## Advantage 1

#### This is the thesis of their advantage – Indian ASAT weaponization and space militarization will happen in SPACE now to protect PRIVATE assets; they have said this is casual; without these commerical and private objects in space, India will demilitarize and remove ASATs, thereby resolving tensions with China. We’ll impact turn that:

#### ASATs are key to deterrence and asymmetric escalation capabilities---that caps conflicts from going nuclear---independently, solves Chinese DEWs.

Kartik Bommakanti 19. Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Program. 11-15-2019. “‘Soft Kill’ or ‘Hard Kill’? The requirements for India’s space and counter-space capabilities.” ORF Occasional Paper. https://www.orfonline.org/research/soft-kill-or-hard-kill-the-requirements-for-indias-space-and-counter-space-capabilities-57832/

II. KEWs: India’s Space Weapons and Balance of Power

A key justification for the development of space weapons is preserving the balance of power, which requires a state’s active effort to enhance its power and secure its interests against the dominant or near-dominant states in the international system. “Balancing” involves engineering a shift in the existing distribution of power, away from the dominant state in the system or region.[3]

India currently faces two adversarial states—China and Pakistan—both of them with active space military capabilities and having a history of strategic cooperation. To achieve a balance of power, India must improve its hard-kill and soft-kill capabilities in the space domain and work towards “internal balancing,” i.e. accumulating capabilities through domestic effort, instead of “external balancing,” i.e. relying on the power of other states.[4] Internal balancing gives a state the power to prevent the escalation of conflict and war. American realist scholar John J. Mearsheimer observed, “…the balance of power is largely synonymous with military power.”[5]

The success of India’s ASAT test of March 2019 demonstrated the country’s ground-launched KEW capability. However, the country’s kinetic capabilities are not without limitations vis-à-vis its situation with Pakistan and China. The challenge is summarised by Vipin Narang: “If Pakistan starts hitting Indian satellites, India can knock out Pakistan’s very few satellites whereas India cannot do the same to China. So it’s kind of a weird balance for India if it’s interested in getting into the anti-satellite deterrence game [because] it doesn’t really have an advantage in either of its dyads.”[6]

While Pakistan, too, does not have a confirmed kinetic capability, it could develop one with China’s assistance, which is consistent with Narang’s observation. According to another scholar, “…the number of countries able to undertake such intercepts is much larger…”[7] and Pakistan is one of them. While its space programme is not as expansive as India’s, Pakistan has an extensive missile programme and is in a position to undertake a KEW test in the not-so-distant future. (The barriers to entry in KEW-related space technology for states such as Pakistan, which is otherwise not a leading spacefaring nation, are not too high.)

Another legitimate concern is that a conventional war can escalate to a nuclear war, involving space as a domain and a medium. A potential two-front attack is one of the major reasons that India must develop triadic KEWs, since it gives the country asymmetric escalation capabilities, allowing it to put at considerable and direct risk both Chinese and Pakistani space assets. According to a 2015 Indian study, which ties partially into Narang’s reference to the two-front military challenge facing India, “There is also little doubt that space, nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and strategies of war and deterrence are now inextricably connected with each other.”[8] However, this statement is not entirely accurate, and in the context of India’s conflictual relationships with China and Pakistan, alternative scenarios are equally plausible. For example, in the event of a China–India war or an India–Pakistan war, traditional weapons and space weapons could be used without the involvement of nuclear arms. The Kargil conflict is an example of a “limited-aims conventional war,” fought under the cover of nuclear weapons.[9] Similar conflicts in the future, however, are likely to involve the space segment, especially in the case of a Sino-Indian military conflagration. On the other hand, a joint attack by China and Pakistan could potentially escalate to the nuclear level, as the 2015 study suggests. However, it is equally likely to remain confined to conventional and space warfare, for terrestrial territorial gains. The study also ignores the fact that a two-front war against India will be a function of the common objectives pursued by China and Pakistan against India, and vice versa. An inextricable link between space, nuclear and conventional deterrence and warfighting strategies is limited and conditional, if not tenuous.

According to Narang’s assessment, India lacks an “advantage” in the two conflict dyads. However, what India needs primarily is not an advantage but parity (especially if Pakistan tests its own KEW), which will enable it to militarily balance the collaborative space power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan. Due to the vulnerabilities created by the two-front ASAT challenge and the absence of a robust capability, let alone a distinct advantage, India will need a triadic ground-, air- and sea-launched KEW capability to maintain a credible space deterrent. As one important study observed, “Though its [India’s] space assets are smaller than those of the other major powers they are not insignificant. At the least they may need to be protected against the direct and indirect consequences of actions taken by the other space powers.”[10] Former Indian National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, alluding to the differential in strength recently, observed, “The basic reason is the power gap between the two [China and India]…”[11] Consequently, creating a triad-based KEW capability assumes considerable importance, since it creates mutual risks and threats. In the event of deterrence breakdown, it gives New Delhi the option to escalate during the course of a military confrontation.

American strategic studies scholar Ashley J. Tellis argues, “India’s ASAT test was perhaps necessary, but it will not suffice to protect India’s space assets during any major conflict with China.”[12] While this is a valid point, Tellis overlooks the fact that India does not have kinetic capabilities that can be launched from diverse platforms, which can boost flexibility and offer redundancy to the extent that adversaries will need to contend with a larger “menu” of targets. Thus, it provides a diverse array of hard-kill capabilities. A kinetic ASAT capability may be a last-resort weapon, as Tellis correctly asserts, but the 27 March 2019 test was only a ground-launched projectile adapted from a missile-defence interceptor and launched from the Interim Test Range (ITR). The test is, therefore, insufficient to sustain the Indian space deterrent posture vis-à-vis China, and additional tests from sea- and air-launched platforms are required. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undertaken a prototype laser weapon test, which is a Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) from presumably surface vessel.[13] Beijing has also invited bids for a nuclear powered ship-breaking vessel,[14] which could potentially enable the PLAN to develop nuclear-powered aircraft carriers serving as future platforms for the employment DEWs such as laser weapons against space targets.[15]

Indeed, Tellis’ claim that India’s ASAT amounted to an “incomplete success” is accurate, but not for the reasons he believes. His prescription specifically requires moving away from “debris-generating kinetic tests” and emulating China in developing non-kinetic capabilities.[16] On the contrary, the March test was incomplete because it did not fully test India’s kinetic capabilities from diverse platforms. KEW tests from diverse platforms will make India’s space deterrent more robust, inject caution into India’s adversaries, and create shared risks essential to sustaining credible deterrence. Tellis also leaves unexplained why Beijing, despite the debris-related risks that accompany any direct ascent KEW tests, pursues the acquisition of KEWs such as the SC-19, DN-1 and DN-3, which are capable of striking Indian space assets in GEO in parallel with its development and deployment of DEWs and other non-kinetic counter space capabilities.

The point to underline here is that India will need standalone kinetic capabilities as well as non-kinetic means to deter China. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) appears to have foreclosed the option of further kinetic tests, with G. Satish Reddy declaring, “Though we tested the interceptor missile for an altitude below 300 km as a responsible nation after multiple simulations, it has the technical capability to go beyond 1,000 km. That will cover most of the orbiting satellites in LEO. For the same purpose we don’t need more tests.”[17] This misses the point about survivability, redundancy and flexibility, which can only be assured if additional tests are conducted from sea- and air-launched platforms. However, the DRDO chief’s statement is revealing in terms of the altitude of the test, which is important inasmuch as future tests must not be conducted beyond an altitude of 300 km, to prevent the creation of longer-lasting space debris. In 2012, the DRDO declared that simulated electronic tests were sufficient to meet India’s ASAT requirements.[18] However, the Modi government decided to carry out an actual test, rejecting the view that simulated tests were sufficient. For a credible space-deterrent posture, which Reddy conceded was important, a diversified kinetic capability appears not integral to that effort. Moreover, taking into account the two-front ASAT challenge, it would be unwise to forego the additional tests required for establishing a KEW triad.

