteroid resources extracted through the SREU Act contravenes its international obligations established by the OST.

#### “Is unjust” can require positive action to rectify the injustice

Pomerleau [Wayne, PhD, Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga] “Western Theories of Justice”, IEP, <https://iep.utm.edu/justwest/>, last date cited is 2010, RE

Nozick (a departmental colleague of Rawls at Harvard) was one of the first and remains one of the most famous critics of Rawls’s liberal theory of justice. Both are fundamentally committed to individual liberty. But as a libertarian, Nozick is opposed to compromising individual liberty in order to promote socio-economic equality and advocates a “minimal state” as the only sort that can be socially just. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), especially in its famous chapter on “Distributive Justice,” while praising Rawls’s first book as the most important “work in political and moral philosophy” since that of Mill, Nozick argues for what he calls an “entitlement conception of justice” in terms of three principles of just holdings. First, anyone who justly acquires any holding is rightly entitled to keep and use it. Second, anyone who acquires any holding by means of a just transfer of property is rightly entitled to keep and use it. It is only through some combination of these two approaches that anyone is rightly entitled to any holding. But some people acquire holdings unjustly—e.g., by theft or fraud or force—so that there are illegitimate holdings. So, third, justice can require the rectification of unjust past acquisitions. These three principles of just holdings—“the principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectification of the violations of the first two principles”—constitute the core of Nozick’s libertarian entitlement theory of justice. People should be entitled to use their own property as they see fit, so long as they are entitled to it. On this view, any pattern of distribution, such as Rawls’s difference principle, that would force people to give up any holdings to which they are entitled in order to give it to someone else (i.e., a redistribution of wealth) is unjust. Thus, for Nozick, any state, such as ours or one Rawls would favor, that is “more extensive” than a minimal state and redistributes wealth by taxing those who are relatively well off to benefit the disadvantaged necessarily “violates people’s rights” (State, pp. 149, 183, 230, 150-153, 230-231, 149).

#### US Code defines private entities

US Code 6 U.S. Code § 1501 – Definitions, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/1501#15_A>, 2015 RE

(15)Private entity

(A)In general

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(B)Inclusion

The term “private entity” includes a State, tribal, or local government performing utility services, such as electric, natural gas, or water services.

(C)Exclusion

The term “private entity” does not include a foreign power as defined in section 1801 of title 50.

#### Definition of “outer space”

Vereshchetin 06 [Vladlen, former Member of the ICJ, Chairman of the International Law Commission, and Professor of International Law] “Outer Space,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, <https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Outer_Space.pdf>, 2006 RE

A. Definition of the Term ‘Outer Space’

1 The term ‘outer space’, like several other basic notions of space law (‘outer space activity’, ‘space flight’, ‘space object’), although frequently used in space agreements and other space law instruments, has never been defined by them. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the objective difficulty for the States concerned to agree on legal definitions in the context of rapidly developing technology and their apprehension that legally binding definitions might restrict their sphere of operation.

2 The absence of a formal definition of outer space does not mean that no general perception exists as to what is meant by outer space, even if the use of the term in natural sciences and in law may not always be exactly the same. It should be remembered that there is no definitive physical boundary between atmospheric space and extra-atmospheric space, the transition from one to the other being gradual. Although at 100 km the density of the air is but one millionth of what it is at sea level, for natural scientists these two regions of space, in some respects, may be perceived as one single whole. However, with the launching of the first satellite in 1957 the notion of outer space became inextricably linked with the exploration and uses of space by means of man-made spacecraft (→ Spacecraft, Satellites, and Space Objects). The physical and technical factors are directly relevant to the legal regulation of the region of space concerned. The atmospheric space of the earth and most of the activities in this space fall within the ambit of → Air Law. The space beyond the atmosphere is governed by space law. The ‘spatial’ element of each of the two above-mentioned branches of law is reflected in their denominations: the first being known as air (ie atmospheric) law, the second as space law, often referred to as outer space (ie extra-atmospheric) law.

3 The legal regimes governing → airspace and outer space are fundamentally different. Thus, logically and jurisprudentially it is necessary to know where air space ends and outer space begins. In theory, there must be no ‘outer’ boundary of application of space law, since outer space itself is limitless, but in practice space law, keeping pace with the development of space technology, does not purport to regulate space activity beyond the solar system (see Art. 1 Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3]). At the same time, ‘celestial bodies’ of the solar system, other than the earth, but comprising the Moon, are included in the legal notion of outer space (→ Moon and Celestial Bodies). This follows from the title and text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ([signed 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967] 610 UNTS 205) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

#### At best, it’s extra topical, which still skews neg prep and links to our offense.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits and ground—-allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. Because debate is a competitive game, there is an incentive to revert to truisms that give the negative no chance at engagement. The lack of a plan also means the affirmative can shift their advocacy in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text, which obviates negative arguments.

#### This has two impacts –

#### Fairness – A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win—-radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. Fairness is an intrinsic good—-debate is fundamentally a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg—-the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate and the reason why people are incentivized to do prep and research is to help them do better in their next round is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate. Fairness also comes before substance—-deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it—-any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, because it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### Second is Argument Engagement---advocacy tied to the resolution incentivizes nuanced research and CLASH with a well prepared opponent---They turn debate into one with no negative counterargumentation which causes confirmation bias and less good affirmatives. It also doesn’t subject the aff to rigorous arugmentation which eliminates the skills necessary to make real material change in the world and doesn’t generate real productive discussions – turns their offense.

#### Topical version of the aff – end the commercialization of space. Use sufficiency when evaluating the TVA because all deficits are neg ground. This and SSD solve their offense by re-centering debate on the 1AC.

