## OFF

### [Long]

**Academic philosophy is anti-Black – the 1AC’s abstraction from the material consequences of racialized violence absolves white philosophers of their contributions to America’s apathy towards Black death – their race-neutral rhetoric and assertion of universal humanistic principles reduces systemic racism to a problem of recognition that prevents effective mobilization against white supremacy – vote negative to reject the Western metaphysical tradition and recognize the permanent failure of white philosophy.**

Tommy J. **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

We begin with the first author’s reflections on philosophy and its recurring problem of denying the realities of race and racism, reflections that have arisen as a Black (male) philosopher whose life has been threatened for doing Black philosophy. The experience of confronting death, being fearful of being killed doing my job as a critical race theorist, and being threatened with violence for thinking about racism in America has a profound effect on concretizing what is at stake in our theories about anti-Black racism. Whereas my work on race and racism in philosophy earlier in my career was dedicated to the problems created by the mass ignorance of the discipline to the political debates and ethnological history of Black philosophers in the 19th and 20th centuries, I now find myself thinking more seriously about the way that **philosophy**, really theory itself—our present categories of knowledge, such as race, class, and gender, found through disciplines—actually **hastens the deaths of subjugated peoples in the U**nited **S**tates. **Academic philosophy routinely abstracts away from**—directs thought to not attend to the realities of death, dying, and despair created by—**antiBlack racism. Black, Brown, and Indigenous populations are routinely rationalized as disposable flesh. The deaths of these groups launch philosophical discussions** of social injustice and spark awareness by whites, **while the deaths of white people direct policy and demand outrage. Because racialized bodies are confined to inhumane living conditions that nurture violence** and despair **that become attributed to the savage nature of nonwhites and evidence of their inhumanity, the deaths of these** **dehumanized peoples are** often **measured against the dangers they are thought to pose to others**.

**The interpretation of the inferior position that racialized groups occupy in the U**nited **S**tates **is grounded in how whites often think of themselves in relation to problem populations. This relationship is** often **rationalized by avoidance and by** the **denials** of whites **about being causally related to the harsh conditions imposed on nonwhites in the world. Philosophy, and its glorification of the rational individual, ignores the complexity of anti-Black racism by blaming the complacency**, if not outright hostility, **towards Blacks on the mass ignorance of white America**. To remedy this problem, Black philosophers are asked to respond by gearing their writings, lectures, and professional presence to further educate and dialogue with white philosophers in order to enable them to better understand anti-Black racism and white supremacy (Curry 2008, 2015). This therapy is often rewarded as scholarship. **Philosophical positions that analyze racism as a problem of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and ignorance** (philosophies predicated on the capacity of whites to change) **are rewarded and praised as the cutting edge and most impactful theories about race and racism. Reducing racism to a problem of recognition** and understanding **allows white philosophers to remain absolved of their contribution to the apathy that white America has to the death** and subjugation **Black Americans endure** at the hands of the white race.

To some readers, speaking about races as different groups with opposite, if not antagonistic, social lives seems to run contrary to the idea that there are no real races, just people, only the human race. This is the core of **race-neutral theory** in academic philosophy. Race neutrality **asserts that while race, class, and gender may** in fact **differentiate bodies, the capacity for reason—the human essence beneath it all—is what is ultimately at stake in the recognition of difference**. While **this mantra** has been offered to whites since the integrationist strategies of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s under Chief Justice Earl Warren, it **has had little effect in restructuring the psychology of white individuals or remedying** the **institutional** practices of **racism that continue to exclude** or punish **Black Americans**. How are Black scholars to speak about racism, specifically the violence and death that seem to gravitate towards Black bodies if the rules of philosophy and the fragility of white Americans insist that racism is not the cause of the disproportionate death Black Americans suffer and race is not a significant factor in Black people’s lives?

This article is an attempt to debunk the seemingly neutral starting point of academic philosophy. **For decades, Black philosophers have attempted to** educate white philosophers and **reorient the philosophical anthropologies of the discipline. Black, Brown, and Indigenous philosophers have dedicated their lives** and careers **to educating white philosophers** and students, **with little to no effect on the composition** and disposition **of the discipline**. While it is not uncommon for philosophy departments to say they support diversity, the reality is that many, if not most, Black philosophers continue to write about the problem of racism, their experiences of marginalization, and the violence they suffer from white colleagues, disciplinary organizations, and universities. **This article should be read as an attempt not to amend the Western metaphysical tradition but to reveal the obstacles that indicate its perennial failure**. It is the position of the authors that many of the demands for disciplinary change are often expressed as politics, when in reality **there are issues of metaphysics** (the concerns of being) **and philosophical anthropology** (the concerns about the (non)being capable of thinking) **that are unaddressed in much of the current literature**. Section I of this article describes what Black philosophy has taken to be the problem of racism in academic philosophy more broadly. Since the 1970s Black philosophers have criticized, attacked, and attempted to reform the discipline with little effect. This section interrogates why that is the case. Section II argues that the failure of philosophy to change is a problem of metaphysics or the illusion that Blackness is compatible with the idea of the white human. Section III presents the social scientific evidence demonstrating the seeming permanence of anti-Black racism and the dangerous nature of colorblind ideology, which does not recognize that societal organization and racism determine the life chances of Blacks. This article ends with a suggestion of what Black philosophy would look like if its primary mandate were not to persuade whites to remedy their own racist practices, but to diagnose and build strategies against the present problems of racism in philosophy before us.

**Even if they win that their colorblindness is theoretically ideal, it is practically impossible because racialized bodies are marked by their skin color – the psychological construction of Black as inferior makes their impacts inevitable – philosophy’s segregation of black scholarship is not neutral and not normal.**

Tommy J. **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2010: 15) explains that **colorblind racism emerged as a new racial ideology in the late 1960s** concomitantly with the crystallization of the “new racism” as America’s new racial structure. **Whites could no longer get away with the overt racist practices** that were used before the civil rights movements **but instead depended on more subtle ways to maintain their racial dominance** without using race. In today’s society, there are very few whites who outwardly consider themselves to be racist, but they will still support systems that create inequalities among minority populations.

Bonilla-Silva’s (1996) account of racism leads him to develop the idea of racialized social systems, a term that refers to societies where economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories. Bonilla-Silva theorizes that **the racialized system incentivizes how racialized persons develop their identities within racist structures. Race is not simply imposed on bodies but is psychologically invested in by individuals in terms of how dominant racial groups identify themselves in relationship to the** **groups** and individuals **they construct as inferiors. For some groups assimilation is possible. This is the case for ethnic groups like the Irish and the Jews because their skin color is closer to that of whites, but it would be impossible for Black groups to similarly disappear. Colorblindness could exist in theory, but in reality, people see skin color, and in America, white skin stands for superiority.**

Racial **segregation** has been a mainstay of the American race problem since the beginning of slavery. Assigning the places that Blacks belonged, whether it be in the fields or as the “house Negro,” **has been one of the primary ways that racism has been enforced against Blacks**. Even after the end of slavery, **Jim Crow was established to terrorize Blacks into staying confined by their segregated spaces**. We would argue that **even today**, the established racial dynamic in America maintains racial segregation. In The Hidden Cost of Being African American, Thomas Shapiro (2004: 152) has shown how **whites have been able to move into the neighborhoods with the better schools and resources with the help of their inheritances**. Many of the people he interviewed about their housing location stated that they did not look at race when deciding to move to certain neighborhoods but rather they focused on the lifestyle and “standards” of the people. **Most stated that “it just happened” that there were no African Americans at the school their child attends. These understandings of “standards” and lifestyle are nested in the notion that white culture defines the norms and standards**. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s concept of “white habitus” explains the tendency whites have for racial segregation, namely, their preference for moving to all-white neighborhoods and the effects this practice has on African Americans.