A 2017 Indian study recommended the creation of a KEW triad, albeit without explaining the military-operational and technical reasons for the same.[19] Another analysis draws attention to the vulnerability of Indian satellites—radar, earth-observation (EO), cartographic and navigation satellites—particularly in low-earth orbit (LEO), where a large number of India’s satellites are concentrated. The study proposes several soft-kill capabilities, including counter-measures such as building a more robust Space Surveillance Network (SSN), hardening satellites and making them stealthier to avoid detection, thus reducing their vulnerability to Chinese KEWs.[20] It further recommends developing resilient satellites against electronic countermeasures and geographically spread static and mobile telemetry, tracking and command (TTC) facilities as critical mitigatory measures against soft-kill attacks. However, the study precludes the development of whole categories of weapons. For instance, hard-kill weapons or KEWs have not been included in the mix of capabilities India should possess. Interestingly, the paper does acknowledge that pure soft-kill capabilities in the form of cyber weapons, electronic-warfare capabilities and DEWs are insufficient.[21] As a solution, however, it recommends policy, normative and legal restraints against space weapons, instead of R&D or the deployment of space weapons.[22]

Distant Indian space targets, such as the Indian Regional Navigation Spacecraft System (IRNSS), in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), are difficult to strike kinetically. However, China does possess the capabilities for doing so.[23] In May 2013, China tested the SC-19 ASAT system that can hit targets in GEO.[24] Its successor missile, the DN-3, too is ASAT capable and is likely a ballistic missile interceptor meant for intercepting targets in LEO.[25] Both these capabilities represent significant and critical advances in hit-to-kill kinetic capabilities to strike space assets well beyond LEO. In 2010, 2013 and 2014, China conducted ASAT non-debris-generating tests using adapted land-based ballistic missile interceptors.[26] Co-orbital ASATs are another arrow in China’s space quiver. In 2008, the BX-1, a miniature imaging satellite was deployed in-orbit close to its mother satellite and passed within 45 km of the International Space Station (ISS). While this is speculative, the BX-1 was likely released from a spring-loaded device, which does not conclusively prove counter-space capability but does establish China’s ability to undertake a co-orbital ASAT.[27] As a follow-up to their BX-1 test in 2008, China launched the SJ-12 satellite, which is believed to possess counter-space capabilities such as jamming.[28] In 2011, the SJ-12 undertook a close manoeuvre to test docking capabilities, possibly as a test run for the actual docking of the Shenzhou capsule with the Tiangong-1 space station. In 2013, China tested a robotic arm, which grabbed one satellite from another. These tests demonstrate China's ability to conduct orbital proximity operations, allowing it to execute microwave attacks against enemy satellite systems. While of the technologies and capabilities tested by China are seemingly for civilian applications, given the dual nature of space technology, they are potentially applicable in the military arena.

Thus, China have developed a whole slew of kinetic capabilities that can target Indian satellites in LEO, sun-synchronous orbit (SSO), medium-earth orbit (MEO) and GEO (See Figure 1). These include cyber weapons to attack space assets, co-orbital attack capabilities, as well as kinetic earth-to-space and air-to-space kinetic capabilities.[29] In light of China’s expertise, India cannot afford to confine itself to passive means of defending against Chinese space assets and infrastructure.

#### AND, solves Chinese A2AD expansion.

Stephen Biddle 16. Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Ivan Oelrich, served as Vice President for the Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists and is Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, Summer 2016, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 7-48

The United States must also be able to neutralize any satellite-based sea surveillance systems China may deploy. Neutralization may be possible with cyber or other soft-kill approaches, but it will probably be necessary to maintain a hard-kill ASAT capability for this purpose. If Chinese space-based radars are allowed to function, continued growth of Chinese long-range missile capabilities will eventually enable an A2/AD system that really could threaten targets out to the Second Island Chain. A U.S. capability to deny this is thus critical if Chinese A2/AD range is to be constrained to the limits presented above.

#### Chinese A2AD collapses global FON norms.

Prashanth Parameswaran 15. Visiting Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center at American University, Ph.D. Candidate and Provost Fellow at the Fletcher School of. Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “US Commander Warns China Against ‘Revising’ International Law in the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 10-9, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/us-commander-warns-china-against-revising-international-law-in-the-south-china-sea/

Swift was referring to manifestations of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea over the past few years, including the erection of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea and the construction of artificial islands. If such efforts went uncontested, Swift argued in his speech to the Royal Australian Navy Seapower Conference, seen by The Diplomat, it would be a setback for global norms.

“If even one of these restrictions were successful, it would be a major blow to the international rules-based system with ramifications well beyond the maritime domain,” Swift said.

Restricting freedoms, values and rights that all actors enjoy in the international rules-based system through ‘might makes right’ approaches, Swift argued, would undermine global economic prosperity and return us to a world of mercantilism and protectionism that benefits only a handful of powerful states.

“If we are not willing to commit to resolve these differences peacefully, leveraging the tools of the international rules-based system that has served us so well, for so long, in an multilateral, inclusive way; then are we willing to accept the likelihood that imposed solutions to these national differences at sea, will seek us out in our supposed sanctuaries ashore?” Swift said.

#### Extinction.

Dr. James Kraska 11. Professor in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics, Oxford University Press, Google Books

What do the issues of global politics and grand strategy have to do with oceans policy? Oceans policy should be connected to and serve grand strategy, which should be implemented by national strategy. The United States and its friends and allies face a common set of strategic risks and threats in the global system, and a policy for the legal order of the oceans should be pursued that meets the major challenges of the day. In some respects, U.S. oceans policy has been at the forefront of reducing military risk to the United States. The U.S.-sponsored post- 9/11 counter-terrorism initiatives introduced by the United States and other nations at the International Maritime Organization reflect this strategic purpose. Amendments adopted in the fall of 2005 to the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation tighten rules to counter maritime terrorism and the transport of weapons of mass destruction on a ship. Similarly, the International Shipping and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which amends the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, established tougher standards for seaside and vessel security, reducing the vulnerability of the maritime system to terrorist attack. At the same time, however, the United States has been surprisingly lax in maintaining awareness of military risks posed by peer state rivals, and the relationship between grand strategy and oceans policy. What are the greatest military risks in the international system?

First, the greatest military threat to a stable order comes from China, which is rising on a wave of economic, scientific, and military power. Success in these spheres is producing political power for the first time, creating in Beijing a heady atmosphere of arrival. China is a trendsetter in Asia, and is marketing its illiberal perspective on oceans policy, both in the Pacific region and at the IMO. Following behind China, nations such as Brazil and Iran are becoming dominant in their respective geographic and political spheres. Brazil is filling a power vacuum on the continent of South America; Iran is filling a void created by the toppling of Saddam Hussein and subsequent civil war in Iraq. Second, a resurgent autocratic Russia could further destabilize Europe. Moscow’s heavy hand has frightened the states on its western border, and encumbered better relations with NATO and the EU. Empowered with energy wealth to rebuild its military forces, Russia still suffers from a decayed infrastructure and an unhealthy and declining population base. But Moscow aspires to be a naval power once again, so there may be opportunity to engage with Russia more effectively. The United States has more in common with Russia on oceans policy than any other issue, and the two states worked closely to achieve the navigational regimes in UNCLOS. But instead of working in tandem with Moscow at the IMO, the United States and Russia have been more inclined to butt heads. For the United States, the goal is to reassure European allies and curry favor with the EU nations; for Russia, the objective has been to myopically define its foreign policy in terms of opposition to whatever the U.S. is promoting. Both nations share essential interests in a liberal order of the oceans, and should work together closely to maintain and stabilize the system of rules in UNCLOS that they created.

Third, the Middle East is under a grave threat from an aggressive and dedicated assault by an irreconcilable wing of Islam, funded by radical Shiites and Sunnis. The extremists seek to attack the West in order to weaken its resolve and dilute its institutions, destroy Israel, and impose a caliphate dictatorship throughout the Middle East. The states in the region — Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia — are caught in the crosshairs, and any one of them could erupt into chaos, anarchy, or war. Whereas Egypt and Saudi Arabia care so much about stability that they stamp out all dissent, breeding a seething anger that could explode, Syria and Iran are breeding instability by conducting secret, irregular wars through proxy forces throughout the Levant and beyond. Iran’s “split personality” between the more professional Iranian Navy on the one hand and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy (IRGCN) on the other, keeps the Persian Gulf in a constant state of high tension.

Fourth, there are a growing number of rogue regimes eager to acquire weapons of mass destruction, mass murder, and mass disruption. These regimes, including North Korea, are developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in order to limit the flexibility of the democratic states to challenge them, to deter neighborhood policing by the United States and its allies, and to be able to impose their will on their neighbors. Iran is the most unpredictable nation in the Middle East, and Tehran has exported instability into both Gaza and Lebanon.

Fifth, the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem has lit South Asia from the coast of Gwadar to the peaks of the Hindu Kush. Even more so than Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan teeters on anarchy, and it is not implausible to worry about the nation descending into a jihad autocracy. The Pakistani military and intelligence service are both essential partners in the fight against terrorism, as well as collaborators that are not entirely reliable. While Islamabad remains focused inward toward the continent, it also bristles at Delhi’s grip on the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, like its neighbor India, purports to restrict foreign military activities in its EEZ.

Finally — particularly relevant for this study — there is an emerging international governance system of pseudo-legality sustained by bureaucratic international elites and anti-American and anti-Western states, which weakens the democracies, “protects the vicious and the evil, and absorbs the energy of decent countries into endless maneuvers of utter impotence and dishonesty.” 29 In the maritime context, the tribulations of international law are exposed in the application of UNCLOS. The international law of the sea is pulled in so many different, even contradictory directions, by dissimilar domestic and international constituencies that it is becoming unmoored from its roots as a system for international peace and stability. As a global system, the law of the sea is becoming less coherent, not more. By working at cross-purposes to obfuscate international law of the sea in a bureaucratic web of contradictory transnational, foreign, and domestic rules, oceans law risks being an agent of disorder rather than order. 30

These six global threats are evolving in parallel and sometimes in synergistic coordination. American grand strategy should take into account the six threats; democratic states should implement a foreign policy that is designed to overmatch all of these challenges. As an adjunct of grand strategy, oceans policy should be attached to and promote the defeat of these six threats. Freedom of the seas, particularly in the EEZ, is a crucial element for meeting each of these challenges.