#### Topicality must be a voting issue—the role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question. Any aff role for debate must explain why we switch sides and why there has to be a winner and a loser—switching sides within the competitive yet limited bounds of the topic performs the labor of the negative which avoids group polarization and untested advocacy

#### Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## OFF

### NC – CP

#### We endorse the entirety of the affirmative without their affirmation that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Asteroid mining is privatized and feasible – it solves resource conflict and environmental catastrophe

Kevin MacWhorter 16, J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, "Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism", William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol 40, Issue 2, Article 11, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1653&context=wmelpr>

A. Rare Element Mining on Earth In the next sixty years, scientists predict that certain elements crucial to modern industry such as platinum, zinc, copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium could be exhausted on Earth. 12 Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical elements such as oil or diamonds.13 Liquid-crystal display (LCD) televisions, cellphones, and laptops are among the various consumer technologies that use precious metals.14Further, green technologies including wind turbines, solar panels, and catalytic converters require these rare elements. 15 As demand rises for both types of technologies, and as reserves of rare metals fall, prices skyrocket.16 Demand for nonrenewable resources creates conflict, and consumerism in rich countries results in harsh labor treatment for poorer countries.17 In general, the mining industry is extremely destructive to Earth’s environment.18 In fact, depending on the method employed, mining can destroy entire ecosystems by polluting water sources and contributing to deforestation.19 It is by its nature an unsustainable practice, because it involves the extraction of a finite and non-renewable resource.20 Moreover, by extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the mining industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world.21 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes the industry as the source of more toxic and hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities. 22 Poor regulations and oxymoronic corporate definitions of sustainability, however, make it unclear as to just how much waste the industry actually produces.23 Platinum provides an excellent case study of the issue, because it is an extremely rare and expensive metal—an ore expected to exist in vast quantities in asteroids.24 Further, production of platinum has increased sharply in the past sixty years in order to keep up with growing demand for use in new technologies.25 In fact, despite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one] of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production. 26 Scholars do not expect demand to slow any time soon.27 Among other technologies, industries use platinum in products such as catalytic converters, jewelry production, various catalysts for chemical processing, and hydrogen fuel cells.28 While there is no consensus on how far the Earth’s reserves of platinum will take humanity, many scientists agree that platinum ore reserves will deplete in a relatively short amount of time.29 With the rate of mining at an all-time high,30 it is increasingly clear that historical patterns of mineral resources and development cannot simply be assumed to continue unaltered into the future. 31 The platinum mining industry, however, has a strong incentive to increase its rate of extraction as profits grow with the rate of demand. Without any alternative, this destructive practice will continue into the future.32 So-called platinum-group metal (PGM) ores are mined through underground or open cut techniques.33 Due to these practices, all but a very small fraction of the mined platinum ore is disposed of as solid waste.34 The environmental consequences of platinum production are thus quite significant, but like the mining industry in general, the amount of waste is typically under-reported.35 While this is due to high production levels at the moment, those levels will only increase given the estimated future demand of platinum.36 In spite of the negative consequences, mining continues unabated because it is economically important to many areas.37 The future environmental costs provide a major challenge in creating a sustainable system. Relegating at least some mining companies to near-Earth asteroids would reduce the negative effects of future mining levels on Earth. The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake of the environment.38 B. Privatization of the Space Industry For most of the Space Age, the role of private companies has been as that of government contractors.39 During the past fifteen years, however, space flight has become increasingly the realm of private industry.40 Space tourism is on the rise,41 and private companies have been launching their own satellites into orbit for decades.42 In May 2012, SpaceX docked with the International Space Station the first private company to do so. 43 While the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) federal outlay has increased since 1958, NASAs budget as a percentage of US spending has decreased dramatically.44The private space industry has seen dramatic growth as a result.45 Since NASA retired its shuttle fleet in 2011, the agency has turned to private actors to design and build spacecraft.46 That year, NASA awarded four private space companies SpaceX, Blue Origin LLC, Boeing Co., and Sierra Nevada Corp. contracts worth a combined total of $269.3 million to transport cargo and crew to and from the International Space Station.47 More companies, such as Orbital Sciences, have followed suit.48 Space mining in particular has been a focus of private investment.49 The promise of abundant rare Earth resources creates the possibility of vast wealth for intrepid investors.50 For example, Google founders Larry Page and Eric Schmidt have invested heavily in private space flight.51 Google is offering the Lunar X Prize: $30 million in prizes to any team who is able to safely land a robot on the surface of the Moon, have that robot travel 500 meters [1,640 feet] over the lunar surface, and send video, images, and data back to the Earth before 2016. 52 The purpose behind the contest should be apparent: investors think private space flight and mining could be extremely lucrative.53 Rare metals, such as platinum, could become far more accessible.54 In 2012, Page, Schmidt, director James Cameron, and other distinguished entrepreneurs announced they were investing considerable financial resources in Planetary Resources, a company developing the technology to mine an asteroid.55The companys goalis to land a mining vessel on a near-Earth asteroid, mine its valuable minerals, and bring the natural resources of space within humanitys economic sphere. 56 To that end, many companies are focused on the idea of asteroid mining.57 Privatization, however, has brought many legal and economic considerations to the forefront. One of the most significant obstacles for the private space industry has been the price tag of traveling into space. Complicating matters, the current law governing claims of property in space is ambiguous.58 Companies therefore cannot be sure whether their property claims will be enforced after they extract minerals in space and bring them back to Earth.59 When investing large sums of money such a consideration is absolutely critical.60 Although there has been investment in the area, sending an actual mission to an asteroid will require less ambiguous property provisions in international space law. C. Asteroid Mining 101 As the Planetary Resources website exclaims, [T]he more we learn about asteroids, the more enticing they become! 61 Certain types of asteroids including X-type and S-type asteroids contain both precious and base metals in quantities sufficient to make any entrepreneur salivate.62 Metals on which many current technologies rely such as iron, gold, and platinum can be found in most asteroids. 63 Current estimates count around two million asteroids in the solar system that are a kilometer or more in diameter.64 Astrophysicists estimate that each could contain 30 million tons of nickel, 1.5 million tons of cobalt, and 7,500 tons of platinum, among other minerals.65 To put that in economic terms, the value of each asteroid could be somewhere in the trillions [of dollars] or higher. 66 Indeed, because of their zero gravity fields and availability of metals, asteroids have been considered as candidates for resource extraction since the beginning of the space age.67 The technology needed to extract resources from asteroids, however, is a very recent phenomenon.68 With the European Space Agency successfully landing the Philae Lander on Comet 67P, it is much more plausible to land a mining operation on an asteroid.69 Although companies likely are not able to send mining ventures to asteroids immediately, as the preceding section suggested, asteroid mining is a possibility in the near future.70 First of all, two companies are developing the technology needed to mine asteroids.71Planetary Resources is creating cheaper prospecting spacecraft small enough to hitch a ride into space with larger, primary payloads. 72 Another company, Deep Space Industries (DSI), is developing a four-stage system for mining in space: Prospecting, Processing, Harvesting, and Manufacturing.73 It has already invented one spacecraft to be used for the Prospecting stage: a tiny probe, called FireFly, designed to scout asteroids and study their size, shape, spin and composition . . . . 74 For the Processing phase, DSI is creating technology required to transform regolith to raw materials for manufacture.75 The company is currently developing another spacecraft, called a Harvestor, for the third stage to collect and transport resources.76Finally, the company is creating technology to manufacture finished products in space.77 The United States space policy is also embracing the idea of asteroid mining. In April 2010, President Obama promised to send astronauts to explore an asteroid by 2025.78 In 2014, NASA requested, much to the surprise of asteroid scientists, a budget that includes $105 million to begin work on a mission that would send a robotic spacecraft to capture an asteroid as early as 2019 and haul it back so that astronauts could rendezvous with it by 2022. 79 Further, NASA has awarded contracts to Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries to prepare for and ultimately execute missions to land on and mine asteroids for valuable resources. 80 NASA is also designing a spacecraft, the primary goal of which is to land on an asteroid and take samples.81 It is scheduled for launch in September 2016.82 As all this recent development suggests, the technology to mine asteroids is not far off. In fact, the requisite technology exists it just needs to be adapted for use in an extraterrestrial environment.83 As Chris Lewicki, president of Planetary Resources, said: [T]he single biggest challenge that Planetary Resources will have to overcome is convincing people that asteroid mining will happen sooner than they think. 84 Asteroid mining will gain in popularity as resources deplete, forcing humans to dig deeper and deeper in the Earths crust for minerals. 85 A recent article summarized some of Lewickis reasoning succinctly: [T]he energy required to extract minerals from an asteroid is considerably less than to extract from the Earth, or even the moon . . . , because in space there is no atmosphere to oxidise or salt to corrode, no weather, no gravity or friction to oppose transportation, dissipate energy and waste heat and unlimited heat from the sun and coldness in space for refrigeration, creating the perfect vacuum . . . .86

