## OFF

### NC – T – Short

#### Interp: the aff may only claim offense from the hypothetical implementation of Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Appropriation” is “large-scale extraction of space resources.” Comprehensive analysis proves

Leon 18 [Amanda, JD from UVA] “Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources” Vol. 104:497, Virginia Law Review, <https://www.capdale.com/files/24323_leon_final_note.pdf>, 2018 RE

Employing the treaty interpretation tools of ordinary meaning, preparatory materials, historical context, state practice, and state interpretation offers many possible understandings of the obligations imparted by Articles I and II of the OST. For example, while the ordinary meaning of “use” could reasonably include the exploitation of materials, the meeting summaries of the Fifth Session of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Sub-Committee make clear that no consensus was ever reached regarding whether “use” includes large-scale exploitation of space resources, let alone fee-simple ownership and the ability to sell commercially. State practice dealing with extraterrestrial samples also sheds little light on the confusion, as the examples cited all deal instead with scientific samples of limited quantity. The international community’s rejection of the Moon Agreement also fails to bring clarity. While on the one hand the rejection could be read as a rejection of the idea that the OST prohibits private property rights, it could also be read as a rejection of the common heritage of mankind doctrine. Finally, the prospect of private venture space mining and extraterrestrial resource extraction remained far off and futuristic at the time of the Treaty’s negotiation, making drawing legal conclusions about the legality of these revolutionary activities extremely difficult.

Overall, however, the Treaty’s structure and its purposes (preserving peace and avoiding international conflict in outer space) ultimately indicate that private property rights in space resources are prohibited by Article II’s non-appropriation principle, at least until future international delegation determines otherwise (like in the Antarctic). The Treaty’s structure confirms this interpretation. Article I lays down a general rule for activity in space. Subsequent articles of the Treaty then lay out more specific requirements of and qualifications to this general rule. Much like Article IV restricts the use of nuclear weapons in space, Article II restricts the use of space in ways that might result in potentially controversial property claims. Historically, claims to mineral rights have resulted in just as contentious conflict as those over sovereign lands. Treaty efforts to avoid conflicts in Antarctica and the high seas reflect similar sentiments. The Soviet Union’s representative even hinted at this structural relationship between Articles I and II during Treaty negotiations.232 In light of the imminent need to ease Cold War tensions, the potential for conflict over property, and the final structure of the Treaty, this Note concludes that the large-scale extraction of space resources is incompatible with the non-appropriation principle of Article II of the OST.233 As a result, the United States’ provision of property rights to its citizens to possess, own, transport, use, and sell space and asteroid resources extracted through the SREU Act contravenes its international obligations established by the OST.

#### “Is unjust” requires positive action to rectify the injustice

Pomerleau [Wayne, PhD, Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga] “Western Theories of Justice”, IEP, <https://iep.utm.edu/justwest/>, last date cited is 2010, RE

Nozick (a departmental colleague of Rawls at Harvard) was one of the first and remains one of the most famous critics of Rawls’s liberal theory of justice. Both are fundamentally committed to individual liberty. But as a libertarian, Nozick is opposed to compromising individual liberty in order to promote socio-economic equality and advocates a “minimal state” as the only sort that can be socially just. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), especially in its famous chapter on “Distributive Justice,” while praising Rawls’s first book as the most important “work in political and moral philosophy” since that of Mill, Nozick argues for what he calls an “entitlement conception of justice” in terms of three principles of just holdings. First, anyone who justly acquires any holding is rightly entitled to keep and use it. Second, anyone who acquires any holding by means of a just transfer of property is rightly entitled to keep and use it. It is only through some combination of these two approaches that anyone is rightly entitled to any holding. But some people acquire holdings unjustly—e.g., by theft or fraud or force—so that there are illegitimate holdings. So, third, justice can require the rectification of unjust past acquisitions. These three principles of just holdings—“the principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectification of the violations of the first two principles”—constitute the core of Nozick’s libertarian entitlement theory of justice. People should be entitled to use their own property as they see fit, so long as they are entitled to it. On this view, any pattern of distribution, such as Rawls’s difference principle, that would force people to give up any holdings to which they are entitled in order to give it to someone else (i.e., a redistribution of wealth) is unjust. Thus, for Nozick, any state, such as ours or one Rawls would favor, that is “more extensive” than a minimal state and redistributes wealth by taxing those who are relatively well off to benefit the disadvantaged necessarily “violates people’s rights” (State, pp. 149, 183, 230, 150-153, 230-231, 149).

#### US Code defines private entities

US Code 6 U.S. Code § 1501 – Definitions, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/1501#15_A>, 2015 RE

(15)Private entity

(A)In general

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(B)Inclusion

The term “private entity” includes a State, tribal, or local government performing utility services, such as electric, natural gas, or water services.

(C)Exclusion

The term “private entity” does not include a foreign power as defined in section 1801 of title 50.

#### Definition of “outer space”

Vereshchetin 06 [Vladlen, former Member of the ICJ, Chairman of the International Law Commission, and Professor of International Law] “Outer Space,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, <https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Outer_Space.pdf>, 2006 RE

A. Definition of the Term ‘Outer Space’

1 The term ‘outer space’, like several other basic notions of space law (‘outer space activity’, ‘space flight’, ‘space object’), although frequently used in space agreements and other space law instruments, has never been defined by them. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the objective difficulty for the States concerned to agree on legal definitions in the context of rapidly developing technology and their apprehension that legally binding definitions might restrict their sphere of operation.

2 The absence of a formal definition of outer space does not mean that no general perception exists as to what is meant by outer space, even if the use of the term in natural sciences and in law may not always be exactly the same. It should be remembered that there is no definitive physical boundary between atmospheric space and extra-atmospheric space, the transition from one to the other being gradual. Although at 100 km the density of the air is but one millionth of what it is at sea level, for natural scientists these two regions of space, in some respects, may be perceived as one single whole. However, with the launching of the first satellite in 1957 the notion of outer space became inextricably linked with the exploration and uses of space by means of man-made spacecraft (→ Spacecraft, Satellites, and Space Objects). The physical and technical factors are directly relevant to the legal regulation of the region of space concerned. The atmospheric space of the earth and most of the activities in this space fall within the ambit of → Air Law. The space beyond the atmosphere is governed by space law. The ‘spatial’ element of each of the two above-mentioned branches of law is reflected in their denominations: the first being known as air (ie atmospheric) law, the second as space law, often referred to as outer space (ie extra-atmospheric) law.

3 The legal regimes governing → airspace and outer space are fundamentally different. Thus, logically and jurisprudentially it is necessary to know where air space ends and outer space begins. In theory, there must be no ‘outer’ boundary of application of space law, since outer space itself is limitless, but in practice space law, keeping pace with the development of space technology, does not purport to regulate space activity beyond the solar system (see Art. 1 Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3]). At the same time, ‘celestial bodies’ of the solar system, other than the earth, but comprising the Moon, are included in the legal notion of outer space (→ Moon and Celestial Bodies). This follows from the title and text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ([signed 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967] 610 UNTS 205) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

#### At best, it’s extra topical, which still skews neg prep and links to our offense.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits and ground—-allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. Because debate is a competitive game, there is an incentive to revert to truisms that give the negative no chance at engagement. The lack of a plan also means the affirmative can shift their advocacy in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text, which obviates negative arguments.