**Bad China India relations inevitable, try or die for deterrence which works**

**Rana 21** (Kishan, 6-16, "What does the future of India-China ties look like? 8 experts speak," ThePrint, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/what-does-the-future-of-india-china-ties-look-like-8-experts-speak/678377/, Ambassador Kishan S. Rana is Professor Emeritus, and a Senior Fellow at DiploFoundation. MA in economics, St Stephens College Delhi. He was in the Indian Foreign Service (1960-95); and worked in China (1963-65, 1970-72). He was Ambassador and High Commissioner for Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Mauritius, and Germany; and consul general in San Francisco. He served as a joint secretary on the staff of PM Indira Gandhi (1981-82). Amb. Rana is an Honorary Fellow of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi (book review editor, China Report); an Archives By-Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge; a Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC; guest faculty at the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna; and Commonwealth Adviser, Namibia Foreign Ministry, 2000-01. He has lectured in about 20 countries to diplomats at foreign ministry training institutions, and at ambassador conferences in several countries, DRS)

On 15 June 2020, India lost 20 soldiers at the Galwan river valley in Ladakh. While India and China have had several border standoffs since the 1962 India-China War, this was the first time, since 1975, that a face-off had turned violent — albeit without the actual use of firearms, in line with the confidence-building measures in place for a long time now. Since the clash, India and China have held several discussions at the level of senior ministers, military commanders and diplomats, and yet disengagement and de-escalation processes have not taken the direction that both sides had planned for. While disengagement did take place in the Pangong Tso area where India had strategic advantage, the situation in rest of the areas remains the same. India has now taken a stance that unless there is peace and tranquility in the border areas, the bilateral ties will not go back to normalcy. ThePrint spoke to eight experts on how they view the Galwan Valley clash, one year later, and what it means for the future of India-China bilateral ties: ‘New low will push Asia into divisive, uncertain scenario’ “Expectations about India and China reaching a mutual accommodation of interests at the regional and global level have evaporated. The loss of the most significant achievement since the mid-1980s — a peaceful border — has come in the wake of worrisome power asymmetry. Nationalist sentiments and mistrust are rising and the strategic discourse is hardening. “India’s continuing economic dependence on China jostles uneasily with China’s enlarging footprint in India’s neighbourhood. While geopolitical equations between the major and middle powers have yet to crystallise, between India and China also falls the shadow of the US. In the short to medium term, the wisdom and sagacity of leaders on both sides will be on test. This new ‘low’, if not resolved at the earliest, will push Asia and its much vaunted century, into a highly divisive and uncertain scenario.” — Alka Acharya, Professor of Chinese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University ‘Indian ocean new theatre of India-China competition’ “The Galwan clash was a pivot that revealed China’s readiness to bear the enormous cost of bilateral damage, by using duplicitous means to coerce India. Incidentally, Galwan flagged off China’s active coercion campaigns against Australia, Hong Kong and Taiwan. “China’s failure to enforce coercion and increased troop deployment and infrastructure at the LAC points to a permanent stalemate of deployment. Since not much headway can be made in the Himalayas, China exploits other dimensions. Revelations on Wuhan labs and brief power shutdowns in Indian cities are indications of bio and cyber warfare. “India-China bilateral ties will be defined more by power balance in a divided Indo-Pacific. China has increased its leverage in the subcontinent — Sri Lanka and Nepal are examples. India feels a need for greater external balancing to counter China. Post Galwan, India shed pretensions of neutrality and grew closer to the US and QUAD. Indo-Pacific is a playground of future global tussles, with India as the fulcrum. The Indian ocean is the new theatre of India-China competition, given China’s naval expansion plans and India’s strategic alliance with an active America.” — Probal Dasgupta, Army veteran and author of ‘Watershed-1967: India’s Forgotten Victory Over China’ ‘Time and effort wasted in informal summits led to Galwan’ “One year after the Chinese incursions there has been nothing by way of an accountability exercise by the government. Clearly a series of mistakes were made in China policy. Instead of keeping China under pressure during and post-Doklam by banning Chinese apps and 5G then, the government gave Beijing an out with the ‘informal summits’. This betrayed a lack of understanding of how the Chinese system worked. “China subsequently built up around the face-off site with New Delhi now ignoring the development. It is clear that the time and effort wasted in the informal summits led to Galwan. Current negotiations over disengagement and de-escalation show the government as too eager to reach a compromise with China. The government’s lack of both options and strategy is the result of a long-term process of blanking out and undermining critical voices and of the preference to focus on the more familiar issue of Pakistan.” — Jabin T. Jacob, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University Also read: A year since Galwan, China drags its feet on disengagement at four friction points in Ladakh ‘India, China must find alternate equilibria in their hugely transformed equation’ “Remembering Galwan incidents teaches us how our conventional mechanisms and mannerisms of resolving border standoffs have become ineffective and outdated. After dozen-plus long-drawn interactions between India and China at the level of military core commanders and senior ministers, we have not yet achieved even full military disengagement on the LAC to our satisfaction. We achieved disengagement only on the Pangong Lake area where India had managed to clinch critical strategic advantage on the South bank of the Pangong Tso whereas other points of confrontation still remain militarised with heavy deployment from both sides. “History teaches us that such episodes were resolved only by structural changes plus bold initiatives by strong and ambitious leaders. This time again untying these knots would require direct intervention from the very top. The upcoming BRICS Summit in September could be that important occasion to find a breakthrough in disengagement followed by early demobilisation at the LAC to return to the peace and tranquillity template of their border management. But learning from Doklam and Galwan, both sides must explore building a new set of confidence-building measures to find alternate equilibria in their hugely transformed India-China equation.” — Swaran Singh, Professor and Chair, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University ‘Chinese hawks and doves seem to agree there is no need as of now to turn India into a distinct enemy’ “An influential section within the Chinese strategic community believes that China’s ‘cooperative approach’ towards India in the past years has failed to deliver desired benefits, particularly reduction in strategic pressure on China in the southwest direction, so that it can concentrate on facing its main strategic opponent, the United States. And therefore, China’s India policy from hereon should focus on an occasional show of strength or an assertion of China’s strength advantage vis-a-vis India from time to time so as to effectively check and balance a rising and more confident India and undercut what is considered as its strategic opportunity period induced by the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific. “However, there is also widespread concern within China if such a muscular approach will eventually lead to a rupture in China-India ties and what implications it will have for China in the present not-so-friendly international environment. Interestingly, Chinese hawks and doves seem to agree on one point that as of now there is no need to turn India into a distinct ‘enemy’. Rather, having India as an occasional partner on specific issues continues to serve the Chinese interest better — and hence China’s all-out effort to de-link the border issue from the rest of the relationship. — Antara Ghosal Singh, Research Associate, Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) ‘India must engage proactively with its neighbours’ “With it being one year since the Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese troops, there is a need to reflect on the continuous implications of the tragic event. China’s incursions in Ladakh represent a dissatisfied revisionist rising power bent on altering the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Hemisphere in accordance to its narrowly defined interests. As China will continue to grow in terms of military and economic capability, more of these incursions will be expected despite the presence of cooperative agreements such as those in 1993 and 1996. India must realise that China’s assertive activities along the LAC represent a bigger picture. China views India as a major competitor in its strategic designs in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, it will be inevitable for the former to craft measures to constrain India’s influence in the region. This is quite evident with Beijing’s increase in strategic engagements with states throughout the region. “Moreover, as India is faced with the challenges brought by the Covid-19 pandemic, its preoccupation with containing that disease has provided China with a golden opportunity to alter the region’s architecture discreetly but effectively. These include recent reports on Chinese activity in Bhutanese territory, its refusal to follow through with the initially planned broader disengagement process, and the continued fortification of Chinese military presence in the depth areas of the LAC. The shock of the bloodshed from the Galwan Valley Clash alone ensures that the standoff will long remain in India’s public consciousness. India must internally and externally balance against China by: 1) advancing domestic policies for development and economic recovery, 2) engage proactively with its neighbours and 3) enhance deterrence.” — Don McLain Gill, Fellow, International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), Philippines ‘Still no clarity on casualties on Chinese side’ “A year after Galwan, there is still no clarity on the number of casualties on the Chinese side. It could be anywhere between four and 120 deaths. Currently, China is recycling troops in forward areas due to the harsh terrain and looking at new strategies like drone usage, which had helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenia last November. India isn’t far behind here. Going forward, India should be mindful of China’s attempts to develop border settlements and expand Han Chinese populations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They’ve set up 628 new villages already which means if India were to take action, there would be a real risk of civilian casualties.” — Srikanth Kondapalli, professor in Chinese studies, JNU ‘Open society with free media can’t reveal all that’s afoot’ “Managing a complex relationship with China is intrinsically difficult for India; an open society with a free media cannot reveal all that’s afoot. For me that translates into trusting my government to do the right thing.”

**Current trajectory of Indian civilian innovation deters China – removes the power imbalance**

**Smart 19** – Benjamin T. Smart, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Smart is an Ensign in the United States Navy. He holds a BS and BA from the University of South Carolina. June 2019,“Asian State Responses To China’s Space Power Strategy,”, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/62802/19Jun\_Smart\_Benjamin.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed 1/9/2020 //ICH – SW

India recognizes China’s outreach across Asia and the IOR and is taking steps to compete with its growing regional influence through the use of space diplomacy. Surrounded by the String of Pearls, India continues to rely on its bilateral relations and involvement in multilateral forums to promote strong relationships, further its spacerelated interests, and counter China’s soft power strategy. As for national prestige, India’s space exploration missions aim to close the gap with China’s technological and astronomical achievements. While China still leads India in this respect, ISRO’s pipeline of astronomical exploration projects aims to close this gap and bolster India’s status across both Asia and the international community.

