## OFF

### NC – Long

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Nation is an official territorial division independent and sovereign

Merriam Webster [Encyclopedia Britannica, “Nation”] [DS]

: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent status

#### WTO definition includes Patents, IDs, TM, GIs, ©, Trade Secrets

WTO No Date [World Trade Organization, “TRIPS: What are IPRS”] [DS]

Intellectual property rights are customarily divided into two main areas: (i) Copyright and rights related to copyright.back to top The rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films) are protected by copyright, for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author. Also protected through copyright and related (sometimes referred to as “neighbouring”) rights are the rights of performers (e.g. actors, singers and musicians), producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations. The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work. (ii) Industrial property.back to top Industrial property can usefully be divided into two main areas: One area can be characterized as the protection of distinctive signs, in particular trademarks (which distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings) and geographical indications (which identify a good as originating in a place where a given characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin). The protection of such distinctive signs aims to stimulate and ensure fair competition and to protect consumers, by enabling them to make informed choices between various goods and services. The protection may last indefinitely, provided the sign in question continues to be distinctive. Other types of industrial property are protected primarily to stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology. In this category fall inventions (protected by patents), industrial designs and trade secrets. The social purpose is to provide protection for the results of investment in the development of new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and development activities. A functioning intellectual property regime should also facilitate the transfer of technology in the form of foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing. The protection is usually given for a finite term (typically 20 years in the case of patents). While the basic social objectives of intellectual property protection are as outlined above, it should also be noted that the exclusive rights given are generally subject to a number of limitations and exceptions, aimed at fine-tuning the balance that has to be found between the legitimate interests of right holders and of users.

#### Medicine is for the alleviation of disease

Sara Constantakis 2016 [World of Forensic Science, Gale In Context: Science. “Medicine”] [DS]

Medicine is one of the branches of the health sciences. It deals with restoring and maintaining health, but is also used in determining cause of death. It is a practical science that applies knowledge from biology, chemistry, and physics to treat diseases. Biological knowledge is derived from anatomy, biochemistry, physiology, histology, epidemiology, microbiology, genetics, toxicology, pathology, and many other disciplines. Biology forms the basis for understanding how the human body works and interacts with its environment.

An understanding of chemistry is required to determine the interactions between different drugs, to detect chemicals in the body, and design drugs for treatment. Physics has an impact on understanding how the body works and on understanding how the various instruments and equipment are used in diagnosis and treatment. The need to understand interactions between all of these areas makes medicine one of the most complex scientific disciplines.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits and ground—-allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. Because debate is a competitive game, there is an incentive to revert to truisms that give the negative no chance at engagement. The lack of a plan also means the affirmative can shift their advocacy in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text, which obviates negative arguments.

#### This has three impacts –

#### Fairness – A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win—-radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. Fairness is an intrinsic good—-debate is fundamentally a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg—-the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate and the reason why people are incentivized to do prep and research is to help them do better in their next round is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate. Fairness also comes before substance—-deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it—-any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, because it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### Second is Argument Engagement---advocacy tied to the resolution incentivizes nuanced research and CLASH with a well prepared opponent---They turn debate into one with no negative counterargumentation which causes confirmation bias and less good affirmatives. It also doesn’t subject the aff to rigorous arugmentation which eliminates the skills necessary to make real material change in the world and doesn’t generate real productive discussions – turns their offense.

#### Topical version of the aff – surrender IP to blackness or abolish all pharma patents and say the logic of ownership is a continuation of logistics – use sufficiency when evaluating the TVA because all deficits are neg ground. This and SSD solve their offense by re-centering debate on afro-pessimism

#### Topicality must be a voting issue—the role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question. Any aff role for debate must explain why we switch sides and why there has to be a winner and a loser—switching sides within the competitive yet limited bounds of the topic performs the labor of the negative which avoids group polarization and untested advocacy

#### Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## OFF

### NC – CP

#### Text: We endorse the entire aff except for their advocacy of afro-pessmism

#### The AC centers the “Atlantic” slave trade reproducing the hegemony of western history- we need de-Atlanticized models of slavery

Zeleza, PhD, 10

(Paul Tiyambe , the dean of the Bellarmine College of Liberal Arts and Presidential Professor of African American Studies and History at Loyola Marymount University African Studies Review Volume 53, Number 1, April 2010 pp. 1-19 | 10.1353/arw.0.0274)