#### Outweighs the aff.

Phil Torres 16. Affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. “Biodiversity loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 4/11/2016. http://thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329

Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change, because the former has been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect. Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental crisis with its own unique syndrome of causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats, creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”), and practicing sustainable agriculture. The sixth extinction. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone. The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago. But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006. The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying. Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048. Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.

#### Resource wars go nuclear.

Klare 13 – Michael T., professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC, " How Resource Scarcity and Climate Change Could Produce a Global Explosion", *The Nation*, 4/22/2013, <https://www.thenation.com/article/how-resource-scarcity-and-climate-change-could-produce-global-explosion/> JHW

Resource Shortages and Resource Wars Start with one simple given: the prospect of future scarcities of vital natural resources, including energy, water, land, food and critical minerals. This in itself would guarantee social unrest, geopolitical friction and war. It is important to note that absolute scarcity doesn’t have to be on the horizon in any given resource category for this scenario to kick in. A lack of adequate supplies to meet the needs of a growing, ever more urbanized and industrialized global population is enough. Given the wave of extinctions that scientists are recording, some resources—particular species of fish, animals and trees, for example—will become less abundant in the decades to come, and may even disappear altogether. But key materials for modern civilization like oil, uranium and copper will simply prove harder and more costly to acquire, leading to supply bottlenecks and periodic shortages. Oil—the single most important commodity in the international economy—provides an apt example. Although global oil supplies may actually grow in the coming decades, many experts doubt that they can be expanded sufficiently to meet the needs of a rising global middle class that is, for instance, expected to buy millions of new cars in the near future. In its 2011 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency claimed that an anticipated global oil demand of 104 million barrels per day in 2035 will be satisfied. This, the report suggested, would be thanks in large part to additional supplies of “unconventional oil” (Canadian tar sands, shale oil and so on), as well as 55 million barrels of new oil from fields “yet to be found” and “yet to be developed.” However, many analysts scoff at this optimistic assessment, arguing that rising production costs (for energy that will be ever more difficult and costly to extract), environmental opposition, warfare, corruption and other impediments will make it extremely difficult to achieve increases of this magnitude. In other words, even if production manages for a time to top the 2010 level of 87 million barrels per day, the goal of 104 million barrels will never be reached and the world’s major consumers will face virtual, if not absolute, scarcity. Water provides another potent example. On an annual basis, the supply of drinking water provided by natural precipitation remains more or less constant: about 40,000 cubic kilometers. But much of this precipitation lands on Greenland, Antarctica, Siberia and inner Amazonia where there are very few people, so the supply available to major concentrations of humanity is often surprisingly limited. In many regions with high population levels, water supplies are already relatively sparse. This is especially true of North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East, where the demand for water continues to grow as a result of rising populations, urbanization and the emergence of new water-intensive industries. The result, even when the supply remains constant, is an environment of increasing scarcity. Wherever you look, the picture is roughly the same: supplies of critical resources may be rising or falling, but rarely do they appear to be outpacing demand, producing a sense of widespread and systemic scarcity. However generated, a perception of scarcity—or imminent scarcity—regularly leads to anxiety, resentment, hostility and contentiousness. This pattern is very well understood, and has been evident throughout human history. In his book Constant Battles, for example, Steven LeBlanc, director of collections for Harvard’s Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, notes that many ancient civilizations experienced higher levels of warfare when faced with resource shortages brought about by population growth, crop failures or persistent drought. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller Collapse, has detected a similar pattern in Mayan civilization and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico’s Chaco Canyon. More recently, concern over adequate food for the home population was a significant factor in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, according to Lizzie Collingham, author of The Taste of War. Although the global supply of most basic commodities has grown enormously since the end of World War II, analysts see the persistence of resource-related conflict in areas where materials remain scarce or there is anxiety about the future reliability of supplies. Many experts believe, for example, that the fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by competition among desert tribes for access to scarce water supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels. “In Darfur,” says a 2009 report from the UN Environment Programme on the role of natural resources in the conflict, “recurrent drought, increasing demographic pressures, and political marginalization are among the forces that have pushed the region into a spiral of lawlessness and violence that has led to 300,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people since 2003.” Anxiety over future supplies is often also a factor in conflicts that break out over access to oil or control of contested undersea reserves of oil and natural gas. In 1979, for instance, when the Islamic revolution in Iran overthrew the Shah and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Washington began to fear that someday it might be denied access to Persian Gulf oil. At that point, President Jimmy Carter promptly announced what came to be called the Carter Doctrine. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter affirmed that any move to impede the flow of oil from the Gulf would be viewed as a threat to America’s “vital interests” and would be repelled by “any means necessary, including military force.” In 1990, this principle was invoked by President George H.W. Bush to justify intervention in the first Persian Gulf War, just as his son would use it, in part, to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Today, it remains the basis for US plans to employ force to stop the Iranians from closing the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which about 35 percent of the world’s seaborne oil commerce passes. Recently, a set of resource conflicts have been rising toward the boiling point between China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia when it comes to control of offshore oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea. Although the resulting naval clashes have yet to result in a loss of life, a strong possibility of military escalation exists. A similar situation has also arisen in the East China Sea, where China and Japan are jousting for control over similarly valuable undersea reserves. Meanwhile, in the South Atlantic Ocean, Argentina and Britain are once again squabbling over the Falkland Islands (called Las Malvinas by the Argentinians) because oil has been discovered in surrounding