Given the role of non-aligned international cooperation throughout ISRO’s history, it is unsurprising that ISRO has continued to collaborate with its foreign partners of conflicting strategic ambitions. By continuing to collaborate with both sides of the geopolitical spectrum, India benefits from increased opportunities for partnership and mutual benefit as it aims to compete with China on earth and in space. ISRO continues to cooperate with NASA, as the two space agencies are conducting a joint mission using a highly advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR): Nisar.140 The Nisar satellite is intended to “observe and take measurements of some of the planet’s most complex processes, including ecosystem disturbances, ice-sheet collapse, and natural hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes and landslides.”141 India is also hosting a ground station for the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS in exchange for the reciprocal expansion of the IRNSS, fulfilling the promise of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between ISRO and Roscosmos.142 The security-related implications of both of these projects are significant, as India’s ability to cooperate with established military powers in the development of sensitive space technologies provides a strong foundation for securityrelated cooperation amidst China’s rise.

While ISRO still collaborates with its closest historical partners, the organization’s growth is beginning to come full circle, as it is expanding its assistance to rising space powers around theorld in response to China’s increasing diplomatic clout. ISRO has signed MoUs and Framework Agreements with states such as Armenia, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, South Africa, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Vietnam.143 These arrangements often facilitate cooperation in joint research projects for space science and space applications.144 India has even brokered an MoU for the peaceful use of outer space with China. This rare example of bilateral space-related cooperation between the two rival civilizations listed a number of specific projects for ISRO and CNSA to work on, including remote sensing data sharing and exchange and the cross-calibration of each country’s respective remote sensing and astronomical observation satellites.145 Although the brokerage of this MoU is noteworthy given the Sino-Indian rivalry, the MoU excludes security applications and its concrete proposals are limited, with few exceptions, primarily to space science missions. Areas such as deep space exploration, space components, and satellite navigation warrant mere discussion under the MoU’s guidelines and could potentially yield no results by the agreement’s expiration in 2020.

India’s efforts to promote its image as a top-tier space power and compete with China for influence are evident in its activity in the Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). India does not participate in the China-led APSCO but instead has sent delegations to Japan’s annual regional space forum APRSAF consistently since 2005 to promote its image as a responsible space power. It has co-hosted the forum twice, in 2007 and 2017, promoting the themes of “Space for Human Empowerment” and “Space Technology for Enhanced Governance and Development,” respectively.146 These subjects cater to emerging space powers at the forum and supplement India’s bilateral approach to diplomacy with developing space powers. Despite its absence at the annual conference in its early years, India has become one of APRSAF’s most active contributors, represented by a diversified body of dignitaries from across the vast Indian bureaucracy.147 India even holds one of four seats at the APRSAF Executive Committee as a result of its previous cohosting, providing agenda setting power up to the 2021 Forum.148 India’s recently earned status on the APRSAF executive committee is an especially notable achievement. Despite the rotating basis of the position, for the time being, India wields valuable agenda setting power at a time when APRSAF is seeing some of its highest levels of participation.

India’s leadership in regional space cooperation is especially significant in the context of China’s SIC and BRI. Despite its contributions to BRI, and by extension, its access to services offered in SIC,149 India is unlikely to utilize Chinese space-based resources as it already possesses its own assets which offer similar services. Given the massive scale and scope of this Chinese project, India’s ability to counteract China’s soft power space influence is critical to maintaining its prestige and diplomatic leverage in the region. While India cannot compete with the scale of investment comprising BRI at large, India can counteract China’s soft power influence in the space domain through its leadership in APRSAF and bilateral partnerships.

While India has historically been a leader at the U.N. and other international forums, the changing geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific presents an opportunity to leverage India’s activity in international organizations for increased diplomatic outreach over China. India is very active in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS) and its subcommittees, advocating for responsible state behavior in space.150 India is also currently a leading contributor to the UN Space Based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response, wielding its expertise in remote sensing technology to benefit disaster-plagued nations. India leverages its participation in multilateral associations outside the UN to advance its space-related interests on the world stage as well. India is active in both the International Institute of Space Law and InterAgency Debris Coordination Committee, offering more opportunities to influence international norms of state behavior.151 India’s active engagement with multilateral agencies like those previously described serve to advance India’s vision of a rules-based space order and offer a proactive effort to dissuade China’s provocative activity in space.

A relatively new development in India’s civil space program is its space science initiatives geared towards students. By investing in human capital, India has promoted its prospects for innovation in the long term which could be key in its **struggle to surpass China in space**. One program has sent student-built satellites into orbit, having launched Kalamsat, built on a 3D printer, in January 2019.152 Kalamsat was built by students from the organization Space Kidz India, a group that provides mentorship to students interested in science and technology, representing the role civil society is playing in India’s civil space strategy.153 ISRO also plans to develop a set of space-focused research hubs near academic institutions in support of its commercial incubator program, representing yet another element of India’s investments in space-related education.154

India’s academic efforts also reinforce its diplomatic approach to space power through exchanges. India serves as the host for the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education for Asia and the Pacific which offers degrees to students from across the region.155 Additionally, ISRO has sponsored another program with support from the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) for international students, bringing young scholars from 45 developing countries together to collaborate on small satellite development.156 These efforts collectively signify ISRO’s investment in India’s long term approach to soft space power. By investing in the human capital of its own citizens and its image as a leader in space science among the international community, India is expanding the scale and scope of its outreach beyond its traditional policies which relied primarily on space applications for development.

ISRO has continued to invest in its civil space capabilities, emphasizing its traditional strengths while also expanding the scope of its space-related capacity. Both the INSAT and GSAT constellations have grown to incorporate military applications in to their longstanding commercial purposes, representing the multipurpose capacity of India’s civilly administrated constellations. One communications satellite, GSAT-9, was proclaimed as a “gift” from India to fellow South Asian nations to promote regional unity, representing the civil constellation’s new role in regional diplomacy.157 Given China’s targeting of small South Asian nations with “debt trap” diplomacy, India’s generous offer counters China’s expanding regional influence and places it in stark contrast to a transactional, aggressive China.158 While the expansion of civil satellite constellations like the GSAT series exemplifies India’s commitment to leadership in the earth observation and satellite communications domains, ISRO has also ventured into new territory, namely the fields of astronomical observation and space exploration.

India’s civil space program has surprised many international observers with the scale and scope of its space exploration missions. Much of India’s newfound attention to space science and exploration has been driven by China’s high-profile Shenzhou taikonaut missions, Chang’e lunar exploration missions, and other similar projects. In 2008, a PSLV launched the Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe carrying scientific payloads from European and American organizations.159 Although the mission reached the moon successfully and conducted over 3,400 lunar orbits,160 communication with the satellite was lost in August 2009 when it crashed into the moon, frustrating the project’s foreign collaborators since ISRO did not previously disclose the probe’s technical weaknesses.161 Although China beat India to the moon, India managed to beat China to Mars by launching the Mangalyaan spacecraft in 2013 without international assistance. As the first Asian nation to reach Mars orbit, India relished in its victory over more established regional space powers to achieve this milestone. An official from the Indian Institute of Science proclaimed that “people will see India as a destination for high-end projects” following ISRO’s successful journey to the Red Planet, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi boasted that the mission “[cost] less than it takes to make a Hollywood movie.”162 Modi was not exaggerating, as the mission cost only $74 million,163 signaling that India could very well outpace China’s space exploration missions in the future without taking drastic financial measures.

India has capitalized on the strong techno-nationalist sentiment following Mangalyaan to achieve more objectives in space ahead of China. The Chandrayaan-2 lunar mission is currently planned for July of 2019.164 ISRO describes the mission as “totally indigenous” and plans to land a semi-autonomous rover to analyze soil from the lunar surface.165 Though the program aims to deliver India a “first” in space, as the rover is intended to explore the previously untouched South Pole, the mission has been delayed multiple times and may not launch as intended.166 In addition to a return to the moon, ISRO is planning a follow-on mission to Mars and its first spacecraft mission to Venus in the early 2020s.167 China has yet to explore Venus, offering India another feasible victory in the regional space race.

