# 1NC vs New Aff – Idea 1

## OFF

### NC – CP

#### Text: The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should collaborate with private entities in the United States to apply federal restrictions on anti-competitive business practices to private companies and establish and implement Long-Term Sustainability guidelines, fully endorsing the appropriation of space by those entities that conforms with the agreed upon standards.

#### Only international, multilateral efforts can effectively incorporate the private sector to ensure space sustainability – non-uniform unilateral policies fail

Martinez 20 – Peter, Executive Director of the Secure World Foundation & 2011 - 2018 chair of UN COPUOS Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, “UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities: Early implementation experiences and next steps in COPUOS,” 71st International Astronautical Congress (IAC) – The CyberSpace Edition, 12-14 October 2020

\*\*LTS = Long-Term Sustainability

3. LTS 2.0 – Next Steps in COPUOS

While the 21 consensus LTS Guidelines represent a significant step forward to promote space sustainability, COPUOS Member States agree that the work of COPUOS on this issue is far from over. Building on the lessons learnt from the LTS discussions, the Committee has initiated a new phase of the LTS discussions in COPUOS – LTS 2.0.

At its 62nd session in June 2019, the Committee noted that it should continue to serve as the principal forum for continued institutionalized dialogue on issues related to the implementation and review of the guidelines. The Committee also decided to establish, under a five-year workplan, a working group under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee to continue the LTS discussions in COPUOS. The Committee decided that this new working group would be guided by the following framework:

a) Identifying and studying challenges and considering possible new guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. This work could also take into consideration draft guidelines that were discussed, but for which consensus could not be reached during the term of the first LTS Working Group.[11]

b) Sharing experiences, practices and lessons learned from voluntary national implementation of the 21 already adopted guidelines.

c) Raising awareness and building capacity, in particular among emerging space nations and developing countries, to implement the guidelines.

In taking these discussions forward, COPUOS will have to deal with the challenge of preserving the consensus decision-making rule in a committee that is steadily increasing in size. When the Committee began its work on LTS in 2010 there were 70 member States. As of September 2020, COPUOS has 95 member States. As the Committee membership increases, so too does the diversity of space capabilities, views and priorities represented by the member States. These trends will make it ever more challenging to reach consensus in the Committee. As COPUOS takes this work forward, it will have to explore new methods of work, including ways of incorporating input from non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

Lastly, COPUOS will also need to discuss the ways by which the already agreed guidelines may be revised and updated in future, and also a process by which new topics for guidelines could be proposed for consideration by States. This is in keeping with the view of a number of member States that these guidelines should become a “living document” that is updated from time to time. Indeed, one may identify topics not included among the already agreed guidelines or the remaining unagreed draft guidelines, which could be addressed by COPUOS under the general context of LTS in future. Perhaps issues arising from on-orbit servicing or the placement and operation of large-scale constellations in Earth orbit could be the subjects of such future discussions and one or more possible draft guidelines. In this regard, industry initiatives such as CONFERS and the Space Safety Coalition discussed earlier may help to identify elements of future international standards and guidelines.

4. Conclusion

The adoption of the LTS Guidelines by COPUOS in 2019 was an important step forward for the international community in the sense that there is now a much wider appreciation among UN member States of the urgency of addressing this issue. To, be sure, the LTS Guidelines hardly represent the cutting-edge of what it is technically possible to do in terms of promoting space sustainability. However, the importance of the guidelines is that they codify, for the first time, an internationally accepted set of best practices for space sustainability. These practices have been agreed by 92 States, which includes all spacefaring countries and the vast majority of other countries that rely on space. This is significant because space sustainability is essentially a global challenge that can only be addressed successfully if all countries act collectively. The challenges of space sustainability are inherently multilateral challenges that are most effectively addressed through multilateral space diplomacy in the forum of COPUOS, where the international community has the opportunity to work together to find ways to expand access to the benefits of space activities to more nations, but also to ensure that the space environment is preserved and protected for use by future generations.

#### Multilateralism creates uniform standards, establishes models of best behavior, and prevents conflict escalation

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Sergio, “The final frontier: Prospects for arms control in outer space,” European Leadership Network Global Security Policy Brief, July 2019, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/10072019-Sergio-Marchisio-Arms-control-in-outer-space.pdf

More than ever, a set of international norms addressing the security of outer space activities is needed. While the adoption of legally binding norms revising or complementing the existing international legal regime would be difficult and time consuming, a non-legally binding instrument on basic principles and voluntary TCBMs has the potential to be a near-term outcome and important means to encouraging trust and confidence among space actors. That is to say, a positive first-step toward more engaging commitments for arms control in outer space.

It is imperative to create a platform for exchanging views on the establishment of general principles of responsible behaviour, transparency and confidence building measures and make workable recommendations. These should address challenges associated with the dual-use applications, civil and military, of outer space objects and capabilities, but should avoid hindering access to such technologies for peaceful purposes. In this regard, regional organisations have an important role to play. The implementation of the already adopted, and practically oriented, recommendations of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) report on TCBMs should be ensured. These should be integrated, as needed, as a consequence of evolution in space operations. It remains necessary to continue developing and promoting a range of norms of behaviour not only to minimise orbital debris, but also to promote coordination of space operations, and to enable greater space situational awareness data sharing though international co-operation.

Codes of conduct are normative instruments used in the diplomatic practice in a variety of fields: they have characteristics making them different from other categories of soft law. They embody political commitments that endorse basic principles of responsible behaviours in outer space and are open for further integration at a more technical level through best practices, standards and guidelines. It is legitimate to express compelling views, both for and against, a nonlegally binding instrument having the peculiar features of a code of conduct. There is a value in agreeing such an instrument, potentially negotiated within the framework of the UN, which could compliment on-going initiatives in UN mandated bodies and take care not to duplicate efforts. This would allow for the delivery of key principles, such as common interest in progress of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, or the commitment to refrain from any action that brings about damage or destruction of space objects, creating long-lasting space debris, amongst others.

Crucially, there is a need to foster increased international cooperation in order to establish a set of politically backed principles and measures that prevent outer space from becoming an arena of conflict. This requires a renewed European engagement at the multilateral level, learning lessons from past experiences. There are two parallel paths for the EU to pursue, one to support the continuous discussion of guidelines, space norms, and regulations at the United Nations within the context of the COPUOS, and another to promote an autonomous initiative aimed at setting out a multilateral framework that could function as a platform for broader, global, agreements.

## OFF

### NC – Taxes

#### Growth is up – businesses are confident

Hilsenrath 2/28 [Jon, senior writer for The Wall Street Journal, where he has written about economics and finance since 1997. “U.S. Positioned to Withstand Economic Shock From Ukraine Crisis”. 2/28/22. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-positioned-to-withstand-economic-shock-from-ukraine-crisis-11646083994]

As Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a war against Ukraine, half a world away the U.S. economy appeared to be rebounding from a winter surge of Covid-19 infections.

A range of U.S. data suggests U.S. economic activity picked up in recent weeks. Many Wall Street analysts expect the Labor Department on Friday to report large job gains in February and a further decline in unemployment.

These developments suggest that the U.S. is in a position to withstand the economic shock that might emanate from battlegrounds in Ukraine. Those effects could push U.S. inflation higher from already elevated levels, but the economic expansion appears to be on solid ground.

“It looks like the U.S. has gotten through the Omicron variant and weathered that storm and the economy is growing solidly,” said Mickey Levy, chief U.S. economist at Berenberg Capital Markets LLC, the securities arm of a German bank.

Much could change in the days or weeks ahead. If fighting intensifies or spreads to other countries, or if sanctions and Russian reprisals to sanctions deepen, the effects could hit the U.S. economy harder.

But for now, Mr. Levy has been watching weekly signs of rising U.S. consumer spending and output in February. OpenTable Inc., the online restaurant reservation business, reports that U.S. restaurant seating broke 6% above pre-pandemic levels in February after slumping earlier this year.

STR LLC, a research firm that tracks hotel trends, said occupancy at U.S. lodgings hit 59% in mid-February, up from 50% early in the month and 45% during the same period a year earlier.

Meantime, the Transportation Security Administration said airport checkpoint counts hit 2.15 million in late February, compared with 1.54 million at the end of January and 1.19 million at the same time a year earlier.

Mr. Levy said these are important developments because they suggest resurging life in the services side of the economy, which has been hit hardest by pandemic-driven disruptions.

U.S. Covid-19 cases and hospitalizations dropped substantially in February and deaths have fallen in recent weeks with a lag.

In all, consumer spending in the first half of February was up 7.2% from a year earlier, compared with a 2.7% increase in the first two weeks of January, according to data from Earnest Research, which tracks credit- and debit-card purchases.

Economists at Citigroup estimate the Labor Department will report Friday that U.S. payrolls grew by more than 500,000 in February and the jobless rate fell to 3.8%. Morgan Stanley estimates payrolls grew 730,000 in February and the jobless rate dropped to 3.7%. In 2021, monthly payroll increases averaged 555,000. In the decade before the pandemic, monthly increases of around 150,000 to 200,000 were more normal.

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A powerful coalition of democracies announced it would cut off some Russian banks from the global payment system Swift. Here’s how Swift works, and how the move could ramp up pressure on Russian President Putin. Photo: Anton Vaganov/Reuters

The U.S. economy is exposed to Russia and Ukraine mostly through energy channels. Russia is a major supplier of oil and gas supplies to the globe—especially Europe—and also supplies commodities such as potash and palladium that are important components of goods including fertilizer and catalytic converters for cars. The war and the Western financial sanctions resulting from it have disrupted supplies and pushed up prices for these and other commodities, worsening global inflation.

However analysts so far aren’t forecasting a big hit to U.S. economic growth from these effects. Chris Varvares, head of U.S. economics at IHS Markit, an economic advisory firm, estimates higher oil prices will shave 0.4% percentage point from the U.S. growth rate in 2022, to 2.5% for 2022 from its prewar forecast of 2.9%, and have almost no effect in 2023 and 2024.

Moody’s Analytics, another economic advisory firm, estimates a sustained move of oil prices up to $100 a barrel would slightly sap U.S. consumer spending in other markets, but not in a highly disruptive way. It estimates a shock of this kind would shave just 0.2 percentage point off the U.S. growth rate in 2022. The firm has already lowered its growth forecast to 3.5% this year, from its forecast of 3.7% before the war, said Mark Zandi, its chief economist.

‘The impact of the Russian invasion on the U.S. economy will be on the margins.’

— Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody’s Analytics

“The impact of the Russian invasion on the U.S. economy will be on the margins,” Mr. Zandi said in a written assessment of the impact of an oil price spike.

#### The plan spills over, decimating business confidence and overall economic recovery

Trace Mitchell 21, Policy Counsel at NetChoice, JD from the George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School, Former Research Associate at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, BA in Political Science and Government from Florida Gulf Coast University, “Weaponizing Antitrust to Attack Big Tech Is a Bad Idea”, Morning Consult, 3/3/2021, https://morningconsult.com/opinions/weaponizing-antitrust-to-attack-big-tech-is-a-bad-idea/

From the House Judiciary report calling for dramatic antitrust reform to federal antitrust regulators and state attorneys general initiating lawsuits against Facebook and Google, government officials are once again calling for more aggressive antitrust enforcement to go after America’s tech businesses.

