### NC -- T

#### Interpretation and violation – the affirmative must advocate for a reduction in private appropriation of outer space by private entities

#### Appropriation means use, exploitation, or occupation that is permanent and to the exclusion of others

Babcock 19 Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Cente. Babcock, Hope M. "The Public Trust Doctrine, Outer Space, and the Global Commons: Time to Call Home ET." Syracuse L. Rev. 69 (2019): 191.

Article II is one of those succeeding provisions that curtails “the freedom of use outlined in Article [I] by declaring that outer space, including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation.”147 It flatly prohibits national appropriation of any celestial body in outer space “by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”148 However, “many types of ‘use’ or ‘exploitation’. . . are inconceivable without appropriation of some degree at least of any materials taken,” like ore or water.149 If this view of Article II’s prohibitory language is correct, then “it is not at all farfetched to say that the OST actually installs a blanket prohibition on many beneficial forms of development.”150 However, the OST only prohibits an appropriation that constitutes a “long-term use and permanent occupation, to the exclusion of all others.”151

#### Outer space refers to the space beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.

Vereshchetin 06 [Vladlen, former Member of the ICJ, Chairman of the International Law Commission, and Professor of International Law] “Outer Space,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, <https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Outer_Space.pdf>, 2006

A. Definition of the Term ‘Outer Space’

1 The term ‘outer space’, like several other basic notions of space law (‘outer space activity’, ‘space flight’, ‘space object’), although frequently used in space agreements and other space law instruments, has never been defined by them. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the objective difficulty for the States concerned to agree on legal definitions in the context of rapidly developing technology and their apprehension that legally binding definitions might restrict their sphere of operation.

2 The absence of a formal definition of outer space does not mean that no general perception exists as to what is meant by outer space, even if the use of the term in natural sciences and in law may not always be exactly the same. It should be remembered that there is no definitive physical boundary between atmospheric space and extra-atmospheric space, the transition from one to the other being gradual. Although at 100 km the density of the air is but one millionth of what it is at sea level, for natural scientists these two regions of space, in some respects, may be perceived as one single whole. However, with the launching of the first satellite in 1957 the notion of outer space became inextricably linked with the exploration and uses of space by means of man-made spacecraft (→ Spacecraft, Satellites, and Space Objects). The physical and technical factors are directly relevant to the legal regulation of the region of space concerned. The atmospheric space of the earth and most of the activities in this space fall within the ambit of → Air Law. The space beyond the atmosphere is governed by space law. The ‘spatial’ element of each of the two above-mentioned branches of law is reflected in their denominations: the first being known as air (ie atmospheric) law, the second as space law, often referred to as outer space (ie extra-atmospheric) law.

3 The legal regimes governing → airspace and outer space are fundamentally different. Thus, logically and jurisprudentially it is necessary to know where air space ends and outer space begins. In theory, there must be no ‘outer’ boundary of application of space law, since outer space itself is limitless, but in practice space law, keeping pace with the development of space technology, does not purport to regulate space activity beyond the solar system (see Art. 1 Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3]). At the same time, ‘celestial bodies’ of the solar system, other than the earth, but comprising the Moon, are included in the legal notion of outer space (→ Moon and Celestial Bodies). This follows from the title and text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ([signed 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967] 610 UNTS 205) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

#### Extra topicality independently links to our offense – it allows the affirmative to add on random unpredictable planks to generate extra advantages and solve net benefits, which ruins neg preparation, especially when the majority of their offense and framing comes from the extra-topical part.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits and ground—-allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless.

#### TVA: Defend the US, China, Russia, and all other Non-African sovereign nations ban space appropriation. Defend private entities as the actor

#### There are two impacts –

#### 1] Fairness – unlimited aff choice shifts the goalposts for topical debate. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans. Fairness is an intrinsic good—-debate is fundamentally a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg—-the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate and the reason why people are incentivized to do prep and research is to help them do better in their next round is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate. Concluding fairness doesn’t matter would justify intervening on behalf of T even if we lose and extending your favorite critique in your head against the aff even though we never read it because they have no reason why they need to win a competitive game.

#### 2] Clash -- debate creates pressures for research, focused clash, and argument testing which is a standalone impact for their movement to spill over. The external impact is movements -- activism requires learning to defend a proposal against rigorous negation to develop skills for strategy, organizing, problem-solving, using resources, and creating coalitions

Lakey 13. (George Lakey co-founded Earth Quaker Action Group which just won its five-year campaign to force a major U.S. bank to give up financing mountaintop removal coal mining. Along with college teaching he has led 1,500 workshops on five continents and led activist projects on local, national, and international levels. Among many other books and articles, he is author of “Strategizing for a Living Revolution” in David Solnit’s book Globalize Liberation. 8 skills of a well-trained activist. June 11, 2013. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/8-skills-of-a-well-trained-activist/>)