Among the most noteworthy of India’s civil space developments is its official dedication to a manned-space flight mission. A successful manned spaceflight mission would not only mark an especially significant step toward catching up with China’s manned Shenzhou spaceflight program, but also place India in one of the most select clubs among spacefaring nations. Although many nations have sent astronauts into space aboard foreign launchers, only the United States, Russia and China have independently launched astronauts into space.168 In December of 2018, the Indian government set aside $1.43 billion for an astronaut mission, the first manned spaceflight mission conducted totally by ISRO.169 The Ganganyaan project promises to send three astronauts into space and will receive collaborative assistance from CNES and Roscomos.170 While France and Russia will not assist India in directly placing the astronauts in space, they will assist India in aspects related to space medicine and astronaut training, respectively, prior to the launch.171 The Ganganyaan mission is projected for 2021.172

C. CONCLUSION

**The** **long-standing** **rivalry** **between** **China and India shows little signs of warming**, especially in the context of space power competition. **Advancements in India’s spacestrategic** **calculations** **are part** **of a larger national effort** **to** preserve India’s status as a regional power and **close the power disparity with China.** **To India, China’s rise is a zerosum game with dire consequences should it fail to meaningfully compete with its northern adversary**. In response to Chinese military modernization, the Indian space program has expanded its focus from civilian applications to incorporate military support roles. India’s nuclear arsenal and BMD programs have also benefitted from repurposed technology and expertise, signaling New Delhi’s commitment to countering China’s regional aggression. Additionally, India’s commercial space sector is receiving unprecedented support from the national government that aims to counter China’s early steps toward developing a commercial space industry. Though not without its weaknesses, India’s budding space economy is on an upward trajectory with a high upside potential. **Diplomatically,** **India has promoted its status as a major space power and regional leader through its diplomatic initiatives** at regional forums and the UN.

#### Indian ASATs solve Pakistani nuke buildup and Chinese preemptive strikes.

Chellaney 19 ― Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, nonresident affiliate with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King's College London, former Fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Ph.D. in international studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2019. (“The looming specter of Asian space wars”, *Asian Review*, March 29th, 2019, Available Online at: [https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-looming-specter-of-Asian-space-wars Accessed 8-16-2019](https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-looming-specter-of-Asian-space-wars%20Accessed%208-16-2019))

The linkages between antisatellite, or ASAT, weapon technologies and ballistic missile defense systems, which can shoot down incoming missiles, underscore how innovations favor both offense and defense. Space wars are no longer just Hollywood fiction.

India's ASAT test is a reminder that the Asia-Pacific region is the hub of the growing space-war capabilities. The United States and Russia field extensive missile defense systems and boast a diverse range of ground-launched and directed-energy ASAT capabilities. China's ASAT weaponry is becoming more sophisticated, even as it aggressively seeks theater ballistic missile defenses.

Japan and South Korea are working with the U.S. separately to create missile defense systems. Although aimed at thwarting regional threats, these systems are interoperable with American missile defenses. Australia, for its part, participates in trilateral missile-defense consultations with the U.S. and Japan.

Space-based assets are critical not just for communications but also for imagery, navigation, weather forecasting, surveillance, interception, missile guidance and the delivery of precision munitions. Taking out such assets can ~~blind~~ an enemy.

India's successful "kill" of one of its own satellites with a missile -- confirmed by the U.S. Air Force Space Command -- has made it the fourth power, after the United States, Russia and China, to shoot down an object in space. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, facing a tight reelection race, made a rare televised address to announce India's entry into this exclusive club of nuclear-armed countries that can destroy a moving target in space.

India's technological leap is being seen internationally as a counter to China's growing ASAT capabilities, which include ground-based direct ascent missiles and lasers, which can ~~blind~~ or ~~disable~~ satellites.

The international development of ASAT capabilities mirrors the nuclear-weapons proliferation chain. Like nuclear weapons, the U.S. was the first to develop satellite-kill technologies, followed by the former Soviet Union. China, as in nuclear weapons, stepped into this realm much later, only to provoke India to follow suit.

The Indian test was clearly a warning shot across China's bow, although Modi claimed that it was not aimed against any country.

India finds itself boxed in by the deepening China-Pakistan strategic nexus. China has transferred, according to international evidence, technologies for weapons of mass destruction to Pakistan to help tie down India south of the Himalayas. Beijing currently is seeking to shield Pakistan even from international pressure to root out transnational terrorist groups that operate from its territory.

The Indian ASAT demonstration holds strategic implications also for Pakistan, which values nuclear weapons as an antidote to its conventional military inferiority and thus maintains a nuclear first-use doctrine against stronger India. By shielding it from retaliation, Pakistan's nuclear weapons enable its nurturing of armed jihadists as a force multiplier in its low-intensity proxy war by terror against India.

An ASAT capability, by potentially arming India with the means to shoot down incoming missiles, could erode Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. After all, an ASAT capability serves as a building block of a ballistic missile defense system.

However, China remains at the center of Indian security concerns. Without developing ASAT weaponry to help underpin deterrence, India risked encouraging China to go after Indian space-based assets early in a conflict.

In today's world, one side can impose its demands not necessarily by employing force but by building capabilities that can mount a coercive threat.

China's ASAT capabilities arguably hold the greatest significance for India, which has no security arrangements with another power and thus is on its own. Japan, South Korea and Australia, by contrast, are ensconced under the U.S. security umbrella. The U.S. and Russia, armed to their teeth, can cripple China's space-based assets if it dared to strike any of their satellites.

#### resurrection of the Quad alliance is reconstructing the Indo-Pacific to preserve the liberal international order and multilateralism

Jie 19

(Zhang, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute of International Strategy at CASS, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order,” China International Studies, Volume 74, January/February 2019, Snider)

In response to a reversal in the balance of power between China and Japan, soon after returning to office in December 2012, Abe proposed the building of a “Democratic Security Diamond” composed of the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Unfortunately, the Quad was absent of actual utility at that time, as the US-led “Asia-pacific rebalancing” strategy was in full swing and had incorporated Japan and Australia, as US allies, and India, as a US partner. It was not until the beginning of 2017, when the “Asia-pacific rebalancing” strategy was abandoned by the Trump administration, and the regional influence of the US declined while that of China rose, that the Quad began to be “resurrected” in earnest. Marked by two consultative meetings attended by the four countries, the Quad gradually embarked on a path of pragmatic cooperation. The two consultative meetings, attended by director-general level officials from foreign ministries of the US, Japan, Australia and India, were held in November 2017 and June 2018. Convened around the theme of a “free and open Indo-pacific,” the first quadrilateral meeting addressed seven core themes.9 Although separate statements rather than a joint declaration were issued, the four countries reached consensus on the core theme of “common democratic values,” which was regarded as the basis for “cooperation for security and prosperity.”10 The second meeting was relatively low-key. According to the statement issued by Japan at its conclusion, the meeting had at least two priorities, namely, supporting ASEAN centrality in the construction of regional mechanisms, and promoting sustainable economic cooperation in the region.11 This shows that the four countries were trying to use the Quad as the core to gradually expand the scope of their “alliance,” with ASEAN as the key target. Therefore, the priority became dispelling ASEAN’S concerns that the Quad would weaken its own central position. At the same time, the Quad would focus on strengthening economic cooperation, which was further echoed during the Indo-pacific Business Forum at the end of July 2018 by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who announced that the US would adopt a new $113-million plan to support the development of digital economy, energy and infrastructure. The purpose of strengthening economic cooperation is really motivated by security interests. As Pompeo said, “we remain committed to economic engagement in the Indo-pacific because of the national security benefits for the American people and our partners. As President Trump’s National Security Strategy states, ‘Economic security is national security’.”12 So far, the basic objectives and cooperative content of the Quad have gradually become clear, and include: identifying the “Indo-pacific” as the geographical scope for cooperation; focusing on both security and economy, particularly safeguarding the freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-pacific, while trying to strengthen cooperation in regional infrastructure development; and establishing as an ultimate goal a rules-based, free and open regional order.13 First of all, the transition from “Asia-pacific” to “Indo-pacific” is a prominent feature of the Quad in terms of geography, which reflects the geopolitical trend in the disintegration and reconstruction of the regional order.14 In the past few years, the United States, Japan, and Australia have proposed their own versions of Indo-pacific strategies or policies based on their own strategic considerations. Although they may differ in detail, the basic concepts are consistent: emphasizing the importance of the Indo-pacific and supporting the replacement of “Asia-pacific” with “Indo-pacific.” When he announced that the US Pacific Command was officially renamed the Indo-pacific Command, US Defense Secretary James Mattis pointed out the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and its vital importance to global maritime security.15 Moreover, according to the Shangrila Dialogue in 2018, the concept of “Indo-pacific” has gradually been accepted by the international community and is being included in foreign policy agendas of different countries. This trend underlines the importance of the Indian Ocean. With India’s increasing weight in the world economy, and the growing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Indo-Pacific is being integrated into a broad strategic region. It is noteworthy that the “Indian Ocean-pacific” line is precisely the main route of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which, while representing a broad consensus among countries with regard to geopolitical changes, reflects their competition as to the ultimate shape of the Indo-pacific regional order. Second, the Quad focuses primarily on cooperation in the security field and stresses to jointly maintain the openness, freedom and prosperity of the Indo-pacific region, which is the cornerstone for quadrilateral cooperation. For example, in January 2018, the third Raisina Dialogue, organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation, was held in India. Although this was a “Track 1.5” dialogue, top active duty military leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia all attended and made the “China threat” a discussion topic.16 The delegates of the Quad countries believed that China had undermined the prosperity, openness and inclusiveness of the Indo-pacific region, and it was necessary to start from security and strengthen the Quad military cooperation in order to reverse the trend of increasing disparity in the relative strength of regional powers, respond to the rise of China, and force Beijing to change its behavior.17 In practice, the Malabar military exercise was expected to be an “example” of quadrilateral military cooperation. This exercise was initiated by the United States and India in 1992, and joined by Japan in 2007. So far, the US, Japan and India have carried out the exercise together several times. At the beginning of 2018, there were rumors that Australia would join as well, but in the end India did not extend an invitation.

