## OFF

### NC – Long

**A. Interpretation: The aff must defend that one or more member nations of the WTO reduce IP protections for medicines. “Nations” in the resolution is a plural noun which implicates more than one nation.**

Daniel **Scocco, 2007** (English Grammar 101: Plural Form of Nouns. Online. Internet. Accessed May 13, 2014 at http://www.dailywritingtips.com/english-grammar-101-plural-form-of-nouns/)

**The English language has both regular and irregular plural forms of nouns. The most common case is when you need to add -s to the noun. For example one car and two cars.**

**Nations is definitely plural.**

**Collins Dictionary** https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/nation#:~:text=Word%20forms%3A%20plural%20nations

**Word forms: plural nations**

**B. Violation: The plan only applies to one nation**

**C. Vote neg –**

#### 1] Precision – if we win definitions the aff is not topical. The resolution is the only predictable stasis point for dividing ground—any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits and ground – forcing them to defend plural means they have to strategically choose states that have common features like types of LAWs or geopolitical tensions to avoid losing to PICs which is a more limited caselist and ensures link magnitude to core topic generics while still allowing for a robust set of affs

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for—there’s no way for the negative to know what constitutes a “reasonable interpretation” when we do prep – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom, proliferating abuse

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical. RVI’s deter legitimate theory like T and disclosure and are illogical because you shouldn’t win for doing a good thing – logic outweighs because it’s the basis for all arguments.

## OFF

### NC – Long

#### Interpretation: IP protections refer to copyright, trademarks, GI’s, patents, ID’s, and trade secrets

WTO No Date [World Trade Organization] [DS] [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/trips\_e/intel1\_e.htm]

(i) Copyright and rights related to copyright.back to top The rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films) are protected by copyright, for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author. Also protected through copyright and related (sometimes referred to as “neighbouring”) rights are the rights of performers (e.g. actors, singers and musicians), producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations. The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work. (ii) Industrial property.back to top Industrial property can usefully be divided into two main areas: One area can be characterized as the protection of distinctive signs, in particular trademarks (which distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings) and geographical indications (which identify a good as originating in a place where a given characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin). The protection of such distinctive signs aims to stimulate and ensure fair competition and to protect consumers, by enabling them to make informed choices between various goods and services. The protection may last indefinitely, provided the sign in question continues to be distinctive. Other types of industrial property are protected primarily to stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology. In this category fall inventions (protected by patents), industrial designs and trade secrets. The social purpose is to provide protection for the results of investment in the development of new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and development activities. A functioning intellectual property regime should also facilitate the transfer of technology in the form of foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing. The protection is usually given for a finite term (typically 20 years in the case of patents). While the basic social objectives of intellectual property protection are as outlined above, it should also be noted that the exclusive rights given are generally subject to a number of limitations and exceptions, aimed at fine-tuning the balance that has to be found between the legitimate interests of right holders and of users.

#### Violation – data exclusivity is a term several countries are trying to get protected by TRIPS – but it is fundamentally different from other IP protections

MSF May 2004 [Technical Brief, “Data exclusivity in international trade agreements: What consequences for access to medicines?”] [DS] [https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/dataexclusivitymay04.pdf]

“Data exclusivity” is a term covering measures some governments, especially the US, are seeking to include in bilateral and regional trade agreements. The implications of such measures need to be understood, because they could have far-reaching ramifications for access to medicines. Data exclusivity refers to a practice whereby, for a fixed period of time, drug regulatory authorities do not allow the registration files of an originator to be used to register a therapeutically equivalent generic version of that medicine. Data exclusivity is completely separate from patents. In fact, the strongest impact may be felt in a country where there is no patent for a medicine - if data exclusivity is granted this will provide a monopoly for a set period (e.g. five years). This short briefing paper outlines the consequences of data exclusivity for access to medicines and explains why countries are not obliged to agree to it. What kind of data are we talking about? “Data exclusivity” refers to test and other data that a pharmaceutical company must provide to a drug regulatory authority (DRA) in order to get first-time registration for any new medicine it wishes to market in a country. This test data is necessary to demonstrate the efficacy and safety of the drug. Registration - or marketing approval – by the DRA is needed before a medicine can be marketed in a country. When generic manufacturers later apply to register another version of an already-registered medicine, they only have to demonstrate that their product is therapeutically equivalent to the original. To fulfil the efficacy and safety requirements, the drug regulatory authority relies on the registration file of the original manufacturer. So what kind of exclusivity is it? In order to delay competition from generic manufacturers, multinational companies have been pushing hard to obtain exclusive rights over their test data. During this period of “data exclusivity”, the DRA is not authorised to rely on information in the originator dossier to approve/register generic versions of a medicine. This period of exclusivity may vary from five years in the US to eight-10 years in the EU and can be found in developed countries mostly in medicines legislation. Such legislation also exists in a limited number of developing countries. Practically, data exclusivity prevents DRAs from registering generic versions of a medicine during a limited period, unless the generic manufacturer independently carries out its own tests showing the safety and efficacy of the medicine. What are the consequences of data exclusivity for access to generic medicines? The biggest impact of data exclusivity is on medicines that are not patented in some countries, as a result of pre-TRIPS patent laws excluding pharmaceutical patents. This is the case of most antiretroviral medicines in Guatemala for instance1 , where generic manufacturers will now have to wait five years from the date of approval of the original medicine in Guatemala before obtaining registration of their own version of the medicine2 . In other words, even when a medicine is not protected by any patent, multinational pharmaceutical companies are assured a minimum period of monopoly in countries that provide data exclusivity. This is clearly going beyond the TRIPS Agreement (see further below). In other situations, where a medicine is protected by patents, data exclusivity may constitute a barrier to the use of compulsory licenses. If a generic manufacturer is granted a compulsory license to overcome the patent, it will not be able to make effective use of the license if it has to wait for the expiry of data exclusivity before it can get its generic version approved by DRA and put on the market. Therefore, countries will need to ensure that the use of compulsory licences are not restricted by data exclusivity. Data exclusivity is a means of impeding generic competition, and maintaining artificially high prices, thereby restricting access to medicines. Moreover, it could be considered unethical to require generic manufacturers to conduct their own safety and efficacy trials with proven effective compounds. Clinical trials could expose patients to sub-optimal treatment. Proof of therapeutic equivalence should be sufficient. 1 This is because Guatemala only introduced patent protection for pharmaceuticals in November 2000. Consequently, all medicines which were applied for patent protection before this date cannot be patented in Guatemala (except for new improved versions that meet the patentability criteria). See MSF report Drug patents under the spotlight – Sharing practical knowledge about pharmaceutical patents, May 2003. 2 In accordance with Decree 09-2003, and the recently signed Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States. What is the relationship between data exclusivity and patents? Patent application is made well before the application for drug registration, at the stage of basic research, but since patents now last for 20 years, they usually expire after the data exclusivity period. The schematic graph below illustrates the interference of patents and data exclusivity. basic preclinical clinical application drug research research research for registration approval end of 20-year patent 2-4 years 4-5 years 2-3 years start of 20-year patent 5-year data exclusivity Is data exclusivity another kind of intellectual property right? Compared to more traditional intellectual property rights such as patents and copyrights, data exclusivity is very unusual since it does not require any inventive activity for it to be granted. Data exclusivity protection is instead only based on the fact that an investment has been made by the originator in carrying out the necessary tests to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their new medicine. Although the TRIPS Agreement now requires some protection for this sort of data, it does not require that exclusive rights be granted in the same way as patents or copyright.

#### Vote neg for limits and ground – data exclusivity does not require inventive activity, which skirts the innovation DA and access CP’s and makes advantage areas fundamentally different from other affs – it also opens the floodgate to any investment that has been made ever which explodes the topic and makes neg prep unfeasible.

#### c/a ci and no rvis

## Case

### 1NC – Defense

#### AT: Solomon

#### Solomon says Syria, Iraq, national identity, arrest of the Prince make instability inevitable – BUT continued aid and military support prevents escalation

Solomon 4/6 “Instability in neighboring Jordan is ‘bad news’ for Israel” Ariel Ben Solomon [Middle East Correspondent for the Jerusalem Post], Apr 6, 2021 <https://www.jns.org/instability-in-neighboring-jordan-is-bad-news-for-israel/> SM

Instability in neighboring Jordan is ‘bad news’ for Israel

For the past several years, Jordan has come under increasing strain due to wars in bordering Iraq and Syria, which has led to many refugees resettling in Jordan. Combine a population holding divergent loyalties with a poor economic situation, and the result has been unrest.

(April 6, 2021 / JNS) The arrest last weekend of nearly 20 people, including former Crown Prince Hamza bin Hussein, by Jordanian authorities in what is being viewed by some as a coup attempt has led to fears over the stability of the strategic Arab state.