#### This has two impacts –

#### Fairness – A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win—-radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. Fairness is an intrinsic good—-debate is fundamentally a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg—-the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate and the reason why people are incentivized to do prep and research is to help them do better in their next round is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate. Fairness also comes before substance—-deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it—-any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, because it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### Second is Argument Engagement---advocacy tied to the resolution incentivizes nuanced research and CLASH with a well prepared opponent---They turn debate into one with no negative counterargumentation which causes confirmation bias and less good affirmatives. It also doesn’t subject the aff to rigorous arugmentation which eliminates the skills necessary to make real material change in the world and doesn’t generate real productive discussions – turns their offense.

#### Topical version of the aff – end the colonization of space by private entities through asteroid mining. Use sufficiency when evaluating the TVA because all deficits are neg ground. This and SSD solve their offense by re-centering debate on the 1AC.

#### Topicality must be a voting issue—the role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question. Any aff role for debate must explain why we switch sides and why there has to be a winner and a loser—switching sides within the competitive yet limited bounds of the topic performs the labor of the negative which avoids group polarization and untested advocacy

#### Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

## OFF

### NC – Consult CP

#### CP: States ought engage in a prior and binding consultation with indigenous nations to adopt a binding international agreement that establishes outer space as a global commons not subject to appropriation and is enforced via a system of regulatory delimiting and global liability.

#### Normal means isn’t a consultation but it’s key to indigenous sovereignty

Hilding **Neilson &** Elena **Cirkovic** Consulting Canadians on a Framework for Future Space Exploration Activities: A Response to the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) - Part I, Völkerrechtsblog, 28.07.**2021**, doi: 10.17176/20210728-135814-0. //SR

Canada’s position of support and leadership in space exploration has a positive and impressive history. From the development of the CanadaArm and the participation in work on the International Space Station (ISS) to the new scientific contributions with respect to lunar and Martian exploration, Canada has many reasons to be proud. However, it is worth noting that Canada’s role in space exploration has traditionally neglected to include Indigenous peoples, Indigenous knowledges, and Indigenous rights. In general, the history of Canadian participation in space exploration did not have a substantial and direct impact on Indigenous peoples’ rights in Canada. With accelerating technological developments in the past twenty years, space has become more accessible for humans. With these transformations, the current and proposed future of space exploration has the potential to negatively impact Indigenous peoples across Canada. One of the emerging issues for astronomers and various traditions including traditions of Indigenous peoples in Canada and elsewhere, is the launching of so-called satellite mega constellations, such as the SpaceX’s Starlink. Increasing the number of satellites in the Lower Earth’s Orbit (LEO), impacts further research. For various human cultures, Dark Skies have, among others, navigational and spiritual significance. Finally, the objective of our post is to emphasize the need for greater scientific understanding of the universe, which is achieved through research, education and outreach, and inclusion of multiple knowledges and ontologies. Without consultation with multiple knowledges of multicultural and multinational Canada, future space activities might contribute to the ongoing culture of colonization. We present arguments for the ethical and legal requirements for the CSA to consult with and to be inclusive of Indigenous rights and concerns as Canada moves to support the Artemis Accords. The Accords trigger a variety of issues in the outer space sector, which are beyond the scope of this brief post. The authors come to this work from two perspectives: the first being a Mi’kmaw astronomer who grew up in Newfoundland and is a status member of the Qalipu Nation, and co-author, a Bosnian-Canadian legal scholar. Thereby we stress that our contribution is an opinion and has no intent to speak for Indigenous peoples in general and/or any Indigenous-led organization in Canada, or any particular group or community in Canada. Please note that we will be using the terms Indigenous, and Aboriginal interchangeably as we engage with the language of domestic (Canadian) and international documents, publications, institutions, and relevant regulatory and/or administrative bodies. The terms Indigenous and Aboriginal refers to the three different categories of Indigenous peoples in Canada – First Nation, Inuit, and Métis. We reflect upon the CSA’s obligation to consult Indigenous peoples in Canada via two lenses: Firstly, where does Outer Space Law intersect with the modern and historic treaties between the First Nations and Canada (Crown)? Do these treaties include the skies and outer space? Secondly, considering its status as an international (and bilateral) agreement, where the Artemis Accords trigger the application of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Assuming that the Artemis Accords might, and in the situations where they do, trigger any responsibilities and obligations of Canada under the UNDRIP and its domestic laws to consult the First Nations, what are the CSA’s and Canada’s obligations to First Nation, Inuit, and Métis communities and Nations? We engage with these two points considering the following: That the questions of Indigenous rights and title in Canada, including the treaty rights, have significant impacts on how Canada consults with the First Nations and other communities and nations in Canada and pursues the ongoing and future space exploration accordingly; That these questions also require a revisiting of the allegedly prevailing narrative as proposed by some scholars and members of the global outer space sector, generally speaking, which treats space exploration as an analogy of the colonization of the Americas. The legal framework of our argument is that of Canadian Constitutional obligations towards indigenous peoples. The relevant cases are discussed and listed in the rest the following sections. Brief Consideration of Indigenous Rights in Canada Canada’s obligations to Indigenous peoples under the Canadian Constitution cannot be superseded or undermined by commitments under a bilateral agreement such as the Artemis Accords. These legal obligations include those recognized and affirmed by Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and those set out in self-government agreements. We recognize that, in 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) concluded that treaties between Indigenous peoples and the Crown were not international treaties but were sui generis treaties (Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at para 33). However, it is worth considering that ‘[f]or many Indigenous peoples, treaties concluded with European powers…are, above all, treaties of peace and friendship, destined to organize coexistence in – not their exclusion from – the same territory and not to regulate restrictively their lives…under the overall jurisdiction of non-Indigenous authorities’ (para 117). While the United Nations, in documents including the UNDRIP, has recognized the potentially international character of Indigenous Crown treaties (UNDRIP Preamble, art 37(1)), we recognize that Canadian law has yet to consider this international recognition in domestic law. Nevertheless, as Henderson argues ‘any Crown authority over First Nations is limited to the actual scope of their treaty delegations. If no authority or power is delegated to the Crown, this power must be interpreted as reserved to First Nations, respectively, and is protected by prerogative rights and the common law since neither can extinguish a foreign legal system.’. There are plural and ongoing discussions on the status of Aboriginal title in Canada, as well as treaty obligations. It is beyond the scope of our comment to address the extensive international and domestic jurisprudence on the topic. However, we stress the existence of the Crown’s fiduciary duty to Aboriginal People as an aspect of various activities, including Canada’s activities in outer space (See, Annex I). Indeed, ‘The doctrine of Aboriginal rights exists… because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, Aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates Aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal status.’ (Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. Van der Peet, para 30).

#### Indigenous people say yes–appropriation goes against their values

**Young**, M. J. (**1987**). “Pity the Indians of Outer Space”: Native American Views of the Space Program. Western Folklore, 46(4), 269. doi:10.2307/1499889 //SR \*brackets for problematic language]

