### 1NC

#### CP: We endorse the entirety of the affirmative with the exception of Large Satellite Constellations for the purposes of 6G development and research. Significant subsidization and funding directed towards private entities developing 6G is just. The utilization of cryptocurrency by state and non-state actors is unjust.

#### Private LEO appropriation drive rapid SatCom 6G innovations – that’s key to pervasive communication services that solve medical data flow deficits and solve UN SGDs

Höyhtyä et al 22 Marko Höyhtyä, Senior Member, IEEE, Sandrine Boumard, Anastasia Yastrebova, Pertti Järvensivu, Markku Kiviranta, Senior Member, IEEE and Antti Anttonen, Senior Member, IEEE. "Sustainable Satellite Communications in the 6G Era: A European View for Multi-Layer Systems and Space Safety." arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.02408 (2022)

THE two main disruptions driving the development and rapid growth of satellite communications (SatCom) are increasing satellite constellations sizes and integration of satellite and terrestrial networks. The former also aims to provide broadband services to currently underserved areas with improved performance. The latter is related to the evolution of mobile networks where different wireless and wired technologies converge together. This creates vast amount of new opportunities in different application fields such as public safety, digital health, logistics and Internet services in developing countries. The annual space business related to 5th generation (5G) and 6th generation (6G) of communication systems is expected to grow to more than €500B during the next two decades [1]–[3]. This is more than the whole space business currently including scientific missions, earth observation (EO) and navigations. At the same time the whole space sector is in the transformation phase due to so called New Space Economy. Significant reduction of launch costs and easy and affordable access to space have attracted new innovative players to space business [4], [5]. Especially Low Earth Orbit (LEO) systems and small satellites are increasing rapidly. The most typical orbit heights are above 500 km but there are significant efforts to use also very low Earth orbits (vLEO) to provide sensing and communications services. The so called Karman line, defining where atmosphere ends and space begins, is above 80 km and orbiting objects can survive multiple perigees passages at altitudes around 80–90 km [6]. Small satellites in the range of 80-220 kg can be seen as a sweet spot [5] since they are large enough for payloads to support e.g. broadband communications [7]–[9] or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging [10], [11]. A. Multi-Layer Networks 6G systems will be used to provide pervasive services worldwide in order to support both dense and less dense areas. To achieve this goal, 6G systems will need to integrate terrestrial, airborne (drones, high-altitude platforms (HAPs)) and satellite communications at different orbits [12], [13]. This means that in contrast to traditional research and development (R&D) work, network analysis, planning and optimization will be updated from two dimensions to three dimensions (3D), where also the heights of communications nodes are taken into consideration [12]–[15]. In this way, 6G networks will be able to provide drastically higher performance to support e.g., passengers in ships and airplanes. The initiatives spawned recently range from very high throughput geostationary orbit (GEO) systems to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [16]–[18] and small satellite systems dedicated to machine-to-machine (M2M) and Internet-of- things (IoT) services [19]–[21]. Especially interesting are mega-constellations consisting of hundreds to thousands of small and medium size satellites like those proprietary ones envisaged by OneWeb, Starlink, Orbcomm and Telesat to mention but a few. There is also ongoing active work in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standardization to define non-terrestrial networks (NTN) with interoperable interfaces in order to have truly seamless connectivity in the future, described in detail in Section V.B. B. Space Safety and Sustainability There are not only technical drivers in the development of the multi-layer 6G networks. It is essential to develop services and technologies in a sustainable way in order to ensure high quality services also to coming generations. To mention a few examples: 1) According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) only half of the world’s population has access to broadband services above 256 kbits/s currently [22]. 2) The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that video communications provide means for people and businesses, including medical professionals, and their patients to remain in virtual contact, avoiding the need for travel while remaining socially, professionally, and commercially active [23]. A comprehensive analysis to linkage between 6G and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) from technological, business and regulation perspectives has been provided in [24], [25]. A very good overview on how European Space Agency (ESA) programs support SDGs is given in [26]. For instance, satellite communication technologies provide e-learning in Congo, tools for telemedicine and transmission of key medical data to and from remote locations, and means to gather and share data on arctic sea and climate conditions. Thus, it supports multitude of SDGs including good health and wellbeing, climate action, quality education, sustainable cities and communities, reduced inequalities, and life on land by helping to protect terrestrial ecosystems. Therefore, modern communication networks will be purposefully designed to be socially, economically and environmentally sustainable, and they will provide means to support equality globally. The main sustainability aspects are visualized in Figure 1. In the following, we list a couple of key points from the SatCom point of view.

#### solves emerging biodisasters – extinction

**Su ’21** [Zhaohui; 2021; Center on Smart and Connected Health Technologies, Mays Cancer Center, School of Nursing, UT Health San Antonio; The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, “Addressing Biodisaster X Threats with Artificial Intelligence and 6G Technologies: Literature Review and Critical Insights,” https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.08870.pdf]

A disaster can be defined as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society involving widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources” [47]. Based on the contributing causes, disasters are usually categorized as **natural** (eg, **earthquakes**, infectious disease-inducing epidemics, or **pandemics** of natural origin) and **anthropogenic** (eg, armed **conflicts**, **nuclear accidents**, or the release of **pathogenic genetically modified organisms** from laboratory settings). In the context of this study, **biodisasters** are defined as disasters that occur as a result of **infectious** **pathogens** **with bioweapon potential**, which are unleashed by state or nonstate actors **accidentally** and **intentionally** (eg, the Japanese government’s controversial decision to dump Fukushima’s contaminated water into the boundless and borderless ocean shared by all life forms on earth, including humans and sharks [48]). In the context of biodisasters, a state actor often takes the form of a nation that deliberately and systematically designs and develops infectious pathogens with its national interest in mind. In contrast, a nonstate actor is an individual or group acting independently to obtain or manufacture a pathogen either owing to misguidance or malice. Of note, although existing multilateral agreements prohibit the production and use of bioweapons by state actors (termed biowarfare) [49], the presence of signed agreements **does not imply** that accidental or intentional development and release of pathogens by state actors **will not occur**. The concept of “bioterrorism,” defined as the deliberate release of pathogens that could cause illnesses and deaths in society, is not the focus of this study because “**bioterrorism**” entails both deliberation and malice (eg, to elicit terror to the public) [50]; antecedents **may not necessarily apply** to Biodisaster X threats. Insights from behavioral science [51-53] and evidence regarding individual-caused mass casualty events (eg, indiscriminate mass shootings) [54-56] suggest that individual actors’ behaviors, potentially leading to the onset of Biodisaster X, may or may not include conscious deliberation to harm. In other words, while it is possible that individual actors’ malicious actions might cause **some** biodisasters, it is also possible that some individual-caused biodisasters are **accidental**. Furthermore, the term bioterrorism is **limited**, in that “**terror**” is the main outcome. We believe that for Biodisaster X, which could **upend lives**, **livelihoods**, and **economies**, “**disaster**” is a more appropriate description that sheds light on the **scale** and **severity** of its consequences and is more diverse than “terror.” Drawing insight from real-world examples, similar to the prevalent ransomware hacks, it is possible that state or individual actors could develop and utilize infectious pathogens as “ransomgens” for financial gain rather than merely aiming to generate terror in society. Therefore, under the current research context, we adopted the term “biodisaster” instead of “bioterrorism.” Furthermore, considering that various studies have discussed approaches to address state actor–initiated biodisasters [57-61], this study focuses on biodisasters that are infectious in nature, caused by individual actors, and can result in catastrophic human and economic consequences. Biodisaster X vs Disease X The risk of biodisasters, such as Biodisaster X, is **increasing** **in likelihood**: advances in technology, particularly the **availability** and **maturity** of **biotech**nology, have grown **considerably** in recent years. Inadvertently, these advances may resemble those of **Oppenheimer** [62] in facilitating the release of destructive factors. One example of the misuse of biotechnology is a microbiologist, vaccinologist, and senior biodefense researcher who worked at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, who allegedly engineered the 2001 anthrax attacks [63-65]. While the scale of the 2001 **anthrax** attacks was minor, it demonstrated how **easily** biodisasters can occur and how **unprepared** society was for these events. As seen in the lack of **adequate preparation** and **coherent responses** to infectious disease–induced **pandemics**, including **COVID**-19 [66-69], Biodisaster X’s effects may be **compounded** to the same, if not greater, degree by **incompetence** across international, national, and regional agencies and organizations. The concept of Biodisaster X can be best understood in contrast with Disease X. In terms of similarities, both Biodisaster X and Disease X are driven by pathogens unknown to humans and have the potential to cause crippling effects on society. Furthermore, based on previous inadequacies in response to emergency events including pandemics [66-74], the world at large may be ill-prepared for both Biodisaster X and Disease X. In terms of unique attributes, compared to Disease X, Biodisaster X is more likely to have the following characteristics: (1) having a pathogen directly affiliated to a laboratory; (2) having distinctive and engineered attributes tailored by the capabilities and intentions of the developer; and (3) the origin, development, and history can be definitively ascertained upon identification of the developer, which is not possible for naturally occurring pathogens (eg, the 1918 influenza pandemic), where there is always uncertainty regarding the origin and evolutionary history of the disaster [75-77]. The Imperative of Preparing for Biodisaster X Some of the **deadliest** **pandemics**—the most recent ones ranging from AIDS, severe acute respiratory syndrome, Middle East respiratory syndrome, Ebola, and COVID-19—all have zoonotic origins [78]. Studies have further shown that for viruses that can transmit from animals to humans, especially those that can infect a diverse range of host species, the transmission speeds are **substantially amplified** once human-to-human transmission is established, and the diseases can **quickly evolve** into **global pandemics** [79]. Consequently, once a pathogen is transmissible within a population, there is a **low access threshold**: an individual actor can “obtain” these deadly pathogens **without** the need for **advanced laboratory skills** or **extensive financial resources**. However, costs to physical and mental health may reveal a counternarrative. Based on available evidence, it is difficult to determine whether an individual can be a malicious “patient zero”; an individual who intentionally contracts a novel virus intending to cause infectious disease outbreaks in a society [80]. It is not impossible to purposely study and capture known or unknown deadly pathogens that can trigger infectious diseases; microbial surveys are commonly conducted to identify novel pathogens before they pose a threat to public health [81-84]. In theory, there could be individual actors, with adequate knowledge or experience (similar to the microbiologist allegedly behind the 2011 anthrax attacks [63-65]), who may take the same actions but with different motives, ranging from scientific curiosity to ill-guided intentions. Considering the **rich biodiversity** of wildlife, along with the large number of “**missing viruses**” and “missing **zoonoses**” that remain unidentified [85], close contacts with latent deadly pathogens are **nearly impossible** to control, which in turn, renders it challenging to locate or identify individual actors who might utilize them. Advances in **synthetic biology** may further compound the situation, especially considering the scholarly endeavors using pathogens in laboratory settings, which could amount to the level of real-world pandemics (eg, laboratory-cultured viruses such as smallpox [86-88]). The likelihood of Biodisaster X increases in proportion to these factors. Overall, considering the species diversity of wildlife, the unknown factors related to the scale and severity of viruses in animals, which have the latent potential to infect humans, and the varying degrees of competency of community health centers in detecting infectious disease outbreaks in a bottom-up manner, it could be tremendously difficult for health experts and government officials to monitor potentially emerging Biodisaster X threats. However, not all hope is lost. Technology-based solutions, especially those utilizing AI and 6G technologies, can help address these issues. The Need for Advanced Technology Solutions for Monitoring and Managing Biodisaster X The Need for Technology-Based Solutions Once Biodisaster X becomes a reality, human contact will drive transmission and become the primary fuel for exacerbating infections and deaths caused by the disaster. As seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, owing to virus spread and subsequent public health policies (eg, lockdowns), many **critical** **societal** **functions** could be **substantially** **disrupted**. The potential to **control** and **contain** human and economic **consequences** of Biodisaster X, such as the functionality of the health care systems (eg, infected health care professionals) [89-91], may also become **critically undermined**. In these circumstances, **tech**nology-based solutions could be the **key** to addressing these crises, as they are different from conventional solutions; they are **not** **highly** **dependent** on physical interactions and transportation. Overall, technology-based solutions require **limited** human resources (eg, with the ability to operate without human input), can be delivered **independent** of physical human contact (eg, web-based and remote deployment), and are **immune** to infectious diseases (eg, can function in contaminated environments). Furthermore, technology-based solutions are **less vulnerable** to issues ranging from physical fatigue to mental health burdens, which are health challenges that frontline workers often face amid emergency events. The Need for Advanced Technologies To effectively predict, control, and manage Biodisaster X, which is an event with a low probability (ie, difficult to detect preemptively) and a high impact (ie, difficult to control and contain), advanced technologies are needed. While many emerging technologies can address the dangers and damages associated with Biodisaster X [92,93], 2 families of advanced technology-based solutions show particular promise, namely AI techniques and 6G technologies. Unique Capabilities of AI AI is generally considered synonymous with “thinking machines” [94], or techniques that can facilitate “a computer to do things which, when done by people, are said to involve intelligence” [95]. With AI technologies, machines can identify patterns too intricate for humans to identify and process quickly. AI techniques are widely used in areas such as natural language processing, speech recognition, machine vision, targeted marketing, and health care, including efforts to combat COVID-19 [96-99]. While technologies such as virtual reality, smart sensors, drones, and robotics could play a positive role in supporting health care professionals to cope with the pandemic [100-102], AI technologies are arguably most instrumental in addressing some of the most prominent issues health experts and government officials are faced with, ranging from pandemic surveillance to COVID-19 drug and vaccine development [103-106]. AI and machine learning techniques are particularly valuable in their ability to identify trends and patterns across large amounts of data promptly and cost-effectively; for example, in identifying or searching for specific patterns. With natural language processing, for instance, data can be extracted retrospectively from clinical records or prospectively in real time and statistically processed for insights, which, in turn, can supplement existing structured data to enrich actionable information [86]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, natural language processing models have been used to analyze publicly available information such as tweets, tweet timestamps, and geolocation data, to identify and map potential COVID-19 cases cost-effectively, without utilizing testing devices or other medical resources that involve health care professional [107]. Overall, most, if not all, AI techniques are irreplaceable in regard to administering complex tasks such as extracting useful information from large data sets. Moreover, with the continuously increasing speed of its technological advancements and applications, AI technologies are often utilized as core components in other emerging technologies [108]. Smart sensors that perform advanced tasks, such as effectively identifying and recognizing captured motions and images, often need to integrate deep learning technologies (a subgroup of AI) [109-111]. These combined insights suggest that AI techniques have great potential in monitoring and managing Biodisaster X threats. Unique Capabilities of 6G Networks 6G technologies are the next generation of wireless communication systems following 5G networks [112]. While 6G is still under development, it is envisioned as the most capable communication network currently available [112-119]. The advantages of 6G networks derive from their high data transmission speed (up to 1 terabyte per second), wireless hyper-connectivity (100 million connections per km2), low end-to-end latency (< 1 ms), reliability (1-10-9) (reliability in terms of the frame error rate, which is defined as the ratio of the number of incorrectly decoded frames to that of total transmitted frames), and high-accuracy positioning capabilities (indoor: <10 cm in 3D; outdoor: <1 m in 3D) [112-119]. Adding the fact that 6G networks also excel in their energy efficiency and spectrum efficiency, these networks can provide fast and efficient wireless reporting and access to remote computational facilities, facilitating mobile biomonitoring and disaster management. For instance, the high reliability and data transmission speed of 6G technologies will be of critical importance amid global emergency events with the scale of Biodisaster X. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many internet companies and service providers experienced outrage and were forced to reduce the amount of data individuals and organizations could utilize to ensure continuous communication for all [120]. This limitation of existing communication networks could compromise the ability of health experts and government officials to monitor and manage COVID-19–related threats and other disasters promptly and properly. Of note, in the face of an extremely deadly, contagious, and fast-developing Biodisaster X, information will be predominantly updated and exchanged remotely and over the internet. The speed and success of updating and exchanging information are highly dependent on the reliability of communication networks, in which 6G technologies excel, especially when spatial big data have been introduced for disease control and prevention since the COVID-19 pandemic [27,108,121]. Figure 1 lists visual comparisons in communication capabilities between 6G and 5G networks.