#### Collapse of the LIO causes interstate conflict and increases nuclear weapon usage

Kendall-Taylor 19

(Andrea, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline: National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World,” <https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence-1>, Snider)

Twenty-first-century autocrats are not the same as their Cold War predecessors. In the face of what looked like their inevitable extinction in the 1990s and early 2000s, dictators have changed their strategies. Today’s authoritarian regimes have become more resilient and a more formidable challenge to democracy. Research shows that today’s authoritarian regimes last longer than their predecessors. From 1946 to 1989, the typical autocracy lasted 14 years. This number has nearly doubled since the end of the Cold War to an average of 20 years. As authoritarian regimes become savvier and more durable, global democracy is likely to suffer.5 Autocracies are evolving in a number of important ways. They have learned to mimic elements of democracy, for example by regularly holding elections, allowing multiple political parties to exist, and providing space for legislatures to function. They seek to portray themselves as upholders of the rule of law, and then weaponize the system to weaken the opposition. And they have adapted to manage the threats initially posed by social media. Authoritarian regimes have co-opted these technologies to deepen their grip internally, curb basic human rights, spread illiberal practices beyond their borders, and undermine public trust in open societies. New advances in facial recognition and artificial intelligence will only intensify and accelerate these maleficent practices. Not only have the tactics of today’s autocrats evolved, but so too has their form. Since the end of the Cold War, highly personalized autocracies—those regimes where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual—are on the rise. As my colleagues Erica Frantz, Joseph Wright and I have shown, personalist dictatorships—or those regimes where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual—have increased notably since the end of the Cold War. In 1988, personalist regimes comprised 23 percent of all dictatorships. Today, 40 percent of all autocracies are ruled by strongmen.6 The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts.9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot afford. Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression. Although Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions. Politics in China show many of these same trends. Xi’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea has occurred alongside the rising personalization of the political system. Xi has amassed substantial personal power since coming to office in 2012 and continues to roll back the norms of the post-Mao collective leadership system. If Xi further consolidates control and limits accountability—particularly over military and foreign policy bodies—research suggests that he, too, could feel free to further escalate his aggressive rhetoric and actions in the South China Sea. Not only do personalist dictatorships pursue aggressive foreign policies—they are also often difficult and unpredictable partners. Research underscores that, thanks to limited constraints on decisionmaking, personalist leaders generally have the latitude to change their minds on a whim, producing volatile and erratic policies.10 Moreover, personalist leaders—think Putin, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro—are among those autocrats who are most suspicious of U.S. intentions and who see the creation of an external enemy as an effective means of boosting public support. Anti-U.S. rhetoric, therefore, is most pronounced in personalist settings. Finally, personalist regimes are the most corrupt and the least likely to democratize. Strongman autocracies, more so than any other type of government, depend on the distribution of financial incentives to maintain power.11 As such, these leaders are the most likely to squander foreign aid and sideline competent individuals, hollowing out those institutions that could plausibly constrain their power. Their departure from power often entails instability and violence. And they leave conditions that are highly inhospitable for a transition to democracy. Put differently, when leaders like Turkish President Erdoğan roll back democracy and consolidate personal power, the effects of their actions persist long after they exit office. 3

#### China is a revisionist authoritarian power and only deterrence and assurance solves

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[Aaron L., "An Answer to Aggression," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-08-11/ccp-answer-aggression, accessed 10-27-20]

The Chinese Communist Party’s initial mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent attempts to exploit the crisis have produced enduring problems for the rest of the world. But the CCP’s behavior has also helped clarify the threat that China poses to the security, prosperity, and well-being of other countries. Public opinion polls show that over 60 percent of Americans of both political parties now hold a negative view of Beijing’s leadership and intentions, and similar attitudes can be found across the democratic world. This heightened awareness of a shared danger creates an opportunity for the United States and its allies to formulate a new and more effective strategy for dealing with China.

For the past four decades, Western democracies have hoped that engagement with China would cause its leaders to abandon any revisionist ambitions they might harbor and accept their country’s place as a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led international order. Expanding flows of trade and investment would, it was thought, also encourage Beijing to proceed down the path toward greater economic and political openness. The policy of engagement was not absurd on its face; it was a gamble rather than an outright blunder. But as has become increasingly obvious, the West’s wager has failed to pay off.

Instead of opening up and mellowing out, with Xi Jinping at the helm, China is pursuing unusually brutal and oppressive policies at home and acting more aggressively abroad. China is trying to replace the United States as the world’s leading economic and technological nation and to displace it as the preponderant power in East Asia. Beijing has ratcheted up its efforts to exploit the openness of democratic societies in order to shape the perceptions and policies of their governments. It is working hard to establish itself as the leader of the developing nations and, with their support, to rewrite rules and reshape international norms, standards, and institutions in line with its own illiberal, authoritarian preferences. In the long run, China’s rulers evidently hope that they can divide, discredit, and weaken the democracies, lessening the appeal of their system, co-opting some, isolating others, and leaving the United States at the head of what will be, at best, a diminished and enfeebled coalition.

It is one thing to have such dreams, another to actually fulfill them. In addition to its impressive strengths, China has large and mounting liabilities, including a slowing economy, a rapidly aging population, and a system of governance that relies on costly coercion rather than the freely given consent of its people. These liabilities will complicate the regime’s plans and could eventually derail them. But it would be imprudent to assume that this will happen soon or of its own accord.

Deflecting Beijing from its present, revisionist path will naturally require defensive measures. In the face of China’s growing strength, the United States and its allies need to bolster their defenses against overt acts of military aggression or coercion. They must also do more to protect their economies from exploitation and their societies and political systems from penetration and subversion.

But better defenses alone will not suffice. An effective strategy must also have a strong offensive component; it must be designed to identify and exploit the CCP regime’s vulnerabilities instead of simply responding to its actions or trying to match its strengths. A purely reactive posture might have been adequate for dealing with a far weaker, nascent rival, but it cannot succeed against an opponent as powerful and aggressive as China has become. Even as they block Beijing’s attempts to advance toward its goals, the United States and its allies must therefore find ways to regain the initiative.

The aims of this approach should be twofold: first, to deny Beijing its immediate objectives, imposing costs, slowing the growth of China’s power and influence, and reducing the threat it can pose to democracies and to an open international system; and second, by demonstrating the futility of China’s current strategy, to change the calculations of its ruling elite, forcing them to eventually rethink both their foreign and their domestic policies. This will take time, and given Xi’s obvious predispositions and commitments, success may well depend on changes in the top leadership of the CCP.

As a National Security Council white paper that the White House released in May notes, it would be foolish to premise U.S. strategy on “determining a particular end state for China.” But Washington need not be fatalistic. Even as they acknowledge that China’s future is not theirs to decide, the United States and its allies should articulate a hope for deeper reforms that will someday change the fundamental character of the regime. The democracies should not waver in their insistence that universal values do in fact exist and that all people, including China’s citizens, are entitled to the rights and freedoms that flow from those values. Anything less would be a betrayal of principle, and of those in China who hold fast to this belief.

A LENINIST STATE IN A LIBERAL ORDER

Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, in 1949, the nation’s leaders have felt threatened from within and without. The principal danger has always been the United States, which Chinese leaders have seen as working tirelessly to constrain their country, even as it has spoken earnestly of engagement. In Beijing’s view, the United States has sought to encircle China with a ring of alliances. It has also challenged the legitimacy and endangered the survival of the CCP’s one-party Leninist system by proclaiming the existence of a liberal international order based on principles at odds with authoritarian rule.

Faced with these threats, the party has pursued three essential goals: to preserve its monopoly on political power, to restore China to its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia, and to demonstrate the superiority of its socialist system by transforming the country into a truly global player whose wealth, power, and influence will eventually exceed those of the United States. Although these goals have not changed over time, Beijing’s confidence in its ability to achieve them has. After a period of relative quiescence, the regime now feels strong enough to push back, not only against the material strength and physical presence of the United States and its democratic allies but also against the insidious threat of their liberal democratic ideals.

A turning point in this process came shortly after the 2008 financial crisis. The near collapse of the global economy aroused a mix of anxiety and optimism among the CCP elite, deepening fears about their own ability to sustain growth and stay in power, while persuading them that the United States and other liberal democracies had entered a period of decline. Beijing responded with repression and nationalism at home, mercantilism and assertiveness abroad. These tendencies became much more pronounced after Xi came to power in 2012. Under Xi, the CCP has finally abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide its capabilities and bide its time.”

Despite his swagger, Xi is driven by a sense of urgency. He is keenly aware of his country’s many problems. CCP strategists have also anticipated for some time that China’s growing power would eventually provoke counterbalancing from others. If such a response comes too soon, they recognize, it could choke off China’s access to Western markets and technology, halting its rise before it can achieve a sufficient degree of self-reliance.

Unlike other, earlier rising powers, such as the United States, which established regional dominance before pursuing their global ambitions, China is trying to do both at once. The mix of instruments used varies with distance. Close to home, Beijing is expanding its conventional anti-access/area-denial capabilities and modernizing its nuclear arsenal in an effort to weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and undermine the network of democratic alliances that rests on them. But because China’s capacity to project military power over long distances is limited, the further from its own borders China goes, the more it must rely on other tools—namely, economic statecraft and political influence operations.