Shapiro’s work parallels the findings of Bonilla-Silva’s theory of white habitus. Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006: 233) describe “white habitus” as a racialized, uninterrupted socialization process that conditions and creates whites’ racial taste, perceptions, feelings, and emotions and their views on racial matters. The most pronounced effect of white habitus is that “it promotes a sense of group belonging (a white culture of solidarity) and negative views about nonwhites.” **In these all-white spaces, whites become the standard or norm while anything or anyone different becomes unnatural or problematic**. White habitus promotes minorities being viewed based on stereotypes and generalizations perpetuated by the media or through other second-hand sources. **The greatest irony of Bonilla-Silva et al.’s interviews was their finding that “whites do not interpret their racial isolation and segregation from Blacks as something racial.”** This qualitative project shows that **even when whites are communally segregated** from Blacks, **they do not interpret this as a racialized or racist environment**. The absence of Blacks is thought to be compatible with how white Americans think about colorblindness. The idea of white superiority, or whiteonly neighborhoods, is not understood by many white Americans as racist. In one of Shapiro’s (2004: 152) interviews, the participant states that she has “Black friends.” However, Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006: 248) point out that when whites claim to have Black friends, they usually are referring to formal activities such as sports or classroom work groups. Once the activity is over the relationship ends; the so-called Black “friends” are not actual neighbors or friends who live within their social environment. **Academic philosophy operates similarly**.

**Racism deems Black life disposable and demands racialized violence – we’re not an ad-hom that criticizes the positionality or personal views of their authors – their philosophy is actively used as an expression of white supremacy and to rationalize the deaths of Black men and women.**

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**Far too often, the Black philosopher is charged with making sense of the irrationality of white America’s erroneous perceptions of Black, Brown, and Indigenous people. The histories of terror, death, rape, and murder are** often **said to be remnants of the past. To speak of anti-Black racism as an ever-threatening doom**—a looming threat of death and dying—**after** the presidency of Barack **Obama seems heresy to many white Americans**. Despite the horrors that now confront the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump, it is often very difficult for Black speakers to convince white audiences of the divergent worlds codified by anti-Blackness. Black philosophers, especially Black men, often try to persuade academic audiences, who fear being in the same room as them, of their humanity through the academic endeavor. Because this Black person is a professor, there is, standing in front of the white audience, evidence that Black people are not all criminals, and that Black males specifically are not all violent or dangerous. In performing what a human being is thought to be by whites, the Black philosopher imitates that human for whites in hopes of being interpreted as human and consequently heard. To be a Black philosopher is to assert that the perilous nature of being Black is outside of the human. Whereas white philosophers often share a similar language with other whites, namely, that all people are human beings and rational individuals, Black philosophers who study race often speak in terms of their negations: non-being. Harris (2018) refers to this as “necro-being.” Curry (2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b) speaks of the Man-Not. Wilderson (2009) writes of the slave.

**To be Black is to render the very grammar of the academy delusional. To speak of impending death and sub-personhood** and explain the experiences of violence and dehumanization that accompany this position to white individuals who only think of their existence in terms of always being human and persons is ineffable. **Perhaps** the theorist Calvin **Warren best captures this problem in his book Ontological Terror**: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation. Warren (2018: 2) argues:

**The human being provides an anchor for the declaration, and since the being of the human is invaluable, then Black life must also matter, if the Black is a human** (the declaration anchors mattering in the human’s Being). **But we reach a point of terror with this syllogistic reasoning. One must take a step backward and ask the fundamental question: is the Black, in fact, a human being?** Or **can Black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human? If it cannot, then on what bases can we assert the mattering of Black existence?**

The consequence of attending to the problem of Blackness and the realities of death is that **the theories that emerge to account for what is taken to be the accidental positionality of whites who are thought to be human**, individuals, citizens, and persons **must make sense of a reality where to be Black is to be nonhuman, savage, alien, and reified and consequently subject to violence and wished dead. As** the late Critical Race Theorist, **Derrick Bell** (1997: 23) **once said**:

**We have never understood that the essence of the racism we contended against was not simply that we were exploited in slavery**, degraded by **segregation, and** frustrated by **the unmet promises of equal opportunity. The essence of racism in America was the hope that we who were Black would not exist**.

Instead of racism being defined as a set of attitudes or beliefs about racial groups held by biased individuals, the authors prefer to understand racism as

a complex nexus, a cognitive architecture used to invent, reimagine, and evolve the presumed political, social, economic, sexual, and psychological superiority of the white races in society, while materializing the imagined inferiority and hastening the death of inferior races. Said differently, racism is the manifestation of the social processes and concurrent logics that facilitate the death and dying of racially subjugated peoples. (Curry 2017a: 4)

**Racism is a social process that demands the extinguishing of Black life. Racism craves death**. It is constructed, then legitimized through cultural and individual complacency. **When a young Black boy is killed, the instruments of the state, the authority of the police, and the vulnerability of the Black male body converge in the ultimate expression of violence** that results in death. **The public then rationalizes this exercise of state violence** and the individual will of the police officer who killed the Black boy **through empathy**. The white individual who sees the dead Black male body understands the need to kill the Black boy because Blackness socially expresses criminality, danger, and the possible death of a white life. **This fear of Blackness creates empathy for the officer who killed the Black boy**. He is thought of by the white interpreter who is watching the dead Black male body as a corpse. The fear shared between the officer and white onlooker is legitimated by the state because the state offers its society security from this Black male threat. **This is how populations feared by the society are simultaneously constructed and destroyed**.

This brief example describes the depth of the problem involved with racism. **Black philosophers are not simply objecting to the thoughts individuals hold about different groups of people, but how the thoughts that white individuals hold can be supported and expressed in violence against Black men and women in the world**. Because a white supremacist world supports the fears of the white racist, **the** individual **racist’s anti-Blackness is aspirational. It is expressed as a will for there to be no Black bodies** there. **As such, the human becomes an untenable account of Black life, given this disposability**. The world is simply not organized in such a way that allows Blackness to not be seen, perceived, and dehumanized in relation to whites. **No amount of evidence** or argument **seems to be able to displace the faith philosophers have in education, dialogue, and mutual understanding** between Blacks and whites as the remedies of racism (Curry 2008). Generations of nonwhite philosophers have spent their careers and research showing the discipline the horrors of racism, xenophobia, and ethno-nationalist thinking, but there has been little to no change in departments or the discipline at large.

For many philosophers, the idea that racism is permanent is unthinkable. Despite the words and works of Black political theorists like the lawyer Robert F. Williams or Dr. Huey P. Newton, or even more canonically established Black figures like W. E. B. DuBois, Carter G. Woodson, Frantz Fanon, or Derrick Bell, philosophy as a discipline and **philosophers** more generally **refuse to acknowledge that racism remains the core and most determining aspect of America’s social processes**. Enamored by the stories of Blacks suffering, many scholarly conversations about Blackness and racism focus on the harm that Black individuals suffer at the hands of whites or the discipline of philosophy. Relatively few works actually analyze racism structurally or beyond identity at all. **Philosophical analyses do not revolve around death or the material consequences of anti-Blackness**. Instead, the fear and anxiety that Black philosophers and graduate students share with whites become more worthwhile topics.

**This turns the aff – America is organized around the subjugation and death of non-white people – discriminatory applications of their policy are inevitable absent a recognition of racialization in the law – their colorblindness is mutually exclusive with the necessary upheaval of the racial dynamics that necessitate inequality.**

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It is now accepted fact that **scientists have been able to demonstrate that race does not exist on a biological level, but instead was constructed by society**. Classifying race as a social construct conveys that there is a “process of endowing a group or concept with a delineation, name or reality” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012: 155). Race has a reality to it, a substance given by the historical and cultural projections of the specific society within which it is birthed. **While philosophers commonly entertain**, at least at the theoretical level, **the idea that race does not have any real consequence, that is a pernicious supposition**. Tessman and On (2001: 5) suggest that “**an analysis of racialization as the process of the social construction of race can lead theorists away from the possibility of race-conscious strategies for struggling against racism**.” **If the issues surrounding race and racism are not addressed, minorities will still fall victim to unfair treatment in education, housing, and the court systems**.