Jordan, a key U.S. and Israeli ally, is important for Israel’s national security because it serves as a buffer against radical forces from within the country as well as those further east, Israeli Middle East experts told JNS.

“The border with the Hashemite Kingdom is Israel’s longest, and Jordan serves as a friendly buffer on the east,” affirmed Efraim Inbar, president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies. “We should not forget that the territories east of Jordan until the border of India are in the hands of rulers under Islamist influence.”

On Saturday, Jordan’s official media outlet denied reports that Prince Hamza had been arrested, claiming that the prince had instead been asked to stop “movements and activities that are used to target” the kingdom’s stability and security. Other key figures were also detained, including at least one other Jordanian royal, as well as tribal leaders and members of the country’s political and security establishment.

Prince Hamza, the eldest son of the late King Hussein and his American-born fourth wife, Queen Noor, and the half-brother of King Abdullah, said he would defy his house arrest conditions, adding to the intrigue behind what was reported as an attempt to destabilize the country.

“For sure, I won’t obey when they tell you that you cannot go out or tweet or reach out to people but are only allowed to see the family. I expect this talk is not acceptable in any way,” Hamza said on Monday in a recording released by Jordan’s opposition, reported Reuters.

According to the report, Prince Hamza had visited tribal gatherings in recent weeks, where the government and the king had been openly blasted.

Middle East expert Hillel Frisch, a professor at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan, told JNS, “I don’t think this is the beginning of the fall of King Abdullah. All the key actors are behind him.”

“Nevertheless, this is the first serious fissure in the royal family, which if it did not enjoy total unity was always sufficiently disciplined to keep major differences within the family,” he said. “What happened in Jordan seems to be a result of dynastic struggles within the ruling royal family.”

“A mainstay of Hashemite rule always lay in that it was more united than any other political actor in Jordan,” added Frisch. “This may no longer be the case.”

Indeed, Abdullah has ruled the country since King Hussein’s death in 1999 and has cultivated a very close relationship with the United States.

Hamza has had a strained relationship with his half-brother, who stripped him of his title in 2004 and later appointed his own son as crown prince. Nevertheless, Hamza has held multiple positions within the monarchy, including in the army, and commands a loyal following in Amman, where he often styles himself after his late father.

At the same time, for the past several years, Jordan has come under increasing strain due to wars in bordering Iraq and Syria, which has led to many refugees resettling in Jordan. The country has most recently has been hard-hit by the coronavirus pandemic.

The United States is “closely following” the situation in Jordan following reports of an alleged coup plot involving the former Jordanian crown prince, U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said on Sunday.

The action against Hamza comes a few weeks after the Jordanian government publicly acknowledged a new defense agreement with the United States that allows free entry for American forces. It boosts Israel’s unstable eastern neighbor, providing a base from which U.S. forces can potentially act in Syria, Iraq and Iran.

The defense pact’s timing—coming soon before the government crackdown—shows how dependent Jordan is on outside support.

Weak national identity leads to instability

Jordan is estimated to have more than half of its population of Palestinian origin, with many from the West Bank, which Jordan occupied between 1949 and 1967, in addition to a significant Muslim Brotherhood presence. These are ingredients for instability.

Add to this the fact that the Jordanian state has a weak sense of national identity, as it and other Arab states were created by Western European powers after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.

A journal article by Linda L. Layne titled “The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan,” published in 1989 in the American Ethnologist, explains how the state sought to cultivate a national identity around disparate tribes.

“The symbolization of tribes has been facilitated by the Jordanian government’s policy over the last several decades to unify and integrate individual tribal identities into one broad tribal identity, that is, to promote Bedouinism in a general way rather than encouraging each tribe to maintain and develop its own individual identity,” she wrote.

One question that gets to the root of the matter is how “Jordanian” its citizens actually feel. Palestinian, tribal and Islamist elements are less loyal to the state than their ideology or kinship networks. In the Middle East, loyalty tends to be to one’s family and tribe.

The Jordanian regime keeps its grip on power thanks to military and economic aid, mainly by the United States and the Gulf states.

Indeed, America is Jordan’s biggest supporter with more than $1.5 billion in aid in 2020, including $425 million in military assistance.

The poor economic situation combined with a heterogeneous population with divergent loyalties has led to frequent unrest among a vehemently anti-Israel population.

As Frisch noted, “even though the rise of a radical regime was not in the offing, instability in Jordan is bad news for Israel.”

#### AT: Lazaroff:

#### Lazaroff doesn’t even get close to escalation – says the peace treaty scares terrorists and offers general stability – that’s distinct from a nuclear war

#### AT: Silverstein

#### The impact card is about Iran lashout, but their internal links are about Israeli protection from terrorism – local skirmishes with terrorists won’t escalate

#### AT: Hour

#### Proves low-level war is inevitable – due to Syrian collapse, Yemeni conflict, etc. Their card also says it’s “low probability” and doesn’t say Russia will get involved, just that it is a regional war that the US might get involved in.

#### Middle East war won’t go nuclear – balanced alliances, Chinese non-intervention, and cooperation prevent great power draw-in

Mead 14 – Walter Russell Mead, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University, Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine and a non-resident Scholar at the Hudson Institute, 2014 (“Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?” *Huffington Post*, July 7th, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html>)

The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago.

GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW

What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms.

Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending.

But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible.

AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES

And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain.

Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close.

While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.

#### No Iran war with the US or Israel – postdates their escalation card

Hallinan 2/1/19 [Conn Hallinan, columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus, PhD in Anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley, “Could Trump Really Launch a War With Iran?”, https://fpif.org/could-trump-really-launch-a-war-with-iran/]

Would the U.S. or Israel Actually Attack?

Of course, if the United States and/or Israel join in, Iran will be hard pressed. But as belligerent as Bolton and the Israeli government are toward Iran, would they initiate or join a war?

Such a war would be unpopular in the United States. Some 63 percent of Americans oppose withdrawing from the nuclear agreement and, by a margin of more than 2 to 1, oppose a war with Iran. While 53 percent oppose such a war — 37 percent strongly so — only 23 percent would support a war with Iran. And, of those, only 9 percent strongly support such a war.

The year 2020 is also the next round of U.S. elections, where control of the Senate and the White House will be in play. While wars tend to rally people to the flag, the polls suggest a war with Iran is not likely to do that. The U.S. would be virtually alone internationally, and Saudi Arabia is hardly on the list of most Americans’ favorite allies.

And it’s not even certain that Israel would join in, although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls Iran an “existential threat.” Polls show that the Israeli public is hardly enthusiastic about a war with Iran, particularly if the U.S. isn’t involved.

The Israeli military is more than willing to take on Iranian forces in Syria, but a long-distance air war would get complicated. Iraq and Lebanon would try to block Israel from using their airspace to attack Iran, as would Turkey. The first two countries might not be able to do much to stop the Israelis, but flying over a hostile country is always tricky, particularly if you have to do it for an extended period of time. And anyone who thinks the Iranians are going to toss in the towel is delusional.

Of course Israel has other ways to strike Iran, including cruise missiles deployed on submarines and surface craft. But you can’t win a war with cruise missiles; you just blow a lot of things up.

#### No strikes – Israel would never

Keck 15 [Zachary Keck is the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Before that, he was a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "5 Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran." https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469?page=0%2C1]

Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isn’t likely to attack Iran.

1. You Snooze, You Lose

First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one.

Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.

2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely

Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.

Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.

3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel

Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world.

Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger.

Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.

4. Israel’s Veto Players

Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation.

For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current defense minister Moshe Yaalon explained last year: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today.

What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, “It is quite clear that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.”

#### Defense and turn still applies to water wars – because the only impact is Middle East war – also impact card doesn’t say escalation.

#### No impact to water wars

Gleick 18 [Peter Gleick, MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship and was elected to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, world-renowned expert, innovator, and communicator on water and climate issues, cofounded the Pacific Institute, which he led as president until mid-2016, pHd from UC Berkeley, and Charles Iceland, s Director, Global and National Water Initiatives with WRI’s Food, Forests, and Water Programs, “Water, Security, & Conflict”, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Water-Security-and-Conflict\_Aug-2018-2.pdf]

3.2. The Role of Governance in Water Security

Most water crises do not end in conflict, migration, or acute food insecurity. Instead, people muddle through until the crises recede. Some crises even generate cooperation among local or regional parties. Understanding why water crises lead to adverse outcomes in some places and better outcomes in others will help inform strategies for reducing the risks of conflict. Why, for example, did Syria sink into civil war following a record-breaking five-year drought, while .Iordan and Lebanon avoided strife following that same drought (Adams et al. 2018)? This requires integrating analyses of meteorological and resource-related events with the diverse social, political, and economic dynamics at play.