Because Native Americans [indigenous people] have a different perspective of the world, they can offer us alternative ways of seeing ourselves in relationship to the natural world and help us answer the question of what constitutes appropriate behavior-in outer space, as well as on earth. Furthermore, some non-Native Americans realize that, as they look to the traditions of the Native Americans, they see their own heritage with increased clarity. Although this appreciation of Native Americans comes too late in America's history and could be construed as appropriating their ideas as we did their land, a significant number of Native Americans are receptive to the potential that now exists for a dialogue between traditions, both non-Native and Native American, perhaps because they are experiencing a parallel concern, a need to come to terms with their own emerging identity.2 Both groups have begun to realize that it is only through such a dialogue that the mistakes of the past can be avoided in the future. For non-Native Americans the justification for this inquiry is that through an analysis of the difference between the two understandings of space-Anglo and Native American-we can better "see" the ideological dimensions of our own, taken-for-granted mythology that legitimizes space exploration. Native American [indigenous] attitudes towards "outer space" often conflict with the attitudes of the proponents of the U.S. space program. Rather than applying the metaphor of the "new frontier" or even the term "outer" to this aspect of the cosmos, many Native Americans regard it as encompassed in "Father Sky," part of their network of symbolic associations that integrates all elements of the cosmos. A recent commercial called "Earth Pictures," produced by TRW, a firm that specializes in "aerial views" of portions of the earth's globe from outer space, aptly illustrates these differing attitudes.3 In this commercial, TRW representatives give members of the Navajo tribe a guided tour of the TRW laboratories and conclude by showing them a satellite picture (Landsat) of the Navajo reservation from outer space. With evident humor, the Navajos respond by holding up a picture of outer space from their reservation-a dry painting of Father Sky who contains within his body the sun, moon, and constellations. The commercial thus serves to illustrate Navajo beliefs about "outer space." According to Navajo worldview, which emphasizes harmonious relations with all elements of the cosmos-a sacred kinship among all aspects of experience, natural and supernatural-Father Sky is a living being, intimately related to humans who should, therefore, treat him with appreciation and respect. This example from the Navajo is representative of the cosmology of most Native American groups, a cosmology that is shaped by a belief in the unity and sacred nature of all life, the above and the below. As Joseph Epes Brown suggests, the Native American quality of seeing is based on "a polysynthetic metaphysic of nature, immediately experienced rather than dangerously abstracted."4 He describes this vision as a "message of the sacred nature of the land, of place."5 Place in this sense extends, of course, to outer space, or Father Sky, as well as to Mother Earth. This perspective contrasts sharply with that of enthusiasts of space exploration who regard space as something "out there," beyond everyday experience, through which we should travel to reach planets and other objects that we will investigate, and, if possible, use to meet our own needs.

#### Solves the aff better

**​​Barsh 93** Russel Lawrence Barsh 1993 “Native American Sovereignty” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Winter, 1993, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 671 (Professor of Native American Studies at the University of Lethbridge)//Elmer

There no longer seems to be much difference in the Westernization of the Third World and of the indigenous world. Indigenous societies are usually more isolated geographically, so the process of convergence is understandably slower. But they are catching up. While world leaders lament the loss of biological diversity, which holds the key to the renewal and survival of ecosystems, our planet rapidly is losing its cultural diversity, which holds the key to the renewal and survival of human societies. Scientists and scholars search for an alternative in their theories while real alternative cultures disappear. It will be a real struggle to reassert an indigenous perspective on social justice, democracy, and environmental security. The hardest part of the struggle will be converting words to action, going beyond the familiar, empty rhetoric of sovereignty and cultural superiority. The struggle will be hardest here in the United States, where the gaps between rhetoric and reality have grown greater than anywhere on earth. This is the best place to begin, however, because this is the illusory "demonstration" that is studied by the rest of the world, including the indigenous peoples of other regions. Are American Indians ready to accept this global responsibility? The current generation of tribal leadership appears unwilling to try. It is firmly committed by its actions to the materialist path, and it is neutralized by its dependence on a continuing financial relationship with the national government and developers. The next generation of American Indians may be another matter. Disillusioned and critical, they may yet find a voice of their own that is both modern and truly indigenous, and they may have the courage to practice the ideals that their parents merely sloganize. Let us hope so. There is no alternative for Indian survival or for global survival.

## OFF

### NC – Crypto Good

#### We endorse the entirety of the aff, except: Spacefaring nations should build the infrastructure necessary to allow Indigenous people to create terrestrially accessible blockchain verification computing centers and cryptocurrency mining centers on the Moon. The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust in all other instances.

#### Climate-motivated terrestrial mining regulations kill crypto now – those don’t get applied to space because of unique environments – that saves crypto with sufficient private investment

Greene 21 Greene, Tristan. Tristan covers human-centric artificial intelligence advances, quantum computing, STEM, Spiderman, physics, and space stuff. As far as I can tell his highest level of education was that he was in the Navy for a while. "What happens to Bitcoin when billionaires build cryptocurrency miners on the Moon?" TNW | Hardfork, 8 June 2021, thenextweb.com/news/bitcoin-billionaires-build-cryptocurrency-miners-on-moon-bitcoin.

Space exploration and exploitation have traditionally been nationalist endeavors. But the rise of the 12-digit billionaire has suddenly made outer space look like open territory. The players Jeff Bezos is stepping down from his position as the CEO of Amazon after 25 years ahead of his imminent launch into space aboard one of his own Blue Origin spaceships. This will be the future of fintech 6 trends that will dominate fintech in 2022 While it’s easy to imagine the long-time leader retiring to live out a childhood fantasy, there’s nothing in Bezos’ history as an incredibly ambitious person and businessman to indicate his he’ll just blast off into the sunset to live a life of quiet leisure. Simply put, Bezos’ interest in the space sector likely won’t end with offering consumer thrill rides. While it’s impossible to know where the soon-to-be-former CEO might take his ambition, it’s likely Amazon and/or Blue Origin is already looking for ways to exploit the space sector for profit. But, obviously, Bezos isn’t the only private citizen with a spaceship company. Elon Musk’s SpaceX has spent the last decade becoming the belle of NASA’s ball and he’s already all-in on the idea of sending humans to Mars. And we can’t forget Richard Branson. He may only be worth a paltry $5 billion (lol), but his Virgin Galactic company’s been banking on making some money in space tourism for a long time. Let’s also not forget that Virgin’s dabbled in everything from railroad technology to record labels. And the list goes on. Anyone with a few billion dollars has business options and opportunities that extend beyond our planet’s surface. Space for profit In the past, we’ve discussed the idea of mining space asteroids for profit. Some experts believe there are unimaginable fortunes floating around in space in the form of resource-rich asteroids. In fact, you can even get a degree in asteroid mining. And even Goldman Sachs has considered getting in on the action. But, at the end of the day, we still have to figure out where these resources are, build machines capable of extracting them, and get them safely to somewhere they can be useful. Right now, there’s not much value in investing in asteroid mining futures because the technology either doesn’t exist or isn’t ready yet. However, there’s more than one kind of mining you can do in space. Enter cryptocurrency and the future Elon Musk recently got involved in a friendly space race, but this time it has nothing to do with competition over rockets or government contracts. He’s racing against BitMEX, a cryptocurrency exchange and derivative platform, to see who can get a cryptocurrency on the Moon first. If you’re curious about how that works, here’s a snippet from BitMEX’s official announcement: BitMEX will mint a one-of-a-kind physical bitcoin, similar to the Casascius coins of 2013, which will be delivered to the Moon by Astrobotic. The coin will hold one bitcoin at an address to be publicly released, underneath a tamper-evident hologram covering. The coin will proudly display the BitMEX name, the mission name, the date it was minted and the bitcoin price at the time of minting. According to BitMEX, this isn’t just a ceremonial or token delivery. The coin itself is a hardware wallet containing an actual Bitcoin, so its value will change with the value of the BTC here on Earth. In other words, BitMEX is sending a literal treasure to the Moon for anyone brave (or rich) enough to retrieve it. Per the company’s blog post: A moon surface background with text superimposed, quote below Credit: BitMEX Come and Get It. When the physical coin lands, it will remain on the Moon until anyone deems it worthy of retrieval. Decades from now, what will it be worth? It’s a great question. Some experts have predicted a single bitcoin will one day be worth $100K, $1M, or even more. But an even better question is this: What’s the end game for cryptocurrency in space? Billionaires want to be trillionaires Back in 1999 Wired ran a feature about the imminent rise of the world’s first trillionaire. At the time, everyone assumed the richest man in the world, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates, would be the first trillionaire by a long shot. Here’s a quote from that article: The value of Bill’s Microsoft stake has grown from $233.9 million at the time of Microsoft’s 1986 IPO to $72.2 billion as of June 15, 1999 (disregarding stock sales). At this rate – 58.2 percent a year – he will become a trillionaire in March 2005, at age 49, and his Microsoft holdings will be valued at $1 quadrillion in March 2020, when he is 64. Of course, we still haven’t seen a trillionaire in modern history. As of the time of this writing, the richest person in the world is France’s Bernard Arnault, whose $193.6 billion empire edges out Jeff Bezos’ $189 billion. At some point, if Bezos wants to pull away with it or Elon Musk wants to close the widening gap between his $151.4 billion and a first place finish, the world’s richest people are going to have to do more than squeeze terrestrial markets for every last drop of profit. That’s why many experts view Elon Musk’s heavy involvement in cryptocurrency as the potential difference maker. On any given day the Tesla, SpaceX, and Neuralink founder’s total worth can skyrocket or plummet by tens of billions of dollars based on how his cryptocurrency holdings are performing. When you consider that market movements can be directly tied to Musk’s social media statements, the power proposition for billionaires holding cryptocurrency is unbridled. Simply put: Elon Musk has more control over the so-called “volatile” world of cryptocurrency than most. Putting a cryptocurrency in space, much like firing a Tesla off into the galaxy, is a PR move meant to generate interest in the burgeoning cryptomarket. But that’s not the only purpose they serve. These acts remind us that people like Musk and Bezos can do anything they want. If they want to put a coin on the Moon, they have the means to do it. And, for example, if Musk or Bezos suddenly wanted to solve the biggest problems with cryptocurrency mining – power consumption, carbon footprint, developing powerful-enough hardware – they’re in a unique position to do so. In space, no one can hear you mine Arguably, one of the biggest things stopping an apex whale like Elon Musk from spending a fair portion of his billions on cryptomining centers is the fact that such an operation would almost certainly draw universal condemnation for its potential effect on the global climate crisis. But the Moon’s atmosphere isn’t necessarily as fragile as the Earth’s. Hypothetically speaking, there’s nothing to stop a billionaire from building a facility on the Moon to mine cryptocurrency. They would, of course, need to be able to build their own batteries, have experience with artificial intelligence and supercomputers, and already have their own satellite network set up in space – all boxes Elon Musk can tick today. And, in the near-future, as we perfect deep space transmission technology, what’s to stop a billionaire from putting a supercomputer on a satellite and sending it somewhere in deep space to mine cryptocurrency 24/7 at near absolute-zero temperatures? All of this is conjecture, but the writing is on the wall. Cryptocurrency enthusiasts fear what the experts are consistently warning: regulation is coming. Eventually, it’s possible cryptocurrency mining could become regulated with harsh policies designed to keep mining operations from further damaging the environment. This could seriously hinder the market. If humanity walks away from terrestrial mining to save the planet, we’ll be leaving unfathomable amounts of money on table. Billionaires don’t become billionaires by doing that. The only logical path forward, barring some unknown new green mining technology, may be moving the cryptocurrency industry to space.