Although the concept of race is socially constructed, the populations most affected by racialization and racial disparities agree that **there are still real consequences to race because of its embeddedness within** practically **all facets of American society. Race consciousness is necessary to diagnose the function** and effects **of racialization in law, policy, and social interactions**. As the sociologist Michael Banton (2001: 164) argues, some elements of the racial idiom are still needed in law because “the concept of a racial group is the price to be paid for a law against indirect discrimination.” Contrary to the idea that race is mere societal rhetoric, Banton argues that the language of race is needed in law to combat prejudice and discrimination against victim groups. This point is made extremely clear by the data presented by Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow: Colorblindness in the Age of Mass Incarceration. She argues that **racism is a driving force behind social organization—an architecture around which social hierarchy and disparity accumulate. Racism explains why the penal system is filled with Black men who are incarcerated and how labeling them as felons**, primarily due to the criminalization of drugs, **causes them to lose their basic civil rights**. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, passed by Congress as part of the War on Drugs, called for strict lease enforcement and eviction of public housing tenants who engage in criminal activity (Alexander 2010: 142). In the spirit of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Clinton Administration sought to strengthen the law in 1996, adding **the “One Strike and You’re Out”** legislation whose goal is to prevent people with criminal records from being able to live in public housing. This **measure to “crack down” on crime has had a debilitating effect on the family lives of people of color living in public housing units**.

**America is organized around the subjugation, death, and political suppression of racialized people’s voice**. Even under the ethno-nationalist regime of Donald Trump, there is a reactionary consensus that has reemerged, namely, that a truly white supremacist society is colorblind. This follows a similar logic as the dissent of Justice John Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896):

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.

**Notice** how **the assumption** behind Harlan’s words asserts **that the law guarantees equality, while the disparities in society are due to the racial superiority of the white race. In this sense, race is irrelevant in law, but undergirds the dynamics that produce inequality in the society**. Harlan believed that white supremacy was natural. He suggested, like many white liberals and conservatives today, that race should not matter in policy and the law, and that the social consequences that befall racial groups are the result of their superior or inferior racial traits.

Not even a decade ago, white America celebrated being post-racial. The election of President Barack Obama seemed to be a great leap forward and evidence that the United States, as a majority white country, had indeed moved to a place where race did not indicate the capacity of an individual. However, racial progress is interpreted differently by the oppressed populations. **Racism has always existed in American society and continues to be a major problem for** many **people of color** who live in the United States. **The** recent **election of** President Donald **Trump showed that there are always going to be consequences for disrupting** the grand narrative of **white supremacy**. Perhaps the best way to understand this backlash that resulted in the election of Trump is through a measure of covert or overt racism. **While many philosophers maintain that it is desirable to live in a colorblind society where race does not matter, social science research has vehemently rejected this notion**. Joe Feagin’s theory of systemic racism is beneficial for race analysis because it places white agents at the front of racial oppression. **Feagin** (2012: 937) **refers to systemic racism as “the foundational, large-scale and inescapable hierarchical system of US racial oppression devised and maintained by whites and directed at people of color.”** Racism is seen from a structural view and negatively impacts people of color because whites dominate the structures that dictate the order and organization of society. Systemic racism, as described by Feagin (2006), consists of six parts: the patterns of impoverishment and unjust enrichment and their transmission over time; the resulting vested group interests and the alienating racist relations; the cost and burdens of racism; the important role of white elites; the rationalization of racial oppression in a white-racist framing; and continuing resistance to racism. Feagin challenges Harlan’s explanation for white supremacy: instead of **whites** being inherently superior, they **rely on institutional racism to produce social structures that reward and elevate whites**.

**Instead you should affirm Black philosophy as a site to engage in radical theorizations that are a genuine reflection of Black experience – attempts at integration commodifies Black philosophers as extensions of white thinkers which waters down Black philosophy to a form for white philosophers to deem respectable scholarship – a fundamental reorientation of the discipline away from universal reason is key.**

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The debate about what constitutes or is real philosophy continues to dominate the discussions concerning race and racism. Drawing from the inclusion/exclusion or integrationist/segregationist paradigms, the problem of race and racism in philosophy is routinely understood as what is allowed to stand within or excluded from the discipline. The integrationist or post-civil-rights understanding of racism in philosophy routinely misses that **racism involves a complex and denaturing dynamic regarding the thought and perceptions of oppressed groups**. This is a paradigmatic and methodological problem introduced by Curry (2011a, 2011b) as signs of Black philosophy’s “derelictical” crisis. As Curry (2011a: 144) explains:

At its most basic level, philosophy is an activity of inquiry into the world which is supposed to guarantee its practitioners some level of assuredness in the ways we interpret the realities before us. If we take African American philosophy to be philosophical activity, then we should expect, by necessity of being philosophy, that Africana philosophy should result in the same methodological rigor—some assuredness in the ways that Africana people have used to interpret their realities. Unfortunately, the present day crisis of African American philosophy makes this simple formulation an impossibility. By making the methodological rigor of Africana philosophy dependent on its popular acceptance; its closeness to the political dogmas of our racial era, we condemn our area of study to under-specialization whereby our works of philosophical genius, past and present, will be judged solely by the degree to which they extend the universalizing character of Europe and her theories. **To the extent that African American philosophy chooses to abandon the genealogical patterns of Black thought for philosophically privileged associations with white thinkers, it remains derelictical—continuing to neglect its only actual duty**—the duty **to inquiry into the reality of African-descended people as they have revealed it**.

We begin with the premise that **racism permeates the discipline of philosophy**. We are attempting to bring attention to the ways in which **authentic Black philosophy has been revised and denatured into a form that whites in the discipline accept as philosophical**. Whereas all disciplines have norms or rules of scholarly rigor, **philosophy demands that Black thinking and thought tend towards specific political ends in order to be considered philosophy**. Whether or not the thought and texts of Black philosophers are correctly interpreted, understood, or even read ultimately becomes irrelevant to the larger political orientation of the discipline.

**Black philosophers are read as extensions of white thought. A Black philosophical figure is relevant only to the extent that he or she can be understood as the unrealized intentionality of canonical white figures. Black historical figures are made philosophical by the extent to which their voice can be imagined as what Dewey, Hegel, Addams, or Foucault would have said if they thought more seriously about race** and racism. Consequently, writes Curry (2011b: 141):

**Black thinkers function as the racial hypothetical of European thought whereby Black thought is read as the concretization of European reflections turned to the problem of race, and Black thinkers are seen as racial embodiments of white thinkers’ philosophical spirits**. In this vein, the most studied Black philosophers are read as the embodiment of their white associates; **W. E. B. Du Bois is read as the Black Hegel, the Black James, the Black Dewey, and Frantz Fanon as a Black Sartre**, or Black Husserl. **This demonization of Black thinkers by the various manifestations of the European logos as necessary to the production of AfricanAmerican philosophy is a serious impediment to the development of a genuine genealogy** of the ideas **that actually define Africana philosophy’s Diasporic identity**.

**The insistence that Black philosophy parallel white philosophical traditions, such as pragmatism, feminism, and Rawlsianism, and arrive at integrationism as the concluding political goal suggests that the study of Black philosophy is little more than a disciplinary ruse. Critical Race Theory is consistently revised away from materialist interpretations** of racism and racist institutions **towards a focus on the history and racism of particular white European thinkers** (Curry 2017b). This derelictical demand is so powerful that **Black philosophers are rarely asked to verify, empirically or historically, their theories about racism. Instead, they are evaluated on the basis of the extent to which white philosophers can or do agree with their position**. Said differently, the racism of philosophy is so overwhelming and severe that **the question of whether or not a claim or statement about racism or Black people is true or false is arbitrated by whether or not there is a white consensus supporting or rejecting the claim**. Often, manifestly false statements about Black people are made by white and Black philosophers that are taken to be fact because white philosophers and the discipline at large agree to act and think as if the statement is true. These debates often concern easily verifiable facts of underrepresentation, the use of discourse and education to solve racism, and gender dynamics both intra- and inter-racially.