We can postulate—based on research conducted by Wolf and his colleagues (2003) on transboundary basins— that when rapid change, either on the institutional side or in the physical system, outpaces the institutional capacity to absorb that change, the stage is set for possible water insecurity. Therefore, when we go looking for water insecurity, we need to be on the lookout for large-scale water-related change and low capacity to handle such change (this Is what the Water, Peace, and Security [WPS] consortium is attempting to do via the development of a near realtime global early warning system for potential water-related threats to human security—more on this further on in this brief).

### 1NC – Offense

#### **Prices are already going back down – market data from today proves the spike was artificial perception of demand.**

Resnick-Ault 10/18 [Jessica Resnick-Ault, “Oil prices ease off highs as U.S. factory data weighs on market”, Financial Post, 10/18/21, https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/oil-prices-ease-off-highs-as-u-s-factory-data-weighs-on-market]

Oil prices pulled back after touching multi-year highs on Monday, trading mixed as U.S. industrial output for September fell, tempering early enthusiasm about demand.

Production at U.S. factories fell by the most in seven months in September as an ongoing global shortage of semiconductors depressed motor vehicle output, further evidence that supply constraints were hampering economic growth.

“The oil market started off with a lot of exuberance, but weak data on U.S. industrial production caused people to lose confidence in demand, and China released data that intensified those worries,” said Phil Flynn, senior analyst at Price Futures Group in New York.

Brent crude oil futures were down 20 cents or 0.24% at $84.66 a barrel by 11:46 a.m. EST (1546 GMT) after hitting $86.04, their highest since October 2018.

#### Middle East war is good—it raises oil prices

Lynch 18 [Michael Lynch spent nearly 30 years at MIT as a student and then researcher at the Energy Laboratory and Center for International Studies. He then spent several years at what is now IHS Global Insight and was chief energy economist. Currently, Lynch serves as the president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, Inc., and lectures MBA students at Vienna University. He’s been president of the US Association for Energy Economics and serves on the editorial boards of three publications. Will Oil Prices Blow Up With The Middle East? April 12, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellynch/2018/04/12/will-the-oil-price-blow-up-with-the-middle-east/#166754c23d19]

It's said that a woman once approached 19th century German Chancellor Bismarck and asked him to explain the controversy over Schleswig-Holstein, to which Bismarck responded, “Madam, only three people have ever understood Schleswig-Holstein. One is dead, the second has gone mad, and I’m the third and I’ve quite forgot.” This summarizes how I feel about the current Middle East situation. The public rhetoric (including tweets) suggests that the U.S. and Russia are both willing to attack each other’s forces -- the U.S. is planning an attack on Syrian forces that might affect Russian personnel and Russia is apparently threatening to shoot down U.S. planes. This is obviously concerning, and while incidental Russia casualties might not lead to a direct military response, if Russia shot down a U.S. plane (as opposed to an unmanned missile), the U.S. would almost certainly respond. Given that the Russians know this, they are unlikely to take such a step. An additional factor is the possibility that Iranian forces in Syria would be hit by any U.S. attack, which might invite retaliation. Iran is unlikely to be able to attack U.S. forces in the Mediterranean directly, but forces in Iraq and Syria might be subject to ‘asymmetrical warfare,’ i.e., small-scale attacks, possibly including suicide bombers. The threat to oil markets come if Iranian actions encourage President Trump to refuse to recertify the Iranian nuclear agreement in mid-May. While many of Iran’s customers in Asia would not be concerned, there might be some drop in sales from companies fearful of U.S. legal action. Sanctions on financial transfers would also deter the more conventional customers, but the Iranians should be able to work around that after a brief pause. Could this also mean an escalation in the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia (or more broadly but less accurately, Shia versus Sunni regimes)? Given that the Saudis have been attacking Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen without direct response by Iran for some time now, any Saudi actions in Syria seem unlikely to be a provocation that would worsen the situation in the Gulf. FDR’s comment that ‘we have nothing to fear but fear itself’ seems appropriate for oil traders. Bombs and missiles flying in the greater Middle East always creates a bullish impetus on prices, even if the oil fields remain distant from the actual violence. The death of Russian personnel would worsen this, as it implies a greater probability of retaliation and continuation of the conflict which, again, would push up oil prices. And naturally, should Iranian personnel be affected, there would be very rational concerns that they might respond with some sort of attack that could affect Gulf oil trade. The worst case scenarios -- ongoing U.S.-Russian combat or direct Saudi-Iranian fighting -- seem very unlikely to happen. But as long as the possibility exists, oil prices will remain elevated, with WTI perhaps hitting $70 or higher, and only coming down when it has become clear that the violence is diminishing and will not spread. Until then, expect a bumpy ride.

#### Quebec growth will continue, but it’s fragile

Rastello 9/28/21 [Sandrine Rastello, Bloomberg News. "Quebec's deficit outlook better than foreseen, minister says.” https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/quebec-s-deficit-outlook-better-than-foreseen-minister-says-1.1658492]

The Quebec economy is bouncing back faster than was anticipated six months ago, raising the prospect of a smaller budget deficit even as the government faces new expenses to weather the pandemic, the province’s finance minister said.

“Things are looking better than we had forecasted in the budget,” which was based on economic growth of 4.2 per cent, Eric Girard said Tuesday at the online Bloomberg Canadian Fixed Income Conference. That forecast came in March.

Now, from consumption to residential investment, “all components are powering along,” and the private sector no longer needs most of the emergency programs set up during pandemic, he said.

Quebec’s economy stood out last quarter, growing at an annualized pace of 3.4 per cent even as the country as a whole contracted 1.1 per cent, held back by supply-chain disruptions. Canada’s second-most populous province has also managed to avoid another economic shutdown, which Girard attributes to “fairly high” vaccination rates and rules requiring proof of two jabs to enter restaurants, theaters and gyms.

#### Oil and gas key to Canadian economy – exports and jobs overwhelmingly outweigh any other industry.

Canada Action 20 [“How Important is Oil to the Canadian Economy?”, 5/6/20, https://www.canadaaction.ca/how\_important\_is\_oil\_to\_canada]

Whether you like it or not, oil is a very important part of the Canadian economy. It's been said revenues generated by the oil and gas industry “pay the rent” in our country, not to mention the sector provides hundreds of thousands of direct and indirect jobs from coast-to-coast.

Yet, many Canadians seem unaware of the importance of oil to Canada. Such understanding seems to be lost amid the intense misinformation campaigns by special interest and environmental groups targeting the industry.

The latest falsehood spread by these groups includes the suggestion that the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion (TMX) doesn’t make economic sense. They argue there is no demand for the additional oil that would be shipped on the expansion project’s second line to the west coast for export, which is false.

The demand for Canadian heavy oil is alive and well in Asia. To add, such narrative does not recognize the fact that heavy oil competes on a different market than lighter crudes.

Once you sift through the misinformation regarding Canada’s world-class energy sector, however, you find the facts. And you don’t have to look too hard to learn about how important the oil and gas industry is to the Canadian economy.

59% of Canadians believe if Canada does leaves its oil in the ground, another country will simply produce theirs

Trade Value of Canadian Oil & Gas Exports (2019)

According to World’s Top Exports, Canada’s total exports were valued at approximately $592.46 billion, or $15,790 per Canadian in 2019.

Canada exports goods to several countries around the world, with more than three quarters (76.7%) going to the United States and Mexico. The remaining locations:

• 11.7% went to Asia

• 8.9% went to Europe

• 1.3% went to Latin America (excluding Mexico)

• 0.9% went to Africa

• 0.5% went to Oceania (mostly Australia, New Zealand)

Top 10 Canadian Export Products (2019)

In other words, Canada is an exporting nation which benefits immensely from trade with other countries.

Exports are also a huge part of our country’s overall prosperity. Last year, exports accounted for 23.5% of the nation's total gross domestic product (GDP).

Canada's most valuable export commodity are mineral fuels, accounting for 22% of total exports in 2019. The following list also shows just how crude oil and other petroleum exports stack up to those from other sectors of the economy:

1 – Mineral fuels including oil: $130.57 billion (22% of exports)

2 – Vehicles - $81.47 billion (13.8%)

3 – Machinery including computers $46.18 billion (7.8%)

4 – Gems, precious metals: $28.26 billion (4.8%)

5 – Electrical machinery, equipment: $17.91 billion (3%)

6 – Plastics, plastic articles: $16.85 billion (2.8%)

7 – Wood: $15.52 billion (2.6%)

8 – Aircraft, spacecraft: $14.99 billion (2.5%)

9 – Ores, slag, ash: $11.81 billion (2%)

10 – Pharmaceuticals: $11.14 billion (1.9%)

Notice the value of Canada’s total oil and gas export products considerably outweigh any other listed. Mineral fuel exports also outweigh the total value of numbers 4 through 10 combined.

Even the auto industry you always hear about as a Canadian, about how important it is to our country economically, had exports worth just over half of the value of oil and gas. These export figures above are comparative to those in 2018.