It has become increasingly clear to me that as the field grows, the need to clarify the terms of discourse and analysis is **more imperative than ever**. The first issue concerns **hegemonies** in African diaspora studies: the where, when, what, why, and who is privileged in the field. The second involves the need to clarify the key concepts we use in structuring our methodological and theoretical frameworks. Conceptual clarification entails specifying our intellectual and ideological interests, identifying disciplinary and interdisciplinary influences, and problematizing our analytical metaphors and interpretive analogies. Among scholars of African diasporas in Asia and Europe, common critiques are heard against the domination of the **Afro-Atlantic model and the African Americanization of Afro-Europe and Afro-Asia**. There is no question that **the Atlantic model dominates African diaspora studies**, which focus on movements from western Africa to the Americas through the forced migrations of the **Atlantic slave trade** and are **preoccupied with the construction of "black" identities**. But African American hegemony in diaspora studies both in the Americas and in its export to other world regions is not simply a question of what could be called, to paraphrase Gordon Lewis's (1999) term, epistemological bad faith. The hegemony or universalizing ambitions of the Atlantic model are based partly on the sheer size of the Afro-Atlantic diasporas in the Americas, which currently number more than 160 million people (more than 100 million in South America, 40 million in North American, and 22 million in the Caribbean). They are also embedded in the very cultural and economic hegemony of the United States. This has become a **heated issue** at international diaspora conferences, as Darlene Clark Hine et al. (2009) and Carole Boyce Davies (2008) note in their recent publications, Black Europe and the African Diaspora and the three-volume Encyclopedia of the African Diaspora, respectively. This was also evident at the First International Conference on the African Diaspora in Asia held in Goa, India, in January 2006 (Prasad & Angenot 2008). During my travels, I often had to fend off suspicions that I had come to propagate exclusively American conceptions of African diasporas, and I agree with both Hine et al. and Davies that such critiques and suspicions cannot be wished away. We need to confront the **asymmetries in knowledge** [End Page 4] **production about African diasporas in different world regions**, desist from imposing models derived from specific African American experiences, and understand how much there is to gain from **truly comparative perspectives and historiographies**. This is the source of my argument that **we need to de-Atlanticize and de-Americanize the histories of African diasporas**. In order for the field to grow, it is critical that the Afro-Atlantic and U.S. African American models of African diaspora studies be **provincialized rather than universalized**, as is the tendency among many of us in the U.S. and Anglophone academies for whom the world beyond our borders can **only be simulated copies of our own** and for those elsewhere who are anxious to signal their cosmopolitan familiarity with the intellectual products of the world's largest academic system by producing mimic histories.

#### The very paradigm of blackness is Eurocentric – the discourse of the Atlantic reduces “Africa” to “sub-Saharan Africa” and erases other African diasporas

Zeleza, PhD, 10

(Paul Tiyambe , the dean of the Bellarmine College of Liberal Arts and Presidential Professor of African American Studies and History at Loyola Marymount University African Studies Review Volume 53, Number 1, April 2010 pp. 1-19 | 10.1353/arw.0.0274)

This implies that our conception of "African diasporas" crucially depends on **how we define these very terms**, and these definitions in turn have national and transnational contexts that frame them. This is merely to stress the obvious point that **hegemonic ideas ride on the hegemonies of material power**. This is why the Afro-Atlantic and the African American models are dominant, but it is for the same reason that they **should not be applied to other world regions unquestioningly**, however accurately they capture and explain the historical experiences and struggles in the Afro-Atlantic world and the United States. Even internally, as we all know, these models are not cast in the iron grid of methodological and theoretical rigidity. But as is often the case with discursive exports, they acquire the conceits of suffocating homogeneity as they cross the Atlantic to foreign lands. The Atlantic model is problematic when applied to other world regions and periods in part because it is premised on a conception of "**Africa" as "sub-Saharan Africa**," a racialized construct that haunted African studies [End Page 6] in Euroamerica over the last century and that some African scholars have **desperately sought to deconstruct**. This reflects the dominance in the Euro-American academy of the Atlantic model and of race in the fields of African studies in general and African diaspora studies in particular. Quite predictably, "**black" is the paradigmatic trope** in Afro-Atlantic diaspora studies, the pivot around which discourses of "African" diaspora identities, subjectivities, transnationalisms, engagements, or dialogues are framed and **debated**. This is quite evident in several recent studies. Let me just mention three, all published in 2009. The first is Patrick Manning's The African Diaspora: A History Through Culture, which despite its global ambitions remains **trapped in Eurocentric cartographic conceptions of Africa as sub-Saharan Africa and American preoccupations with the black diaspora.** The others openly **substitute "Africa" with "black."** The two-volume Encyclopedia of Blacks in European History and Culture (Martone 2009) focuses on the historical experiences in Europe of peoples from sub-Saharan Africa except where an Afrocentric claim cannot be resisted and North Africa is sneaked in. In Black Europe and the African Diaspora by Hine at al., the mostly U.S.-based authors have great difficulty in explaining what they mean by "Black Europe," and their African diaspora in Europe excludes North Africans, who surely do have a claim to an African origin and identity as much as the descendants of diasporans from the Americas who have relocated to Europe or the offspring of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of studies on "Black Europe" that are largely patterned on "Black America" and remain trapped in the racialized discourses and imaginaries of **American studies**. Ironically, "Black Europe" has continued to be inscribed long after "Black Americans" have become African Americans. The conflation of African diaspora formations with the histories and geographies of Atlantic slavery disregards the histories of **other African diasporas in the Americas**, both during the period of the slave trade and after. To begin with, it fails to problematize the identity of the very Iberians—the Spanish and Portuguese—who began the conquest of the Americas. Among them were **peoples of African descent** who had been resident in Iberia for centuries. On my trip to Spain this summer, an Afro-Spanish scholar and activist insisted that Spanish identity only fully dis-Africanized itself following the country's inclusion in the European project (Toasije 2009). The joke that Africa began at the Pyrenees articulates Spain's and Portugal's mixed historical heritage from the Moors (or, according to some, Muslims, Arabs, or Berbers—the designations are themselves quite revealing) who conquered and ruled large parts of the peninsula between 711 and 1492. In the view of Anouar Majid (2000:77), a Moroccan scholar, Al Andalus could be considered "essentially an African kingdom in Europe." Recent work on the migrations of the Moriscos, Ladinos, and even Cape Verdians to the Americas is pertinent in this regard (Garafalo forthcoming; Molina & López 2001). [End Page 7] The findings on the free Afro-Iberian migrations to the Americas serve to qualify, but do not of course displace, the centrality of forced migrations from western Africa to the Americas. But in its universalizing ambitions, the Afro-Atlantic model easily yields to a Eurocentric conception of Africa in which Africa, Hegel's (1956:91) "Africa proper," entails sub-Saharan Africa and African diasporas are **exclusively "black," a paradigm** that leads to a **preoccupation with the formation of black racial identities among African diasporas**. This model also ignores the formation of "new" African diasporas out of voluntary migrations since the abolition of slavery and especially since decolonization. Over the last two decades, more African migrants have been arriving in the United States than during the Atlantic slave trade. As shown in the recent capacious collection by Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu, The New African Diaspora (2009), the mobilities, experiences, identities, and dialogues of these diasporas **differ and intersect** with those of the historic Afro-Atlantic diasporas in complex and contradictory ways.6 The very existence of intercultural and intertextual diaspora spaces in which they find themselves ensures complex negotiations and performances of racial, national, ethnic, and gender identities that are neither already fixed in the diaspora nor imported from Africa. And of course we know **the identities of the historic Afro-Atlantic diaporas are not frozen**; they have continually been reconstructed and reshaped by changing economic, social, cultural, and political contexts, and through the dialogic and dialectical interplay of material and discursive processes, the shifting structures of power, and the agencies of resistance. But even for the historic Afro-Atlantic diasporas, some scholars object to the regionalization of the African American model in which the U.S. experience and modes of racialization and identity formation are often generalized to the rest of the Americas, even though Afro-Latin America, which is more than twice as large as Afro-North America, has its own quite distinctive histories. Paul Gilroy's influential Black Atlantic (1993), which ignores both Africa and Afro-Latin America, **exemplifies this Anglophone analytical conceit**. Let me hasten to add that in recent years many U.S. diaspora scholars have produced excellent comparative studies of Afro-Atlantic diaspora histories and anthropologies. The works by Sheila Walker (2001), George Andrews (2004), and Kevin Yelvington (2006) readily come to mind. Historical Mappings The Afro-Atlantic model is **clearly inadequate** when applied to the much older and more complicated histories of African interactions with, and diasporas in, Europe and Asia. I am struck by the amount of **intellectual energy expended** in trying to restrict the histories of African movements to Europe and Asia, and to force the formation of African diasporas in these regions into the Atlantic model by seeing their movements primarily in [End Page 8] **terms of slavery** and sub-Saharan Africans. "Africa" and "Africans" of course **include "blacks" but are not confined to them**, and before the twentieth century some Africans went to Europe and Asia as enslaved people, but not all, perhaps not even the majority, and their identities were not always framed by American-style regimes of racialization. Other social inscriptions and ideologies such as religion sometimes played a more salient role. Systematic studies of African diasporas in Europe and Asia are a recent phenomenon. Both are inspired by some of the same forces noted earlier. In the case of Europe, additional impetus has been provided by the increased African migrations over the last few decades and by European anxieties, which have manifested themselves both in the development of multiculturalism as public policy and in xenophobic violence. In Europe the definitional challenges are thrown into particularly sharp relief: do we talk of "black" or "African" diasporas, "Black Europe" or "Afro-Europe"? Some of the scholarship on "Black Europe," "Black Britain," "Black France," and so on, is illuminating, but much of it, which seems to borrow uncritically from the Atlantic model, is clearly problematic. These works are often written by African American scholars, specialists in African American studies, or Afro-European scholars who have discovered their epistemic and existential blackness on **American campuses** and **remained in the United States**; an example of the latter is Pap Ndiaye (2008), the Afro-French historian, whose celebrated La Condition Noire was inspired by his studies of African American history.7

