### 1NC

#### Interpretation: “Private entities” is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a subset of nations ban the appropriation of outer space.

Nebel 19. [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions.

Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window.

So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why.

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons.

First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural.

Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals.

Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universitiesz generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “private entities” – 1] upward entailment test – “appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust” doesn’t entail that all entities ought to ban private entities because public entities don’t, 2] adverb test – adding “generally” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a ban is universal.

#### Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### Violation – They specified China

#### Standards:

1] **Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend any combination of private entities in any countries which explodes negative burden and causes random affs every tournament**

#### Drop the debater:– we can’t restart the round from the 1AC and I’m skewed for the rest of the debate.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Cross apply 1AC Patel – it proves that the private sector is seen as key to ccp legitimacy

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots and causes nuclear war

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

### Case – Russia-China Alliance/SATs

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

#### Satellite loss shuts down global fracking

Les Johnson 13, Deputy Manager for NASA's Advanced Concepts Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Co-Investigator for the JAXA T-Rex Space Tether Experiment and PI of NASA's ProSEDS Experiment, Master's Degree in Physics from Vanderbilt University, Popular Science Writer, and NASA Technologist, Frequent Contributor to the Journal of the British Interplanetary Sodety and Member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, National Space Society, the World Future Society, and MENSA, Sky Alert!: When Satellites Fail, p. 99-105

Energy, environment, farming, mining, land use. All of these areas and more are now inextricably linked to satellite data and would be devastated should that flow of data stop.

Environmental Monitoring

Oh how complacent we've become. We take for granted that we will have instant images from space showing a volcanic eruption somewhere in the South Pacific within hours of learning that it happened. When the BP oll spill happened in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, satellite images were used in conjunction with aircraft and ships to monitor the extent and evolving nature of the spill (Figures 10.1 and 10.2).

The data were also used to direct the ships that were attempting to clean up the spill, to warn fishermen of areas in which it would be dangerous to fish, and to generally monitor the extent of the disaster. This is the type of data we get from space in a field known as remote sensing.

Remote sensing is, well, exactly what its name implies. With it, you gather data, or sense, usually in the form of electromagnetic radiation (light), remotely - that is, you are not physically touching what you are looking at. Satellite remote sensing began shortly after we began launching satellites and many industries are now totally dependent upon having the capability.

We use satellites, like the venerable Landsat series, to study the Earth m unprecedented detail. Since 1972, Landsat satellites have taken millions of high resolution images of the Earth's surface, allowing comprehensive studies of how the land has changed due to human intervention (deforestation, agriculture, settlement, etc.) and natural processes (desertification, floods, etc.).

The best way to understand how useful Landsat and similar data can be to governments at all levels is best illustrated by looking at 14then and now" photographs. For example, Africa's Lake Chad has been shrinking for 40 years, as the desert has encroached on this once plentiful inland freshwater lake. Forty years ago, there were about 15,000 square miles of water within the lake. Now, it is less than 500 square miles (Figure 10.3) [1].

And what is the practical side of this particular bit of information?

Governments use this type of satellite imagery to avoid human tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions, depend upon the waters of Lake Chad for agriculture, industry, and personal hygiene. With the lake going dry, how has this impacted on their livelihoods, their families, and their very lives?

The European Space Agency (ESA) is freely providing satellite data to developing countries as they search for new sources of drinking water. For example, ESA assessed data obtained from space over Nigeria to find over 90 new freshwater sources within that country. After ground teams visited the new sites, all were confirmed to contain fresh water. This was no accident. These were satellites with sensors developed for just such purposes in mind [2].

Desertification is but one example of changing climates affecting people's everyday lives. What about more direct observations of our impact on the planet? Figures 10.4 and 10.5 show the scarring of the Earth's surface as a result of surface mining in West Virginia. This is not a polemic against mining; rather, it is an observation that we can use satellite imagery to monitor such mining and be mindful of its impact on the environment.

Other than taking pictures of surface features, like lakes and open pit mines, how are satellites monitoring the Earth's changing climate? In just about every way, by: monitoring global land, sea, and atmospheric temperatures; measuring yearly average rainfall amounts just about everywhere on the globe; measuring glaciation rates; measuring sea surface heights; and more. Remote sensing is more than taking pictures of the Earth in the visible part of the spectrum. We can learn a great deal from looking at part of the spectrum that our eyes cannot see - but our instruments can.

Shown in Figure 10.6 is a composite image of the Earth's surface showing the average land-surface temperature at night. The data came from two NASA satellites, Terra and Aqua, as they orbit the Earth in a polar orbit. (This means that they circle the Earth from top to bottom, passing over both the North and South Poles with each complete orbit.) Terra's orbit is such that it passes from the north to the south across the equator in the morning; Aqua passes south to north over the equator in the afternoon. Taken together, they observe the Earth's surface in its entirety every two days. Data sets such as this exist for just about any day of the year and can show either night-time lows or daytime highs.

By looking in different parts of the spectrum, like the infrared light discussed above, we can make observations as described in Table 10.1.

Pollution Monitoring

As emerging countries industrialize, they also become polluters. Many of these countries are not exactly forthright about releasing air-pollution details to the media, so much of our awareness of the rising pollution there is anecdotal - typically m the form of stories told by people who have visited these countries and seen the extreme pollution at first hand. This, by the way, is not exactly scientific.

