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### NC – DA

#### CP: The member nations of the World Trade Organization, excluding the United States, should reduce intellectual property protections for medicines during pandemics.

#### Entirely solves while avoiding politics

Siripurapu 21 Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy, and geopolitics, BA in political economy from the University of Southern California. "The Debate Over a Patent Waiver for COVID-19 Vaccines: What to Know." Council on Foreign Relations, May 26, 2021, [www.cfr.org/in-brief/debate-over-patent-waiver-covid-19-vaccines-what-know](http://www.cfr.org/in-brief/debate-over-patent-waiver-covid-19-vaccines-what-know).

WTO negotiations are notoriously slow, and it could take months before countries reach an agreement, particularly over the scope and duration of a waiver. Decisions are normally made unanimously, and though a TRIPS waiver could be granted by a three-quarters vote of WTO members, it is unlikely that members would break precedent.

#### Infrastructure and reconciliation are the priority now. they’ll pass by new deadline

Alemany 10/12 [Jacqueline Alemany and Theodoric Meyer, "The new deadline to pass Biden's agenda is coming up fast", 10/12/21, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/13/new-deadline-pass-biden-agenda-is-coming-up-fast/]

New deadline, old problems: Less than two weeks after House Democrats missed a deadline to hold a vote on the infrastructure bill, the party is staring down another one.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer say they’re aiming to pass the $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill and a larger package stuffed full of Democrats’ child care, health care and climate change priorities by Oct. 31, when a short-term extension of highway funding is set to run out.

Coincidentally, Oct. 31 is the day before the much-anticipated United Nations climate summit kicks off in Glasgow, where administration officials are eager to show off legislation that would establish credibility in negotiations with foreign governments. White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters last month that Biden expected the reconciliation bill — much of which is focused on fighting climate change — would “move forward in advance of that.”

(Asked about it on Tuesday, Psaki said Biden would tout the administration's commitment to combating climate change in Glasgow “regardless of where the package stands.”)

And two days later, Virginians will head to the polls to elect a new governor in a contest lawmakers and the White House are watching closely. Former Democratic Gov. Terry McAuliffe has implored Democrats in Washington to pass the infrastructure bill by Election Day.

The 18-day sprint

Can Democrats really pass two massive bills in the next 18 days?

“Yes,” Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.) told The Early yesterday evening. “Will it is a different matter. But can it? Yeah. We’re experts at coming right up against the edge and pulling a miracle.”

#### Pushing a WTO treaty takes time, energy, and political capital away from domestic legislation – big pharma and EU allies

**Bhadrakumar 5/9** M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat. "Biden’s talk of vaccine IP waiver is political theater." Asia Times, May 9, 2021, asiatimes.com/2021/05/bidens-talk-of-vaccine-ip-waiver-is-political-theater.

On the other hand, Biden, whose political life of half a century was largely spent in the US Congress, is well aware of the **awesome clout** of the pharmaceutical companies in American politics. From that lobby’s perspective, the patent waiver “amounts to the expropriation of the property of the pharmaceutical companies whose innovation and financial investments made the development of Covid-19 vaccines possible in the first place,” as a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security puts it. The US pharmaceutical industry and congressional Republicans have already **gone on the offensiv**e blasting Biden’s announcement, saying it undermines incentives for American innovation. Besides, the argument goes, even with the patent waiver, vaccine manufacturing is a complex process and is not like simply flipping a switch. Senator Richard Burr, the top Republican on the US Senate Health Committee, denounced Biden’s decision. “Intellectual property protections are part of the reason we have these life-saving products,” he said. “Stripping these protections only ensures we won’t have the vaccines or treatments we need when the next pandemic occurs.” The Republican senators backed by Republican Study Committee chairman Jim Banks propose to introduce legislation to block the move. Clearly, Biden would rather **spend his political capital on getting the necessary legislation through Congress to advance his domestic reform agenda rather than spend time and energy to take on the pharmaceutical industry** to burnish his image as a good Samaritan on the world stage. Conceivably, Biden could be counting on the “text-based negotiations” at the WTO **dragging on for months, if not years**, without reaching anywhere. The US support for the waiver could even be a tactic to persuade pharmaceutical firms to back less drastic steps like sharing technology and expanding joint ventures to boost global production quickly. So far Covid-19 vaccines have been distributed primarily to the wealthy countries that developed them, while the pandemic sweeps through poorer ones such as India, and the real goal is, after all, expanded vaccine distribution. Biden is well aware that there will be **huge opposition** to the TRIPS waiver from the United States’ **European allies as well**. The British press has reported that the UK has been in closed-door talks at the World Trade Organization in recent months along with the likes of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Singapore, the European Union and the US, who all opposed the idea.

#### Quickly secures the vulnerable grid.

Carney 21 [Chris, August 6; Senior Policy Advisor at Nossaman LLC, former US Representative, Former Professor of Political Science at Penn State University; JD Supra, “The US Senate Infrastructure Bill: Securing Our Electrical Grid Through P3s and Grants,” https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-us-senate-infrastructure-bill-4989100/]

As we begin to better understand the main components of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that the US Senate is working to pass this week, it is clear that public-private partnerships ("P3s") are a favored funding mechanism of lawmakers to help offset high costs associated with major infrastructure projects in communities. And while past infrastructure bills have used P3s for more conventional projects, the current bill also calls for P3s to help pay for protecting the US electric grid from cyberattacks. Responding to the increasing number of cyberattacks on our nation’s infrastructure, and given the fragile physical condition of our electrical grid, the Senate included provisions to help state, local and tribal entities harden electrical grids for which they are responsible.

Section 40121, Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnerships, calls for not only physical protections of electrical grids, but also for enhancing cyber-resilience. This section seeks to encourage the various federal, state and local regulatory authorities, as well as industry participants to engage in a program that audits and assesses the physical security and cybersecurity of utilities, conducts threat assessments to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, and provides cybersecurity training to utilities. Further, the section calls for strengthening supply chain security, protecting “defense critical” electrical infrastructure and buttressing against a constant barrage of cyberattacks on the grid. In determining the nature of the partnership arrangement, the size of the utility and the area served will be considered, with priority going to utilities with fewer available resources.

Section 40122 compliments the previous section as it seeks to incentivize testing of cybersecurity products meant to be used in the energy sector, including SCADA systems, and to find ways to mitigate any vulnerabilities identified by the testing. Intended as a voluntary program, utilities would be offered technical assistance and databases of vulnerabilities and best practices would be created. Section 40123 incentivizes investment in advanced cybersecurity technology to strengthen the security and resiliency of grid systems through rate adjustments that would be studied and approved by the Secretary of Energy and other relevant Commissions, Councils and Associations.

Lastly, Section 40124, a long sought-after package of cybersecurity grants for state, local and tribal entities is included in the bill. This section adds language that would enable state, local and tribal bodies to apply for funds to upgrade aging computer equipment and software, particularly related to utilities, as they face growing threats of ransomware, denial of service and other cyberattacks. However, under Section 40126, cybersecurity grants may be tied to meeting various security standards established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and/or submission of a cybersecurity plan by a grant applicant that shows “maturity” in understanding the cyber threat they face and a sophisticated approach to utilizing the grant.

While the final outcome of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act may still be weeks or months away, inclusion of these provisions not only demonstrates a positive step forward for the application of federal P3s and grants generally, they also show that Congress recognizes the seriousness of the cyber threats our electrical grids face. Hopefully, through judicious application of both public-private partnerships and grants, the nation can quickly secure its infrastructure from cyberattacks.

#### Grid vulnerabilities spark nuclear war.

Klare 19 [Michael; November; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College; Arms Control Association, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation]

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13

The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

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### NC – K

**The 1ac is then a new form of engaging in permanent preemption and biometric surveillance under the access of increasing care. This resonates with the US warfighting establishment, the Pentagon and CIA, who will redeploy the gains of the 1ac replacing the war on terror with a more insidious form of liberal violence**

**Cooper 06.** Melinda, graduated from the University of Paris VIII in 2001 and now holds a Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of East Anglia. “Pre-empting Emergence The Biological Turn in the War on Terror.” Theory, Culture & Society 23(4) Theory, Culture & Society 2006 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 23(4): 113–135.