waters. By all accounts, resource-driven potential conflicts like these will only multiply in the years ahead as demand rises, supplies dwindle and more of what remains will be found in disputed areas. In a 2012 study titled Resources Futures, the respected British think-tank Chatham House expressed particular concern about possible resource wars over water, especially in areas like the Nile and Jordan River basins where several groups or countries must share the same river for the majority of their water supplies and few possess the wherewithal to develop alternatives. “Against this backdrop of tight supplies and competition, issues related to water rights, prices, and pollution are becoming contentious,” the report noted. “In areas with limited capacity to govern shared resources, balance competing demands, and mobilize new investments, tensions over water may erupt into more open confrontations.” Heading for a Resource-Shock World Tensions like these would be destined to grow by themselves because in so many areas supplies of key resources will not be able to keep up with demand. As it happens, though, they are not “by themselves.” On this planet, a second major force has entered the equation in a significant way. With the growing reality of climate change, everything becomes a lot more terrifying. Normally, when we consider the impact of climate change, we think primarily about the environment—the melting Arctic ice cap or Greenland ice shield, rising global sea levels, intensifying storms, expanding desert and endangered or disappearing species like the polar bear. But a growing number of experts are coming to realize that the most potent effects of climate change will be experienced by humans directly through the impairment or wholesale destruction of habitats upon which we rely for food production, industrial activities or simply to live. Essentially, climate change will wreak its havoc on us by constraining our access to the basics of life: vital resources that include food, water, land and energy. This will be devastating to human life, even as it significantly increases the danger of resource conflicts of all sorts erupting. We already know enough about the future effects of climate change to predict the following with reasonable confidence: \* Rising sea levels will in the next half-century erase many coastal areas, destroying large cities, critical infrastructure (including roads, railroads, ports, airports, pipelines, refineries and power plants) and prime agricultural land. \* Diminished rainfall and prolonged droughts will turn once-verdant croplands into dust bowls, reducing food output and turning millions into “climate refugees.” \* More severe storms and intense heat waves will kill crops, trigger forest fires, cause floods and destroy critical infrastructure. No one can predict how much food, land, water and energy will be lost as a result of this onslaught (and other climate-change effects that are harder to predict or even possibly imagine), but the cumulative effect will undoubtedly be staggering. In Resources Futures, Chatham House offers a particularly dire warning when it comes to the threat of diminished precipitation to rain-fed agriculture. “By 2020,” the report says, “yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%” in some areas. The highest rates of loss are expected to be in Africa, where reliance on rain-fed farming is greatest, but agriculture in China, India, Pakistan and Central Asia is also likely to be severely affected. Heat waves, droughts and other effects of climate change will also reduce the flow of many vital rivers, diminishing water supplies for irrigation, hydro-electricity power facilities and nuclear reactors (which need massive amounts of water for cooling purposes). The melting of glaciers, especially in the Andes in Latin America and the Himalayas in South Asia, will also rob communities and cities of crucial water supplies. An expected increase in the frequency of hurricanes and typhoons will pose a growing threat to offshore oil rigs, coastal refineries, transmission lines and other components of the global energy system. The melting of the Arctic ice cap will open that region to oil and gas exploration, but an increase in iceberg activity will make all efforts to exploit that region’s energy supplies perilous and exceedingly costly. Longer growing seasons in the north, especially Siberia and Canada’s northern provinces, might compensate to some degree for the desiccation of croplands in more southerly latitudes. However, moving the global agricultural system (and the world’s farmers) northward from abandoned farmlands in the United States, Mexico, Brazil, India, China, Argentina and Australia would be a daunting prospect. It is safe to assume that climate change, especially when combined with growing supply shortages, will result in a significant reduction in the planet’s vital resources, augmenting the kinds of pressures that have historically led to conflict, even under better circumstances. In this way, according to the Chatham House report, climate change is best understood as a “threat multiplier…a key factor exacerbating existing resource vulnerability” in states already prone to such disorders. Like other experts on the subject, Chatham House’s analysts claim, for example, that climate change will reduce crop output in many areas, sending global food prices soaring and triggering unrest among those already pushed to the limit under existing conditions. “Increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events, such as droughts, heat waves and floods, will also result in much larger and frequent local harvest shocks around the world….These shocks will affect global food prices whenever key centers of agricultural production area are hit—further amplifying global food price volatility.” This, in turn, will increase the likelihood of civil unrest. When, for instance, a brutal heat wave decimated Russia’s wheat crop during the summer of 2010, the global price of wheat (and so of that staple of life, bread) began an inexorable upward climb, reaching particularly high levels in North Africa and the Middle East. With local governments unwilling or unable to help desperate populations, anger over impossible-to-afford food merged with resentment toward autocratic regimes to trigger the massive popular outburst we know as the Arab Spring. Many such explosions are likely in the future, Chatham House suggests, if current trends continue as climate change and resource scarcity meld into a single reality in our world. A single provocative question from that group should haunt us all: “Are we on the cusp of a new world order dominated by struggles over access to affordable resources?” For the US intelligence community, which appears to have been influenced by the report, the response was blunt. In March, for the first time, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper listed “competition and scarcity involving natural resources” as a national security threat on a par with global terrorism, cyberwar and nuclear proliferation. “Many countries important to the United States are vulnerable to natural resource shocks that degrade economic development, frustrate attempts to democratize, raise the risk of regime-threatening instability, and aggravate regional tensions,” he wrote in his prepared statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “Extreme weather events (floods, droughts, heat waves) will increasingly disrupt food and energy markets, exacerbating state weakness, forcing human migrations, and triggering riots, civil disobedience, and vandalism.” There was a new phrase embedded in his comments: “resource shocks.” It catches something of the world we’re barreling toward, and the language is striking for an intelligence community that, like the government it serves, has largely played down or ignored the dangers of climate change. For the first time, senior government analysts may be coming to appreciate what energy experts, resource analysts and scientists have long been warning about: the unbridled consumption of the world’s natural resources, combined with the advent of extreme climate change, could produce a global explosion of human chaos and conflict. We are now heading directly into a resource-shock world.