And while critics from all sides are reaching for any and all tools to go after “Big Tech,” weaponizing antitrust will only end up harming American consumers and the American economy at a time when we’re still trying to keep our heads above water.

Using antitrust to go after American tech won’t stop at Silicon Valley. Every sector of our economy will be at risk of politically motivated antitrust enforcement. And that won’t just hurt consumers searching for information on Google or shopping for products on Amazon — America’s economy could lose its global competitiveness amid a global pandemic.

In fact, the recent cases against Google from the Department of Justice and state attorneys general are a great example of just how this misuse of antitrust could harm Americans across the country and halt innovation in its tracks.

These suits conveniently forget how consumers benefit from Google’s suite of products in attempts to claim that Google unfairly monopolized the search and search advertising markets. Even worse, by claiming consumer harm, the government fails to truly grasp what consumers actually want.

You see, under the consumer welfare standard, antitrust enforcement is built to focus on what consumers want and whether consumers benefit. When the government argues Google is harming Americans because its products are preinstalled and even the default search engine on Apple, the government forgets that American consumers don’t think this is a problem.

The vast majority of search users prefer Google to its competitors. And through preinstallation, we get free-to-use products, quick searches and near-limitless information in an integrated system with the click of a mouse. It isn’t a problem; it’s a time saver. Further, because Google can reinvest in developing more user-friendly tech in a preinstalled ecosystem, we get interoperable apps that make our experience that much more convenient and intuitive. And even if consumers do want a different app, they can fix this problem with no heavy leg work or travel — just the swipe of a finger.

But if the government gets its way, the message could be disastrous for innovation: Even if your business benefits Americans and improves the user experience, the government can still put a target on your back. Not to mention, the government would be more likely to put a target on your back if you’re large and politically disfavored. Consumers across the internet and the American economy would be hurt and left without more accessible and more affordable technology as options.

We should be working to reward, not punish, innovation. Otherwise, the next Google may just decide it isn’t worth the time and effort.

Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission’s recent case against Facebook also puts the wants of policymakers above the actual interests of consumers.

Here, the government claims that Facebook harms consumers by acquiring and then integrating services like Instagram and WhatsApp. So harmful, the Federal Trade Commission says, that Facebook must divest from these services, even if that would harm American consumers, innovation and entrepreneurship for decades to come.

But this is not a case of consumer harm or bad behavior — Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp helped ensure that consumers’ desires were prioritized. Through millions of investment dollars into research and development, Facebook turned good services into great services that consumers actively keep coming back to.

Through relentless product improvement, WhatsApp became a free-to-use platform and Instagram became one of the most successful photo-sharing social media apps in the world. In both cases, consumers benefited from convenient and state-of-the-art advancements. No longer do we have to pay to use messaging or search through multiple results to shop our influencer feed.

As it stands, the Federal Trade Commission case could splinter one successful tech company into multiple, less efficient organizations, setting a precedent that could affect every American industry. Consumers would not only lose Facebook’s free-to-use services but also potentially the next big clothing brand or the next hit microbrewed beer.

By impeding mergers, the sheer fear of potential antitrust enforcement would shutter the doors on small businesses from all sectors of the economy. So much investment in innovation is built on the possibility of being acquired by a larger player. Entrepreneurs and innovators from manufacturing, automotive and tech alike would be left with an unfortunate takeaway — succeed and benefit consumers, but not too much.

And with an economy still struggling to recover, the absolute last thing we need is to leave consumers without innovative and affordable choices, small businesses without key investment opportunities and our economy without a competitive edge globally.

But by weaponizing antitrust, we’ll get neither thoughtful intervention nor consumer benefits. Instead, the United States will lose ground to foreign competitors and American consumers will ultimately pay the price.

#### Decline cascades---nuclear war

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Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

## OFF

### NC – DA

#### Iran deal is imminent and key to prevent escalatory war- BUT PC is key to passage

Hounshell 3/23/22 [Blake Hounshell and Leah Askarinam, – New York Times On Politics. "The Democrat the White House Fears the Most," NY Times, 3-23-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/us/politics/robert-menendez-biden-foreign-policy.html, accessed 3-27-2022]

One of the final obstacles, according to those who have attended the briefings, is Iran’s demand that the U.S. no longer designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization.

Doing so would mean little in a practical sense because other sanctions on the group still apply, proponents of a deal say. But the Biden administration would need to expend precious political capital defending the move at a time when it has little to spare.

“I’d want to see what that means in practice,” said Representative Tom Malinowski, Democrat of New Jersey, who said he was waiting to see the text of an agreement. “But once Iran gets the bomb, our ability to confront their other malign activities will be diminished.”

Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat of Connecticut, said in an interview that he’d seen “bone-chilling” assessments of how close Iran is to producing weapons-grade uranium. Others who have been briefed on the U.S. intelligence assessments say Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in as little as two weeks, escalating the risk that Israel might take military action.

“The consequences of no deal are horrific,” Murphy said. “And there is no other practical path to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon other than diplomacy.”

The main reason the crisis has reached this point, advocates of a deal say, is Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the original nuclear deal, which allowed Iran to keep enriching uranium past agreed-upon levels.

But the Biden administration also moved too slowly to engage Tehran upon entering office, fearing Menendez-led blowback on Capitol Hill.

“It didn’t want to lose fence-sitters in Congress,” said Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the International Crisis Group.

Now that a deal is close, administration officials are being cagey about whether they believe Congress must be allowed to review its terms. Under a bipartisan law passed in 2015, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must submit the text of any “new” agreement to congressional oversight.

Menendez, who opposed the original nuclear agreement in 2015 and has criticized the current deal under discussion, has signaled he will insist on the Senate having its say. In February, he teamed up with Senator Lindsey Graham, a Republican of South Carolina, to propose his own diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff.

“There is no chance in bringing Senator Menendez on board, and the alternative that he offers is unworkable for the administration,” Vaez said. “I think it’s a lost cause.”

State Department officials caution that “an agreement is neither imminent nor certain,” as one put it. The administration is also still examining its legal options regarding congressional review of a potential deal, which might not technically qualify as “new.”

If an Iran deal is put to a vote in the Senate, Menendez’s reaction will be crucial. Republicans most likely will uniformly oppose it. The administration can still afford to lose a handful of Democrats, because only 41 votes would be needed to allow a revived agreement to proceed. But it might take some arm twisting to round up enough votes to win.

Ben Cardin, the hawkish Maryland senator, has already expressed concerns about delisting the Revolutionary Guards. Other influential Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, such as Chris Coons of Delaware, have said little in support of a fresh deal.

A defeat in the Senate could deal the president a damaging blow on one of his signature foreign policy initiatives, supporters of the talks warn. And given Iran’s rapid advance toward producing weapons-grade uranium, should diplomacy fail, the president could be facing the prospect of a new conflict in the Middle East on top of a grinding war in Ukraine.

If there is no deal, Vaez said, “I think this will escalate very quickly and the specter of war will emerge as soon as the spring.”

#### Antitrust ruins bipart—Republicans link it to other partisan disputes

Ghaffary 20 [Shirin Ghaffary, "Republicans showed why Congress won’t regulate the internet", 7/29/20, https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/7/29/21347128/big-tech-antitrust-hearing-facebook-zuckerberg-amazon-bezos-apple-cook-google-pichai]

Allegations that social media platforms have an anti-conservative bias has for years been a rallying cry of President Trump and the Republican party. And leading up to Wednesday, Republicans attacked the focus of the Democrat-run House Judiciary subcommittee hearing — calling on it to focus more on anti-conservative bias and for Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey to appear. Twitter is a small company compared to, say, Facebook, but it has recently taken measures to moderate President Trump’s posts for violating policies around misinformation and hate speech, enraging Republicans.

Democrats, meanwhile, tried to steer the conversation back to issues more directly relevant to antitrust, like if and how these companies intimidate their competition, such as when Facebook acquired its then-rival Instagram in 2012; or whether these companies exploit their users’ privacy, like how Google tracks individuals’ online browsing across the web with cookies; or if Apple is shutting out its competitors by taking an unreasonable cut of profits coming in from independent app developers in its App Store.

What really matters here is whether these companies’ business practices are ultimately harming consumers, most of whom have no choice but to use Big Tech in one way or another if they want to do basic things online like search the web, order goods, or stay in touch with their friends.

In an earlier era, Republicans and Democrats on the committee might have come together to try to focus on what’s been seen as an area of relative bipartisan agreement: protecting the free market. That didn’t happen at today’s hearing. Instead, it was a display of partisan divides.

#### Iran conflict escalates to great power nuclear war

Lin, 20 [SAIS-Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations fellow [Dr. Christina, she was a Visiting Academic Fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin and a former Transatlantic Academy Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Dr. Lin has extensive US government experience working on China security issues, including policy planning at the US Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and US Department of State, "China might take Iran’s side in a war with US," Asia Times, 1-5-20, https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/could-china-take-irans-side-in-a-war-with-us/, accessed 2-3-21]

China might take Iran’s side in a war with US

Beijing's ties with Tehran are crucial to its energy and geopolitical strategies, and with Moscow also in the mix, a broader conflagration is a real possibility

After the US assassination of Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani on Friday, Germany’s Spiegel Online observed that this is akin to a declaration of war on Iran. Now the US Congress is scrambling for a debate on a formal declaration of war, although it will unlikely block the Trump White House’s march toward the battlefield.

Last March, President Donald Trump reviewed the Pentagon’s plan to send 120,000 US troops to counter Iran, and the current military buildup of deploying 3,500 more US troops to the region may be part of that plan. Also, in 2017, a think-tank that enjoys close ties with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the Trump White House, sent a seven-page memo outlining plans for regime change in Iran, and the current scenario seems to be taken out of this playbook.

The next question is, how will regional powers react to a US-Iran war?

China and Russia already seem to have answered that question via their war games in the Gulf of Oman last week, and the signal to the US is that Iran is not isolated and has powerful allies. Indeed, last year retired US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor already warned that a war with Iran could draw in China and Russia.

Currently, China’s reaction is to urge both Iran and the US to maintain calm and de-escalate tensions, and closely monitor the situation. Beijing does not want war and needs Mideast stability to pursue the Belt and Road Initiative Eurasian integration plan. It has large stakes in Iran’s stability: It is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, China is Iran’s largest trading partner, and Iran is a key geographic node for the BRI.

Up to now, China has tried to balance its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East and set up a firewall between the two, although Iran is more significant in China’s strategic calculus given the fact Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries are still under the US security umbrella and host US military bases. China is also against further Western-sponsored regime change in the region, and Iran is an important partner in counterbalancing US hegemony and the drive toward a multipolar world.

‘It’s about China’

Should a US-Iran war break out and the Iranian government is overthrown, it would be devastating for China’s regional interests. As Robert Kaplan wrote in a New York Times article titled “This isn’t about Iran. It’s about China,” the current US-Iran standoff is about something much vaster.

Geography matters in geopolitics and the Gulf of Oman separates not only Oman and Iran but also Oman and Pakistan, where China has completed a state-of-the-art port at Gwadar. It is a hinge uniting the Middle East, the South Asian subcontinent and East Asia in China’s BRI.