#### Cryptocurrency reach a wide rollout---that builds resilience to survive inevitable existential filters.

Alex McShane 21, Writer and Head of Video for Bitcoin Magazine, BA from the University of Iowa, Degree from the University College Dublin, Degree from Kirkwood Community College, “Bitcoin and Existential Risk”, Bitcoin Magazine, 9/5/2021, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/bitcoin-and-existential-risk-alex-mcshane

TL;DR - An existential risk is the possibility of an event or series of events that could drastically curtail humanity’s potential. A hypothetical global catastrophe could be anthropogenic or non-anthropogenic and internal or external in nature. The adoption of Bitcoin will better position us to address these risks as a society.

EXTERNAL NON-ANTHROPOGENIC

A catastrophic collision with an astronomical object, such as an asteroid impact would be an external non-anthropogenic risk. This has already occurred here several times. During the Permian Triassic period (ending 250 million years ago) an astronomical impact killed 90 percent of the species on Earth. It took tens of millions of years for life on Earth to repopulate and Earth’s intelligence potential to recover.

One interesting external non-anthropogenic risk is Earth’s reflected light, which could be measured by an external intelligence who then come to extinguish us. (The topic of our own signal bringing about this death by misadventure is discussed further below.)

What does this have to do with Bitcoin?

Generally, hard money facilitates greater innovation and technological process. At this point one might argue that if we do not migrate to some degree from Earth as a species, and are subsequently wiped out by an astronomical object impact or a super-volcanic event, the risk becomes anthropogenic in nature. We are a centralized species on a grand scale, and at this point one could say we have through consensus chosen to remain vulnerable to a single vector of attack by staying here.

Bitcoin is not only the hardest money known to man, it is the most responsible from this standpoint. Bitcoin as it currently operates is currency that can provide a monetary framework on which humans can achieve greater capital growth, collaboration, resource allocation, and therefore technological progress. Because the terminal supply of Bitcoin is capped, we can store value in it indefinitely as a society.

66 Million years ago the Cretaceous-Paleogene Extinction Event extinguished the life and intelligence potential of the non-avian dinosaurs. This series of events was external, and broadly non-anthropogenic in the sense that no form of life on Earth at the time contributed to its own demise, but more specifically, at the time of those astronomical impacts the first humans hadn’t split from chimpanzee lineages. This split is thought to have occurred between between 4 and 8 million years ago.

An important distinction between astronomical impacts or super-volcanic events of the past and such events if they were to happen today is that one could argue that our intelligence potential is now mature enough to tackle certain of the external existential risks. Today, the risk posed by an asteroid impact or something similar would still be external in its origin, but at what point does the burden of responsibility to migrate off of the planet fall upon our population? We can surely solve for some external existential risks, and in any case, no one is going to do it for us. You could say that failing to collectively pursue a solution when technically we could have would recategorize a civilization-extinguishing asteroid impact as an external but anthropogenic risk.

At what point do innovation dampening authoritarian states and their mandated broken money cause society to stall at a local optimum? Surely the government has already caused this. It’s only a matter of time before another object strikes the Earth with devastating consequence. I would argue it is irresponsible to continue life here with government money. Government money is an existential risk. Bitcoin is not only a solution, it is a societal responsibility.

INTERNAL ANTHROPOGENIC

Nuclear war is one example of an internal anthropogenic risk. That is, should nuclear war arise, it would be both self destructive, and relatively self contained on a cosmic scale. It follows that biological warfare is an internal anthropogenic risk, the reality of which we as a species can surely understand now. If I were to hazard a guess I would say virtual emergencies and cyber pandemics are next. These self constructed catastrophes are the government’s misguided attempts at proof of work. This is a topic for another time. Do not surrender your ability to think and speak freely.

The second law of thermodynamics can summed thus, processes that involve the transfer or conversion of heat energy are irreversible. The law indicates we have not observed a spontaneous transfer of energy from cold to hot. Another way to think of this is that there is no such thing as cold, only lesser degrees of hot. Nothing cannot transfer. So broadly, within a closed system, the second law of thermodynamics would indicate that all differences tend to level out.

So what has this got to do with Bitcoin?

Well firstly, all hardware is subject to entropy. The distributed nature of the blockchain increases the probability that it will survive centralized entropy. At Bitcoin’s inception, imagine a failure because Satoshi’s computer randomly crashed. Distributed networks are inherently hedged against this particular centralized form of existential risk.