Why more training now? The history of training is a history of playing catch-up. Very few movements seem to realize that the pace of change can accelerate so rapidly that it outstrips the movement’s ability to use its opportunities fully. In Istanbul a small group of environmentalists sit down to save a park, and suddenly there are protests in over 60 Turkish cities; the agenda expands, from green space to governance to capitalism; doors open everywhere. It would be a good moment to have tens of thousands of skilled organizers ready to seize the day, supporting smart direct action and building prefigurative institutions. But excitement alone may slacken; as with the Occupy movement, spontaneous creativity has its limits. With the right skills, movements can sustain themselves for years against punishing, murderous resistance. The mass direct action phase of the civil rights movement pushed on effectively for a decade after 1955. Mass excitement doesn’t need to fizzle in a year. A movement thrives by solving the problems it faces. Anti-authoritarians don’t want to count on a movement’s top leaders to be the problem-solvers, but instead to develop shared leadership by fostering problem-solving smarts at the grassroots. There’s nothing automatic about grassroots problem-solving. How well people strategize, organize, invent creative tactics, reach effectively to allies, use the full resources of the group and persevere at times of discouragement — all that can be enhanced by training. Nothing is more predictable than that there will be increased turbulence in the United States and many other societies. Activists cause some of the turbulence by rising up; other turbulence results from things like climate change, the 1 percent’s austerity programs and other forces outside activists’ immediate control. Increased turbulence scares a lot of people. It’s only natural that people will look around for reassurance. The ruling class will offer one kind of reassurance. The big question is: What reassurance will the movement offer? When students in Paris in May 1968 launched a campaign that quickly moved into nationwide turbulence, with 11 million workers striking and occupying, there was a momentary chance for the middle class to side with the students and workers instead of siding with the 1 percent. The movement, though, didn’t understand enough about the basic human need for security and failed to use its opportunity. That was a strategic error, but to choose a different path the movement would have required participants with more skills. Training would have been necessary. We can learn from this, inventory the skills needed and train ourselves accordingly. What is training ready to do for us? Here are a few of the key benefits that we should expect to gain from one another through training: 1. Increase the creativity of direct action strategy and tactics. The Yes Men and the Center for Story-Based Strategy lead workshops in which activist groups break out of the lockstep of “marches-and-rallies.” We need to have a broad array of tactics at our disposal, and we have to be ready to invent new ones when necessary. 2. Prepare participants psychologically for the struggle. The Pinochet regime in Chile depended, as dictatorships usually do, on fear to maintain its control. In the 1980s a group committed to nonviolent struggle encouraged people to face their fears directly in a three-step process: small group training sessions in living rooms, followed by “hit-and-run” nonviolent actions, followed by debriefing sessions. By teaching people to control their fear, trainers were building a movement to overthrow the dictator. 3. Develop group morale and solidarity for more effective action. In 1991 members of ACT UP — a militant group protesting U.S. AIDS policy — were beaten up by Philadelphia police during a demonstration. The police were found guilty of using unnecessary force and the city paid damages, but ACT UP members realized they could reduce the chance of future brutality by working in a more united and nonviolent way. Before their next major action they invited a trainer to conduct a workshop where they clarified the strategic question of nonviolence and then role-played possible scenarios. The result: a high-spirited, unified and effective action. 4. Deepen participants’ understanding of the issues. The War Resisters League’s Handbook for Nonviolent Action is an example of the approach that takes even a civil disobedience training as an opportunity to assist participants to take a next step regarding racism, sexism and the like. When we understand how seemingly separate struggles are connected, it helps us create a broader, stronger, more interconnected movement. 5. Build skills for applying nonviolent action in situations of threat and turbulence. In Haiti a hit squad abducted a young man just outside the house where a trained peace team was staying; the team immediately intervened and, although surrounded by twice their number of guards with weapons, succeeded in saving the man from being hung. Through training, we can learn how to react to emergencies like this in disciplined, effective ways. 6. Build alliances across movement lines. In Seattle in the 1980s, a workshop drew striking workers from the Greyhound bus company and members of ACT UP. The workshop reduced the prejudice each group had about the other, and it led some participants to support each other’s struggle. Trainings are a valuable opportunity to bring people from different walks of life together and help them work toward their common goals. 7. Create activist organizations that don’t burn people out. The Action Mill, Spirit in Action, and the Stone House all offer workshops to help activists to stay active in the long run. I’ve seen a lot of accumulated skill lost to movements over the years because people didn’t have the support or endurance to stay in the fight. 8. Increase democracy within the movement. In the 1970s the Movement for a New Society developed a pool of training tools and designs that it shared with the grassroots movement against nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement went up against some of the largest corporations in America and won. The movement delayed construction, which raised costs, and planted so many seeds of doubt in the public mind about safety that the eventual meltdown of the Three Mile Island plant brought millions of people to the movement’s point of view. The industry’s goal of building 1,000 nuclear plants evaporated. Significantly, the campaign succeeded without needing to create a national structure around a charismatic leader. Activists learned the skills of shared leadership and democratic decision-making through workshops, practice and feedback. In my book Facilitating Group Learning, I share many lessons that have evolved from Freire’s day to ours. I hope that readers of this column will add to the list of training providers in the comments, since I’ve only named some. My intention is to remind us that this could be the right moment, before the next wave of turbulence has all of us in crisis-mode again, to increase training capacity for grassroots skill-building. We’ll be very glad we did.

#### No RVIs and this means we can kick out of topicality and none of their impact turns apply

#### 1. Topicality is a conditional - we’ve presented a model we think is good for debate, but if you disprove that model we have the right to kick out it. It’s key to negative flexibility because the affirmative gets plan choice and advantage area and the negative only has the burden of rejoinder, so we have to be able to attack them from both the left and the right to produce the best debates.

#### 2. Their impact turns don’t exist in a vacuum - they’re reliant on them winning the case, but if we win the PIC that disproves the thesis of the case, so they can’t go for impact turns unless they’re winning anyways.

#### 3. Call out culture bad - debaters should be able to reform their views throughout time and making T an RVI is the equivalent of saying we should punish people for changing their opinions, which encourages ideological dogmatism and perpetuates the logic of carcerality they criticize

#### 4. Neg teams will exclude your aff and say to reject it regardless, they will say your Aff is messed up and tell you not to vote for it whether it’s a DA, CP, or Framework

### NC -- K

#### Pessimist formulation of “slavery” is Eurocentric and American- it ignores experience outside of western modernity recreating exclusion

Thomas, PhD, 18

(Greg, GlobalBlackStudies@SU, founder/editor @ProudFlesh, Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism ( 2.0 )? Theory & Event, Volume 21, Number 1, January 2018, pp. 282-317 (Article) )

