## OFF

### --Top

#### Interpretation and violation – the affirmative should not garner offense from anything other than the hypothetical implementation of a topical plan – they didn’t.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Aff teams must defend legal action by a government

John Bouvier 56 [The Free Dictionary, “Unjust”] [DS] [https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Unjust#:~:text=UNJUST.,test%20of%20right%20and%20wrong.]

Unjust Also found in: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Wikipedia. Related to Unjust: Unjust enrichment UNJUST. That which is done against the perfect rights of another; that which is against the established law; that which is opposed to a law which is the test of right and wrong.

#### This is clear

Black’s Law Dictionary ND [DS] [https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/]

UNJUST Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws.

#### Extra topicality independently links to our offense – it allows the affirmative to add on random unpredictable planks to generate extra advantages and solve net benefits, which ruins neg preparation, especially when the majority of their offense and framing comes from the extra-topical part.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits and ground—-allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. Because debate is a competitive game, there is an incentive to revert to truisms that give the negative no chance at engagement. The lack of a plan also means the affirmative can shift their advocacy in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text, which obviates negative arguments.

#### There are two impacts –

#### Fairness – A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win—-radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. Fairness is an intrinsic good—-debate is fundamentally a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg—-the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate and the reason why people are incentivized to do prep and research is to help them do better in their next round is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate. Fairness also comes before substance—-deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it—-any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, because it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### Second is clash---advocacy tied to the resolution incentivizes nuanced research and CLASH with a well prepared opponent---They turn debate into one with no negative counterargumentation which causes confirmation bias and less good affirmatives. It also doesn’t subject the aff to rigorous arugmentation which eliminates the skills necessary to make real material change in the world and doesn’t generate real productive discussions – turns their offense.

#### Topical version of the aff – you literally said the topic was true in the 1AC and refused to defend it – if that’s not true than clearly SSD solves – use sufficiency when evaluating the TVA because all deficits are neg ground. This and SSD solve their offense by re-centering debate on settlerism.

#### Topicality must be a voting issue—the role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question. Any aff role for debate must explain why we switch sides and why there has to be a winner and a loser—switching sides within the competitive yet limited bounds of the topic performs the labor of the negative which avoids group polarization and untested advocacy

#### Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## OFF

### NC – K

#### Their starting point of settler colonialism occludes racial capitalism. Civil society is more complex than they think – nuanced criticism of militarism is a necessary component for solvency

DORRIES et al. 19 –\*assistant professor at Carleton University where she teaches in the Indigenous Policy and Administration Program, MScPl and PhD in Planning at the University of Toronto, \*\*Hugill, Assistant Professor in the [Department of Geography and Environmental Studies](https://carleton.ca/geography/) at Carleton University, PhD in Human Geography @ York University, MA in Canadian and Indigenous Studies @ Trent University, \*\*\*Tomiak, PhD (Carleton, Canadian Studies, specialization in Political Economy), Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology @ Carleton [Heather, David, Julie, “Racial capitalism and the production of settler colonial cities,” Geoforum, accepted 7/21/2019, made avail online 8/19/2019, DKP]

Yet settler colonial analysis is not without its limits, some of which we have already outlined. On its own, this approach tells us very little about how settler colonization intersects with other forms of racialized oppression, including the ways that a global culture of anti-Blackness has functioned in the (re)production of settler societies and the urban centers that animate them. In the context of Canada, for example, this relation is often downplayed or occluded, with self-congratulatory (and historically dubious) comparisons to the United States allowing Canadians to enjoy an unseemly smugness. For Walcott (2014), the politics of anti-Backness not only devalue Black lives but also continually produce Black people as out of place in “post-colonial locations,” including contemporary Canada. Similarly, McKittrick (2006, 99) argues that in the terms of commonsense Canadian ideologies, Black communities are imagined as “non-Canadian, always other, al-ways elsewhere, recent, unfamiliar, and impossible.” Settler colonial scholarship sometimes repeats this pattern. By emphasizing land theft without interrogating the broader processes that shape its contours, it too often fails to grapple with how those processes were and are shaped by global and local cultures of anti-Blackness

Importantly, too, settler colonial analysis, with its keen interest in the violent formation of new settler polities, risks reducing the constitutive importance of racialized oppression to only its most salient local expression. Walcott (2014, 99) notes that analyses of settler colonization too often “end at the geographical border of the nation state” and fail to engage with broader questions about the ways that settler colonial states continue to be bound up with a set of racialized and racializing commitments that overflow their territorial boundaries. In such analyses, the power of the settler polity is generally assumed. But an analysis that integrates racial capitalism would also need to ask more pointed questions about the origins of the power and wealth that drive these processes.

Foregrounding racial capitalism in our analyses allows us to expand the ways that we think about the history of Winnipeg. It encourages us to consider how settler programs of continental transformation do not occur in a geopolitical vacuum and makes it possible to draw lines of continuity between settler colonialism and other forms of racialized violence, including the transatlantic slave trade and the anti-Blackness that underpinned it. We might highlight, for example, how the political commitments and anti-Blackness that shaped British involvement in the transatlantic slave trade were echoed in the fur trade. Not only were Indigneous and Black slavery features of the fur trade, trans-Atlantic slavery shaped British interactions with Indigenous peoples. As Adele Perry (2014, 39) notes, “the fur trade entered Indigenous space with longstanding practices of human unfreedom, knitted them into their own social and economic practice, and transformed and profited from them.”

Connectedly, racial capitalism also allows us to understand how anti-Blackness and anti-Indigenous attitudes shaped the postwar transformation of North American cities. While we would caution against a straightforward conflation of the production of stigmatized urban Indigenous and Black geographies, it may well prove fruitful to think about how dicourses of “out-of-placeness” were mobilized to serve white supremacist urban agendas in a range of places. In the Canadian context, Walcott (2014) suggests that a more robust re-thinking of the colonial order of things might well entail putting seemingly unrelated geographies of racialized exclusion into conversation with one another. In his terms, a “critical articulation of settler colonialism needs to engage the conditions and ideas of the plantation, the reservation, the ghetto, and neo colonial dispossession, revealing the particular euphemisms of those discursive and violent material constructions, but also their linked and shared realities as the result of the logic and practice of anti-Blackness and thus a wider reach of coloniality” (Walcott, 2014, 100). To draw these questions together, he con-tends, is to challenge commonsense presentations of them as “non-related entities.” In the case of Winnipeg, a settler-colonial analysis emphasizes how the active production of segregated spaces marked by disinvestment and concentrated poverty was aided by discourses which positioned Indigenous peoples as out-of-place and degenerate (Hugill, 2019). Racial capitalism invites us to analyze the production of urban space as part of a broader pattern that is rooted in both anti-Black and anti-Indigenous sentiment. In both cases, these narratives bolster a “white spatial imaginary” (Lipsitz, 2011) and naturalize racialized accumulations of property and advantage. Significant work by McKittrick (2006), Nelson (2009), Maynard (2017), Rutland (2018)and others investigates the role of anti-Blackness in the making of Canadian cities, and provides important points of departure to those wishing to understand how settler colonialism mobilizes anti-Blackness in the making of urban space.