#### This is a question of methodology- their middle passage model reinscribes a Eurocentric “tyranny of the atlantic”

Allen, PhD, 14

(Richard B., History@Farmingham State, Slaves, Convicts, Abolitionism and the Global Origins of the Post-Emancipation Indentured Labor System, Slavery & Abolition, 2014 Vol. 35, No. 2, 328–348, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2013.870789 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Allen2014.pdf)

The historiography of the free and forced labor trades that supplied European plantation colonies with millions of African, Indian, East Asian and other non-western workers between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries is a case study in geographical, chronological and topical compartmentalization. Histories of European slave trading, the attendant African diaspora to the Americas and European abolitionism remain subject to what Edward Alpers aptly characterized more than 15 years ago as **the ‘tyranny of the Atlantic’ in slavery studies**.1 As their preoccupation with developments in Britain and the Caribbean attest, studies of the ‘great’ or ‘mighty experiment’ with the use of indentured labor following slave emancipation in the British Empire likewise tend to **focus on the Atlantic world** despite a long-standing awareness that the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius was the site of the **crucial test case** for the use of free agricultural laborers working under long-term written contracts and a wealth of demographic data which highlight the **Indian Ocean’s importance** in the history of a system that scattered more than 2.2 million workers throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world between the 1830s and 1920s.2 More indentured laborers landed in Mauritius than in any other colony while the total number of such workers who reached European colonies in the Indian Ocean basin surpassed those who arrived in the Caribbean by some 259,000.3 The Indian Ocean’s significance in this global labor migration becomes even more pronounced if the 1.5 million or more individuals who emigrated from southern India to plantations in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Malaya to work under short-term, often verbal, contracts between the 1840s and the early twentieth century, and the 700,000–750,000 Indian migrants who labored on Assamese plantations between 1870 and 1900 are included in this labor diaspora.4 This historiographical tendency to privilege one oceanic world is matched by a propensity to draw a sharp dividing line between the pre- and post-emancipation eras despite widespread acceptance of the argument that the years after 1834 witnessed the creation and institutionalization of a ‘new system of slavery’ in the colonial plantation world.5 Histories of British colonies in the Caribbean and elsewhere usually end with the abolition of slavery in 1834 or occasionally with the termination of the ‘apprenticeship’ system in 1838, while studies of indentured laborers in these same colonies frequently pay little attention to the slave regimes that preceded them. Debates about conceptualizing and interpreting the indentured experience likewise reflect this tendency to view the colonial plantation world in terms of sharply demarcated pre- and post-1834 eras.6 The consequences of this chronological apartheid include an implicit, if not explicit, tendency to view the post-emancipation indentured labor system as a phenomenon separate and distinct unto itself, a notion which is reinforced by the historiographical emphasis on reconstructing the experience of indentured Indians to the exclusion of the hundreds of thousands of African, East Asian, Melanesian and other workers who also migrated throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7 This Indo-centrism is compounded in turn by a continuing penchant to focus on reconstructing limited aspects of indentured workers’ lives, doing so within tightly circumscribed social, economic, political and cultural contexts, and failing to compare local developments with those of indentured workers elsewhere in the colonial plantation world.8 These conceptual problems are similar to the pitfalls, especially **methodological** nationalism and **Euro-centrism**, identified by those working in the emerging field of global labor history as characteristic features of traditional theories about and interpretations of transnational labor migration.9 Recent research on labor migration in the Indian Ocean underscores the fact that a fuller understanding of the labor trades which supplied European colonies with millions of free and forced laborers is contingent upon **transcending this preoccupation with the particular**. Clare Anderson’s perceptive examination of the similar ways in which British officials thought about and processed Indian convicts and indentured laborers during the early nineteenth century, for example, demonstrates that these two labor trades can **no longer be viewed in isolation** from one another.10 Other work has established the increasing interconnectednessof the slave, convict and indentured labor trades in the Indian Ocean during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.11 In so doing, this research reveals that the post-emancipation indentured labor system originated some 25 years earlier than previously believed, that it took shape on a global stage that stretched from the Caribbean and the banks of the Thames to an obscure island in the South Atlantic and thence across the Indian Ocean to the Malay peninsula and finally to China, and that the British East India Company corporate-state played a **significant** and hitherto unappreciated role in this global migrant labor system’s early development.

#### The alternative is a global systems paradigm instead of an Atlantic-centric slavery paradigm. The AC imposes rigid, analytical blinders that prevent generating a fuller understanding of African diaspora

Allen, PhD, 14

(Richard B., History@Farmingham State, Slaves, Convicts, Abolitionism and the Global Origins of the Post-Emancipation Indentured Labor System, Slavery & Abolition, 2014 Vol. 35, No. 2, 328–348, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2013.870789 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Allen2014.pdf)

In his excellent survey of indentured labor in the age of imperialism, David Northrup emphasized the need to view the movement of millions of indentured workers throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world not only in the context of its times, but **also as a global system** that invites comparison with the great European migrations of the day and age.93 Even a cursory survey of published scholarship since the appearance of Northrup’s book almost 20 years ago reveals, however, that indentured labor studies remain hobbled by a **failure** to examine the indentured experience in well-developed local, regional, global and comparative contexts. This historiographical inertia may be traced to various factors: the continuing dominance of the Tinkerian ‘new system of **slavery’ paradigm** in both **scholarly and public discourse** about indentured labor; a corresponding propensity to view this system’s origins largely, if not exclusively, through the prism of an **Atlantic-centric** abolitionism in which the 1834 emancipation of slaves in the British Empire has acquired iconic status; and an Indo-centrism that distracts attention from or obscures work on other indentured populations. Northrup’s comments about the origins of the indentured labor trade echo these historiographical preoccupations: Despite the existence of a few earlier experiments, it is fair to say that the new **indentured labor trade arose** in direct response to the abolition of slavery in the colonies of Great Britain in the 1830s and to its subsequent abolition or decline in French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies.94 Recent research on free and forced labor migration in the Indian Ocean reveals that the early experiments to which Northrup referred were, however, neither few in number nor marginally important to understanding the indentured labor system’s origins and subsequent development. This research highlights, moreover, that these experiments occurred in a truly **global setting** that stretched from the Caribbean to the South Atlantic and across the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia and China. That this was so should come as no surprise given recent scholarship on the trans-imperial movement of ideas, personnel and news with the British Empire, especially during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.95 As P.J. Marshall has trenchantly observed, if there were significant differences between the British experience in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds, there were also significant similarities between these two components of a single imperial entity.96 Compelling work on the impact that public knowledge about and perceptions of empire had on British politics and identity underscores this point.97 So do astute assessments of the limitations inherent in oceanic basin approaches to studying labor migration and maritime history.98 Insights provided by the emerging field of global labor history, including case studies such as Jan Lucassen’s examination of the VOC’s role in the emergence of an international labor market which connected Europe with southern Africa and South and Southeast Asia, further illustrate the need for indentured labor historians to transcend the conceptual parochialism that inhibits the development of a **much fuller understanding of this** post-emancipation **labor system in all of its complexity**.99 The challenge before us is, accordingly, to **probe much more deeply and perceptively** into the ways in which the complex dialog within and between these oceanic worlds shaped the nature and dynamics of a global migrant labor system, the legacy of which continues to resonate in our own day and age.

## Case

### NC – AT: Disclosure

#### The judges don’t have jurisdiction to not vote for disclosure theory – doing so can get you kicked out of the tournament – it’s just a rule.

#### These are tournament rules written by a very prominent – perhaps the most prominent – black coach in the country. They are decidedly not antiblack – and I’m sorry that you thought they were – every other black student did this as well.

### AT: ROTJ

#### No Arbitrary roles of the judge or ballot – the judge should vote for the side that produces the best material consequences. Anything else moots the NC and lets the aff choose a self-serving starting point for discussion.