First of all, how is it that “Afro-pessimism argues,” in point of fact? How does it become such a personified abstraction bestowed with such a rhetorical aura of authority, begging so many questions as to the perverse circumstances of its hypothetical birth, or rebirth? Furthermore, how does this arguing “Afro-pessimism” get to have such authoritative “life”—as a “field”; to be a living, speaking thing, not a theory even but an oracular “Theorist”—when Black people as a people (or “sentient beings”) are rendered as nothing but “dead” by this Afropessimism’s absolute commitment to the concept of “social death” for Black people on the white plantations of African enslavement and after the formal demise of those plantations still? It’s imperative to analyze this specific discourse (or notion) of “slavery” embedded here along with the conception of history or the geopol-itics of history inscribed by a “Black” discourse that could so casually dub itself “Afro-pessimism.” The entire discourse operates in the flow of an exceptionally provincial time and place. The “First Worldism” noted in Afro-pessimism (1.0) by Emeagwali is matched here by what Malcolm X marvelously defied as “Americanism.” A “new,” “pessimist” critique of “anti-Black racism” is made in the age and academic context of liberal identity conflicts and competitions—“after the revolution has failed,” to recall George L. Jackson, after counter-revolution has receded an array of revolutionary movements of praxis from hegemonic and certainly academic view. Wilderson adds in his writing against redemption: “We need to apprehend the profound and irreconcilable difference between White supremacy (the colonial utility of the Sand Creek massacre) and anti-Blackness (the human race’s necessity for violence against Black people). The antagonism between the post-colonial subject and the settler (the Sand Creek massacre, or the Palestinian Nakba) cannot—and should not be—analogized with the violence of social death: that is the violence of slavery, which did not end in 1865, for the simple reason that slavery did not end in 1865.”23 The chronological marker of “1865” is not insignificant or inconsequential. It indexes a specific white settler nationalist project; the USA construct of “Americanism” (or “amerikanism”) and slaveocracy; an official, white settler-slave state nationalist history and historiography. Yet Blackness and slavery are supposedly being thought at the most global or worldly level of humanity and humanism. Yet species automatically becomes nation, or the settler nation-state ideal, “American” meaning US settler imperialism in North America—both the species of humanity and the species of Blackness, which is cut up, constricted, and undercut from the start by Wilderson’s paradigm. How should 1865 function for the London site of The Occupied Times?24 The powder-keg Haitian Revolution does not pivot around 1865, of course, but 1791–1804. Britain declared a “gradual” abolition of slavery in 1833–34 with a typical “compensation” mandated for the slavers. So, what of the official if spurious “emancipation” dates for the rest of the Black world of Africa’s enslaved diaspora? Spain is said to officially abolish slavery in 1811, for instance, while making exceptions for colonies in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico. Denmark proclaims abolition in its “West Indies” in 1846–1848, like Sweden for Barthélemy in 1847. France is forced to follow suit, once more, in 1848; and Gabon is “founded” accordingly in Africa as the US would Liberia, etc. “Upper Canada” was said to end slavery with the British and “Lower Canada” (now Québec) with the French, an interesting fact for narrations of the Underground Railroad that often kept moving beyond Canada in the north back to the African continent (often Sierra Leone). The Netherlands is said to do so in 1861 or 1863. The modern slavery founded in the “Hispano-Portuguese slave trade” would thrive in the Western Hemisphere both before and after formal independence from Spain and Portugal. This is key to debunk the “Afro-pessimism” that thinks it can delink slavery and colonialism as two separate, even competing entities or issues. The criollo settler-colonial slave-states of Cuba and Brazil do not officially abolish slavery for Africans until two decades after 1865 in 1886 and 1888, respectively. Slavery was purportedly abolished in Ecuador in 1851, but it is quite possible to move that pretentious date to 1894, which is well beyond the official “closing” dates widely touted for Brazil after Puerto Rico and Cuba in the Americas. To think of slavery’s pseudo-abolition in terms of 1865 alone or any one date is not to think on the level of “Blackness” and “Human Life” at all; it is to reinscribe the most imperial white “American” perspective on slavery and Blackness instead. The conceptual-geopolitical trappings of “1865” fundamentally define the discourse of “Afro-Pessimism and the Ends of Redemption,” like assorted neo-pessimist texts: “The expanding field of Afropessimism theorises [sic] the structural relation between Blackness and Humanity as an irreconcilable encounter, an antagonism. One cannot know Blackness as distinct from slavery, for there is no Black temporality which is antecedent to the temporality of the Black slave.”25 Critically, Wole Soyinka details “pre-colonial” African languages of “black” self-identification from the Yoruba to the Ga to the Hausa peoples on continent, for starters, in “The African World and the Ethnocultural Debate” (1989). But these details do not enter modern Eurocentric discussions in the main, be they Marxist or anti-Marxist, etc.26 There is in Wilderson only the slaver’s history of slavery—one slaver’s official “national” or state history and discourse. The “expanding field” of “Afro-pessimism” (2.0) further expands anti-Black, anti-African conceptions of historical agency. There is nothing outside of, or before, or countering Wilderson’s “slavery” for the African enslaved. There is only Wilderson’s “Blackness,” which is curious. For what he casts as “Black” rather than “black” is more accurately cast as “negro” (in this specifically English usage, moreover, with no memory of the Spanish or Portuguese etymology) and not even “Negro,” quiet as it’s kept—since all of Africa is flatly foreclosed by this acutely paradoxical “Afro-pessimism.” Both Africa and diasporas eclipsed, his “Blackness” and “Human Life” turn out to be the blackness and humanism of white Americanism, specifically and restrictively, an isolationist or exceptionalist Americanism despite the past and present hegemony of white Western humanism and its “anti-Black racism” worldwide. What is the “Afro” in “Afro-pessimism,” therefore, when this Afro-pessimism (2.0) revivifies in disguise the “negro” concept of white settler-slave state history and historiography? It ironically does so in the name of some “Blackness” itself or, rather, the “blackness” of whiteness, of white postulation—not the Blackness of Blackness or the transvaluations of manifold Black liberation movements themselves, even as it blithely misappropriates the ongoing if now naturalized cultural-political labor of that historic Blackness in the upper case. A dominant Anglo-American discourse of slavery is all that there is and ever was now when it comes to the Black and African, all anti-slavery discourses and counter-discourses of slavery as well as Blackness somehow vanished.(289-92)

#### Linear time – afropess relies on the linear progress narrative in reverse – that there is no black progress as shown through a linear progression of society staying the same for black people.