The problem of dereliction emphasizes the point that **philosophy is constructed with a white audience and public in mind. The admission of Black, Brown, and Indigenous students** into graduate programs across the country **is not meant to fundamentally change or reorient the discipline**. As a matter of professional survival, **racialized minority students are being professionalized to accept that their work must focus on global problems and sustain the supposed universalism of reason, ethics, and dialogue**, even while they rhetorically claim they reject such an orientation. Ensuring that young Black philosophers fear being labeled as too radical, or having their work designated as controversial or unsafe, is reason enough to self-censor and revise the original thinking of Black scholars. As such, **Black philosophy becomes a discipline accepted as philosophy by the extent to which it mirrors, or Blackfaces, the insights of white thinkers and theories**. Philosophy departments have ensured that conversations go unattended that concern the permanence of racism and the histories of trauma and bidirectional violence amongst Blacks (Hernandez et al. 1993; Cascardi and Avery-Leaf 2015; Curry and Utley 2018c). They have also ignored the imperialism and colonial heritage of feminism and the paternal benevolence that white women receive from patriarchal power and sexism, despite decades of research that documents the truth of such positions in the social sciences and history (Newman 1999, 2007; Glick and Fiske 2001).

Black philosophy is forced to interpret the world in the most elementary terms of white theory. Ellen Pence, one of the founders of the Duluth model, admitted that she simply made up the idea that patriarchy and sexist attitudes are causally linked to intimate partner violence, but Black philosophy commits itself to propagating this theory despite countless studies showing this is not true in white culture, and has never been the case amongst Blacks (Pence 1999; Mills 2009; Caetano et al. 2005). The intellectual repression of Black philosophers is so severe that popularly held opinions and majority (white) consensus can dictate the interpretations of race, class, and gender amongst Blacks. Many of the theories proposed by Black philosophers concerning racism, intimate partner violence, classism and privilege, underrepresentation, and sexism are routinely found to be out of line with, if not outright rejected by, the scientific accounts of the very same social problems. **The social sciences**, history, and epidemiology **have shown that the causes of social problems in white communities often have very different causes when analyzed in Black or Brown communities. In philosophy, however, there are no distinctions in causation. All social ills stem from** ignorance, patriarchy, or **some incredibly general theory that often lacks cultural specificity or racial nuance**. To appear legitimate, these categories simply mimic the already established thinking of whites and in doing so gain the appearance of truth. No matter the empirical findings or authoritative literatures by experts in other disciplines, all conversations about racism and Black folk that run contrary to the endorsed whites are effectively banned by social stigma and punished through professional ostracism.

**Black philosophy has a responsibility to engage the Black experience as a genuine site of existential reflection and epistemological tool making. The idea that Black experience and reality must be accounted for by white theories of causality or aim towards the same ends of white philosophy is delusional. Black philosophy must engage in radical theorizations that can be traced back to the problems tackled in the texts and debates of Black thinkers**. The **social prognoses suggested** by Black philosophers **should also have some accountability to the realities that Black people are facing in the U**nited **S**tates, **if not the world**. There is no time for idle thought that simply attempts to imitate white theories of causality and canonical traditions in order to be accepted. How can we demonstrate the importance of Black philosophy, if not for what we observe and verify in the lives of Black people in the world? **Its ability to express the full complexity of Black life and death in theory at the most abstract levels of thought is what is at stake in the Black philosophical project**.

## Underview

### AT: 1AR Theory

#### They get 1AR theory but it’s not DTD- incentivizes reading 10 friv shells since they can win on any of them- AND, 1AR time advantage on 1AR theory since they get 2 speeches and 7 min, abuse is self-imposed b/c they could always better develop the shell in the 1ar; proportional- reading theory cancels out the abuse; and no reason short speech means drop the debater- just get more efficient or don’t read theory.

### AT: P/P Flows AFF

Permissibility and presumption negate –

1. Probability – there is 1 truth and an infinite amount of falsehoods which means if we presume neg we’re more often right. That outweighs on truth – means we are closer to finding truth in debate which outweighs because it shapes everything we get out of the activity and why people fund it.
2. Actor-spec – policies require time and energy to do which means governments don’t do things unless there is an active reason to do so – that outweighs because different actors have different behaviors and obligations.
3. Their counter interp proves our argument – the affirmative has to prove an obligation – they didn’t if it is permissibile but not obligatory to do a FJG. That’s their counter interp on log con which outweighs since even that’s literally what they said in their speech.

### NC – AFC Bad [Short]

#### AFC is a V/I.

#### 1. Skews the neg- they pick the framework that shields the aff from relevant negative argumentation which arbitrarily eliminates neg ground and tips the balance in favor of the aff- that arbitrarily insulates the aff from relevant criticism- prevents them from being adequately tested against a well-prepared opponent.

#### 2. Logic- there’s no basis for abdicating defense of the framework and undermines basic argumentation- logic is a constraint on all arguments since illogical arguments undermine the basis of debate in the first place.

### NC – AFC Bad [Long]

#### Interpretation: affirmative debaters may not read affirmative framework choice- to clarify, affs may not say that the neg is not allowed to contest the aff framework

#### Violation:

#### 1. Neg ground – they pick the framework that shields the aff from relevant negative argumentation which arbitrarily shreds the quantity of quality of neg ground and stacks the deck too far in favor of the affirmative – this arbitrarily insulates the aff from relevant criticism and prevents them from being adequately tested against a well-prepared opponent – that kills topic education since they always pick the framework that best favors their offense which kills quality neg engagement and kills fairness

#### 2. Clash – AFC destroys philosophical clash since they presume an ethical theory is true which prevents framework clash – this kills education since we learn about how frameworks interact in debates and kills fairness since the NC/AC strategy is always core negative ground

#### 3. Predictability – AFC makes negating impossible if debaters don’t have specific cases adaptable to each possible framework. AFC encourages affs to run obscure framework arguments that they know their opponents are not prepared for. AFC destroys fairness because with certain unpredictable frameworks you simply can’t have cases prepared to adapt to them. Predictability is also key to education because it ensures we are prepared to debate on issues substantively.

#### 4. Logic – abdicating defense of the framework is illogical and arbitrary – there’s no basis for just refusing to debate the framework and undermines basic argumentation – logic is a constraint on all arguments since illogical arguments undermines the basis of debate in the first place

### NC – AFC Bad – Racism Standard

#### Racism – AFC encourages lazy and academically shoddy debate – justifies the aff defending a standard of “promoting racism” and saying its insulated from criticism – that’s a terrible interpretation for debate and they should be held accountable for that

## Case

### NC – Grievability

#### Black people are rendered ungrievable in current society – means the K at least operates on the same layer.

#### Specifically, Butler’s concept of agency is fundamentally negative, which depoliticizes people and overdetermines resistance to oppression.

Magnus 06 - Kathy Dow Magnus Hypatia Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 2006 Ph.D. “The Unaccountable Subject: Judith Butler and the Social Conditions of Intersubjective Agency”