### 1NC

#### Reject the arg on 1AR Theory

#### 1. Proportionality- punishment is worse than the skew which is solved by investment in the original arg and defending theory.

#### 2. Creates perverse incentives to collapse to theory instead of returning to substance- turns deterrence since theory over-proliferates which crowds out substance.

Multiple routes to ballot good -- 1AR Shiftiness -- affs change in 1AR with add-ons, clarifications of plan text, blowing up vague internals-- they incentivize sandbagging best offense until late in the debate once the neg is locked into positions which prevents clash -- kills education because neg strats won’t engage their offense -- outweighs aff skew because they can always pivot based on the 1NC but without condo the neg is completely inflexible. That means multiple options are key.

#### Reciprocity is fake – affs kick advantages, internal links, etc all the time – the neg should also be able to kick c0unterplans

#### No freezing action – I don’t calculate small probabilities of a piano hitting me butterflying into extinction, extinction is 10^27 not infinitiny mathematically, and governements mitigate existential risk while solving structural inequities allthe time which proves empirics disprove their impact

#### They link to fear of death – they said “climate change” was an impact that will kill us and an injection of contradiction and Berardi into debate is necessary to solve

#### Fear motivates people to pursue constructive means to sustain peace and prevent large-scale conflict

Lifton 01– Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York – 20 (Robert Jay, World Policy Journal, “Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age,” Spring, v18n1)

The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union);(FN2) and the eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, **the nuclear quietism is perilous. Or, to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe. We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves--to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of fear**--sometimes more than a tinge--**can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure.** But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We know that the weapons are around--and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there"--but our minds no longer connect with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical standards as human beings. **In the absence of the sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, we can all too readily numb ourselves to everything nuclear, and thereby live as though the weapons pose no danger, or as though they don't exist.** To be sure, we have never quite been able to muster an appropriate level of fear with respect to these weapons--one that would spur us to take constructive steps to remove the threat. We have always been able to numb ourselves in this regard, which must be seen as a basic human response to a threat that is apocalyptic in scope and so technologically distanced as to be unreal. But there were at least brief moments when we would awaken from our nuclear torpor. Now there is little but torpor. The weapons have been accepted as belonging on our planet no less than we do, as if they were part of nature--like great trees or mountains that are old, established, immovable--rather than technological instruments of genocide that we ourselves have created.

#### Fear of death affirms life

Beres 1996 [Louis Rene, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Feb., The Freeman http://www.freeman.org/m\_online/ feb96/ beresn.htm]

**Fear of death**, the ultimate source of anxiety, **is essential to human survival.** This is true **not only** **for individuals**, **but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance.** So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. **Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war -** this **state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival.** What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. **For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself.** In this respect**, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness**, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, **it loses,** possibly **forever**, the altogether **critical benefits of "anxiety**."

#### Death isn’t inevitable wholescale – process of a nuclear would be paarticularly bad

#### Stockwell is true for government inequalities as well

#### They don’t solve bitcoin terrestrially – just whatever is built on the Moon

#### Bifo pessimism wrong- causes massive die off

**Lear 12**

(Ben, <https://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/> 5-18)

What does the end of the future mean for rad­i­cal pol­i­tics? It is at this point that Bifo’s argu­ment becomes prob­lem­atic. In an argu­ment that inter­sects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see “Com­mu­nism as a neces­sity in the col­lapse of cap­i­tal.” Dis­tant from the vol­un­tarism of pre­vi­ous forms of Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, this “post-growth Com­mu­nism” will be best under­stood as a nec­es­sary response to capital’s refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the “oppor­tu­nity” to work, with wel­fare sys­tems dis­man­tled, Bifo argues that we will wit­ness the pro­lif­er­a­tion of zones of auton­omy respond­ing to the needs of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and super­flu­ous social body. Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics will emerge from an exo­dus, both vol­un­tary and com­pul­sory, from a stag­nat­ing and increas­ingly preda­tory state-capital nexus. This exo­dus is both social, in the devel­op­ment of an alter­na­tive infra­struc­ture, and per­sonal, in the with­drawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semi­otic econ­omy. Bifo aban­dons hope in col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion at the level of the political. Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a **nec­es­sar­ily small** por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and **con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal.** Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is **still pos­si­ble today**, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be strate­gic and tac­ti­cal, not ter­mi­nal. **Mis­di­ag­nos­ing** the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life **as** a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an **evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal**, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy. If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a **sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed** – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy. It is hard to imag­ine a net­work of self-organized projects and sys­tems sup­port­ing the **major­ity of the pop­u­la­tion** in the con­text of an increas­ingly preda­tory cap­i­tal­ism. Emerg­ing from the and iso­lated left­ist scenes, this lifeboat com­mu­nism will by its very nature have a **lim­ited car­ry­ing capac­ity**, as the anar­chist expe­ri­ence in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubt­edly be too small and makeshift to har­bor us all. The cri­sis is twofold. It is a cri­sis of cap­i­tal­ist prof­itabil­ity, and of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and sur­plus global pro­le­tariat whose repro­duc­tion (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the pro­lif­er­a­tion of com­munes, squats, food co-ops, file shar­ers, urban gar­den­ers, and vol­un­tary health ser­vices will bring forth a new, bet­ter world. But while the cur­rent seem­ingly post-political sit­u­a­tion throws up mas­sive obsta­cles to orga­niz­ing, there is still a poten­tial for col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion. The cap­i­tal­ist state, racked by its own legit­i­macy cri­sis and weekly polit­i­cal scan­dals, is more vul­ner­a­ble than it appears. We need only recall the period of unex­pected hope built by stu­dents in Britain, occu­piers in Oak­land, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Mid­dle East dur­ing the past two years. These move­ments were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but along­side their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behav­iour and to forge new tac­ti­cal and organ­i­sa­tional weapons for strug­gle. Bifo’s con­tri­bu­tion is a timely and chal­leng­ing one, but it ulti­mately leads us back towards a DIY cul­ture and “out­reach” pol­i­tics. As our move­ments come to terms with these lim­its, we must also hold onto the belief that lux­ury for all is pos­si­ble. The social poten­tial of unfilled blocks of flats, emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies like [3D-printing](http://www.open-designism.com/profiles/blogs/finally-it-has-happened-the-pirate-bay-goes-product-bay), and the desires of the mil­lions of under­em­ployed, should remind us of this. This will not be pos­si­ble with­out a col­lec­tive strug­gle against the state and the demands of cap­i­tal, one which simul­ta­ne­ously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture **and a self-fulfilling prophecy**. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, **and** their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

#### Symbiocapitalism is nonsense

**STURGEON, MFA, 13**

(JONATHON KYLE, On Theory and Finance: Review of Berardi’s "The Uprising" http://theamericanreader.com/on-theory-and-finance-review-of-berardis-the-uprising/)

This is a tidy metaphor, but more on that later. The first problem with Berardi’s analogy between poetry and finance is that it bears **no relation to the reality of either**. Financial deregulation was not meant to divorce money from matter or value; its purpose was to get government out of the way of finance. The result, we know from no less than two financial crises, was not the loss of connection between money and matter, it was the wild proliferation of connections, of speculative positions taken on anything and everything. Or, as a financial regulator once told me, “It isn’t the speculation on ‘nothing’ that keeps me up at night, it’s the gambling on all of the things that matter.” So there was nothing symbolist about the development of modern finance. In Berardi’s version of symbolism, nothing means anything. In global finance, every signifier is forced to mean something. Every speculative position is tethered to some good or commodity or service, or some permutation thereof. This is why financial regulators are trying, and failing, to put limits on the number of positions speculators can take on commodities. What’s worse, Berardi never identifies the beneficent regulator of symbolist poetry, the good guy we need to reinstate in order reverse symbolism and bring meaning back to language. Who was such a regulator in the time of the symbolist poet? Perhaps it was bourgeois morality or the real and violent government censor? Or maybe what we need is general intellect in high-minded agreement, synchronized en masse by Berardi’s poetics?