#### Hierarchy – representations stem from the experience of males and shut out queer and female voices

#### Agency – tying black being to white racism makes antiblackness inevitable

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The immediate clarity of the linear progress narrative allows individuals to grasp a series of events in a cohesive fashion, something that Epiphe- nomenal narratives do not facilitate. In an Epiphenomenal narrative, they must be taken together, but in order to take them together, it is crucial to identify the three properties of linear progress narratives that limit or “stall” more inclusive interpellations of the collective and of events involved. The first limit on linear progress narratives is that of origins, which, under scrutiny, can never be absolute, because the causal antecedents of an event or an era can always be traced just a bit further back—indeed, it is often the goal of the ambitious historian or archaeologist to subvert established origins—to find an even earlier example of Black European writing, evidence of even earlier Mayan settlements, and so forth. On a linear timeline, origins also hold pride of place, which becomes problem- atic because they define the entire timeline—meaning that each event on the timeline must reflect the thematic of the origin. A (progress) history of medicine does not continually note that we have failed to cure the common cold and at times have misdiagnosed both the cause and the cure of various illnesses. While this provides what is likely a necessary clarity, it also helps inhibit radical revisions: those realizations and breakthroughs that cannot be incorporated because they threaten the entire premise of the timeline—its origin. The second limit, also noted before, is that linear narratives must use hierarchical or vertical means of representation. Histories of collectives can therefore track the progress of only the “leaders” of the collective—

and in the majority of Western collective histories, these are men. While women and queers might achieve marginal mention, their achievements and contributions are erased, thus perpetuating the false belief that men did indeed dominate the intellectual, cultural, political, and economic contributions of that collective’s timeline. Detailed histories of scien- tific discoveries, for example, often point out that the person credited with the invention in popular or dominant historical narratives was not the only one—or perhaps even the first—to deserve fame and credit. This means that many if not most histories of collectives are woefully distorted—yet including “the rest” of the collective would destroy the clarity of the timeline. Inclusion might also contradict the origin at some point—while the timeline might celebrate the political independence of its property-owning male members as “Independence Day,” the socioeconomic minority (likely the numerical majority) would reject or counter the marking of this day with their own arch note about their own status at the time of this “independence.” Because the origin of this timeline inaugurates a progress history of the collective as a whole, the options are untenable: only one group can represent the collective. This does not mean that achievements by women and queers cannot be noted, just that such histories cannot include any events that point to the failure of the history to do what it claims: trace the shared progress of an entire collective. The third limit to linear progress narratives involves agency, but this pertains only to collectives that originate as an effect of others’ actions— such as the Middle Passage epistemology’s direct reference to the white European and U.S. slave ships that transported millions away from their homes and families. The Middle Passage epistemology has a complicated origin because its theme is not only progress but progress against anti- Black racism. Each event on this progress narrative therefore always refers, explicitly or implicitly, to triumph over white racist obstacles, tying Black agency to white racist actions. In other words, Black actions are always reactions, making Black agency highly contingent and ambiguous rather than a celebrated given. To return briefly to Seacole, if one reads her through the Middle Pas- sage epistemology alone, she is almost “ungraphable,” because she does not intersect with the struggle that defines its original thematic, nor does she meet or otherwise comment on the personages and events that define it. Yet if we add Epiphenomenal time, Seacole actually connects the Atlantic, from her birthplace in Jamaica to her time in Panama to her eventual home in England—and beyond (the Crimea). She does so, Epiphenomenal time reveals, by virtue of her status as free, widowed, the inheritor of property, and the recipient of an informal education that nonetheless launched her into a successful career as publican and “doctress.” Seacole’s text is also an Anglophone text that connects the Hispanophone Diaspora to the dominant Atlantic narrative, however briefly, by noting work on the Panama Canal (an enormous source of jobs for Black Caribbean men) and the transport of slaves through South America as well as the commerce between U.S. slave traders and their even more southern counterparts.

#### The alternative is a global systems paradigm instead of an Atlantic-centric slavery paradigm. The AC imposes rigid, analytical blinders that prevent generating a fuller understanding of African diaspora

Allen, PhD, 14

(Richard B., History@Farmingham State, Slaves, Convicts, Abolitionism and the Global Origins of the Post-Emancipation Indentured Labor System, Slavery & Abolition, 2014 Vol. 35, No. 2, 328–348, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2013.870789 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Allen2014.pdf)

In his excellent survey of indentured labor in the age of imperialism, David Northrup emphasized the need to view the movement of millions of indentured workers throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world not only in the context of its times, but **also as a global system** that invites comparison with the great European migrations of the day and age.93 Even a cursory survey of published scholarship since the appearance of Northrup’s book almost 20 years ago reveals, however, that indentured labor studies remain hobbled by a **failure** to examine the indentured experience in well-developed local, regional, global and comparative contexts. This historiographical inertia may be traced to various factors: the continuing dominance of the Tinkerian ‘new system of **slavery’ paradigm** in both **scholarly and public discourse** about indentured labor; a corresponding propensity to view this system’s origins largely, if not exclusively, through the prism of an **Atlantic-centric** abolitionism in which the 1834 emancipation of slaves in the British Empire has acquired iconic status; and an Indo-centrism that distracts attention from or obscures work on other indentured populations. Northrup’s comments about the origins of the indentured labor trade echo these historiographical preoccupations: Despite the existence of a few earlier experiments, it is fair to say that the new **indentured labor trade arose** in direct response to the abolition of slavery in the colonies of Great Britain in the 1830s and to its subsequent abolition or decline in French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies.94 Recent research on free and forced labor migration in the Indian Ocean reveals that the early experiments to which Northrup referred were, however, neither few in number nor marginally important to understanding the indentured labor system’s origins and subsequent development. This research highlights, moreover, that these experiments occurred in a truly **global setting** that stretched from the Caribbean to the South Atlantic and across the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia and China. That this was so should come as no surprise given recent scholarship on the trans-imperial movement of ideas, personnel and news with the British Empire, especially during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.95 As P.J. Marshall has trenchantly observed, if there were significant differences between the British experience in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds, there were also significant similarities between these two components of a single imperial entity.96 Compelling work on the impact that public knowledge about and perceptions of empire had on British politics and identity underscores this point.97 So do astute assessments of the limitations inherent in oceanic basin approaches to studying labor migration and maritime history.98 Insights provided by the emerging field of global labor history, including case studies such as Jan Lucassen’s examination of the VOC’s role in the emergence of an international labor market which connected Europe with southern Africa and South and Southeast Asia, further illustrate the need for indentured labor historians to transcend the conceptual parochialism that inhibits the development of a **much fuller understanding of this** post-emancipation **labor system in all of its complexity**.99 The challenge before us is, accordingly, to **probe much more deeply and perceptively** into the ways in which the complex dialog within and between these oceanic worlds shaped the nature and dynamics of a global migrant labor system, the legacy of which continues to resonate in our own day and age.