The same era witnessed something of a conceptual revolution in microbiology. The new microbiology tells us that our relation to microbial life is one of inescapable co-evolution. We are literally born of ancient alliances between bacteria and our own cells; microbes are inside us, in our history, but are also implicated in the continuing evolution of all the forms of life on earth. Biologists are discovering the biospheric dimensions of microbial life (the notion of a common evolution linking plants, animals and microbes with the geology of the earth and the composition of the atmosphere) and claiming that emerging infectious diseases are indissolubly linked with climate change. In the words of Margulis and Sagan, the environment ‘is regulated by life for life’ (1997: 94) and the common vector linking all these life forms and responsible for maintaining a breathable atmosphere is provided by bacterial evolution. At the same time, recent research is throwing new light on the specific processes of bacterial evolution, suggesting that bacteria evolve through highly accelerated processes of horizontal communication rather than chance mutation and selective pressures. It has been known, since the late 1950s, that bacteria are able to exchange sequences of DNA, often between unrelated species, through a general process of horizontal transfection.1 Only recently has the full extent of this mobility become apparent: under certain conditions, mobile sequences of bacterial DNA jump across species, genuses and kingdoms; once integrated into a new genome, these sequences are able to mutate and recombine; the bacterial genome itself is highly fluid, capable of mutating under stress and accelerating its own mutation rate (Ho, 1999: 168–200). While many leading infectious disease specialists continue to see microbial resistance as a form of (highly accelerated) Darwinian evolution (Lederberg et al., 1992), a growing body of new research is suggesting that bacteria don’t even have to wait around for random mutation to confer resistance; they can share it amongst themselves. The new microbiology is discovering that, for bacteria, resistance is literally contagious (Ho, 1999: 178–9; Levy and Novick, 1986). These new insights into microbial resistance have important ramifications for our understanding of genetic engineering technologies. **What molecular biology shared** in common **with** the political philosophy of 20thcentury pu**blic health was the belief that the future evolution of life could be predicted, controlled and (at worst) reverse-engineered on the basis of localized interventions.** It is this shared utopia that is coming under increasing scrutiny however, as recent research points to the possible links between the re-emergence of infectious disease and the use of recombinant DNA technologies. The production of ‘transgenic’ life forms, after all, hitches a ride on the same vectors of communication that are responsible for resistance – viruses, transposons (mobile genetic elements) and plasmids (extrachromosomal genetic elements) – while these vectors are routinely modified to render them even more prone to circulate and recombine. As the full extent of horizontal transfer comes to light, biologists are beginning to suggest that we cannot mobilize these vectors of communication without provoking and even accelerating the emergence of all kinds of counterresistance.2 Emergence Re-emerging The microbiologist René Dubos was the first to coin the term ‘emergence’ as a way of describing the temporality of biological evolution. By ‘emergence’, he understood not the gradual accumulation of local mutations, but the relentless, sometimes catastrophic upheaval of entire co-evolving ecologies; sudden field transitions that could never be predicted in linear terms from a single mutation (Dubos, 1987 [1959]: 33). Writing at a time when the ‘health transition’ was official public health doctrine, Dubos dismisses the idea that infectious disease could ever be eliminated, let alone stabilized. There can be no final equilibrium in the battle against germs, he argues, because there is no assignable limit to the co-evolution of resistance and counter-proliferation, emergence and counter-emergence. In Dubos’s work, the concept of microbial ‘resistance’ is divested of its association with the pathological: resistance is merely another word for emergence, and there is no end to it; its future evolution is unforeseeable from within the present. **Dubos** is scathing in his criticism of the strategic vision of mid- 20th-century public health, but what he **offers** in response is **not so much a pacifist manifesto, as an alternative vision of warfare and a counterphilosophy of disease**. If we are at war, Dubos contends, it is against an enemy that cannot be sequestered; a threat that is not containable within the boundaries of species life; is both inside and out; necessary for our survival yet prone to turn against us; and **capable of reinventing itself in response to our ‘cures’.** Dubos’s theatre of war presupposes a co-implication of human, bacterial and viral existence; a mutual immersion in the conditions of each other’s evolution. It is inevitable – he argues – that our most violent efforts to secure ourselves against contagion will be met with counter-resistances of all kinds. Microbial life will ‘strike back’ and yet we can never be sure when and how it will happen: ‘at some unpredictable time and in some unforeseeable manner nature will strike back’ (1987: 267). If we are to follow Dubos, **the relentless nature of coevolving emergence irresistibly engages us, despite ourselves, in a form of permanent warfare, a guerrilla counter-resistance without foreseeable end, against a threat whose precise ‘when’ and ‘how’ we can only speculate on**. Such an elusive vision of warfare might seem to preclude any effective strategic response – but Dubos is precisely interested in elaborating a philosophy of war which would be up to the challenge. If humans are to survive the inevitable ‘counter-strike’ from microbial life, he argues, we need to prepare for the unexpected; learn to counter the unknowable, the virtual, the emergent. **The new science of life,** he writes, **must cultivate an ‘alertness to the advent of the unpredictable’; a responsiveness to the threat that is merely felt or apprehende**d (1987: 271). We must become capable, in other words, of responding to the emergent, long before it has actualized in a form we can locate or even recognize**. Life is** a gamble, Dubos contends – a kind of **speculative warfare** (1987: 267). And **war, in this view, is necessarily preemptive**, as much an attempt to resist the counter-contagion as a creative reinvention of the conditions of human existence, beyond whatever actual limits we might have adapted to in the present. At the time he was writing – the 1950s – Dubos could not have been more at odds with the reigning public health orthodoxy. Three decades later, however, his counter-philosophy of disease seems to have been taken up into the mainstream of microbiology. The continuing evolution of infectious disease is inevitable, microbiologists now tell us. There can be no final conquest of infectious disease, although nothing will allow us to predict when and where the next pandemic will emerge: It is unrealistic to expect that humankind will win a complete victory over the multitude of existing microbial diseases, or over those that will emerge in the future. . . . Although it is impossible to predict their individual emergence in time and place, we can be confident that new microbial diseases will emerge. (Lederberg et al., 1992: 32) The new public health discourse calls our attention to emerging and reemerging infectious disease; old pathogens that have resurfaced in new, more virulent or resistant forms; existing pathogens that have infected humans for the first time; or entirely new creations. It defines infectious disease as emerging and emergent – not incidentally, but in essence. **What public health policy needs to mobilize against, the new microbiology argues, is no longer the singular disease with its specific aetiology, but emergence itself, whatever form it takes, whenever and wherever it happens to actualize** (Lederberg et al., 1992: 84). More ambiguously, the **new discourse on emerging infectious disease seems also to have struck a chord with US foreign policy** and international relations theorists, who over the same period were busy at work enumerating the new and ‘emerging threats’ that would define the post-Cold War era of warfare. **Under the banner of the new intelligence agenda,** certain **defence theorists** (often with the uncritical support of **NGOs** and **humanitarian organizations**) were **argu**ing that **the scope of security should be extended beyond the conventional military sphere to include life itself** (Johnson and Snyder, 2001: 215–18). What was at issue here was first of all the securitization of human life (hence the altogether strange concept of humanitarian warfare); but increasingly **US defence discourse is wanting to push further and incorporate the whole of life, from the micro- to the ecosystemic level, within its strategic vision.** One of the most prominent advocates of the concept of microbiological security has long claimed that ‘**emerging infectious disease . . . poses a clear threat to national security’** and that US defence should develop a common strategy for confronting both emerging and drugresistant disease and bioterrorism (Chyba, 1998: 5). And in case this might seem to represent an extreme position, it is worth noting that in the year 2000, a CIA report classified emerging ‘global infectious disease’ as a nonconventional security threat comparable to the new terrorism (National Intelligence Council [NIC], 2000), while in 2002, US Congress passed a Bioterrorism Act outlining the same emergency response procedures for bioterrorist attacks and emerging infectious disease (US Congress, 2002). More recently, the Pentagon has published a report exhorting the US government not only to wake up to the impending threat of climate change (assumed now to be closely related to the resurgence of infectious disease) but to treat it as a national security threat (Schwartz and Randall, 2003). **The future evolution of life**, it warned, **would be defined by permanent warfare.**

#### **Regulating intellectual property participates in a scarcity logic that re-affirms a broader market ownership over information – that consolidates neoliberal control through a shift to private protections, even if the individual act of the aff is good**

Soderberg 1 [Johan, BA from Falmouth College of the Arts. “Copyleft vs Copyright: A Marxist Critique” https://firstmonday.org/article/view/938/860]

"The contradiction that lies at the heart of the political economy of intellectual property is between the low to non-existent marginal cost of reproduction of knowledge and its treatment as scarce property" [23].