Racial capitalism also enables us to think of Winnipeg’s racialized geographies as shaped by more than the violence of settler colonization. While settler colonialism might train our attention on local and national expressions of racist violence, racial capitalism can help draw our attention beyond national borders. Drawing on empirical work about the nefarious reach of the contemporary Canadian banking system, Walcott makes the case that Canada’s colonial project “stretches far beyond the geo-politics of the ‘entity’ we now call Canada.” The same point could be made by looking at recent work that focuses on the violent record of the Canadian state and Canadian corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean (Gordon, 2010; Gordon and Webber, 2016; Shipley, 2017).Thus, while cities like Winnipeg are thoroughly animated by the violence of settler colonization, this is far from the only way that they are shaped by the global project of racial capitalism and its differential valuing of lives. Racial capitalism expands the settler colonial frame and positions it as part of a more far reaching system. Like other cities in the global North, Winnipeg is embedded in a racialized global order that has allowed it to benefit from “economic and ecological parasitism, forms of socio-political exclusion...and a dependence of commercial exchange on militarism, imperial expansion, and other forms of primitive accumulation”(Kipferand Goonewardena, 2007). Toews (2018) has already gone a long way in demonstrating how and why this is the case.

Finally, bringing racial capitalism to bear on a settler colonial analysis also has implications for how we understand anti-colonial resistance. While racial capitalism and settler colonialism have had a profound impact on Winnipeg’s development, Indigenous peoples have been relentless in their resistance to these processes. Racial capitalism expands the terrain of resistance and points towards new ways of envisioning non-racist social, economic and political relations. Movements such as Idle No More and Black Lives Matter have demonstrated how trans local movements recognize and resist anti-Black and anti-Indigenous racism and dispossession as interrelated processes (Simpson et al., 2018), and in doing so set an agenda scholars would do well to follow. Thus, these analytic frameworks not only help us to better understand the dynamics of racialization and dispossession, but also to see the contours of resistance more clearly.

#### You should prefer movements centered around capitalism -- to quote Coulthard -- “for Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die” – the alternative is also necessary to scale movements globally

Webber 16 – Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, PhD in Political Science @ University of Toronto [Jeffrey, Idle No More An Introduction to the Symposium on Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks, Historical Materialism 24.3 (2016) 3–29, DKP]

Using the relative downtime of the subterranean period, Coulthard has reflected on his experience as a militant in Idle No More’s activities in British Columbia, drawing up a set of critical theses on Indigenous resurgence and decolonisation, in the mode of what the late French Marxist Daniel Bensaïd called ‘strategic hypotheses’. ‘Our insistence is not on a “model”,’ Bensaïd argued, but on what we have called ‘strategic hypotheses’. Models are something to be copied; they are instructions for use. A hypothesis is a guide to action that starts from past experience but is open and can be modified in the light of new experience or unexpected circumstances. Our concern therefore is not to speculate but to see what we can take from past experience, the only material at our disposal. But we always have to recognize that it is necessarily poorer than the present and the future if revolutionaries are to avoid the risk of doing what the generals are said to do – always fight the last war.7 Coulthard’s first thesis pivots on disruption, the necessity of direct action, a plea for the unauthorised Indigenous route to rebellion, an insistence that legitimate struggle is not confined to ‘official’ representatives of the Indigenous people, the channels of formal negotiation, and the parameters of the ‘rule of law’.8 One reason is efficacy. ‘I would venture to suggest’, Coulthard writes, ‘that all negotiations over the scope and content of Aboriginal peoples’ rights in the last forty years have piggybacked off the assertive direct actions – including escalated use of blockades – spearheaded by Indigenous women and other grassroots elements of our communities.’9 Another cluster of reasons to defend this assertive dynamic has to do with self-emancipation: first, the practices are directly undertaken by the subjects of colonial oppression themselves and seek to produce an immediate power effect; second, they are undertaken in a way that indicates a loosening of internalized colonialism, which is itself a precondition for any meaningful change; and third, they are prefigurative in the sense that they build the skills and social relationships (including those with the land) that are required within and among Indigenous communities to construct alternatives to the colonial relationship in the long run.10 The drivers here are self-emancipation of the oppressed, the partial overcoming of internalised colonialism in the subjectivity of Indigenous participants through struggle, and the prefiguration of radical alternatives to colonial rule in contemporary Canada. This parallels, in a particular sense, Marx’s notion of ‘revolutionary practice’, in which there is a ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change’.11 For Coulthard, as for Marx, in their struggle to satisfy their needs, the oppressed come increasingly to recognise their common interests and become conscious of their own social power; through their self-activity they come to see themselves as subjects capable of altering the structures of society as well as changing themselves in the process through self-organisation and self-activity from below.12 While the connection to Marx in this regard is not made by Coulthard, he does draw explicit parallels with Frantz Fanon. Coulthard’s first thesis on Indigenous resurgence and decolonisation draws on Fanon’s engagement with Nietzsche at the close of Black Skin, White Masks, in which humanity is understood simultaneously as an affirmation and a negation.13 ‘Through these actions’, Coulthard contends, ‘we physically say “no” to the degradation of our communities and to exploitation of the lands upon which we depend. But they also have ingrained within them a resounding “yes”**:** they are the affirmative enactment of another modality of being, a different way of relating to and with the world’.14Ensuring that anti-capitalism is at the core of Indigenous resurgence is the basis of Coulthard’s second thesis. ‘For Indigenous nations to live,’ he concludes, ‘capitalism must die.’15 Coulthard sees in recent Indigenous tactics like traffic- and train blockading an anti-capitalist impulse, rooted in the disruption of the sphere of circulation. Such actions ‘seek to impede or block the flow of resources currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills, mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of Indigenous nations’.16 Such actions are consciously built to intensify their ‘negative impact on the economic infrastructure that is core to the colonial accumulation of capital in settlerpolitical economies like Canada’s’.17 Although Coulthard does not highlight the connection, this strategic orientation resonates in many ways with what might be labelled the turn to circulation in much of contemporary Marxist and anarchist strategic theory, particularly in the domain of historical-materialist geography.18 Another urgent concern of Coulthard’s anti-capitalist thesis is again one of socio-geography: ‘how might we begin to scale up these often localized, resurgent land-based direct actions to produce a more general transformation in the colonial economy?’19 He recognises that short of a ‘massive transformation in the political economy of contemporary settler-colonialism, any efforts to rebuild [Indigenous] nations will remain parasitic on capitalism, and thus on the perpetual exploitation of our lands and labour’.20 A project of transformation at this level inevitably requires networks of solidarity beyond the Indigenous movement: This reality demands that we continue to remain open to, if not actively seek out and establish, relations of solidarity and networks of trade and mutual aid with national and transnational communities and organizations that are also struggling against the imposed effects of globalized capital, including other Indigenous nations and national confederacies; urban Indigenous people and organizations; the labour, women’s, GBLTQ2S (gay, bisexual, lesbian, trans, queer, and two-spirit), and environmental movements; and, of course, those racial and ethnic communities that find themselves subject to their own distinct forms of economic, social, and cultural marginalization.21An anti-capitalist strategy of Indigenous liberation, then, requires broad networks of solidarity and purposeful linkages between local battles and wider scales of conflict.

#### Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities Farbod 15

( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6% per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800%.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85% of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50% of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1% will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80% of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return**.**

**The alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation**

**Escalante 18**  
(Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> cVs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct **chauvinist** ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such **accountability is crucial**. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. **The party model** remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within.

## OFF

### NC – DA

#### CP Text: We advocate the entirety of the 1AC except for the claim that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. The appropriation of outer space by private entities except for Viasat is unjust.