China is also a net importer of oil and obtains half its supply from the Persian Gulf. Yet the US Navy maintains control of the sea lines of communications. As such, China is worried about, first, US restriction of China’s oil imports over a clash across the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea and, second, events abroad that might lead to price volatility hurting the Chinese economy. Most important, China needs Iran in the “east flank” of the Persian Gulf to prevent a full blockade by the US Navy.

This insurance plan against a remote contingency was spelled out in a 2000 article published by the prestigious Chinese Society for Strategy and Management (CSSM) in its influential Strategy and Management Journal. The article’s author Tang Shiping, an associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), argued that the US already controls the west bank of the oil-rich Persian Gulf via its pro-American proxies (Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states), in effect rendering it an “internal sea” for the US, and challenges to that position are likely to fail.

Yet if China and Russia expand relations with Iran, they could maintain a “minimum balance” to thwart US moves. Since securing oil imports from the Gulf requires both US-controlled west bank and the China-and-Russia-supported Iranian east bank, this axis would prevent the US from implementing oil embargoes against other countries, and Washington would not shut off China’s Gulf oil supplies, since China, Russia and Iran control the Gulf’s “east bank.”

A great power conflict?

In the past, China’s Mideast posture was a balancing act of engaging Iran while simultaneously not alienating the US. However, what has changed now is the rapid deterioration of Sino-US relations and decoupling over the past year in a new Cold War. With US hostility and “maximum pressure” toward Beijing, Moscow and Tehran (all under US sanctions), Washington is driving all three to coalesce, as evidenced in the recent joint military exercise in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean.

Thus as Colonel Douglas Macgregor and Dr Lydia Wilson of Oxford University caution, should the US attack Iran in a full-scale war, it could herald the additional entry of two nuclear powers to the theater, and transform the bilateral war into one of great-power conflict.

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#### The call to space fuels strategies of technocratic managerialism that position the American transcendental state as supreme---transcendence of limits enables imperialistic violence through intervention, war, circumvention of norms, preemption, and tactics of control

Daniel Sage 16, Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior at Loughborough University, Ph.D. in Political and Cultural Geographies from Loughborough University, 4/29/16, How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization and the Cosmic Sublime, p. 153-156

// Space’s vast endlessness is integral to US geopower – our production of US identity (Manifest Destiny) is wedded to the idea that we can transcend limits and explore / colonize. American geopower results in drone war/police helicopters etc. “Deterritorialization involves reterritorialization.”

In the preceding eight chapters I have argued that some of the unique qualities of outer space—vastness, Otherness, sublimity, timelessness, spacelessness—are just as integral to extra-terrestrial projections of US geopower, as its well-known capacity (Arendt, 1963; Cosgrove, 2001; Dickens and Ormrod, 2007; Dolman, 2001; Macdonald, 2007) to function as an Archimedean high point to monitor and control the surface, and atmosphere, of the Earth. While the focus of my study has been the United States, and more specifically NASA, the implications of this cosmic projection of geopower—the American transcendental state—are global in reach, from enabling and shaping imperialistic ideologies (Chapters 1-3 and 7) to fuelling the extension of technocratic managerialism (Chapter 4-6 and 8). What is more, messianic hope in America remains a global commodity, consumed, for example, through the internationally franchised Star Trek television episodes and films (Penley, 1997: 98-99), multinational ‘Space 2.0’ corporations, like SpaceX (Chapter 6), worldwide audiences to the addresses of American presidents (Chapter 6) and global tourist attractions like the National Air and Space Museum and Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). These global circulations suggest that while my empirical focus in this study has been on the extra-terrestrial assemblage of the American transcendental state, as viewed from within the borders of the US, the salience of my analysis is geo-political.

The development of the American transcendental state through space exploration must also be viewed as an integral component of a far older geopolitical project—the production of an American identity defined in terms of the transcendence of limits, whether technological, economic, spiritual or territorial, enabling the moral aggrandizement of the past, present and future of a horizontal strata of sovereign territory and its peoples (McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; O’Brien, 1988; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995). Over the last decade or so, a growing number of scholars, including geographers, have turned their attention to how messianic-exceptionalist visions of America as the ‘Promised Land’ of ‘Chosen People’ have inflected various imperialistic projects including: the pursuit of democracy through military intervention in the ‘global south’ (Anthony, 2008); the technocratic ‘greening’ of Western global capitalism (Singer, 2010); the building of a ‘culture of war’ in foreign policy (Marsella, 2011), the circumvention of international institutions (Agnew, 2006); and most prominently perhaps, George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ where invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq became justified as a ‘cosmic struggle between good and evil’ (Agnew, 2006: 183; see also Barkun, 2010; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). All of this work indicates two points: first, the enduring Apocalyptic influence of dispensational pre-millennialism on both interventionist and isolationist currents within American (geo)politics (Strum and Dittmer, 2010: 18); and secondly, the rise of a religious cosmology that positions America at the moral, geographical, and spiritual, centre of the universe (Strum, 2010: 150).

My analysis of American spaceflight adds to this body of work on religion and geopolitics by drawing attention to five less discussed conduits of this pious vision of American geopower: (i) the secular—museums, family theme parks, systems management; (ii) the sublime—astronomical artwork, Moon landings and distant Nebula; (iii); the profane—Nazi slave labor camps, technocratic patriarchy, and dead astronauts; the technological (iv)—rocket production lines, O-rings, electrical wiring; and (v) the revolutionary—female astronauts, May 1968, and Richard Feynman. Analytically, these diverse registers suggest the utility of working with a broader, less explicitly spiritual, set of theoretical assumptions, to address the cosmological aspects of American geopolitics. This is why I mobilized the concept of the ‘American transcendental state’, rather than ‘deified nation’ (O’Brien, 1988: 41) within this study. This deliberately hallucinogenic sounding term captures some sense that the messianic-exceptionalistic projection of American geopower is a more diffusive, experimental, fantasmic, embodied, and ostensibly secular, affair, than conveyed within much discursive analysis of the religious undercurrents inflecting American geopolitics (for example Agnew, 2006; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006).

I would like to suggest now that there is another benefit in bringing together these diverse practices under a broader analysis of the American transcendental state: their common geography becomes all the more obvious. That is, all these practices involve thinking, doing or resisting, celestial transcendence as an apparatus of American geopower; hence they can all be rightly considered ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Elden, 2013; Graham, 2004; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). This label has developed to identify a body of work addressing how the circulation of American geopower involves more than two-dimensional geographies of area. It currently includes analyses of; drone warfare (Gregory, 2011); aerial bombardment (Graham, 2004); police helicopters (Adey, 2010); satellite surveillance (Macdonald, 2007) and satellite drone navigation and targeting (Gregory, 2011). Elden (2013: 40) explains that ‘vertical geopolitics’ is mostly focussed upon how state political technologies allow diverse populations to be measured, calculated, controlled and killed, ‘from above’, and occasionally ‘from below’ (for example Elden, 2013; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). By contrast, the vertical orientation I have adopted here, while related, is different. Specifically, I have described how aspects of the projection of American identity, geopower, and territory, also involve a vertical spacelessness—a deterritorialization—a potential collapse into sublime, cosmic, insignificance; in short, rather than the ‘view from above’, the perspective I have traced has been a ‘view into the above’ (and back). In part, therefore, my study can be considered a response to Elden’s (2013) recent question: ‘How would our thinking of geo-power, geo-politics and geo-metrics work if we took the earth; the air and the subsoil; questions of land, terrain, territory; earth processes and understandings of the world as the central terms at stake, rather than a looser sense of the ‘global?’ (p49)

I propose we add to this list celestial entities, including the Moon (Chapter 3), the Martian surface (Chapter 6) and the Eagle Nebula (Chapter 7), as well as God (Agnew, 2006; Dittmer and Strum, 2010; Strum, 2013). Thus, perhaps we should be cautious of Elden’s (2013b) rather geocentric call ‘about how geopolitics might be thought as earth-politics rather than simply a synonym for global politics’ (p59). Instead, it might be more useful to bear in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988: 101) argument that even absolute deterritorialization—something akin perhaps to the mathematical cosmic sublime of Kant (Nye, 1994: 7-8)—always involves reterritorialization(s). Recall how Charles Bonestell (Chapter 2), William Clancey (Chapter 6) and the National Air and Space Museum (Chapter 7), respectively, and persuasively, associated vistas of the Moon, Mars and the Eagle Nebula with the American West, and by extension locate America at the centre of God’s universe (Boime, 1991; Stephanson, 1995).

This analysis of American spaceflight also sheds light on seldom acknowledged connections between religious and vertical geopolitics and technocracy. The relation between critical analysis of geopolitics (O Tuathail, 1996) and technocratic management (Alvesson, 1987), remains remarkably undeveloped. Arguably this lacuna says more about the disciplinary separation between critical security studies and organization studies (Grey, 2009) than the various intellectual crossfertilizations between organization studies and human geography (Clegg and Kornberger, 2006; Dale and Burrell, 2008; Parker, 2013). Nevertheless, there are, as Grey (2009) maintains, clear resonances:

Indeed it could said that, in the same way that the development of security studies in particular, and organization studies to an extent, was shaped by geopolitics of wars both hot and cold, so too many current and future directions be in part a reflection of developments in contemporary geo-politics (p31).

Some organizational practices are of course, very much on the ‘front line’ of practical geopolitics; that is, they comprise the ‘the foreign policy bureaucracy’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 4) through which geographical concepts are deployed to aid ‘conceptualization and decision making’ in ‘everyday foreign policy’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Examples here include the work of the US Air Force, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the UK’s Foreign and Common Wealth Office. There are also a host of other organizations that no doubt influence how practical geopolitics is produced, from security analysts like the RAND Corporation to global defense contractors like McDonnell Douglas. However, analysis of the relationship between organizational and geopolitical practices remains embryonic. For example, Anderson’s (2011) study of urban counterinsurgency and Gregory’s (2011) of drone warfare, do no more than merely infer that the rise of the ‘networked organization’ is reworking the projection of American geo-power. Correspondingly, two organizational studies of the military only hint that, for example, masculine discipline (Godfrey et al., 2012) and team identities (Corona and Godart, 2010) shape and are themselves shaped by grand geopolitical narratives like the ‘war on terror’.

But the imbrication of geopolitical and organizational practice can also be more subtle and much less militaristic—concerning the anticipation and cultivation of geopower through shared national identities, that is ‘popular geopolitics’ (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Here, the connection to organizational practices is no less significant, yet invisible in the literature. NASA offers a good example: from its inception, the space agency developed increasingly refined technocratic techniques that aligned people and machines to naturalize the pursuit of a popular geopolitics wedded to American geopower. Viewed in this way, imperialistic geopower and technocratic-managerialism are interwoven forces; hence the present study suggests the richness of more sustained critical analysis of organization and geopolitics.

