### 1NC

#### Interpretation – topical affs must defend a reduction of intellectual property protections.

#### IP is a specific, definable category which doesn’t include data exclusivity. WTO

“World Trade Organization.” WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/trips\_e/intel1\_e.htm.

Intellectual property rights are the rights given to persons over the creations of their minds. They usually give the creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her creation for a certain period of time. Intellectual property rights are customarily divided into two main areas: (i) Copyright and rights related to copyright.[back to top](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm#top) The rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films) are protected by copyright, for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author. Also protected through copyright and related (sometimes referred to as “neighbouring”) rights are the rights of performers (e.g. actors, singers and musicians), producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations. The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work. (ii) Industrial property.[back to top](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm#top) Industrial property can usefully be divided into two main areas: One area can be characterized as the protection of distinctive signs, in particular trademarks (which distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings) and geographical indications (which identify a good as originating in a place where a given characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin). The protection of such distinctive signs aims to stimulate and ensure fair competition and to protect consumers, by enabling them to make informed choices between various goods and services. The protection may last indefinitely, provided the sign in question continues to be distinctive. Other types of industrial property are protected primarily to stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology. In this category fall inventions (protected by patents), industrial designs and trade secrets. The social purpose is to provide protection for the results of investment in the development of new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and development activities. A functioning intellectual property regime should also facilitate the transfer of technology in the form of foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing. The protection is usually given for a finite term (typically 20 years in the case of patents). While the basic social objectives of intellectual property protection are as outlined above, it should also be noted that the exclusive rights given are generally subject to a number of limitations and exceptions, aimed at fine-tuning the balance that has to be found between the legitimate interests of right holders and of users.

#### Prefer –

#### Limits – allowing non intellectual property explodes limits to include literally all possible plans out there – makes neg prep impossible because the case negs to the different affs would have no overlap – privileges the aff by stretching pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding nuanced rigorous testing of aff

**No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical**

**1NC**

#### Oil prices are sliding – two days in a row, dollar strength, Ida, increased production, and tapering asset purchases

Paraskova 9/20/21 [Tsvetana is a writer for Oilprice.com with over a decade of experience writing for news outlets such as iNVEZZ and SeeNews. "Oil Prices Fall As Traders Anxiously Await Fed’s Decision." https://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Prices-Fall-As-Traders-Anxiously-Await-Feds-Decision.html]

Oil prices dropped early on Monday as the U.S. dollar continues to strengthen ahead of the Fed’s much-anticipated policy meeting this week, which could announce the beginning of stimulus easing.

As of 9:05 a.m. EDT, WTI Crude was losing 1.75% at $70.71 and Brent Crude prices were down 1.49% at $74.21.

The oil market is down for a second consecutive day after Friday’s session settled in the red, as broader markets are anxiously watching whether the Federal Reserve will announce the start of asset purchase tapering at its meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday. The U.S. dollar gains were depressing the oil market as a stronger greenback makes oil buying more expensive for holders of other currencies.

The risk to U.S. oil production in the Gulf of Mexico is now diminishing as more output is being restored in the wake of Hurricane Ida. The return of more production from the U.S. offshore also weighed on oil prices early on Monday.

“As this week starts, much of the US market tightening on account of Ida is already baked into prices, while outages in offshore oil production and Louisiana refining capacity are continuing to ease,” Vanda Insights said in a note early on Monday.

The U.S. dollar and the Fed meeting will be the key external factors that will determine oil’s direction this week, apart from the usual U.S. inventory reports by the API and EIA, ING strategists Warren Patterson and Wenyu Yao say.

“All eyes will be on the FOMC meeting on Wednesday, where some believe we could already see the Fed announce its intentions to start tapering asset purchases, though our US economist is of the view that an announcement is more likely in November. A tapering announcement this week would likely put some downward pressure on oil and the broader commodities complex,” they noted.

#### Oil prices will decline – OPEC will increase production – our ev is predictive

Julia Fanzeres 9-30-21, "Biden renews OPEC outreach as oil prices climb 10% in September," 9-30-2021 https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/9/30/biden-renews-opec-outreach-as-oil-prices-climb-10-in-september

The rising price of oil “is of concern for the U.S.,” said White House press secretary Jennifer Psaki. The U.S. has been in touch with OPEC about oil prices, she said at a press briefing. Heading into next week’s meeting between OPEC and its partners, there is increased speculation that the organization will consider raising production more than the previously announced hike of 400,000 barrels a day.

“With oil prices at multi-year highs, we think that OPEC will come under increasingly intense pressure from Washington to increase production,” RBC analyst Helima Croft said in report.

#### Middle East war is good—it raises oil prices

Lynch 18 [Michael Lynch spent nearly 30 years at MIT as a student and then researcher at the Energy Laboratory and Center for International Studies. He then spent several years at what is now IHS Global Insight and was chief energy economist. Currently, Lynch serves as the president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, Inc., and lectures MBA students at Vienna University. He’s been president of the US Association for Energy Economics and serves on the editorial boards of three publications. Will Oil Prices Blow Up With The Middle East? April 12, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellynch/2018/04/12/will-the-oil-price-blow-up-with-the-middle-east/#166754c23d19]