## OFF

### 1NC – CP

#### We advocate for the 1AC without the use of the term Anthropocene.

#### Its competitive and legitimate – it does less than the 1AC – the entire aff is a criticism of the way we describe space with impacts about colonization – using settler descriptions of the world turns their entire advocacy. No stable action means the entire 1AC is the plan and we should get to negate the AFFs choices. They get infinite prep time to choose each word carefully – any other interp is arbitrary and justifies the aff not being held accountable for their rhetoric.

#### The term “Anthropocene” to describe our current era whitewashes Eurocentric violence and erases black and indigenous struggle by framing all humans as responsible for modernity

Grove 16- Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai‘i Mānoa [Jairus, Boston Review, “Jairus Grove response to Jedediah Purdy,” <https://bostonreview.net/forum_response/jairus-grove-response-nature-anthropocene/>, DKP]

Unlike many who appeal to the Anthropocene simply to advance the cause of geoengineering, Jedediah Purdy begins with an assessment of our political condition. Still, he fails to appreciate the nature of the geopolitics responsible for the crisis we face. If we are to take up his noble call for an ecological democracy, we must acknowledge that the violence done to our planet has largely been perpetrated not by all humans but by a select group of Europeans. The Anthropos—the human species as such—is not to blame. Properly named, our era is not the Anthropocene but the Eurocene.

It was a European elite that developed a distinctively mechanistic view of matter, an oppositional relationship to nature, and an economic system indebted to geographical expansion. The resulting political orders measured success by how much wealth could be generated in the exploitation of peoples and resources. The geological record bears the mark of this European assemblage of hierarchies. Understanding the forces of Europeanization—the forces of racial superiority, economic hegemony, and global resettlement—is essential to understanding how the planet got to this point, and how “we” could possibly become democratic.

Purdy and others claim there are two reasons for renaming the last few centuries to mark a new geological era. The first is a matter of accuracy: there is significant evidence that humans have contributed to climate change. The second is a matter of consciousness raising: renaming the Holocene is essential to raising awareness that humans are responsible. Yet on both counts, we should reconsider what we mean by “human.” It would be more accurate, and go further in raising awareness, to acknowledge the grossly disproportionate impact Europeans have had on our planet. This is not just another hyperbolic jeremiad against European peoples: Purdy’s invitation for global democratic thinking requires a geological history and name that foregrounds what really stands in the way of such a future.

As Purdy points out (unlike Paul Crutzen and others), the “human” footprint involves much more than just carbon dioxide. On a geological time scale, the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide are dwarfed by those of radioactivity and are comparable to those of plastic, the modern waste product par excellence. If the Anthropocene is meant to name the scale of human impacts on the planet, it should refer not only to warming but also to cooling the earth, and Europeanization has done both at levels that even China’s current growth cannot match.

Beginning in 1610, a small-scale ice age took hold of the planet when a wilder arboreal nature took back what had been inhabited land: some 20 million people killed by the European invasion of the Americas resulted in vast reforestation of the North and South American continents. The providence spoken of by those who arrived was not God but syphilis, influenza, and the number of other species that went along for the ride. Waves of well-armed European explorers and settlers leveraged the devastation for their own gain. There is no way to know how many languages, cities, ideas, cosmologies, and ways of inhabiting the world were lost in this genocide and terraforming of the Americas.

The history of nuclear weapons is also predominantly European. The bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, is only the beginning of this story. In the years that have followed, more than 2,000 nuclear weapons have been tested, about 97 percent of which were detonated by European powers. Those detonations do not appear as tests from the perspectives of the Marshallese or Western Shoshone. A seventy-year nuclear war has spread cancer, incinerated sacred lands, and made other spaces uninhabitable on a temporal scale several orders of magnitude more condensed than the lifespan of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The nuclear powers of the Eurocene—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel—possess 97 percent of the 15,800 nuclear weapons around the planet. The beleaguered state of the arms control agenda means self-annihilation is still a very real possibility.

## Case

### NC – Framing

#### I value morality, the standard is maximizing wellbeing.

#### 1] Use util – it’s impartial, specific to public actors, and resolves infinite regress which explains all value. Reject flawed calc indicts that misunderstand happiness and rely on problematic intuitions.