This contradiction [24], May demonstrates, is concealed by information capitalists whose interests are best served if ideas are treated as analogous to scarce, material property [25]. The privatisation of cultural expressions corresponds to the enclosure of public land in the fifteenth to eighteenth century.

As then, the new enclosure is concerned with creating conditions for excludability. Lawrence Lessig lists four methods to direct the behaviour of the individual to comply with property regulation: social norms, markets, architecture (including technology and code), and law. "Constraints work together, though they function differently and the effect of each is distinct. Norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes; markets constrain through the price that they extract; architectures constrain through the physical burdens they impose; and law constrains through the punishment it threatens" [26].

Several new national laws have been passed in recent years on intellectual property rights. In the U.S. the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was passed in 1998 and has been imitated by legislation in Europe. The European Patent Office circumvented scheduled political decisions to be taken by European governments, and decreed a regulation that authorises patent claims to computer programmes [27]. These national laws were implemented under the direction of what is known as the Uruguay Round agreements [28], established by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As a part of the bargain came the treaty of Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIP), and its importance lies in two respects: "as an extension of the rights accorded to the owners of intellectual property and as part of the extension of a property-based market liberalism into new areas of social interaction, previously outside market relations" [29]. Simply by coordinating national regulations on a global level the net of intellectual property is tightened. TRIP was backed by American and European pharmacy companies and entertainment industries, and unsuccessfully opposed by the developing nations and northern civil society.

Despite the rigged debate on intellectual property in the mainstream media [30], the rhetoric of 'piracy' has not transformed social norms to any greater extent. The failure to curb copying is linked with the low costs and low risks for individuals to copy, i.e. the non-existent constriction of the market. However, Bettig remarks "The initial period following the introduction of a new communications medium often involves a temporary loss of control by copyright owners over the use of their property" [31].

Similarly, Lessig warns against the false reliance, common among hackers, that information technology is inherently anarchistic. The industry is determined to re-design hardware and software to command compliance with the intellectual property regime. "Code can, and will, displace law as the primary defence of intellectual property in cyberspace" [32]. It is predominantly this struggle that I now will attend to.

#### Capitalism is quickly reaching its ecological, structural, and psychological limits and causes near-term extinction – laundry list.

Robinson 16 (William, Professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. His most recent book is Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. | “Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis” in *Truth-out*, April 12, 2016. <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis> )//tbrooks

The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam [published a follow-up](https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2016-01-18/62-people-own-same-half-world-reveals-oxfam-davos-report) to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "[The World Economy: Out of Ammo?](http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21693204-central-bankers-are-running-down-their-arsenal-other-options-exist-stimulate)" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." [We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas](http://www.amazon.com/Ecological-Rift-Capitalisms-War-Earth/dp/1583672184/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1460153228&sr=8-1&keywords=the+ecological+rift) -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, [The Sixth Extinction](http://www.amazon.com/Sixth-Extinction-Unnatural-History/dp/1250062187/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1457393458&sr=1-1&keywords=the+sixth+extinction). "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." [Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible](http://www.amazon.com/Collapse-Societies-Choose-Succeed-Revised/dp/0143117009/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1460153265&sr=8-1&keywords=collapse+book). The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation.

#### neoliberalism turns politics into the technical management of risk, eliminating democracy and freedom, and inaugurating the ethical dilemma of the 21st century – a restless market subject fated to endless work, burnout and exhaustion that leads to new types of extension of the system in forms of colonialism and exploitation. Value to life outweighs

**Featherstone 17.** Mark, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University. “Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation.” Series: Routledge studies in social and political thought. February 17, 2017.

In seeking to think through the implications of this shift, I explore the ways in which neoliberal thought conceives of economy, and by extension society, politics, and culture, in terms of techno-scientific machines complete with cybernetic minds and bodies that respond to stimulus in more or less rational ways. Here, I suggest that the shift from the Austrians to the Americans represents an important moment, because where Popper (2002a, b), Mises (2007), Menger (2009), and Hayek (2012) imagined a rational economy, society, and political system through the image of spontaneous order, it was the Americans, and specifically the Friedman-era Chicago School, that transformed economics, economy, and as consequence society into mathematics and mathematical objects. Under these conditions the role of politics becomes about technical management of the cybernetic system, with the result that democratic participation in consideration of decisions around fundamental goods starts to take a back seat and freedom moves towards the space of the private sphere of individuals who express their self through their consumption choices and the development of a kind of doomed market subjectivity. The reason this new market subjectivity becomes an ethical problem, perhaps the ethical problem of the 21st century, is because the mode of individualism, which is never complete but always desperately in search of completion through the symbolic systems of the market, is fated to a life of endless work, terminal consumerism, and eventual burnout and exhaustion. This form of subjectivity, which Dardot and Laval (2014) call ultra-subjectivity, is therefore always late, in the sense that it is doomed before it has even begun, and represents the dystopic counterpoint to the neoliberal capitalist utopia that relies on ultra-subjectivity to maintain its hyped-up form of dynamic equilibrium. The real affront of the neoliberal utopia is, therefore, that it lives off the imposition of a dystopic form of subjectivity defined by the progressive destruction of mind and body and hides this behind its techno-scientific computational aesthetic that suggests objectivity, neutrality, and the impossibility of alternatives.

What is more is that the prospects of salvation are not good for the ultra-subject because what characterises neoliberal capitalism as late capitalism is the problem of growth, vitality, and dynamism, which was sustained by world war and recovery from world war across most of the 20th century, but today is exhausted by ecological finitude and technological limitation. Under these conditions, growth and the maintenance of the dynamism of the neoliberal utopia will only come from the modernisation of the south, which produces new limits in the form of ecological destruction, the progressive mechanisation of the worker in the cybernetic economy where every aspect of life becomes a site of possible value, and the increasing virtualisation of the economy that further condemns human subjectivity to marginality, meaninglessness, and transformation into waste. Following the elaboration of this thesis through reference to Dardot and Laval’s (2014) work, I turn to the issue of the progressive objectification of value and the virtualisation of capitalism in the form of the stock market, which is the topic of Chapter 4. Here, I consider the translation of economy from a sphere of thought through the philosophical image of the invisible hand in the laissez-faire, liberal, political economics from the 18th century to the early 20th century to the mathematical, computational conception of a cybernetic networked order in the neoliberalism of Friedman (2002) and the Chicago School from the 1950s onwards, in order to advance a theory of the capitalist utopia realised in a kind of techno-scientific sublime. In other words, the invisible hand, or spontaneous order, is no longer simply a metaphor, but rather a computational matrix realised across the global network in the neoliberalism of Friedman and the Chicago School that captured the world powers and major global institutions and subsequently transformed the sphere of international relations into a space of economic contestation and competition.

In order to try to capture this vision of the globalisation of the really existing neoliberal late capitalist utopia, I conclude the chapter with an exploration of the ways in which utopian order and dystopian disorder play out in conceptualisations of stock market trading, which shifts from a space of American frontierism, speculation, and high risk in the 19th century to a supposed closed universe of riskless risk in the late 20th century and early 21st century when the practice of securitisation led to the ultimate capitalist utopian vision—the economic, mathematical absolute where it is possible to hedge against the inevitable fluctuations in price and as a result escape the vicissitudes of time and the future itself. While this vision of the cancelled or what I want to call the strike-through future (future)—because this kind of utopianism paradoxically recalls the sci-fi fantasy of a high-tech world far off in the future—represents the utopian idea par excellence, since it is spatially contained by virtue of its global reach and temporally limited through techniques that make it possible to hedge against the radical uncertainty of the future, it is also reflective of a dystopian nightmare because the kind of dynamic equilibrium it suggests represents the opposite of what Bataille (1991) and Mauss (2000) wrote about in their theories of the cosmological primitive economy. Where they made generosity, the limited needs of humanity, and, in Mauss at least, redistribution the condition of an economy of excess, the late capitalist, neo-liberal utopia disappears or vanishes humanity and the human body beneath a cybernetic dystopia, which is comparable to the kind of totalitarianism found under Stalin and Mao, with the only difference being that the Soviet and Chinese communists destroyed humanity through politics, while the neoliberal utopians suggest that the market decides, and imagine that this somehow makes the destruction of body and mind by the objective violence of the technoscientific economy more bearable.