#### No permutations in a methods debate –

#### They don’t get a permutation—a permutation is a test of competitiveness between policy options—that model doesn’t make sense when the debate is between amorphous philosophical positions because you can’t really tie them down to anything. They can always explain why in the abstract certain things they said are compatible with diaspora studies but that just begs the question of why they included the rest

#### Stick them to every word of their advocacy—they chose to initiate a debate without a plan and have thus forgone the right to “plan focus” style arguments—they can’t pick and chose which parts of their advocacy to include in the permutation—if we win a link to anything that should be sufficient to vote negative

#### Permutations should be evaluated from a “risk” perspective through the offense defense paradigm—if they can’t explain why there is an offensive reason to prefer the permutation there is no reason to risk it. The case isn’t an advantage to weigh when evaluating the permutation because if we win the premise of the link their advocacy is counterproductive—this isn’t a situation where perm shields the link

### NC – PIC

#### We advocate for the 1AC absent the call to “surrender to blackness.”

#### “Surrender to Blackness” is worse for community formation and reifies anti-Blackness.

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4, dml)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do or do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail.

The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces.

Some rooms have outsize power and influence: the Situation Room, the newsroom, the bargaining table, the conference room. Being in these rooms means being in a position to affect institutions and broader social dynamics by way of deciding what one is to say and do. Access to these rooms is itself a kind of social advantage, and one often gained through some prior social advantage. From a societal standpoint, the “most affected” by the social injustices we associate with politically important identities like gender, class, race, and nationality are disproportionately likely to be incarcerated, underemployed, or part of the 44 percent of the world’s population without internet access – and thus both left out of the rooms of power and largely ignored by the people in the rooms of power. Individuals who make it past the various social selection pressures that filter out those social identities associated with these negative outcomes are most likely to be in the room. That is, they are most likely to be in the room precisely because of ways in which they are systematically different from (and thus potentially unrepresentative of) the very people they are then asked to represent in the room.

I suspected that Helen’s offer was a trap. She was not the one who set it, but it threatened to ensnare us both all the same. Broader cultural norms – the sort set in motion by prefacing statements with “As a Black man…” – cued up a set of standpoint-respecting practices that many of us know consciously or unconsciously by rote. However, the forms of deference that often follow are ultimately self-undermining and only reliably serve “elite capture”: the control over political agendas and resources by a group’s most advantaged people. If we want to use standpoint epistemology to challenge unjust power arrangements, it’s hard to imagine how we could do worse.

To say what’s wrong with the popular, deferential applications of standpoint epistemology, we need to understand what makes it popular. A number of cynical answers present themselves: some (especially the more socially advantaged) don’t genuinely want social change – they just want the appearance of it. Alternatively, deference to figures from oppressed communities is a performance that sanitizes, apologizes for, or simply distracts from the fact that the deferrer has enough “in the room” privilege for their “lifting up” of a perspective to be of consequence.

I suspect there is some truth to these views, but I am unsatisfied. Many of the people who support and enact these deferential norms are rather like Helen: motivated by the right reasons, but trusting people they share such rooms with to help them find the proper practical expression of their joint moral commitments. We don’t need to attribute bad faith to all or even most of those who interpret standpoint epistemology deferentially to explain the phenomenon, and it’s not even clear it would help. Bad “roommates” aren’t the problem for the same reason that Helen being a good roommate wasn’t the solution: the problem emerges from how the rooms themselves are constructed and managed.

To return to the initial example with Helen, the issue wasn’t merely that I hadn’t grown up in the kind of low-income, redlined community she was imagining. The epistemic situation was much worse than this. Many of the facts about me that made my life chances different from those of the people she was imagining were the very same facts that made me likely to be offered things on their behalf. If I had grown up in such a community, we probably wouldn’t have been on the phone together.

Many aspects of our social system serve as filtering mechanisms, determining which interactions happen and between whom, and thus which social patterns people are in a position to observe. For the majority of the 20th century, the U.S. quota system of immigration made legal immigration with a path to citizenship almost exclusively available to Europeans (earning Hitler’s regard as the obvious “leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration”). But the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act opened up immigration possibilities, with a preference for “skilled labour”.

My parents’ qualification as skilled labourers does much to explain their entry into the country and the subsequent class advantages and monetary resources (such as wealth) that I was born into. We are not atypical: the Nigerian-American population is one of the country’s most successful immigrant populations (what no one mentions, of course, is that the 112,000 or so Nigerian-Americans with advanced degrees is utterly dwarfed by the 82 million Nigerians who live on less than a dollar a day, or how the former fact intersects with the latter). The selectivity of immigration law helps explain the rates of educational attainment of the Nigerian diasporic community that raised me, which in turn helps explain my entry into the exclusive Advanced Placement and Honours classes in high school, which in turn helps explain my access to higher education...and so on, and so on.

It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes.

​But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted.

But these are the last facts we should want to hold fixed. Doing better than the epistemic norms we’ve inherited from a history of explicit global apartheid is an awfully low bar to set. The facts that explain who ends up in which room shape our world much more powerfully than the squabbles for comparative prestige between people who have already made it into the rooms. And when the conversation is about social justice, the mechanisms of the social system that determine who gets into which room often just are the parts of society we aim to address. For example, the fact that incarcerated people cannot participate in academic discussions about freedom that physically take place on campus is intimately related to the fact that they are locked in cages.

Deference epistemology marks itself as a solution to an epistemic and political problem. But not only does it fail to solve these problems, it adds new ones. One might think questions of justice ought to be primarily concerned with fixing disparities around health care, working conditions, and basic material and interpersonal security. Yet conversations about justice have come to be shaped by people who have ever more specific practical advice about fixing the distribution of attention and conversational power. Deference practices that serve attention-focused campaigns (e.g. we’ve read too many white men, let’s now read some people of colour) can fail on their own highly questionable terms: attention to spokespeople from marginalized groups could, for example, direct attention away from the need to change the social system that marginalizes them.

Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy.

Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside.

But probably not.