#### Viasat boosts Indigenous economies.

**SBS 1/12** [Indigenous Australians to lead space industry at new Alice Springs earth ground station, <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/indigenous-australians-to-lead-space-industry-at-new-alice-springs-earth-ground-station/b35811cc-1ecb-4a90-9be2-d6c1f4486e3b>, Jan 12 2022, SBS News] [SS]

A multi-million-dollar earth ground station will be built in the Northern Territory's Alice Springs, set to be the first development of its kind on Aboriginal-owned land in Australia. Indigenous Australians will become leading participants in the global satellite and space industry, with the Real-Time Earth (RTE) facility expected to bring new jobs and economic opportunities to remote Australia. Global communications company Viasat Inc. has partnered with Aboriginal not-for-profit science and technology company Centre for Appropriate Technology Ltd (CfAT) to deliver the project, financed by Indigenous Business Australia. It will be used to track the next generation of low earth orbiting satellites for earth observation used for scientific research, environmental monitoring, and commercial applications. CfAT chairperson Peter Renehan said the facility "puts Aboriginal people at the forefront of Australia’s growing space sector". "This state-of-the-art development will provide a positive contribution to the local economy through employment opportunities for local businesses during each phase of construction as well as ongoing jobs for local Aboriginal people once operational," she said. "CfAT exists to provide people in regional and remote Australia with options for maintaining their relationship with country. "We do this by providing technologically innovative solutions to infrastructure challenges with digital connectivity as a core focus of the companies work." A KPMG report Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people own or have controlling interests in about 40 per cent of the Australian land mass under various forms of title and legislation. Indigenous Business Australia Chairperson Eddie Fry said the new earth ground station was important for both the Australian space industry and the Indigenous community. "Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people own or control significant areas of land in remote areas where there is limited economic potential," he said. "This first of its kind development on Aboriginal land gives the community both economic and social returns." He added Alice Springs was an optimal environment for this type of technology due to a large number of cloud-free days, limited radio interference and access to fibre network on the grounds. Indigenous Australians Minister Ken Wyatt said developments such as this showcased how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people could continue leading roles in our nation’s innovation. "Indigenous Australians hold a powerful economic force through their connections with land, culture and community,” he said. "This exciting project is a prime example of the power of country to help deliver commercial returns through technology, employment and career opportunities."

#### Indigenous led economics solve warming.

**Swiderska ‘21** [Here's why Indigenous economics is the key to saving nature, <https://www.iied.org/heres-why-indigenous-economics-key-saving-nature>, Krystyna Swiderska, April 13 2021] [SS]

Western economics is not only destroying the environment. It is also destroying Indigenous peoples’ holistic development models that ensure balance with nature, and provide alternative paradigms for sustainable development. For many of the world’s 476 million Indigenous peoples, balance and reciprocity (PDF) with nature are fundamental principles that guide all aspects of life. Rather than privileging human economic goals and pursuing nature conservation separately, many Indigenous societies seek to achieve ‘holistic wellbeing’ or ‘Buen Vivir’, which means the wellbeing of both people and nature together. Take the Quechua and Aymara people in Peru, for example, who make up nearly a fifth of Peru’s population. According to their Andean cosmovision, the world is divided into three communities or ‘ayllus’: i) the wild or natural world, ii) the human and domesticated world, and iii) the sacred world. To achieve wellbeing (‘Sumaq Causay’), these three communities must be in balance, which requires reciprocity between them (‘ayni’). These Andean concepts come from the Incas, the largest pre-Columbian empire, and are still very much alive in the Andes. So too are barter markets (PDF), which provide people at different altitudes with access to essential nutrients and help sustain rich Andean biodiversity. Balance with nature, reciprocity and solidarity (the obligation to help those in need) are key principles embedded in many Indigenous cultures across the world, from the Americas, to China, India and Kenya. These Indigenous economies (PDF) promote sufficiency rather than infinite growth, and equity and redistribution of wealth rather than accumulation. Many subsistence economies are also characterised by circular agriculture models, which minimise waste and carbon emissions. The separation of people and nature threatens both In Peru and across the world, the nature- and people-friendly informal economies of Indigenous peoples are steadily being eroded by Western, neo-liberal economic policies that separate people and nature, and view Indigenous cultures and subsistence economies as ‘backward’ and in need of modernisation. Ironically, the same Indigenous economies that have conserved and enhanced biodiversity for millennia are now threatened by environmental policies that often fail to recognise the value of Indigenous knowledge, thus contributing to its erosion. Most of the world’s remaining biodiversity is located on lands owned or managed by Indigenous peoples. A global scientific assessment (PDF) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) found that “nature is generally declining less rapidly in Indigenous peoples’ lands than in other lands”. However, the IPBES assessment also found nature managed by Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) is under increasing pressure, as is the knowledge of how to manage it. Areas managed by IPLCs “are facing growing resource extraction, commodity production, mining and transport and energy infrastructure”. Negative impacts from all these pressures include “continued loss of subsistence and traditional livelihoods” and impacts on “health and wellbeing from pollution and water insecurity”. These impacts “also challenge the transmission of Indigenous and local knowledge” and “the ability of indigenous peoples and local communities to conserve and sustainably manage wild and domesticated biodiversity that are also relevant to broader society”. Mainstream economic activities on Indigenous lands have rarely benefited Indigenous Peoples, who make up 6% of the world’s population but 19% of the extreme poor. In fact, their situation has often deteriorated (PDF), due to loss of land and natural resources, and the weakening of cultural ties and social cohesion. Integration with market economies has led to social tension and conflict, limited opportunities for meaningful employment, low returns for producers and a shift towards consumerist lifestyles. The dominant approach to nature conservation through protected areas also reflects a Western worldview that separates people and nature, often excluding Indigenous people to protect biodiversity. Many state-run protected areas have resulted in negative social impacts, are losing biodiversity and are not effectively or equitably managed, as IPBES found (PDF). Bridging the divide Clearly, alternative development and conservation models that bridge the nature-people divide are urgently needed to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Indigenous Peoples’ holistic worldviews provide alternative development paradigms, which benefit both people and nature. For example, Indigenous Peoples’ ‘mixed economies’, which combine subsistence and market activities, sustain Indigenous values that underpin biodiversity conservation, while contributing to nutrition, health, wellbeing and climate resilience, and generating income. Local markets and short value chains are often prioritised, rather than global export markets. Indigenous Peoples have started to shape new community enterprise models that assert control over their territories and promote Indigenous traditions of sustainability and enterprise for the common good. These Indigenous enterprises have delivered multiple benefits for livelihoods, culture, social capital and biodiversity conservation. For example, in the Potato Park in Peru, a Biocultural Heritage Territory governed by six Quechua communities, collective micro-enterprises (for gastronomy, agro-ecotourism, crafts, herbal teas and so on) are guided by Andean principles and holistic wellbeing goals. Ten per cent of the revenues from each micro-enterprise is invested in a communal fund and redistributed annually to reward biocultural heritage stewards and help those in need. Thanks to their ancestral Indigenous knowledge, linked with science, the Potato Park communities have ensured food security despite severe climate change impacts and the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the communities donated a ton of potatoes to hungry people in Cusco, in line with the principle of solidarity. The social ties and mutual care and solidarity that Indigenous communities have displayed in the pandemic, highlights the type of social relations that are core to resilient economies and an inclusive green recovery. The concept of 'biocultural heritage', which is derived from Indigenous Peoples’ holistic worldviews and traditions, recognises the inextricable linkages between nature, culture and development. The way forward A new narrative is needed which recognises the highly progressive and dynamic nature of Indigenous knowledge and economic systems that put nature and equity at the heart of development. Indigenous Peoples have a leading role to play in shaping alternative paradigms to mainstream economic models that are destroying the environment and traditional cultures. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and undoing years of racial injustice that lie at the root of poverty and inequality, requires structural reform across economic and environment sectors, from local to global levels, to put Indigenous Peoples at the heart of decision-making. This year provides an opportunity for governments and political leaders to demonstrate real commitment to achieving the SDGs and leaving no one behind. It is not too late to reform the leadership structure for the UN Food Systems Summit in September 2021, so that representatives of poor, hungry, marginalised and Indigenous Peoples play a leading role. Or to reform the proposed post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (PDF), to be agreed at the biodiversity convention COP15 in October, so that the knowledge and leadership of Indigenous Peoples and local communities is integrated across the targets. Indigenous Peoples have answers for many of the world’s most intractable challenges: inequality, ecocide, climate change. We cannot address these challenges without their wisdom and leadership.