\*conversions from USD to CAD using Bank of Canada's 2019 exchange rate of 1.3269

Oil & Gas: Overall Economic Contribution

Trade is just one element of a nation’s overall economic performance. To get a better idea of how important oil is to the Canadian economy, public and private consumption, government investment and spending and foreign balance of trade (net exports) among other factors must be considered.

These all constitute GDP, a widely used measure of an economy’s output or production. Depending on deficits among other factors, the overall contribution to the national economy may be larger (or smaller) for a given industry. Having said so, let's put the importance of oil and gas to Canada into perspective.

A good example is despite car exports this year being similar in total value to what they were in 2018 - just over half the value of mineral fuel exports - the overall contribution of the oil and gas industry to the national GDP ($117 billion) was about 6 times that of the Ontario auto industry.

In simpler words, we sell a lot more liquid fuel products than we buy, creating an immense overall net positive contribution, or trade surplus to our national economy.

The bottom line is this: oil and gas is one of the single largest contributing sectors to the national economy. Furthermore, over the next decade oil and gas is projected to be one of the largest contributors to our GDP and a major source of tax revenues

> $1.4 trillion to Canada’s GDP

> $139 billion in federal tax revenues

> $86.7 billion in provincial tax revenues

Canadian Sectors by GDP Contribution (2018)

Canada benefits when any of its industries are performing well, especially the oil and gas sector.

To put into perspective just how important oil is to the Canadian economy, some brief comparisons of total GDP contribution to Canada’s economy in 2018:

> Oil and gas extractive, service and pipeline sector - $132 billion

> Total finance and insurance sector - $129 billion

> Transportation sector (air, water, rail, trucking, related warehousing) - $78 billion

> Residential construction sector - $51 billion

> Agriculture, forestry and fishing industries - $40 billion

> Telecommunications sector - $33 billion

> Auto and parts manufacturing sector - $16 billion

A Strong Oil and Gas Sector Benefits all of Canada

As indicated by the immense contribution to the national GDP, the oil and gas sector is extremely important to the Canadian economy.

Many respected business leaders across the country have said something along the lines of what Patricia Mohr has, a respected economist and market commodity specialist in Vancouver, BC:

“Canada is a trading nation. We owe our economic prosperity and relatively high per-capita income to trade — and crude oil dominates that trade.”

She is right. For example, in 2014/2015 Alberta (home to over 80% of oil production in Canada) had a net contribution to federal finances (taxes paid minus services and transfers received) of $27 billion. That was when the province's petroleum industry was strong and oil prices were high. In 2018, that figure dropped to around $21 billion.

Even when Alberta’s oil and gas sector was struggling to get back on its feet, it still made net transfer payments to Ottawa of well over $20 billion each year between 2015 - 2018.

As a matter of fact, between 1961 and 2017, Alberta has contributed more than $600 billion to Ottawa in net federal transfer payments, largely due to a robust and prosperous. energy sector.

Canadians Should Be Proud!

A strong oil and gas sector in Canada means billions more in transfer payments that can help pay for social programs, schools, hospitals and the jobs that go with across the country.

According to the most recent study, the world’s demand for oil is expected to peak by 2035. As the most environmentally friendly, transparent and regulated oil producer in the world, Canada should be the one to meet growing demand across the globe.

A strong oil and gas sector is extremely important to the Canadian economy. All Canadians should realize just how incredible its economic contribution is for municipal and provincial economies – whether it be through direct / indirect activity, or transfer payments – from coast-to-coast-to-coast.

#### Aff causes secession

RT News 12 Quebexit: Canada's separation anxiety Published time: September 04, 2012 http://rt.com/news/quebec-election-separation-canada-309/

**Quebec’s separatist party is expecting a comeback amidst** student protest and **economic uncertainty**. As voters head to the polls to choose their government, the French-speaking province looks on course for another referendum to split from Canada. Tuesday’s provincial election is a three-way fight between the incumbent Liberals, newly-formed coalition Avenir Quebec, and the separatist Party Quebecois (PQ). PQ has been proving most popular at the polls – marching ahead of the others at around 33 per cent. Liberal premier, Jean Charest, head of Quebec’s government for nearly a decade, called for an early election on August 1 due to looming student protests. However, throughout the election campaign he has trailed the separatist Party Quebecois leader Pauline Marois in the polls. PQ’s popularity means the issue of Quebec’s separation from Canada has surfaced again. Quebec has already had two unsuccessful referenda that came close to splitting Quebec from Canada in the past: one in 1980 with 40 per cent support and another in 1995 with almost 50 per cent voting for separation. The separatists leading in the polls claim their short-term priority would be picking the economy up off its knees, instead of pushing for a separation vote straight away. "It's very important for me to manage our finances responsibly. That is without doubt why our engagements are the least costly of all parties," Marois told Canadian media, while outlining a program that sets out new spending of $1 billion over five years. At the same time she stated that she would hold an independence vote "tomorrow morning" if the conditions were right. Further, the party leader clarified that a referendum on Quebec's independence would only be held if there was complete confidence in a win. For now, opinion polls suggest that only less than 40 per cent of the province's population would support a split. Protests and lack of support for Liberals The new buzz over Quebec comes after months of student and union protests raging this spring and summer against tuition hikes in the province and the controversial new Bill 78, which restricts mass gatherings in the province. Tens of thousands of students have made their outrage public by demonstrating and clashing with police, making headlines across the world. Protests began in February, resulting in about 2,500 arrests. Tuesday's vote is seen by many as an echo of this public discontent. Experts believe that the more the economic uncertainty continues, the louder the calls for Quebec's sovereignty will be. After nine years of Liberals governing Quebec, people have grown wary and reluctant to re-elect them considering the student unrest that evolved into a larger social protest, says Concordia political science Professor Bruce Hicks. "Quebecers tend to tire of the government and throw them out," he says. "It's sort of been the tradition in Quebec politics." "It's not going to be a referendum or nothing," said Antonia Maioni, a political scientist at McGill University. "The idea is to have smaller wins and move towards an eventual, perhaps, referendum. At least [Pauline Marois] can then go back to her party and say I'm moving to a third referendum." Referendum agenda: PQ’s referendum agenda consists of two phases. First, Marois plans to ask Ottawa for greater control in areas such as foreign policy and economic development. Any kind of refusal from Ottawa would be met with a legislative fight and any of PQ’s losses **would be** added to the list of **reasons why Quebec should separate**. The second phase is setting referendum in motion. PQ has already transferred the responsibility for calling a referendum to the general public. Currently, as soon as 850,000 people sign a petition – 15 per cent of Quebec’s population – **the public could demand a referendum**. Moreover, Marois plans to establish a new cabinet post that would manage such requests, CBC reported. Canadian reporter Michael Forian says **Quebec is growing estranged from the rest of Canada**, while half of Canadians no longer care whether Quebec chooses to separate or not.

#### Quebec secession collapses Canadian war fighting

Granatstein, Senior Research Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 12

(J.L. “How a separate Quebec would transform our defence policy,” 9-7-12, DOA: 12-28-14, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/09/07/j-l-granatstein-how-a-separate-quebec-would-transform-our-defence-policy/)

The prospect of a referendum has implications for Canadian defence and foreign policy. The possibility of a Parti Quebecois referendum victory has even more.

The PQ’s platform makes the right noises on defence and foreign policy, pledging to remain in NATO and NORAD and to enthusiastically support UN peacekeeping. But during the election campaign, Ms. Marois attacked the Harper government’s supposed “warrior” mentality, its support for the F-35 fighter, its defence spending that metaphorically takes bread from the mouths of Quebec’s children. The reality is that no one in Quebec, or outside it, believes that an independent Quebec would want anything but the most bare-bones of constabulary7 duties for its military7. That translates into either Canada or the United States assuming de facto responsibility for the defence of Quebec, responsibilities in which Quebec would have almost no say. Certainly both Canada and the United States are unlikely to be willing to make Quebec a third member of NORAD. There might also be opposition to allowing Quebec to join NATO. None of this may matter very much if there is no military7 threat to North America or Europe, but these conditions cannot be guaranteed to last forever. Possibly bereft of alliances, certainly with its defences under others’ stewardship, how Quebecois could consider this independence is most unclear. The impact of secession on the Canadian polity would also be severe. Some other provinces might decide that Canada no longer meets their long-term needs and seek statehood in the United States or independence. Whole industries — the aviation business in Quebec built with federal subsidies, for example — would be lost to Canada. **Ottawa’s power and status would be greatly diminished in every international organization** (while Quebec’s, of course, would be minimal in every case), and keeping the United States friendly to Canadian survival and trade would become even more critical than it now is. Moreover, the implications of a separate Quebec for the Canadian Forces (CF) are also severe. First, every francophone in the military would face a difficult personal choice — to go with his or her heart or head. The only possibility of a serious career lies with the CF, but Canada’s post-secession military would likely be English-speaking. **It would certainly be diminished in size and talent if many**, or most, of the francophones who make up **28% of the present CF** left for the new republic’s quasi-military. Moreover, much of the CF’s equipment and infrastructure in Quebec would accrue to the new nation, including bases at Bagotville, Montreal and Valcartier, and the Naval Reserve headquarters in Quebec City. The CF-i8s at Bagotville — unless they were flown out before the referendum (as was done just before the vote in 1995) would fall into Quebec hands, as would the equipment and most of the personnel of the Ve Brigade — some one-third of the Army’s combat strength — at Valcartier. And although we can scarcely bear even to think of this, the possibility exists that secession will **spark violence that could escalate quickly into something approaching civil war.** Quebec’s remaining anglophones, its unassimilated allophones and its First Nations are not likely to acquiesce silently to becoming Quebec citizens and to losing their ties to Canada. Some will surely press to separate parts of western Quebec, Montreal and the north, efforts that the new republic would be obliged to resist. Seeing their compatriots confronted on the evening news, Canadians would certainly demand they be protected. A single misstep, a single rash act, **could create a bloodbath**.