#### The Neg’s form of theory is as irresponsible as deregulated finance

**STURGEON, MFA, 13**

(JONATHON KYLE, On Theory and Finance: Review of Berardi’s "The Uprising" http://theamericanreader.com/on-theory-and-finance-review-of-berardis-the-uprising/)

Berardi’s book is meant to galvanize “the general intellect” into believing that poetry is a non-exchangeable form of language. This because Berardi (admirably) wants us to believe in another world altogether, one we are transported to by poetry as “the excess of language, a hidden resource which enables us to shift from one paradigm to another.” In Berardi’s work, as in much of contemporary theory, literature becomes a vanishing mediator, a throwaway wormhole that takes us to another community. But communities must be built before they are found. Poetry can only build a community if it is exchanged, and exchangeability lies at the very etymological root of the word literature, of letters shared among friends. Perhaps it is Berardi’s own semiotization that has led to his alienated view of poetry; it is ironic that he considers Google to be an evil algorithmic plot driven by semio-capitalism even when his name registers more than two million search results. The mistakes of The Uprising speak to a much larger crisis within the evolution of theory in general. In fact, if contemporary finance is analogous to something in literature, it isn’t symbolist poetry but theory itself. Denationalized, decontextualized, divorced from its origins in philosophy and criticism, theory has assumed totally **deregulated positions** on everything from literature to politics and beyond. With its uncountable speculations and tightly commoditized, catchworded language, theory has become the **swaps market of thought.** There is another disturbing undertone to The Uprising, one that has spread like a secret since the burst of the dot-com bubble at the turn of the decade. Berardi makes it clear that semio-capitalism rests on a foundation of digital exchange, and anyone who reads contemporary theory knows that the digital has become the bogeyman that lurks behind capitalism. In the case of Berardi’s book, the digital is a screen-word for two ideas in particular. First, it represents the loss of “indexicality,” or the material connection between a sign and the world. To distinguish indexicality from referentiality, we might use the example of a photograph. Once upon a time a photograph was an object that, by way of a chemical process, inscribed some real, material event onto film or some other light-sensitive chunk of matter. Now in the era of the digital image, we have lost indexicality. We are free to manipulate images ad nauseum or to invent them from scratch. The result is a loss of truth-value; where we once had to rely on the material world, we now live in an automated world, alienated from matter and the body. This veiled accusation of automatism should be seen for what it is: **a generational accusation of autism**. The “precarious” youth of semio-capitalism, victimized by global finance, are incapable of delivering themselves from the unreal chains of digital culture. They are plainly divorced from the material truth of the word and **the world**. This generational disdain is the second idea the digital covers up in contemporary theory, though Berardi hardly hides his: In 1977 the American anthropologist Rose Khon Goldsen, in The Show and Tell Machine, wrote the following words: “We are breeding a new generation of human beings who will learn more words from a machine than from their mothers.” That generation is here. The connective generation entering the social scene today fully suffers the pathogenic and disempathetic effects of the automation of the word. Yet the very distinction between indexicality and referentiality suggests what we should already know, that Berardi has no faith in the material power of language. If he did, he would need only one concept. Why else distinguish between the word and the material sign? Maybe it is time to **regulate the theorist’s position**, the mantra that says we have lost the link between the word and the world. We haven’t lost anything in language. Rather we have experienced an amplification of the same conditions that first brought us “the aesthetic regime of art”: new, democratizing forms of circulation and a breakdown of social hierarchies. If this is true, we do not need literature to act as a vanishing mediator that takes us to another world before disappearing. We need words to perform another economic operation: redistribution. At its best, symbolist poetry helped redistribute what was seen and said away from dead metaphors and realist claims to representation. Now, more than ever, Mallarmé and Rimbaud can help us shake the belief in medium more immediate, more liquid, more glowing than words.

#### Semiocapitalism is nonsense – nothing but nostalgia and condescension – the clint eastwood of K args

**Yilmaz 9-19-10**

(Onur http://mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl/2010/09/19/review-franco-berardi-precarious-rhapsody/)

#### Berardi presents several more arguments in his book: about intellectual labor and its appropriation by capitalist institutions, about the disconnect between the amount of information generated within networks (cyberspace) and the human inadequacy of processing this information fast enough (cybertime), about the collapse of democracy under the influence of the capitalist free-market system. Some of his arguments are reasonable and interesting; others can be tenuous and veer into the metaphysical at times, like his connection between the semiocapitalist system and pathological disorders. However, the true problem with Berardi’s work is in the way the book is structured. The first two chapters of Precarious Rhapsody contain the entirety of Berardi’s arguments. However, these chapters are written in a dense, labyrinthine manner that makes it nigh on impossible to ascertain just what it is that is being argued. Berardi introduces all his concepts at once without defining them, and forgets to explain just how this premise leads to that conclusion. Over the course of the book the same points are repeated over and over again, becoming more clearer as the tightly spun manifesto of the opening chapters unspools into more intelligible arguments and lines of reasoning. It is as if Berardi placed the summary of his thesis at the very beginning of the book and worked backwards from there. Besides the obfuscating prose and circuitous way of presenting his arguments, the repeating pattern of the book leads to a great deal of redundancy. Some parts are repeated word for word from one chapter to the next, and deja vu sets in quite often. Part of this seems to owe to the fact that many of the chapters have appeared in various forms before being collected in this book. Whatever the case may be, Precarious Rhapsody would have benefitted a great deal from a bit of editing. Another issue is the underlying current of nostalgia that is present throughout. It is no surprise that Berardi places the last moment of true, hopeful revolt against the capitalist domination of everyday life in his student years. The notion that everything used to be better in the past and kids these days just don’t understand nags around the corner of every page. When Berardi argues that the disconnect between cyberspace and cybertime leads to an empty lifestyle where people have lost the ability to love, to imagine, to enjoy life, it comes across as condescending. Moreover, he fails to provide any evidence for his claims. No case studies or statistics. The same is the case when he states that pathological disorders like depression spring from labor relations in semiocapitalism. These are interesting claims, but they are built solely on rhetoric. If you have the patience to stick through to the end and decipher Berardi’s arguments, Precarious Rhapsody is a rewarding book to read. Not per se because it presents a workable theory to apply on the field of media studies- it might be better described as media philosophy. But in the end Berardi manages to present a unique and interesting view of the modern world and the role media play in it. It makes you think in new ways and about issues you might not have considered otherwise. And it contains at least one sentiment that anyone can agree with. Berardi places the “source of intelligence, of technology, of progress” in the simple statement:”I don’t want to go to work because I prefer to sleep”. Their information overload argument is wrong---high volume of information doesn’t render it meaningless, and information is not consumed uniformly by a mass society---it’s diffused, meaning individuals and social groups can accurately process and employ the information they consume for pragmatic political reforms. Turner 04

Bryan S. Turner, Dean of Social Sciences at Deakin University, Australia, “Baudrillard for Sociologists,” in Forget Baudrillard?, 2004 edition, p. 80-83

While, as far as one can tell, Baudrillard was not influenced by Bell’s vision of the role of technology and the media in shaping postindustrialism, he was influenced by Marshall McLuhan’s analysis (Gane 1991b:48) of the impact of new media on the transformation of modern culture, especially in The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1967). McLuhan was particularly sensitive to the idea that we live in a processed social world where human beings live in a complete technostructure. This technological environment is carried with us as extensions of our own bodies, but McLuhan did not adopt a pessimistic view of the age of anxiety, because his ‘technological humanism’ (Kroker et al. 1984) and Catholic values committed him to the idea of the immanence of reason and the hope of an escape from the labyrinth. Indeed, a global technological system could become the basis of a universalistic culture. Although he was fully aware of the sensory deprivation which he associated with the impact of the mass media, he none the less remained committed to the hope that these negative effects were not fatal. Baudrillard, who as we have noted was deeply influenced by McLuhan’s idea that the content of messages was relatively unimportant in relation to their form, has embraced a very nihilistic position with respect to our processed environment. Baudrillard’s pessimistic view of the fissure in the historical development of the modern is based on his view of the masses. Baudrillard’s analysis of the masses is a product of the Situationist responses to the May events of 1968, when it became increasingly obvious that the critical social movements of modern society would not be dominated by Marxist theory or directed by a vanguard of the working class. The crisis of May 1968 had not been predicted by Marxism or by mainstream sociology, but they did validate the claims of Situationists like Guy Debord in the journal Internationale Situationiste. However, if the crisis had been unanticipated by conventional political analysis, then the sudden collapse of the students’ and workers’ movements of 1968 found no easy explanation in the framework of mainstream social sciences. Baudrillard’s concept of the inexplicable nature of the mass depend a great deal on the unusual circumstances surrounding the May events. By 1973 with the publication of The Mirror of Production (Baudrillard 1975), Baudrillard was already moving away from an orthodox Marxist view of production, arguing that Marxism, far from being an external critique of capitalism, was merely a reflection or mirror of the principal economistic values of capitalism. Instead of engaging in the production of meaning, a subversive, oppositional movement would have to challenge the system from the point of view of meaninglessness. Subversion would have to rob the social system of significance. In taking this stand, Baudrillard followed the Situationist claim that whatever can be represented can be controlled (Plant 1992:137). The mass events of 1968 offered a promise of the nonrepresentational moment, the pure event of authenticity, which could not be explained, and therefore could not be manipulated. Baudrillard, in dismissing Marxist theory as a means of representing events, sought to replace the idea of a mode of production with a mode of disappearance. In taking this attitude towards modern social movements, Baudrillard’s argument also rests on the various meanings of the word ‘mass’. Baudrillard is thus able to make allusions to the idea of physical substance, matter, the majority and the electrical meaning of earth. The translator’s note to In the Shadow of the Silent Majority points out that faire masse can mean to form a majority and to form an earth. Baudrillard argues by allusion that the mass absorbs the electrical charges of social and political movements; the mass thus neutralizes the electrical charge of society. This use of allusion, parody and irony is typical of Baudrillard’s mode of analysis, which is a type of sociological poetics, a style which is likely to make sociologists feel uncomfortable (Gane 199la:193). There is here also a continuity with the style of Dada and the Situationists. The poetic and striking character of Baudrillard’s style has no counterpart in professional social science, least of all in the British context. Baudrillard’s ‘sociological fictions’ (1990a:15) are striking and challenging, but they are not ultimately convincing. Arguments which depend on allusion, allegory and similar rhetorical devices are decorative but they are not necessarily powerful. The notion of ‘mass society’ already has a clearly worked out sociological critique. The idea of ‘mass society’ might have been relevant in describing the new markets which were created in the post-war period with the advent of innovative technologies, which had the immediate effect of lowering prices and making commodities available to a mass audience. However, the trend of sociological analysis in the last two decades has been to assert that mass audiences have been broken down into more selectively constructed niches for more individualized products. It is controversial to argue that industrialization necessarily produces a mass society, characterized by a common culture, uniform sentiments or an integrated outlook. The idea of a mass society was often associated with the notion that the decline of individualism would produce a directionless mass as the modern equivalent of the eighteenthcentury mob. Critical theorists like Adorno and Marcuse associated the massification of society with authoritarianism and a potential for fascism. Of course, Baudrillard’s version of mass society is based on a particular view of the mass media creating a hyperreality in which the real has been absorbed by the hyperreal; meaning has imploded on itself. Although Baudrillard’s analysis of hyperreality is postcritical (Chen 1987), he does adopt in practice a critical position towards American civilization, which is the extreme example of massification. Rather like critical theorists, Baudrillard believes that the (bourgeois) individual has been sucked into the negative electrical mass of the media age. However, sociological research on mass audiences shows that there is no ground for believing that media messages are received, consumed or used in any standardized manner, and the majority of social scientists working on culture have attempted to argue that cultural objects in the age of the mass media are appropriated, transformed and consumed in diverse forms and according to various practices (de Certeau 1984). In fact, sociologists, largely inspired by the Situationists, have argued that everyday life is resistant to massification and that the concrete reality of everyday life-situations is the principal arena within which opposition to massification can be expected. Everyday life was regarded by both Guy Debord and Henri Lefebvre (1991) as the foundation of authenticity. Baudrillard, by arguing that criticism belongs to the period of modernism and not to the age of hyperreality, has ruled out opposition to the system, at least at the level of public debate and formal politics.