This reconceptualization of agency is, however, quite negative. Butler makes the negativity inherent to her notion of agency explicit in Feminist Contentions when she describes her concept of agency in terms of "a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted" (1995, 46), but in The Psychic Life of Power and Excitable Speech this negativity becomes even more salient. In these 1997 accounts, Butler conceives of the subject as essentially subjected. Agency consists in acts of performative resistance such that the subject can do nothing but resist. This negative notion of agency nonetheless harbors a politically liberating potential within it, and despite appearances, it requires a certain degree of creativity. However, it fails to express the full range of possibilities for subjective agency. Butler underestimates the power of subjects to work together to determine their lives and the social conditions that structure their existence. Consequently, her notion of agency runs the risk of discouraging more radical exertions of agency and thus of diminishing the very subjects who must struggle the most to assert themselves. The negativity of Butler's 1997 accounts of agency does not simply arise from her assumed notion of performative resistance, however. Three specific conceptual problems in The Psychic Life of Power contribute to her portrayal of subjectivity as heavily burdened with negativity. First, Butler conflates moral and political subjection, on the one hand, and the constructive and destructive dimensions of social subordination, on the other. Second, Butler elaborates her understanding of performative subjectivity in such a way as to obscure questions of guilt and responsibility. Third, she associates dependence with subordination and thus underestimates the productive, liberating dimensions of intersubjectivity. Although these problems are less pronounced in Excitable Speech, they are, for the most part, apparent there as well. In Excitable Speech, Butler actually avoids conflating the destructive and productive dimensions of social subordination, but she still portrays the subject's power in very negative terms. She also obscures questions of guilt and responsibility, and associates dependence with subordination, though in a less explicit manner than she does in The Psychic Life. All of these theoretical shortcomings work to highlight the negativity already implicit in Butler's notion of performative resistance. [End Page 83] One of Butler's aims in The Psychic Life of Power is to establish a connection between the development of consciousness and the self-beratement that occurs with the assumption of conscience. Accordingly, she draws attention to the fact that a subject's subordination to her own conscience may be a form of politically induced subjection. However, Butler overextends this connection when she argues that conscience is necessarily formed through such political or social oppression. For Butler, social and psychic realities are connected in such a way that the social structure of discourse determines the character of interior psychic space. Indeed, she contends that the very distinction between the public and the private is created through the internalization of social norms—that is, through subjection to preestablished forms of discourse (1997b, 19). This assumption inclines her to interpret subjectivity in terms of social subjection, and more specifically, it leads her to conflate the subordinating power of moral law with political subjugation. As a result, she fails to distinguish between (a) a sense of moral obligation that may condition the possibility of a subject's coming into existence and of human beings living together productively and (b) unjustified forms of social/political domination that destroy human subjectivity and community. Butler is quite right to note that the interior psychic space which serves to constitute subjectivity is produced in the context of social and political circumstances, but she takes it for granted that these circumstances are always and necessarily oppressive. While it is true that political powers sometimes impose fabricated "moral" principles on their subjects in order to pursue their own corrupt interests, not all moral laws result from such corruption. Nor do moral laws need to be construed as primarily restrictive. In Excitable Speech, Butler acknowledges the need "to distinguish between kinds of injury that are socially contingent and avoidable, and kinds of subordination that are, as it were, the constitutive condition of the subject" (1997a, 26). She does not explicitly distinguish between moral and political forms of subordination, but she does admit the need to distinguish between productive and destructive forms of subjection (1997a, 26). However, Butler still understands these "productive" forms of subjection in terms of oppression and thus as primarily negative. Although she insists that the idea "that agency is derived from limitations in language . . . is not fully negative in its implications" (1997a, 41), she repeatedly articulates the subject's power to act and to speak in negative terms. Always already subjected to the discourse that conditions her being, the subject may perform linguistic acts that contest her social position, but she cannot define this position for herself. The subject can protest her situation and "talk back" to socially constructed authorities (1997a, 15), but she cannot escape her situation of fundamental subjection. Butler's agent can capitalize upon the space between word and effect and so "use language to counter the offensive call" (1997a, 2), but she remains in the grips of a discourse that dictates the very form of this "countering." Indeed, for Butler, the subject or agent is formed within [End Page 84] the parameters of a discourse that conditions her existence and commands her very presence. The subject quite literally is "called" into being by an authority whose interpellation locates her in a subordinate position (1997b, 106–15).

#### Her concept of social agency is overly reliant on language and the Other. This makes oppression too abstract and results in a useless form of politics.

Magnus 06 - Kathy Dow Magnus Hypatia Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 2006 Ph.D. “The Unaccountable Subject: Judith Butler and the Social Conditions of Intersubjective Agency”

Furthermore, Butler's intimate association of the production of subjectivity and the experience of subjection implies that all subjects are subjected or oppressed and that all subjects are guilty of oppression. That is to say, she reduces social oppression to an abstract necessity embedded in the structure of a "discourse" whose speakers are all equally subjected and equally culpable. This has important consequences: the notion that all subjects are subjected makes the question of responsibility superfluous, and it vitiates the distinction between dominating and subordinated cultures and discourses. Butler's theory, in other words, provides no basis upon which to assert that some subjects are guiltier than others. Nor can it offer us any insight into the processes in which guilt is unjustly projected upon socially and economically underprivileged subjects as a means of keeping them oppressed. Butler's suggestion that all subjects share in the same guilt leads to a further difficulty: it seems to imply that those who are not recognized as subjects—the "abjected"—escape this kind of self-negativity altogether, when, in fact, the experience of self-alienation that defines the abject has much in common with the self-negating tendencies of socially imposed guilt. Butler also conveys a vision of subjectivity as heavily burdened with negativity by tacitly identifying dependence with subordination. Assuming a rather traditional form of psychoanalysis, she maintains that children must deny their dependence upon adult caretakers in order to become mature subjects (1997b, [End Page 85] 170). In this way, she precludes the thought of interdependent relationships and, against her own intention, propagates an abstract theory of the subject. On such a theory, to become an agent is to become separated; the one who acts is the one who is detached from others. This tendency to understand dependency as oppressive prevents Butler from conceiving of subjects who are empowered through intersubjective connections. Instead, as Allison Weir (1996, 119) argued with respect to earlier texts, Butler implies that "our capacity to speak and to interact with each other [is] a form of violation." Moreover, despite her references to psychoanalytic theory, Butler remains preoccupied with the ways in which social power and discourse constitute the subject and so works primarily with a conception of the subject as derivative from these abstract external powers, rather than as developing in the midst of concrete relations. This difficulty is less apparent in Excitable Speech, where Butler leaves no doubt that dependency is necessary to agency. But in this text, "dependency" and "the Other" upon which the subject depends are still understood negatively. Dependency connotes neither connection nor mutuality, but rather a fundamental vulnerability. Similarly, "the Other" refers to the potentially injurious "call" of "language"; it is neither mother, father, sister, nor friend who is "Other," but the preestablished terms of an oppressive discourse (1997a, 26). Butler's reliance on Louis Althusser also contributes to her negative evaluation of dependency. Specifically, it inclines her to interpret the call that brings the subject into being as fundamentally accusatory (1997b, 106–8). However, this call need not be understood as an imputation or a summons of the law. The call that brings a subject into being is not necessarily oppressive or subordinating. Alternatively, a subject might come into being through a loving interpellation, such as the parental bestowal of a name. This kind of interpellation recalls the child's dependency, but it does not reduce this dependency to a form of subjugation or subjection, and so eludes the paradigm of Butler's subjected subject. All three of the above mentioned points—Butler's conflation of the moral and the social, the implication that all subjects are both oppressed and guilty in equal measure, and the association of dependence with subordination—enhance the negativity implicit in Butler's notion of subjective agency. In both The Psychic Life of Power and Excitable Speech, Butler frames the question of agency in terms of how the subject might counter the discourse that constitutes her. The subject, in other words, is posed against the conditions of her own being. Bodies That Matter already made this clear: Butler's subject is not one who chooses, but one who repeatedly opposes her own constituting law (1993, 15). In Feminist Contentions, Butler went so far as to say that the subject cannot even assert her own theoretical position, for "the 'I' who would select between them is always already constituted by them" (1995, 42). Later, Butler qualifies her position when she says, "The power of the speaking subject will always, to some degree, be derivative" (1997a, 33), but she still does not articulate [End Page 86] any way in which the speaking subject may be the source of her own action, take initiative, or act on her own accord. Drawing on her earlier claim that every act is by definition a repetition (1993, 244n), Butler emphasizes that the subject's capacity to resignify the terms given to her means that she always has a foundation outside herself. The subject has to begin with the terms given to her, and she can only make her mark through changes or resignifications, which necessarily move against the status quo that previously defined the given terms. (In this sense, resignifications are necessarily oppositional: they always oppose or stand in opposition to particular preexisting significations.) Thus, as both Catherine Mills (2000) and Lois McNay (1999) have also noted, Butler proposes a fundamentally negative notion of agency. She defines the subject's power in terms of her ability to repeat, recite, or recontextualize her inaugurating call and thereby reduces agency to resistance and action to reaction.

#### The notion of recognition reinscribes colonial thought – coloniality has structured the world in a way that makes the marginalized beg for recognition and understanding from colonizers but it’s like a hamster on a wheel. Butler’s pursuit reifies Coulthard 09

Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, Glen Sean Coulthard and Foreword by Taiaiake Alfred, 2009.