It's said that a woman once approached 19th century German Chancellor Bismarck and asked him to explain the controversy over Schleswig-Holstein, to which Bismarck responded, “Madam, only three people have ever understood Schleswig-Holstein. One is dead, the second has gone mad, and I’m the third and I’ve quite forgot.” This summarizes how I feel about the current Middle East situation. The public rhetoric (including tweets) suggests that the U.S. and Russia are both willing to attack each other’s forces -- the U.S. is planning an attack on Syrian forces that might affect Russian personnel and Russia is apparently threatening to shoot down U.S. planes. This is obviously concerning, and while incidental Russia casualties might not lead to a direct military response, if Russia shot down a U.S. plane (as opposed to an unmanned missile), the U.S. would almost certainly respond. Given that the Russians know this, they are unlikely to take such a step. An additional factor is the possibility that Iranian forces in Syria would be hit by any U.S. attack, which might invite retaliation. Iran is unlikely to be able to attack U.S. forces in the Mediterranean directly, but forces in Iraq and Syria might be subject to ‘asymmetrical warfare,’ i.e., small-scale attacks, possibly including suicide bombers. The threat to oil markets come if Iranian actions encourage President Trump to refuse to recertify the Iranian nuclear agreement in mid-May. While many of Iran’s customers in Asia would not be concerned, there might be some drop in sales from companies fearful of U.S. legal action. Sanctions on financial transfers would also deter the more conventional customers, but the Iranians should be able to work around that after a brief pause. Could this also mean an escalation in the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia (or more broadly but less accurately, Shia versus Sunni regimes)? Given that the Saudis have been attacking Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen without direct response by Iran for some time now, any Saudi actions in Syria seem unlikely to be a provocation that would worsen the situation in the Gulf. FDR’s comment that ‘we have nothing to fear but fear itself’ seems appropriate for oil traders. Bombs and missiles flying in the greater Middle East always creates a bullish impetus on prices, even if the oil fields remain distant from the actual violence. The death of Russian personnel would worsen this, as it implies a greater probability of retaliation and continuation of the conflict which, again, would push up oil prices. And naturally, should Iranian personnel be affected, there would be very rational concerns that they might respond with some sort of attack that could affect Gulf oil trade. The worst case scenarios -- ongoing U.S.-Russian combat or direct Saudi-Iranian fighting -- seem very unlikely to happen. But as long as the possibility exists, oil prices will remain elevated, with WTI perhaps hitting $70 or higher, and only coming down when it has become clear that the violence is diminishing and will not spread. Until then, expect a bumpy ride.

#### Lower oil revenue encourages Russia to intervene militarily which causes escalating crisis

Jaffe and Elass 16 [Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, Columbia Journal of International Fails. War and the Oil Price Cycle. January 1, 2016. https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/war-oil-price-cycle]

While low oil prices have forced Moscow to take draconian economic steps, so far it has not fundamentally produced the desired diplomatic capitulation. As predicted by Robert Blackwill and Meghan O’Sullivan, “… a weaker Russia will not necessarily mean a less challenging Russia…Russia could seek to secure its regional influence in more direct ways –even through the projection of military power.”48 Indeed, U.S. summer diplomatic efforts fizzled quickly by autumn, with Russia changing the facts on the ground through direct Russian military intervention. Russia’s motivations are multifold and certainly include protecting its substantial interests in Syria including its preferred outcome that maintains Syria as an Iranian bulwark against Sunni jihadists.49 Some analysts are suggesting that Moscow is overly optimistic about defeating Syrian opposition groups. Instead, it is suggested that Russia’s previous difficulties during its invasion of Afghanistan may prove instructive, with all Syrian opposition forces still focusing in earnest on the Assad camp, and saving energies against each other for a later day.50 However, it is still not clear as this article went to press whether Russia intends to satisfy the Saudis by participating in peace negotiations, or whether the Russian engagement on behalf of Assad is meant to hold Iran and Moscow in a position to use Syria to assert themselves against the kingdom and restore oil prices. While the outcome in Syria is uncertain, the Russian move clearly complicates the landscape in the region, and leaves open the possibility of escalating violence. Pavel Baev and Jeremy Shapiro of Brookings suggest Russia’s increased intervention may simply be designed to “establish a position of strength from which to bring Moscow back into the center of diplomacy over Syria,”51 but they are skeptical that Russia will be able to manage its participation in the conflict to reach a desired goal. Russia may also have broader goals, including intimidating U.S. allies both in the region and in Europe, to influence oil policy over the longer term, as well as to weaken strategic alliances that could be used against Russia, its national interests or the interests of individuals in the current regime. In recent years, Russia has acted to reassert itself on the world stage both through military means and by tapping energy as a weapon for leverage to enhance its geopolitical status.52

#### But, decline causes worse aggression – it’s NoKo 2.0

Fisher 14 [Max Fisher, Vox. The worse Russia's economy gets, the more dangerous Putin becomes. December 17, 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/12/17/7401681/russia-putin-ruble]

You might reasonably conclude that the destruction of Russia's economy is great news for the United States of America. After all, won't it humble Vladimir Putin, forcing him to finally back out of his disastrous Ukraine invasion, soften his growing hostility toward Europe and the US, and generally ratchet down the brinksmanship and aggression that have made him so troublesome?

Actually, it's the opposite. The odds are that Russia's freefalling economy will make Putin even more aggressive, more unpredictable, and less willing to compromise. The weaker that Russia becomes, the more dangerous it will get, and that's terrible news for everyone, including the US.

It is precisely because the cratering economy is weakening Putin that it will force him to bolster his rule, which he will almost certainly do by drumming up nationalism, foreign confrontations, and state propaganda. Russia, already hostile and isolated, is likely to become even more so, worsening both its behavior abroad and the already-significant economic suffering of regular Russians. The country's propaganda bubble will further seal off Russians from the outside world, telling them that Russia's decline is the fault of Western aggression that they must rally against.

In all, this effect is starting to look something like the North Koreaification of Russia. That does not mean that Russia is about to become or will ever be as isolated, hostile, or aggressive as North Korea, but it only has to edge a little bit in that direction to bring terrible consequences for the world and for Russians themselves.