Of course from the point of view of the starved body and ruined mind, it makes no real difference, and offers no real compensation or comfort, to say that its executioner is sat behind a console in a London investment bank. This is no better, or somehow more defensible, than to look for the architect of monstrous violence behind a desk in CCP headquarters in Beijing. This difference makes no difference, which is precisely why the Chinese communists have found the transformation from communism to capitalism so very easy to make. Although this thesis suggests a hopeless, post-political future, where late capitalist utopianism transcends divisions between left and right, and even unites American Friedmanites and Chinese post-Maoist marketeers, it is the very completion and realisation of this cybernetic utopian machine that opens up a space to consider its potential dialectical negativity. This was revealed in 2008, when it became clear that the overconfidence, and utopian hubris, of the market fundamentalists who imagined the condition of riskless risk was their greatest enemy. At the same time that this hubris threatens to undermine the late capitalist utopia in power, and has today led to discussion of zombie politics and zombie economics, resistance to the neoliberal utopians who remain in love with their system post-mortem will require the imagination of a new utopia, or fundamental good, which should emerge from the very human condition neoliberalism ignores. The human body that suffers may very well become the new utopian figure of the 21st century which will enable the construction of a new ethics to oppose the post-human, cybernetic, utopia of capitalism. Finally, and in order to think through the possibility of the emergence of the critical space necessary to articulate this vision, in the conclusion of the chapter I set up a consideration of theories of market turbulence, including Benoit Mandelbrot’s (2004) theory of the inherent wildness of markets, in order to, first, comment on the crash of 2008, and second, show how the impossible durability of the capitalist utopia may well be threatened by its neoliberal, ultra-rational formulation. Here, I open a space to consider Quentin Meillassoux’s (2009, 2015) work on the limitations of the idea of finitude in order to show how the inherent hyper-chaos of markets opens a space for potential utopian change which is necessary because of the ways in which the hyper-rationality of the late capitalist mathematical utopia violates and humiliates the human body in pursuit of value. In this respect, I move into the discussion of financialisation, the stock market, and the potential collapse of the mathematical sublime in Chapter 4.

#### The alternative is to engage in anticapitalism, an act of radical resistance grounded in grassroots movements. Anticapitalism does not represent an unattainable utopia but challenges common myths about capitalism as a whole.

Rogers 14 (Chris Rogers, author, *Capitalism and Its Alternatives: A Critical Introduction*, Zed Books, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1758713>.) AM

*A note on terminology* The book will draw on four core concepts. The first of these is capitalism. The term capitalism is used throughout the book to refer to the prevailing form of social organization. While acknowledging that the ways in which capitalism operates and the implications of these operations are contested, this book defines capital­ ism in terms of one commonly accepted distinguishing feature: that capitalism is a system that organizes the production, distribution and exchange of goods, on the basis of private property, with a view to realizing profit and therefore increasing wealth. The second term is alternative capitalism, which is used to describe a system where the capitalistic relationship between state and market is re-regulated, but not fundamentally reformed, in order to try to produce optimal social and economic outcomes. The aim of an alternative capitalism is to maximize wealth and profit by introducing a different structure of rules to govern capitalism. The third concept is that of an alternative to capitalism. An alternative to capitalism is distinct from capitalism because it places an emphasis on social and civic goals, rather than purely focusing on pecuniary gain. In contrast to capitalism, an alternative to capitalism is founded on collective or community property rights, rather than individual property rights, although the form and extent of collective or community property rights may vary. Where the book is referring to either an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, it uses the form ‘alternative (to) capitalism’. The final concept the book uses is anti-capitalism. It uses the term anti-capitalism to refer to the act of resisting capitalism, whether this occurs by attempting to influence the state, taking control of the state, or actions taken independently or outside of the state. An individual who pursues or wishes to pursue an alternative to capitalism can therefore be described as an anti-capitalist.

Traditions of Resistance   
In its consideration of capitalism and its alternatives, this book accepts that it is possible to perceive capitalism and its con­ sequences in different ways. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the way in which capitalism and its consequences are perceived will have a fundamental impact on whether people deem capitalism to be desirable, whether they would prefer an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, and therefore whether they believe that it is important and worthwhile engaging in resistance to capitalism through the social act of anti-capitalism. However, the central argument of this book is that **capitalism displays intrinsic tendencies towards crisis that make an alternative to capitalism desirable, and so justifies anti-capitalist action**. In doing so, it argues that capitalism is a product of social interaction between people, and that it is remade or resisted through our social action. This ­emphasis on social constitution challenges common assertions about the inevitability of capitalist logic, and in the process shows that the prospect of realizing an alternative to capitalism is more than wishful thinking. In its discussions of alternatives to capitalism, however, this book guards against thinking of alternative forms of social organization as outcomes or utopias. Rather, it shows how various forms of alternative social and economic organization have shown a tendency to degenerate over time, or to reproduce injustices of capitalist social relations. It therefore suggests that **alternatives to capitalism should be thought of as processes that need to be continually made and remade if they are not to degenerate or reproduce the injustices of capitalist social relations, and if desirable outcomes are to be realized**. Reflecting the book’s emphasis on the social constitution of economy and society, it rejects ‘top-down’ attempts to impose an alternative to capitalism by political means, and argues that anticapitalist action should take a ‘bottom-up’ form, which requires democratic and pluralistic experimentation with different models of social and economic organization to expand the space in which non-capitalist activity takes place.

The arguments of the book therefore fit with a long tradition of anti-capitalist resistance. One of the most well-known instances of this kind of resistance was the insurrections of 1968, typified by the student revolts in Paris in May of that year. However, as Michael Watts (2001: 167) noted, the events of 1968 were far more than a local phenomenon; over seventy countries ‘had major student ­ actions during that year [and between] October 1967 and July 1968 there were over 2000 incidents worldwide of student protest alone’. Furthermore, it was not just students engaged in the act of protest, the act of anti-capitalism. According to Watts’ (ibid.: 167) study, ‘if one were to add the related worker and other nonstudent demonstrations each country in the world would, on average, have had over 20 “incidents” over the nine-month period’. Nor was the substance of the protest uniform; 1968 had what Watts (ibid.: 171– 2) has described as its Eastern, Western and Southern moments. In the first, typified by the Prague Spring and the Cultural Revolution in China, the focus of protests was anti-bureaucratic, and directed against the ‘Old Left’ and the corruption people perceived in it. In the second, typified by student protests in Paris and Berkeley, the focus of protests was opposition to consumerism and the pursuit of civil and social rights. In the third, the focus was the rejection of authority in the first generation of independent states in Africa and Latin America, where military dictatorship had displaced democratic rule.

Luc Boltanski (2002: 6) also highlights the diversity of the 1968 movement by distinguishing between its social and artistic critiques, where the former focused on inequality and poverty stemming from capitalism, and the latter on liberation, individual autonomy and authenticity. Michael Löwy (2002: 95) links this distinction between the social and artistic critique of capitalism to romanticism, which he defines as ‘rebellion against modern capitalist society, in the name of past or premodern social and cultural values, as a protest against the modern disenchantment of the world’. Therefore, the significance of 1968 can be seen not just across space, but also as a reflection of long-established traditions of resistance to prevailing social, political and economic forms or organization. On such readings, the events of 1968 can be interpreted as a demonstration of long-standing anti-capitalist feeling that rested on a critique of the world we live in and the injustices it creates, and in turn motivated action in order to try to address them.