**Warming causes extinction and guarantees every other impact**

Spratt and Dunplop 19, David Spratt [Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action] & Ian Dunlop [member of the Club of Rome. Formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading 1998-2000], “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration, May 2019, pg. 8-10, beckert. Brackets in original text

2020–2030: Policy-makers fail to act on evidence that the current ​Paris Agreement path — in which global human-caused greenhouse emissions do not peak until 2030 — will lock in at least 3°C of warming. The case for a global, climate-emergency mobilisation of labour and resources to build a zero-emission economy and carbon drawdown in order to have a realistic chance of keeping warming well below 2°C is politely ignored. As projected by Xu and Ramanathan, by 2030 carbon dioxide levels have reached 437 parts per million — which is unprecedented in the last 20 million years — and warming reaches 1.6°C.18 2030–2050: Emissions peak in 2030, and start to fall consistent with an 80 percent reduction in fossil-fuel energy intensity by 2100 compared to 2010 energy intensity. This leads to warming of 2.4°C by 2050, consistent with the Xu and Ramanathan “baseline-fast” scenario.19 However, another 0.6°C of warming occurs — taking the total to 3°C by 2050 — due to the activation of a number of carbon-cycle feedbacks and higher levels of ice albedo and cloud feedbacks than current models assume. [It should be noted that this is far from an extreme scenario: the low-probability, high-impact warming (five percent probability) can exceed 3.5–4°C by 2050 in the Xu and Ramanathan scheme.] 2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “**hothouse Earth**” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of **lethal heat** conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of **ecosystems collapse**, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, **become unviable**. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, contributing to **more than a billion people being displaced** from the tropical zone. **Water availability decreases sharply** in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about **two billion** people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. Even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated and In high-end scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a **high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end**.21 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events.​ In this scenario, nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, **including in the United States**, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.​ **Armed conflict** between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and **nuclear war** is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos.​ In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.22 (emphasis added) DISCUSSION This scenario provides a glimpse into a world of “outright chaos” on a path to the end of human civilisation and modern society as we have known it, in which the challenges to global security are simply overwhelming and political panic becomes the norm. Yet the world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of catastrophic climate change.23 What can be done to avoid such a probable but catastrophic future? It is clear from our preliminary scenario that dramatic action is required this decade if the “hothouse Earth” scenario is to be avoided. To reduce this risk and protect human civilisation, a massive global mobilisation of resources is needed in the coming decade to build a zero-emissions industrial system and set in train the restoration of a safe climate. This would be akin in scale to the World War II emergency mobilisation. There is an increasing awareness that such a response is now necessary. Prof. Kevin Anderson makes the case for a Marshall Plan-style construction of zero-carbon-dioxide energy supply and major electrification to build a zero-carbon industrial strategy by “a shift in productive capacity of society akin to that in World War II”.24 Others have warned that “**only a drastic, economy-wide makeover within the next decade**, consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C”, would avoid the transition of the Earth System to the Pliocene-like conditions that prevailed 3-3.3 million years ago, when temperatures were ~3°C and sea levels 25 metres higher.25 It should be noted here that the 1.5° goal is not safe for a number of Earth System elements, including Arctic sea-ice, West Antarctica and coral reefs.

#### Extinction outweighs.

--- must preserve infinite lives and generations.

--- question of intergenerational equity.

--- existential threats are underestimated: global public good, intergenerational, unprecedented, scope neglect.

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>, Accessed 7/22/2017, Kent Denver-jKIM)

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

## Case

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#### 1. The aff is just a cover for YTs to keep exploiting indigenous people on Earth – space is a much better replacement for terrestrial mining, which is exploitative and infringes on indigenous land.

MIT Technology Review 10/19/2018 [“Asteroid mining might actually be better for the environment”] [DS] [https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/19/139664/asteroid-mining-might-actually-be-better-for-the-environment/]

The first study of its environmental impact suggests that extracting resources such as platinum from asteroids might be cleaner than doing so on Earth.

For a certain kind of investor, asteroid mining is a path to untold riches. Astronomers have long known that asteroids are rich in otherwise scarce resources such as platinum and water. So an obvious idea is to mine this stuff and return it to Earth—or, in the case of water, to a moon base or Earth-orbiting space station.

There is no shortage of interest in these ventures. In the last decade, investors have funded half a dozen companies that have set their sights on various nearby rocks. To many observers, it’s only a matter of time before such a mission gets the green light.

But profit margins are only part of the picture. A potentially more significant aspect of these missions is the impact they will have on Earth’s environment. But nobody has assessed this environmental impact in detail.

Today, that changes thanks to the work of Andreas Hein and colleagues at the University of Paris-Saclay in France. These guys have calculated the greenhouse-gas emissions from asteroid-mining operations and compared them with the emissions from similar Earth-based activities. Their results provide some eyebrow-raising insights into the benefits that asteroid mining might provide.

The calculations are relatively straightforward. Rocket launches release significant amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The fuel on board the first stage of a rocket burns in Earth’s atmosphere to form carbon dioxide. For kerosene-burning rockets, one kilogram of fuel creates three kilograms of CO2. (The second and third stages operate outside the Earth’s atmosphere and so can be ignored.)

Reentries are just as damaging. That’s because a significant mass of a re-entering vehicle ablates in the upper atmosphere, producing NOx such as nitrous oxide (N2O), a greenhouse gas that is about 300 times more potent than CO2. By one estimate, the space shuttle released about 20% of its mass in the form of N2O every time it returned to Earth.

Hein and co use these numbers to calculate that a kilogram of platinum mined from an asteroid would release some 150 kilograms of CO2 into Earth’s atmosphere. However, economies of scale from large asteroid-mining operations could lower this to about 60 kilograms of CO2 per kilogram of platinum.

That needs to be compared with the emission from Earth-based mining. Here, platinum mining generates significant greenhouse gases, mostly from the energy it takes to remove this stuff from the ground.

Indeed, the numbers are huge. The mining industry estimates that producing one kilogram of platinum on Earth releases around 40,000 kilograms of carbon dioxide. “The global warming effect of Earth-based mining is several orders of magnitude larger,” say Hein and co.

The figures for water are also encouraging. In this case, the authors calculate the greenhouse-gas emissions from an asteroid-mining operation that returns water to anywhere within the moon’s orbit, a so-called cis-lunar orbit.  They compare this to the emissions from sending the same volume of water from Earth into orbit.

The big difference is that a water-carrying vehicle from Earth can haul only a small percentage of its mass as water. But an asteroid-mining spacecraft can transport a significant multiple of its mass as water to cis-lunar orbit. “Substantial savings in greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved,” say Hein and co.