With the advanced industrial democracies, Beijing wants to preserve the status quo, which it considers favorable, for as long as possible. The regime seeks to discourage these countries from implementing tougher policies by highlighting the benefits of continued cooperation and the costs of potential conflict. It wants them to believe that they face a choice between, on the one hand, continued profits and collaboration on issues such as climate change and communicable diseases and, on the other, the terrifying specter of protectionism, deglobalization, and a new Cold War. The regime hopes that the democracies will choose the promise of cooperation, thus safeguarding Chinese access to Western markets and technology, which are still essential to the country’s quest to become a high-tech superpower.

With its massive Belt and Road Initiative, a network of infrastructure projects that stretches across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, China seeks to secure resources, tap new markets, and expand its military reach. But Beijing also aims to cement its self-proclaimed position as leader of the global South. Abandoning its past reluctance to be seen as posing an ideological challenge to the West, it now openly offers its mix of authoritarian politics and quasi-market economics as a model for nations that want to, in Xi’s words, “speed up their development while preserving their independence.”

The CCP is also leveraging its relationships with elites in the developing world to gain influence in international institutions (such as the World Health Organization) and encouraging developing countries to enter new groupings that it can more easily dominate. Rejecting what he calls the “so-called universal values” of liberal democracy and human rights, Xi has declared his desire to build a nonjudgmental “community of common destiny” in which China would naturally take the lead.

To an underappreciated degree, the global South appears to be central to the CCP’s strategy. China’s rulers may not want to rule the world, but as the analyst Nadège Rolland has argued, they do aspire to a “partial, loose, and malleable hegemony” over much of it. Taking a page from Mao Zedong’s peasant-centric playbook, today’s leaders may also believe that they can “encircle the cities from the countryside,” rallying poorer nations to roll back the influence of a divided, demoralized, and declining West.

THE COOPERATION TRAP

A more competitive stance toward China does not preclude working with it when interests converge. But Washington shouldn’t get its hopes up. Seemingly sensible proposals that the United States engage in “responsible competition” or “cooperate while competing” overlook the zero-sum mentality of China’s current rulers and understate their ambitions. As the CCP’s mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak made plain, just because transnational policy coordination is desirable does not mean it will be forthcoming. Democratic governments must avoid the familiar trap of allowing the alluring prospect of cooperation to take precedence over the urgent necessity of competition.

Nor should the democracies worry that tougher policies will empower hawks in the CCP. At this point, there is no evidence that doves are nesting quietly in its upper ranks. Persistent opposition to Xi’s current course is more likely to force change than further attempts at accommodation. The dominant hawks must be discredited before any doves can be expected to emerge.

Faced with greater resistance to its actions, Beijing will inevitably blame “hostile foreign forces” and amp up its patriotic rhetoric. But these are well-worn tactics that have been deployed even when the United States was bending over backward to get along. Beijing will beat the nationalist drum no matter how Washington and its allies behave. All that the democracies can do is convey as clearly as possible that their stiffer stance comes in response to the CCP leadership’s misguided policies.

Beyond heightening its rhetoric, the regime may manufacture crises, both to play to a domestic audience and to discourage foreign powers from challenging it. This is a real danger, as the June skirmish on the Chinese-Indian border suggested, but it should not be exaggerated. Despite being strategically forward-leaning, the CCP has generally been cautious in its tactics. It has shown no inclination to lash out blindly or enter into confrontations that it has reason to fear it may lose or that could spin out of control. Nevertheless, a strategy that applies greater pressure to Beijing must be accompanied by enhanced defenses and a stronger deterrent.

BATTLEGROUND ASIA

The starting point for a successful U.S. strategy lies in preserving a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific. If China can control the waters off its coasts and sow enough doubt about U.S. security guarantees, it will be able to reshape relations with its maritime neighbors in ways that enhance its power while freeing up resources to pursue aims in other regions. Absorbing Taiwan, for example, could give China control of some of the high-tech manufacturing capabilities that it needs to strengthen its military and economy.

#### Prefer our analytic- it’s based in actual CCP ideology NOT motivated reasoning

O’Brien, 20 -- United States National Security Adviser

[Robert C., "How China Threatens American Democracy," Foreign Affairs, 10-21-20, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-10-21/how-china-threatens-american-democracy, accessed 10-26-20]

For decades, conventional wisdom in the United States held that it was only a matter of time before China would become more liberal, first economically and then politically. We could not have been more wrong—a miscalculation that stands as the greatest failure of U.S. foreign policy since the 1930s. How did we make such a mistake? Primarily by ignoring the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. Instead of listening to the CCP’s leaders and reading its key documents, we believed what we wanted to believe: that the Chinese ruling party is communist in name only.

Today, it would be a similarly grave mistake to assume that this ideology matters only within China. In fact, the CCP’s ideological agenda extends far beyond the country’s borders and represents a threat to the idea of democracy itself, including in the United States. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitions for control are not limited to the people of China. Across the globe, the CCP aims to spread propaganda, restrict speech, and exploit personal data to malign ends. The United States, accordingly, cannot simply ignore the CCP’s ideological objectives. Washington must understand that the fight against Chinese aggression first requires recognizing it and defending ourselves against it here at home, before it is too late.

WORDS ARE BULLETS

The CCP is a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist organization, and Xi, as the party’s top general, sees himself as Stalin’s successor. Marxism-Leninism is a totalitarian worldview that maintains that all important aspects of life should be controlled by the state, and the CCP’s intent to dominate political thought is stated openly and pursued aggressively. For many years, the CCP’s leaders have emphasized the importance of “ideological security.” A 2013 Chinese policy on the “current state of ideology” held that there should be “absolutely no opportunity or outlets for incorrect thinking or viewpoints to spread.”

#### Quad solves Chinese revisions in Asia, sustainable Japanese growth, diverse security interoperability, and multilateralism

\*\*same as bottom of defense contracts link\*\*

Panda 7/17/20 [Jagannath Panda is a research fellow and center coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. He is the series editor for “Routledge Studies on Think Asia.” "The Abe doctrine on 'Quad plus'." https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/07/17/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-doctrine-quad-plus/#.XyBWv55KiPp]

Importantly, the Quad plus framework could be advantageous for Japan on several fronts. First, it provides an opportunity for Japan to execute a long-term economic recovery plan and the creation of a sustainable economic post-COVID-19 structure in Asia. The International Monetary Fund has predicted that Japan’s economy will see a 5.2 percent contraction in 2020, which will be followed by a 3 percent recovery rate in 2021. An economic alliance framework led by the Quad nations and supported by the Quad Plus countries (New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam in particular) can go a long way in helping Abe strategize his economic recovery plans.

For instance, Japan is New Zealand’s fourth-largest trading partner: Two-way trade totaled $8.8 billion in 2019. Via a Quad plus synergy, Japan could refocus on efforts that were initiated in 1974, such as the establishment of the Japan-New Zealand Business Council, which contributed to boosting private sector growth. Further, utilizing the young and labor-intensive demographics of countries like Vietnam could help in moving production out of China.

While South Korea may require a more diplomatic touch, Vietnam can prove to be a major partner in Abe’s manufacturing departure from China. Ties have grown through the Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement over the years while a survey by Japanese consultancy NNA Japan Co. revealed that Vietnam has emerged as a preferred foreign direct investment destination for Japanese investors with India coming a close second.

Second, under the Quad plus framework, Tokyo could strengthen its strategic synergy in the maritime and defense domain, outside its relationship with the U.S., India and Australia, with the new set of countries such as Vietnam and New Zealand. Most of the Quad plus nations are vulnerable to Chinese aggressiveness; even amid the disruptions resulting from the global pandemic, China has continued its aggressive posturing in the Indo-Pacific.

By gradually but surely adopting the Indo-Pacific construct, New Zealand’s pull away from China is noticeable. Abe and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s summit meeting in 2019 resulted in a joint statement titled “Taking the Japan-New Zealand Strategic Cooperative Partnership to the next level,” which aimed to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific” while expressing concern over the tense situation in the South China Sea.

Concurrently, as part of an intensified ASEAN engagement, Vietnam has begun to figure prominently in Japan’s “Free and Open Indo Pacific” vision. Even South Korea, with the decision to continue with the GSOMIA defense intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, highlighted a common threat perception both nations share vis-a-vis China and how that extends beyond their strained ties. A Quad plus proposition allows Tokyo to maneuver its foreign policy within these growing strategic gambits.

Third, while Abe’s long-cherished dream to revise Japan’s pacifist Constitution may remain unfulfilled, his attempt to revitalize the nation’s defense and security structure, including boosting defense exports and building technology, is crucial to Japan’s future. A focus on defense-sector growth and exports is vital toward fulfilling this aim. In this context, traditional Quad partners like India and Australia along with prospective “plus” countries such as Vietnam and New Zealand take on added importance.

Over the past few years, Vietnam has emerged as a major defense market, with a rising defense budget and a wish to reduce dependence on Russia. New Zealand in 2016 also announced plans to maintain annual increases to its military budget that will manage defense spending at an average of 1 percent of its GDP until 2030. The possibilities of Japan building its defense sector as a result of a Quad plus connection with these countries are hence significant.