The second law of thermodynamics also suggests that on a grander scale, relatively isolated (centralized) systems will degenerate more and more into disordered states. Proof of work, and network growth are two ways Bitcoin fights against falling into disrepair.

Bitcoin uses proof of work to stave off entropy. The system cannot stay dormant. It must continue to use proof of work to advance the state of the chain, and to fight entropy to secure the monetary value all of the users have stored in the network. The U.S. dollar, as many have pointed out, relies on proof of war, or distributed political energies to maintain dominance. Its methodology can be described as haphazard at best.

INTERNAL NON-ANTHROPOGENIC

One internal non-anthropogenic risk is that of a super-volcanic eruption, provided it wasn’t humans who brought about the eruption. Just like with external non-anthropogenic risks, Bitcoin alone cannot prevent them, but it can help humans prepare for them such that we may survive these relatively small intelligence filters the universe throws our way.

Bitcoin allows for fundamental capital accumulation and human innovation, and promotes collaboration to such a degree that we will find an increased collective problem solving power as humans the further Bitcoin adoption spreads. It is worth mentioning that Bitcoin also maintains and appreciates wealth to such a degree that often those of us to chose to live our lives on a Bitcoin standard will experience relatively greater freedoms, and vastly greater amounts of free time than our peers who chose to continue their lives on a fiat standard, and are perpetually working to outpace their chronic debt. Many Bitcoiners will likely forego that newfound free time to work and continue to provide value to others in whatever area interests them, because Bitcoin incentivizes the collaborative accumulation of capital but also the responsible reallocation of it.

EXTERNAL ANTHROPOGENIC

An external anthropogenic risk has the least probability of occurring. This is a problem of reach. Imagine human intelligence being sent into the cosmos and signaling or generally causing an external intelligence or astronomical object to come back to extinguish us. This is a most improbable extinction by misadventure.

The probability that we send messages of consequence into the cosmos that in turn cause some other far-flung intelligence, with knowledge enough to reach us, to come and bring about our own destruction is next to zero, but it isn’t zero.

I would posit that the probability increases every day that Bitcoin survives, with each person that chooses to hold Bitcoin over fiat, because on a fiat standard we are again, stuck at a local optimum at best, and each day the global monetary system devolves further into chaos. The fiat world may continue to be habitable chaos, but our technological progress and our greatest capacity for innovation cannot be achieved on a fiat standard.

A Bitcoin standard is not only our current best bet, it is the only monetary vehicle that will take us from here, or enable us to build technology that can effectively communicate with places in the universe where other intelligence has emerged. The other reason this fatal miscommunication is unlikely to occur is that once through a Bitcoin standard we have manage to build a society that can effectively reach and communicate at greater depths of the cosmos we will at that time have already become a multi-planetary, if not transitory, if not multi-solar system species. The topic of Bitcoin in space and planetary interoperability will be discussed in a later essay.

The most distant human made object from the earth is the Voyager 1, which is over 13 billion miles away. (For perspective, Apha Centuri, the nearest star system to Earth, is 25 trillion miles away.) Human radio signals have announced our presence and our intelligence to the cosmos since around 1900. The first human radio signals have all ready traveled 114 light years, that is 681,920,540,000,000 miles. Although the reach of our radio signals is very great, the probability of us being heard and subsequently extinguished is negligible. External anthropogenic risks are the least of our concerns at the moment.

As Bitcoin adoption grows, it serves to promote advances in artificial intelligence and nanotechnology. External anthropogenic risks will become more relevant to human intelligence at a much later time. External non-anthropogenic risks are similarly out of our hands for the time being. That is, at the moment there is nothing we can do to prevent the Sun from becoming a red giant star and subsuming the Earth.

But we do already have the monetary technology upon which to engineer solutions to some of these problems. We have the potential as humans to prevent internal global catastrophes, both those set on by us and not. Survival and longevity is arguably our greatest task as a species. Adopting Bitcoin, and protecting this network is proceeding with diligence and a long eye toward the future in all of our political and scientific affairs. The existential risks of living are great, though it is human nature for our ambitions to out pace our current abilities. The only evidence of life is change. To change is to exit fiat currency, it is to use Bitcoin instead.

## OFF

### NC – K – Long

#### Their use of an ethical frame of “injustice” presumes a metaphysics of discrete individuals for injustice to be acted by and on – that’s both conceptually incorrect and leads us to egoistic violence

Carpenter 17 Carpenter, Amber, works in ancient Greek and classical Indian philosophy, with a topical focus on the metaphysics, epistemology and moral psychology underpinning Plato’s ethics and Indian Buddhist ethics, taught or held visiting research appointments at the University of York, St Andrews, Cornell, Oxford, the University of Melbourne and Yale University. BA (Yale), PhD (Kings College London). "Ethics without Justice." A Mirror Is for Reflection: Understanding Buddhist Ethics (2017).

This study in the Buddhist claim that we ought to eliminate anger, and the distinctively Buddhist mode of doing so, has shown that the link between injustice and anger presumes a metaphysics. The moral perspective that picks out injustice as a special and additional kind of harm requires a metaphysics of discrete individuals, doing and “being done to” in turn, with a clear distinction between the two. But such a metaphysics and its moral categories engender in turn certain typical modes of thought—in particular, obsessing about Who is to Blame. Particularly in our victim-status-claiming age, we should wonder whether this is especially fruitful—or apt.

The Buddhist cannot show that their view will confirm or conform to all our intuitions about injustice because their basic metaphysical presumptions do not support the centrality of autonomous agency as a distinctive sort of cause, nor the violation of that by such free agents as a distinctive sort of harm. This is not, however, just an oversight or a morally horrifying omission. The proposal of an alternative metaphysics is the proposal of an alternative way of conceiving the moral. For every exercise in appreciating what no-self means, and what its implications are, is simultaneously an exercise in detachment, in recognizing the impulse to blame and resent as harmful assertions of oneself over and against others. Removing the conceptual structures for righteous indignation strips our evaluations of situations and persons of its self-assertiveness. Rather than being enervating, or blinding us to what moral responsiveness demands, this outlook is resolutely practical. None of this denies the no-self anger-eliminativist the resources necessary for forensics: we can see that some sets of conditions have intentions among them, and we can recognize that under some circumstances, these are more effectively engaged with in modes that differ from how we would engage with a forest fire.30 To regard someone’s raging violence as a forest fire does not mean that we turn the fire hose on it; it means that we consider the enabling conditions and defeating conditions and seek to eliminate the one and enhance the other.31

At the same time, as no-self introduces fluidity into our practices of individuation, it presents us with the entangled mutual causation of all factors and the simultaneous suffering. To see no-self, Buddhist-wise, just is to see that everything is conditioned and conditioning. Released from the demands of indignation, we are left with the only attitude that is appropriate in the face of suffering—a practically oriented care to relieve that suffering. Karuṇā is not an additional feature of a Buddhist outlook or the next thing on the list of dogmata. Care just is the affective and practical recognition of no-self metaphysics. Without discrete individuals to appeal to in any situation—these the perpetrators, these the victims—we have only efficacy in removing suffering as the standard preventing us from nihilism. Where before there were culprits to blame, and myself to exonerate or assert in retaliation, there is now only suffering, for which care to alleviate it is simply what is left when I am no longer distracted by righteous indignation.

#### Delusional egoism collapses the biosphere and produces rampant nationalism – extinction

Loy 17 David R Loy, former Besl Professor of Ethics/Religion and Society at Xavier University, teacher in Sanbo Kyodan Buddhism. M.A. in Asian philosophy from the University of Hawaii in 1975, and Ph.D. in philosophy in 1984 from the National University of Singapore. “Are Humans Special?” Tikkun, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter 2017, <http://www.davidloy.org/downloads/Loy%20Are%20Humans%20Special.pdf>.