#### Technocratic apathy makes war an inevitable outcome of calculative logics---removes the inter-subjective nature of war and reduces conflict to risk calculations that always justify conflict because of the increasing sophistication and remoteness of weapons

Columba Peoples 9, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Bristol, 2009, “Haunted Dreams: Critical theory, technology and the militarization of space,” in Securing Outer Space, International Relations Theory and the Politics of Space, p. 152-178 (All of Chapter 6)

// War is no longer an ethical, interpersonal experience. It has become symbolic, detached from experience. The integration of technocracy in war means there is no separation between means and ends – all of this makes space war inevitable. Academic hegemony upholds the status quo.

***\*\* Italics in Original***

Christopher Coker interprets Adorno here as identifying a process of ‘dissociation’ by which the increasing sophistication and remote-ness of weapons, reaching new distances with the V-2, that had ‘begun to hollow out war as a social experience’. Adorno, according to Coker, feared that ‘in time societies would be able to target their enemies while immune from any threat or risk themselves. At that point war would cease to be an inter-subjective (and therefore) ethical experience’ (Coker 2001: 150).

Even more so than Adorno, Marcuse’s writings in the 1950s and 1960s make frequent reference to von Braun and the disturbing pre—history of the American space programme. In typically Marcusian fashion, these references played upon the contemporaraneous fixation with space in the US and the mix of fascination and fear it evoked in the public consciousness. By the early 1950s, as Rip Bulkeley and Graham Spinardi note, the American public had ‘acquired and alarmingly combined a typically post—war liking for science fiction, and a fascination for revelations about “ﬂying saucers”, with an intense “Cold War” anxiety about the “Communist menace” of the Soviet Union’ (Bulkely and Spinardi 1986: 11). Such combinations were encouraged by the publication of von Braun’s contribution to the ‘Space—Flight’ issue of Collier’s magazine in 1952, expounding plans for a ‘Space Station and Bomb Platform’, replete with illustrations of a wheel—shaped, nuclear—armed space station (Neufeld 2006: 52—62). ‘Facing the existence of the atomic bomb and the fact that such a circling rocket represents an everpresent threat above the heads of almost every nation’, von Braun assured US Army representatives in 1946, ‘that nation which ﬁrst reaches this goal will possess an overwhelming military superiority over other nations’, and recommended using such a platform as a means for launching pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union (Neufeld 2006: 53—54). Likewise, the *Collier’s* piece described how satellites placed in orbit could be used to fire ‘Small winged rocket missiles with atomic warheads’ which could be ‘accurately guided to any spot on earth’ (Bulkely and Spinardi 1986: 12). Such ideas only made Americans more nervous once the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957.

Marcuse effectively tapped into this mixture of fascination and anxiety over the development of space technology by alluding to the more disquieting past of rocket technology discussed in the previous section. In a striking passage of *One Dimensional Man*, his assault on what he viewed as the disappearance of genuine freedom and critique in post—war (particularly American post—war) society, Marcuse asserts that:

*Auschwitz continues to haunt, not the memory but the accomplishments of man — the spaceﬂights; the rockets and missiles; the ‘labyrinthine basement under the Snack Bar’; the pretty electronic plants, clean, hygienic and with ﬂower beds; the poison gas which is not really harmful to people; the secrecy in which we all participate. This is the setting in which the great human achievements of science, medicine, technology take place; the efforts to save and ameliorate life are the sole promise in the disaster. The wilful play with fantastic possibilities; the ability to act with good conscience, contra naturum, to experiment with men and things, to convert illusion into reality and ﬁction into truth, testify to the extent to which Imagination has become an instrument ofprogress.*

(Marcuse 1962: 248)

Marcuse’s juxtaposition of the seemingly banal with the barbaric is one of his common motifs; the ‘labyrinthine basement under the Snack Bar’ is a reference to the nuclear war ‘scenarios’ played out in the 1950s and 1960s at the RAND corporation in sunny Santa Monica, California (Kaplan 1983).

Quoting from promotional material he found to be representatively abhorrent, Marcuse declares that

*The rockets are rattling, the H —bomb is waiting, and the space—ﬂights are flying, and the problem is ‘how to guard the nation and thefree world.’ It is a picture in which ‘the world becomes a map, missile merely symbols [long live the soothing power qfsymbolisml] and wars just [just] plans and calculations written down on article...’In this picture, RAND has transﬁgured the world into an interesting technological game, and one can relax — the ‘military planners can gain valuable "synthetic" experience without risk’.*

(Marcuse 1962: 81)

Marcuse identifies a similar tendency in the widespread ‘hyphenised abridgement’ of the corporeal and technological as an implicit sanitization of new means of destruction and their creators. Here he refers speciﬁcally to ‘“bush—browed” Teller, the “father of the H—bomb”’ and ‘“bull—shouldered missileman von Braun”’, representative quotes he takes from the popular media (Marcuse 1962: 84).

With regard to the latter, von Braun’s time in America provides a rich tapestry for those of a Frankfurt School bent, with the rocket—man proving something of a model product of the ‘culture industry’ and the ‘star system’. Von Braun’s activity in promoting the idea of space exploration and the early American space—programme had elevated him to celebrity status, and his life became the subject of a Hollywood movie in 1960, I Aim at the Stars. Von Braun disliked the film intensely, although he was not exactly publicity shy.

His star—quality assured by his intellect, chiselled features and natural propensity for promotion of space exploration, von Braun appeared on the covers of Time and Life, and was a subject for This is Your Life! Among his celebrity friends were such luminaries as Walter Kronkite, John Denver and Walt Disney, with whom von Braun made a series of TV shows on the possibilities for space travel (Ward 2006: 11). This ‘management of his public image, backed by his superiors and a sympathetic, cold—war—driven press’ helped to diminish the memory of von Braun’s earlier proposals for a nuclear—armed space station and shift the emphasis to peaceful and scientific exploration of space (Neufeld 2006: 52, 59). Those who knew von Braun, such as the astronaut John Glenn, lauded him as ‘a space—age Renaissance man’, interested not only in space but also a keen reader of ‘books on religion, comparative religion, philosophy, geography, geology and politics and a whole realm of other subjects’ and possessing a ‘curiosity about everything around him just as curious about matters of religion and politics and philosophy and government as he was interested in how to build a better rocket’ (Ward 2006: x).

This image of the inquisitive von Braun, curious about all around him and conversant on topics of religion and philosophy, is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the image of von Braun as the dreamer caught up years earlier in the cogs of the German war—machine, oblivious to the suffering and slave labour of Dora and Mittelwerk. Bob Ward argues that there is no ﬁrm evidence that von Braun ever visited Camp Dora, although he had seen the primitive living conditions inside the factory tunnels prior to the camp’s establishment (Ward 2006: 67). Von Braun himself later emphasized that he was not directly in control of the production facilities, remarking of those that were that,

*I would never have believed that human beings can sink that low; but I realized that any attempt [at] reasoning on humane grounds would be utterlyfutile. These individuals had drifted soﬁzr away from even the most basic principles ofhuman [morality] that this scene ofgigantic suﬂering left them entirely untouched.*

(Ward 2006: 67)

Irrespective of what von Braun knew or could do about the conditions of the V weapons production, though, it’s difficult not to get the impression that his overriding concern was for his work:

*Any moral conﬂict caused by the thought the rockets [V—2s] could be used as weapons in a war was opposed by the desire for finance for our space plans. We always considered the development of rocketsfor military purposes as a roundabout way to get into to space.*

(Ward 2006: 70)

Von Braun ends up then, not as a Nazi ideologue, but as something of a Faustian character enslaved by the prospect of making his rocket dreams a reality, seemingly at any cost. As Michael J. Neufeld concludes, it is von Braun’s ‘technocratic amorality, his single—minded obsession with his technical dreams, that is so disturbing’ (Neufeld 2002: 72).

It is this seeming apathy to the relationship between means and ends, and the diptych between von Braun the idealistic dreamer of space and the pragmatic realist, that would perhaps mark out von Braun as a ‘One Dimensional Man’ in the Marcusian sense: ‘The formerly antagonistic realms merge on technical and political grounds — magic and science, life and death, joy and misery’ (Marcuse 1962: 248). The most damning criticism of von Braun is, perhaps, in his apolitical indifference to the furtherance of his dreams. Here again Marcuse takes von Braun to be representative of a broader trend:

*The interdependence of productive and destructive forces, which characterizes technicity as domination, tends to suppress any difference between the ‘normal ’and the abnormal ‘use’ of technology. The difference between the use of ‘technology’ and science by the Nazis and by democracy is dubious. A missile remains a missile whether it destroys London or Moscow, and Mr. von Braun remains Mr. von Braun whether he works for the Brown House or the White House. The absence of an ultimate purpose in technology manifests itself equally in politics, where it becomes open to suspicion and contestation.*

(Marcuse 1oo9: 124)

Von Braun’s imagination becomes an instrument of progress, to paraphrase Marcuse, becoming subservient to instrumental technical rationality. In this vision, ideological leanings are a somewhat secondary question. Perhaps appropriately, Ordway and Sharpe note that in the period during which von Braun and his rocket team were held by the allies before being allowed into the US, ‘Some of the Germans were issued brand new Nazi Party uniforms, but without insignia — the only clothing for them the British quartermasters could find’ (Ordway and Sharpe 2003: 209). This image — of the previous servant of the Nazi war machine now wearing the now apparently neutral costumes prior to their entry into the ‘Free World’ — fits the Marcusian vision perfectly. The elimination of the outward identifiers of fascism creates the grounds for the absorption of fascist techniques into capitalism: in this case, the instrumental calculation of the value of the Rocket Team to the US was reason enough to overlook the troubling context of their wartime work.

We might say that technological rationality, in this instance, is overriding, ﬁnal, and its own justiﬁcation, becoming what Marcuse termed as the ‘Happy Conscience’:

*In this general necessity, guilt has no place. One man can give the signal that liquidates hundreds and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all pangs of conscience, and live happily ever ater. The anti-fascist powers who beat fascism on the battleﬁeld reap the benefits of the Nazi scientists, generals and engineers," they have the historical advantage Qfthe late—comer. What begins as the horror of the concentration camps turns into the practice of training peoplejbr abnormal conditions — a subterranean human existence and the daily intake of radioactive nourishment.*

(Marcuse 1962: 80)

The ‘practice of training people for abnormal conditions’ (in reference to nuclear tests involving troops as well as the inculcation of the Cold War at a broader societal level) has a grim resonance with the altitude and cold experiments of Dachau and Auschwitz, although Marcuse, in some ways foreshadowing the starting point taken by Giorgio Agamben, views the logic of the camp as something more pervasive (Agamben 1998). Marcuse quotes one commentator approvingly that ‘The world of the concentration camps was not an exceptionally monstrous society. What we saw there was the image, and in a sense the quintessence, of the infernal society into which we are plunged every day’.4 Elsewhere Marcuse had noted that

*Throughout the world of industrial civilization, the domination of man by man is growing in scope and efficiency. Nor does this trend appear as an accidental, transitory regression on the road to progress. Concentration camps, mass exterminations, world wars and atom bombs are no ‘relapse into barbarism,’ but the unrepressed implementation of the achievements of modern science, technology and domination.*

(Marcuse 1998: 290)

In sum, for Marcuse and the other early Critical Theorists technological rationality equates to a mode of being in which modern science, technology and domination necessarily go together.