#### Even if information overload exists, coping requires constant training – that’s key to advocacy and value to life

Lovink ‘13 (Geert, Media Theorist, “After the Social Media Hype: Dealing with Information Overload”, e-flux, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/after-the-social-media-hype-dealing-with-information-overload/)

\*Exercise lines are metaphors, not literally about going to the gym, but obviously Hemanth lifts

The internet and smart phones are here to stay. They blend smoothly into our crisis-stricken neoliberal age, which is characterized by economic stagnation, populist anxieties, and media spectacles. The question no longer concerns the potential or the social impact of “new media,” but how to cope with them. In calling this “Foucauldian,” we do not refer to the Foucault of surveillance and punishment, but rather to the later Foucault, the one who wrote about the ethical care of the self. How do we practice the “art of living” with so much going on simultaneously? A few years ago, blog research already invoked Foucault’s genealogy of confession when analyzing Web 2.0’s user-generated content as a self-promotion machine. Recently, attention has shifted towards the aesthetics of mental and physical sanity. Can we speak of a “virtue of networking” that guides us in what to say and when to shut up, what to save and when to join, when to switch off and where to engage? How can everyone’s life become a work of art in this age of standardized commodities and services?

Most artistic, activist, and academic work portrays social media as a technology of domination. Whereas the Unlike Us network (in which I am deeply involved) is engaged in the struggle for internet privacy and the building of software alternatives to Facebook and Twitter, the authors I will discuss here explore the possibility of altering our lifestyles.1 The data streams may rain down on us, but we still have the freedom to decide how best to respond to this meteorological given. We can remain inside and focus on the shape of the umbrella, or we can take a walk outside and get wet. The sovereign attitude of ignoring the constant stimuli of our techno-saturated everyday lives is not available to everyone. Distraction is a useful holdover from our hunter-gatherer past, when it helped us focus on dangers that could approach from all sides. As such, it is inscribed deep in our human system. But could it also be a gift that helps focus on multiple tasks simultaneously?

The question on the table is—following Foucault—how to minimize domination and shape new technologies of the self. Why has the internet industry bred its own monsters of centralization and control (Google, Facebook, Amazon) while promising the opposite? What bothers us is our own survival. Which techniques are effective in reducing the social noise and permanent data floods that scream for attention? What kind of online platforms facilitate lasting forms of organization? We’re not merely talking here about filters that delete spam and “kill” your ex. As the state of internet discourse shows, it is all about training and repetition (as Aristotle already emphasized). There is no ultimate solution. We will need to constantly train ourselves to focus, while remaining open to new currents that question the very foundations of our direction. This is not merely a question of distributing our concentration. When do we welcome the Other, and when should it be jammed? When do we stop searching and start making? There are times when our real-time communication weaponry should be fired up for mobilization and temporary spectre dominance, until the evening sets in and it is time to chill out and open other doors of perception. But when do these times ever arrive?

We know by now that publicly criticizing the Facebooks of the world is not enough. There is a hope that boredom will prevail amongst youngsters, with users moving on, forgetting current social media platforms altogether within weeks of their final logoff (as happened to Bibo, Hyves, StudiVZ, Orkut, and MySpace). It is not cool to be on the same platform as your parents and teachers. The assumption is that the heroic gesture of the few who quit will eventually be followed by a silent exodus of the multitudes. While this may be inevitable in the long run, the constant migration from one service to the next does only increases the collective feeling of restlessness. According to Belgian pop psychiatrist Dirk De Wachter, author of Borderline Times, Western citizens are struggling with a chronic feeling of emptiness. Intense social media use thus becomes part of a larger societal malaise, connecting a variety of issues from the echo chamber effect to ADHD and globalization. Instead of reading social media as a zeitgeist symptom, I approach the Internet Question here as an interplay between cultures of use and the technical premises of these systems.

There is a need to design daily rituals of sovereignty from the network. If we do this, we may no longer get lost in browsing, surfing, and searching, but when the techno-social routines become meaningless and there is nothing left to report, there is a similar danger of “rienisme.” That’s the moment when we need to come up with passionate forms of disengagement from the virtual world. The question is: How to lose interest into something vital? The issue here is different from the late twentieth century dialectic between remembering and forgetting. There is nothing to remember in Facebook—nothing but accidents. In the end, it is merely a traffic flow. In such a cybernetic environment, history becomes a question of managing eventless events. Because of its “tyranny of informality,” social media are too fluid, secondary, and unfinished to be properly stored, and thus to be remembered. As a consequence, they can also not be forgotten. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, author of *Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age*, may be right that all digital information can and will be stored. However, the architecture of today’s social media is developing in the opposite direction. As temporary reference systems, hard to access with search engines, the streaming databases are caught in the Eternal Now of the Self.

Social Wisdom, anno 2013: “You can’t get a house mortgage based on your Facebook reputation” (Jaron Lanier)—Ignore Requests—“What I often do at 3 a.m., exhausted, yet unable to sleep, I sometimes browse on my twitter, reading banal nonsense to further raise my ire for the human race and listen to Tom Waits to restore my faith in humanity” (Mickey MacDonagh)—Government of Temper—“I’m no prophet. My job is making windows where there were once walls” (Michel Foucault)—“Bullshit is the new wisdom” (@ProfJeffJarvis)—“I know how it ends: one day I will be declared ‘web-hostile’ and liquidated. God, why is so much Internet theorizing so awful?”(Evgeny Morozov)—Cataclysmic Communications, Inc.—“Man ist zwar kreativ, aber das heißt noch lange nicht, dass man etwas schafft” (Twitter)—Critique of the Enhancements—“Facebook to Tell Users They Are Being Tracked” (New York Times)—“My data is bigger than your data” (Ian Bogost)—“Forums are the dark matter of the web, the B-movies of the Internet. But they matter” (Jeff Atwood)—The necessary “haven’t we done this seventeen times already?” thread—“Since the world is evolving towards a frenzied state of affairs, we have to take a frenzied view of it” (Jean Baudrillard).

If we limit our scope to the internet debate, we can see that the New Age tendency that dominated the roaring 1990s has slowly but steadily lost supremacy. The holistic body and mind approach has been overruled by waves of conflict in society. The New Age faction shies away from negative critique, in particular of corporate capitalism. So Google still can’t be evil. Suspicion about the business model of internet start-ups will not and cannot arise. We use technology, they say, in order to “thrive.” In this positivist view, our will is strong enough to “bend” the machines in such a way that they will eventually start working for us—and not the other way around. If we as conscious citizen-consumers flock together, the business community will follow suit. There is no Facebook conspiracy (for instance their collaboration with the CIA) as we are Facebook. We are its employees, investors, first adoptors, app developers, social media marketers—in short, propagandists of a cause we do not understand. It is the technology that is disruptive, not those who complain about it. Those who unwittingly support the malignant social media cause which they naively believe to be a force for good are kept busy thinking they have signed up for a self-improvement course. The user is too busy “thriving” with the constant streams of tweets, status updates, pings, and emails, until it is time for the next gadget.

Is there a way out of the self-help trap that we have set up for ourselves? Why should we think of our lives as something that we need to manage in the first place? Take *The Information Diet: A Case for Conscious Consumption* (2012) by California IT professional Clay A. Johnson. The book is about information obesity and how to recognize its symptoms. Johnson discusses the ingredients of a “healthy” information diet and shows how we can we develop a data literacy that helps us be selective about the information we access. Information obesity arises, he says, when consensus in society over what is truth and what is not diminishes, when any odd piece of information can pass as vital scientific knowledge. For Johnson, the parallels between food and information consumption are all too real and go beyond metaphorical comparisons. There’s no such thing as information overload, he writes. It’s all a matter of conscious consumption.

We can read as many facts as we like, but if we try to add them up, they refuse to become a system. We struggle to keep track of all the information that approaches us, making it hard for most info bits to be properly digested. This is the passive indifference that Jean Baudrillard celebrated during his lifetime, and which has now become the cultural norm. The result is “epistemic closure.” When we are constantly exposed to real-time interactive media, we develop attention fatigue and a poor sense of time. (Johnson says that his overconsumption of information impaired his short-term memory.) The info-vegan way out would be to work on the will power—an executive function that can be trained—with the goal of increasing one’s attention span. To start with you, can install RescueTime on your desktop, a program that tracks what you pay attention to and sends you a weekly productivity score.

As Peter Sloterdijk already noticed in his *You Must Change Your Life* (2009), training is key. The “anthropotechnic approach,” as Sloterdijk calls it, is different from the rational IT world of engineers in that in it is cyclical, not linear. It is not about concepts and debugging. Instead, it is about workouts. Self-improvement will have to come from inside, in the gym. If we want to survive as individuals while maintaining a relationship of sorts with (potentially addictive) gadgets and online platforms, we will have to get into fitness mode—and stay there. In extreme cases, visiting a Social Media Anonymous group might be helpful, but what average users need is merely a minor trigger to instigate the process of forgetting the gadget world.

Some may view the idea of improvement through repetition as conservative and anti-innovative. In an environment where paradigm shifts happen overnight, planned obsolescence—not durability—is the rule. But Sloterdijk’s emphasis on exercises and repetition, combined with Richard Sennett’s argument (in The Craftman [2009]) in favor of skills, help us to focus on tools (such as the diary) that we can use to set goals in the morning and reflect in the evening on the improvements that we made during the day. However, the disruptive nature of real-time news and social media needs to find a place in this model. In the meantime, Sloterdijk remains ambivalent about the use of information technology. It is clearly not on his mind. In his recently published dairy covering the years 2008–2011 (called *Zeilen und Tage* and running to 637 pages), I counted precisely one entry that deals explicitly with the internet. In this short entry, he describes the internet as a universal bazaar and Hype Park Gemüsekiste. The same could be said of Slavoj Zizek, who admits that he is not the world’s hippest philosopher.2 Even though both use laptops and internet intensely, information technology has not (yet?) been an object of inquiry in their work.