#### Key to global stability – prevents hot spot escalation

Towsend et al, Policy Research Initiative @ Canada@150, 13

(Thomas, “Canada’s Place in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape: Leveraging our Comparative Advantage,” Policy Horizons Canada,7-8-13, DOA: 12-28-14, http://www.horizons.gc.ca/eng/content/canada%E2%80%99s-place-changing-geopolitical-landscape-leveraging-our-comparative-advantage)

As we look ahead to 2017, factors such as the **rebalancing of powers on the international stage** and the **increasing influence of non-state actors** are leading to a world that is, if nothing else, more **complex and unpredictable**. The confluence of known and unknown drivers of change may lead to **unanticipated upheavals in the global order**. Drivers such as climate change, resource scarcity, and demographics will challenge conventional geopolitical thinking in the coming decade. Similarly, poverty, pollution, and pockets of disaffected populations will fuel **resentment and possibly extremism and violence**. As diasporas find themselves increasingly co-localized, cultural, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic differences may stress established commons.1 There is a perception that Canada punches above its weight inter nationally.2 This will not necessarily be the case in the years to follow as the shifting geopolitical landscape may no longer support Canada’s privileged position. Looking ahead to 2017, Canada needs to be cognizant of the changing patterns of engagement, power, and security to assess implications for our country and its place in the world. Fine-tuning Canada’s relationship with the United States will continue to be a priority in 2017 in terms of inter alia trade, security and international engagement. The establishment of an Arctic balance of power will drive Canada’s involvement with circumpolar nations in light of climate change and sovereignty concerns. Canada will need to protect its position as a resource provider amidst competitors such as Russia, Brazil, and African countries, while ensuring the sustainability of its natural capital. Meanwhile, it will also need to deepen its economic and diplomatic ties with nations representing major future consumer demand, like China and India. Canada will need to contend with limited resources and its middle power status when addressing domestic and foreign challenges. These resource constraints affect not only the issues that Canada must address but also how the Public Service organizes itself to do so. This will mean making some difficult choices and acting strategically to leverage our comparative advantages where they exist. Canada should focus on areas where we are most likely to have an impact or in areas that are most important to our safety and prosperity by identifying the opportunities in global trends for Canada to strengthen its position internationally. Analytic Scope Our paper will focus on Canada’s place in a changing geopolitical landscape. We will examine Canada’s comparative advantage and how it can be levered in the years leading up to 2017. The Arctic, domestic security and international trade policy are being addressed by other papers in canada@150 and those issues will not be examined them here. We will target three thematic areas: international security, global governance, and relations between Canada and the United States. The approaches suggested in this paper are not mutually exclusive. Considering that Canada’s public service must evolve and organize itself to ensure that it can effectively represent Canadian interests on the world stage, we present two ideas for changes that will allow Canada to respond quickly and effectively to international events. These approaches will help to create a public service that is ready to address complex multi- stakeholder issues. Trends in violent conflict over the past 20 years warrant cautious optimism that traditional wars will continue to decrease in frequency and intensity as the international community maintains an active engagement in intervention and post-conflict peace-building activities.3 In 2017, however, the underlying causes of political and social instability and, as a result, of violence, will certainly remain. Factors such as climate change, poverty, and resource scarcity **could lead to an increase in the prevalence of fragile states and the severity of conflicts**. Fragile and conflict-affected situations pose a significant threat to Canada’s security and development interests.4 Canadian engagement in these states has traditionally involved modest interventions in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.5 This focus has shifted with a more robust combat mission in Afghanistan. The decision to focus resources in Afghanistan has resulted in the mission being one of Canada’s main sources of geopolitical influence, increasing our standing among allies.6 **Canada will face sustained pressure to contribute to the global security burden. NATO and the United Nations will look to Canada’s capacities to accept roles within larger strategic missions in conflict zones.** Canada will also continue to be called upon by other domestic and international stakeholders to support humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions. Canada will be well placed for future interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states, having developed **valuable expertise in** **Afghanistan**, **Sudan**, **Haiti**, and **a myriad of other countries** over the course of the past 15 years, as well as an improved ability to work inter-departmentally towards security, diplomatic, and development efforts. Many lessons have also been learned, including the need for: improved planning capacity towards a long-term vision; interdepartmental agreement and buy-in on a single mandate; and focus to avoid spreading ourselves too thinly. Improved foreign intelligence capacity will also be vital to improve Canada’s planning capacity in this area.

#### Secession independently undermines NORAD and relations

Doran, Professor of IR @ Johns Hopkins, 01

(Charles, “Why Canadian Unity Matters and why Americans Care: Democratic Pluralism at Risk,” pg. 61-3)

But regardless of how well the United States and Canada use their hard and soft power, a fragmentation of the jurisdictions, whose sharing has been so carefully nurtured since the end of the Second World War, is worrisome. Nothing exemplifies the harmony of the city on the hill in military terms like the cooperation between the United States and Canada **in NORAD**. Quebec secession would surely **undercut this cooperation**, not because Quebecers would be less talented than their partners but because the Canadian remnants would now be **too anaemic to fulfill the responsibilities of NORAD partnership.** Likewise, Canadian fragmentation would destroy the armed forces since the economies of scale necessary to mount an appreciable military effort would dissolve with secession. Not because of friction between a Canadian anglophone military outfit and a Quebec francophone unit, but because of size difficulties that leave each polity beneath a feasible start-up threshold, the respective remnants would lose all military effectiveness. **More than any other ally,** the United States would **lament this loss of military coordination**, including contributions to peacekeeping.44 Moreover, the problems posed for the North American city on the hill by airspace jurisdiction and undersea jurisdiction would multiply. As the claimants to the seabed and to the above-territory airspace and asynchronous orbit expand in number, there is no guarantee that all will see the occupation and even the defence of these areas in the same way, or in the way that present day Canada, Mexico, and the United States see these jurisdictional matters. While the United States would remain as economically and politically dominant as ever, the propensity for a dissatisfied smaller participant **might be to draw in outside allies or bidders to enhance its weight at the bargaining table**. Such balance of power tactics probably would fail. But the task of administration for the United States at a minimum would increase. More seriously, it might begin to experience rivalry for jurisdiction within the very boundaries of the city on the hill.

**NORAD prevents accidental launch**CIMBALA, 99 (STEPHEN J, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol. 25, No. 4)

A second **requirement** for the avoidance of accidental/inadvertent war is the validity of warning and attack assessment. Leaders must have confidence that they can distinguish between false and true warnings of attack. They must also expect, once received valid warning of attack, that they will have time to respond appropriately. U.S. nuclear warning and attack assessment evolved during the Cold War into a tightly coupled system of warning sensors, analysis and fusion centers, communications links, commanders, and command posts. **The nerve center** of U.S. Cold War warning and assessment was NORAD, located in an underground and hardened shelter complex at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Even after the Cold War, NORAD is the **chef d'oeuvre of the elaborate U.S. warning system** for surprise attack.