**Mining on Earth actively harms Natives –**

**Churchill 3** [Ward Churchill, Acts of Rebellion, published 2003, Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of Colorado, Boulder,, pages 103-106, accessed 10.3.2015]//TRossow

IN 1903, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINED THAT, AS A RACIAL GROUP, American Indians, like minor children and those deemed mentally deficient or deranged, should be viewed as legally incompetent to manage our own assets and affairs. Indians were therefore to be understood as perpetual “wards” of the federal government, the high court held, the government our permanent “trustee.” With a deft circularity of reasoning, the justices then proceeded to assert that, since it was Indians’ intrinsic incompetence which had led to our being placed under trust supervision, we should by the same definition be construed as having no standing from which to challenge the exercise of our trustee’s authority over us.1 Thus did the U.S. formally and unilaterally assign itself “plenary”—that is, absolute and unchallengeable—power over all native lands, lives, and natural resources within the area of forty-eight contiguous states of North America, as well as Alaska, Hawai‘i and other external possessions such as Guam and “American” Samoa. The only curb upon the imagined prerogatives of the United States in this regard was/is an equally self-appointed fiduciary responsibility to act, or at least claim to act, in the “best interests” of those it has subjugated both physically and juridically.2 Although the basic proposition at issue has undergone almost continuous modification and perfection over the years, it remains very much in effect at present.3 The scale and implications of the situation are in some ways staggering. In its 1978 final report, the government’s own Indian Claims Commission conceded that after more than thirty years’ intensive investigation, it had been unable to find evidence that the U.S. had ever acquired anything resembling legitimate title to about 35 percent of its claimed territoriality, all of which therefore remains native property in a legal sense.4 The approximately 2.5 percent of U.S. territory currently reserved for Indian use and occupancy—most of it still held in federal trust status—is also extraordinarily rich in mineral resources.5 As much as two-thirds of the uranium ore the U.S. claims as its own is situated within reservation boundaries, as is about a quarter of the readily accessible low sulfur coal, up to twenty percent of the oil and natural gas, and substantial deposits of molybdenum, copper, bauxite, and zeolite.6 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), a component of the U.S. Department of Interior, presently administers trust relations with several hundred indigenous peoples and communities encompassing, by official count, some two million individuals.7 Simple arithmetic reveals that when the fifty million-odd acres of reserved land is divided by the federal tally of Indians, we end up as the largest landholding group in North America on a per capita basis. Divide the estimated dollar value of the mineral assets within the land by the number of Indians and you end up with native people as the wealthiest population aggregate on the continent (again, on a per capita basis). All of this is, unfortunately, **on paper**. The practical reality is that American Indians, far from being well off, are today the most impoverished sector of the U.S. population.8 We experience by far the lowest average annual and lifetime incomes of any group. The poorest locality in the United States for 23 of the past 25 years has been Shannon County, on the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, where a recent study found 88 percent of the available housing to be substandard, much of it to the point of virtual uninhabitability. The annual per capita income in Shannon County was barely over $2,000 in 1995, while unemployment hovered in the 90th percentile.9 Bad as conditions are on Pine Ridge, they are only marginally worse than those on the adjoining Rosebud Sioux Reservation and a host of others. In many ways, health data convey the costs and consequences of such deep and chronic poverty far better than their financial counterparts. These begin with the facts that, overall, American Indians suffer far and away the highest rates of malnutrition, death from exposure, and infant mortality (14. 5 times the national average on some reservations).10 The Indian health level is the lowest and the disease rate the highest of all major population groups in the United States. The incidence of tuberculosis is over 400 percent the national average. Similar statistics show the incidence of strep infections is 1,000 percent, meningitis is 2,000 percent higher, and dysentery is 10, 000 percent higher. Death rates from disease are shocking when Indian and non- Indian populations are compared. Influenza and pneumonia are 300 percent greater killers among Indians. Diseases such as hepatitis are at epidemic proportions, with an 800 percent higher chance of death. Diabetes is almost a plague [6.8 times the general population rate].11 It should come as no surprise, given the ubiquitousness of such circumstances, that alcoholism and other addictions take an inordinate toll Although fewer Indians drink than do nonindians, the rate of alcohol-related accidental deaths among native people is ten times that of the general population, while the rate of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) among the newborn is 33 times greater.12 The suicide rate among Indians is ten times the national norm, while, among native youth, it is 10,000 percent higher than among our nonindian counterparts.13 All told, the current life expectancy of a reservation-based American Indian male is less than fifty years in a society where the average man lives 71.8 years. Reservation-based Indian women live approximately three years longer than males, but general population women enjoy an average life expectancy seven years longer than nonindian men.14 Hence, every time an American Indian dies on a reservation—or, conversely, every time a child is born—it can be argued that about one-third of a lifetime is lost. This thirtieth percentile attrition of the native population has prevailed throughout the twentieth century, a situation clearly smacking of genocide.15 This last is, of course, a policy-driven phenomenon, not something inadvertent or merely “unfortunate.” Here, the BIA’s exercise of trust authority over native assets comes into play. While it has orchestrated the increasingly intensive “development” of reservation lands since 1945, a matter which might logically have been expected to alleviate at least the worst of the symptomologies sketched above, the Bureau’s role in setting the rates at which land was/is leased and royalties for extracted minerals were/are paid by major corporations has precluded any such result.16 Instances in which the BIA has opted to rent out the more productive areas on reservations to nonindian ranchers or agribusiness interests for as little as $1 per acre per year, and for as long as 99 years, are legion and notorious

.17 As to mineral royalties, the Bureau has consistently structured contracts “in behalf of” Indians which require payment of as little as ten percent of market rates while releasing participating corporations from such normal overhead expenses as the maintenance of minimum standards for worker/ community safety and environmental safeguards. In fact, most such arrangements have not even provided for a semblance of postoperational clean up of mining and processing sites.18 Such “savings” accrue to U.S. corporations in the form of **superprofits indistinguishable from those gleaned through their enterprises in the Third World**, a matter which has unquestionably facilitated the emergence of the United States as the worlds dominant economic power in the post-World War II context.19 Minerals such as uranium, molybdenum, and zeolite, moreover, are not only commercially valuable but strategically crucial, an important factor in understanding America’s present global military ascendancy.20 All of this has been obtained, as a matter of policy, **at the direct expense of Native North America** as well as other underdeveloped regions of the world. As Eduardo Galeano once explained to mainstream Americans, with respect to the impact of their lifestyle(s) on Latin America: “**Your wealth is our poverty**.”21 The correlation is no less true on American Indian reservations. It holds up even in such superficially more redeemable connections as U.S. efforts to curtail acid rain and other collateral effects of electrical power generation through reliance upon low sulfur bituminous rather than high sulfur anthracite coal. The largest and most easily extracted deposit of bituminous coal in North America is located at Black Mesa, in northern Arizona, an area occupied almost exclusively by Navajos. Beginning in 1974, the federal government undertook a program of compulsory relocation to remove some 13,500 resident Navajos from the intended mining area, dispersing them into primarily urban areas and completely obliterating their sociocultural existence (until then, they had comprised the largest remaining enclave of traditionally oriented Indians in the lower forty-eight states). The land upon which their subsistence economy was based is itself to be destroyed, a circumstance barring even the possibility of their reconstitution as a viable human group at some future date.22 The coal, once mined, is slurried to the Four Corners Power Plant and other generating facilities where it is burned to produce electricity. This “product” is then transported over massive power grids to meet such socially vital needs as keeping the air conditioners humming in the Phoenix Valley and the neon lights lit 24 hours a day at Las Vegas casinos. Meanwhile, 46 percent of the homes on the Navajo Reservation have no electricity at all (54 percent have no indoor plumbing, 82 percent no phone).23 No more fitting illustration of Galeano’s equation seems conceivable.