Yet, there are public figures who do speak out. Take Vivienne Westwood, whose manifesto *Active Resistance to Propaganda* is a call to arms against information overload.3 She says we need to defend ourselves against the “abundance of everything,” of sound, images, and opinion, the non-stop distractions that keep us away from the important things in life, namely introspection and reflection. Westwood targets pathological consumption in particular. Quit updating, “get a life, artlovers unite.” However, what we need to overcome is not technology as such, but specific time spent consuming popular applications. Unlike knowledge, which we obtain or run into and then store, interpret, spread, and remember, our attitude towards how to deal with info overload and multitasking needs to be worked on constantly, otherwise we lose our “conditioning” and fall back into previous modes of panic and indifference. Dealing with data excess requires a 24/7 state of “mindfulness,” as it is called in New Age circles.

Whereas Clay Johnson is focused on the polarized world of the political news industry in the United States, Howard Rheingold, in his book *Net Smart: How to Thrive Online* (2012), discusses more explicitly the balance between the peaceful mind and a clever reorganization of the computer desktop. The idea is not, Rheingold writes, to capture the flow and to freeze-dry the incoming status updates, but to create a mental distance from the scene. It is all about feeling like you’re back in control, gaining confidence, and becoming independent again. There is a movement of tactical detachment at play here. In this context, the addiction metaphor is misleading. It is not about total involvement followed by complete withdrawal. In the case of social media, withdrawal is often not possible for social and economic reasons. Who can afford to endanger his or her social capital? Rheingold knows this and offers his readers a range of practical guidelines for how to master the master’s media.

What makes Net Smart and the accompanying online video lectures by Rheingold so compelling is not the author’s utopian message, nor his merciless deconstruction of the corporate agendas of the Silicon Valley giants. Rheingold is neither a net visionary à la Wired magazine editor Kevin Kelly, nor a continental European critic. However, he is a brilliant and nuanced instructor who believes in “internal discipline, not ascetic withdrawal.” Net Smart is a pamphlet in favor of public education. Self-control along with other social media literacy needs to be taught, Rheingold argues. We’re not born with these skills. We need to learn how to practice “real-time curation.” Following Daniel Sieger, author of The Mindful Brain (2007), Rheingold argues that we have to wake up from a life on automatic. Forget for a moment how many of us prefer this state of mind—killing time by using escapist social media, in non-spaces, surrounded by non-people, is widespread, and loved, as we all know. What Rheingold teaches us are tricks to train the brain—for instance, through breath exercises. He concludes the book by saying that “the emerging digital divide is between those who know how to use social media for individual advantage and collective action, and those who don’t.”

In my view, the best part of *Net Smart* deals with “crap detection,” a 1960s term that indicates a critical attitude towards information. Using your “crap detector” meant that you inquired about the political, religious, and ideological background of the person who was talking. (Let’s do some fact-checking!) Ernest Hemmingway and Neil Postman both argued that everyone needed a built-in crap detector. In today’s age, where there are ten times as many PR agents as fact-checking journalists, internet users are supposed to do their own homework. How do we dissect the pseudo-information that comes from think-tanks and consultants? The postmodern insight that everything is “discourse” also contributed to the demise of the clear demarcation line between propaganda and truth. What I like is Rheingold’s blend of old-school values concerning media manipulation coupled with a sophisticated knowledge of how to manage a range of online research tools, both in terms of their functionality and interface usability. Rheingold’s screen is large, there are a lot of menus open at the same time, yet he is in charge. This is called personal dashboard design—and we don’t hear enough about this, as the organization of one’s desktop is supposed to be a private matter. Rheingold calls it “infotention,” which he defines as “synchronizing your attentional habits with your information tools,” with the aim to better “find, direct and manage information.”

The different forms of social media are often portrayed as necessary channels of communication. For Rheingold and Johnson, they are here to stay. For the outgoing European baby boomers, however, these platforms may seem like nothing more than nihilist drugs which produce the contant feeling that we are being left out of something, that we are about to miss the boat. Linking, liking, and sharing uphold the systemic boredom and “rienisme” that is a consequence of the event inflation that we all experience. It therefore comes as a surprise to read Tom Chatfield’s *How to Thrive in the Digital Age* (2012)—a booklet in Alain de Botton’s “School of Life” series—which claims to reinvent the genre of the self-help book. No more moralistic warnings and well-meaning tips, such as the one from Evgeny Morozov, who hides his iPhone and internet cable in a treasure chest when he has to work. Surprisingly, Chatfield’s way out is to politicize the field in the spirit of the Arab Spring, Occupy, Wikileaks, Anonymous, pirate parties, and demonstrations in favor of online anti-copyright peer-to-peer exchanges (such as Kim Dotcom’s recently launched Mega platform). We have received enough tips for how to carve out time away from our smart phones, he says. Offline romanticism as a lifestyle solution is a dead horse, and so is its philosophical equivalent of “interpassivity” as formulated by Robert Pfaller and Gijs van Oenen.4 While it may be liberating to let go of all our gadgets, to do nothing for a while, to pretend to live in accordance with nature and enjoy a well-deserved break, what do we but then? Venture into slow communication? For Chatfield, what comes after the information hangover are new forms of collective living. T

hrough protests and other collective experiences, we find ourselves dragged into events, stories, situations, and people that make us forget all the yelling emails, Tumblr image cascades, and Twitter business-as-usual. When will the Long Wait be over?

#### Only our model solves effective information management – overload is inevitable to some degree, but equipping students to manage it is key

Leek 16 [Danielle R. Leek, professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 399-405]

Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement. Information literacy While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed , and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem- solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowl- edge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are chal- lenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process. Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well- rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011). Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically con- textual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engage- ment. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For stu- dents to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motiv- ation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014). Arguing facts In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policy- making for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good. While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence. This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to service- learning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding fro

m traditional institutions. Fur- thermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research high- lights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of insti- tutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place. I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experi- ences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes: ... the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61) Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind. Political engagement through policy debate This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives. To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cul- tivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learn- ing combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely. Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discus- sion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world. Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situ- ates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

#### Debate can be a vehicle for change – just because change is not immediate doesn’t mean it impossible. Independetly, the topic doesn’t force oyu to defend the USFG

Palczewski 19 Catherine Helen Palczewski, Professor of Communication Studies and former Director of Debate @ University of Northern Iowa. A Personal/Political Case for Debate Philosophy & Rhetoric Volume 52, Number 1, 2019 Penn State University Press https://muse.jhu.edu/article/721923

On 26 May 2015, four seventh- and eighth-grade students spoke to the Portland Public Schools (PPS) Board of Education about their district's dress code (Porter 2016). Jeffrey Roberts testified about how the code stereotypes boys as distractible and how the prohibition on jerseys and sagging targeted specific students based on race. Hailey Tjensvold and Anna Loisa Cruz testified about the double standard that resulted in 100 percent of the students sent home being girls. Sophia Carlson argued the message sent to girls was that "hiding her body is more important than her education. . . boys are more entitled to their education than she is." The arguments presented by the students persuaded the school board to form a committee of students, parents, teachers, and administrators to create a code "fair and nondiscriminatory to all students" (McCombs 2017).

Lisa Frack, Oregon NOW board president, was at the school board meeting and had been developing a model dress code. Frack, along with Carlson and NOW board vice-president Elleanor Chin, served on the PPS Board of Education committee, which met for two hours every month for a year. The PPS Board of Education adopted a new code, based on the Oregon NOW model, in June 2016.

The debate was not contained to Oregon. In August 2017, Evanston Township High School (ETHS) in Illinois updated its dress code based on the Oregon NOW model after a student advisor to the school board found it online. ETHS district superintendent Eric Witherspoon had "heard from our students that their ability to be inspired to learn was directly impacted by their daily experiences with dress code enforcement because of their gender identity or expression, racial identity, cultural or religious identity, [End Page 89] body size, or body maturity" (quoted in McCombs 2017). As administrators reviewed the data, they found it "supported the students' claims of being disciplined disproportionately across racial and gender lines" (McCombs 2017).

This example illustrates a few things about debate.

First, debate is still possible and still matters. The students' arguments persuaded a group with the power to change policy. Then, people with different power positions and different interests (students, administrators, teachers, parents, community members) worked together to develop a solution.

Second, debate depends on people's willingness to consider claims supported by data. After students at ETHS claimed that the dress code was inequitably enforced along racial and gender lines, administrators found that the data regarding disciplinary actions supported these claims. Debate is possible when people are willing to consider changing their positions and subscribe to the rules of the game (i.e., that arguments require evidence).

Third, debate depends on extended interactions over time. Changing the dress code took hundreds of hours of work over months of meetings. Woman suffrage took over seven decades of debates. That does not mean that change is impossible. Instead, it means that change requires debate, deliberation, input from affected parties, and careful balancing of costs and benefits. Debate's extended interactions require patience and persistence. Just because you (think you) are right does not mean that people will automatically stop doing something or start doing something else. Winning the debate is only the first step in changing attitudes and behaviors.

Fourth, although public policy has personal impacts, debate encourages a systemic, and systematic, view rather than a personal one. For example, the individual students could have simply resorted to a personal solution, such as changing their clothing or having their parents talk to the principal. Instead, the students talked to each other, identified a systemic problem with the code and its implementation, and introduced the topic for public deliberation. They sought an institutional change that enabled them to achieve personal goals of self-expression and educational achievement.

It is possible for data to convince others (like a school's administration) that their implementation of policy is discriminatory and that it needs to be changed. It is possible to convince institutions (like school boards) to change their policies. It is possible for those who disagree to work toward a solution. Although we are in a political climate where reasonable argument and evidence (for example, of death tolls from Hurricane Maria in [End Page 90] Puerto Rico) seem to matter less, and political affiliation matters more, this example ought to give hope.

### 1NC

#### The ROB and ROJ is to vote for the better debater – anything else self-serving, arbitrary, impact justified. The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### Their ROB is not possible to internalize broadly – only a standard of increasing conscious experience can

Greene 07 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: <https://www.gwern.net/docs/philosophy/ethics/2007-greene.pdf>, pages 47-50)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

#### Space is necessary for the continuation of capital accumulation

Kovic '19 [Marko; March 2019; co-founder president of the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research; "The future of energy," https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/aswz9/download]

Ideally, the mitigation of climate risks will coincide with and contribute to the development of improved or even entirely novel sources of energy that will increase the long-term chances of humankind’s survival by means of space colonization. This is not an unrealistic expectation, given that the mitigation of climate risks consists, to a large degree, of replacing fossil fuels with other, less harmful sources of energy. However, some climate change mitigation strategies might actually harm the long-term prospects of humankind.

First, it is possible that dominant climate change mitigation strategies will actively exclude any form of nuclear energy from the repertoire of climate-friendly energy sources. Existing and experimental (molten salt) fission reactors could play a significant role in replacing carbon-heavy energy sources, but pro-environmental attitudes often overlap with anti-nuclear sentiments [65]. As a result, and in combination with other problems such as large-scale market failures of existing fission reactors (one of the reasons being that generating electricity from fossil fuels is cheaper) [66], nuclear fission does not currently have significant standing as a “cleantech” contribution to climate change mitigation. From a long-term perspective, an unfavorable view of nuclear energy in the context of climate change might mean that technological progress in the areas of nuclear fission and fusion might come to a halt (for example, due to explicit bans or implicit disincentives). If such a scenario came to be, our attempts at colonizing space would almost certainly fail: There are currently no alternatives to fission and fusion, and it is highly improbable that Solar power alone could suffice for sustaining extraterrestrial habitats.