A fuller and fairer assessment of what is going on with deference and standpoint epistemology would go beyond technical argument, and contend with the emotional appeals of this strategy of deference. Those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in. After all, a person privileged in an absolute sense (a person belonging to, say, the half of the world that has secure access to “basic needs”) may nevertheless feel themselves to be consistently on the low end of the power dynamics they actually experience. Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect.

The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology – its recognition of the importance of perspective – becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents “centring” or even hearing from the most marginalized; it focuses us on the interaction of the rooms we occupy, rather than calling us to account for the interactions we don’t experience. This fact about who is in the room, combined with the fact that speaking for others generates its own set of important problems (particularly when they are not there to advocate for themselves), eliminates pressures that might otherwise trouble the centrality of our own suffering – and of the suffering of the marginalized people that do happen to make it into rooms with us.

The dangers with this feature of deference politics are grave, as are the risks for those outside of the most powerful rooms. For those who are deferred to, it can supercharge group-undermining norms. In Conflict is Not Abuse, Sarah Schulman makes a provocative observation about the psychological effects of both trauma and felt superiority: while these often come about for different reasons and have very different moral statuses, they result in similar behavioural patterns. Chief among these are misrepresenting the stakes of conflict (often by overstating harm) or representing others’ independence as a hostile threat (such as failures to “centre” the right topics or people). These behaviours, whatever their causal history, have corrosive effects on individuals who perform them as well as the groups around them, especially when a community’s norms magnify or multiply these behaviours rather than constraining or metabolizing them.

For those who defer, the habit can supercharge moral cowardice. The norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility: it displaces onto individual heroes, a hero class, or a mythicized past the work that is ours to do now in the present. Their perspective may be clearer on this or that specific matter, but their overall point of view isn’t any less particular or constrained by history than ours. More importantly, deference places the accountability that is all of ours to bear onto select people – and, more often than not, a hyper-sanitized and thoroughly fictional caricature of them.

The same tactics of deference that insulate us from criticism also insulate us from connection and transformation. They prevent us from engaging empathetically and authentically with the struggles of other people – prerequisites of coalitional politics. As identities become more and more fine-grained and disagreements sharper, we come to realize that “coalitional politics” (understood as struggle across difference) is, simply, politics. Thus, the deferential orientation, like that fragmentation of political collectivity it enables, is ultimately anti-political.

Deference rather than interdependence may soothe short-term psychological wounds. But it does so at a steep cost: it can undermine the epistemic goals that motivate the project, and it entrenches a politics unbefitting of anyone fighting for freedom rather than for privilege, for collective liberation rather than mere parochial advantage.

How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have.

#### It devolves into toxic tokenization where blackness becomes a disembodied concept devoid from the impact of ideas on black people, which is extraordinarily dangerous for political resistance

Matlon 19 – (Jordanna Matlon, Assistant Professor at American University’s School of International Service. She is at work on a book about racial capitalism and black masculinity., “Black Masculinity Under Racial Capitalism”, Boston Review, 7-16-19, Available Online at <https://bostonreview.net/race/jordanna-matlon-black-masculinity-under-racial-capitalism?utm_source=Boston+Review+Email+Subscribers&utm_campaign=991e2490a1-MC_Newsletter_7.18.19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_2cb428c5ad-991e2490a1-41101001&mc_cid=991e2490a1&mc_eid=d286526fe5>, accessed 7-26-19, HKR-AM)

Striving to achieve economic value presents the aforementioned alternatives to labor: commodification and consumerism, branding and brands. Blackness, with its legacy of double commodification, is particularly susceptible to disembodied market value. Tokenism and cultural appropriation—valuable blackness coupled with the near or total absence of black people—exemplify the marginal position occupied by blacks in the marketplace. So while black laboring bodies in many instances have become redundant, the social registers of blackness have been converted into cultural capital and remain highly significant. Greg Tate writes in Everything But the Burden (2003) that, as capitalism’s original fetish object, “the Black body, and subsequently Black culture, has become a hungered-after taboo item and a nightmarish bugbear in the badlands of the American racial imagination.” The ubiquitous image of a dunking Michael Jordan hints at how iconic the black male body is in popular culture. Yet Jordan’s repurposing as a commodity—one aimed at compelling consumption by other black men—renders his remarkable athleticism secondary to his power as a commercial object. This commodification of Jordan dramatizes the degree to which black manhood, so far as the market is concerned, has value mainly as a trope. Tropes, in this sense, are not only personifications of a stereotype. They are performing commodities that embody extreme expressions of livelihoods—whether celebrity or criminal—that are outside of wage labor and that are rooted in conspicuous consumption. For black men excluded from the labor market, such tropes stand in as promises of success in the capitalist world system. Indeed, for many they suggest an alternative to market fundamentalism: if conventional routes to masculine worth via virtuous breadwinning are unavailable, the freedom to make money any way possible and spend it with abandon emerges as a generalizable expression of manhood.

Like a blinged-out Horatio Alger, the black male trope is many things at once: as Tate maintains, the “ultimate outsider,” yes, but also, as Nicole Fleetwood contends, “an ultra-stylish thug and the ultimate American citizen.” In his essay “NIGGA: The 21st-Century Theoretical Superhero” (2013), Neal explains, “basic tropes of ‘blackness’—black culture, black identity, black institutions—have been distorted, remixed, and undermined by the logic of the current global economy.” This distorted blackness enables a “stake in transnational capitalism” but at the expense of being “posited and circulated as a buffer against white supremacy, political disenfranchisement, slavery, Jim Crow segregation and the collusion of racist imaginations and commercial culture.” The commodification of blackness during a time when an ever-increasing number of the world’s laborers are insecure, contingent, or chronically unemployed thus has the perverse effect of extolling blackness within the very system that objectifies it.

While blackness was initially subjected to what Aimé Césaire referred to in 1955 as thingification in service to capitalism, tropes of blackness now personify the ideals of making and spending—the basic freedoms of late capitalism. Even for black men who are never able to attain normative, producer-provider masculinities, the seduction of patriarchal privilege is a powerful driver. With their masculinities at stake, many seek out alternative means to demonstrate their economic agency. They achieve this by locating black value in its commodity form—paying to advertise, as Thomas aphorizes. Doing so enables black men to overwrite the dominant narrative of labor market exclusion.