#### Debate that can mobilize students are crucial to galvanize movements – otherwise extinction, endless war, and oppression are inevitable – it filters the permutation and turns framework args

SW 13, (no, not Mimi and Wimsatt, this is Socialist Worker, The inconvenient truth about greenwashing, <https://socialistworker.org/2013/09/24/the-truth-about-greenwashing?quicktabs_sw-recent-articles=6-27>)

TO RAISE these difficulties and different political outlooks within the environmental movement is not to be "divisive" or to "weaken" the movement, as is so often the charge from those trying to close down political discussion. Rather, it is absolutely essential if we are to move forward in these desperate times. As such, there is a level of importance to the debate that should encourage everyone concerned with the future of our planet to consider, analyze and discuss, because it relates directly to the future of the movement. And as building a successful, mass, independent movement and democratic, militant organization for social and ecological justice is the only thing that will prevent runaway climate change and mass extinctions that call into question the future of human civilization, it is critical that activists engage with the blossoming, much needed and very healthy debate on strategy and tactics. The debate has erupted across environmental blogs and websites once more because, just as the environmental justice movement originally emerged from activists and communities of color 30 years ago, a more radical wing of the movement is growing, becoming more assertive, asking new questions and seeking to overcome previous political weaknesses and omissions. The new questions are not just about how to marshal our forces to win individual battles, but how to string those victories together into a campaign that has an identifiable objective and grand vision. Strategically speaking, over the large scale and longer term, what kind of society are we fighting for? Are we seeking merely to sand off some of the ever-expanding, rougher edges of capitalism, while keeping the system somewhat contained and at least a few small areas sacrosanct from the profit motive? Or are we fighting for a completely different kind of world? One free of commodities, fast food, agribusiness, carbon markets, warfare over key resources, poverty, racism and sexism--and for a truly objective science and technology that is no longer twisted and disfigured by the priorities of financial accumulation. How can we both fight for meaningful change right now (tactics) that simultaneously helps build the movement and brings us closer to our larger, more long-term goals (strategy)? How do we differentiate between effective tactics that supplement our overall strategy, versus those that lead us up blind alleys? How one answers these political questions determines how and with whom one organizes. In reality, this is a very old debate and surfaces whenever a social movement reaches an impasse. The question of strategy and tactics grows out of the concrete situation which confronts new activists drawn into the struggle. Very often, it results in the emergence of new organizations which are more responsive to the increased demands and broader world views of those newly radicalized participants, such as we are beginning to see with the formation of national groups such as 350.org, Rising Tide, the left-wing coalition System Change not Climate Change and, most importantly, the newly emerging indigenous organization Idle No More. Such was the case in the civil rights movement, as newer, young activists, desirous of swifter and more thoroughgoing change, became disillusioned with the go-slow and legalistic route pursued by venerable civil rights organizations such as the NAACP (despite its radical roots). They agitated and formed organizations that were independent and open to new tactics with larger goals. Instead of an emphasis on experts, lobbying, moral suasion and lawsuits in the courts, tactics were redirected toward mobilizing the Black population as a whole--through mass, nonviolent, direct action, set within a strategy of escalating activism and involvement from wider and wider layers of society.

## Underview

### NC – AT 1AR Theory [:10]

#### They get 1AR theory but it’s not DTD- incentivizes reading 10 friv shells since they can win on any of them- AND, 1AR time advantage on 1AR theory since they get 2 speeches and 7 min, abuse is self-imposed b/c they could always better develop the shell in the 1ar; proportional- reading theory cancels out the abuse; and no reason short speech means drop the debater- just get more efficient or don’t read theory.

### AT: Apoc Rhetoric Good

#### Disease crisis rhetoric consolidates a national identity based in a reaffirmation of the Western body politic—this becomes the basis for a politics of exclusion.

Schell 97 (Heather, Outburst! A Chilling Story About Emerging Virus Narratives and Pandemic Social Change Configurations 5.1, pp. 93-133)

I would like to examine the significance of our current fascination with viruses within the context of the work on immune system discourses by feminist science studies scholars Donna Haraway and Emily Martin. Both Haraway's "Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Constitutions of Self in Immune System Discourse" and Martin's Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture argue that immune system discourse reflects changing ideas about the qualities that comprise identity and selfhood. 11 In addition, they probe the depictions of the immune system's relationship with the non-self. Critical evaluations of the criteria for self and non-self have long been an important and necessary component of feminist analysis, not least because Western women were frequently shunted into that non-self category. The developing global consciousness of Western feminism in the past decades has also led feminist scholars increasingly to consider the status of others classified politically, socially, and even biologically as outsiders on the basis of race, ethnicity, sexual practice, class, and so forth. This growing awareness reflects not simply general humanitarian concerns but also the realization that our destinies are intertwined in a symbiotic manner, not in a free market structure where only the "fittest" survive. Applying natural selection to social groups turned out to be a trick to divide and conquer us, since the lucky few to succeed turned out to be even fewer than we had been promised. Many feminist scholars have also built on the poststructuralist insight that self/non-self distinctions are socially [End Page 95] constructed ways of making sense of the world; while such distinctions are therefore deeply permeated by existing power relations, they are also subject to change. Working from this historical position, Haraway and Martin carefully examine new discourses on identity to see who or what gets targeted as outsiders, non-selves. Though they both recognize potential danger in the practices of some scientists and journalists, whose use of military metaphors for understanding the immune system perpetuates outdated, aggressive, Cold War mindsets, these scholars see signs of hope in alternate interpretations of the immune system. Martin and Haraway offer examples of some scientists, SF writers, and nonexperts who have begun to perceive the immune system--and, by extension, our own interaction with the world--in ways that accommodate multiplicity, situated knowledges, and multivocal communication. Although I like the implications of Haraway's and Martin's analyses, an examination of immune system discourses is incomplete without a complementary appraisal of the immune system's most formidable non-self: the virus. The self/non-self dichotomy has been so extensively explored by historians and mined of its last glitter of insight by theoreticians that we might easily be tempted to dismiss its continued operation in our everyday lives as the tailings from an abandoned excavation. Such dismissal would be a mistake. Society still deploys binarisms in blatant disregard of decades of sound, decisive scholarship. Debates about national and personal boundaries are unfolding within our anxious apprehensions of an approaching viral pandemic. The virus emerges as a dangerous foreign being: a fecund, primitive yet evolving, hungry, needy, African predator unleashed by modern travel from the last recesses of the wild. It wants to immigrate, with or without a visa. It demands attention in the form of resistance or capitulation. While ostensibly pondering the possible overthrow of the food chain, virus discourse imagines the overthrow of the social order. Viruses represent social change--frightening and enormous social change--and our drastic fear of viral epidemics is in part a reactionary response to the possibility of such change. Virus discourse has become a covert means of negotiating identity and contact in the increasing multiculturalism of the global village. Western ideas of the non-self, the external threat, have not kept pace with the postmodern flexible self. The Other is still that same, tired old Other, that dark, unknowable native lurking in that dark, unknowable continent, waiting to erode our identity and leave us degenerated or reborn. Marlow or Tarzan, the Westerner who makes contact with the indefinable essence of Africa has always emerged a transformed soul. The only postmodern element of virus discourse is that now the African transformative [End Page 96] being has become a global passenger with no need for a green card. Virus discourse is retelling old imperialist nightmares that, neutralized under cover of medical common sense, seem to justify exclusionary practices, surveillance, and general prejudice that we would otherwise find inexcusable as well as politically untenable.

#### And, it turns the case—identifying disease as a threat to the nation-state stagnates health policy improvement.

Davies 10 (Sara E., Prof. Poli. Sci. And Int’l Studies @ U of Queensland-Australia, Centre for Governance and Public Policy @ Griffith U, "Global Politics of Health," p. 20-21)

Colin Mclnnes (20042 53-55) contends that the securitization argument elevates the status of infectious disease to the point where it has created impetus for resources and international attention to be focused on the prevention of outbreaks in the developing world. The existential nature of the threat makes infectious disease a legitimate focus for world attention and securitization is a useful strategy for making the case for extra resources. This position is certainly not without merit, but the statist case has not yet succeeded in delivering significant amounts of money or new resources to prevent the threat of disease in the first place. Rather, responses are still primarily focused on developed states **protecting their own** (Mclnnes and Lee 2006). Recently, Fidler has argued that maintaining health as a foreign policy issue is vulnerable due to two tensions. The first is complacency: to engage health at the foreign policy level requires crisis escalation - but as the selected crisis passes, public health prevention and protection will be neglected again (leaving everyone vulnerable to the next health crisis). Second, health policy improvement requires many areas to [21] collaborate, which means that it is pushed down the list and ‘subordinates health to other non-health problems and crises’ such as global economic crisis and climate change (Fidler 2009: 29). The argument that infectious disease constitutes an emergency requiring extraordinary measures indicates that, overall, individual health is not actually being seen as a referent object. In line with the broad statist perspective, the securitization of health focuses on national-level threats rather than treating an individual's health as an end in itself.