Second, there is some probability that climate change mitigation strategies will change the social order towards a degrowth philosophy. Degrowth is a vague socio-economic concept and social movement that, in general, calls for a contraction of the global and national economies by means of lower production and consumption rates, and, to some degree, to more profound changes to the “capitalist” system of economic production [67]. Degrowth or degrowth-like approaches are being actively considered as climate risk mitigation strategies [68, 69], and degrowth would almost certainly be a highly effective measure for mitigating climate change. After all, if we were to drastically reduce or even completely eliminate the (industrial) sources of greenhouse gases, the amount of greenhouse gases that are being emitted would accordingly drastically sink. From the long-term perspective of humankind’s survival, degrowth is problematic in at least two ways. First, there is a risk that the general contraction of economic activity would also slow or eliminate progress in the domain of energy, which would, in turn, reduce the probability of successful space colonization due to an absence of suitable energy sources. Second, and more fundamental: If degrowth were to become a dominant societal paradigm, it is uncertain whether the long-term survival of humankind by means of space colonization would be regarded a desirable goal. In a literal sense, establishing extraterrestrial colonies would mean growth; the size of the total human population would grow, and the area of space-time that humans occupy would grow.

In a more philosophical sense, degrowth might even be antithetical to space colonization. Even though both degrowth and space colonization have a similar moral goal – increasing wellbeing – , the ends to that goal are very different. Within degrowth philosophy, the goal is, metaphorically speaking, not to “live beyond our means”: We should strive for “ecological balance”, and such a state should increase the average wellbeing. But the frame of reference is the status quo; Earth and humankind as we know it today. Space colonization, on the other hand, operates with a much larger frame of reference: All the future generations of humans (and other sentient beings) who could enjoy wellbeing if we succeed in colonizing space – and who will categorically be denied that wellbeing if we fail to colonize space [70]. The goal of space colonization as a moral project is not to live beyond our means, but to actively redefine and expand what our means are through scientific and technological progress.

#### Decline shreds US China relations which are key to solving a host of existential risks --- independently destroys hegemony

**Johnson** and Gramer **20** [Keith Johnson is Foreign Policy's global geoeconomics correspondent, Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy, covering the State Department. “The Great Decoupling”, May 14th, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/china-us-pandemic-economy-tensions-trump-coronavirus-covid-new-cold-war-economics-the-great-decoupling/]

“What we have now through the beginnings of economic decoupling is the removal of that economic ballast in the U.S.-China relationship, which has historically differentiated it from the characteristics of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the Cold War,” said Rudd, the former Australian prime minister.

“If we have another pandemic, or environmental issues, or financial-sector issues, or Iran, or North Korea, how effective are you going to be if you don’t have a working relationship with China?”

In concrete terms, that will likely make it harder for the United States to nudge China to make any of the reforms Washington has pushed for years, let alone to moderate its increasingly belligerent and aggressive foreign policy. “If the question is whether breaking economic ties will lead to increased friction, the answer has to be yes,” Zoellick said. “The nature of decoupling doesn’t mean the Chinese will stop” their disruptive behavior, “they will just be less concerned with norms that the United States would otherwise push.”

In other words, after almost two decades of urging, sometimes successfully, China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the global system, as then-Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick famously urged in a 2005 speech, the United States would essentially be throwing in the towel. And, on a host of global challenges, giving up influence and engagement with the world’s largest population, second-largest economy, and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council could undermine U.S. interests across the board, he warned.

#### nuke war with North Korea – draws in Russia and China. NoKo will exploit the crisis narrative

Farley 17 [Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. A War with North Korea Would Be a Conflict Like No Other (And Millions Could Die). November 28, 2017. nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-north-korea-would-be-conflict-no-other-millions-could-23407?page=show]

Even if a world economic collapse does not bring capitalism to its knees, another such crisis could put stress on the relationship between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. North Korean prospects in the war depend utterly on sidelining the United States in some fashion, either through the presentation of a fait accompli, or through high stakes deterrence. The situation with Japan is more complex, but Tokyo views North Korea as sufficiently threatening that a war would almost certainly incur some kind of intervention, if not necessarily in direct support of RoK forces. The other scenario under which DPRK might decide to attack would come in anticipation of a major U.S.-ROK attack against the North. In such a situation, the North Korean leadership might decide that it has little to lose. The military balance would, in such a context, strongly favor pre-emptive action on North Korea’s part. In War… The clearest path to North Korean victory in war depends on a quick defeat of South Korean forces, providing the United States and Japan with a fait accompli that Pyongyang will expect Beijing to back. The North Korean attack would likely involve a classic 20th century combined arms assault, using artillery to disrupt RoK defenses and soften up positions (as well as create civilian panic), infantry to break holes in the South Korean lines, and mechanized forces to exploit those gaps. The North Koreans could well add special forces (potentially deployed to South Korea before the initiation of hostilities) and regular forces deployed by tunnel to South Korean rear areas. The Korean People’s Air Force is ancient, and has received no significant infusion of Russian or Chinese technology in years. The force has very little counter-air capability relative to the Republic of Korea Air Force, and its fighters would find themselves easy prey for well-trained South Korean pilots flying sophisticated aircraft. The KPA can expect very little ground support, either on the tactical or operational scales, and would likely struggle under South Korean air attacks. To remedy these problems, North Korea would likely reserve a large proportion of its land-attack cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles for attacks on South Korean air bases, in the hopes of destroying fighters on the ground and rendering facilities useless. The Korean People’s Navy would play a dual role in the operation. Offensively, it would try to attack Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) capital ships (including the Dokdo-class amphibs, and the Sejong the Great-class destroyers, the latter of which have anti-ballistic missile capabilities) with submarines and cruise missiles, while also attempting to disrupt port operations. Defensively, the KPN would try to protect North Korea’s coastline from bombardment and amphibious assault, both of which had a great impact on the 1950 war. Any North Korean invasion would also include attacks on South Korean ports, both to disrupt trade and to complicate the arrival of large-scale reinforcements. These attacks would likely involve conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, although the DPRK might resort to nuclear or chem-bio weapons for some particularly lucrative targets (such as Busan). With luck (and the North Koreans would need tremendous amounts of luck) the Korean People’s Army (KPA) could disrupt U.S. and RoK forces sufficiently to seize control of the major entry and exit points to Seoul, at which point it could consider either trying to roll up the rest of the peninsula, or hold for a negotiated peace that would leave the DPRK in a stronger position. This decision would hinge both on the tactical situation, as well as an assessment of whether North Korea’s national goals lie mainly in reunification, or in regime survival. But Diplomacy Has a Role… The longer the war continues, the grimmer North Korea’s prospects look. Consequently, Pyongyang needs the support of Beijing to end the war and secure its gains quickly. Why would Beijing concede to act as guarantor of the fruits of North Korean aggression? Not because of any lingering affinity with the North Korean regime, but rather out of a desire to prevent further disruption and instability along its border. Similarly, its frustrations with North Korea aside, China has little interest in the establishment of a U.S. or Japanese client across the whole of the Korean Peninsula. In this situation, North Korea would hope that the prospect of war against China (and perhaps Russia) would deter the United States from pursuing the liberation of South Korea. This calculus is remarkably similar to that of Kim il-Sung in 1950, although in this case North Korea’s own nuclear arsenal (presumably directed at Japan) would provide some deterrent.

#### Tech and innovation solve all their impacts and green the global economy – its feasible, likely, and not too late

**Krupp** et al **19** [FRED KRUPP is President of the Environmental Defense Fund. “Less Than Zero Can Carbon-Removal Technologies Curb Climate Change?”, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/less-zero]

But it is not too late to solve the global climate crisis. A decade of extraordinary innovation has made the greening of the global economy not only feasible but also likely. The market now favors clean energy: in many U.S. states, it is cheaper to build new renewable energy plants than to run existing coal-fired power plants. By combining solar power with new, efficient batteries, Arizona and other sunny states will soon be able to provide electricity at a lower cost per megawatt-hour than new, efficient natural gas plants. Local, regional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making measurable progress on reducing carbon pollution. Since 2000, 21 countries have reduced their annual greenhouse gas emissions while growing their economies; China is expected to see emissions peak by 2025, five years earlier than it promised as part of the negotiations for the Paris climate agreement in 2015. At the UN climate talks held late last year in Poland, countries agreed on rules for how to report progress on meeting emission-reduction commitments, an important step in implementing the Paris accord.

What’s more, an entirely new arsenal is emerging in the fight against climate change: negative emission technologies, or NETs. NETs are different from conventional approaches to climate mitigation in that they seek not to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere but to remove carbon dioxide that’s already there. These technologies range from the old-fashioned practice of reforestation to high-tech machines that suck carbon out of the sky and store it underground. The window of opportunity to combat climate change has not closed—and with a push from policymakers, NETs can keep it propped open for longer.

#### Growth is sustainable because of the shift to a knowledge economy---AND making it faster is key to outrun entropy---extinction

Gennady **Shkliarevsky 18**, professor of history at Bard College where he has taught since 1985, 1-5-2018, "Tax Cuts and the Problem of Economic Growth," International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/05/tax-cuts-and-the-problem-of-economic-growth/

Does this problem have a solution? Is it possible for humanity to break out of the current vicious circle and achieve a constant, stable, sustained, or even exponentially increasing economic progress? Production and consumption are the two most important categories in our economy and economic thinking. They constrain each other and this mutual constraint acts as a limitation on the rate of our economic growth. The typical effect of the expansion of production is the increase in supply. Supply growth results in declining prices. The decline in prices signals that the market is saturated and production must slow down. When production slows down, supply diminishes and prices begin to grow, which triggers a new expansion of production. When production expands, our wealth grows and economy appreciates. Consumption generally depreciates products and thus our wealth declines and our economy depreciates. Thus, production and consumption constrain each other and this constraint limits the rate of our economic growth. In order to solve this problem and achieve constant growth, we need to constantly rejuvenate our economy, we need to ensure a sustained supply of new products to the market and, moreover, we need to make sure that these products are needed. The main economic problem we face today is precisely in bringing novelties to the marketplace. Many business people, economists, pundits and politicians have stressed that we will have to innovate our way out of the current economic predicament. Therefore, creativity and creation are the key to solving the problem of growth. However, creativity, or what we call entrepreneurship when we talk about economy, is not a science. We cannot use it in any predictable way. It is a very uncertain and contingent factor that is fraught with many unknowns and surprises. Therefore, the problem of economic growth is reformulated into the problem of how to make innovation constant, predictable, and steady, rather than sporadic and contingent. In other words, how can we control our creativity? As has already been pointed out, consumption acts as a constraint on production. Production appreciates and consumption depreciates. The tendency of consumption to depreciate our economy is the reason for the existence of limits to rates of economic growth. As one can see, production and consumption are two most essential economic functions. They are mutually dependent, complementary and cannot exist without each other. The problem for achieving constant and sustained growth is that their vectors point in different directions: one toward appreciation and the other toward depreciation. However, do they have to be opposed to each other? There are two kinds of consumption that we know. One kind of consumption is consumption of final products. Indeed, this kind of consumption always depreciates products. You drive your new car out of the parking lot and it immediately loses value. But this form of consumption is not the only one we know. There is also a form of consumption that appreciates products, for example, consumption of raw materials or semi-finished products. Another interesting case of consumption that appreciates is the consumption of technological devices and machines. Indeed, physical use of such devices and machines depreciates them. However, they also represent certain technological knowledge. Knowledge consumption involves our mind. Mental consumption inevitably involves mediation and, therefore, construction that takes place in our mind. In other words, in order to consume something our mind has to create forms of mediation that allow us to consume this something, or, in other words, we have to produce it in our mind. Our sense organs transmit to our brain electrical signals that the brain interprets. We produce reality and production necessarily involves appreciation. Thus mental consumption involves necessarily the creation of new knowledge and hence appreciation. The above argument bears one important conclusion that consumption does not necessarily involve depreciation. Consumption can also, like production, be associated with appreciation, particularly consumption that involves mental activity that is associated with production of knowledge, or creation. We live in the era of knowledge society when knowledge is the main means of production and the principal product. The share of knowledge production by comparison with the production of consumer goods is constantly growing and already begins to outstrip the latter. Since consumption of knowledge, just like its production, is associated with appreciation, the transition to knowledge society suggests that in the modern economy both consumption and production will lead to appreciation and increase in wealth. They do not stand opposed to each other and their balance does not slow down the economy but is the source of its appreciation and constant growth. Balance in this case means that when production grows, so does consumption and both contribute to appreciation of the economy and economic growth. The constraint on the rates of growth disappears and the pace of economic growth can accelerate. The combined effect of growth that comes from production and consumption is double from what it is in our current economy. In other words, economic growth becomes exponential and limitless: as production increases, so does consumption, and more consumption leads to greater appreciation and greater wealth. This infinite and exponential economic growth is not only possible, but is, in fact, essential. Without such growth our civilization simply cannot exist. Our civilization is essentially a dissipative system that constantly generates entropy. As soon as this system ceases to create new levels and forms of organization, it begins to deplete available resources. The only way it can sustain itself indefinitely is by constantly redefining itself in ways that allow us to capture new flows of energy and resources; and where there are new flows of energy and resources, work can be performed. It is our destiny to play this catch-up game, and the only way we can play it indefinitely is by constantly creating new levels and forms of organization of reality so as to maintain the overall entropy level at zero. There is no way for our civilization to go back to less powerful levels of organization of social production, as advocated by the adepts of de-growth, or even to maintain the same level of production organization (steady-state economy). Limits to growth or de-growth are not ultimately realistic possibilities. Our civilization can only move forward. If we decide to terminate the progress of our civilization, we will embark on the path that leads only to its eventual disintegration and disappearance—an option that even supporters of limits to growth or de-growth do not want to entertain.