#### Rising oil prices fend off deflation which collapses European economies

Pylas 17 (2017, Pan, Associated Press, citing Ben May, lead eurozone economist at Oxford Economics, “Eurozone inflation spikes to highest in over 3 years”, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/788e6d377e264b9790066e0dc3143814/eurozone-economy-growing-fastest-pace-may-2011)

Europe appears to have seen off the deflation bugbear that has stalked it for the past couple of years. Consumer prices across the 19 countries that use the euro grew in December at their fastest rate since Sept. 2013, official figures showed Wednesday. A surge in oil prices contributed most to the near-doubling in the annual inflation rate to 1.1 percent from the previous month's 0.6 percent. Though higher inflation can eat into consumer spending, it can also help push up wages and stimulate economic activity in a region that has largely stagnated. As such, the figures are likely to provide some relief to policymakers at the European Central Bank who have resorted to a raft of stimulus programs to get inflation back toward their target of just below 2 percent, considered most suitable for a healthy economy. With the inflation rate still short of that target, the central bank is unlikely to give up on stimulus anytime soon. Though the ECB can argue that its policies, which have included cutting interest rates and injecting billions into the financial system, have shored up the economy, the main contributor to the December spike in inflation was out of its control: energy prices. Eurostat, the European Union's statistics agency, said energy costs were up 2.5 percent in the year to December compared with a 1.1 percent drop in November. In December, the price of crude oil rose above $50 a barrel — from below $30 a year earlier — after the OPEC oil cartel and other nations agreed to cut output levels. When energy costs are excluded, inflation remains muted. The core rate, which strips out the volatile items of alcohol, energy, food and tobacco, rose to only 0.9 percent from the previous month's 0.8 percent. That suggests that high unemployment in many parts of the eurozone following the region's debt crisis continue to weigh on wage demands and consumption. "Despite headline inflation returning to an upward trend we expect that the ECB's preference will be to maintain the policy course ... and 'look through' energy-influenced price developments in coming months," said Cathal Kennedy, European economist at RBC Capital Markets. In the near-term, higher headline inflation could weigh on economic activity if wages don't keep up, as people's income won't go as far. However, a steady level of inflation is considered good for an economy as it can drive up wages and promote innovation and investment by firms. It can also reduce debt levels for firms and countries in real terms. That's certainly a better prospect than prices falling over a sustained period, a phenomenon known as deflation that has haunted Europe in the past few years. Lower prices may sound good and have in fact been a boon to European consumers recently as they were due to the slide in oil prices — money saved filling up a car or on home heating could be spent elsewhere. The problem arises when a fall in prices endures. That can choke the life out of an economy if consumers put off purchases in the hope of future bargains. It can erode profits and make governments' debts appear greater. Deflation has proven difficult to reverse, as evidenced by the case of Japan over the past couple of decades. Ben May, lead eurozone economist at Oxford Economics, conceded that higher inflation could weigh on eurozone economic activity in coming months, while noting that it may "trigger some positive developments" such as higher wages in economies like Germany where unemployment is low. "We think that the eurozone economy is now in a strong enough position to weather this shock," he said. "Indeed, the region may now be in a position where a period of moderate inflation is more desirable that a further sustained bout of 'noflation'." The view in the currency markets was broadly positive and the euro recouped some of its recent losses, which had seen it fall to 14-year lows against the dollar. Europe's single currency was up 0.7 percent at $1.0477. A separate survey Wednesday provided evidence that the eurozone economy gained momentum at the end of 2016. According to research firm IHS Markit, eurozone business activity grew in December at its fastest pace since May 2011. The company's composite purchasing managers' index — a broad gauge of business activity across the manufacturing and services sectors — rose to 54.4 points in December from 53.9 the previous month. Anything above 50 indicates growth. It said December's level points to quarterly economic growth of 0.4 percent — better than the eurozone performed for most of 2016 but modest compared with the United States.

#### European economic collapse causes global conflict

Wright 12 Thomas, fellow with the Managing Global Order at the Brookings Institution, Summer 2012, “What if Europe Fails?” The Washington Quarterly, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf

Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little analysis of what the end of European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world. This article does not predict that failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical implications if it does. The severity and trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a high-impact event with a non-trivial probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious analysis. Failure is widely seen as an imminent danger.¶ Would the failure of the Euro really mean the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe? Could the global economy survive without a vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like after the end of European integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the international order has been primarily a Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would the disintegration of the European Union or the Eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on world politics in the coming decade?¶ Thinking through and prioritizing the consequences of a failed Europe yield five of the utmost importance. First, the most immediate casualty of the failure of the European project would be the global economy. A disorderly collapse (as opposed to an orderly failure, which will be explained shortly) would probably trigger a new depression and could lead to the unraveling of economic integration as countries introduce protectionist measures to limit the contagion effects of a collapse. Bare survival would drag down Europe’s economy and would generate increasing and dangerous levels of volatility in the international economic order.¶ Second, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis depend not just on the severity of the crisis but also the geopolitical climate in which it occurs. Europe’s geopolitical climate is as healthy as can be reasonably expected. This would prevent a simple repeat of the 1930s in Europe, which has been one of the more alarming predictions from some observers, although certain new and fragile democracies in Europe might come under pressure.¶ Third, failure would cement Germany’s rise as the leading country in Europe and as an indispensable hub in the European Union and Eurozone, if they continue to exist, but anti-Germanism would become a more potent force in politics on the European periphery.¶ Fourth, economic downturn as a result of disintegration would undermine political authority in those parts of the world where the legitimacy of governments is shallow, and it would exacerbate international tensions where the geopolitical climate is relatively malign. The places most at risk are the Middle East and China.¶ Fifth, disintegration would weaken Europe on the world stage–it would severely damage the transatlantic alliance, both by sapping its resources and by diverting Europe’s attention to its internal crisis–and would, finally, undermine the multilateral order.¶ Taking these five implications in their totality, one thing is clear. Failure will badly damage Europe and the international order, but some types of failure–most notably a disorderly collapse–are worse than others. Currently, the pain is concentrated on the so-called European periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland). Disorderly collapse would affect all European countries, as well as North America and East Asia. If a solution to the Eurocrisis is perceived as beyond reach, leaders of the major powers will shift their priorities to managing failure in order to contain its effects. This will be strenuously resisted on the periphery, which is already experiencing extremely high levels of pain and does not want to accept the permanence of the status quo. Consequently, their electorates will become more risk-acceptant and will pressure Germany and other core member states to accommodate them through financial transfers and assistance in exchange for not deliberately triggering a break-up. This bitter split will divide and largely define a failing Europe. Absent movement toward a solution, EU politics is about to take an ugly turn.

#### Independently, decline kills EU Soft Power

Kaplan, 13 (Robert D., Stratfor's chief geopolitical analyst, Warsaw Business Journal, 1/21/13, http://www.wbj.pl/blog/Stratfor\_on\_Geopolitics/post-394-europes-soft-power.htm, “Europe's soft power,” ADM)

Indeed, it is the economic decline of this very model – that of the European social welfare state – over the past few years that now threatens Europe's soft power and, therefore, its own moral conception of itself. Soft power, as defined by Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. is, among other things, the power to persuade in a media-driven world. And for Europe, such power ultimately came from its economic and political model.¶ The welfare panacea¶ In “Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945” (2005), the late New York University historian Tony Judt documents how the state – the modern welfare state – which reached its apogee in the 1960s and early 1970s, was seen back then as the decisive bureaucratic panacea to Europe's horrific recent past. The response to the mass killings of two world wars – in terms of government policy – was a benevolent administrative order that “would always do a better job than the unrestricted market” in protecting people's interests, in dispensing social justice and allowing for “cultural vitality.” The state, as Judt describes the halcyon middle decades of the Cold War in Western Europe, “lubricated the wheels of commerce, politics, and society in numerous ways.”¶ Government jobs were plentiful, and so were generous pensions and health care. The philosopher and historian might have had a more profound answer to the Holocaust and other outrages of the first half of the 20th century in Europe, but the European politician and the economist had a specific, not-to-be-disparaged answer as well: the modern social welfare state.¶ The full-bodied administrative state was until recently instantly appealing, not only to Europeans themselves but to American tourists, who came from a land of embarrassingly poor train and bus service, slummy big-city airports and decaying highways and bridges – not to mention poor public service in general – and found in places like France, Germany and the Netherlands a paradise of sleek trains, postmodern air terminals and wondrous nighttime lighting across bridges and along highways. The European state with its high taxes could certainly deliver, it seemed. It was why conservative politicians in Europe were often proudly to the left of liberal politicians in the United States.¶ The state itself was the foundation upon which so much else rested in Europe. In his academic classic, “The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569-1999” (2003), Yale historian Timothy Snyder talks about “European standards” that the Poles and other subject peoples of the communist bloc aspired to upon their liberation in 1989-1991. European standards meant “territorial integrity … and the protection of the cultural rights of minorities.” European standards meant that the “crucial categories” were the “state and its citizens;” not the ethnic nation and its members. For the state enforced the same rules for all people without regard to their ethnicity or religion. Thus was fascism and Nazism legally vanquished. And while these laws and values did not directly rest on reasonably high economic growth, the success of the social welfare state provided added legitimacy to this morals-based system.¶ The European Union itself, which grew out of the Franco-German Coal and Steel Community of the early Cold War days and the European Common Market (European Economic Community) of the middle ones, was the supreme culmination of social welfare economics and international legal and diplomatic norms within the Continent. Because France and Germany had been repeatedly at war over the previous century, the European Union would henceforth bind them together through common economic and fiscal interests. And from the reconciliation between those two giants, unity would radiate throughout Europe.¶ But it all rested, in varying degrees, on a prosperous social welfare state.¶ 'European standards'¶ That is why the European debt crisis is so troubling. It is troubling not just in an economic and political sense, but in a moral sense as well. Europe could bounce back much quicker than expected – economists have been proved wrong before. More likely, however, the euro zone on the whole will be sunk in zero growth rates or thereabouts for a few years to come, with consequent cuts in social benefits and continued high unemployment. And if that happens, the legitimacy of both the European Union and the social welfare model will continue to erode, whittling away the very basis of European soft power and, perhaps, the norms of behavior that such soft power has represented.