#### This is about apocalypse in literature. In debate, reading extinction is not disruptive because everybody does it.

#### This arg proves the neg because it says that apoc rhetoric can be used in the context of climate change to challenge statist norms – the aff doesn’t challenge statist norms, which is the K.

## Framing

### --Top

#### Their focus on catastrophic violence trades off with analysis of everyday slow violence and ensures error replication because it allows us to bracket on-going casualties from declared conflicts that have officially ended

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 12-14)

Over the past two decades, this high-speed planetary modification has been accompanied (at least for those increasing billions who have access to the Internet) by rapid modifications to the human cortex. It is difficult, but necessary, to consider simultaneously a geologically-paced plasticity, however relatively rapid, and the plasticity of brain circuits reprogrammed by a digital world that threatens to "info-whelm" us into a state of perpetual distraction. If an awareness of the Great Acceleration is (to put it mildly) unevenly distributed, the experience of accelerated connectivity (and the paradoxical disconnects that can accompany it) is increasingly widespread. In an age of degraded attention spans it becomes doubly difficult yet increasingly urgent that we focus on the toll exacted, over time, by the slow violence of ecological degradation. We live, writes Cory Doctorow, in an era when the electronic screen has become an "ecosystem of interruption technologies.''" Or as former Microsoft executive Linda Stone puts it, we now live in an age of "continuous partial attention.?" Fast is faster than it used to be, and story units have become concomitantly shorter. In this cultural milieu of digitally speeded up time, and foreshortened narrative, the intergenerational aftermath becomes a harder sell. So to render slow violence visible entails, among other things, redefining speed: we see such efforts in talk of accelerated species loss, rapid climate change, and in attempts to recast "glacial"-once a dead metaphor for "slow-as a rousing, iconic image of unacceptably fast loss. Efforts to make forms of slow violence more urgently visible suffered a setback in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible image of what constitutes a violent threat. The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was burned into the national psyche as the definitive image of violence, setting back by years attempts to rally public sentiment against climate change, a threat that is incremental, exponential, and far less sensationally visible. Condoleezza Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud looming over America if the United States failed to invade Iraq gave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as something explosive and instantaneous, a recognizably cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event. The representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of slow violence become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire consequences for the ways wars are remembered, which in turn has dire consequences for the projected casualties from future wars. We can observe this bias at work in the way wars, whose lethal repercussions spread across space and time, are tidily bookended in the historical record. Thus, for instance, a 2003 New York Times editorial on Vietnam declared that" during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and helped kill at least 1.5 million people.'?' But that simple phrase "during our dozen years there" shrinks the toll, foreshortening the ongoing slow-motion slaughter: hundreds of thousands survived the official war years, only to slowly lose their lives later to Agent Orange. In a 2002 study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels in the bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at '35 times the levels of Hanoi's inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying." The afflicted include thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than thirty years after the last spray run, Agent Orange continues to wreak havoc as, through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of pivotal foods such as duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. An Institute of Medicine committee has by now linked seventeen medical conditions to Agent Orange; indeed, as recently as 2009 it uncovered fresh evidence that exposure to the chemical increases the likelihood of developing Parkinson's disease and ischemic heart disease." Under such circumstances, wherein long-term risks continue to emerge, to bookend a war's casualties with the phrase "during our dozen years there" is misleading: that small, seemingly innocent phrase is a powerful reminder of how our rhetorical conventions for bracketing violence routinely ignore ongoing, belated casualties.

## Pandemics

### NC – Disease

#### No “spare domestic manufacturing capacity”

Hans **Sauer 21,** Deputy General Counsel and Vice President for Intellectual Property for the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, “Waiving IP Rights During Times of COVID: A ‘False Good Idea’,” IPWatchdog, 4-19-2021, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/04/19/waiving-ip-rights-during-times-of-covid-a-false-good-idea/id=132399/

The Proposed Waiver is Unlikely to Help the Fight Against the Pandemic To begin with, one would think, the burden of establishing the need for such an extreme and disruptive measure should be on its proponents. Yet, in the face of unprecedented progress towards COVID vaccines, tests and treatments in record time, the waiver proponents can point to no credible instances in which IP has in fact hindered the development or production of COVID-19 countermeasures. Readers should judge for themselves by perusing the joint South African/Indian TRIPS Council submission purporting to demonstrate such IP barriers. Even cursory inspection shows that this proof consists of a number of pending patent applications, a handful of patents that haven’t been asserted, a few statements by politicians, and historical narratives having nothing to do with COVID-19. There have been a few instances of patent litigation, but none to block or delay COVID products. Interestingly, royalty-free licenses by drug originators to dozens of manufacturers in developing countries are counted as IP barriers to access. Perhaps recognizing the lack of affirmative proof supporting the need for a COVID IP waiver, proponents are increasingly trying to shift the burden to those who oppose the waiver, maybe best exemplified by World Health Organization Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus’ stance: “if not now, then when would a WTO waiver ever be justified?” Yet this is a poor substitute for an actual rationale, especially when the TRIPS Agreement and its addenda are already replete with IP flexibilities that have been justified for both national and multilateral use on the ground that they will be necessary in a public health emergency. The same proponents who have for decades with significant traction argued for an ever-growing expansion of these flexibilities now say that it is not worth even trying to use them; only the effective abrogation of all IP rights in relation to COVID-19 would be a quick enough measure to deal with the present crisis while it lasts. However, the proposed blanket suspension of IP rights is no quick fix for the pandemic, as it is unlikely to accelerate the delivery of COVID-19 vaccines. Waiver proponents have been unable to document the existence of idle global COVID vaccine manufacturing capacity **that could be unleashed by suspending IP rights.** Existing capacity to produce traditional vaccines with conventional manufacturing technology simply cannot quickly or easily be converted to produce the advanced COVID-19 vaccines currently deployed. Thus, developing country manufacturers that currently make e.g. diphtheria, yellow fever, or tetanus vaccines, cannot simply be re-tooled to make the high-end mRNA or vectored COVID vaccines we are eagerly waiting for. Very different facilities will be needed, and getting these built, certified, and operational will take time, money, and precious expertise. Waiver proponents also seem to forget that someone must keep making the whooping cough, polio, MMR, and other childhood vaccines against diseases that kill more children in the developing world than COVID ever will. Current global need for non-COVID vaccines is estimated at 3.5-5.5 billion doses per year, and those who talk about using existing capacity must realize that we cannot convert current manufacturing away from these critically-important products. On top of that, an estimated 14 billion doses of COVID vaccines will be needed globally. As GAVI – The Vaccine Alliance explains, it was always clear that demand for COVID vaccines would be high, immediate, and impossible to meet in the short term. This is no fault of the IP system. Vaccine manufacturing processes are complex, require specific know-how and equipment, and just cannot happen overnight. Some COVID-19 vaccines involve new technologies, such as mRNA and lipid nanoparticle encapsulation, for which no large-scale manufacturing facilities or copious raw materials existed at the outset of the pandemic. The worldwide capacity to build or convert new plants is likewise limited, specialized manufacturing equipment is difficult or impossible to source, and none of this is or was ever going to be achievable within a few months as the proponents of the TRIPS waiver assert. Not even counting the time it takes to construct and equip a new plant, just the regulatory certification of a completed new facility takes several months before it can begin commercial production, and the manufacture and quality control of a single batch of COVID-19 vaccine takes 3-4 months before it can be released. Anywhere between 100 and 1,000 quality controls are done at each step of the manufacturing process. Those who argue that an IP waiver would enable the free flow of COVID vaccines within months are raising impossible expectations.