Contemporary US policy and the domination of space

It might be wondered, however, as to why particularly we should revisit Critical Theory in light of the resurgent debate on the militarization/weaponization of space. Certainly the rhetoric surrounding both the military and non—military use of space in the case of the United States, which has tended to stimulate the greatest debate in this regard, is pervaded by the language of domination underpinned by an assumption of technological supremacy. Indeed, pace Agamben, some have gone so far as to argue that current research into space weapons that could ‘target anyone, anywhere, at anytime’ portends the reduction of all life to ‘bare life’.5 Whether or not this assumption is backed up either by actual technological advances or funding is less easy to verify. But recent policy discourse surrounding US space technology is certainly replete with aspirations of ‘dominance’, and related concepts such as ‘space control’ and ‘space superiority’. Representative of this is the US National Space Policy, released in August, 2006 which states that:

*The United States considers space capabilities — including the ground and space segments and supporting links — vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.*

(US 2006)

This follows on the back of a persistent fascination with space as ‘the ultimate highground’ for both civil and military purposes (Wolfowitz 2002), the designation of space as within *Joint Vision 2020’s* mandate of ‘full spectrum dominance’,7 the elevation of the concept of ‘Space Control’ (‘the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required’8) within US air and space doctrine, as well as references by American military officials to the ‘importance of dominating space in peace and war’ (France 2000).

The role of space surveillance and communications technologies during the Gulf War of 1991, the US—led strike on Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 lend substance to this stated centrality of space dominance to US military capacity. In addition the latent ‘dual—use’ potentialities of missile defence technologies — whether in terms of using deployed Ground—Based or Sea—Based Missile Defense as a rudimentary form of anti—satellite or ASAT weapon (as was effectively illustrated by the US in its strike against an American spy—satellite in February 2008) or the offensive potential of ostensibly defensive technologies in development such as the ‘NFIRE’ and Space—Based Laser (SBL) — have raised further questions about the potential use of space as a theatre of war in its own right as well as a ‘force multiplier’ for conventional terrestrial conﬂicts (DeBlois et al. 2008).

Much of this current debate invites parallels with the period of the space weapons fantasies of the 1950s and 1960s and Marcuse’s ensuing analysis. Certainly there are echoes of von Braun’s proposed orbital bombing platforms in recent discussions of ‘Long—Rod Penetrators’ — satellites used to deliver projectile weapons from orbit (DeBlois et al. 2008: 70). Indeed, Neufeld argues that von Braun is a ‘forgotten forerunner to space power theory’, most notably being the first person to use the term ‘space superiority’, the antecedent to today’s concepts of space control and dominance, in print (Neufeld 2006: 52). Likewise, Marcuse’s war—gamers at RAND have their contemporary equivalent in simulations of space conflict in the ‘2o1o and 2020 time frame’ that invariably end up in escalated, even nuclear, conﬂict where players recommend space weaponization in the interim as a panacea (DeBlois et al. 2008: 66).

It would be tempting to read American space policy in this regard in terms of Marcuse’s assertion that:

*Technological rationality reveals its political character as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this universe 9.*

To do so would of course be taking Marcuse’s use of the term ‘universe’ too literally; even the ‘discursive universe’ surrounding American policy on space is not entirely closed, as objections to the bellicose nature of the current US stance attest to.1O At the same time, Marcuse’s foreboding reading of the nature of technological development in One—Dimensional Man and elsewhere might at the very least provide a cautionary reminder of the latent negative consequences of increasing technological sophistication, most obviously in weapons of war. As in Coker’s reading of Adorno cited earlier, Douglas Kellner argues that ‘[Marcuse] feared that more sophisticated technologies would “instrumentalize” war and produce ever more brutal forms of destruction — a vision amply confirmed in the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars’.11 We could, arguably, easily extend this analysis to contemporary US space policy as illustrated above.

Conclusion: rocket dreams, critical consciousness

Where the Marcusian perspective arguably becomes more problematic, and certainly more provocative, is in its assertion that a stated desire to dominate, such as that recurrent espoused within recent US space policy, are only the most obvious outward manifestation of an intrinsic connection between technology and domination; his contention that there is a barbarism latent in all technological ‘progress’. Proponents of the military use of space as an aspect of current US policy are quick to point out that by space dominance they mean ensuring that the US preserves its access to space in all instances, not that the US should exercise complete control. Certainly, we might also want to refute the claim that technological innovation, in space as in any other realm, necessarily leads to domination. Here it is worth noting that Marcuse himself both dismissed the possibility that we might return to some kind of pre-technological culture and even at his most pessimistic still held out hope for what he termed as ‘the chance of the alternatives’:

*It [pre—technological culture] is an outdated and surpassed culture, and only dreams and childlike regressions can recapture it. But this culture is, in some of its decisive elements, also a p0st—technological one. Its most advanced images and positions seem to survive their absorption into administered comforts and stimuli; they continue to haunt the consciousness with the possibility of their rebirth in the consummation of technical progress.*

(Marcuse 1 962: 59)

So, in short, there might still be a chance that technological development could encompass more emancipatory social ends — a view extendable once again, presumably, to space technologies. Space has consistently been the realm of dreams, of the fantastical, of (hu)man’s striving to explore the unknown (Benjamin 2004) and imagination must certainly be required to think of alternative, less bellicose uses of space.

As Wendy Brown notes in a different context, however, ‘the ﬁgure of dreamwork taken up for political analysis promises to puncture the conceit of our innocence and virtue: dreams often tell us things we would rather not know about ourselves’ (2006: 690). Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the case of von Braun and his Rocket Team and their inﬂuence upon the US space programme, where the ‘dream’ metaphor is employed recurrently both by participants and in subsequent historical narratives. The conditions of the advancement of their ‘dream’ of space exploration are, as was shown, somewhat opaque; even if the connections to forced labour and concentration camps are difficult to prove or disprove with finality, the vagaries of the past continue to exert a haunting quality to, as Marcuse put it, ‘the accomplishments of man — the space ﬂights; the rockets and missiles’. As in Goya’s painting, the sleep of reason produces monsters.

In this sense, it is perhaps worthwhile tarrying with the negative potentialities of the military use of space, even if these potentialities are still only in their infancy and dreams of ‘space control’ seem as fantastical as utopian visions for future space exploration and colonization (Radford 2006). Marcuse’s approach is suggestive of a move from, to paraphrase one of his own works, technology to hauntology: 12 current developments in space technology in the US in particular are haunted most immediately by the prospects for greater destructive capacity that they portend, but also by alternative visions for the use of space that they preclude. Marcuse argues that ‘Naming the “things that are absent" is breaking the spell of the things that are’ (1962: 68), and at the current moment there is a vital need to point out not only the negative consequences of the weaponization of space, but also to understand the tendency to conceive of space within a militarized framework in the ﬁrst place (think of the multiple visions of conﬂict in space that saturate the science ﬁction genre), and the rival ways of thinking about space that risk being marginalized as a result (for example, those with an emphasis on exploration or space, on outer space as a Weapons free ‘sanctuary’, or less anthropocentric understandings of the cosmos). In short, a critical approach to the military use of space must tread a careful path between despondency and determinism in the face of the development of space technology, and the utopian impulse so frequently associated with outer space. Without the former, the latter risks becoming ~~blind~~ idealism; Without the latter, assessments of the negative potentialities of space technology risk becoming complicit in the promotion of these largely still nascent capacities. As Joel Whitebook puts it in a different context: ‘The following question can still be raised: What is the fate of the transgressive— utopian impulse, given this new sobriety? For better or worse, that impulse Will exist as long as people dream’; but ‘Any process of enlightenment worth its name must engage the nocturnal’ (Whitebook 1996: 301). In the case of the militarization of space this might be extended to all aspects of the nocturnal: the dark side of the history of space exploration; space nightmares as Well as space dreams.

#### The alternative is a refusal to name and command space, a movement of transcendence to a plane focused on human experience, and an exploration of new affects that all interfere with the state’s technocratic, imperial impulses

Daniel Sage 16, Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management and Organizational Behavior at Loughborough University, Ph.D. in Political and Cultural Geographies from Loughborough University, 4/29/16, How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization and the Cosmic Sublime, p. 156-161

The alternative is a refusal of the aff’s politics to impose order and control space

How does it work

1. We think debate is a question of aff’s scholarship – the demand for us to offer a clean blueprint for how the alternative operates is a. political myopia we’ve indicrted on framework and b. example of calculative politics which we’ve impact turned
2. Our arg is that the fundamental quick fixes results from a desire to control difference – we demand a more contextual and contingent space policy that doesn’t control difference – an example of this is the destruction of satellite arrays – but we will not explain the rest

Destruction of satellite arrays – good bc

// Break “good and evil” “us and them” reps in space – challenge cosmic aggrandization. Alt = refusal to name space, a human transcendence beyond the limits of Manifest Destiny, and the interruption of squo political theorization with new affect – that produces real change.

However, I am all too aware that in stressing the widespread application of this concept of the America transcendental state to understand American geopower— and, concomitantly, the fecundity of bringing together analyses of religion, verticality and now technocracy within critical geopolitics—I run the risk of constructing a totalizing, monstrous, edifice. The reader might rightly ask at this juncture, paraphrasing Nietzsche, have you not gazed into the cosmic abyss of American geopower for too long; are you not also reifying American geopower in the cosmos rather than challenging it? Indeed, throughout the preceding chapters I made reference to a rather singular sounding concept of the ‘American transcendental state’. But, as in the introduction, I must stress again here, that I took this decision for reasons of analytical clarity rather than to suggest I have revealed an independent, singular, definite and a priori reality (Law, 2006), some essence akin perhaps to what Agnew (2006: 184) refers to as ‘Americanism’. Instead, within each chapter I have traced the progressive assemblage of the American transcendental state—that is, nothing less than the divinely sanctioned, exceptional, and messianic, right and duty, of America, and its leaders in its name (Wallace, 2006: 225), to command cosmic space and time by evoking forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Agnew, 2006; Strum, 2010). But the immutability of this cosmic vision (Strum and Dittmer, 2010; Wallace, 2006) belies the transformative, fragmented, heterogeneous components that sustain it, across landscape artwork, through Kennedy’s Moon Speech, to the O-rings of Space Shuttle Challenger. Throughout this study I have suggested countless relations through which this vision is not only produced (Dijink, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995; Wallace, 2006) but circulated, maintained, resisted, repaired, transformed, and experimented with.