### NC – AT: Pessimism

#### Antiblackness isn’t fatalistic or ontologically rigid---their heuristic cements nihilism and destroys the possibility for political participation---that process alone cements the worst excesses of racial violence

Spillers 18 [Hortense J. Spillers is the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of English at Vanderbilt University. Since receiving her Ph.D. from Brandeis, she has taught at Wellesley College, Haverford College, Emory, and Cornell Universities. She has also served as a guest professor in the Program in Literature at Duke University during academic year 2002-03 and for two consecutive years during tri-semester terms at the John F. Kennedy Center for North American Studies at the Free University in Berlin, Germany, 2000 and 2001. 8/30. "Or Else…" https://alinejournal.com/convergence/or-else/]

Ironically, however twisted a standard of measure, we might gauge how far we’ve come by the degree of doubt expressible toward the efficacy of voter registration and electoral politics, as have a couple of my fellow writers in this issue. Even though I regard this argumentative posture as a strategic error of near-fatal proportions, I think I understand how we got here: basically, there are two related, but contrastive, founding propositions on black life and thought in modernity that critics have consistently elaborated since “time immemorial,” and by that, I mean the time that the student of history marks down as the beginning of her sense of crisis that initiates “blackness” in the Western context; as I understand it, Afrocentric views, for instance, elide “blackness” and Africanity which concept is driven back into the ancient world so that transatlantic slavery—relatively recent in light of an ancient human past—is not the origin—or more precisely, the prime time— of black personality’s historical identity, but, rather, an interruption of it. The diasporic, or (for lack of a better word) creolized reading of blackness lends weight to the term itself, insofar as blackness on this view defines a new historical apprenticeship, kin to Africanness, but distinct from it in its particular and stressful formation, instaurated by the trade. One “becomes” black –neither a phylogeny nor an ontogeny—by virtue of his/her interpellation in total Western Economy. These portions of discursive content imply discrete spatiotemporal registers, as the putative subjects of each overlap, but are not entirely conformable (even if they look exactly alike), and there’s the rub.

In the former instance, one discovers as many occasions as possible to establish and sustain symbolic contact with an imagined past, long receded, so that emphasis comes to rest on the power and porosity of myth and its ceremonial/ritualistic determinations wherever possible. Whether the Afrocentric sense eventuates in a vision of strategic movement toward a putative origin (as in “return” narratives/actualities of black politics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries), or of ideological movement toward it (“ancestral” ceremonies, ritual celebrations), this reading seems to engender a politics that is cultural, that looks “otherworldly”—the place of the ego-ideal—in its valorized reference to an imagined ancestral field. We would anticipate that electoral politics in its uninspirational mundaneness might actually be beneath it. In the latter instance, focus comes to rest on the conditions that make blackness possible in the first place and what several diasporic thinkers, Frantz Fanon, prominent among them, describe as “disalienation,” or the process of undoing the deleterious effects of slavery and colonization; because the diasporic view installs the latter as efficient cause of historic black movement, its political projects are charged with a sense of urgency as they resonate the era of their appearance with unmistakable identitarian markings. David Walker’s, Anna Julia Cooper’s, and W.E.B.Du Bois’s respective discourse, for example, could never be mistaken for a different time/cultural period, which means that such discourses are organically linked to their own “now.” Consequently, the political protocols of a diasporic commitment tend to reflect the sense of crisis that characterizes blackness as an emergent category of human possibility. Because blackness in the diasporic reading runs parallel to modernity, blackness is cut away from the idea of Africa—perhaps we could say more precisely that the idea of Africa is bracketed in this ideological outline, rather than jettisoned as it might have been a century ago—as the idea of blackness itself assumes the name of a virtually absolute origin. If we think of these concurrent strands of ideas as postures, then we realize the extent to which they determine not only how one stands, but where, as well as why.

This enormous conceptual legacy, one way or another, accounts, I believe, for the lion’s share of African-American theoretical production and might be said to proffer a rich example of the problem of being/becoming and time. In its impressive variations and combinations, recombinations and iterations, black theory-making has engendered its fullest efflorescence in my view in the post-sixties period with regard to both thematic variedness and complexity and the democratic and demographic distribution of its practitioners; it is also true that any one of these postures and/or variations on it might evince at any given moment a kind of intellectual sclerosis which would induce in turn a conservative politics. If, for example, a theory governed by a diasporic view of black history from which to commence its narrative reifies slavery and colonization as inherent properties in a subject, then the theoretical posture no longer serves as an intellectual technology, or a heuristic device, but, rather, comes to advance an ontological valence. In my own work, for instance, I attempt to advance a theory of flesh/body as a strategy to differentiate historical positionalities in confrontation with the modern world. But if this idea has any usefulness, it proposes the theory as an opening into a closure; a torque that kicks off movement or rotation in static properties. But I should hope not to lose sight of the human potential that the subject of the flesh embodies; perhaps another way to say this is that the enfleshed subject inscribes an opening in a chain of necessity rather than a last word. The theory does not exhaust the subject that it would address, but attempts to highlight it. To hold to the view that the enfleshed subject is actually chattel or property—which we cannot say, insofar as we have merely established a subject possibility in this case—defeats the purpose of discriminating in the first place between a conceptual device on the one hand and a speaking (even if barred) subject on the other.