#### Only instability in the Middle East can prevent Russian economic implosion

Baev 15 (Pavel K. Baev is a Research Director and Professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institutions, Washington DC, and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris. 24 April 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/pavel-k-baev/russia-is-spoiling-for-fight-in-middle-east>)

The first is the dramatic (and, for Russia, devastating) decline in oil prices, which has been caused by profound shifts in global energy markets. This trend might only be reversed rapidly by a further spike of instability in the Middle East, which would disrupt supplies coming from the Persian Gulf. The 30-40% price drop that occurred in the second half of 2014 happened while three major suppliers—Iraq, Iran, and Libya—were already performing far below capacity. It is reasonable to assume that a normalisation of production in any of them would push the benchmark price even lower. Russia may thus find it necessary to prevent progress in conflict resolution (and, hence, stabilisation in one or more of these three major producers). It could mean the difference between severe economic crisis and implosion.

#### They’ll use cyberattacks, which cause extinction

Perkovich 18 [George, Olivier and Nomellini chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Really? We’re Gonna Nuke Russia for a Cyberattack?” 1/18, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/18/donald-trump-russia-nuclear-cyberattack-216477>]

For three reasons, the Trump administration would be wise to reconsider and more carefully calibrate the circumstances under which it would initiate nuclear war. The first reason has to do with the fact that nuclear war would be much more devastating to the United States than would any conceivable cyberattack. Russia and China appear to be the most likely adversaries that in the near term might be able to use cyberweapons to disable significant segments of the U.S. electricity system. Indeed, Russian attackers already did so to Ukraine, in a December 2015 operation that shut down power for approximately 230,000 Ukrainians for up to six hours. That attack, Wired magazine reported last June, may have been a dress rehearsal for a future assault on the U.S. power grid. Now imagine it was much worse, and all of Ukraine was without electricity for weeks. If Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons, would any sane person in Washington have recommended that Ukrainian leaders retaliate by nuking Russia, and thereby inviting Russian nuclear attacks on Ukraine? The cure would have been much worse than the disease. The same strategic logic applies to the United States. A cyberattack on U.S. civilian infrastructure could be enormously disruptive and costly. Depending on the scale and durability of outages of electricity, piped water, etc., the effect could be like what Puerto Rico is experiencing due to Hurricane Maria (though without the collapsed roadways and buildings). But, if a U.S. president initiated nuclear war in response to a massive cyberattack*, Russia and China would be expected to retaliate with nuclear weapons.* This could leave the mainland U.S. in the condition of Puerto Rico *minus all the people, buildings and wildlife*. Russia and China would suffer gravely in the process, but the U.S. would lose much more than it would gain by moving from cyberwar to nuclear war. Here’s the second reason it’s crazy to retaliate with nuclear weapons: The United States’ conventional and cyber capabilities combined are greater than its adversaries’. Thus, the United States for decades has wanted to keep conflicts from going nuclear, where it would be harder if not impossible to “win.” The U.S. continues to develop and deploy its own cyber capabilities to disrupt adversaries’ civilian and dual-use infrastructure—energy, water, finance, etc. This helps deter adversaries from initiating cyberwarfare on a large scale, and, if deterrence fails, to enable *countervailing cyberattacks and perhaps conventional warfare*.

#### Oil and gas key to Canadian economy – contributes both directly and indirectly to the rest of the economy

* 8 percent of Canadian GDP & tax revenue
* Direct contributor through employment
* Indirect contributor through links to other industries

Globerman and Emes 19, Steven Globerman is a Resident Scholar and Addington Chair in Measurement, Professor Emeritus, Western Washington University and Joel Emes is a Senior Fellow at Fraser Institute, 5-7-2019, "Investment in the Canadian and U.S. Oil and Gas Sectors: A Tale of Diverging Fortunes," Fraser Institute, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/investment-in-the-canadian-and-us-oil-and-gas-sectors-a-tale-of-diverging-fortunes, HKR-AT

The **oil and gas industry is critically important to Canada’s economy.** **It accounts for almost 8 percent of Canada’s GDP,** as well as for a significant share of the tax revenue collected by governments. The oil and gas sector is particularly important to the provincial economies of Alberta and Saskatchewan. It accounts for almost 30 percent of Alberta’s GDP and slightly over 23 percent of Saskatchewan’s GDP. As such, the economic health of the oil and gas sector is a direct contributor to employment and economic activity in Western Canada and an indirect contributor to the rest of the domestic economy through links to industries that supply inputs to the sector, as well as use the outputs of the sector. The upstream segment of the oil and gas sector encompasses exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas. It is the single largest segment of the oil and gas sector, which also includes midstream gathering and pipeline facilities and downstream refineries. The oil sands account for almost two-thirds of Canada’s oil production. Since activity in the mid and downstream sectors will ultimately reflect the production of crude oil and natural gas in the upstream sector, the willingness of companies to explore for and produce oil and gas in Western Canada dictates the pace of economic activity throughout the industry’s total supply chain. A sharp drop in the world price of crude oil in 2015 and 2016 hurt the profitability of upstream oil and gas companies in both Canada and the US. However, while economic activity in the US upstream segment increased substantially with a modest recovery in crude oil prices in 2017 and 2018, investment in Canada’s upstream segment as a share of total capital expenditures in Canada declined consistently from 2014 through 2018. While total capital expenditures in Canada declined post-2014, the decline in capital expenditures for oil and gas extraction was even more pronounced. Thus, while capital expenditures for oil and gas extraction accounted for approximately 28 percent of total Canadian industrial capital expenditures in 2014, oil and gas extraction accounted for only 14 percent in 2018. Investment analysts and portfolio managers have recently warned that investment in the oil and gas sector is moving increasingly to the US and away from Canada, and that they are reluctant to invest their clients’ savings in Canadian oil and gas companies. An unfavourable business environment for oil and gas exploration and production in Canada is cited as the reason, particularly compared to the business environment in the US. A number of Canadian oil and gas companies have also reallocated their exploration budgets away from Western Canada to the more profitable shale oil producing regions of the United States. In the absence of changes to Canadian government policies affecting the sector, relatively low prices for Western Canada crude oil as well as depressed profitability of Canadian oil and gas companies are likely to continue. As a consequence, the ongoing shift in the location preferences of North American oil and gas companies towards the US might well intensify with drastic consequences for the fiscal health of the Alberta and Saskatchewan governments. While limited pipeline capacity is the major factor depressing the price of Canadian heavy crude oil, more favourable tax and regulatory environments in the US compared to Canada are also contributing to the diversion of upstream oil and gas investments from Canada to the US. By way of illustration, whereas capital expenditures in the upstream segment were around 41 percent higher for the US when comparing 2018 to 2016, they were only about 15 percent higher in Canada. An investment manager in the United Kingdom recently wrote a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau saying that it was hard for her to watch a vibrant Canadian oil and gas industry being strangled by regulation, carbon taxes, and the inability of producers to get their products to world markets. Recent investment patterns in the North American oil and gas sector support this sentiment.