How then to conceptualize this heterogeneous, but obdurate, cosmic being? Latour’s actor-network theory (1987; 2005; 2012) is useful to an extent here; first, we can conceptualize the transcendental state as an ‘immutable mobile’ that ‘ends up traversing the universe’ by ‘pay[ing] for each transport with a transformation’ (Latour, 2013: 127); it is ‘not displacement without transformation but displacement through transformation (Latour, 2005: 223); second, the transcendental state can be understood as offering a prophetic, but partial, ‘panorama’ of the ‘world [cosmos] to be lived in’ (p189) which must then, in turn, be:

… carefully situated inside one of the many Omnimax theatres offering complete panoramas of society—and we now know that the more thrilling the impression, the more enclosed the room has to be. [American] Society is not the whole ‘in which’ everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything, calibrating connections and offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability. (p242)

Read against Latour’s concepts of the ‘immutable mobile’ and the ‘localizable panorama’ it is easy to see why my analysis of American transcendental state has involved mapping circulations within as well as beyond our lives. And this is a political move too, because it suggests that opportunities to test and resist the American transcendental state are closer to hand than we might think. As revealed in Chapter 8, a great deal of effort is required to keep the transcendental state circulating because the heterogeneous conduits it passes through—electrical wiring, teleconferences, flight readiness reviews, budget decisions and O-ring joints—are capricious and experimental; that is, affective. Other Chapters acknowledged similar fragility accompanying the assemblage of the transcendental state, including; the partially-owned Declaration of Independence (Chapter 1), the globally unifying Earthrise photograph of Apollo 8 (Chapter 3) and the rusting rockets on display in the gardens of the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). Now located within this chain of heterogeneous transformations, what strategies might aid us in purposefully transforming this now confined totality? Or put differently, how might we engage outer space to resist this cosmic deification of America (O Brien, 1988)? In concluding this study, I propose three techniques but no doubt there are many more.

First, we can expose the void at the heart of this messianic-technocratic projection of geopower (Wallace, 2006). This approach was evidenced in Chapter 1 by Derrida’s (2002) deconstructive reading of Declaration of Independence. Derrida (2002) emphasizes how signing the Declaration in God’s name entails no democratic ownership over America’s future, in outer space or elsewhere. Across the development of American spaceflight, the perils of messianic, freefloating, notions of ‘Progress’, ‘Exploration,’ ‘Frontier’ and ‘The Future’ are all too apparent, not least for NASA itself. Lester and Robinson (2009) suggest the emergence of this critique within the American space policy community:

We should accept that “exploration” is a multivalent term, with many meanings, some of which are contradictory, and all of which have historical precedent. For too long we have looked at the history of exploration selectively, seeking to find the antecedents which justify our own vision of exploration: as science, as human adventure, as geopolitical statement. This is a definitional fight which cannot be won. Space policy must acknowledge the multiple visions for space exploration, developing a clear-eyed metric of value which avoids the vagaries of lofty “exploration-speak”, If the merits of human exploration of the Moon and Mars are primarily symbolic and geopolitical, what are these goals worth in terms of federal funding?

I am unconvinced by the economically instrumentalist conclusions made by Lester and Robinson (2009) about putting a value upon even NASA’s ‘softer’ geopower, but the general caution about harnessing nebulous messianic mythologies to advance American space exploration is valuable. Of course the problem is this tradition of finding our God in the cosmos is long-established as Olsson (2007) suggests via this retelling of the Babylonian creation epic, Enuma elish:

Marduk is the Lord of lords … Hail to the Chief! Fifty were his names, so numerous that if ever attacked he could always hide behind another alias. Never catchable as the specific this or that, always on the move as an ambiguous this and that … Ungraspable multiplicity. … In this mist-enveloped region of religion naming is the name of the game, an exercise in ontological transformations where earthly people appear as projections of heavenly gods, social relations as signs in the sky. … a signified meaning searching for its own coordinates (Olsson, 2007: 23).

Perhaps a more modest approach is required: we should simply resist the urge to name, and tame, the cosmos as a Whole, by naming a celestial Godhead in it that we claim for ourselves (Wallace, 2006) but cannot ever fully own. ‘Evil is the disaster of a truth when the desire to force the naming of the unnameable is unleashed . … Evil is not disrespect for the name of the other, but rather the will to name at any price’ (Badiou, 2004: 115-6; original emphasis). Challenging the cosmic aggrandization of America might therefore imply some attempt to resist naming our God/Future/Progress in the cosmos. Put simply, this all too easy act of cosmic de/reterroritalizaiton is too crude, too undemocratic, too costly.

A second, related, strategy which can be adopted to resist the American transcendental state was discussed within Chapter 3; this is the capacity to push transcendence to another plane or refuge—to follow one line of flight of cosmic deterritorialization and then re-territorialize the Earth in a panorama that starts with a common human experience, rather than those of any particular nation/ God/future. The aim of this strategy is to mobilize a cosmic imagination that can register something of the shared experience of being human.

In Chapter 3 I discussed how the Earthrise photograph from NASA’s Apollo 8 mission have stimulated new cosmic imaginations—including ‘spaceship’ Earth (Cosgrove: 2001, 257-262; Henry and Taylor, 2009; Ward, 1964), Noetic science (Benjamin, 2003: 60-61), global political ecologies (Connolly, 2002)—that defied nationalistic appropriations by inferring a human transcendence. However, as the American author Kurt Vonnegut explains such a transcendental image of humanity, emptied of territorial divisions and difference, is not itself without risk: ‘Earth is such a pretty blue and pink and white pearl in the pictures NASA sent me. It looks so clean. You can’t see all the hungry, angry earthlings down there—and the smoke and sewage and trash and sophisticated weaponry’ (Vonnegut cited in Burrows, 1998: 423). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggest we should always remain sceptical that de-territorialization is a progressive act on its own: ‘Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (p500).

A third strategy is to augment different affects amid the assemblage of the American transcendental state. As described in Chapter 8, the American transcendental state depends upon the cultivation of confidence in technocracy allied to an affective becoming hopeful—a positive openness to the future as life enhancing—orientated around the transcendence of America in cosmic space and time. But, as Anderson (2006), explains, becoming hopeful does not necessarily need to operate in this transcendental manner: hopefulness can also emerge not to ward off suffering, but through every day sorrows, through diminishment of the body’s potential to affect and be affected. Consider, for example, how Dotty Duke refused to discuss her fears and anxieties with her astronaut husband as she kept the ‘house in order and [took] out the garbage’ (Duke 1990—Chapter 5). Dotty Duke epitomizes a different kind of becoming hopeful—a capacity to remain open-ended about the future in a life enhancing manner through diminishment—devoid of discussion of a better future in Earth or in the cosmos; this is hope that challenges ‘the easy equation between transcendence and a future elsewhen or elsewhere in favor of an imminent transcendence from within vectors of diminishment’ (Anderson, 2006: 749; for more analysis of immanent transcendence related to Space see Smith, 2009: 211).

Another affect which is useful in short-circuiting the hopeful assemblage of the transcendental state is boredom. Anderson (2004) describes boredom as the moment when the ‘“forgetting” intrinsic to habit has been momentarily incapacitated. It is the unravelling of habit, a sudden realization of the again’ (p743). Boredom depresses the life enhancing capacity of ourselves to be open to the future, engendering stillness and slowness of thought-action in spacetime, where, as Anderson (2004) puts it, the capacity to experience the ‘not yet’ (p749) is suspended. The evolution of American spaceflight might appear to some the antithesis of boredom, but, as Jorgensen (2009) suggests, the American humanization of outer space has gone hand in hand with endless repetition (of middle America):

The August 1969 Life Special Issue, released to commemorate the landing, wants to produce sympathetic accounts of the astronauts. It is filled with glossy, high color photographs of the astronauts not only mastering outer space, but their domestic spaces as well. Neil Armstrong bakes pizza, Buzz Aldrin jogs through the suburbs, and Mike Collins prunes his garden. These images resonate with outer space itself, as the astronauts use tools in both terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. The spatula and shears the astronauts use to cook lamb curry and prune roses with resemble the objects they hold while walking the moon, these being a laser reflector, seismometer and solar wind sheet (p179).

There is no hopefulness on offer in Jorgensen’s (2009) reading of American spaceflight. Instead the boredom experienced in the cosmic repetition of middle America signals despair: ‘Apollo 11 represented an America that had become unhinged by its own technocracy, its middle class lifestyle, and television’ (p188). Jorgensen (2009) is not, of course, alone in identifying aspects of spaceflight repetitive, even boring. As the emergence of the Teacher in Space program demonstrated (see Chapter 8), NASA itself has historically attempted to introduce elements of excitement, even increased risk, to engage a global audience. Yet, of course, a balance has always had to be struck, as Parker (2009) explains of Apollo: ‘Everything was supposed to be boring, because boredom meant no surprises, and hence the possibility of the adventure in some sense rested on its denial’ (p326). Although fleeting, boredom is surely an unavoidable ingredient in NASA’s technocratic confidence, but when focused and channeled, it does suspend hope in the cosmos as a better place, perhaps providing an opportunity for us to pause and register something of the sublime Otherness of Space, where we concurrently repeat and differ ourselves into infinity: ‘Media representations of space travel turn the vastness of space into the similitude of domesticity, as human familiarity comes to stand in for the infinite. At the same time, the domestic attains the dimensions of the infinite, and in turn becomes strangely unfamiliar to the television viewer’ (Jorgensen, 2009: 179).

These three techniques of cosmo-political intervention—refusal to name, human transcendence, and sensitivity to new affects—are all worthy of greater attention, especially when they can be connected up to, and interfere with, the assemblage of the American transcendental state. Clearly not all of those involved directly in the development of spaceflight will want or be able to practise these techniques. Nevertheless even among this group these techniques are intended to offer greater receptivity to new cosmographical imaginations which move beyond the cosmic aggrandization of messianic-imperialistic-technocratic impulses. If we have entered the Cosmic Age where all territorializing assemblages, all States, now derive vital energy from the Cosmos (Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342), then the imperative becomes not to simply do cosmopolitics (Latour, 2005) but rather which cosmo-politics do we want to pursue? My favoured vision of a Geography of Space is one where this question is endlessly asked but never answered with absolute confidence.

## OFF

### 1NC – Long

#### Interpretation – affirmative teams must defend private entities restrict their appropriation of space – external restrictions on private actors aren’t topical.

Jan-Christoph Heilinger 02/06/2021 [Journal of Social Philosophy, “Individual responsibility and global structural injustice: Toward an ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility”] [DS] [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/josp.12398]

The world we live in is unjust and the existing political institutions fail to adequately address the current injustices. In this paper, I will discuss the role and the responsibilities of individual citizens in affluent countries1 in the face of global structural injustice (GSI): How, if at all, should such individual agents, morally, respond to GSI? This is a challenging question because it links the smallest unit of agency, single persons, with complex moral challenges of an extremely large scale.

Different from attempts to determine the role and moral responsibility of individuals through specific acts and concrete duties, I will propose that a theoretical discussion of global individual responsibility should proceed in terms of an individual—and subsequently potentially collective shared—“ethos.” An ethos is understood as an attitude based on normative commitments that pervasively influence the multiple ways in which individual agents think and feel, talk and act. Proposing and defending the view that the moral responsibility of individuals in the face of GSI consists in fostering an ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility corresponds with the entanglement of individuals in the distinctive moral wrong of GSI. It highlights how individuals can contribute to overcoming structural injustice through targeting its relational origins.

However, even a cosmopolitan ethos held by many individuals alone will not be sufficient to end GSI. What is ultimately needed is significant institutional reform. But a widely shared commitment to the equal status of all, palpable in the way how many people feel, think, talk, and act about it, seems to be a necessary condition for effectively demanding and eventually realizing adequate institutional reform. Personal attitudinal change and personal action thus are essential practical steps toward the larger goal of overcoming GSI—even if their direct and immediate effects remain frustratingly small.