#### 2. Turn – interstellar exploration can be hijacked by indigenous people to unsettle white futurity and colonial imaginaries

Cornum 15 [Lou Cornum is a diasporic Dine writer, student, and space cadet. "The Space NDN's Star Map," the new inquiry, <https://thenewinquiry.com/the-space-ndns-star-map/> Jan 26, 2015]

Science/speculative fiction author Nalo Hopkinson, known for her use of creole languages and Caribbean oral stories in her works, writes that people of color engaging with SF “take the meme of colonizing the natives and, from the experience of the colonizee, critique it, pervert it, fuck with it, with irony, with anger, with humor and also, with love and respect for the genre of science fiction that makes it possible to think about new ways of doing things.” Perhaps because science fiction is so prone to reproducing colonial desires it has become seductive to the “colonizee” who finds pleasure and power in reversing the telescope’s gaze of who is exploring who. This reversal is no mere trick, though. It is a profound deconstruction of how we imagine time, progress, and who is worthy of the future. Following in the rocket trails of black authors such as Hopkinson, the space NDN is also in a long tradition of NDN interstellar exploration, using technologies such as creation stories and ceremony as her means of travel. For some, she is a startling and unsettling figure. As Philip Deloria argues in *Indians in Unexpected Places*, settlers are upset and confused when the seemingly contrasting symbolic systems of indigeneity and high-tech modernity are put in dialogue, as demonstrated in the shocked reactions to a 1904 photograph of Geronimo in a Cadillac. This estrangement arises from “a long tradition that has tended to separate Indian people from the contemporary world and from recognition of the possibility of Indian autonomy in the world.” In the colonial imaginary, indigenous life isnot only separate from the present time but alsoout of place in the future, a time defined by the progress of distinctively western technology. If colonial society cannot accept Geronimo in a Cadillac, it can hardly conceive of him in a space ship. The Indian in space seeks to feel at home, to undo her perceived strangeness by asking: why can’t indigenous peoples also project ourselves among the stars? Might our collective visions of the cosmos forge better relationships here on earth and in the present than colonial visions of a final frontier? Many of the ideas deemed strange or new-fangled in Western sci-fi come naturally to the space NDN. The all-pervasive “force” or similarly the super brain connecting all beings. The animism and agency of cyborgs, AI systems, and other non-human people. Alternate dimensions and understandings of non-linear time. These are things the space NDN knows intuitively. This is not the future but historical knowledge. The future is reclaiming these technologies not for domination but for new organizations aimed at better worlds. I am reminded of Octavia Butler’s words, “There is nothing new under the sun, but there are new suns.” Instead of imaging a future in bleak cities made from steel and glass teeming with alienated white masses shuffling under an inescapable electronic glow, indigenous futurists think of earthen space crafts helmed by black and brown women with advanced knowledge of land, plants, and language. Indigenous futurism seeks to challenge notions of what constitutes advanced technology and consequently advanced civilizations. As settler colonial governments continue to demand more and more from the Earth, indigenous peoples seek the sovereign space and freedom to heal from these apocalyptic processes. Extractive and exploitative endeavors are just one mark of the settler death drive, which indigenous futurism seeks to overcome by imagining different ways of relating to notions of progress and civilization. Advanced technologies are not finely tuned mechanisms of endless destruction. Advanced technologies should foster and improve human relationships with the non-human world. In many indigenous science fiction tales of the futures, technology is presented as in dialogue with the long traditions of the past, rather than representing the past’s overcoming. In the recent iteration of the constantly re-packaged tale of white men planting flags in space, *Interstellar*’s all-American space boy Matthew McConaughey stares into the distance and announces, “We are explorers, pioneers, not caretakers.” As if one cannot be both an explorer and a caretaker…For the space NDN the two roles are intertwined. The advanced technology of the space NDN does not separate technical from natural knowledge. Technology is not divorced from or forced upon land but develops in relation to lands and the many beings land supports. The space NDN’s disavowal of western progress makes clear the difference between indigenous futurism and early 20th century forms of futurism, which were compatible with the interests of fascist and oppressive governments. Unlike those futurists, who were in an antagonistic relation with their literary and cultural predecessors, indigenous futurism is centered on bringing traditions to distant, future locations rather than abandoning them as relics. Indigenous futurism does not care for speed so much as sustainability, not so much for progress as balance, and not power but relation. *God is the Red Planet* For many the image of the ~~Indian~~ [indigenous folks] in space is jarring not just because of the settler perception of indigeneity as antithetical to high tech modernity, but because Indian identity is tied so directly to specific earthly territories. What happens to indigeneity when the indigenous subject is no longer in the location that has defined them? This is not just a question of outer space. Already the majority of Native people in the U.S. and Canada live in cities away from their traditional territories. Of course at one point these places would also have been viewed as indigenous territories. While many nations have worked very hard to dispel the notion of nomadic Indian tribes, there is a history of movement among many of our peoples. Colonial forms such as reserves, reservations, nation-states and borders have madethese traditions of movement nearly impossible.And the need to defend our rights to live on our lands without harassment has created the political necessity of claiming our land-based political and cultural identities. But land-based does not have to mean landlocked. This insistence on indigenous people having to always be located on or closely connected to one particular area also erases those who are unable to return to their traditional territories, such as Mohawk women who are kicked out of their tribe for marrying non-Mohawk men or Afro-Indigenous people stolen from their lands. There is also the simple fact that NDNS may want to move around. There’s an old cliché that every Indian story is about going home. But what about the Indians who can’t go home, or simply want to go away? I sometimes describe myself as a diasporic Diné in order to bring the often disparate ideas of indigeneity and movement into closer proximity. Those we consider diasporic are often violently robbed of their indigeneity and those we consider indigenous are often on the move. The space NDN looks into the void and knows still who they are.Nanobah Becker shot the Mars scenes in *The 6th World* in Monument Valley, one of the sacred territories of the Diné. The red rock canyons and cliffs make a convincing Martian backdrop. They also offer a symbol of dynamic sacredness. These distant lands are connected. Just because the Diné have not lived on Mars since time immemorial, it does not mean our plants and teachings cannot take root there. I am reminded of the time before a ceremony on a college campus when we washed our hands in a drinking fountain. I am reminded of Betonie, the medicine manin Leslie Marmon Silko’s novel Ceremony,who makes medicine bundles from trash heaps. I am reminded ofpow-wow regalia ornamented with semiconductors.I am reminded of thedescendants of slaves telling and re-telling their stories on new, bloody ground.Finding ourselves in new contexts, we are always adapting, always surviving. This is the seed of many indigenous technologies: the ability tocontinue andsustain ourselves against all odds.The challenge of the space NDN is how to apply knowledge of the worlds toward non-destructive ends. Any form of travel or exploration comes with the dangers of exploitation and upheaval. Nobody knows this better than the inhabitants of those places constantly divvied up between colonial nation-states. The figure of the space NDN is not an attempt to simply put an indigenous face on the outer space colonizer. Indigenous futurist narratives try to enact contact differently. Not all encounters with the other must end in conquest, genocide or violence. The space NDN seeks new models of interaction. We do not travel to the distant reaches of space in order to plant our flags or act under the assumption that every planet in our sights is a terra nullius waiting for the first human footprint to mark its surface. Robert Sullivan’s poem “Star Waka” captures the complexities of indigenous space travel. Waka is the Maori term for a canoe and Sullivan’s epic poem relates the journey of this star waka to outer planets to find new homes for the Maori people. The crew of the ship wonder how their prayers will work in the cold vastness of the stars and how they can approach these distant worlds in a good way. The Indian in space does not abandon their home, their people, or their teachings. Dynamic traditions, themselves a type of advanced technology, help the space NDN to understand how to foster the kind of relationships that make futures possible. *All Our Interstellar Relations* For indigenous futurism, technology is inextricable from the social. Human societies are part of a network of wider relationships with objects, animals, geological formations and so on. To grasp our relationship with the non-human world here on Earth, we must also extend our understanding of how Earth relates to the entirety of the cosmos. We live on just one among millions of planets, each an intricate and delicate system within a larger, increasing complex structure. For the indigenous futurist endeavor, striving to understand the ever-multiplying connections linking us to the beginning of the universe and its constant expansion also entails unraveling the intricate relations that make up our Earthly existence. Zainab Amadahy, who identifies as a person of mixed black, Cherokee and European ancestry, grounds her writing practice in illuminating and understanding networks of relationships: “I aspire to write in a way that views possible alternatives through the lens of a relationship framework, where I can demonstrate our connectivity to and interdependence with each other and the rest of our Relations.” Her 1992 novel *The Moons of Palmares* examines the relationships, both harmful and collaborative, between indigenous peoples and descendants of slaves in an outer space setting that merges histories of the Black Atlantic with the colonial frontier. In a provocative bit of plotting, she casts an indigenous character, Major Eaglefeather, as an oppressive foreign force in the lives of an outer space labor population that has shaped its society in remembrance of black slave resistance in North/South America and the Caribbean. The story follows Major Eaglefeather’s decision to reject his ties to the corporate state and support a rebel group of laborers. The name Palmares is taken from a real-world settlement founded by escaped slaves in 17th-century Brazil, which is also known to have incorporated indigenous peoples and some poor, disenfranchised whites. In a chronicle written in the late 17th century, these *quilombos* are described as networks of settlements that lived off the land and were supplemented by raids on the slave plantations where the inhabitants were formerly held. It is said that in Palmares the king was called Gangasuma, a hybrid term meaning “great lord” composed of the Angolan or Bandu word *ganga* and the Tupi word *assu*. The word succinctly captures the mixture of cultures that banded together in Palmares to live together on the margins of a colonialist, slave-holding society. While Palmares was eventually destroyed in a military campaign, it lives on as a legend of slave rebellion and utopian possibility that Amadahy finds well suited for her outer space story about collaborative resistance to state power and harmful resource extraction processes. Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze. Amadahy’s work is crucial for a critical understanding of the space NDN. The space NDN cannot allow him or herself to fall into the patterns of domination and kyriarchy that have for too long prevailed here on Earth as well as speculative narratives of outer space. Afrofuturists have looked to space as the site for black separatism and liberation. If the space NDN is truly committed to being responsible to all our relations, it is imperative for our futurist vision to be in solidarity with and service to our fellow Afrofuturist space travelers. Our collective refusal of colonial progress (namely, our destruction) means we must chart other ways to the future that lead us and other oppressed peoples to the worlds we deserve.*The Moons of Palmares* works toward this end by revealing the strong connections between indigenous and black histories, narratives and ways of living. Indigenous futurism is indebted to Afrofuturism: Both forms of futurism explore spaces and times outside the control of colonial powers and white supremacy. These alternative conceptions of time reject the notion that all tradition is regressive by narrating futures intimately connected to the past. SF and specifically the site of outer space give writers and thinkers the imaginative room to envision political and cultural relationships and the future decolonizing movements they might nourish. This focus on relationship, especially as posited by Amadahy, also accounts for those forms of indigeneity that persist among peoples either stolen from their lands or whose lands have been stolen from them. As the writer Sydette Harry recently posted on Twitter, “Black people are displaced indigenous people.” However, because of the processes of forced relocation and slavery and continuing anti-black racism, black people are often denied claims to indigeneity. There is also a pernicious erasure of black NDNs in America and Canada. In exploring outer space, black authors are also able to assert their own relationship to land both on Earth and in the cosmos. The Black Land Project (BLP), while not an explicitly futurist organization, fosters the kind of relationships to land on Earth that futurist authors and thinkers envision in outer space. In a recent podcast, *Blacktracking through Afrofuturism*, BLP founder and director Mistinguette Smith discusses how walking over the routes of the Underground Railroad brought forth alternate dimensions and understandings of time outside the settler paradigm of ownership. These are aspects of relating to land that the Afrofuturist and the space NDN (identities which can exist in the same person) bring with them on their travels. This focus on relationship rather than a strict idea of location speaks to the way in which the space NDN can remain secure in their indigenous identity even while rocketing through dark skies far from their origins. This is not to demean the work of land protectors and defenders who risk serious repercussions for resisting corporate and state encroachment on indigenous territories. The space NDN supports those who are able and choose to remain on the land, while also hoping to broaden understandings of indigeneity outside simple location. Locations of course are never simple. It is the settler who wishes to flatten the relation between place and people by claiming land through ownership. Projecting themselves forward into faraway lands and times, the space NDN reveals the myriad ways of relating to land beyond property.