I have taken, then, the long way around in order to say that the ballot does not lose efficacy when it is wielded by black personality because the latter was once defined as anomie, as chattel. In other words, to premise the future of blackness on its past is to be mired in timelessness, which is precisely to be bereft of historicity, of differentiation, of progression. But moreover, it confuses a conceptual narrative, or a position in discourse, with an actual narrative that will always exceed it. To disparage the black vote is not a sophisticated, or radical, response to anything, but reverberates instead, without meaning to, we might suppose, a long-standing hatred of black people and their aspirations. To express doubt about the vote, especially this election season, in light of what we face now is beyond criticism: it is quite simply to embrace the inevitability of violence, and one should avoid flirtation with violence unless she is willing to put herself in its path. Anything less is an act of bad faith; I would go so far as to say that the failure to cast a vote at the coming midterms is an immoral act for at least two reasons that might go without saying, but bear repeating nonetheless: the meaning of suffrage for generations of African-Americans and the suffering that it has exacted over the decades and the certain danger that the current presidency and a treasonous, complicit Republican congressional majority pose to the United States and the world. Do we need to count the ways that we are doubtless threatened?

When I was a child, I not only spoke as one, but imagined like a child, too—a sauce pan, for instance, turned upside down made a really great hat—shining and irrepressible, cocked upside the head to the left, or the right; fabulous for a stately procession; the family’s beautiful mahogany console housed a radio with a green light in it, and if you squeezed yourself behind the device and examined the exposed radio tubes in it, you watched as they were suddenly dissolved in your mind’s eye into the skyline of a good-size city that you were taking in from a bird’s eye-view; if you stood a mop head up and drew a face on its handle, you had a pretty good doll for a day, especially if your father, or a sibling, whittled down the handle. In this world of discovery and surprise and everyday objects charged with magic, a word like “treason” signaled a remoteness light years away; in fact, it was a “school” word about as close to a little four- to seven -year old black girl’s reality as eighteenth-century images of white guys in tri-cornered hats, crossing the Delaware (wherever that was!), except that one of them was oddly named “Benedict Arnold,” who was not a very nice guy, we were told, and nowhere near “George Washington,” “who never told a lie.” Somebody cut down a cherry tree and, asked about it, ‘fessed up. (Or was that Abe Lincoln?) But this “treason” business started growing up, too, not unlike its young host body, as its next iteration was closer in both time and space to that of the school children—it was the Civil War and “seceding” states from the “Union.” Why would “they,” including the state where our young lady lived then and now, do that? Ah! And she learns that “history hurts.” And at that precise moment, one put away childish things, even though Emmett Till, my contemporary, was child enough. One day, long after, the end of a line in the presidential oath of office caught my attention, in fact, it quite astonished me—to defend the United States against “all enemies, foreign and domestic.” But is it possible for the “enemy” to be domestic? And what if it is? I thought I’d never live to see the day when I would have to ask myself that question and to wonder what the citizen’s duty might be in the realization that it is not only possible, but under certain circumstances, as appears to be the case at present, quite likely. And here we are, faced with the actual possibility now that the long-deferred democracy we have labored toward is poised to take a blow that could permanently end it. If voting could stave it off, who would refuse? Hold that thought.

#### Neurological, racial bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain---orienting groups around institutional change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions.

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology**.** Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### The origin of slavery was opportunistic, not an inevitable product of subconscious drives---slave status had to be physically unchangeable to maximize profit.

Wood 15. (Peter H. Wood is professor emeritus of history at Duke University. The Birth of Race-Based Slavery. May 19, 2015. www.slate.com/articles/life/the\_history\_of\_american\_slavery/2015/05/why\_america\_adopted\_race\_based\_slavery.html)