The following argument is based on a normative commitment to the equal moral status of all which has to be respected in all interactions and connections between people, even if these people are different (regarding nationality, individual capacity, sex, gender, race, etc.) and occupy different places and roles in a (global) society (being able to consume or to produce, being in need of assistance, etc.). My view is thus based on a variant of global interactional or relational egalitarianism that requires that all interactions—as well as the absence of interaction where such interaction would be possible—are justified and shaped in the light of this fundamental egalitarian commitment.2

#### “Is unjust” means external restrictions on appropriation by private entities are extra-T. The rez doesn’t say appropriation by private entities should be made unjust, it just says it is unjust.

GU no date [Gallaudet University. "ACTION VERBS AND LINKING VERBS," https://www.gallaudet.edu/tutorial-and-instructional-programs/english-center/grammar-and-vocabulary/verbs/action-verbs-and-linking-verbs/]

A linking verb is a verb that links (connects) the subject of the sentence to **information about that subject**. Linking verbs **do not describe action**. When using linking verbs, the sentence structure will be : SUBJECT--->LINKING VERB---> INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT (noun)(verb)(adjective, noun, or complement)

Some verbs are ALWAYS linking verbs because they never describe an action. Other verbs can be linking verbs in some sentences and action verbs in other sentences.

The following three verbs are ALWAYS linking verbs:

to be (is, am, are, was, were, has been, have been, had been, is being, are being, was being, will have been, etc.) to become (become, becomes, became, has become, have become, had become, will become, will have become, etc.) to seem (seemed, seeming, seems, has seemed, have seemed, had seemed, is seeming, are seeming, was seeming, were seeming, will seem) Here are some examples of linking verbs that are ALWAYS linking verbs in sentences: “The ball is red.” 'Is' is a linking verb that connects the subject, ball, to information about that subject (that it is red). “The children are smart.” 'Are' is a linking verb that connects the subject, children, to information about that subject (that they are smart). “The child will be tall five years from now.” 'Will be' is the linking verb connecting 'child' to the fact that he will be 'tall five years from now.'“The cat seems fine.”'Seems' links the subject, cat, with information about the cat (that it is fine). “The dog became thin after his surgery.” 'Became' links the subject, the dog, with information about him (that he became thin).

#### Violation – the aff fiats state action [or a multilateral agreement]. That makes an action unjust, it doesn’t argue that private practice is unjust and change the private practice. Extra-T links to our standards – it encourages new, unpredictable advantages and plan wordings that skew CP competition and solve DAs.

#### Predictable Limits – there are infinite combinations of nations that could appropriate space but only a small amount of spacefaring companies – limits are necessary when the topic doesn’t have the word “substantial” in it.

#### Ground – generics on this topic must be tied to the actor, not the action, because each space appropriation is unique. Governance affs adds a whole slew of unpredictable multilateralism, global space governance, and process advantages that screw neg ground.

#### Topicality is a voting issue of competing interpretations – it prevents arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the top that favors no one. The standards debate above also proves they aren’t reasonable.

#### No RVIs – they’re illogical, create a chilling effect on setting theory norms, and destroy substantive education.

## Adv 1

### 1NC – AT: Space War

#### No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

### 1NC – AT: Taiwan War

#### No Taiwan war

Greer 18 [T. Greer is a writer and analyst formerly based out of Beijing. His research focuses on the evolution of East Asian strategic thought from the time of Sunzi to today. 9/25. "Taiwan Can Win a War With China." https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/]

Two recent studies, one by Michael Beckley, a political scientist at Tufts University, and the other by Ian Easton, a fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, in his book The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, provide us with a clearer picture of what a war between Taiwan and the mainland might look like. Grounded in statistics, training manuals, and planning documents from the PLA itself, and informed by simulations and studies conducted by both the U.S. Defense Department and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, this research presents a very different picture of a cross-strait conflict than that hawked by the party’s official announcements.

Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is better trained, better motivated, and better prepared for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA could throw against them. A cross-strait war looks far less like an inevitable victory for China than it does a staggeringly risky gamble.

Chinese army documents imagine that this gamble will begin with missiles. For months, the PLA’s Rocket Force will have been preparing this opening salvo; from the second war begins until the day the invasion commences, these missiles will scream toward the Taiwanese coast, with airfields, communication hubs, radar equipment, transportation nodes, and government offices in their sights. Concurrently, party sleeper agents or special forces discreetly ferried across the strait will begin an assassination campaign targeting the president and her Cabinet, other leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, officials at key bureaucracies, prominent media personalities, important scientists or engineers, and their families. The goal of all this is twofold. In the narrower tactical sense, the PLA hopes to destroy as much of the Taiwanese Air Force on the ground as it can and from that point forward keep things chaotic enough on the ground that the Taiwan’s Air Force cannot sortie fast enough to challenge China’s control of the air. The missile campaign’s second aim is simpler: paralysis. With the president dead, leadership mute, communications down, and transportation impossible, the Taiwanese forces will be left rudderless, demoralized, and disoriented. This “shock and awe” campaign will pave the way for the invasion proper. This invasion will be the largest amphibious operation in human history. Tens of thousands of vessels will be assembled—mostly commandeered from the Chinese merchant marine—to ferry 1 million Chinese troops across the strait, who will arrive in two waves. Their landing will be preceded by a fury of missiles and rockets, launched from the Rocket Force units in Fujian, Chinese Air Force fighter bombers flying in the strait, and the escort fleet itself. Confused, cut off, and overwhelmed, the Taiwanese forces who have survived thus far will soon run out of supplies and be forced to abandon the beaches. Once the beachhead is secured, the process will begin again: With full air superiority, the PLA will have the pick of their targets, Taiwanese command and control will be destroyed, and isolated Taiwanese units will be swept aside by the Chinese army’s advance. Within a week, they will have marched into Taipei; within two weeks they will have implemented a draconian martial law intended to convert the island into the pliant forward operating base the PLA will need to defend against the anticipated Japanese and American counter-campaigns.

This is the best-case scenario for the PLA. But an island docile and defeated two weeks after D-Day is not a guaranteed outcome. One of the central hurdles facing the offensive is surprise. The PLA simply will not have it. The invasion will happen in April or October. Because of the challenges posed by the strait’s weather, a transport fleet can only make it across the strait in one of these two four-week windows. The scale of the invasion will be so large that strategic surprise will not be possible, especially given the extensive mutual penetration of each side by the other’s intelligence agencies.

Easton estimates that Taiwanese, American, and Japanese leaders will know that the PLA is preparing for a cross-strait war more than 60 days before hostilities begin. They will know for certain that an invasion will happen more than 30 days before the first missiles are fired. This will give the Taiwanese ample time to move much of their command and control infrastructure into hardened mountain tunnels, move their fleet out of vulnerable ports, detain suspected agents and intelligence operatives, litter the ocean with sea mines, disperse and camouflage army units across the country, put the economy on war footing, and distribute weapons to Taiwan’s 2.5 million reservists.

There are only 13 beaches on Taiwan’s western coast that the PLA could possibly land at. Each of these has already been prepared for a potential conflict. Long underground tunnels—complete with hardened, subterranean supply depots—crisscross the landing sites. The berm of each beach has been covered with razor-leaf plants. Chemical treatment plants are common in many beach towns—meaning that invaders must prepare for the clouds of toxic gas any indiscriminate saturation bombing on their part will release. This is how things stand in times of peace.

As war approaches, each beach will be turned into a workshop of horrors. The path from these beaches to the capital has been painstakingly mapped; once a state of emergency has been declared, each step of the journey will be complicated or booby-trapped. PLA war manuals warn soldiers that skyscrapers and rock outcrops will have steel cords strung between them to entangle helicopters; tunnels, bridges, and overpasses will be rigged with munitions (to be destroyed only at the last possible moment); and building after building in Taiwan’s dense urban core will be transformed into small redoubts meant to drag Chinese units into drawn-out fights over each city street.

To understand the real strength of these defenses, imagine them as a PLA grunt would experience them. Like most privates, he is a countryside boy from a poor province. He has been told his entire life that Taiwan has been totally and fatally eclipsed by Chinese power. He will be eager to put the separatists in their place. Yet events will not work out as he has imagined. In the weeks leading up to war, he discovers that his older cousin—whose remittances support their grandparents in the Anhui countryside—has lost her job in Shanghai. All wire money transfers from Taipei have stopped, and the millions of Chinese who are employed by Taiwanese companies have had their pay suspended. Our private celebrates the opening of hostilities in Shanwei, where he is rushed through a three-week training course on fighting in the fetid and unfamiliar jungles of China’s south. By now, the PLA has put him in a media blackout, but still rumors creep in: Yesterday it was whispered that the 10-hour delay in their train schedule had nothing to do with an overwhelmed transportation system and everything to do with Taiwanese saboteurs. Today’s whispers report that the commander of the 1st Marine Brigade in Zhanjiang was assassinated. Tomorrow, men will wonder if rolling power outages really are just an attempt to save power for the war effort. But by the time he reaches the staging area in Fuzhou, the myth of China’s invincibility has been shattered by more than rumors. The gray ruins of Fuzhou’s PLA offices are his first introduction to the terror of missile attack. Perhaps he takes comfort in the fact that the salvos coming from Taiwan do not seem to match the number of salvos streaking toward it—but abstractions like this can only do so much to shore up broken nerves, and he doesn’t have the time to acclimate himself to the shock. Blast by terrifying blast, his confidence that the Chinese army can keep him safe is chipped away. The last, most terrible salvo comes as he embarks—he is one of the lucky few setting foot on a proper amphibious assault boat, not a civilian vessel converted to war use in the eleventh hour—but this is only the first of many horrors on the waters. Some transports are sunk by Taiwanese torpedoes, released by submarines held in reserve for this day. Airborne Harpoon missiles, fired by F-16s leaving the safety of cavernous, nuclear-proof mountain bunkers for the first time in the war, will destroy others. The greatest casualties, however, will be caused by sea mines. Minefield after minefield must be crossed by every ship in the flotilla, some a harrowing eight miles in width. Seasick thanks to the strait’s rough waves, our grunt can do nothing but pray his ship safely makes it across. As he approaches land, the psychological pressure increases. The first craft to cross the shore will be met, as Easton’s research shows, with a sudden wall of flame springing up from the water from the miles of oil-filled pipeline sunk underneath. As his ship makes it through the fire (he is lucky; others around it are speared or entangled on sea traps) he faces what Easton describes as a mile’s worth of “razor wire nets, hook boards, skin-peeling planks, barbed wire fences, wire obstacles, spike strips, landmines, anti-tank barrier walls, anti-tank obstacles … bamboo spikes, felled trees, truck shipping containers, and junkyard cars.” At this stage, his safety depends largely on whether the Chinese Air Force has been able to able to distinguish between real artillery pieces from the hundreds of decoy targets and dummy equipment PLA manuals believe the Taiwanese Army has created. The odds are against him: As Beckley notes in a study published last fall, in the 1990 to 1991 Gulf War, the 88,500 tons of ordnance dropped by the U.S.-led coalition did not destroy a single Iraqi road-mobile missile launcher. NATO’s 78-day campaign aimed at Serbian air defenses only managed to destroy three of Serbia’s 22 mobile-missile batteries. There is no reason to think that the Chinese Air Force will have a higher success rate when targeting Taiwan’s mobile artillery and missile defense. But if our grunt survives the initial barrages on the beach, he still must fight his way through the main Taiwanese Army groups, 2.5 million armed reservists dispersed in the dense cities and jungles of Taiwan, and miles of mines, booby traps, and debris. This is an enormous thing to ask of a private who has no personal experience with war. It is an even great thing to ask it of a private who naively believed in his own army’s invincibility.