Fourth, a Quad plus framework allows Japan to build a global consensus that defends a rules-based order by trying to change the character of existing multilateral institutions that are being challenged by China’s increasing authoritarian or revisionist policies. In a post-COVID-19 narrative, the Quad plus process accelerates a context for Japan’s cherished dream of supporting new multilateral frameworks or connotations that exclude China.

The D-10 (democratic 10) alliance is one such medium that Japan would like to view in strategic consonance with the Quad plus as it supports an anti-China narrative globally. An expanded Group of Seven framework is another forum that Japan would like to support. Likewise, Quad plus could gradually reinvigorate the debate pertaining to a reformed U.N. Security Council permanent membership that Japan aspires for.

## Advantage 2

#### No Indo-Pak war – history proves de-escalation

* History proves:
* Kargil war ended without escalation
* Terror attacks in ’01 and ’02 didn’t cause war
* Pakistan military doesn’t want war, neither does Modi
* Both leaders understand MAD – speeches prove
* Current moves are theatrics and unlikely to escalate

Ganguly 3/5/19 [Sumit Ganguly is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. Why the India-Pakistan Crisis Isn’t Likely to Turn Nuclear. March 5, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear]

Worried analysts now fear that, since India and Pakistan have breached the informal norm against using air power across the border, they will be unable to prevent further escalation. Hawkish publics in both countries are calling for retaliation. Can the politicians exercise restraint?

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan’s original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation.

Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military’s men and materiel. The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations.

Other nuclear states have also clashed without resorting to nuclear weapons. In 1969, China, then an incipient nuclear weapons state, and the Soviet Union, a full-fledged nuclear power, came to blows over islands in the Ussuri River, which runs along the border between the two countries. Several hundred Chinese and Soviet soldiers died in the confrontation. Making matters worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong had a tendency to run risks and dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons, reportedly telling Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that even if half of mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would survive and imperialism would have been razed to the ground. Yet despite Mao’s views, the crisis ended without going nuclear, thanks in part to the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who took the first step by travelling to Beijing for talks.

There’s reason to believe that the current situation is similar. Pakistan’s overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan’s policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military.

Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the “nuclear revolution,” the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India’s nuclear capabilities.

The decision by India and Pakistan to allow their jets to cross the border represents a major break with the past. Yet so far both countries have taken only limited action. Their principal aim, it appears, is what the political scientist Murray Edelman once referred to as “dramaturgy”—theatrical gestures designed to please domestic audiences. Now that both sides have gone through the motions, neither is likely to escalate any further. Peering into the nuclear abyss concentrates the mind remarkably.

#### Current tensions are routine and de-escalating- newest ev

Roblin, 20 -- university instructor for the Peace Corps in China

[Sébastien, "It's Only A Matter Of Time Before The Next India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis," National Interest, 4-16-20, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/its-only-matter-time-next-india-pakistan-nuclear-crisis-144697, accessed 4-18-20]

Indian and Pakistani ground forces are also exchanging tank and artillery fire across the LOC, injuring and killing civilians and soldiers on both sides. Sadly, such artillery duels have been routine for decades.

Aerial skirmishes might easily have continued. Instead, on February 28 Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced he would release Wing Commander Vathraman as a gesture of goodwill. This conciliatory move was carried out the following day, and will hopefully bring an end to the current cycle of escalation.

#### No Indo-Pak War

* Leaders know risks and deescalate
* US, Soviet Union, China, Britain, France are historical examples of deescalating dyads
* South Asia doesn’t fight large scale wars anymore
* Impact is too large so neither side even considers starting war

Shellenberger 2/21/19 [Michael Shellenberger, Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment,” Green Book Award Winner, and President of Environmental Progress, a research and policy organization. His writings have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, Scientific American, Nature Energy, and PLOS Biology. His TED talks have been viewed over 1.5 million times. Stop Letting Your Cartoon Fears Of Nuclear Bombs Kill The Planet. Februrary 21, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/gradsoflife/2019/03/04/to-end-the-ever-growing-skills-gap-employers-must-change-their-outdated-hiring-practices/#7fa29a8f2d16]

But then political leaders in India and Pakistan considered the likely impacts of nuclear war and frightened each other into peace, just as the US, Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France had done before them.

Vox’s Dylan Matthews asked India-Pakistan expert, Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at University of Indiana, what the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the region was.

“In South Asia,” Ganguly said, “it has, for all practical purposes, done away with the prospect of full scale war. It's just not going to happen. The risks are so great as a consequence of the nuclearization of the subcontinent that neither side can seriously contemplate starting a war.”

#### hotspots won’t escalate

DW 19 [Deutsche Welle is Germany’s international broadcaster. Nuclear fears abound after India-Pakistan military escalation. February 27, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/nuclear-fears-abound-after-india-pakistan-military-escalation/a-47712975]

But Talat Masood, a former Pakistani army general and defense analyst, told DW that he does not think the latest Kashmir conflict could escalate into a nuclear conflict. "Yes, there are fears because the tension is rising and no talks are being held. Pakistan has offered talks but India will not hold such talks because of the [upcoming] elections there," Masood said.

"Everyone expects that the situation will de-escalate and they could be right. But in contrast to the Kargil episode of 1999, when two Indian aircraft were shot down after they crossed on to the Pakistani side, this time the United States will be absent as mediator," Pervez Hoodbhoy, an Islamabad-based nuclear physicist, told DW. "In the absence of international mediation, the crisis could grow steadily," he added.

"For now, Pakistani rhetoric lacks the shrillness of that in India, where Modi's re-election as prime minister may depend on his being seen as tough on Pakistan," Hoodbhoy said. "In contrast Pakistan's official military spokesman has spoken in relatively measured terms and ruled out use of nuclear weapons," he noted. "Still, one cannot predict what might change this. Pursuing all initiatives for peace is clearly urgent."

#### Zero risk of India-Pakistan conflict---deterrence checks escalation

S. Paul **Kapur &** Sumit **Ganguly 16**, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi AND Professor of Political Science at University of Indiana-Bloomington, “India, Pakistan and the Unlikely Dream of a Nuclear-Free South Asia,” Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives, edited by Nik Hynek & Michal Smetana, pp. 273-274, Google Books

This minimalist approach is changing, however. Today, India is increasing all aspects of its nuclear weapons capability. For example, India is expanding fissile material production: India and Pakistan are the only countries in the world that are currently believed to be doing so (Crail 2011). India probably possesses enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce 100—130 nuclear warheads. It is increasing its production capacity with projects such as an unsafeguarded fast breeder reactor under construction near Kalpakkam (Kristensen and Norris 2012). The Indians are also improving their weapons-delivery capabilities. For example, the Agni V intermediate range ballistic missile, which the Indians recently tested, will have a range of approximately 5000 km, enabling it to reach targets anywhere in China. The BRAHMOS cruise missile, jointly developed with Russia, will be able to strike targets at ranges of 300—500km with conventional or nuclear warheads at supersonic speeds (Rahyuhin 2012). The Indians are also working to acquire sea-based launch capabilities, in addilion to land- and air-based platforms, to ensure that they are able to field a full nuclear triad (Davenport 2012; Kristensen and Norris 2012: 96).

**India is doing this** mainly **for security-related** **reasons** — reasons largely **unconnected with** its oft-cited nemesis, **Pakistan**. Although analysts tend to focus their attention on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the **Pakistanis do not pose a serious**, long-term **strategic** **threat** **to India**. The rivalry between the two countries is, of course, real. They have fought four wars against each other and they continue to battle one another over the territory of Kashmir, where Pakistan supports an anti-Indian insurgency; they have also trained sizable nuclear arsenals on one another.10 Nonetheless, Pakistan suffers from **too many handicaps** to pose a significant strategic threat. These include economic stagnation, sectarian and ethnic violence, a relatively small territorial and population base, and a dysfunctional government that is increasingly unable to provide its people with basic public goods (Lieven 201 1: 3—40; Bajoria 2009).

In the military realm, Pakistan possesses highly capable conventional and nuclear forces. **These forces**, however, **are** mainly **defensive** **and seek to prevent India from leveraging** its superior **conventional military capabilities** to attack Pakistan." In addition to its strategic nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is developing a battlefield nuclear capacity consisting of small, short-range weapons stationed close to the Indo-Pakistani border. This will increase the likelihood of nuclear escalation in the event of any Indo- Pakistani conventional confrontation and may discourage India from undertaking aggressive military action against Pakistan (Khan 2011: 279; Basrur 2011). **There is little likelihood**, however, even with the addition of a battlefield capability, **that** **Pakistan will** be able to **use** its **nuclear** **weapons to** capture significant portions of Indian territory, to **erode India's nuclear second-strike capability, or** otherwise to **achieve** coercive **leverage over India**.

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

#### Space wars don’t cause escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No space war miscalc

Bragg et al, July 2018 - \*Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI’s Chief Analytics Officer (CAO) and Executive Vice President, PhD in IR @ NYU \*\*Dr. Robert Elder, PhD @ Emory, BA @ Clemson, Assistant prof of History @ Baylor \*\*\*Dr. Belinda Bragg, principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in polisci @ Texas A&M.;“Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf

Everyone needs space

While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

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