#### Timeframe is too long and materials thump

Damian **Garde 21,** National Biotech Reporter, “Waiver of patent rights on Covid vaccines may be mostly symbolic, for now,” STAT, 5-6-2021, https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/06/waiver-of-patent-rights-on-covid-19-vaccines-in-near-term-may-be-more-symbolic-than-substantive/

The U.S.’s stunning endorsement of a proposal to waive Covid-19 vaccine patents has won plaudits for President Biden and roiled the global pharmaceutical industry. **But, at least in the short term, it’s likely to be more of a symbolic milestone than a turning point in the pandemic.** For months, proponents of the proposal have argued that the need to waive intellectual property protections was urgent given the growth of Covid cases in low- and middle-income countries, which have been largely left without the huge shipments of vaccine already purchased by wealthy countries. But patents alone don’t magically produce vaccines. Experts suggested the earliest the world could expect to see additional capacity flowing from the waiver — if it’s approved at the World Trade Organization — would be in 2022. Prashant Yadav, a supply chain expert and senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, said the biggest barrier to increasing the global vaccine supply **is a lack of raw materials and facilities that manufacture the billions of doses the world needs.** Temporarily suspending some intellectual property, as the U.S. proposes to do, **would have little effect on those problems**, he said.

#### Other barriers prevent boosts in production.

Ana Santos **Rutschman 21**, Assistant Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law., “The COVID-19 Vaccine Patent Waiver: The Wrong Tool for the Right Goal,” Bill of Health, 5-5-2021, https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/05/covid-vaccine-patent-waiver/

Patents cover both processes and products. In the case of vaccines, the former category includes methods of vaccine production, while the latter covers a myriad of vaccine components, from antigens (substances used to elicit a reaction from the immune system), to inactive ingredients, such as adjuvants (substances that help enhance the immune response, like oil-in-water emulsions) and stabilizers (substances that help maintain the potency of the vaccine, like sugars), to the vaccine delivery mechanism. In order to understand the practical limitations of a waiver of intellectual property rights when a vaccine is involved, it may be useful to think of patents as informational mechanisms akin to the information and tools needed to turn a recipe into an edible product. One or more patents will provide a recipe for a process or a component needed to produce a vaccine. But, just as with a culinary recipe, the informational power of a patent does not cover any tips or instructions that have not been memorialized in writing, nor does it provide any access to the raw materials needed to put a vaccine together. Waivers, therefore, temporarily remove exclusionary rights, but do not address two fundamental sources of the current vaccine scarcity problem. First, we are still left with a significant informational problem: as many commentators have remarked, knowledge disclosed through patents alone is often insufficient for a third party to actually be able to replicate a vaccine. From a scientific perspective, vaccines are biological products, and, as such, their relative complexity makes them highly dependent on specific manufacturing processes and practices, many of which are not disclosed in a patent — think of it as the unwritten tips or instructions for a particular recipe. Some of this information may be kept secret by a company for competitive reasons; in these cases, lifting patent rights will not result in increased informational disclosure, unless the patent holders themselves are willing to collaborate. A waiver thus solves the exclusivity problem, but not the information problem that undergirds competition in vaccine manufacturing. To revisit the analogy introduced above, a waiver allows third parties to freely use the recipe. It does not, however, provide all the information that may be needed to manufacture the desired good, nor does it provide manufacturers with the tacit knowledge that only the original manufacturer possesses and is not disclosed elsewhere. Second, even if all types of legal restrictions on the use of vaccine technology were lifted — or had never existed in the first place — there is simply not enough infrastructure (manufacturing facilities and equipment) nor raw materials (the components needed to manufacture and deliver vaccines) to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines as predicted under current waiver proposals. We have long faced a global vaccine manufacturing problem that will not be fully resolved during the current pandemic. In the case of vaccines that need to be kept at ultra-cold temperatures, these problems intensify. One of us (Barnes-Weise) has been involved in the contractual negotiations for the development, manufacturing and transfer of technology related to COVID-19 vaccines. In addition to the informational gaps described above, COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers are most concerned about how well the recipients of the technology transfer will understand and be able to implement such knowledge in making vaccines of the necessary quality. Shortages do not merely affect materials necessary to manufacture vaccines and facilities adequate to manufacture the vaccines; they also affect the availability of personnel qualified to instruct the licensee and recipient of this information. Sending an employee of this caliber out of the original manufacturing site to a partner site risks reducing the capacity of the first site. And remote instruction, necessitated by the pandemic, has its own shortcomings. In relation to the patents on the vaccines themselves, most of the concerns that the vaccine manufacturers express are around the protection of their vaccine platforms for the purposes of making future or non-COVID-19 vaccines. Moderna shared information about its patents in summer 2020. The manufacturers, as evidenced by the number of licenses to manufacture granted to date, are eager to find partners with the capabilities to expand production. It is not to their benefit to produce an inadequate supply of a highly sought-after vaccine. However, even willingness to transfer patented vaccine technology has faced numerous practical hurdles to date: 1) infrastructural limitations; 2) scarcity of raw materials; 3) concerns about licensees having the ability to actually manufacture effective vaccines in light of the infrastructural and product scarcity, even in situations in which there might be no informational gaps. A patent waiver would not address any of the practical concerns currently at the root of tech transfer negotiations involving COVID-19 vaccine technology. Compounding these problems is the fact that, should a waiver be issued, there is no legal mechanism that can compel the transfer of certain types of know-how or trade secrets should a company be unwilling to license its intellectual property — which, again, at this point in the pandemic, is not a problem we have observed. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that a waiver would be temporary: supporters of current waiver proposals should consider what will happen once demand for vaccines begins diminishing and fewer manufacturers remain on the market. Moreover, they should consider the legal and practical uncertainty that a waiver would introduce, as it is unclear how technology transfer between companies would cease (or continue) once the waiver expires.

#### Disease doesn’t cause war

Dr. Barry R. Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program, “Do Pandemics Promote Peace? Why Sickness Slows the March to War”, Foreign Affairs, 4/23/2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace

As the novel coronavirus infects the globe, states compete for scientific and medical supplies and blame one another for the pandemic’s spread. Policy analysts have started asking whether such tensions could eventually erupt into military conflict. Has the pandemic increased or decreased the motive and opportunity of states to wage war?

War is a risky business, with potentially very high costs. The historian Geoffrey Blainey argued in The Causes of War that most wars share a **common characteristic** at their outset: **optimism**. The belligerents usually start out sanguine about their odds of military success. When elites on both or all sides are confident, they are more willing to take the plunge—and less likely to negotiate, because they think they will come out better by fighting. Peace, by contrast, is served by **pessimism**. Even one party’s pessimism can be helpful: that party will be more inclined to negotiate and even accept an unfavorable bargain in order to avoid war.

When one side gains a sudden and pronounced advantage, however, this de-escalatory logic can break down: the optimistic side will increase its demands faster than the pessimistic side can appease. Some analysts worry that something like this could happen in U.S.-Chinese relations as a result of the new coronavirus. The United States is experiencing a moment of domestic crisis. China, some fear, might see the pandemic as playing to its advantage and be tempted to throw its military weight around in the western Pacific.

What these analysts miss is that COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is **weaken**ing all of the great and middle powers more or less **equally**. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for war. **For the duration of** the **pandemic**, at least, and probably for years afterward, **the odds of a war between major powers will go down, not up**.

PAX EPIDEMICA?

A cursory survey of the scholarly **lit**erature on war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is **conducive to peace**. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories. But one **seldom** finds **any** discussion of **epidemics causing wars** or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.)

That **sickness slows the march to war** is partly due to the fact that **war depends on people**. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But pandemics still threaten military units, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly.

Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it comes into use.

The most important reason disease inhibits war is **economic**. Major outbreaks **damage national economies**, which are the **source** of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have **reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects**. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again.

#### It dries up popular support for war AND decreases trade that produces tension

Dr. Barry R. Posen 20, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program, “Do Pandemics Promote Peace? Why Sickness Slows the March to War”, Foreign Affairs, 4/23/2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace

LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION

How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century.

Most governments have **not covered themselves with glory** managing the pandemic, and **even the most autocratic** worry about **popular support**. Over the next few years, people will want **ev**idence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. **Citizens** will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be **less inclined to support adventures abroad**.

At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be **diminished trade**, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has **not helped improve relations** between states but rather fueled resentment. Less trade could mean **less friction** between major powers, thereby **reducing the intensity of their rivalries**.