#### Strong economy key to Canada’s global influence

Tilson 14 , MP, Ottawa Journal

(David, “Federal government promotes Canada’s global leadership,” 7-9-14, DOA: 12-29-14, <http://www.newspapers-online.com/caledon/?p=8477>, ava)

Canada is positioned to be a strong and credible voice on key issues in our global community. Our prominence and global influence on the world stage continues to grow under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. In a time of global economic uncertainty, our government has prioritized Canada’s economic recovery and resulted in significant measures of economic success. With the creation of more than one million net new jobs since the depth of the global recession, we have the best job growth record among all G7 members. Our government’s investment in jobs, growth and long-term prosperity has enhanced the resilience of the Canadian economy, our economic credibility and in turn demonstrated to the international community that Canada is a great place to invest. Our government has remained focused on pursuing an ambitious and balanced trade agenda that will help Canada’s economic recovery and ensure long-term prosperity. In October, our government reached a free trade agreement with the European Union, a historic accomplishment for Canada’s trade relations. It will boost Canada’s economy by $12 billion annually — the equivalent of 80,000 jobs — and Canadian businesses will have preferential market access to the EU’s half a billion consumers. We also reached an agreement for free trade with South Korea, which is expected to help grow our economy by $1.7 billion per year. In addition to increased jobs and economic activity, expanding Canada’s free trade agreements also provides hard-working families more choice at a lower cost for everyday household goods. We are also working to maintain and build on all of Canada’s bilateral relationships. While in Malaysia, Prime Minister Harper signed a declaration of intent to conclude a new tax agreement between Canada and Malaysia to help promote trade and investment between the two countries. In an increasingly global community with shared concerns, our government is also committed to helping ensure the safety and security of Canadians and our interests abroad. While in Malaysia, Prime Minister Harper renewed our commitment to enhance security cooperation between the two countries for the safety of all our citizens. Prime Minister Harper also announced Canadian support for four projects that will strengthen Malaysia’s ability to counter international crime, human smuggling, and organized crimes. These projects build on what we’ve already done in the global community to help combat money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption, tax evasion and other crimes. Canada’s growing prominence on the world stage has also afforded us the opportunity to take a leadership role within the international community to address issues of human rights and equality, while promoting Canadian values of freedom, democracy, and rule of law. Our government introduced the Office of Religious Freedom to promote Canadian values of pluralism and tolerance in our global community. The Office is working with like-minded partners to raise awareness and develop policies and programs to protect religious minorities under threat, to oppose religious hatred and to promote tolerance. Prime Minister Harper has also demonstrated real leadership in addressing the health challenges and disadvantages faced by women, infants, and children in the poorest of countries, in launching the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health with G8 countries in 2010. Thanks to the Muskoka Initiative and subsequent global action, maternal and child mortality rates are declining. However, there is still more work to be done. Canada hosted the Summit on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health. Through this Summit, we are accelerating our health initiatives and continuing to push this issue into the forefront. Indeed, our government announced that Canada will be providing an additional $3.5 billion in funding for various projects to help children and mothers in the developing world. As we strengthen ties and promote economic prosperity, Canada is positioned to lead on the world stage and promote Canadian values. Our government is delivering on the priorities of Canadians.

#### Only Canadian soft power can solve international threats

Malik 20 Malik, Sadia Mariam. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, York University, Canada "Canada must use its 'soft power' to champion global human rights." Conversation, 25 Feb. 2020, theconversation.com/canada-must-use-its-soft-power-to-champion-global-human-rights-132177. [HKR QC]