Greene 15 — (Joshua Greene, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard, being interviewed by Russ Roberts, “Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism”, The Library of Economics and Liberty, 1-5-15, Available Online at <https://www.econtalk.org/joshua-greene-on-moral-tribes-moral-dilemmas-and-utilitarianism/#audio-highlights>, accessed 5-17-20, HKR-AM) \*\*NB: Guest = Greene, and only his lines are highlighted/underlined

Guest: Okay. So, I think utilitarianism is very much misunderstood. And this is part of the reason why we shouldn't even call it utilitarianism at all. We should call it what I call 'deep pragmatism', which I think better captures what I think utilitarianism is really like, if you really apply it in real life, in light of an understanding of human nature. But, we can come back to that. The idea, going back to the tragedy of common-sense morality is you've got all these different tribes with all of these different values based on their different ways of life. What can they do to get along? And I think that the best answer that we have is--well, let's back up. In order to resolve any kind of tradeoff, you have to have some kind of common metric. You have to have some kind of common currency. And I think that what utilitarianism, whether it's the moral truth or not, is provide a kind of common currency. So, what is utilitarianism? It's basically the idea that--it's really two ideas put together. One is the idea of impartiality. That is, at least as social decision makers, we should regard everybody's interests as of equal worth. Everybody counts the same. And then you might say, 'Well, but okay, what does it mean to count everybody the same? What is it that really matters for you and for me and for everybody else?' And there the utilitarian's answer is what is sometimes called, somewhat accurately and somewhat misleadingly, happiness. But it's not really happiness in the sense of cherries on sundaes, things that make you smile. It's really the quality of conscious experience. So, the idea is that if you start with anything that you value, and say, 'Why do you care about that?' and keep asking, 'Why do you care about that?' or 'Why do you care about that?' you ultimately come down to the quality of someone's conscious experience. So if I were to say, 'Why did you go to work today?' you'd say, 'Well, I need to make money; and I also enjoy my work.' 'Well, what do you need your money for?' 'Well, I need to have a place to live; it costs money.' 'Well, why can't you just live outside?' 'Well, I need a place to sleep; it's cold at night.' 'Well, what's wrong with being cold?' 'Well, it's uncomfortable.' 'What's wrong with being uncomfortable?' 'It's just bad.' Right? At some point if you keep asking why, why, why, it's going to come down to the conscious experience--in Bentham's terms, again somewhat misleading, the pleasure and pain of either you or somebody else that you care about. So the utilitarian idea is to say, Okay, we all have our pleasures and pains, and as a moral philosophy we should all count equally. And so a good standard for resolving public disagreements is to say we should go with whatever option is going to produce the best overall experience for the people who are affected. Which you can think of as shorthand as maximizing happiness--although I think that that's somewhat misleading. And the solution has a lot of merit to it. But it also has endured a couple of centuries of legitimate criticism. And one of the biggest criticisms--and now we're getting back to the Trolley cases, is that utilitarianism doesn't adequately account for people's rights. So, take the footbridge case. It seems that it's wrong to push that guy off the footbridge. Even if you stipulate that you can save more people's lives. And so anyone who is going to defend utilitarianism as a meta-morality--that is, a solution to the tragedy of common sense morality, as a moral system to adjudicate among competing tribal moral systems--if you are going to defend it in that way, as I do, you have to face up to these philosophical challenges: is it okay to kill on person to save five people in this kind of situation? So I spend a lot of the book trying to understand the psychology of cases like the footbridge case. And you mention these being kind of unrealistic and weird cases. That's actually part of my defense.

Russ: Yeah, there's some plus to it, I agree.

Guest: Right. And the idea is that your amygdala is responding to an act of violence. And most acts of violence are bad. And so it is good for us to have a gut reaction, which is really a reaction in your amygdala that's then sending a signal to your ventromedial prefrontal cortex and so on and so forth, and we can talk about that. It's good to have that reaction that says, 'Don't push people off of footbridges.' But if you construct a case in which you stipulate that committing this act of violence is going to lead to the greater good, and it still feels wrong, I think it's a mistake to interpret that gut reaction as a challenge to the theory that says we should do whatever in general is going to promote the greater good. That is, our gut reactions are somewhat limited. They are good for everyday life. It's good that you have a gut reaction that says, 'Don't go shoving people off of high places.' But that shouldn't be a veto against a general idea that otherwise makes a lot of sense. Which is that in the modern world, we have a lot of different competing value systems, and that the way to resolve disagreements among those different competing value systems is to say, 'What's going to actually produce the best consequences?' And best consequences measured in terms of the quality of people's experience. So, that's kind of completing or partially completing the circle between the tragedy of the commons, that discussion, and how do we get to the Trolleys.

#### 2] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### 3] That is the only egalitarian metric---anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

### NC – Presumption

The aff must be a significant departure from the status quo rather than just an idea internal to debate.

If not, vote neg on presumption.

### NC – Case

#### 1. You should hold new 2AR spin with extreme skepticism – the 1AC is a flat-out double turn – part 1 is about Luce Irigaray who is a Lacanian psychoanalyst whose theory of language and linguistics endorses sexual difference – part 2 is Haraway and Puar – who are Deleuzians who think psychoanalysis is wrong – they think instead of embracing sexual difference gender is in total flux and destabilized – we should play with gender and explode the binary through cyborgian affects. The 1AR will try to persuade you they don’t have to defend their authors – we think they should defend the words in the 1AC which explicitly make these arguments – anything else makes being neg impossible and is a voter for clash and education.

#### 2. Their defense the cyborg reflects a universalizing Western mythologization of neutrality and identity that props up colonization

Schueller 05 [Malini Johar. "Analogy and (white) feminist theory: Thinking race and the color of the cyborg body." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 31.1 (2005): 63-92.]