#### Targeted intervention to prevent ethnic cleansing, failed states, and terror is key to preventing large strikes – a single attack causes autocratic violence that outweighs every neg link BUT terrorists are inevitable so only we solve it

Fontaine 19 [RICHARD FONTAINE is head of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. State Department, at the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser for U.S. Senator John McCain. November/December. "The Nonintervention Delusion." https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-15/nonintervention-delusion]

The first argument holds that the United States need not employ military means in response to terrorism, civil wars, mass atrocities, and other problems that are not its business. Washington has used force against terrorists in countries ranging from Niger to Pakistan, with massive human and financial expenditures. And yet if more Americans die in their bathtubs each year than in terrorist attacks, why no war on porcelain? The post-9/11 overreach, this camp contends, endures some 18 years later, having stretched well beyond eradicating the original al Qaeda perpetrators and their Afghan base. In this view, as the threats have diminished, so should American attention. The civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen may be tragic, but they do not demand a U.S. military response any more than did the atrocities in Rwanda, eastern Congo, or Darfur.

Adopting such a cramped view of American interests, however, carries its own costs. Terrorism remains a threat, and the effect of successful attacks on Americans goes beyond their immediate casualties to include increased pressure to restrict civil liberties at home and wage impromptu operations abroad—operations that end up being costlier and less effective than longer-term, better-planned ones would be. After the Islamic State (or ISIS) took hold in Iraq and Syria and footage of terrorists decapitating American hostages horrified the public, Obama undertook a far larger operation than would have likely been necessary had he left a residual force in Iraq after 2011. As for genocide and civil war, certain cases can pose such serious threats to U.S. interests, or be so offensive to American values, as to merit intervention. Successive presidents have used military might to prevent, halt, or punish mass atrocities—Clinton to cease the genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the Balkans, Obama to protect the Yezidi minority in Iraq, and Trump after Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attacks against his own people in Syria. There is every reason to believe that similar cases will arise in the future.

#### Globalization is immensely beneficial for improving quality of life in the Global South---it’s also widely supported which proves their epistemic skepticism is from an ivory tower.

Horner et al. 18 (Rory, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK, “Globalisation, uneven development and the North–South ‘big switch’,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2018, 11, 17–33 doi:10.1093/cjres/rsx026)

Citizen surveys further reveal dramatic changes in attitudes to globalisation across and within the global North and South. While such surveys have methodological limitations,1 the results indicate distinctive trends that support the thesis of the ‘big switch’. Among people in the global South, polls have consistently found quite positive attitudes towards globalisation. In 2007, the Times of India claimed that ‘Indians believe globalisation benefits their country’, citing a poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion that 54% of Indians answered ‘good’ compared to 30% ‘bad’ to the question of whether increasing economic connections ‘with others around the world is mostly good or bad’. More recently, Stokes (2016) reported on Pew Research Surveys from 2016 which found that 60% of Chinese think their country’s involvement in the global economy is good (compared to 23% who think it is bad), while 52% of Indians surveyed thought it was good compared to 25% who said it was a problem. A recent YouGov survey of 20,000 people across 19 countries found a majority believed that globalisation has been a force for good. That survey found the most enthusiasm for globalisation in East and South-East Asia, where over 70% in all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam, a relative latecomer to globalisation (Smith, 2017).

By contrast, public support for globalisation in the global North has plummeted. Bhagwati (2004) cited an Environics International Survey presented at the 2002 World Economic Forum Meetings to argue that disillusionment with globalisation was not universal; ‘anti-globalisation sentiments are more prevalent in the rich countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers and the public in the poor countries of the South see globalisation instead as a positive force’ (2004, 8). Although Bhagwati suggested this was an ‘ironic reversal’, it proved to be in line with a 2007 BBC World Service poll that found 57% of people in G7 countries thought the pace of globalisation was too rapid, whereas the majority of those in ~~developing~~ countries surveyed thought it was just right or too slow (e.g. IMF, 2008; Pieterse, 2012). A 2007 Pew Global Poll similarly found a decline in the percentage of people in many Northern countries who believed trade had a positive impact. In its analysis of the survey results, Kohut and Wilke (2008, 6–7) commented that ‘it is in economically stagnant Western countries that we see the most trepidation about globalisation’. Almost 10 years later, The Economist (2016) reported on a YouGov survey of 19 countries, which found that fewer than half of people in the USA, UK and France believed that globalisation is a ‘force for good’ in the world. This broad change in attitude toward globalisation is playing out in national electoral politics as well as gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The ‘big switch’ and the geography of uneven development

The ‘big switch’ seemingly confounds the predictions of the most vocal proponents and critics of globalisation alike. Uneven development is dynamic and relates to differences both within and among countries (Sheppard, 2016). Naïve claims that the world is flat or that economic globalisation is ‘win-win’ have rightly been dismissed (Baldwin, 2016; Christopherson et al., 2008; Turok et al., 2017), yet it is also insufficient to suggest that globalisation simply leads to a reproduction of existing inequalities, overlooking how that unevenness may be changing as a result of new macroeconomic geographies (Peck, 2016). While trade theory could predict that there would be ‘losers’ in the global North from international economic integration, proponents of economic globalisation have asserted that they would be few in number and could be compensated. More recently, it appears that a large group of people feel more forsaken than compensated. Similarly, for those who embraced Marxian political economy, and warned of its negative consequences in the South, the apparent optimism and support for globalisation in the South may have been unexpected. The sceptical internationalists (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) should be acknowledged, however, for forecasting downsides in the global North. As we outline below, many people in the global North have experienced relative stagnation, whereas, albeit from a very low starting point and amidst considerable inequality, many people (but not all) have experienced improved development outcomes in the global South. We then explore what this apparent ‘big switch’ may tell us about contemporary economic globalisation.

The new geography of global uneven development

Significant portions of the population in the USA and other countries in the global North have experienced limited, if any, income gains in an era of globalisation. Milanovic’s (2016) ‘elephant graph’ (Figure 1) has quickly become a popular way to demonstrate the relative stagnation experienced in North America and Europe in recent decades. Exploring changes in real incomes between 1988 and 2008, he showed that those who particularly lost out on any relative gain in income were the global upper middle class (those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution) and the poorest 5% of the world population. Of these least successful percentiles, 86% of the population were from mature economies in the global North (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 23). Considering these contrasts more widely, a growing body of evidence shows that the global North’s dominance in the global economy is receding, with the share of high-income countries in global GDP having fallen from 76.8% in 2000 to 65.2% in 2015 (see Figure 1).

A different picture emerges in the global South. In Figure 1, it was Asians who comprised 90% of the population in the percentiles which did best in terms of relative income gains from 1988 to 2008 (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 223). The UNDP has remarked that

A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many ~~developing~~ countries into dynamic economies…doing well in economic growth and trade … they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other ~~developing~~ economies, reducing poverty and increasing wealth on a grand scale. (UNDP, 2013, 43)

The share of global GDP of low and middle income countries increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% in 2015 (Figure 2). Much of this increase is accounted for by China, as well as India and Brazil. Their share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, had almost doubled in the 21st century to 18% by 2015.

The development context of the global South has changed significantly since the turn of the Millennium, across a variety of important indicators. The total number of people in the world living on less than $1.90 per day (i.e. extreme poverty) has more than halved from 1.69 billion in 1999 to 766 million in 2013. At least by official estimates, the share of the population in the global South who are living in extreme poverty has fallen considerably this century. Whereas the percentage of the population in the global South with a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 was 33.4% in 1999, it was just 13.4% in 2013.2 The percentage of the world’s countries classified by the World Bank as low-income, albeit a very low threshold, more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century. Moreover, the total number of countries which are highly dependent on aid (having a net ODA > 9% of GNI) has fallen considerably, from 42 in 2000 to 29 in 2015, or from 34.1% to 23.2% of all low and middle-income countries with data available over that period.3

Considered overall, in comparison with the 1990s, the global South, in aggregate, now earns a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middleclass people, less aid dependency, considerably greater life expectancy and lower child and maternal mortality. Table 1 provides some summary indicators for high-income countries (HICs) and low and middle-income countries (L&MICs), as somewhat imperfect approximations for global North and South.

After two hundred years of a ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997) between developed and ~~developing~~ countries following the Industrial Revolution, recent measurements suggest a change in the pattern of global inequality across a number of indicators (Horner and Hulme, 2017). The Global GINI of income distribution across all individuals in the world has fallen from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016, 81). Analysis presented in the World Bank’s Taking on Inequality (2016) suggests that, in 1998, 26% of global income inequality was related to differences within countries, with the remaining 74% relating to differences among countries. By 2013, these shares were 35 and 65%. Two hundred years of a great divergence between global North and South now seems to have had some reversal, although more than half of an individual’s income can be accounted for by the country where he/she lives or was born (Milanovic, 2013). Inter-country inequality, rather than intra-country inequality, is still dominant, but it accounts for a diminished share of income-based and other inequalities (World Bank, 2016).

#### Bitcoin eliminates worker exploitation AND promotes ecological sustainability

Hannes Gerhardt 20, Associate Professor of Human Geography at the University of West Georgia, “Blockchains: Building Blocks of a Post-Capitalist Future?”, The Transnational Institute Long Reads, 11/6/2020, https://longreads.tni.org/blockchains-post-capitalist-future

The above cases may seem disparate, but they share a common interest in using “cryptographic ledger technology,” often referred to as “blockchain,” as a way of rethinking the valuation inherent in market-based pricing. By offering new, non-capitalist ways of measuring and pursuing value(s), blockchain promises the ability to pursue an alternative economic path to capitalism as we know it. Assuming the social and political power to do so, what would such an endeavor look like?