One uniquely human characteristic, emphasized by Buddhism, is that we can develop the ability to “dis-identify” from anything and everything, letting go not only of the individual sense of separate self but also of collective selves: dissociating from dualisms such as patriarchy, nationalism, racism, even species-ism (“we’re human, not lower animals”). Meditation develops such nonattachment, yet the point of such letting-go is not to dissociate from everything but to realize our nonduality with everything.

That human beings are the only species (so far as we know) that can know it is a manifestation of the entire cosmos opens up a possibility that may need to be embraced if we are to survive the crises that now confront us. Instead of continuing to exploit the earth’s ecosystems for our own supposed benefit, we can choose to work for the well-being of the whole. That we are not separate from the rest of the biosphere makes the whole earth our body, in effect, which implies not only a sp cial understanding but also a special role in response to that realization. As the Metta Sutta declares: “Let one’s thoughts of boundless love pervade the whole world— above, below, and across — without any obstruction, without any hatred, without any enmity.”

To ask whether the universe itself is objectively meaningful or meaningless is to miss the point— as if the universe were outside us, or simply there without us. When we do not erase ourselves from the picture, we can see that we are meaning- makers, the beings by which the universe introduces a new scale of significance and value.

The Responsibility of Being Special

If we are special because of our potential, we must choose. We are free to derive the meaning of our lives from delusions about who we are—from dysfunctional stories about what the world is and how we fit into it—or we can derive that meaning from insight into our nonduality with the rest of the world. In either case, there are consequences.

The problem with basing one’s life on delusions is that the consequences are unlikely to be good. As well as producing poetry and cathedrals, our creativity has recently found expression in world wars, genocides, and weapons of mass destruction, to mention a few disagreeable examples. We are in the early stages of an ecological crisis that threatens the natural and cultural legacy of future generations, including a mass extinction event that may lead to the disappearance of half the earth’s plant and animal species within a century, according to E. O. Wilson—an extinction event that may include ourselves.

What needs to be done so that our extraordinary co-creative powers will promote collective well-being (collective in this case referring to all the ecosystems of the biosphere)? Must we evolve further—not biologically but culturally—in order to survive at all? From a Buddhist perspective our unethical tendencies ultimately derive from a misapprehension: the delusion of a self that is separate from others, a big mistake for a species whose well-being is not separate from the well-being of other species. Insofar as we are ignorant of our true nature, individual and collective self-preoccupation naturally motivates us to be selfish. Without the compassion that arises when we feel empathy—not only with other humans, but with the whole of the biosphere—it is likely that civilization as we know it will not survive many more generations.

In either case, we seem fated to be special. If we continue to devastate the rest of the biosphere, we are arguably the worst species on earth: a cancer of the biosphere. If, however, humanity can wake up to become its collective bodhisattva—undertaking the long-term task of repairing the rupture between us and Mother Earth—perhaps we as a species will fulfill the unique potential of precious human life.

#### Planetary interdependence uniquely extends into space – the alternative is a shift away from individuation towards a politics of care that recognizes our mutual interdependence

Gál 20 Réka Gál, PhD student at the Faculty of Information and a Fellow at the McLuhan Centre for Culture and Technology, work unites feminist media theory and postcolonial studies with the history of science and environmental studies and explores how technological tools and scientific methods are employed to purportedly solve socio-political problems. B.A American and Media Studies, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, M.A Cultural Studies, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. "Climate Change, COVID-19, and the Space Cabin: A Politics of Care in the Shadow of Space Colonization." mezosfera.org, Oct, 2020, mezosfera.org/climate-change-covid-19-and-the-space-cabin-a-politics-of-care-in-the-shadow-of-space-colonization.

As much as dominant cultural narratives encourage us to entertain the idea that humans stand separate from and above their environments, the planetary crises of climate change and COVID-19 are painful reminders of the ways in which human and nonhuman ecologies are perpetually entangled. It is well-known that industrialized human-nonhuman relations, based on the capitalist extraction of what are considered natural resources, stand at the root of numerous environmental problems that are contributing to climate change. Animal industries – specifically the livestock industry – are one of the largest contributors to deforestation, greenhouse gas emission, and species extinctions.17 COVID-19’s believed origins in the Huanan wild animal markets and its eventual spread to humans is further testament to the ways in which our ecologies are always inseparable, with their intertwined nature here manifesting violently towards humans. Moreover, the spread of the coronavirus lays bare how local exploitation of nature can have global repercussions: the wildlife industry in China exists to this day because wildlife is considered a natural resource owned by the state, and the breeding, domestication, and trading of wildlife is encouraged by law.18

What must be made clear to those who are entertaining the idea that space habitats could provide a solution to such crises is that leaving Earth does not render these entanglements null and void. As much as spacecraft have been positioned as examples of subordinating the rules of nature to human control, their material reality only further consolidates the reciprocity of human and nonhuman, including human-machine, relations. 19 Our dependence on our surroundings intensifies in outer space. The inhospitality of space makes even the most physically fit astronauts dependent on numerous life support systems: oxygen and food supplies, waste management, and humidity control are all technologically operated but require continuous maintenance by humans. As such, ensuring the normal operation of a spacecraft is a relevant analogy for how a relationship of care with the diverse life support systems on Earth could be established.20

However, governments and private companies have been selling people the dream of human spaceflight ever since the Cold War, and the origins of this project in a military enterprise have made a significant mark on its implications for care work. The world of the 1960-70s astronauts was extremely segregated: the popular narrative was that of the hypermasculine astronaut, able to cope with danger and pain without complaint, with a brave wife at home waiting for his return.21 This segregation has had a remarkable impact on the types of work which have been considered “worthy” of these hypermasculine astronauts. In fact, the first American to travel to space, Alan Shepard, explicitly objected to having to learn maintenance techniques. As historian David Mindell put it, “the hottest test pilots didn’t want to be repairmen in space.”22 Similarly, data collected from NASA’s Skylab and the International Space Station’s 4-8 expeditions reveal that the time needed to complete maintenance activities on the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems was vastly underestimated, and in some cases even completely left out of operations plans.23 Even as late as the 2000s, the gendered view of care activities aboard spacecraft persisted: regarding the first female commander of a Space Shuttle, Eileen Collins, NASA made sure that her public persona was level-headed but also “pleasing.” She was referred to as “nice.” She took care of her fellow astronauts on board, taking on emotional labor by “providing support in ways that ease[d] the long hours and tension of training.” Her Air Force nickname was Mom.24

When this article calls for a feminist critique of outer space colonization, the argument is not that banishing technology and returning to a “pristine” nature or some other type of utopian primitivism is going to solve our planetary crises. Nor is it the point that more women need to be hired. What is being critiqued here is what Debbie Chachra has pointed out as a masculinist-capitalist obsession with progress and technological innovation that casts all maintenance, repair, and care work as inferior to creation.25 Much as our current experience of physical isolation during COVID-19 has exhibited, only during breakdowns are such taken-for-granted services made visible anew.26 The privileging of production obscures the societal understanding of the very real relationality of living, and the ongoing care and maintenance work required to keep human life running smoothly both on Earth and in outer space.