As the world enters the third decade of the 21st century, it is waking up to a new reality, facing threats to international solidarity and human security that are not necessarily economic in nature. Climate change, inequality, populist movements, ethnic nationalism and global epidemics are posing major challenges to international development and human security. Disenchantment with the neoliberal economic system and unregulated capitalism is growing. And on the political front, the global balance of power is shifting as we move away from a unipolar world, dominated largely by the United States, to a bipolar world where China is emerging as the major counterpart to the U.S. Read more: What exactly is neoliberalism? These turbulent times pose challenges and call for collective action since many threats to human security can no longer be contained within the geographical boundaries of nation states. Although Canada has reduced its foreign aid commitments recently, it has great potential to make up for it by using its soft power to address issues of international development and security. Soft power is defined as a persuasive approach to international relations and diplomacy that doesn’t involve coercion and trades on a country’s cultural and economic influence. Since the world and the nature of threats to human security and solidarity have changed, our approach to international solidarity and development must also change. In many ways, Canada is well-prepared to lead that change. No longer all about income The notion of international development, as historically understood in light of an income-centred approach, is now being increasingly contested. For too long, we have measured progress and well-being in terms of expansion in GDP alone and framed issues of international development predominantly in terms of lack of income. Read more: Why our obsession with GDP ignores harm done to welfare and the world There are growing calls to question this approach. Economic growth is of little use if it doesn’t promote broad-based human well-being, leads to climate change and threatens the very survival of the human race. What the world needs today, more than ever, is a model of international development that is decolonized, humane and centred on human rights and freedoms. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen is seen at an event at Harvard University in May 2015. (Gretchen Ertl/AP Images for FXB) The United Nations — under the intellectual guidance of scholars like Amartya Sen and development practitioners like Mahbub ul Haq — has made significant headway in popularizing a more humane model of international development through the publication of its Annual Human Development Reports and the Human Development Index. It has also influenced global security discourse by popularizing a concept of human security that transcends the traditional focus on territorial security and encompasses health, food and environmental safety. That concept recognizes the geographic and spatial connectivity of threats. It’s based on the realization that the battle for human survival in the future will be fought not by defending national borders but by understanding the interconnectedness of the fate of human race — and by evoking the compassion that unites us as fellow human beings. The intellectual foundations of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also rest on the concept of human security. Canada has been at the forefront of promoting this concept. Through the formation of the Human Security Network with like-minded countries, Canada was successful, to an extent, in influencing global institutions to promote a human security agenda. New threats Canada needs to continue its efforts in this direction, especially in light of new or heightened threats to human security that the world faces today in the form of climate change, polarization, ethnic nationalism, intolerance and the global spread of disease. Canada’s efforts in promoting a human rights-based approach to international solidarity are commendable. Whether it’s an issue of freedom of speech violations in repressive regimes or assisting international refugees, Canada has adopted a humane approach and has set high moral standards. Read more: Syrian refugees in Canada: Four years after the welcome Given the current shift in the global balance of power from U.S. dominance to the one that includes China and other emerging economies, middle-power countries like Canada, France and Germany will be in a better position to use their soft power to influence global institutions on human rights-based development and to promote much-needed human rights around the world. Although Canada’s recent reduction in foreign aid has been harshly criticized, it can be seen in a positive light as it signals a move away from problem-solving approach that is based on short-term humanitarian assistance. What’s really needed for long-term sustainable development is to address the root causes of underdevelopment, which include unaccountable governments, corruption, concentration of political power in the hands of the few without proper checks and balances or rule of law, weak property rights and contract enforcement, and lack of opportunities for the vast majority of citizens. Genuine global leadership needed But whether Canada’s decision to reduce foreign aid signals the need to address the root causes of underdevelopment isn’t clear. Too often, the Global North has supported repressive, dictatorial regimes in the Global South to promote its own economic and geopolitical interests. It’s time to realize that sustainable and people-centred development is not possible as long as unequal structures of power and repressive political regimes remain intact in developing countries. The world is ready for a new vision that defines human progress in a profound way and recognizes the interconnectedness of the fate of humanity. But to achieve this, we need a genuine and credible global leadership. Given Canada’s global image and its historical record in promoting ethical norms and freedoms around the world, it commands greater legitimacy. However, to bring about genuine change, middle-power countries like Canada must adopt a leadership role in pursuing an ethical agenda to ensure the security and survival of humanity.

#### ME war stops Saudi Arabia nuclear energy development

Green 17 [Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and editor of the Nuclear Monitor newsletter, published by the World Information Service on Energy. Is Saudi Arabia going nuclear? April 12, 2017. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/854/saudi-arabia-going-nuclear]

Military conflict Military conflict has been a recurring feature of Middle Eastern politics for decades and it isn't difficult to imagine military conflicts complicating and compromising nuclear power plants and associated facilities such as spent fuel stores. Since 2015, Saudi forces have intercepted missile attacks from Yemen on several occasions, including a missile attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh in November 2017. "All airports, ports, border crossings and areas of any importance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will be a direct target of our weapons, which is a legitimate right," the Houthi political office said in a statement on 7 November 2017.57 On 6 November 2017, the New York Times reported on the intercepted missile attack on the Riyadh airport: "Saudi Arabia charged Monday that a missile fired at its capital from Yemen over the weekend was an "act of war" by Iran, in the sharpest escalation in nearly three decades of mounting hostility between the two regional rivals. "We see this as an act of war," the Saudi foreign minister, Adel Jubair, said in an interview on CNN. "Iran cannot lob missiles at Saudi cities and towns and expect us not to take steps." ... The accusations raise the threat of a direct military clash between the two regional heavyweights at a time when they are already fighting proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, as well as battles for political power in Iraq and Lebanon. By the end of the day Monday, a Saudi minister was accusing Lebanon of declaring war against Saudi Arabia as well."58 Prince Turki al-Faisal said in 2016 that Saudi Arabia has "no illusions" about its limited nuclear security capabilities. "We know we have few capabilities in terms of human resources, so that's why we began a very extensive training and skills acquisition program," he said.15 A number of Middle Eastern countries (and the US) have developed their own response to the limitations of the IAEA safeguards system: bombing nuclear facilities suspected of being involved in covert weapons programs. Examples include the destruction of research reactors in Iraq by Israel and the US; Iran's attempts to strike nuclear facilities in Iraq during the 1980−88 war (and vice versa); Iraq's attempted strikes on Israel's nuclear facilities; and Israel's bombing of a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria in 2007. Most of the above-mentioned attacks were directed at research reactors capable of producing plutonium for weapons, while Iraq attacked the partially-built Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in 1987. Israel has threatened to strike nuclear facilities in Iran in recent years. According to a cable released by Wikileaks, King Abdullah urged the US in 2008 to launch military strikes on Iran's nuclear program to "cut off the head of the snake".59 In time, nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia might be the targets of military strikes, either to prevent their use in a weapons program or simply as an act of war or terrorism. Bennett Ramberg, a policy analyst in the US State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs under President George H.W. Bush, wrote in 2014:60 "[W]arfare is rife with accidents and human error, and such an event involving a nuclear plant could cause a meltdown. A loss of off-site power, for example, could be an issue of serious concern. Although nuclear plants are copious producers of electricity, they also require electrical power from other sources to operate. Without incoming energy, cooling pumps will cease functioning and the flow of water that carries heat away from the reactor core ‒ required even when the reactor is in shutdown mode ‒ will stop. "To meet that risk, nuclear plants maintain large emergency diesel generators, which can operate for days ‒ until their fuel runs out. The reactor meltdowns at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power station in 2011 demonstrated what happens when primary and emergency operating power are cut. "Such vulnerabilities raise troubling questions in the event of a war. Fighting could disrupt off-site power plants or transmission lines servicing the reactor, and could also prevent diesel fuel from reaching the plant to replenish standby generators. Operators could abandon their posts should violence encroach.