During the second half of the 17th century, a terrible transformation, the enslavement of people solely on the basis of race, occurred in the lives of African Americans living in North America. These newcomers still numbered only a few thousand, but the bitter reversals they experienced—first subtle, then drastic—would shape the lives of all those who followed them, generation after generation. Like most huge changes, the imposition of hereditary race slavery was gradual, taking hold by degrees over many decades. It proceeded slowly, in much the same way that winter follows fall. On any given day, in any given place, people can argue about local weather conditions. “Is it getting colder?” “Will it warm up again this week?” The shift may come early in some places, later in others. But eventually, it occurs all across the land. By January, people shiver and think back to September, agreeing that “it is definitely colder now.” In 1700, a 70-year-old African American could look back half a century to 1650 and shiver, knowing that conditions had definitely changed for the worse. Some people had experienced the first cold winds of enslavement well before 1650; others would escape the chilling blast well after 1700. The timing and nature of the change varied considerably from colony to colony, and even from family to family. Gradually, the terrible transformation took on a momentum of its own, numbing and burdening everything in its path, like a disastrous winter storm. Unlike the changing seasons, however, the encroachment of racial slavery in the colonies of North America was certainly not a natural process. It was highly unnatural—the work of powerful competitive governments and many thousands of human beings spread out across the Atlantic world. Nor was it inevitable that people’s legal status would come to depend upon their racial background and that the condition of slavery would be passed down from parent to child. Numerous factors combined to bring about this disastrous shift—human forces swirled together during the decades after 1650, to create an enormously destructive storm. By 1650, hereditary enslavement based upon color, not upon religion, was a bitter reality in the older Catholic colonies of the New World. In the Caribbean and Latin America, for well over a century, Spanish and Portuguese colonizers had enslaved “infidels”: first Indians and then Africans. At first, they relied for justification upon the Mediterranean tradition that persons of a different religion, or persons captured in war, could be enslaved for life. But hidden in this idea of slavery was the notion that persons who converted to Christianity should receive their freedom. Wealthy planters in the tropics, afraid that their cheap labor would be taken away from them because of this loophole, changed the reasoning behind their exploitation. Even persons who could prove that they were not captured in war and that they accepted the Catholic faith still could not change their appearance, any more than a leopard can change its spots. So by making color the key factor behind enslavement, dark-skinned people brought from Africa to work in silver mines and on sugar plantations could be exploited for life. Indeed, the servitude could be made hereditary, so enslaved people’s children automatically inherited the same unfree status. But this cruel and self-perpetuating system had not yet taken firm hold in North America. The same anti-Catholic propaganda that had led Sir Francis Drake to liberate Negro slaves in Central America in the 1580s still prompted many colonists to believe that it was the Protestant mission to convert non-Europeans rather than enslave them. Apart from such moral concerns, there were simple matters of cost and practicality. Workers subject to longer terms and coming from further away would require a larger initial investment. Consider a 1648 document from York County, Virginia, showing the market values for persons working for James Stone (estimated in terms of pounds of tobacco): Francis Bomley for 6 yeares 1500 John Thackstone for 3 yeares 1300 Susan Davis for 3 yeares 1000 Emaniell a Negro man 2000 Roger Stone 3 yeares 1300 Mingo a Negro man 2000 Among all six, Susan had the lowest value. She may have been less strong in the tobacco field, and as a woman she ran a greater risk of early death because of the dangers of childbirth. Hence John and Roger, the other English servants with three-year terms, commanded a higher value. Francis, whose term was twice as long, was not worth twice as much. Life expectancy was short for everyone in early Virginia, so he might not live to complete his term. The two black workers, Emaniell and Mingo, clearly had longer terms, perhaps even for life, and they also had the highest value. If they each lived for another 20 years, they represented a bargain for Mr. Stone, but if they died young, perhaps even before they had fully learned the language, their value as workers proved far less. From Stone’s point of view they represented a risky and expensive investment at best. By 1650, however, conditions were already beginning to change. For one thing, both the Dutch and the English had started using enslaved Africans to produce sugar in the Caribbean and the tropics. English experiments at Barbados and Providence Island showed that Protestant investors could easily overcome their moral scruples. Large profits could be made if foreign rivals could be held in check. After agreeing to peace with Spain and giving up control of Northeast Brazil at midcentury, Dutch slave traders were actively looking for new markets. In England, after Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660, he rewarded supporters by creating the Royal African Co. to enter aggressively into the slave trade. The English king also chartered a new colony in Carolina. He hoped it would be close enough to the Spanish in Florida and the Caribbean to challenge them in economic and military terms. Many of the first English settlers in Carolina after 1670 came from Barbados. They brought enslaved Africans with them. They also brought the beginnings of a legal code and a social system that accepted race slavery. While new colonies with a greater acceptance of race slavery were being founded, the older colonies continued to grow. Early in the 17th century no tiny North American port could absorb several hundred workers arriving at one time on a large ship. Most Africans—such as those reaching Jamestown in 1619—arrived several dozen at a time aboard small boats and privateers from the Caribbean. Like Emaniell and Mingo on the farm of James Stone, they tended to mix with other unfree workers on small plantations. All of these servants, no matter what their origin, could hope to obtain their own land and the personal independence that goes with private property. In 1645, in Northampton County on Virginia’s Eastern Shore, Captain Philip Taylor, after complaining that “Anthony the negro” did not work hard enough for him, agreed to set aside part