Therefore, the problem with extraplanetary colonization is not solely that this escape reinforces an enduring gendered opposition between exit and care, privileging the former over the latter, but also that machines only give the illusion of providing humans with independence from care work. Orsolya Ferencz, the Hungarian Secretary of Space Affairs, claims that Hungarian machines in outer space do not break down27 but the truth is that machines, just like our “natural” environments, do repeatedly break down. They require maintenance. Humans whose lives are intimately intertwined with technology are all too aware of this. Social scientist Laura Forlano writes about her experience as a diabetic who uses various technologies to monitor and maintain her blood glucose levels: “With respect to my insulin pump and glucose monitor, often, I am not really sure whether I am taking care of them, or they are taking care of me.”28 This interdependence additionally applies to the care for “natural” environments which can be regularly observed, for example, in the relationship of Indigenous communities to the environment. In the Hā’ena community in Hawaii, for instance, not only do they always return some of the fish caught to the water as a way of thanking the ocean, but they also managed to impose a ten-year fishing moratorium around their island in 2019, which will both help the renewal of the ecosystem and the recovery of the immediate environment, allowing future generations to fish sustainably.29 With this moratorium, the Hā’ena are providing care-based, restorative justice: the ocean ecosystem has fallen victim to injustice (overfishing), and remedying this ought to help heal the party wounded by the injustice, which is in this case the ocean.30

The extractive industry practices deeply embedded within Western social systems clearly propel us toward unsustainable development. Escaping Earth will not solve these problems. Rather, the solution requires a fundamental onto-epistemological shift, one that will enable us to move away from the exploitative Western-colonialist worldview and towards one that prioritizes care and sustainability. The works of feminist and Indigenous thinkers can inspire us to imagine and understand such a worldview. Numerous pre-colonial Indigenous cultures were sustainability-centric: the acceptance of the reciprocity between humans and their environment and the enforcing of the ethics of care in all areas of life were essential parts of several nations’ worldviews. Indigenous epistemologies see humans and nature as members of an ecological family in which humans, the nonhuman beings around them (for example, badgers, antelopes) and materials (for example, water, clay) all form part of their kinship structures.31 In Indigenous cultures that have survived colonization, such teachings and ethical approaches are passed down to this day.32 Research by Potawatomi scholar Kyle P. Whyte and Chris Cuomo demonstrate that Indigenous conceptions of care emphasize the importance of recognizing that humans, nonhumans (animals) and collectives (e.g. forests) exist in networks of interdependence. Indigenous care ethics manifest also in the fact that mutual responsibility is seen as the moral basis of relationships.33 An important part of this mutual responsibility is that care-based justice is not punishment-centered but recovery-centered: as in the example of the fishing moratorium of the Hā’ena, it seeks to promote restorative justice for those wounded by injustice. This restoration is aimed not only at people and communities, but also at nature.34 Similarly, an ethics of care in feminist philosophy treats the state of interdependence of human and nonhuman beings as a moral foundation.35

Since all infrastructures break, they require continuous maintenance. Information scientist Steven Jackson therefore proposes that the starting point to our thinking on the human relationship to technology has to be a contemplation of “erosion, breakdown, and decay, rather than novelty, growth, and progress.”36 If we accept that our world is “always-almost-falling-apart,”37 then instead of simply focusing on technological innovation as the vessel of our salvation,38 we need to look at the ways in which the world is constantly fixed, cared for, and maintained. This, of course, does not only translate to humans’ relationship to machines, but also to our relationship to our environment –in fact, feminist scholars have already made this point about dealing with our environmental problems: historian of science Donna Haraway’s concept of “staying with the trouble”39 explicitly pleads for the foregrounding of the inherent interconnectedness and interdependence of living, and for working on restoring our broken systems. What we are looking at here is a promising paradigm shift in human-machine and human-nature relations that promotes the recognition that the processes of care and maintenance are foundational to the way humanity relates to our biotic and abiotic environments.40

Both life during the social isolation of COVID-19 and life in the space cabin highlight our perpetual interdependence with our environments. Our life support systems are in a state of continuous decay, but the solution to this is not building more and more invasive risk-mitigation machines based on individualization, isolation and an imperative of absolute, one-directional control. Instead, a better, safer, more sustainable future starts with acknowledging one’s place in a web of interdependent relationships.41 Among other steps, this means that instead of acting as though our biotic and abiotic infrastructures can endlessly care for us, we need to care for them in return. This entails not only planting new forests and cleaning up shorelines, but also policy decisions such as the fishing moratorium mentioned above. As anthropologist Gökçe Günel indicates, even the technologies used for the harvesting of renewable energies require maintenance: solar panels, for example, need to be wiped clean of dust and sand regularly.42 Thinking through the lens of maintenance and care also means providing infrastructures for effectively repairing machines as opposed to producing e-waste and continuously buying new ones which are thrown away once a smarter version is released. Additionally, it means respecting and paying theworkers who are cleaning our hospitals, nursing our sick and harvesting food – most of them immigrants, predominantly women43 – better, as they are the reason we have clean hospitals, transport, and food on our tables, even during a global pandemic.44

## Case

#### 2] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### 3] That is the only egalitarian metric---anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

### NC – Role of the Ballot

No Arbitrary roles of the ballot- the judge should vote for the side that produces the best material consequences. Anything else moots the NC and lets the aff choose a self-serving starting point for discussion.

### Extinction Reps Good – Not Settler

#### Advocacy to prevent extinction is good and not colonialist – it’s a radical vision of a “we.”

Coles and Susen, 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262, dml)

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

Throughout Visionary Pragmatism, I argue that there are powerful reasons for active hope. At the same time, we do not live far from tipping points beyond which planetary ecological collapse, globalizing neoliberal fascism, and violent chaos may overwhelm our efforts. I do not think so much in terms of pessimism or optimism as I do about seizing and co-creating opportunities for catalysing dynamic changes in theory and practice that foster a powerful movement of receptive democracy, for complex democratic commonwealth and ecological flourishing. In one sense, as Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ makes poignantly clear, it is always ‘too late’ for so much and so many, as catastrophic history keeps piling wreckage at our feet. At the same time, there are what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘weak messianic powers’ that emerge as the retroactive force of salvaged aspects of past struggles ignite sparks with emerging struggles to explode the continuum of progress. In this sense, up to our day, it is never altogether too late. With the language of ‘game-transformative practice’, I argue that a visionary-pragmatic movement of radical democracy must do something analogous in response to the fierce urgency of now, to avoid a sixth extinction in which this possibility could well become a casualty.

### NC – AT: Advantage

#### Space discourse inevitable – people will always romanticize, the card is about public appropriation.

#### Public sector mining thumps

NASA 19 [“NASA Invests in Tech Concepts Aimed at Exploring Lunar Craters, Mining Asteroids,” NASA, June 11, 2019, <https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-invests-in-tech-concepts-aimed-at-exploring-lunar-craters-mining-asteroids>] TDI

NASA Invests in Tech Concepts Aimed at Exploring Lunar Craters, Mining Asteroids

Robotically surveying lunar craters in record time and mining resources in space could help NASA establish a sustained human presence at the Moon – part of the agency’s broader [Moon to Mars exploration](https://www.nasa.gov/specials/moon2mars/) approach. Two mission concepts to explore these capabilities have been selected as the first-ever Phase III studies within the [NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts](https://www.nasa.gov/niac) (NIAC) program.

“We are pursuing new technologies across our development portfolio that could help make deep space exploration more Earth-independent by utilizing resources on the Moon and beyond,” said Jim Reuter, associate administrator of NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate. “These NIAC Phase III selections are a component of that forward-looking research and we hope new insights will help us achieve more firsts in space.”