Yet by accepting commodification as a source of black value, these strategies also perpetuate capitalist hegemony. The trope accepts the fundamental association of blackness with commodification as the cost of admission to the patriarchal political economic order. Just as the incorporation of blackness in the world capitalist economy reduced it to object status, black value thus recuperated is still—the more so, even—a product of racial capitalism. Resisting the denigrations of racial capitalism has become the means of its preservation.

In 1961 Frantz Fanon wrote: “The economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.” We might also add that you are a man because you have money, and you have money because you are a man. It is in this context of unequal access to productive, remunerative labor that consumerism and commodification have become so pervasive to the public personas of black masculinity. From slavery on, the fact of blackness being the cause and consequence of economic devaluation has made patriarchal capitalist inclusion especially appealing for black men, like winning a rigged game against all odds. But in doing so, the terms of black liberation are collapsed into patriarchal entitlement and participation in capitalism, rather than being framed as a more ambitious anti-capitalist critique.

As a result of their structural position and the perspective it has given them, black Americans are in a privileged position to critique racial capitalism. But that is a potentiality, not a foregone fact. The risk of essentializing blackness, Hall warns, is that “we are tempted to use ‘black’ as sufficient in itself to guarantee the progressive character of the politics we fight under the banner.” The cause may appear the consequence, such that all utterances celebrating blackness are treated as oppositions to racial capitalism. Among other things, this threatens to mistake consumer choice for social justice and branding for black power. A recent example is the controversy surrounding Colin Kaepernick’s Nike contract, in which the terrain of struggle was in some senses transformed into one of brand visibility and consumer allegiance. Meanwhile Kaepernick’s endorsement, embraced as a victory, overshadows the fact that his appointment as a Nike spokesperson in no way altered the fragility of black life in the United States—not to mention the debased conditions of Nike’s sweatshop laborers abroad. Highly visible expressions of black masculinity—specious substitutes for revolutionary potential—thus become but a selling point for disposable bodies in the market of disposable consumerism**.**

At the same time that commercial culture converts black men into tropes, black men’s purported deviances (as drug dealers, say) or deficiencies (as absent fathers) vis-à-vis the breadwinning masculine ideal are made— with equal parts disgust and fascination—the subject of exposés, white papers, and government programs. Initiatives such as Barack Obama’s My Brother’s Keeper—which proposes that better mentorship, rather than structural change, is the key to black men’s success—underscore the emphasis black respectability politics places on the right kind of remunerative strategies and consumption practices as the way to achieve black uplift. Such approaches have identified black capitalism as the source of black liberation. Beholden to the system, perhaps it is.

Yet for black people, “buying in rather than dropping out” acquiesces to “the link between commodities and identities,” as Paul Gilroy observed. In other words, not all proposed routes to black liberation lead to the same place. Black thingification has the potential to be a powerful counterhegemonic force against the degradations of racial capitalism. The black radical tradition that Robinson outlined in Black Marxism understands anti-capitalism as an abolitionist politics—one that has the potential to benefit not only blacks but everyone ensnared by a global system of labor market exclusion and environmental devastation t

hat will immiserate and finally destroy us all.

In the welcome resurgence of writing about racial capitalism, the integral role of patriarchy in upholding ideological and economic domination is often missed. But a truly radical counterhegemony can only be realized by disassociating both blackness and manhood from capitalist registers of worth. The original construction of the black body as a commodity object, after all, uniquely positions it to critique the commodity fetish. And likewise the contradictory location of black masculinity uniquely positions it to critique the patriarchal, heteronormative ideals of male economic entitlement.

Yet the trope—as the ultimate performance of black masculinity—has proven a ready proponent of capital. In Black Looks: Race and Representation (1992), bell hooks asks, “And what does it say about the future of black liberation struggles if the phrase ‘it’s a dick thing’ is transposed and becomes ‘it’s a black thing?’” If this is the case, she warns, “black people are in serious trouble.” True black liberation is rather, as Tate suggests, “divestment in the performance of ‘Blackness.’”

#### Frames for inspiration

#### 1. Single debates don’t matter – it’s TOC elims, the difference between the quarters and the semis is a non-issue and this deficit is an assertion that proves our argument that unconditional deference becomes a circular justification for privileged institutions like debate that comes at the expense of material organizing

#### 2. If we impact turned the content of the 1AC, the inspiration is bad. More people saying we should surrender to blackness proves our impact turns are unique and it’s the reason to vote neg, not the other way around

#### 3. Debate should be about more than itself – that’s our argument, you should have a higher bar for aff’s being politically positive than just inspiring more people to do debate, because the whole point is we should tactically redeploy privileged academic spaces like debate to help more people, not just create better debates

#### It competes – the opportunity cost of reading a K aff where you get to pick the whole 1AC is that you must be held to every part of the aff. That means, even if you conclude they’re largely correct, you should vote neg to intellectually sharpen the aff and submit a research review that makes their politics more effective. Any perm is severance, which is a voting issue that makes being neg impossible by undermining the logical basis for any offense.

### NC – Case

#### Rob better debater

#### Lbl of part 2

#### Unconscious bias exists but psychoanalytic explanations ignore specific social and cultural value systems and confuse habit with instinct.

Peter Hudis 15, Professor of English and History at Queens College, 2015, Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades, p. 35-37

Fanon’s vantage point upon the world is his situated experience. He is trying to understand the inner psychic life of racism, not provide an account of the structure of human existence as a whole. Racism is not, of course, an integral part of the human psyche; it is a Social construct that has a psychic impact. Any effort to comprehend social distress that accompanies racism by reference to some a priori structure- be it the Oedipal Complex or the Collective Unconscious- is doomed to failure.