Valuation within capitalism

Before turning to the technology, it is important to be clear about the dysfunctional value system dominating the current economic order. In Ancient Rome, the thinker Publilius Syrus captured what would later become capitalist dogma when he said, “everything is worth what its purchaser will pay for it.”

Today, the obfuscated workings of the market — Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” — is seen as an omnipotent super-computer cranking out the current value of everything in the form of price. Following Marx, this simple reduction of value to what price it will fetch on the market happened when the basic rationale animating economic interactions shifted from one of pursuing commodity exchanges, facilitated by money (C-M-C), to using commodities as a means to gain more money (M-C-M). Money here becomes the marker of all the value in the world.

Such a valuation system, which is the very foundation of capitalism, leaves no room for any considerations of derived or inherent value, let alone ethical values. The consequences are clear: the reduction of labor to price leads to exploitation; viewing commodities as disconnected from labor results in the alienation of workers and consumers; and the never-ending externalization of environmental costs precipitates the collapse of global ecosystems.

Logically, therefore, any counter-capitalist movement must explore ways in which values — not one sole overarching value — can be re-incorporated into valuation by internalizing aspects of the economy that are generally excluded or hidden from view — both the good and the bad. Today, technology-inspired efforts, as illustrated in the examples above, are being pursued to do precisely this.

Blockchain and beyond

Blockchain is a digital, decentralized database of value-exchange transactions — essentially a ledger. It is open for anyone to see, like a shared Google document. Those who take part in viewing and building the ledger are called nodes. The ledger is established in a linear sequence of encrypted, time-stamped datasets, or “blocks.”

It is almost impossible to tamper with the ledger owing to a number of ingenious security measures, of which the most important is that the blockchain is based on the consent of the majority of nodes, i.e. it is a decentralized, peer-to-peer security system with no central site that could be compromised. The far-reaching contribution blockchain offers is the ability to create and maintain incorruptible records of monetary, product, or labor exchanges, among many other things, with no centralized intermediary such as a bank, a boss, or a government.

We are now also beginning to see the unfolding of second- and third-generation blockchain technologies, which have moved beyond capturing value transfers to establishing entire systems of value exchanges using smart contracts. A smart contract is a blockchain-enabled “if-then” program in which a particular event is triggered if a certain condition is met, which can be assessed by peer-to-peer or automated systems.

For instance, Sensorica’s value accounting system would be based on self-reporting and group verification. The information supplied by fishermen claiming Fishcoin could be assessed via a combination of autonomous sensing equipment, audits and reliance on users’ honor. Smart contracts can also be bound together into larger systems using artificial intelligence (AI) applications to create distributed autonomous organizations. Think here of Sensorica’s entire open value network being coded — from articles of association to bylaws — meaning that its complete production environment would have been created to function autonomously according to specific norms and values.

Despite its potential to make short shrift of centralized rent extractors and bosses, it is important to acknowledge that blockchain is not inherently progressive. In fact, it embodies the libertarian sentiments that are entrenched in capitalism’s market-centered value system. This means that technology-inspired, counter-capitalists have to fundamentally re-design, repurpose and re-govern blockchain’s underlying code.

FairCoin, for instance, successfully circumvented the ridiculous amounts of energy required by the verification system of traditional blockchains by re-coding the procedure through which blocks are added. FairCoin has also embraced open, democratic governance arrangements for managing its code in order to avoid the often opaque and guarded decision-making structures employed in systems like Bitcoin.

Some commons-oriented code writers are even developing cryptographic ledger systems beyond blockchain whereby anonymous, “trustless” networks are replaced by interlinked trusting groups, thereby enabling greater speed and scalability of data processing. One such effort is the biomimicry-inspired “Holochain,” a blockchain-like code described as a “method and reward structure for storing and accessing data and applications among users themselves.”

The ultimate aim of the Holochain project is to overcome the internet’s server-dependent centralization by using the participants’ excess computer processing power and hardware storage to create a true peer-to-peer internet, or “Holo network.”

Such a network will eventually require the widespread adoption of HoloPorts, the hardware that enables computer power sharing, as well as decentralized Holo applications that will run in the Holo network. The Holo apps, or Happs, will generally be aimed at making use of and expanding the peer-to-peer nature of the network, ranging from alternative social media platforms, such as Junto, to energy monitors and distribution systems such as Redgrid.

Re-valuing and de-fetishizing

How could this fancy new code challenge the human and environmental degradations caused by capitalism’s valuation system? We know that the current value system reduces labor to an exploitable commodity. In Sensorica’s open value network, however, the exploitation of labor is directly challenged by creating a value accounting system that is inherently meritocratic and fair, where work done within one project can also be credited if it is picked up by another. It is a commons-based peer-to-peer production arrangement rooted in fundamentally non-capitalist values — collaboration, openness, decentralization — yet one that its proponents believe can compete with and ultimately replace capitalist actors in the marketplace.

Developing such a system has been one of Sensorica’s main goals and it is now seeking blockchain-based solutions to increase its functionality, scalability and security. Holochain is one of the leading contenders to build this infrastructure.

The idea of coding commons-centered environments such as these is also the impetus for the creation of the Economic Space Agency (ECSA), a global collective of counter-capitalist economists and computer scientists seeking to expand and scale up the values-infused production pursued by the likes of Sensorica. According to Tere Vadén at ECSA, the aim is to create environments for economic interaction that “… encode incentive mechanisms and choose specific valuation metrics of non-monetary assemblages (from relationality, trust, and quality to land, labour and material goods) in smart contracts.”

Importantly, the values being coded into these environments, which can expand far past a single enterprise to encompass trans-local economies, are not limited to labor but can also address environmental issues. According to David Dao, a pioneer in employing distributed autonomous organizations to further sustainability, “we now have accessible tools to efficiently engineer economic incentives in a cheap and scalable manner…by distilling (crypto) incentives into code, we are now able to treat economics simply as software .” Driven by this conviction, Dao founded GainForest, which uses a combination of smart contracts to link donors, forest communities and sophisticated verification systems to fund and support sustainable forest stewardship, specifically in the Kayapo Indigenous territories in Brazil.

Beyond exploitation, capitalism creates a sense that goods and services are stand-alone things whose value is directly captured in their price, thereby obscuring how this value is actually derived. This is what Marx called “commodity fetishism.” This view of commodities significantly contributes to workers’ alienation because it breaks down the inter-personal relationship between producer and consumer. It also leads to a disconnect between consumer and nature.

Turning again to Sensorica, the voluntary, empowered and justly remunerated labor that could be made feasible on a large scale through blockchain-enabled, open value networks could be a way to return a sense of ownership of the labor provided. FairCoop is another instance in which workers’ alienation is challenged by facilitating self-employment with the help of the alternative FairCoin cryptocurrency. Similarly, Fishcoin challenges the disconnect between producers and consumers inherent in commodity fetishism through more transparent supply chains.

By meticulously documenting the various stages in production, producers and consumers can develop and respond to the various human and natural dimensions in a given economic activity. The blockchain-based system that reveals the various sources of the seafood we eat, for instance, is a first step in overcoming the obfuscation within existing forms of consumption, while simultaneously serving to track and hence manage the tapped resources. The potential here is significant.

#### Causes mass death---only capitalism enables a peaceful solution to poverty.

Rainer Zitelmann 21. German historian and author of “The Rich in Public Opinion.” "Violence Is History’s Great Economic Leveler." National Interest. 6-30-2021. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/violence-history%E2%80%99s-great-economic-leveler-188974

Another question that is all too rarely asked is: What would be the price of eliminating inequality? In 2017, the renowned Stanford historian and scholar of ancient history Walter Scheidel presented an impressive historical analysis of this question: The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. He concludes that societies that have been spared mass violence and catastrophes have never experienced substantial reductions in inequality.

Substantial reductions in inequality have only ever been achieved as the result of violent shocks, primarily consisting of war, revolution, state failure and systems collapse, and plague.

According to Scheidel, the greatest levelers of the twentieth century did not include peaceful social reforms, they were the two world wars and the communist revolutions. More than 100 million people died in each of the two world wars and in the communist social experiments.

Total War as a Great Leveler

World War II serves as Scheidel’s strongest example of “total war” leveling. Take Japan: In 1938, the wealthiest 1 percent of the population received 19.9 percent of all reported income before taxes and transfers. Within the next seven years, their share dropped by two-thirds, all the way down to 6.4 percent. More than half of this loss was incurred by the richest tenth of that top bracket: their income share collapsed from 9.2 percent to 1.9 percent in the same period, a decline by almost four-fifths. The declared real value of the income of the largest 1 percent of estates in Japan’s population fell by 90 percent between 1936 and 1945 and by almost 97 percent between 1936 to 1949. The top 0.1 percent of all estates lost even more during this period, 93 and 98 percent, respectively. During this period, the Japanese economic system was transformed as state intervention gradually created a planned economy that preserved only a facade of free-market capitalism. Executive bonuses were capped, rental income was fixed by the authorities, and between 1935 and 1943 the top income tax rate in Japan doubled.

Significant leveling also took place in other countries during wartime. According to Scheidel’s analysis, the two world wars were among the greatest levelers in history. The average percentage drop of top income shares in countries that actively fought in World War II as frontline states was 31 percent of the prewar level. This is a robust finding because the sample consists of a dozen countries. The only two countries in which inequality increased during this period were also those farthest from the major theaters of war (Argentina and South Africa).

Low savings rates and depressed asset prices, physical destruction and the loss of foreign assets, inflation and progressive taxation, rent and price controls, and nationalization all contributed in varying degrees to equalization. The wealth of the rich was dramatically reduced in the two world wars, whether countries lost or won, suffered occupation during or after the war, were democracies or run by autocratic regimes.

The economic consequences of the two world wars were, therefore, devastating for the rich—a fact that stands in direct opposition to the thesis that it was capitalists that instigated the wars in pursuit of their own economic interests. Contrary to the popular perception that the lower classes suffered most in the wars, in economic terms it was the capitalists who were the biggest losers.

Incidentally, the left-wing economist Thomas Piketty comes to a similar conclusion. In his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, he argues that progressive taxation in the twentieth century was primarily a product of the two world wars and not of democracy.

Poverty is Eliminated Peacefully

The price of reducing inequality has thus usually involved violent shocks and catastrophes, whose victims have been not only the rich but millions and millions of people. Neither nonviolent land reforms nor economic crises nor democratization has had as great a leveling effect throughout recorded history as these violent upheavals. If the goal is to distribute income and wealth more equally, says historian Scheidel, then we simply cannot close our eyes to the violent ruptures that have so often proved necessary to achieve that goal. We must ask ourselves whether humanity has ever succeeded in equalizing the distribution of wealth without considerable violence. Analyzing thousands of years of human history, Scheidel’s answer is no. This may be a depressing finding for many adherents of egalitarian ideas.

However, if we shift perspective, and ask not “How do we reduce inequality?” but “How do we reduce poverty?” then we can provide an optimistic answer: Not violent ruptures of the kind that led to reductions of inequality, but very peaceful mechanisms, namely innovations and growth, brought about by the forces of capitalism, have led to the greatest declines in poverty. Or, to put it another way: The greatest “levelers” in history have been violent events such as wars, revolutions, state and systems collapses, and pandemics, but the greatest poverty reducer in history has been capitalism. Before capitalism came into being, most of the world’s population was living in extreme poverty—in 1820

, the rate stood at 90 percent. Today, it’s down to less than 10 percent. And the most remarkable aspect of all this progress is that, in the recent decades since the end of communism in China and other countries, the decline in poverty has accelerated to a pace unmatched in any previous period of human history. In 1981, the rate was still 42.7 percent; by 2000, it had fallen to 27.8 percent, and in 2021 it was only 9.3 percent.