The Phase III proposals outline an aerospace architecture, including a mission concept, that is innovative and could change what’s possible in space. Each selection will receive as much as $2 million. Over the course of two years, researchers will refine the concept design and explore aspects of implementing the new technology. The inaugural Phase III selections are:

Robotic Technologies Enabling the Exploration of Lunar Pits

William Whittaker, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh

This mission concept, called Skylight, proposes technologies to rapidly survey and model lunar craters. This mission would use high-resolution images to create 3D model of craters. The data would be used to determine whether a crater can be explored by human or robotic missions. The information could also be used to characterize ice on the Moon, a crucial capability for the sustained surface operations of NASA’s Artemis program. On Earth, the technology could be used to autonomously monitor mines and quarries.

[Mini Bee Prototype to Demonstrate the Apis Mission Architecture and Optical Mining Technology](https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/niac/2019_Phase_I_Phase_II/Mini_Bee_Prototype)

Joel Sercel, TransAstra Corporation, Lake View Terrace, California

This flight demonstration mission concept proposes a method of asteroid resource harvesting called optical mining. Optical mining is an approach for excavating an asteroid and extracting water and other volatiles into an inflatable bag. Called Mini Bee, the mission concept aims to prove optical mining, in conjunction with other innovative spacecraft systems, can be used to obtain propellant in space. The proposed architecture includes resource prospecting, extraction and delivery.

#### Abstract drives don’t shape action.

Paris 17 [Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]

In an era in which psychiatry is dominated by neuroscience-based models, psychological constructs tend to be neglected and may be taken seriously only when they have neural correlates.37 Some psychoanalysts have sought to link their model with neurobiological research and to claim that newer methods of studying the brain can validate their theories.5,6

Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, is the founder of “neuropsychoanalysis.” This new field, with its own society and its own journal, proposes to use neuroimaging to confirm analytic theories. Its key idea is that subjective experience and the unconscious mind can be observed through neuroimaging.5 It is known that brain processes can be seen on brain imaging even before they have entered consciousness.38 However, claims that neuroimaging validate Freud’s model of the unconscious can be based only on “cherry-picking” the literature. The observed correspondences are superficial and hardly support the complex edifice of psychoanalytic theory.

Solms39 has also suggested that Freud’s ideas about dreams are consistent with neuroscience research based on rapid eye movement (REM) activity. This attempt to rescue a century-old theory met with opposition from dream researchers who consider Freud’s clinical speculations to be incompatible with empirical data.40,41

The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42 Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models, without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.

However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.

Another attempt to reconcile psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.

Psychoanalysis and the Humanities

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.

This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism.

One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power.

Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history.

#### LEO is uniquely accessible to African industry due to cheaper launch and production costs – that allows them to resist colonialism

Samanga 21 Ruvimbo Samanga, Zimbabwean scholar and lawyer working with the Space Law & Policy, holds a BA Law (cum laude), an LLB and an LLM in International Trade and Investment Law from the University of Pretoria. "Why Africa Should Expand its Mega-Satellite Constellation Capacity." Space Legal Issues, 3 May. 2021, www.spacelegalissues.com/why-africa-should-expand-its-mega-satellite-constellation-capacity.

Since 1988, Africa has spent approx. USD$4 billion towards the launch of 41 satellites (excluding the cost of the RASCOM-QAF 1R replacement). 30 of these satellites fall into the Small Satellite market. The majority of satellites owned by African institutions typically involves satellites with less than 600kgs in fueled mass and 24 of these satellites have less than 200kg fueled mass. The reason for the interest in the miniaturized satellites? In a nutshell, they offer cheaper design alternatives, coupled with the ease of mass production. They are also significantly more versatile in certain applications, owing to their reduced size. For example, they are the satellite of choice for low data rate communications, being launched in large multi-coverage constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). It comes as no surprise then that small satellites are growing increasingly popular amongst developing countries, no less within the region, for the accessibility. The growth of the small satellite industry is evident in commercial as well as large programs which exhibit steady growth. In 2019, 5 African countries launched 8 satellites, 6 of which were small satellites. It is expected that by the year 2024, 19 African countries would have launched additional satellites into space. These small, sometimes called nano-satellites, are really driving the African space program, especially in line with the African Union’s (AU) science and technology ambitions which are expected to reap huge benefits for the continent. Most importantly through the AU Science, Technology and Innovation Science Strategy for Africa – 2024 (STISA-2024). Small satellites are categorized as space systems of up to 600 kg (falling into the categories of Minisatellites, Microsatellite, Nanosatellite, Picosatellite, and Femto Satellites). They range across different applications (Satellite Communications, Imaging & Earth Observations, Space Situational Awareness, and Technology Development), and have different end users (Government & Defense, and Civil & Commercial). Of the 8 satellites launched in 2019, 6 were small satellites (3 Nanosatellites, 2 Microsatellites, and 1 Picosatellite). Satellite communications mega-constellations are on the rise, however this growing interest is not without its challenges and uncertainties. The biggest risks in the small sat interest in the coming years are mostly ascribed to investor’s rick assessment & funding availability; Securing customers & Return on Investment (ROI); Stronger regulations; Competition from heavier satellite, and reliability. This is also further compounded by the fact that establishing a satellite service industry which is sustainable requires adequate funding. Skillset deficit is also a prominent challenge. Even though Africa has and will in future have the largest population of young people, the youth are generally not interested in pursuing careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). You can expect more satellites to be launched despite these crises. As regards the African Small Sat market, the growth perspectives seem to point towards predominant university projects which demonstrates a capacity to operate Smallsats, also attesting to the affordability of the systems. This is also a sign of government effort to support the growth of this industry, and the contributions of the youth in satellite development. Indeed the manufacturing ability is extremely important, but also the service capability and development prospects. Despite these positive steps there is still quite a need for funding in this area. Of the overall revenue and results, Earth Observation is the most predominant small sat use, however it is expected in the next few years this may shift to internet broadband, but ultimately, creating value for users and enabling services that drive industry development will be the ultimate determining factor. Internet coverage allows people to create capacity and this might undoubtedly be Africa’s most prolific use of small satellite solutions. CubeSats which are around 50 kg, are the most popular and are only getting bigger because of the interest for carrying larger payloads. But in future it may become less stringent to use the restricted platform, but the threshold is bound to switch to a smaller regular platform. These services are enabled through satellite mega-constellations. Satellite mega-constellations operate in the Lower Earth Orbit which is described as the orbit located no more than 2,000 kilometers from the Earth’s surface. There is room for LEO regarding low-latency connectivity. But this does not mean that the Geostationary Orbit will become redundant, rather, and on the other hand GEO will remain an asset for broadband, because of its efficiency and coverage as well as less-sophisticated ground segments. Nevertheless, the LEO offers the most advantageous orbital resource to come and deserves much policy intervention to regulate, owing to the fact that it is a finite, scare resource. At the end of the day, whether Smallsats are launched in a constellation or as individual space systems, they offer a cost-effective alternative to traditional space objects, and would allow Africa the opportunity to release its potential in various areas of interest including but not limited to communications, global positioning and navigation, and Earth observation. Africa would be enriched by the ability to use this new technology to enable users through diverse services, to protect assets within the value chain, or simply to monitor areas of national security such as the environment and borders. These are all aspects which will have a substantial developmental impact in the African economy, and is well aligned to the African space policy which speaks towards increase of space and satellite capacity in an affordable and beneficial manner.

#### Ontology has a narrative deficit – doesn’t overcode everything and makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting terms of victory as all-or-nothing -- reifies acquiescence to subtler settler power

Busbridge 18—Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018, dml)

The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7).

The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising -- although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’.

Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

#### Reps don’t matter – they’re unknowable and 2 people in a room talking have no impact on others.