To elucidate precisely how colonial rule made the transition from a more-or-less unconcealed structure of domination to a mode of colonial governmentality that works through the limited freedoms afforded by state recognition and accommodation, I will be drawing significantly (but not exclusively) on the work of anticolonial theorist, psychiatrist, and revolutionary Frantz Fanon.60 At first blush, turning to Fanon to develop an understanding of the regulating mechanisms undergirding settler-colonial rule in contexts where state violence no longer constitutes the norm governing the process might seem a bit odd to those familiar with his work. After all, Fanon is arguably best known for the articulation of colonialism he develops in The Wretched of the Earth, where colonial rule is posited, much like Marx posited it before him, as a structure of dominance maintained through unrelenting and punishing forms of violence. “In colonial regions,” writes Fanon, the state “uses a language of pure violence. [It] does not alleviate oppression or mask domination.” Instead, “the proximity and frequent, direct intervention by the police and military ensure the colonized are kept under close scrutiny, and contained by rifle butts and napalm” (emphasis added).61 And considering Fanon wrote The Wretched of the Earth during one of the twentieth century’s most gruesome anticolonial struggles—the Algerian war of independence (1954–62)—it is not surprising that he placed so much emphasis on colonialism’s openly coercive and violent features. Given the severe nature of the colonial situation within which The Wretched of the Earth was produced one could argue that the diagnosis and prescriptions outlined in the text were tragically appropriate to the context they set out to address. But this simply is not the case in contemporary Canada, and for this reason I begin my investigation with a sustained engagement with Fanon’s earlier work, Black Skin, White Masks. As we shall see in the following chapter, it is there that Fanon offers a groundbreaking critical analysis of the affirmative relationship drawn between recognition and freedom in the master/slave dialectic of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—a critique I claim is equally applicable to contemporary liberal recognition-based approaches to Indigenous selfdetermination in Canada.62 Fanon’s analysis suggests that in contexts where colonial rule is not reproduced through force alone, the maintenance of settlerstate hegemony requires the production of what he liked to call “colonized subjects”: namely, the production of the specific modes of colonial thought, desire, and behavior that implicitly or explicitly commit the colonized to the types of practices and subject positions that are required for their continued domination. However, unlike the liberalized appropriation of Hegel that continues to inform many contemporary proponents of identity politics, in Fanon recognition is not posited as a source of freedom and dignity for the colonized, but rather as the field of power through which colonial relations are produced and maintained. This “is the form of recognition,” Fanon suggests, “that Hegel never described.”63 Subsequently, this is also the form of recognition that I set out to interrogate in Red Skin, White Masks.

### NC – Contention

#### R&D necessary to get drugs out in the first place – solves case

#### Pharmaceutical innovation is accelerating now – new medicines are substantially better than existing treatments.

Wills, MBA, and Lipkus, PhD, 20 – Todd J. Wills [Managing Director @ Chemical Abstracts Service, MBA from THE Ohio State University] and Alan H. Lipkus [Senior Data Analyst @ Chemical Abstracts Service, PhD Physical Chemistry from the University of Rochester], “Structural Approach to Assessing the Innovativeness of New Drugs Finds Accelerating Rate of Innovation,” ACS Medicinal Chemistry Letters, Vol. 11, 2020, <https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acsmedchemlett.0c00319> C.VC

Despite recent concerns over an innovation crisis, this analysis shows pharmaceutical innovation has actually increased over the last several decades based on the structural novelty of approved NMEs. The higher proportion of Pioneers over the most recent decade is a sign that innovation within the industry is accelerating rather than slowing. It is also an encouraging sign for the state of innovation in drug discovery that these Pioneers are significantly more likely to be the source of promising new therapies that are expected to provide substantial clinical advantages over existing treatments. Drug hunters are discovering Pioneers in newer and less explored regions of chemical space as they are increasingly found on scaffolds first reported in the CAS REGISTRY five or less years prior to their IND year or on scaffolds populated with 50 or less other compounds at the time of IND.

As scale becomes less of a strategic advantage, Big Pharma’s share of Pioneers has decreased even though the number of Big Pharma originated Pioneers has increased. This has created a structural innovation gap between Big Pharma and the Rest of Ecosystem which has widened over the last two decades as the Rest of Ecosystem is now responsible for originating almost 3 out of every 4 Pioneers. Pioneers originated by the Rest of Ecosystem are increasingly on new scaffolds, while a majority of Big Pharma originated Pioneers have historically been on new scaffolds.

The work presented here was intended as a study of drug innovation at a macro level. As a result, it included substances of various sizes with different degrees of complexity belonging to a range of functional and drug classes. Even though it was outside the scope of the present work to study specific subsets, such focused studies could yield additional insights into how innovation at a more micro level has changed over time. Other interesting subsets of our data set are the shapes and scaffolds of the Settlers and Colonists. Many of these shapes and scaffolds are privileged in the sense that they are seemingly capable of serving as ligands for a diverse array of target proteins. A separate study of the Settlers and Colonists as well as their side chains could provide insights into possible target-specific innovation trends.

As it often takes more than 10 years after initial discovery for an experimental drug to gain FDA approval, any measure of drug innovation that relies on the time of approval incorporates a significant time lag between initial discovery and ultimate approval. However, characterizing drug innovation based on structural novelty provides a means to assess the forward-looking innovation potential of an experimental drug at the time of initial discovery by comparing its framework information (at the scaffold and shape level) with prior FDA-approved drugs. Therefore, a separate study of drug candidates with publically disclosed structures currently in clinical development could provide additional insights into innovation trends at an FDA regulatory review level and serve as a leading indicator of innovation trends at an FDA approval level.

Given the tremendous opportunity represented by the vast amount of chemical space yet to be explored, drug-hunters of all types will continue pushing the boundaries to find promising new therapies in previously unexplored areas of chemical space. The race to discover these new drugs will be fueled by further advancements in screening approaches and in-silico methods (including innovations related to machine learning algorithms and molecular representations). However, comprehensive data on known shapes and scaffolds can fast track the identification of meaningful open areas of chemical space (shapes or scaffolds that are potentially important but have never been used as the basis for a molecule) to further explore.

#### The biopharmaceutical industry is uniquely reliant on IP protections – undermining them would kill innovation by making an already expensive process completely unfeasible.

Kristina M. Lybecker, PhD, 17 [PhD Economics, Associate Professor of Economics @ Colorado College], “Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: How Canada Measures Up,” Fraser Institute, January 2017, <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/intellectual-property-rights-protection-and-the%20biopharmaceutical-industry.pdf> C.VC

The unique structure of the innovative biopharmaceutical industry necessitates a variety of intellectual property protection mechanisms. In particular, the industry is characterized by a research and development (R&D) process that is lengthy, expensive, uncertain, and risky. According to DiMasi and colleagues, the estimated cost of developing a new medicine is US$2.6 billion (DiMasi, Grabowski, and Hansen, 2016).2 In addition, the time required to develop a new drug is also significant, averaging 10 to 15 years without any guarantee of success (PhRMA, n.d.). While these figures are highly controversial, biopharmaceutical innovation is unquestionably an expensive and lengthy undertaking.3 For the biopharmaceutical industry, innovation and its protection are essential and the source of both profits and growth. As such, patent protection is disproportionally more important for ensuring that the innovator appropriates the returns to R&D for the biopharmaceutical industry than virtually any other. Extending the findings of the 1987 “Yale Survey” (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter, 1987), the “Carnegie Mellon Survey” established that while patents are again considered “unambiguously the least effective appropriability mechanisms,” the drug industry and other scholars regard them as strictly more effective than alternative mechanisms (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 1996). The industry’s disproportionate reliance on patents and other forms of intellectual property protection is confirmed in numerous other studies.4

In essence, IPR protections provide innovative biopharmaceutical firms with an assurance of some return on their investment, thus creating incentives for the development of new technologies that could otherwise be easily replicated and sold by competitors. Due to the tremendous fixed costs required to develop new treatments and cures, a significant potential exists for free riding by follower firms, a market failure that would prevent investment in innovation were it not for the patents and other forms of intellectual property protections that provide a limited period of market exclusivity or other such incentives. Fundamentally, patents amount to an efficiency tradeoff. Society provides innovators with a limited period of market exclusivity to encourage innovation in exchange for public access to this knowledge. In exchange for the temporary static loss from market exclusivity, society gains complete knowledge of the innovation through disclosure, a permanent dynamic gain. Through this tradeoff, the existing patent system corrects the market failure that would stymie innovation. In its Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. finding, Justice Binnie wrote for the Supreme Court of Canada, “A patent, as has been said many times, is not intended as an accolade or civic award for ingenuity. It is a method by which inventive solutions to practical problems are coaxed into the public domain by the promise of a limited monopoly for a limited time. Disclosure is the quid pro quo for valuable proprietary rights to exclusivity which are entirely the statutory creature of the Patent Act” (para. 37).