#### Causes prolif – even if not, causes enrichment and reprocessing tech

Green 17 [Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and editor of the Nuclear Monitor newsletter, published by the World Information Service on Energy. Is Saudi Arabia going nuclear? April 12, 2017. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/854/saudi-arabia-going-nuclear]

Regardless of intent, a nuclear power program would bring Saudi Arabia far closer to a weapons capability. The reactor-grade plutonium produced in the normal course of operation of a reactor can be used in weapons, or reactors can be operated on a short irradiation cycle to produce weapon-grade plutonium. In addition, a nuclear power program would necessarily entail the development of significant nuclear science and engineering expertise which could be redeployed to a weapons program. A nuclear power program could justify the acquisition of other technologies − such as enrichment and reprocessing technology, and research reactors − which might be put to use in a weapons program. (Argentina's INVAP is building a very low power research reactor in Saudi Arabia37 and an October 2017 agreement between KACARE and Russia's Rosatom envisages construction of another research reactor in the Kingdom.

#### Prolif will be rapid and escalate – kills stability – multiple reasons

Horowitz 09[April, Michael, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” journal of conflict resolution, vol 53, no 2]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent, nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabil-  ities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given  the new risk of nuclear escalation—and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable  states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What  follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete  information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time.  Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible  responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their  ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if  war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states  learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that  learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information  that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty—  on the part of potential adversaries.  Learning to Leverage?  When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the  state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition  might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular secu-  rity challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or  might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo.  This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new  nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system wide perceptions of nuclear  danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning  process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cog-  nizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However,  each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capa-  bilities. Empirical research by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993)  suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit  knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear  arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents. Sagan contends  that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons  will skew decision making toward more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The ques-  tions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic  bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999).  Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key  behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify”  the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases  that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “use it or lose it” mind-set—  may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on  warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992;  Sagan 1995).3  Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states more  likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their  general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to  select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adver-  saries that will reciprocate militarized challenges. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states  should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders  effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make  a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their com-  parative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the  probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.  Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences  of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on  the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short term,  nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a war,  the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.

#### Nuclear war

Gerzhoy and Miller 16 [Gene Gerzhoy is a congressional fellow with the American Political Science Association. Nick Miller is an assistant professor of political science and international and public affairs at Brown University. Donald Trump thinks more countries should have nuclear weapons. Here’s what the research says. April 6, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.1c54134ffee8]

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals. Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best. Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes. So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was weaker than it is today. Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk of nuclear war.

#### Prolif causes nuclear war and terrorism – accidents, brinksmanship, adventurism, and preemptive strikes – all of that makes Middle East war more escalatory

Kroenig 15 [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015]

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons c

an be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

#### Even if Saudi Arabia doesn’t fully proliferate, developing nuclear power without enrichment and reprocessing constraints causes middle east and global prolif

Green 17 [Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and editor of the Nuclear Monitor newsletter, published by the World Information Service on Energy. Is Saudi Arabia going nuclear? April 12, 2017. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/854/saudi-arabia-going-nuclear]

Proliferation in the Middle East Iran's nuclear program was in part a response to those of Israel and Iraq. Saudi Arabia's program is motivated in part by those of its regional rivals. The UAE's agreement to forego enrichment and reprocessing could have tempered proliferation risks in the Middle East. But the UAE agreement is shaping up as an exception rather than the new norm ‒ such that the UAE itself is wavering on its commitment to forego enrichment and reprocessing.40,49 A Saudi Arabian nuclear program without a binding commitment to forego enrichment and reprocessing will further fuel regional proliferation risks. The Institute for Science and International Security states:56 "In the Middle East, the perceived strategic, political, and military advantages derived from having the ability to enrich nuclear fuel to weaponization levels or to separate plutonium will be too strong for many governments to resist, even in the absence of a full-blown nuclear weapons effort. This dynamic will severely challenge global nonproliferation regimes and agreements as more and more countries strive, overtly or covertly, to become members of "nuclear fuel club," or on the threshold of building nuclear weapons. "The global community should anticipate a dramatic increase in state-sponsored nuclear proliferation activities, regardless of the fate of the JCPOA. Efforts to constrain such aspirations are critical. The net result of these events is that the world will soon face a greater proliferation danger from Iran and the spread of sensitive technologies in the Middle East may be stimulated by this new, dangerous norm legitimizing enrichment almost anywhere. The policy community must identify threats to the global export control regime and enact broader counterproliferation efforts to mitigate damages."