I point to the similarities between Haraway’s cyborg theory and theories of several other poststructuralists in order to suggest that there is nothing inherently subversive for feminism about such theorizing unless the theory can be shown to have specific, material, and located ramifications (a fact Haraway seems to have partially recognized in Modest\_Witness [1997a], which I will briefly discuss at the end of this essay). Indeed, as Susan Bordo suggests, **the epistemological jouissance suggested by the image of the cyborg denies locatedness and fantasizes itself as a postmodern “dream of everywhere”** (1990, 136, 144–45).10 Here it is important to distinguish between locatedness and a simple celebration of the local as endless possibility. I am not advocating what Manuel Castells (1997) describes as a defensive and retrenched localism (manifested most disturbingly in the “not in my backyard” ideal) in the face of globalization as a basis for feminist identity but rather a relationship to materiality and sociopolitical specificity as a basis for theorizing, much in the manner of Castells’s own analyses (1997, 61–62). In arguing for a relationship to locatedness, I am taking a stance about critical responsibility in a postcolonial world. As third-world environmentalists such as Vandana Shiva (1997) and subaltern studies historians have demonstrated, **policies and political concepts of postcolonial nations cannot be understood through universal** (read: Western) **concepts alone, even though local concepts need to be related to the global.** Witness Shiva’s call for international legal ecological policies based on an understanding of indigenous knowledges and Partha Chatterjee’s (1986) critique of the Western idea of nation as inapplicable to postcolonial countries. In the United States, **critical race theorists have argued for what legal theorist Richard Delgado** (1995) **terms the call to context, which challenges the traditional juridical preference for universalism over particularism and abstract principles over perspectivism.** This is particularly important, Delgado points out, in normative discourse such as civil rights (1995, xv). **Feminists and gender theorists might simply repeat the universalizing knowledge claims of colonialism by celebrating an ahistorical and acontextual blurring of boundaries**. For instance, might the blurring of racial boundaries be an obfuscation of the systemic racial oppression and racial hierarchies that continue to affect women’s lives? I will return to this point shortly, but for the moment I want to suggest that **neocolonial and imperial knowledge claims can be contested only through theories derived from located knowledge.** Indeed, my own arguments for context-specific theory derive in part from Haraway’s own paradigm of situated knowledge. Positing an alternative to a value-free relativism that she declares to be the “perfect mirror twin of totalization” (1988, 584), Haraway suggests an alternative that is “partial, locatable, critical knowledg[e] sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology” (584). “Our problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a nononsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared” (579). It is in the spirit of Haraway’s own call for partial and locatable knowledge that I propose to examine the relationship between Haraway’s concept of the cyborg and the women of color who figure so prominently in the essay. Such an analysis will also reveal the problematic nature of the concept of woman of color as used by Haraway. I have already mentioned the overly celebratory nature of Haraway’s cyborg myth as a means of resisting the domination of a thoroughly technologized information culture and as a description of that culture. Haraway writes, “By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism: in short, we are cyborg. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. . . . This chapter is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (1991, 150). **The cyborg enables a productive blurring of the binaries such as male/female, self/other, and culture/nature that have sustained Western cultural hierarchies**. Just as the cyborg provides the means whereby to resist repressive dichotomies through unnatural fusions and illegitimate couplings, Haraway suggests that the political constituency of women of color provides a means of constructing a political solidarity out of coalition and affinity rather than out of essential identity. **Unlike identities based on sameness or unity, this postmodern identity is premised on “otherness, difference, and specificity”** (Haraway 1991, 155). Chela Sandoval’s (1984) model of oppositional consciousness, which suggests a mode of articulation seized by those denied stable identities of race or gender, demonstrates to Haraway the subversive potential of the coalition of women of color (1991, 174). Thus **women of color becomes for Haraway a cyborg identity**, “a potent subjectivity **synthesized from fusions of outsider identities**” (1991, 174). By the end of the essay, the analogous relationship of women of color to the illegitimate and hybrid fusion of the cyborg is clear. Haraway moves to delineate aspects of the cyborg myth by looking at “two overlapping groups of texts . . . constructions of women of color and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction” (1991, 174). What follows are illustrations of subversive political identities formulated by women of color such as Audre Lorde and Cherrı´e Moraga and feminist science fiction writers such as Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delaney, James Tiptree Jr., Octavia Butler, and Vonda McIntyre. Following a partial trajectory of Haraway’s complex essay still leaves us with a few nagging questions: Why are women of color needed in order to formulate a cyborg myth centrally based on the monstrous fusion of human and machine? Who are the women of color referred to in the essay? Let us attempt to answer the second question first. Clearly the term women of color (it usually appears in quotation marks in the essay) alludes to radical African American, Latina, Native American, and Asian American feminists who constituted themselves as a group apart from white U.S. feminists. Sandoval’s (1984) formulation of oppositional consciousness, which Haraway cites, was preceded by the formation of Kitchen Table/ Women of Color Press and the publication of the influential anthology This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, edited by Moraga and by Gloria Anzaldu´a in 1981. Subsequently, the term women of color gained widespread critical and pedagogical usage. Let us now see how Haraway explains the first question raised above. Haraway sees the writings of women of color as postmodern resistance writing or cyborg writing. Like all colonized groups, women of color seize the power to write in order to resignify hegemonic Western myths: “The poetry and stories of US women of color are repeatedly about writing, about access to the power to signify; but this time that power must be neither phallic nor innocent. . . . Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. . . . Figuratively and literally, language politics pervade the struggles of women of color” (Haraway 1991, 175). Haraway’s claims for the writings of women of color are similar to the arguments of scholars who see minority writing or postcolonial writing as resistance writing alone. However, **such an argument not only reifies the very binaries of center and margin, colonizer and colonized, that Haraway as poststructuralist wishes to blur but also homogenizes, through a colonial imperative, the margin itself, a tactic strongly critiqued** by feminists like Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991, 51). Let us revisit, for a moment, the two groups of texts Haraway compares: constructions of women of color and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction. One includes a variety of texts (presumably including autobiographies, novels, poetry, and drama) by a racially marked group, while the other deals with grotesque bodies in a specific genre. One would be hardpressed to find similar generalizations about white U.S. women’s writings, but women of color become fair game here, as did all third-world texts in Fredric Jameson’s much contested claim about these texts being national allegories (1986). Here I would argue in similar fashion to Aijaz Ahmed ([1987] 1992) that many texts by women of color are not about access to the power to signify or about subverting either the central origin myths of Western culture or myths of original innocence. Texts like Jade Snow Wong’s Fifth Chinese Daughter ([1950] 1989), Le Ly Hayslip’s When Heaven and Earth Changed Places (1989), and Bharati Mukherjee’s Jasmine (1989), for instance, affirm to an extent the binaries of Western rationality, modernity, and progress and Eastern irrationality, prejudice, and backwardness. Furthermore, the very assumption that texts by U.S. women of color are centrally about subverting Western myths suggests that minority texts are significant only insofar as they relate to the center. Many texts by U.S. women of color—Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987) and Fae Myenne Ng’s Bone (1993) are powerful examples—are not fundamentally about subverting Western myths. And simply to suggest that writings about women of color are “repeatedly about writing” is simply to reiterate the discursive postmodern truism that all fiction is metafiction. Moreover, the very distinction between women of color and feminist science fiction writers begs the obvious question: Is Butler (who is included in the category of feminist science fiction) not a woman of color?