The biopharmaceutical industry is characterized by a number of legal and economic issues that distinguish it from other research-intensive industries. Danzon (1999) describes three features that are particularly noteworthy. First, given that the biopharmaceutical industry is characterized by an unusually high rate of R&D, intellectual property protection provides for the potential for significant market power and monopoly pricing that raises numerous public health policy questions surrounding prices and profits. Second, virtually every aspect of the industry is heavily regulated, from safety and efficacy to promotion and advertising, to pricing and reimbursement. Danzon describes the impact of these regulations as “profound and multidimensional even within a single country, affecting consumption patterns, productivity, R&D and hence the supply of future technologies” (Danzon, 1999: 1056). Lastly, while research and development costs are borne solely by the innovator, the resulting product is a global public good. “Each country faces an incentive to adopt the regulatory policies that best control its pharmaceutical budget in the short run, free-riding on others to pay for the joint costs of R&D and ignoring cross-national spillovers of national regulatory policies through parallel trade and international price comparisons” (Danzon, 1999: 1056). The combination of these characteristics defines a set of unique economic and legal challenges for the innovation of new drugs and the public health policies that surround their production, marketing, and distribution.

Innovative companies make far greater investments in time, resources, and financial support than do generic firms. Notably, innovation-based companies spend more than 200 times that which generic companies spend on the development of a particular drug (CIPC, 2011: 10). In addition, the investment of time, from laboratory to market, is also close to double for innovative companies relative to generic producers. Table 1 highlights the differences in the drug development processes of innovative and generic companies. For innovative biopharmaceutical companies, the development process is expensive, risky, and time consuming, all of which points to the need for strong IP protection to encourage investment and ensure companies are able to recover their investments.

The risk involved in biopharmaceutical development is starkly illustrated in a recent report by Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), which reports that less than one of every 10 drugs that enter clinical trials is ultimately approved by the Food and Drug Administration in the United States. The report finds a success rate of merely 9.6%, a calculation that is significantly smaller than the widely-cited 11.8% figure from a 2014 study by the Tufts University’s Center for the Study of Drug Development.5 The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (2012) estimates that more than 3,200 compounds were at different stages of development globally in 2011, but only 35 new medicines were launched (Dawson, 2015).

Fundamentally, research-based biopharmaceutical companies incur greater expenses and risk in the development of their products than do generic manufactures. These investments of time and financial resources should be recognized and the effective patent life should be sufficient to recoup these investments. Continued investment and innovation are contingent upon strong, effective intellectual property protection and the ability of innovative firms to recoup their investments. Patents and other forms of intellectual property protection are disproportionally important to the research-based biopharmaceutical industry. Consequently, the legal architecture necessary to foster a robust innovation-based industry is multifaceted and is a powerful force shaping the biopharmaceutical industry, its profitability, productivity, and innovative future.

**Pharmaceutical innovation is key to protecting against future pandemics, bioterrorism, and antibiotic resistance.**

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As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sci-ences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a **bioterrorism con-text**.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by **antimicrobial resistance** is also **well-recognised** as an area **in need of pharmaceutical innovation**. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and compe-tition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an **indispensable** partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceu-tical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is **essential** for socially responsible companies in the sec-tor.2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing indus-try-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing com-pounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID-19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating tri-als for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accel-erate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to **benefit patients** and wider **population health**. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be rela-tively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pres-sure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing com-bination product that is being tested for therapeutic poten-tial against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other **infectious diseases**, **bioterror-ism** agents **and antimicrobial resistance**) are **urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation**, **even if their impacts are not as visible** to society **as COVID**-19 is in the imme-diate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infec-tious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contribu-tions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still **low**.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innova-tion conditions.

#### Bioterrorism and future pandemics cause extinction – rendering their lives as ungrievable

Hamish De Bretton-Gordon, CBRN Expert @ British Army, 20 [Director @ DBG Defense, Consultant on CBRN and Biosecurity], “Biosecurity in the Wake of COVID-19: The Urgent Action Needed,” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel, November/December 2020, Volume 13, Issue 11, <https://ctc.usma.edu/biosecurity-in-the-wake-of-covid-19-the-urgent-action-needed/> C.VC

Policymakers around the world did not grasp just how large the impact of a bio threat could be. Beyond the enormous human and economic impact, the current pandemic has exposed the weakness, lack of preparedness, and poor responsiveness of healthcare systems of even highly developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. And the virus has inflicted carnage, even though SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19) is not especially virulent. The world may be confronted with other viruses in the future whose combination of virulence (the harm a pathogen does to its host), transmissibility, and other characteristics pose much greater danger.

While overwhelming evidence points to SARS-CoV-2 spontaneously spreading to humans, the advances in synthetic biology and the growth in the number of Level 3 and 4 biocontainment facilities around the world storing deadly viruses1 mean there is also the very real possibility that in the future, bad actors will try to engineer or steal/obtain a highly transmissible and highly virulent virus and unleash it onto the world. Another risk is accidental releases from such biocontainment facilities.

COVID-19, a highly transmissible but not very virulent pathogen, has had a devastating global impact, a fact that will not have gone unnoticed by rogue states and terror organizations. Advances in synthetic biology have created tools that could be put to malevolent use. In the last two decades, scientists synthesized the poliovirus from its genetic sequence,2 recreated the 1918 Spanish flu virus,3 and succeeded in modifying the H5N1 avian flu virus so that it resulted (in a research laboratory) in airborne transmission among mammals.4 In the future, we should think of weaponized biology as no less of an existential threat to the planet than weaponized atomic science. It should also be noted that the fear and panic that even a medium-scale bioterror attack could create could have dangerous implications that may rival or even surpass the immediate loss of life.

The Need to Rethink Likelihood

Given the fact that in late 2019 when, as far as is known, COVID-19 cases first started emerging in China, it had been more than a century since the previous catastrophic outbreak (the 1918-1919 “Spanish flu” pandemic),d it was unsurprising that many thought of such pandemics as a one-in-a-100-year event. Such assumptions should no longer hold. The encroachment of human settlements into areas that had previously been sanctuaries for wildlife5 and the popularity in some parts of the world of markets where people and wild animals are brought into proximity have made it more likely viruses will make the species leap to human beings.e And when they do, as the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated, the interconnectedness of a world in which millions of people fly each day6 means they can spread very rapidly.

There is also growing concern about engineered viruses. Not only have advances in synthetic biology (SynBio) created growing capacity for extremely dangerous viruses to be engineered in a laboratory, but the number of people with access to potentially dangerous ‘dual use’ technology has greatly expanded and continues to expand, making malevolent use of such technology ever more likely.

In the August 2020 issue of this publication, scientists at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point warned that:

The wide availability of the protocols, procedures, and techniques necessary to produce and modify living organisms combined with an exponential increase in the availability of genetic data is leading to a revolution in science affecting the threat landscape that can be rivaled only by the development of the atomic bomb. As the technology improves, the level of education and skills necessary to engineer biological agents decreases. Whereas only state actors historically had the resources to develop and employ biological weapons, SynBio is changing the threat paradigm.

The cost threshold of engineering viruses is also lowering, with the West Point scientists warning that synthetic biology has “placed the ability to recreate some of the deadliest infectious diseases known well within the grasp of the state-sponsored terrorist and the talented non-state actor.”7

As already noted, another source of vulnerability is that deadly viruses could be stolen from or escape from a research laboratory. There are now around 50 Biosafety Level 4f facilities around the world, where the deadliest pathogens are stored and worked on, and this figure is set to increase in the next few years.g This is a large increase over the last 30 years, creating bigger risk of a breach. Of equal, if not greater concern are the thousands of Biosafety Level 3 labs globally,8 which handle deadly pathogens like COVID-19.9

Given what has been outlined above, the risk of a future destructive biological attack or another devastating global pandemic should no longer be seen as low. From this point forward, there should no higher priority for the international community than biosecurity.