#### High oil prices are the cure for Asian deflation.

The Diplomat 8/3/16 (8/3, “Higher Oil Prices Could Save Asia From Deflation”, http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/higher-oil-prices-could-save-asia-from-deflation/)

For much of Asia though, the rebound in the price of oil from $27 a barrel in January to its current price of around $40 has served to reduce the threat of global deflation substantially, according to ANZ Research. In a July 29 report, the Australian bank said fundamentals would drive prices toward US$54 by year-end, helping “see the end of deflation in Asia.” “In fact, the inflation rates of most Asian economies have gone up in the past six months. Producer prices in China and wholesale prices in India have improved by more than 2.5 percentage points,” ANZ said. The change in headline inflation rates has been led by Chinese producer prices, followed by India’s wholesale prices and then Vietnam and Thailand’s consumer prices. According to ANZ, China’s producer price index could turn positive in the second half of 2016 after four years of contraction, while recent floods should see higher fruit and vegetable prices in coming months. The significance of oil for Asian prices is its large representation in production costs for many consumer items, such as clothing, food and transportation costs. According to ANZ, energy, food and clothing and apparel constitute more than half of India’s consumer price index (CPI) basket, and more than 60 percent of the CPI basket in both the Philippines and Indonesia. Although global commodity prices remain subject to the risk of a faster slowdown in Chinese investment demand, more aggressive U.S. Federal Reserve tightening and geopolitical conditions, ANZ said even a drop in the oil price to around $30 a barrel would not dent its forecasts. Higher commodity prices are also a positive for Australian inflation, which according to Nikko Asset Management (Nikko AM) has fallen in line with the end of the mining boom but now shows signs of picking up. “If the recent stabilization in commodity prices can continue, then this would suggest the low point for inflation could be closer than expected. While inflation will likely remain low for some time, this recent stabilization in commodities means that the risk of inflation falling below 1 percent [in Australia] is reduced. In our view, it is now more likely that it will rebound higher, albeit moderately, over the next six months,” Nikko AM’s Chris Rands said. Higher oil prices may hit consumers but could help efforts by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to revive inflationary expectations in the world’s third-largest economy. In a July 30 statement, the nation’s central bank said the CPI would likely remain slightly negative or at zero for the time being, “due to the effects of the decline in energy prices,” but should accelerate toward its 2 percent target by fiscal 2017, helped by an expected upturn in crude oil prices. The BOJ disappointed investors Friday with its decision to maintain negative interest rates and bond buying at their current level, while increasing purchases of exchange-traded funds to 6 trillion yen ($59 billion) from 3.3 trillion yen previously. But while the move saw the yen strengthen and stocks weaken initially, signs are emerging of a change in inflationary expectations, at least among consumers. According to UBS economist Paul Donovan, Japanese consumers’ expectations of inflation are now around 4 percent a year – twice the official target and the highest in the developed world. “In one sense, if the 2 percent inflation target of the Bank of Japan was aimed at raising inflation expectations, the Bank of Japan has succeeded. Bank of Japan Governor [Haruhiko] Kuroda should get a banner made saying ‘mission accomplished’…[although it] is still dealing with a deflationary economy” with companies cutting prices, he told the Nikkei Asian Review. After Japan’s recent experience, the rest of Asia should not be relaxing anytime soon about having vanquished the bugbear of deflation. But with higher oil prices on the horizon, the region’s central bankers might finally be able to get back to their real jobs of helping grow their economies, and along with it the rest of the world.

#### Sustained deflation is death for the Japanese economy

Rubino 7/3/16 (7/3, John, Finance MBA from NYU and author of The Money Bubble, “Something Huge Is Coming From Japan”, http://dollarcollapse.com/japan/something-huge-coming-japan/)

Pretend, for a minute, that your country responds to the bursting of a credit bubble by borrowing unprecedented amounts of money and using it to prop up banks and construction companies. This doesn’t work, so you create record amounts of new money and push interest rates into negative territory in an attempt to devalue your currency. But this - amazingly - doesn’t work either. Your currency soars and the inflation you’d hoped to generate never materializes. Now what? Is there even anything left to try, or is it simply time to stand back and let the current system melt down? Those are the questions facing Japan, and the answers are not obvious. Here, for instance, is its inflation rate two years into the largest major-country money creation binge since Wiemar Germany: [Table Omitted] Deflation is to be expected and even desired in a well-run country where debt is minimal, money is sound and rising productivity makes things continuously cheaper. But in an over-indebted financial system, deflation is death because it magnifies the debt burden and raises the odds of an existentially threatening financial crisis. To continue to borrow money under such circumstances is to court disaster. And yet Japan is still at it: [Table Omitted] What we’re witnessing, in short, is a catastrophic loss in the currency war. Contrary to every mainstream economic theory, debt monetization and full-throttle currency creation have resulted in a rising yen and falling prices. Here’s an excerpt from a recent — and really gloomy — Financial Times analysis of Japan’s situation:

#### Goes nuclear

Elliott 02 (Larry Elliott, The Guardian, “Defenceless Japan awaits typhoon,” https://www.theguardian.com/money/2002/feb/11/business.globalrecession)

Even so, the west cannot afford to be complacent about what is happening in Japan, unless it intends to use the country as a test case to explore whether a full-scale depression is less painful now than it was 70 years ago. Action is needed, and quickly because this is an economy that could soak up some of the world's excess capacity if functioning properly. A strong Japan is not only essential for the long-term health of the global economy, it is also needed as a counter-weight to the growing power of China. A collapse in the Japanese economy , which looks ever more likely, would have profound ramifications; some experts believe it could even unleash a wave of extreme nationalism that would push the country into conflict with its bigger (and nuclear) neighbour.

#### Middle East war won’t go nuclear – balanced alliances, Chinese non-intervention, and cooperation prevent great power draw-in

Mead 14 – Walter Russell Mead, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University, Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine and a non-resident Scholar at the Hudson Institute, 2014 (“Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?” *Huffington Post*, July 7th, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html>)

The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago.

GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW

What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms.

Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending.

But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible.

AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES

And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain.

Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close.

While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.

#### No international strikes – Israel would never

* They’d have done it by now – preemptively attacked Iraq and Syria within weeks of finding single reactors
* A strike would make the bomb more likely by emboldening Iran, they’d leave the NPT, kick out IAEA watchdogs, and sanctions support collapses – funds nuke mod in Iran
* It hurts Israel by eroding regional allies and Iran gets a face lift – independently messes up US-Israel ties and erodes assurances
* Veto players – Netanyahu needs approval from the IDF and security cabinet and they all hate him

Keck 15 [Zachary Keck is the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Before that, he was a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "5 Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran." https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469?page=0%2C1]

Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isn’t likely to attack Iran.