#### 3. No solvency – how does the aff reign in space companies? Cx

#### 4. The call to space fuels strategies of technocratic managerialism that position the American transcendental state as supreme---transcendence of limits enables imperialistic violence through intervention, war, circumvention of norms, preemption, and tactics of control

Daniel Sage 16, Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior at Loughborough University, Ph.D. in Political and Cultural Geographies from Loughborough University, 4/29/16, How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization and the Cosmic Sublime, p. 153-156

In the preceding eight chapters I have argued that some of the unique qualities of outer space—vastness, Otherness, sublimity, timelessness, spacelessness—are just as integral to extra-terrestrial projections of US geopower, as its well-known capacity (Arendt, 1963; Cosgrove, 2001; Dickens and Ormrod, 2007; Dolman, 2001; Macdonald, 2007) to function as an Archimedean high point to monitor and control the surface, and atmosphere, of the Earth. While the focus of my study has been the United States, and more specifically NASA, the implications of this cosmic projection of geopower—the American transcendental state—are global in reach, from enabling and shaping imperialistic ideologies (Chapters 1-3 and 7) to fuelling the extension of technocratic managerialism (Chapter 4-6 and 8). What is more, messianic hope in America remains a global commodity, consumed, for example, through the internationally franchised Star Trek television episodes and films (Penley, 1997: 98-99), multinational ‘Space 2.0’ corporations, like SpaceX (Chapter 6), worldwide audiences to the addresses of American presidents (Chapter 6) and global tourist attractions like the National Air and Space Museum and Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). These global circulations suggest that while my empirical focus in this study has been on the extra-terrestrial assemblage of the American transcendental state, as viewed from within the borders of the US, the salience of my analysis is geo-political.

The development of the American transcendental state through space exploration must also be viewed as an integral component of a far older geopolitical project—the production of an American identity defined in terms of the transcendence of limits, whether technological, economic, spiritual or territorial, enabling the moral aggrandizement of the past, present and future of a horizontal strata of sovereign territory and its peoples (McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; O’Brien, 1988; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995). Over the last decade or so, a growing number of scholars, including geographers, have turned their attention to how messianic-exceptionalist visions of America as the ‘Promised Land’ of ‘Chosen People’ have inflected various imperialistic projects including: the pursuit of democracy through military intervention in the ‘global south’ (Anthony, 2008); the technocratic ‘greening’ of Western global capitalism (Singer, 2010); the building of a ‘culture of war’ in foreign policy (Marsella, 2011), the circumvention of international institutions (Agnew, 2006); and most prominently perhaps, George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ where invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq became justified as a ‘cosmic struggle between good and evil’ (Agnew, 2006: 183; see also Barkun, 2010; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). All of this work indicates two points: first, the enduring Apocalyptic influence of dispensational pre-millennialism on both interventionist and isolationist currents within American (geo)politics (Strum and Dittmer, 2010: 18); and secondly, the rise of a religious cosmology that positions America at the moral, geographical, and spiritual, centre of the universe (Strum, 2010: 150).