of the cornfield where they worked as Anthony’s plot. “I am very glad of it,” the black man told a local clerk, “now I know myne owne ground and I will worke when I please and play when I please.” Anthony and Mary Johnson had also gained their own property in Northampton County before 1650. He had arrived in Virginia in 1621, aboard the James and was cited on early lists as “Antonio a Negro.” He was put to work on the tobacco plantation of Edward Bennett, with more than 50 other people. All except five were killed the following March, when local Indians struck back against the foreigners who were invading their land. Antonio was one of the lucky survivors. He became increasingly English in his ways, eventually gaining his freedom and moving to the Eastern Shore, where he was known as Anthony Johnson. Along the way, he married “Mary a Negro Woman,” who had arrived in 1622 aboard the Margrett and John, and they raised at least four children, gaining respect for their “hard labor and known service,” according to the court records of Northampton County. By the 1650s, Anthony and Mary Johnson owned a farm of 250 acres, and their married sons, John and Richard, farmed adjoining tracts of 450 and 100 acres respectively. In the 1660s, the whole Johnson clan pulled up stakes and moved north into Maryland, where the aging Anthony leased a 300-acre farm called “Tonies Vineyard” until his death. His widow Mary, in her will of 1672, distributed a cow to each of her grandsons, including John Jr., the son of John and Susanna Johnson. Five years later, when John Jr. purchased a 44-acre farm for himself, he named the homestead Angola, which suggests that his grandparents had been born in Africa and had kept alive stories of their homeland within the family. But within 30 years, John Jr. had died without an heir, and the entire Johnson family had disappeared from the colonial records. If we knew their fate, it might tell us more about the terrible transformation that was going on around them. Gradually, it was becoming harder to obtain English labor in the mainland colonies. Civil war and a great plague reduced England’s population, and the Great Fire of London created fresh demands for workers at home. Stiff penalties were imposed on sea captains who grabbed young people in England and sold them in the colonies as indentured servants. (This common practice was given a new name: “kidnapping.”) English servants already at work in the colonies demanded shorter indentures, better working conditions, and suitable farmland when their contracts expired. Officials feared they would lose future English recruits to rival colonies if bad publicity filtered back to Europe, so they could not ignore this pressure, even when it undermined colonial profits. Nor could colonial planters turn instead to Indian labor. Native Americans captured in frontier wars continued to be enslaved, but each act of aggression by European colonists made future diplomacy with neighboring Indians more difficult. Native American captives could easily escape into the familiar wilderness and return to their original tribe. Besides, their numbers were limited. African Americans, in contrast, were thousands of miles from their homeland, and their availability increased as the scope of the Atlantic slave trade expanded. More European countries competed to transport and exploit African labor; more West African leaders proved willing to engage in profitable trade with them; more New World planters had the money to purchase new workers from across the ocean. It seemed as though every decade the ships became larger, the contacts more regular, the departures more frequent, the routes more familiar, the sales more efficient. As the size and efficiency of this brutal traffic increased, so did its rewards for European investors. Their ruthless competition pushed up the volume of transatlantic trade from Africa and drove down the relative cost of individual Africans in the New World at a time when the price of labor from Europe was rising. As their profits increased, slave merchants and their captains continued to look for fresh markets. North America, on the fringe of this expanding and infamous Atlantic system, represented a likely target. As the small mainland colonies grew and their trade with one another and with England increased, their capacity to purchase large numbers of new laborers from overseas expanded. By the end of the century, Africans were arriving aboard large ships directly from Africa as well as on smaller boats from the West Indies. In 1698, the monopoly held by England’s Royal African Co. on this transatlantic business came to an end, and independent traders from England and the colonies stepped up their voyages, intending to capture a share of the profits. All these large and gradual changes would still not have brought about the terrible transformation to race slavery, had it not been for several other crucial factors. One ingredient was the mounting fear among colonial leaders regarding signs of discontent and cooperation among poor and unfree colonists of all sorts. Europeans and Africans worked together, intermarried, ran away together, and shared common resentments toward the well-to-do. Both groups were involved in a series of bitter strikes and servant uprisings among tobacco pickers in Virginia, culminating in an open rebellion in 1676. Greatly outnumbered by these armed workers, authorities were quick to sense the need to divide their labor force in order to control it. Stressing cultural and ethnic divisions would be one way to do that. Lifetime servitude could be enforced only by removing the prospect that a person might gain freedom through Christian conversion. One approach was to outlaw this traditional route to freedom. As early as 1664, a Maryland statute specified that Christian baptism could have no effect upon the legal status of a slave. A more sweeping solution, however, involved removing religion altogether as a factor in determining servitude. Therefore, another fundamental key to the terrible transformation was the shift from changeable spiritual faith to unchangeable physical appearance as a measure of status. Increasingly, the dominant English came to view Africans not as “heathen people” but as “black people.” They began, for the first time, to describe themselves not as Christians but as whites. And they gradually wrote this shift into their colonial laws. Within a generation, the English definition of who could be made a slave had shifted from someone who was not a Christian to someone who was not European in appearance. Indeed, the transition for self-interested Englishmen went further. It was a small but momentous step from saying that black persons could be enslaved to saying that Negroes should be enslaved. One Christian minister was dismayed by this rapid change to slavery based on race: “These two words, Negro and Slave” wrote the Rev. Morgan Godwyn in 1680, are “by custom grown Homogeneous and Convertible”—that is, interchangeable.