1. You Snooze, You Lose

First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one.

Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.

2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely

Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.

Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.

3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel

Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world.

Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger.

Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.

4. Israel’s Veto Players

Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation.

For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current defense minister Moshe Yaalon explained last year: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today.

What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, “It is quite clear that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.”

**1NC – Water Wars**

#### No water wars

* Most water crises don’t cause conflict
* Often results in collaboration through water sharing agreement development
* Main causation for water wars is weak institutional capacity and political and economic dynamics

Gleick 18 [Peter Gleick, MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship and was elected to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, world-renowned expert, innovator, and communicator on water and climate issues, cofounded the Pacific Institute, which he led as president until mid-2016, pHd from UC Berkeley, and Charles Iceland, s Director, Global and National Water Initiatives with WRI’s Food, Forests, and Water Programs, “Water, Security, & Conflict”, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Water-Security-and-Conflict\_Aug-2018-2.pdf]

3.2. The Role of Governance in Water Security

Most water crises do not end in conflict, migration, or acute food insecurity. Instead, people muddle through until the crises recede. Some crises even generate cooperation among local or regional parties. Understanding why water crises lead to adverse outcomes in some places and better outcomes in others will help inform strategies for reducing the risks of conflict. Why, for example, did Syria sink into civil war following a record-breaking five-year drought, while .Iordan and Lebanon avoided strife following that same drought (Adams et al. 2018)? This requires integrating analyses of meteorological and resource-related events with the diverse social, political, and economic dynamics at play.

We can postulate—based on research conducted by Wolf and his colleagues (2003) on transboundary basins— that when rapid change, either on the institutional side or in the physical system, outpaces the institutional capacity to absorb that change, the stage is set for possible water insecurity. Therefore, when we go looking for water insecurity, we need to be on the lookout for large-scale water-related change and low capacity to handle such change (this Is what the Water, Peace, and Security [WPS] consortium is attempting to do via the development of a near realtime global early warning system for potential water-related threats to human security—more on this further on in this brief).

#### No water war

Bernauer 18 [Thomas Bernauer, Professor of Political Science at ETH Zurich and Director of ETH’s Institute of Science, Technology and Policy (ISTP), “Dispelling the Water War Myth”, 9/10/18, https://www.diplomaticourier.com/dispelling-the-water-war-myth/]

Humans need water. If it is in short supply, conflicts can arise. Contrary to popular belief; however, these types of conflicts almost never lead to war, but rather to cooperation.

Fresh water is one of the most precious of natural resources. Water is available in huge quantities throughout the world, but scarcities can arise on a local level, since rainfall, natural water reservoirs, and demand create an uneven distribution across the globe. A shortage of water can cause conflicting needs to emerge within and between countries.

Do water shortages cause violent conflict?

As early as 200 years ago, in the face of a growing population, the English political economist and demographer Thomas Malthus warned against resource scarcity and the potential for resulting social upheaval. Especially from the 1970s onwards, this gave rise to the argument that the ever-increasing overexploitation of natural resources, above all water, would ultimately lead to massive conflicts and even wars. This is why the term “water wars” has come into widespread use in books, popular science texts, and statements by policy makers. In recent years, there has been a boom in assertions like these, as part of the discourse around climate change.

Cooperation rather than violent conflict

Research on this subject has contributed significantly to bringing such assertions back to reality. Statistical analyses of international and civil wars show that water scarcity is not a relevant variable for predicting this extreme form of conflict.

Several research groups, including my own, have also examined the scale of conflict and cooperation over water resources on an international and national level. Studies such as these analyze a vast number of worldwide media reports. The single most important conclusion is that social and political interactions around water resources adhere to a kind of normal distribution. Water conflicts that are fought out violently are extremely rare. No international or domestic water wars were observed in the available data dating back to the 1940s.

On the other hand, water conflicts in the form of verbal disputes are relatively common. More common, however, are interactions of a cooperative nature. In other words, water scarcity more often leads to cooperation than to conflict.

What do these findings mean for the future?

The factors determining the risk of water-related conflicts have not yet been conclusively identified, though we know that the most important predictors are likely to include: political conflicts over problems that have nothing to do with water; large development gaps within and between countries; and missing or underdeveloped institutions in the water sector within and between countries.

Even if water conflicts have so far, almost never resulted in armed conflicts, could acute water shortages resulting from massive climatic changes not lead to violent disputes about water in the future? This is of course conceivable in principle, but I think it is rather unlikely. In the vast majority of cases, the cost of armed conflict will be considerably higher than the cost of solutions reached at the negotiating table.

#### Adaptation solves

Gleick 18 [Peter Gleick, MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship and was elected to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, world-renowned expert, innovator, and communicator on water and climate issues, cofounded the Pacific Institute, which he led as president until mid-2016, pHd from UC Berkeley, and Charles Iceland, s Director, Global and National Water Initiatives with WRI’s Food, Forests, and Water Programs, “Water, Security, & Conflict”, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Water-Security-and-Conflict\_Aug-2018-2.pdf]

Although water risks are growing worldwide, there are many risk-reducing options available to decision-makers. Some of these options include imposing water demand caps in water-stressed regions; replacing water-inefficient irrigation schemes with more efficient irrigation technologies (irrigation accounts for 70 percent of water withdrawals worldwide); planting water-efficient and drought-resistant crops; introducing social safety net programs; reducing global food loss and waste; reducing population growth rates; implementing urban water conservation measures; investing in wastewater treatment and reuse technologies; engaging in negotiation of watershed agreements; improving water data and information systems; investing in dams, dikes, and levees; protecting and restoring natural capital, including forests and wetlands; and helping countries strengthen their governance systems.