My analysis of American spaceflight adds to this body of work on religion and geopolitics by drawing attention to five less discussed conduits of this pious vision of American geopower: (i) the secular—museums, family theme parks, systems management; (ii) the sublime—astronomical artwork, Moon landings and distant Nebula; (iii); the profane—Nazi slave labor camps, technocratic patriarchy, and dead astronauts; the technological (iv)—rocket production lines, O-rings, electrical wiring; and (v) the revolutionary—female astronauts, May 1968, and Richard Feynman. Analytically, these diverse registers suggest the utility of working with a broader, less explicitly spiritual, set of theoretical assumptions, to address the cosmological aspects of American geopolitics. This is why I mobilized the concept of the ‘American transcendental state’, rather than ‘deified nation’ (O’Brien, 1988: 41) within this study. This deliberately hallucinogenic sounding term captures some sense that the messianic-exceptionalistic projection of American geopower is a more diffusive, experimental, fantasmic, embodied, and ostensibly secular, affair, than conveyed within much discursive analysis of the religious undercurrents inflecting American geopolitics (for example Agnew, 2006; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006).

I would like to suggest now that there is another benefit in bringing together these diverse practices under a broader analysis of the American transcendental state: their common geography becomes all the more obvious. That is, all these practices involve thinking, doing or resisting, celestial transcendence as an apparatus of American geopower; hence they can all be rightly considered ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Elden, 2013; Graham, 2004; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). This label has developed to identify a body of work addressing how the circulation of American geopower involves more than two-dimensional geographies of area. It currently includes analyses of; drone warfare (Gregory, 2011); aerial bombardment (Graham, 2004); police helicopters (Adey, 2010); satellite surveillance (Macdonald, 2007) and satellite drone navigation and targeting (Gregory, 2011). Elden (2013: 40) explains that ‘vertical geopolitics’ is mostly focussed upon how state political technologies allow diverse populations to be measured, calculated, controlled and killed, ‘from above’, and occasionally ‘from below’ (for example Elden, 2013; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). By contrast, the vertical orientation I have adopted here, while related, is different. Specifically, I have described how aspects of the projection of American identity, geopower, and territory, also involve a vertical spacelessness—a deterritorialization—a potential collapse into sublime, cosmic, insignificance; in short, rather than the ‘view from above’, the perspective I have traced has been a ‘view into the above’ (and back). In part, therefore, my study can be considered a response to Elden’s (2013) recent question: ‘How would our thinking of geo-power, geo-politics and geo-metrics work if we took the earth; the air and the subsoil; questions of land, terrain, territory; earth processes and understandings of the world as the central terms at stake, rather than a looser sense of the ‘global?’ (p49)

I propose we add to this list celestial entities, including the Moon (Chapter 3), the Martian surface (Chapter 6) and the Eagle Nebula (Chapter 7), as well as God (Agnew, 2006; Dittmer and Strum, 2010; Strum, 2013). Thus, perhaps we should be cautious of Elden’s (2013b) rather geocentric call ‘about how geopolitics might be thought as earth-politics rather than simply a synonym for global politics’ (p59). Instead, it might be more useful to bear in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988: 101) argument that even absolute deterritorialization—something akin perhaps to the mathematical cosmic sublime of Kant (Nye, 1994: 7-8)—always involves reterritorialization(s). Recall how Charles Bonestell (Chapter 2), William Clancey (Chapter 6) and the National Air and Space Museum (Chapter 7), respectively, and persuasively, associated vistas of the Moon, Mars and the Eagle Nebula with the American West, and by extension locate America at the centre of God’s universe (Boime, 1991; Stephanson, 1995).

This analysis of American spaceflight also sheds light on seldom acknowledged connections between religious and vertical geopolitics and technocracy. The relation between critical analysis of geopolitics (O Tuathail, 1996) and technocratic management (Alvesson, 1987), remains remarkably undeveloped. Arguably this lacuna says more about the disciplinary separation between critical security studies and organization studies (Grey, 2009) than the various intellectual crossfertilizations between organization studies and human geography (Clegg and Kornberger, 2006; Dale and Burrell, 2008; Parker, 2013). Nevertheless, there are, as Grey (2009) maintains, clear resonances:

Indeed it could said that, in the same way that the development of security studies in particular, and organization studies to an extent, was shaped by geopolitics of wars both hot and cold, so too many current and future directions be in part a reflection of developments in contemporary geo-politics (p31).

Some organizational practices are of course, very much on the ‘front line’ of practical geopolitics; that is, they comprise the ‘the foreign policy bureaucracy’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 4) through which geographical concepts are deployed to aid ‘conceptualization and decision making’ in ‘everyday foreign policy’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Examples here include the work of the US Air Force, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the UK’s Foreign and Common Wealth Office. There are also a host of other organizations that no doubt influence how practical geopolitics is produced, from security analysts like the RAND Corporation to global defense contractors like McDonnell Douglas. However, analysis of the relationship between organizational and geopolitical practices remains embryonic. For example, Anderson’s (2011) study of urban counterinsurgency and Gregory’s (2011) of drone warfare, do no more than merely infer that the rise of the ‘networked organization’ is reworking the projection of American geo-power. Correspondingly, two organizational studies of the military only hint that, for example, masculine discipline (Godfrey et al., 2012) and team identities (Corona and Godart, 2010) shape and are themselves shaped by grand geopolitical narratives like the ‘war on terror’.

But the imbrication of geopolitical and organizational practice can also be more subtle and much less militaristic—concerning the anticipation and cultivation of geopower through shared national identities, that is ‘popular geopolitics’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Here, the connection to organizational practices is no less significant, yet invisible in the literature. NASA offers a good example: from its inception, the space agency developed increasingly refined technocratic techniques that aligned people and machines to naturalize the pursuit of a popular geopolitics wedded to American geopower. Viewed in this way, imperialistic geopower and technocratic-managerialism are interwoven forces; hence the present study suggests the richness of more sustained critical analysis of organization and geopolitics.

#### Ontology Args

#### The top half of the aff is an arc of redemption that invests hope in improvement of civil society - the Juarez evidence is an impact turn and says redemptive narrative create cruel optimism and psychic violence for natives

#### Their two cards about ontology also don't make any sense - the juarez evidence is about libidinal and gratutitous violence structuring colonization via antagonoism, mccitrik applies wynter theories of sociogeny to settlerism that believes violence is not libidinally engrained but based on a series of actions that promote the category of Man

#### If they win ontology, vote neg on presumption - voting aff is an investment of liberal hope in reform that reifies all of the psychic violence they've said is the impact to the aff

#### They do not get to read this argument – it says the s-slur against Natives and uses the term “our,” and the fact that they stole this from an Indigenous person and forgot to change affirmative to negative proves SSD – it also proves you should reject rhetorical critiques of framework

#### Ontology has a narrative deficit -- “incommensurability” frame makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting terms of victory as all-or-nothing -- reifies acquiescence to subtler settler power

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The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7).

The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising -- although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’.

Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

#### Extinction K

#### Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

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Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.