### NC – AT: Undercommons

#### The call to resistance in debate is an intellectual mirage – it imagines that symbolic and representational disruptions in benign academic spaces implicate material violence and buys off material tactics for resistance

Webb, 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7

Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work.

If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents.

What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street.

The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997).

Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision.

There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

### NC – Framing

#### 2] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

### NC – Interventions Good

#### Targeted intervention to prevent ethnic cleansing, failed states, and terror is key to preventing large strikes – a single attack causes autocratic violence that outweighs every aff impact BUT terrorists are inevitable so only we solve it

Fontaine 19 [RICHARD FONTAINE is head of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. State Department, at the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser for U.S. Senator John McCain. November/December. "The Nonintervention Delusion." https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-15/nonintervention-delusion]

The first argument holds that the United States need not employ military means in response to terrorism, civil wars, mass atrocities, and other problems that are not its business. Washington has used force against terrorists in countries ranging from Niger to Pakistan, with massive human and financial expenditures. And yet if more Americans die in their bathtubs each year than in terrorist attacks, why no war on porcelain? The post-9/11 overreach, this camp contends, endures some 18 years later, having stretched well beyond eradicating the original al Qaeda perpetrators and their Afghan base. In this view, as the threats have diminished, so should American attention. The civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen may be tragic, but they do not demand a U.S. military response any more than did the atrocities in Rwanda, eastern Congo, or Darfur.

Adopting such a cramped view of American interests, however, carries its own costs. Terrorism remains a threat, and the effect of successful attacks on Americans goes beyond their immediate casualties to include increased pressure to restrict civil liberties at home and wage impromptu operations abroad—operations that end up being costlier and less effective than longer-term, better-planned ones would be. After the Islamic State (or ISIS) took hold in Iraq and Syria and footage of terrorists decapitating American hostages horrified the public, Obama undertook a far larger operation than would have likely been necessary had he left a residual force in Iraq after 2011. As for genocide and civil war, certain cases can pose such serious threats to U.S. interests, or be so offensive to American values, as to merit intervention. Successive presidents have used military might to prevent, halt, or punish mass atrocities—Clinton to cease the genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the Balkans, Obama to protect the Yezidi minority in Iraq, and Trump after Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attacks against his own people in Syria. There is every reason to believe that similar cases will arise in the future.

#### A single terrorist detonation causes automatic launch of 15,000 nukes

Webber **19** [Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. May 18, 2019. https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/]

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons. Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours. Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America. One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it. But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon - the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer. After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across. This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured. The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) - twice the altitude of Everest - and is 15 miles, 24km across. This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched. Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects. Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer. But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation -especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit. Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences. But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises. The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in. These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off - rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads. With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.