#### EU soft power key to prevent terrorism

Nye, 4 – professor of international relations at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph S., International Herald Tribune, “Tapping soft power : America needs a strong Europe,” 11-15-2004, www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/15/ednye\_ed3\_.php, JMP)

European soft power has an important role to play in the struggle against terrorism. Opening Europe's doors to Turkey helps to strengthen one of the most moderate Muslim countries, and European aid for democracy reinforces America's objectives. In some cases, there can be a beneficial division of labor in which Europe's soft power and America's hard power combine in a good cop-bad cop routine.

#### Nuclear terror’s likely and causes extinction – global nuclear war

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Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by **states** or **non-state** actors – is today a **plausible** scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the **threat of nuclear terrorism** is here and **increasing**. For more than a decade, **Al Qaeda**, **Aum Shinrikyo**, and other **terrorist groups** have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future.

Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are **sellers in search** of potential **buyers**, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear **smuggling** network in **Moldova** in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, **24 countries** still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with **different degrees of security**.

And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: **Structural** and **institutional weaknesses** in a country may make it **favorable** for the illicit trade of materials. **Permeable boundaries**, high levels of **corruption**, **weaknesses** in **judicial systems**, and **consequent impunity** may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could **end in** a **nuclear attack**. The truth is that, at this stage, **no** country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can **guarantee** their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling.

Because we live in a world of **growing insecurity**, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which **upheld global stability** during the post-Cold War – are **giving way** to **increasing mistrust** and **hostility**, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world?

We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2).

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and **promptly propagate worldwide**. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience.

Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be **strongly affected**. An increase in **global distrust** would **spark rising tensions** among countries and **blocs**, that could even lead to the brink of **nuclear weapons use** by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a **decrease** in states’ **self-control,** an **escalation** of **present conflicts** and the **emergence** of **new ones,** accompanied by an **increase** in **military unilateralism** and **military expenditures.**

#### E.U. soft power is key to enlargement and Balkan stability

Rehn, 7 (Olli, EU Commissioner, speech at Anna Lindh Award Ceremony, Brussels, “Enlargement as an instrument of the EU’s soft power,” 10-19-2007, http://www.dtt-net.com/en/index.php?page=view-article&article=3131)

As Enlargement Commissioner for nearly three years now, I am convinced that enlargement is at the core of the EU’s soft power – its power to transform its nearest neighbours into functioning democracies, market economies, and true partners in meeting common challenges. ¶ Enlargement has proven to be one of the most important instruments for European security. It reflects the essence of the EU as a civilian power, extending the area of peace and prosperity, liberty and democracy. The EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done with a stick or a sword. ¶ We have seen our soft power at work in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years. Now it seems self-evident that the countries that emerged from communism in 1989 and 1991 would become stable democracies with fast-growing economies, firmly anchored into the EU. But in reality, this looked like a highly uncertain outcome in the 1990s, and things could have gone badly wrong. The EU’s guiding influence and the firmness of our commitment to the eventual membership of these countries was essential to anchor their reforms and progress.¶ Let’s remember this fresh historical experience over the years ahead. ¶ In the EU’s current debate about enlargement, there often seems to be an assumption that there is no cost to questioning the commitments that the EU has made. Unfortunately, this is not true. Every time that countries gain the impression that the process may not lead to membership, it diminishes the power of our conditionality. We see this erosion at in Turkey, where the support for EU membership has declined from 65% to 40% since 2004, correspondingly diminishing our political leverage. ¶ As Karen Smith’s research has shown, Europe can project its civilian power of democratic and economic transformation only if the logic underpinning its policies remains credible. ¶ The geo-strategic and economic reasons for the EU to continue enlarging are much more easily understood when considered in global terms than in local politics. The prospect of joining the Union can be a powerful catalyst for stabilisation, reconciliation and reform in countries facing difficult problems. The accession process provides these countries with a political anchor, with economic opportunities, with financial assistance and with guidance through a host of policy dilemmas. ¶ This help from the EU makes it much more likely that the countries will navigate their difficult reform course successfully. They usually manage to achieve greater stability and a faster pace of reforms as a result, which benefits the European Union greatly by giving us greater security and more economic opportunities in opening markets. It also provides us with more capable partners to tackle problems such as trans-national crime and cross-border environmental threats.¶ The EU itself is therefore among the primary beneficiaries of the enlargement process. That is why we have an enormous interest – enlightened self-interest, I’d say – in ensuring that both sides remain committed to the process throughout its long time-frame.¶ I invite you, as political scientists and historians, to consider the counter-factual: How would the EU fare if we stopped our process of enlargement? When reflecting on the pros and cons of the current policy, we should also consider the costs of non-enlargement. ¶ Would the EU be better off without the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous members? Would the EU be better off with a Turkey that turns its back on us and rejects democratic values? I strongly believe not. Can we afford the Western Balkans to become a new ghetto inside Europe? ¶ That is what we risk if we call into question the commitments at the heart of our accession process.¶ The EU will have to be engaged in the Balkans, whether we like it or not. It is much more effective and cheaper to keep these countries on track by guiding them towards EU membership than by sending soldiers to enforce the peace or by running international protectorates in the region.

#### Balkans instability escalates to nuclear war

Gaur, 6 (Kalki, Editor of World Press Club, American Nuclear Weapon Doctrine, “Chapter 66: Russian Nuclear Weapon Doctrine,” 2006, http://kalkigaur.googlepages.com/66)

Catholic-Orthodoxy Wars of Religion

Orthodox Slavs hate Catholics for the break-up of Yugoslavia. Tito's Yugoslavia was a grater military power than Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Austria. Nuclear Yugoslavia would have become the leading military power of Western Europe, surpassing Germany and France a military power. On a level playing ground, with similar military hardware, Serb Infantrymen would convincingly defeat Italians, French, Germans, Portuguese, and Spanish Army men. In land-warfare, Western nations are no match to Serbs. Serbs would ignite the World War III by launching preemptive nuclear shrikes against Rome. Europe would again become the theater of World War III. The general war between White Western Christendom and White Eastern Orthodoxy, would result in the decline of the White race worldwide and herald the rise of Brown and Yellow Asia and the rise of Hindu and Buddhist worlds. The Wars of Religions between Catholic-Protestant Christian and Orthodox Christian would could cause loss of more than 50 million White European Christian lives, before 2050 AD. Inter-White, inter-European, inter-Christian, Wars of Religions in Balkans would explode into a general war between Catholic-Protestants and Orthodox worlds. It is in the interest of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic civilizations to exacerbate Wars of Religions in Balkans, as it would cause the decline of Christianity in the world. ¶ India's Balkan Option¶ The geopolitical policy of Divide and Rule would advise policymakers in India and China to be neutral in the Catholic wars on Orthodoxy. However, the victory of NATO, Catholics and Protestants over Orthodoxy is not in the geopolitical interest of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic civilizations. So long, Rome remains the hot spot for the nuclear war in Europe, the NATO and USA would refrain from launching preemptive nuclear strikes on any non-White nations. India and China should join forces to destabilize Balkans. Balkan Wars creates hatred between Orthodox and Catholic Christians. India should support Serbia to keep Balkans in nuclear hot-zone. Had India not deployed nuclear weapons, NATO forces might have invaded Kashmir or Northeastern States in India. India should deploy troops in Balkans to sabotage NATO's total victory in Yugoslavia. India should provide military manpower and hardware to Yugoslavia to avert its collapse. Disintegration of Yugoslavia is not in India's interest. India should develop military bases in Greece to play effective military role in the future Balkan Wars. Balkans would remain hot spot in every major wars of the world. Yugoslavia is Geopolitical Cancer of Western Europe. ¶ Geopolitics of Balkans¶ Future Balkan Wars have the potential to disintegrate United Europe and NATO. NATO's conquest of Balkans would embolden NATO invade Asia, following the land routes of Emperor Alexander. Indian and Chinese military bases in Balkans would allow Asian Armies fight European Armies in Balkans to sabotage any future European dreams for invasions of Asia. India Army supplied more than 3.5 million soldiers to Allied Powers during Second World War and 1.5 million soldiers during First World War. India should again provide 3 million soldiers to fight in any future European War. India should keep permanent military bases in Balkans to check European's imperial dreams. India should develop close military ties with Greece. India should sign a Defense Pact with Greece. India and China should geopolitically exploit the strategic opportunities offered by intra-White, intra-Christian and intra-European War of Religions between Western and Eastern Christians, to secure permanent strategic gains for Brown and Yellow races. The NATO's barbaric bombing and destruction of Yugoslav industrial civilian infrastructure has created permanent animosity between Eastern and Western Christianity. Asia can effectively castrate Europe by exploiting Catholic-Orthodoxy cleavages in Europe. NATO-Yugoslavia War has the potential to undermine the territorial gains White Europeans secured during the Colonial era in the New Worlds. Geopolitically to India and China, the Balkan War or NATO-Serbia War is too good an opportunity to miss. Only by making prompt payment of $ 40 Billions to Yugoslavia that, NATO could avoid the looming World War in the Balkans. Would NATO victors see the logic of rebuilding Serbia for promoting the security of United Europe? ¶ Serb Nuclear Strikes on Rome¶ Third World War will begin in one of the following flash points. Did NATO's 73 days bombing war on Kosovo and Serbia during 1999, start the World War III? First flash point is Serbia in the Balkans. Russian has joined in union with Bylorus. Yugoslavia would also join Russia and Bylorus in Union. Serbs have access to nuclear technology. President Tito made a fundamental mistake by not developing nuclear weapons. Serbs are Slavs just like Russians. United States allowed China to steal virtually every known American nuclear secret with impunity, to goad China invade Siberia. Russia could easily undermine NATO's preponderance in the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea by allowing Serbs access to nuclear weapons designs. It is possible that many Serbs currently work for Russian nuclear weapons laboratories, as many Chinese work for US nuclear weapons labs. NATO has consistently refused to reimburse Serbia for the $40 billion civilian infrastructure damage it caused in Serbia. The NATO's barbaric bombing raids and destruction of Serbia civilian industrial infrastructure, would tempt Serbs to steal Russian nuclear weapons designs, and assemble tactical thermonuclear devices with the help of nuclear scientists from Kazahastan or Ukraine. Yugoslavia would start the Third World War by dropping tactical thermonuclear bombs on Vatican City, Naples, Bari, Milan and Venice. Yugoslavia would drop Atom Bomb on Rome to signal the War of Religions between Catholic-Protestant Christians and Greek Orthodox Christians.