## Plan

### NC – Top

#### Plan doesn’t solve the WTO – China didn’t comply for years, etc.

#### Free trade is genocide

Giroux 6 – Henry Giroux, “Dirty Democracy and State Terrorism: The Politics of the New Authoritarianism in the United States” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26.2 (2006) 163-177

As the state of emergency, in Giorgio Agamben's aptly chosen words, becomes the rule rather than the exception, a number of powerful antidemocratic tendencies threaten the prospects for both American and global democrac**y**.[10](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html#FOOT10%23FOOT10) The first is a market fundamentalism that not only trivializes democratic values and public concerns but also enshrines a rabid individualism, an all-embracing quest for profits, and a social Darwinism in which misfortune is seen as a weakness—the current sum total being the Hobbesian rule of a "war of all against all" that replaces any vestige of shared responsibilities or compassion for others. The values of the market and the ruthless workings of finance capital become the template for organizing the rest of society. Everybody is now a customer or client, and every relationship is ultimately judged in bottom-line, cost-effective terms as the neoliberal mantra "privatize or perish" is repeated over and over again. Responsible citizens are replaced by an assemblage of entrepreneurial subjects, each tempered in the virtue of self-reliance and forced to face the increasingly difficult challenges of the social order alone. Freedom is no longer about securing equality, social justice, or the public welfare but about unhampered trade in goods, financial capital, and commodities. As the logic of capital trumps democratic sovereignty, low-intensity warfare at home chips away at democratic freedoms, and high-intensity warfare abroad delivers democracy with bombs, tanks, and chemical warfare. The global cost of these neoliberal commitments is massive human suffering and death, delivered not only in the form of bombs and the barbaric practices of occupying armies but also in structural adjustment policies in which the drive for land, resources, profits, and goods are implemented by global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Global lawlessness and armed violence accompany the imperative of free trade, the virtues of a market without boundaries, and the promise of a Western-style democracy imposed through military solutions, ushering in the age of rogue sovereignty on a global scale. Under such conditions, human suffering and hardship reach unprecedented levels of intensity. In a rare moment of truth, Thomas Friedman, the columnist for the New York Times, precisely argued for the use of U.S. power—including military force—to support this antidemocratic world order. He claimed that "the hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist. . . . And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps."[11](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html#FOOT11%23FOOT11) As Mark Rupert points out, "In Friedman's twisted world, if people are to realize their deepest aspirations—the longing for a better life which comes from their very souls—they must stare down the barrel of Uncle Sam's gun."[12](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html#FOOT12%23FOOT12) As neoliberals in the Bush administration implement policies at home to reduce taxation and regulation while spending billions on wars abroad, they slash funds that benefit the sick, the elderly, the poor, and young people. But **pu**blic resources are diverted not only from crucial domestic problems ranging from poverty and unemployment to hunger; they are also diverted from addressing the fate of some 45 million children in "the world's poor countries [who] will die needlessly over the next decade," as reported by the British-based group Oxfam.[13](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html#FOOT13%23FOOT13) The U.S. commitment to market fundamentalism elevates profits over human needs and consequently offers few displays of compassion, aid, or relief for millions of poor and abandoned children in the world who do not have adequate shelter, who are severely hungry, who have no access to health care or safe water, and who succumb needlessly to the ravages of AIDS and other diseases.[14](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html#FOOT14%23FOOT14) For instance, as Jim Lobe points out, "U.S. foreign aid in 2003 ranked dead last among all wealthy nations. In fact, its entire development aid spending in 2003 came to only ten percent of what it spent on the Iraq war that year. U.S. development assistance comes to less than one-fortieth of its annual defense budget."[15](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html#FOOT15%23FOOT15) Carol Bellamy, the executive director of UNICEF, outlines the consequences of the broken promises to children by advanced capitalist countries such as the United States.

#### WTO irrelevant

Zaki LaïDi 18, Professor of International Relations and European Affairs at Sciences Po. , 5-18-2018, "Is Multilateralism Finished?," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/is-multilateralism-finished-by-zaki-laidi-2018-05?barrier=accesspay

The Reality on the Ground Still, it does not follow that formal deregulation within the existing international system would cause it to collapse. **Though the WTO is in crisis, the essential norms of international commerce continue to function**. Most of these are long-established rules that were inherited from the GATT era – and that remain indispensable to the majority of WTO member states. Moreover, the immediate crisis of the multilateral system has only a marginal effect on the volume of world trade, which is now more dependent on global value chains – in a sense, the most effective instrument against protectionism – than on international accords. That is why we should not be excessively pessimistic about the future of the trading system, as long as the norms on which trade rests are respected. In fact, despite the repeated failures of multilateral trade negotiations over the past two decades, **world trade** since 2001 **has grown dramatically.** Trump is probably not in a position to derail this trend, which is by and large extremely favorable to US interests. In trade negotiations, individual governments adopt a mercantilist vision of international trade that bears little resemblance to reality. Contrary to Trump’s obsessive grumbling about America “losing” to other countries on trade, everyone knows that bilateral trade deficits are of only limited economic importance. A current-account deficit reflects an imbalance between national savings and investment, not necessarily economic weakness or a lack of competitiveness. Besides, gross imports and exports should not be taken at face value. As many economists have pointed out, the US trade deficit vis-à-vis China would be 33% smaller if the balance of value added was factored into the bilateral balance. Because it isn’t, an iPhone shipped to the US from China is recorded as a Chinese export worth $500, even though China added only around $20 to the final value. The gap between trade rhetoric and reality under the Trump administration has created space for protectionist policies that could precipitate a global trade war. But, barring that outcome, **the trading system will continue to allow for alternative approaches other than global-level negotiations.** For example, plurilateral agreements – such as the new iteration of the TPP, led by Japan – will probably become the primary driver of global trade in the future.

#### WTO not key to free trade

Olson, 18 – former US trade negotiator and Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation

(Stephen, 7/8. “Don’t just blame Trump or China for this trade war.” https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2153920/dont-just-blame-trump-or-china-trade-war)

To be clear, there are problems galore with global trade regulations. We now have a trade architecture that is no longer perceived as capable of delivering mutually beneficial trade, and vulnerable to be gamed by powerful players smart enough to use its outdated provisions to their advantage. In that sense, the **Trump** administration **is not the cause of the current dysfunction in the global trade system, it is a symptom**. But the US administration’s approach to these shortcomings is no less broken, and is unlikely to help in any way.

The tariffs now being imposed on China, based on US concerns about intellectual property rights, illustrate the structural weaknesses in the current trade architecture. US trade officials have essentially conceded that at least some of their complaints against China’s intellectual property rights practices are not really violations of the WTO. This doesn’t mean that the US complaints are baseless and that China’s practices are not discriminatory. Quite the opposite. If one starts with the proposition that the rules of international trade should foster open commerce and competition across borders, and minimise or eliminate practices that put foreign companies at a disadvantage, then China’s policies would have to be regarded as contrary to that spirit and counter to the overarching objective of a rules-based trade system.

The fact however that many of these practices do not violate specific WTO rules highlights the extent to which the organisation has **failed to keep pace with the policies that regulate trade.** Under the existing rules of trade, a variety of discriminatory and even predatory practices either fall under “grey areas” of the WTO that are difficult to enforce, or in areas that are left entirely uncovered by the global trade referee, giving countries wide berth to distort trade.

Take intellectual property. Many of China’s practices are arguably in technical compliance with its WTO obligations but are implemented in ways that subvert the intention of the provision. For example, Section 7(3) of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO requires China to “ensure that … any means of approval for importation or investment … is not conditioned on … the transfer of technology”. Taken at face value, this seem entirely clear. However, it leaves sufficient scope for government officials to utilise the variety of levers at their disposal to exert very strong “encouragement” to multinational corporations to transfer technology.

Foreign companies wishing to do business in China are required to obtain various licences that are administered by non-transparent and highly discretionary government regulatory bodies, which essentially hold the “keys to the kingdom”. Not surprisingly, many multinationals evaluate “requests” or “suggestions” for technology transfer in light of these stark regulatory realities, and cave in.

Aside from subtle and not so subtle pressure exerted through the regulatory regime, the Chinese government also utilises its often preponderant market position to influence the decision making of foreign companies. For instance, the three largest airlines in China are all state-owned. Foreign aircraft producers have come to understand that their chances for success in winning purchase orders will be closely linked to the extent to which they establish joint ventures in China, localise production, and transfer technology.

In cases such as these, are technology transfers formally required or written into contracts, which would clearly violate the Protocol of Accession? By and large, no. But as a practical, “real world” matter, are foreign companies essentially being required to transfer technology? In many instances, yes.