#### 3. The identitarian 1+1=? mathematics of the cyborg leaves identity unchanged and limits the possibility for radical change.

Currier 03 [Dianne. "Feminist technological futures: Deleuze and body/technology assemblages." Feminist Theory 4.3 (2003): 321-338.]

While **the figure of the cyborg**, and the manifesto in general, have done much to propel feminist scholarship into a creative engagement with questions of technology and subjectivity, I would argue that it ultimately **fails to make the break with the logic of identity** which Haraway rightly identifies as crucial. This is apparent in one aspect of the cyborg’s ætiology – the intersection of bodies and technologies. **The seamless intermingling of bodies and technologies**, enabled by the common coding of each as information, **is central** to the figure of the cyborg. For Haraway, it is the cyborg, as the product of these intersections, that defies classification as organic or nonorganic, human or machine. However, as Kirby (1997) suggests, what remains problematic is that **in order to fabricate the hybrid and intermingled cyborg one must first begin with the discrete component entities which are precisely those elaborated within the logic of identity.** That is, in the construction of a cyborg, technologies are added to impact upon, and at some point intersect with a discrete, non-technological ‘body’. **While a limitless range of mutations and variations might emerge** from such meetings, I would, however, argue that **to proceed on the basis of an engagement between bodies and technologies which is primarily prosthetic**, as Kirby points out, **effectively reinscribes the cyborg into the binary logic of identity** which Haraway hopes to circumvent. Within Haraway’s work **in the formulation of the cyborg a body pre-exists as a singular entity, to which a range of technological artifacts and/or processes are appended, which then reformulate that body and its associated identity beyond the bounds of conventional categories of Human or Man.** **Tools are applied to bodies** – ‘communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies’ (Haraway, 1991: 164) – **in a formula that posits them as initially discrete categories**. Thus, **in so far as the hybrid cyborg is forged in the intermeshing of technology with a body, in a process of addition, it leaves largely intact those two categories** – (human) body and technology – **that preceded the conjunction.** **Haraway’s ‘disassembled and reassembled’ recipe for cyborg graftings is utterly dependent on the calculus of one plus one, the logic wherein pre-existent identities are then conjoined and melded. The cyborg’s chimerical complications are therefore never so promiscuous that its parts cannot be separated even if only retrospectively.** (Kirby, 1997: 147) This original demarcation of the components of the hybrid functionally reinstates the human, grounded in an non-technological organic body as a stable site that cannot be retrospectively conjured away by a subsequent seamless interface of shared coding. In proposing the cyborg as hybrid, Haraway reiterates precisely the categorical demarcation of human and machine she is attempting to dissolve. And the logic through which those categories are articulated in a relation of binary opposition to each other remains. **Thus the cyborg is framed as different from the preceding forms of Human bodies and nonhuman technologies which give rise to it. Its difference is accounted for as variation or mutation, that is in a relation to a central figure, the Human, in a reiteration of the logic of identity.** That the logic of identity is problematic for feminist theory on a range of fronts has been convincingly and comprehensively argued elsewhere.1 I would argue that these difficulties are especially acute for feminists such as Haraway who are interested in re-conceptualizing technology as a facilitating agent for new and transformed futures. Not only does the logic of identity erase difference, including sexual difference, but to the extent that it is a deterministic framework it forecloses any possibility of radical and unexpected change. As Grosz (2000) has argued, the ability to think the new requires an open-ended, non-deterministic conceptual horizon within which the unpredictable and unexpected, the novel may appear and in which the future is not already predicted and determined in a relation to the past/present. Such a horizon must not be bound by determination, in which all emergent formations are explained in relation to existing ones, but must instead accommodate the ‘disconcerting idea of unpredictable transformation, upheavals in directions and arenas which cannot be known in advance and whose results are inherently uncertain’ (Grosz, 2000: 215). To think radical transformation, then, requires a conceptual horizon that will allow for the emergence of novelty, innovation or radical change – the new.2 Clearly a logic such as that of identity, where difference is always already situated in relation to the same, circumscribes the appearance of the new and radically different. **As long as bodies and technologies are thought through only the determinist framework of identity, their combination cannot give rise to radically transformed new configurations**. In the last instance, any mutant formation remains articulated within the dominant framework and its difference understood only in relation to the forms – human and technological – that preceded it. Transformation is short-circuited in a formulation in which emerging configurations are explicable only in terms of difference from preceding forms and, thus, articulated in relation to the same. Given the many disclaimers to the contrary, it is ironic that the cyborg is perhaps the most recent of Cartesian recuperations. Haraway’s insistence that ‘the cyborg skips the step of original unity’ forgets that it is against the unity of ‘the before’, the purity of identity prior to its corruption, that the cyborg’s’ unique and complex hybridity is defined. (Kirby, 1997: 147)

#### 4. There is zero empirical basis for psychoanalysis – their authors either grossly misrepresent empirical data or hubristically extrapolate single events into broad theories – also Lacan was a cult leader

Paris 17 [Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]

In an era in which psychiatry is dominated by neuroscience-based models, psychological constructs tend to be neglected and may be taken seriously only when they have neural correlates.37 Some psychoanalysts have sought to link their model with neurobiological research and to claim that newer methods of studying the brain can validate their theories.5,6

Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, is the founder of “neuropsychoanalysis.” This new field, with its own society and its own journal, proposes to use neuroimaging to confirm analytic theories. Its key idea is that subjective experience and the unconscious mind can be observed through neuroimaging.5 It is known that brain processes can be seen on brain imaging even before they have entered consciousness.38 However, claims that neuroimaging validate Freud’s model of the unconscious can be based only on “cherry-picking” the literature. The observed correspondences are superficial and hardly support the complex edifice of psychoanalytic theory.

Solms39 has also suggested that Freud’s ideas about dreams are consistent with neuroscience research based on rapid eye movement (REM) activity. This attempt to rescue a century-old theory met with opposition from dream researchers who consider Freud’s clinical speculations to be incompatible with empirical data.40,41

The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42 Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models, without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.

However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.

Another attempt to reconcile psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.

Psychoanalysis and the Humanities

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.

This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism.

One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power.

Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history.