#### I don’t think anyone is considered unvaluable if they can’t afford healthcare. IPP protections don’t solve that either because it subscribes to the broader capitalist mindset

#### IP tinkering represents a myopic focus on making capitalism nicer, but only legitimates the broader process of informatic commodification as integral to class violence

Soderberg 1 [Johan, BA from Falmouth College of the Arts. “Copyleft vs Copyright: A Marxist Critique” https://firstmonday.org/article/view/938/860]

Though I stress the importance of recognising the social construction of information into a commodity, I believe that the post-industrial advocates are right in that information as a resource has qualitively changed. The shift can be extrapolated from capital's ambition to replace the workforce with machinery and science, primarily to suppress labour militancy. A consequence of the replacement of labour with robots is that the cost of labour in production falls while the expenses for fixed capital, high-tech machinery and cutting edge science, sharply rises. Thus comes a rapid shift of relative costs (exchange value) from labour to fixed capital - i.e. information. Furthermore, the productivity of industries depends now more on the development of fixed capital than the human labour:

"But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose powerful effectiveness is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production" [16].

This marks the emergence of what Marx called the 'general intellect' as a productive source in itself.

More clues are offered in a marginal (non-Marxist) theory within political economy known as Kondratiev waves [17]. Writing in this tradition, Perez and Freeman introduce the idea of 'Techno-Economical Paradigms' [18], building on the classic work of Thomas Kuhn about scientific evolution (Kuhn, 1996). A Techno-Economic Paradigm stretches for 50-60 years and centres on a major technological breakthrough in one sector that affects the economy, industry, and organisational forms of that whole period. Different scholars have suggested coal, iron, railway, steel, electricity, oil, and combustion engines as key technologies of previous Techno-Economic Paradigms. The common denominator of these key technologies is that they are located in the areas of materials, energy and transportation. However, inspecting the latest Techno-Economic Paradigm, a near consensus exists among scholars that its key technologies are manifested in microelectronics and possibly microbiology (Volland, 1987; Grubler and Nowotny, 1990).

The broken continuity can be explained in terms of Marxist value theory. During the industrial period, materials and energy were essential to the creation of exchange value, and the transportation of this value depended on infrastructure. However, when the highest exchange value is extracted from information, (while the exchange value of material goods is becoming peripheral relative to information) those sectors lose in importance.

"At the pinnacle of contemporary production, information and communication are the very commodities produced; the network itself is the site of both production and circulation" [19].

Computer networks become both the factory and distribution channel of exchange value.

The characteristics of the information sector will gradually encompass most of the economy. This tendency was essential in Marx's analysis. "In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity" [20]. Or, to be more specific: "Just as the processes of industrialization transformed agriculture and made it more productive, so too the informational revolution will transform industry by redefining and rejuvenating manufacturing processes" [21].

The increase in costs/exchange value of information (fixed capital) in relation to direct labour is the cause for capitalism to commodify information, not the other way around. But because of the intangible nature of information, contradictions emerges out of attempts to enclose it.

#### Patents are key to adequate regulation and testing of drugs -- AFF leads to rampant counterfeiting and unsafe medication, which threatens public health, kills most vulnerable patients, and causes narcotic/human trafficking to surge. Especially true now due to public desperation over COVID, rise in e-commerce, and expansion of substandard medicine manufacturers targeting critical life-saving drugs – rendering poor people as ungrievable

IPKey 21 (IP Key – Run by EUIPO and the European Commission to provide news coverage and scientific knowledge concerning intellectual property rights, “Intellectual Property and Keeping Medicines Safe”, https://ipkey.eu/en/south-east-asia/news/intellectual-property-and-keeping-medicines-safe, 2 February 2021, EmmieeM)

If you are what you eat, and bad diets lead to bad health, imagine what unsafe medicines can do.

We ask today, why the provenance of vaccines has attracted so much attention when the origin of medicines we take, in some cases, every day and without even thinking, is not questioned at all? How do we know we can trust medicines readily available on the market from seemingly legitimate sources? Where does intellectual property (IP) come into all of this and why is a proper IP application and registration process important?

The global race to develop vaccines to fight the spread of COVID-19 has understandably captured the attention of the public worldwide. People of all generations and with little or no expertise in clinical trials have followed the process keenly, wishing and willing together that science can provide the answer to stopping the pandemic so what was called ‘normal’ life can return. This public interest has also rightly scrutinised the testing that is designed to make sure that these vaccines are safe and this same focus is thankfully putting medicines under the spotlight more broadly.

When we talk about medicines, they are universally understood to mean a drug or other preparation for the treatment or prevention of a disease or illness. In essence, they serve to keep us feeling healthy, or make us feel better. But what about when they achieve the exact opposite, when they are in fact harmful, or even fatal? The cause is usually because of fake and counterfeit medicines. This is because something they both have in common is the lack of rigorous inspections by public authorities that seek to guarantee the safety of medicines for widespread use.

What’s more, the proliferation of both kinds of these illegal medicines is worsened by a critical fact. Previously, they used to mainly be related to ‘lifestyle’ medicines, but now, even innovative or critical life-saving medicines, such as medicines that tackle cardiovascular diseases, are being increasingly created and are entering the market without official IP application and registration processes.

But if they are both illegal and both cause harm, what’s the difference between fake and counterfeit medicines? Fake medicines pass themselves off as real, authorised medicines but they may actually contain ingredients that are of low quality or in the wrong dosage. Since they have not passed through the necessary evaluation of quality, safety and efficacy as required by authorisation procedures, they can be a major health threat. Counterfeit medicines, in contrast, are those medicines that do not comply with intellectual and industrial property rights, such as registered trade marks or patent rights. But it is important to stress, this is not just an IP issue. In the vast majority of cases (90%) they can also be harmful to a patient’s health, according to a study recently released by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on ‘Trade in Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Products’. The World Health Organization (WHO) also shared in the 2017 report, ‘WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring System for Substandard and Falsified Medical Products’, that the estimated number of children who may die from pneumonia each year after consuming counterfeit medicines is between 72 000 and 169 000.

But counterfeit medicines are not just a public health concern. Innovation and creativity are the cornerstones of modern economies and counterfeit medicines siphon off revenue that should justly have been earned by the rightful owners of the medicines that counterfeit medicines seek to imitate. Not just legal pharmaceutical companies are hurt. The public lose out on better and more effective medicines because less revenue can be dedicated to further research and development.

Worryingly, experience shows that these products are finding their way into the legal supply chains more easily than ever, meaning the sale of counterfeit medicines is not limited to illegal trading channels, such as illegal retailers or online sales. Instead, innocent consumers and desperate patients with life-threatening conditions can unwittingly purchase them and be completely ignorant of the potentially harmful side effects.

But the problem does not stop there, either. As highlighted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, organised crime is often behind the production of counterfeit medicines, meaning their profits can be used to fuel other illicit trades of, for example, narcotics or even human trafficking practices that help perpetuate more violent crimes, including kidnappings and extortion.

This process has been aided in part by the boom in e-commerce. Technological advancements and the growing tendency to buy online, especially during the pandemic, have made regulation more difficult and helped increase the prevalence of counterfeit goods. These conditions create the perfect environment for non-regulated sellers and, rather than big shipments, the European Commission’s report on the EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights indicates that courier and postal traffic accounted for 84% of all detentions of counterfeit goods generally in the EU.

But citizens can play a part in combating counterfeit medicines. Basic steps such as checking the origin of products or looking for stamps of authorities help, as does greater awareness of their existence. We must come together to fight them because counterfeit medicines have existed in the market now for a long time, and without sufficient awareness, consumption of these substances can lead to unexpected symptoms, permanent disabilities, and even loss of life.

#### Other things solve access – Gov of SA could buy patents, only difference is between domestic production (no ev about) and international buyouts