This sketch makes sense of the anxiety the PLA officer manuals express. They know war would be a terrific gamble, even if they only admit it to each other. Yet it this also makes sense of the party’s violent reactions to even the smallest of arms sales to Taiwan. Their passion betrays their angst. They understand what Western gloom-and-doomsters do not. American analysts use terms like “mature precision-strike regime” and “anti-access and area denial warfare” to describe technological trends that make it extremely difficult to project naval and airpower near enemy shores. Costs favor the defense: It is much cheaper to build a ship-killing missile than it is to build a ship.

### 1NC – AT: Deterrence Failure

#### Space deterrence failures only cause limited conflicts

Bloomfield 13 [Lincoln Palmer Bloomfield Jr. is a United States Defense Department and State Department official. Bloomfield was educated at Harvard University, graduating cum laude with an A.B. in 1974. He later attended The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, receiving an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy in 1980. Bloomfield is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations. September 2013. www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/space-weapons/issues/Anti-Satellite%20Weapons,%20Deterrence%20and%20Sino-American%20Space%20Relations.pdf]

If a breakdown in space deterrence occurs, it could be as a result of seeking tactical advantage in conjunction with limited military operations. Alternatively, a breakdown of space deterrence could be a defensive act for signaling purposes, as has often been postulated with a breakdown of nuclear deterrence. In either case, deterrence breakdowns are most likely to happen on a limited scale alongside attempts to maintain, as much as possible, the military use of space. While worst-case scenarios appear implausible, there may well be a greater potential ambit for limited warfare in space, since satellite interference and disruption can be reversible. The requirements to shore up deterrence or to compensate for a breakdown of deterrence in these scenarios are far more modest than the requirements to deal with worst cases.

## Noble Competition

### Case

### 1NC – Circumvention

#### Even new laws fail—courts refuse to enforce, including SCOTUS

Newman 19 [John Newman is a University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", 4/1/19, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/]

But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions.

But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well.

No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area.

Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades.

But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up.

Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it.

If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench.

Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power.

Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.\* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing.

And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017.

Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench.

Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system.

There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.

### 1NC – D

#### Demographic shifts lock in long term labor power.

Irwin ’21 [Neil; June 5; senior economics correspondent; New York Times, “Workers Are Gaining Leverage Over Employers Right Before Our Eyes,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/05/upshot/jobs-rising-wages.html>; KP]

Yet in key respects, the shift builds on changes already underway in the tight labor market preceding the pandemic, when the unemployment rate was 4 percent or lower for two straight years.

That follows decades in which union power declined, unemployment was frequently high and employers made an art out of shifting work toward contract and gig arrangements that favored their interests over those of their employees. It would take years of change to undo those cumulative effects.

But the demographic picture is not becoming any more favorable for employers eager to fill positions. Population growth for Americans between ages 20 and 64 turned negative last year for the first time in the nation’s history. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the potential labor force will grow a mere 0.3 percent to 0.4 percent annually for the remainder of the 2020s; the size of the work force rose an average of 0.8 percent a year from 2000 to 2020.

An important question for the overall economy is whether employers will be able to create conditions attractive enough to coax back in some of the millions of working-age adults not currently part of the labor force. Depending on your view of the causes, the end of expanded pandemic-era jobless benefits might also have an effect. Some businesses may need to raise prices or retoo

l how they operate; others may be forced to close entirely.

Higher wages are part of the story. The jobs report issued on Friday showed that average hourly earnings for nonmanagerial workers were 1.3 percent higher in May than two months earlier. Other than in a brief period of statistical distortions early in the pandemic, that is the strongest two-month gain since 1983.

But wages alone aren’t enough, and firms seem to be finding it in their own best interest to seek out workers across all strata of society, to the benefit of people who have missed out on opportunity in the last few decades.

“I’ve been doing this a long time and have never felt more excited and more optimistic about the level of creative investment on this issue,” said Bertina Ceccarelli, chief executive of NPower, a nonprofit aimed at helping military veterans and disadvantaged young adults start tech industry careers. “It’s an explosive moment right now.”

In effect, an entire generation of managers that came of age in an era of abundant workers is being forced to learn how to operate amid labor scarcity. That means different things for different companies and workers — and often involves strategies more elaborate than simply paying a signing bonus or a higher hourly wage.

At the high end of the labor market, that can mean workers are more emboldened to leave a job if employers are insufficiently flexible on issues like working from home.

### 1NC – Inequality

#### Inequality’s declining.

Gramm ’21 [Phil and John Early; March 23; a former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; served twice as assistant commissioner at the Bureau of Labor Statistics; Wall Street Journal, “Incredible Shrinking Income Inequality,” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/incredible-shrinking-income-inequality-11616517284>; KP]

Twice over the past 50 years, the Census Bureau has significantly changed how it collects and records income statistics. In 1993 and 2013 the Census Bureau changed its methods in an effort to collect better information from high-income households. These changes created two major discontinuities and distorted the time-series so that the change in measured income inequality in those years was as much as 15 times the average annual change found for the entire 50-year period. At the time, the Census Bureau explained in detail what it had done. It also explained the limitations the changes imposed on the use of its income-inequality measure to look at changes over extended periods. In subsequent use of the data by the Census Bureau and others, however, those warnings have been neglected.

The simple solution would have been to isolate the distortions caused solely by the changes in data-collection techniques and adjusted the previous years’ measures to reflect the effect of the changes. We made these adjustments and they are shown in the nearby figure. The blue line is the actual reported Census Bureau measurement of income inequality. The yellow line eliminates the effects of the 1993 and 2013 discontinuities caused solely by changes in measurement technique. The black line shows income inequality when the value of all transfer payments received is counted as income, income is reduced by taxes paid, and the two technical corrections are made.

Lo and behold—income inequality is lower than it was 50 years ago.

The raging debate over income inequality in America calls to mind the old Will Rogers adage: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It is what you do know that ain’t so.” We are debating the alleged injustice of a supposedly growing social problem when—for all the reasons outlined above—that problem isn’t growing, it’s shrinking. Those who want to transform the greatest economic system in the history of the world ought to get their facts straight first.

### 1NC – Inequality No war

#### Inequality doesn’t cause war

Elise Must 16, PhD student at LSE, this was her PhD thesis, “When and how does inequality cause conflict? Group dynamics, perceptions and natural resources”, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3438/1/Must\_When\_and\_how\_does\_inequality.pdf

Does economic inequality lead to conflict? This question has attracted the attention of prominent scholars at least since the time of Aristotle (Nagel 1974). The frequent assumption that unequal distribution somehow fuels rebellion has resulted in a vast amount of theoretical as well as empirical work. For long, results remained mixed. Despite countless qualitative studies asserting that inequality is a major reason for conflict outbreak, quantitative studies struggled to establish a firm relationship between the two (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Cramer 2005, Lichbach 1989). These quantitative studies, including the most influential ones by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), rely on analysis of individual measures of inequality. However, as most prominently set forth by Frances Stewart, it is minority groups or collectives of individuals who rebel, not the whole population, nor individuals (Stewart 2002). Stewart’s theoretical development has given rise to several quantitative studies which uniformly support the role of economic group inequality in inducing conflict (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014, Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015, Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Deiwiks, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012, Østby 2008a, b, Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009). Hence, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that inequality causes civil conflict when it overlaps with relevant group identities. Promising as these studies are, they nevertheless neglect a potential crucial part of the inequality-conflict causal chain. Seemingly all studies of inequality and conflict, including those measuring group inequalities, are based on objective inequalities. Yet, as Stewart (2010, 14) herself notes, ‘People take action because of perceived injustices rather than because of measured statistical inequalities of which they might not be aware’. Economic inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, or by local GDP data, is most commonly used as proxies, leaving completely aside how economic inequality is actually interpreted and perceived by both groups and individuals (ref. Zimmermann 1983). It remains obvious, however, that in order for people to take action to address inequalities, the first step is to recognize them and to consider them unjust (Han et al. 2012). The use then, of objective measures in current empirical studies, is based on the assumption that both objective and perceived horizontal inequalities essentially amount to the same thing. Put another way it is assumed that all objective inequalities are actually perceived as inequalities by relevant groups, and conversely all perceived inequalities have an objective basis. These are strong claims that are so far largely untested. Existing studies of the link between objective and perceived horizontal inequalities range from concluding that there is no such link (Langer and Smedts 2013) to documenting imperfect correlations – ranging from 0.27 to 0.30 depending on indicators and datasets (Holmqvist 2012). While cross-country analyses of conflict have neglected perceptions of inequality, the case study literature does offer some examples demonstrating their importance. Interviewing Muslim immigrants in London and Madrid, Gest (2010, 178) finds that what distinguishes democratic activists from those who engage in anti-system behavior, is the nature of their individual expectations and perceptions about shared economic realities. Moving on to larger conflicts, a recent World Bank report concludes that the so called ‘Arab Spring’ was driven by a decrease in popular subjective satisfaction, while the objective economic situation actually improved in the years before the widespread mobilization (Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, and Shantayanan 2015). The report also points to the importance of inter-group inequality as opposed to individual inequality. My main argument is that in order to better capture the role of inequality in inducing civil conflict, measures have to account for relevant groups as well as for the perception of inequality in these groups. In addition, my analyses fill two other gaps in the literature. While Stewart emphasizes how groups can mobilize around different identities, current studies have almost exclusively focused on ethnic groups. However, a regional identity might be just as relevant (ref. Posner 2004). I will therefor look at the effect of regional economic inequality on civil war. And finally, most of the studies, and all of those with a global scope, rely on time invariant measures of economic horizontal inequality. This is commonly defended by referring to the demonstrated ‘stickiness’ of horizontal inequalities (see e.g. Stewart and Langer 2008, Tilly 1999). Still, a recent study covering 1992 to 2013 demonstrates a global decline of ethnic inequality (Bormann et al. 2016), while Kanbur and Venables (2005) compare case studies of 26 developing countries and conclude that regional inequalities are rising. The data used in this analysis also show that horizontal inequalities change quite substantially over time. Using inequality data from one particular year to analyze decades of conflict incidents is therefore questionable. Hence, my study represents the first time-variant analyses of the effect of both objective and perceived regional inequality on civil war covering developed and developing countries in all world regions14 . Analysing data for the period 1989 to 2014 from the World Values Survey (WVS), I find that countries with a high level of perceived regional economic inequality have an elevated risk of civil war outbreak. On the other hand, mere objective regional economic inequalities do not have any significant effect. The group aspect remains essential, as neither objective nor perceived individual inequality is linked to increased civil conflict risk.