#### Strong EU checks Russian aggression --- U.S. fails

Corboy, et. al, 8 --- director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at King's College London (11/7/2008, Denis Corboy, William Courtney, Kenneth Yalowitz --- former U.S. ambassadors to Georgia, CSM, “Europe, not the US, can get Russia to behave; Europe must take advantage of its special pull on Russians,” <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1107/p09s01-coop.html>)

When war erupted in August between Russia and Georgia, it was the European Union (EU) president who achieved a cease-fire agreement. Was this just a lucky break for the EU, or a sign of Europe's strength?¶ The answer is one that Europe needs to take full advantage of: Nicolas Sarkozy achieved the cease-fire not because the EU has more military divisions than Stalin's heirs. His personal energy and France's weight may have helped, but Europe's real clout is its pull on Russia and its people.¶ As the tone of Russian President Dimitry Medvedev's state-of-the-union address indicated this week, big challenges remain. On top of strong language for Washington, Russia has military predominance on Georgia's doorstep and no Western counterweight is in sight. Moscow's recognition of the "independence" of the Georgian separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – despite international condemnation – seems intended to signal that Moscow will not retreat.¶ Europe, not America is now best able to get Moscow to behave. Europe is a neighbor and huge market for Russian energy and minerals. The EU accounted for just over half of Russia's foreign trade in 2007. Russians see Europe as appealing – a rich and stable region where the state plays a large role and citizens enjoy generous social benefits. And Russian elites have long aspired to European ways.¶ Underlining Europe's pull, President Medvedev recently called the EU a "strategic partner" and waxed that Europe and Russia were "united by history, by common borders, and most important, I hope, we are united by the vision of a new greater Europe."¶ In the wake of the Georgian war, however, Europeans have reason to harbor increased doubt that Russia is a strategic partner. Moscow is going out of its way to signal that Ukraine is the next target. Russian leaders have publicly vilified President Yushchenko, challenged the logic of Crimea's status in Ukraine, and insisted on retaining the Russian naval base at Sevastopol after the lease expires in 2017.¶ Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin even alleged that Ukraine had dispatched soldiers to fight alongside Georgian troops in the August war. Just as incredulously, this week Medvedev charged that the war was "among other things, the result of the arrogant course of the US administration." It is unlikely that rants such as these are what Europe expects of a partner.¶ Still, the EU has notable advantages over the US and NATO in influencing Russia to behave more responsibly. Distant from Russia, the US is a military rival and not a major economic partner. Many Russians are suspicious of the US and NATO.¶ The EU should develop more traction with Russia so as to capitalize fully on its advantage. The EU should devise ways for Georgia and Ukraine to participate in an association with step-by-step integration, free trade arrangements, and a road map for eventual EU membership. The road map should be accompanied by an intensified EU-Russian dialogue that would underscore the benefits of cooperation for all parties.¶ If Russia treats its neighbors and economic partners fairly, an enhanced EU-Russia partnership should be on the table. Incentives work best when combined with clear expectations. Mistreating energy investors, such as BP, or undermining the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should have well- understood consequences.¶ These steps would better anchor Russia and its interested neighbors in Europe's architecture, enhance democratic gains and political stability, and build a stronger foundation for prosperity. Then, further democratic and economic reforms would make those countries more attractive partners to the EU.¶ Closer linkages with the EU would also discourage Russia from picking fights with neighbors for fear of diminishing its own European relations.¶ The West should adopt a long-haul strategy with South Ossetia and Abkhazia akin to nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic countries into the USSR in 1940. This policy allowed the West to pursue high priorities with Moscow, such as nuclear arms control. Likewise, today a formula needs to be found which will permit negotiations for a new EU-Russia partnership agreement.¶ In addressing the UN General Assembly this fall, French President Sarkozy suggested a good way forward, "Why not build across the whole Continent a common economic space which would unite Russia and Europe?"¶ He is on the mark. Isolating Russia or keeping it permanently at arm's length would be a historic error. Eventually, Russia will awake from its tragic history of authoritarianism and imperialism. Europe and the EU can hasten this by offering the prospect of closer integration if Russia respects the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of its neighbors. When president, Obama can reinforce this course, but America cannot substitute for Europe**.**

#### That would trigger global nuclear war – any other conflict will be contained regionally

Rozoff, 9 – Frequent contributor to Global Research (2/27/2009, Rick, “Baltic Sea: Flash Point For NATO-Russia Conflict,” http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stopnato/message/37592)

So accustomed has the world become to expecting if not accepting wars, serial and gratuitous, to occur in the natural order of things, the discussion has centered not so much on whether war should be waged or whether it will be but solely on which nation or nations will be the next victim or victims of an unprovoked military onslaught.¶ In such an environment of international lawlessness and heightened alarm over military threats, **otherwise minor contretemps and even fears of a neighbor's and potential adversary's intents can spark a conflict - and a conflagration.**¶The world has been on edge for a decade now and a form of numbing has set in with many of its inhabitants; a permanent condition of war apprehension and alert has settled over others, particularly those in areas likely to be directly affected. Over the past six years the worst and most immediate fears have centered on the prospects of three major regional conflicts, all of which are fraught with the danger of eventual escalation into nuclear exchanges.¶ The three are a renewed and **intensified Indian-Pakistani conflict, an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and an attack by the US, Israel or both in unison against Iran.**¶ The first would affect neighbors both in possession of nuclear weapons and a combined population of 1,320,000,000.¶ The second could set Northeast Asia afire with China and Russia, both having borders with North Korea, inevitably being pulled into the vortex.¶ The last could lead to an explosion in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East, with the potential of spilling over into the Caspian Sea Basin, Central and South Asia, the Caucasus and even the Balkans, as the US and NATO have strategic air bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and, at least for the time being, Kyrgyzstan that would be employed in any major assault on Iran and the latter would retaliate against both land- and sea-based threats as best it could.¶ In the event that any of the three scenarios reached the level of what in a humane and sensible world would be considered the unthinkable - the use of nuclear weapons - the cataclysmic consequences both for the respective regions involved and for the world would be incalculable.¶ **Theoretically**, though, **all three nightmare models could be geographically contained.**¶ **There is a fourth spot** on the map, however, **where most any spark could ignite a powder keg that would draw in and pit against each other the world's two major nuclear powers and immediately and ipso facto develop into a world conflict. That area is the Baltic Sea region.**