Carl Jung sought to deepen and go beyond Freud's approach by arguing that the subconscious is grounded in a universal layer of the psyche- which he called "the collective unconscious:' This refers to inherited patterns of thought that exist in all human minds, regardless of specific culture or upbringing, and which manifest themselves in dreams, fairy tales, and myths. Jung referred to these universal patterns as "archetypes:' It may seem, on a superficial reading, that 1 Fanon is drawing from Jung, since he discusses how white people tend to unconsciously assimilate views of blacks that are based on negative stereotypes. Even the most "progressive" white tends to think of blacks a certain way (such as "emotional;' "physical," or / "aggressive"), even as they disavow any racist animus on their part. However, Fanon denies that such collective delusions are part of a psychic structure; they are not permanent features of the mind. They are habits acquired from a series of social and cultural impositions. While they constitute a kind a collective unconscious on the part of many white people, they are not grounded in any universal "archetype." The unconscious prejudices of whites do not derive from genes or nature, nor do they derive from some form independent of culture or upbringing. Fanon contends that Jung "confuses habit with instinct."

Fanon objects to Jung's "collective unconscious" for the same reason that he rejects the notion of a black ontology. His phenomenological approach brackets out ontological claims on both a social and psychological level insofar as the examination of race and racism is concerned. He writes, "Neither Freud nor Adler nor even the cosmic Jung took the black man into consideration in the course of his research.”

This does not mean that Fanon rejects their contributions tout court. He does not deny the existence of the unconscious. He only denies that the inferiority complex of blacks operates on an unconscious level. He does not reject the Oedipal Complex. He only denies that it explains (especially in the West Indies) the proclivity of the black "slave" to mimic the values of the white "master." And as seen from his positive remarks on Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, he does not reject the idea of psychic structure. He only denies that it can substitute for an historical understanding of the origin of neuroses .23 Fanon adopts a socio-genetic approach to a study of the psyche because that is what is adequate for the object of his analysis.

For Fanon, it is the relationship between the socio-economic and psychological that is of critical import. He makes it clear, insofar as the subject matter of his study is concerned, that the socio-economic is first of all responsible for affective disorders: "First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority."24 Fanon never misses an opportunity to remind us that racism owes its origin to specific economic relations of domination- such as slavery, colonialism, and the effort to coopt sections of the working class into serving the needs of capital. It is hard to mistake the Marxist influence here. It does not follow, however, that what comes first in the order of time has conceptual or strategic priority. The inferiority complex is originally born from economic subjugation, but it takes on a life of its own and expresses itself in terms that surpass the economic. Both sides of the problem-the socio-economic and psychological-must be combatted in tandem: "The black man must wage the struggle on two levels; whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic:''5

On these grounds he argues that the problem of racism cannot be solved on a psychological level. It is not an "individual" problem; it is a social one. But neither can it be solved on a social level that ores the psychological. It is small wonder that although his name never appears in the book, Fanon was enamored of the work of Wilhelm Reich. This important Freudian-Marxist would no doubt feel affinity with Fanon's comment, "Genuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things, in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place:'27

#### Violence towards black people is explained by a confluence of structures

Dawson 21 — (Michael C. Dawson, Prof. Michael C. Dawson is the John D. MacArthur Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and founding director of its Center for the Study of Race, Politics, and Culture. His research interests include African-American political behaviour, identity, and public opinion, the political effects of urban poverty, and African-American political thought and ideology, as distinct from that of white Americans. This post is adapted from Chapter 2 of his edited volume Race and Capitalism: Black Politics in an Era of Financial Capitalism (in preparation). It is the inaugural piece in Ideology Theory Practice's series evaluating Afropessimism as a social and political ideology., “Against Afropessimism“, Ideology Theory, 5-17-2021, Available Online at https://www.ideology-theory-practice.org/blog/against-afropessimism, accessed 3-3-2022, HKR-AR)

What Wilderson misses is that blacks are subject to multiple sources of violence—the cumulative nature of which is monstrous. Simultaneously analysing the articulation of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism leads one to the realisation that blacks **depending on context** in various combinations experience violence as workers, women, and/or as black people. Each system of domination routinely inflicts violence for those at the bottom of each hierarchy. I would add that an aspect of white supremacy and anti-blackness is that for blacks even the forms of violence that derive from patriarchy and capitalism are intensified due to white supremacy. This violence is also **rational** to the degree that each form of violence is ultimately aimed at reinforcing the rule of those at the **top of each system of domination**.

In a much earlier essay, Wilderson more directly addresses the relationship between capitalism and black subjugation. Wilderson asserts that “…the United States is constructed at the intersection of both a capitalist and white supremacist matrix.”[19] This statement is promising in that it hints at the simultaneous analysis of the interaction between capitalism and white supremacy. Yet, he does not sufficiently explore the consequences of this statement and does not analyse the actual dynamics created by the articulation of capitalism and white supremacy.

For example, in Afropessimism Wilderson correctly asserts that “….the emergence of the slave, the subject-effect of an ensemble of direct relations of force marks the emergence of the capitalism itself.”[20] The “primitive” accumulation necessary for the establishment of the capitalist social order does have at its centre the brutal and hideous social relations of slavery and the slave trade, but not only slavery.[21] But unlike what Wilderson argues, the historical record shows that under white supremacy and colonialism blacks are **not the only racially subordinate group** to be **subject to “direct relations of force.”** As Ince argues, “direct relations of force” **do not only** mark the subject of the slave, but of the colonised more generally such as the genocide of the indigenous peoples of particularly the “New” World (itself a precondition of capitalism).[22] Establishing and maintaining capitalism has required the expropriation of resources and labour—simultaneously wedded to the violation of black, brown, and yellow bodies throughout the world. In the end, non-white bodies are disposable in the global North and South; in the ghettoes, barrios, reservations, prisons, refugee camps and immigration detention centres that can be grimly **found throughout the world**. The **particularities are important**—and anti-blackness is a key particularity that shapes capitalism and white supremacy, but as argued earlier, it still a part a global system of white supremacy marked by direct relations of force, and which non-whites are racialised differently by that force.

Within the context of the U.S., only a type of stubborn blindness, a refusal to acknowledge the historical record, and refusal to see the interrelationship between capitalism and racial domination can lead those such as Wilderson to argue that “we were never meant to be workers…..From the very beginning, we were meant to be accumulated and die.”[23] This assertion flies against the historical evidence. No, blacks were meant to work, die, and be accumulated as need be. White supremacy often demands that blacks die. Capitalism demands that blacks must also, when necessary work and/or be accumulated. Each, and patriarchy as well, continually make their bloody demands. Through politics and other means of struggle blacks continually resist. This resistance can only be successful by understanding the mutual articulation between each system of domination.