Using satellites, and not relying on either the governments in question or second-hand stories, we can accurately assess the pollution levels there and elsewhere. Using satellite images to measure the amount of light absorbed or blocked by fine particulates in the atmosphere, otherwise known as air pollution, you can determine not only what the airborne pollutant might be, but also its size. And, by looking at the overall light blockage, an accurate estimate of the amount of pollution in the air can also be made. Recent studies show that many of these countries are covered in a pollution cloud that countries in the developed world would deem extremely harmful. And how do we know this with scientific certainty? From satellite measurements.

Energy Production

The recent boom in the production of shale oil in the United States and elsewhere is due in large part to the identification and geolocation of promising geologic formations for test drilling and fracking. "Fracking" is a somewhat new term that comes from the phrase "hydraulic fracturing". In fracking, massive amounts of previously unusable reservoirs of oil and natural gas are released for capture, sale, and transport from deposits deep within the Earth - many located at least a mile below the surface. In the United States alone, there may be as much as 750 trillion cubic feet of natural gas within shale deposits releasable by fracking [3]. How do energy companies know where to look for these deposits? In large part, by analyzing satellite imagery.

According to Science Daily (26 February 2009), a new map of the Earth's gravitational field based on satellite measurements makes it much less resource intensive to find new oil deposits. The map will be particularly useful as the ice melts in the oil-rich Arctic regions. The easy-to-find oilfields have already been found. To fuel the growing world economy, those harder-to-find deposits must be located and tapped - which is why satellite imagery is so important. Take away this and other satellite-dependent techniques of oil and gas exploration and the world economy will feel the impact through higher oil and natural gas prices.

#### Fracking makes extinction inevitable---try-or die to shut it off

Rev. Mac Legerton 18, Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Center for Community Action, Member of the Board of Directors of the NC Climate Solutions Coalition, Member of the Board of Directors of the Windcall Institute, “Will The U.S. Blaze A Trail To Mass Extinction?”, APPPL News, 1/15/2018, https://www.apppl.org/news/will-the-u-s-blaze-a-trail-to-mass-extinction/

As an elder, I now realize that there is even a greater threat to humanity and life on Earth than nuclear war—though, unlike a nuclear exchange, this threat is a slow-motion catastrophe. Can you guess what it is? Here’s a clue: it is something with which most people don’t have a personal relationship. Tragically, some persons remain in total denial of its validity, much less its present danger. And that’s the problem – that’s why this threat needs to be more seriously addressed on the local, state, national, and international level.

What is it? It’s the slow-motion but rapidly growing catastrophe of climate change. There’s now good news amidst this seemingly overwhelming challenge. But the answer may surprise you. Today we know what is the #1 preventable cause of climate change. It’s not coal, it’s not nuclear, and it’s not oil and gasoline. It’s actually the use of the very fuel that is touted as being cleaner, greener, and cheaper than all the rest. This fuel is called “Natural Gas”.

Let’s start with its name – “Natural Gas”. What is “natural gas”? There’s actually nothing “natural” about it when it is forcibly extracted from the ground through hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as “fracking”. When something is forcibly ruptured from deep within the earth with the use of toxic chemicals, the last name you would use for it is “natural”.

Fracking disrupts the geologic fault lines causing earthquakes, uses millions of gallons of fresh water that becomes permanently poisoned by unknown, cancer-producing chemicals added to it, creates air pollution during the drilling process, increases the risk of injury and explosions, raises major health risks to both people and place in close proximity to it, and changes the nature of both neighborhoods and landscapes. Fracking also leaves a massive carbon footprint of drilling wells as deep as 8,000 feet and then drilling horizontally over 10,000 feet; On top of all this, it leaks major amounts of gas into the environment.

So, what is this gas? It is 90-95% methane gas which is a hydrocarbon compound made up of one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms (CH4). It releases carbon into the atmosphere and produces carbon dioxide (C02) just like coal does when it is burned. Methane is not its trace element–it is its undisputed compound of this fossil fuel product. If a compound is 90-95% of a product, it makes sense to call it by that name. Doesn’t it? Well, actually not if you want people to believe and think that it is something that it is not. It is un-natural methane gas produced under massive and highly toxic pressure and hazardous conditions.

Now that we know what this gas is, what does it do to the atmosphere and climate that is so dangerous? This hydrocarbon has properties that block the radiation of heat from Earth’s surface 100 times more effectively than CO2 (released from burning coal) during its first 10 years of release and 86 times more effectively in its first 20 years. Because of the climate emergency underway, the first 10 or 20 years matter most.

When utility companies and the larger fossil fuel companies state that they are committed to lowering carbon emissions, this just isn’t true. They are radically escalating the most dangerous and worst of all fossil fuels in relation to its impact on the climate. Now the industry wants to expand production of methane gas all over the world by calling it “the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel”and a “bridge fuel” that we can safely use until we transition to 100% renewable energy sources.

Why would a major business industry want to call its product by another name? Perhaps for the same reason that the tobacco industry did not like the term “coffin nails” or “cancer sticks” for cigarettes. Honestly, there’s a striking similarity between what are called cigarettes and natural gas. When both were produced and named, their harm was not fully known. Once the industries promoting them learned of their significant harm, they did everything they could to hide this knowledge from the public. They even hired scientists to deny their dangers. The tobacco industry was eventually sued, the truth was acknowledged, and billions of dollars were paid out in the tobacco settlement.

This same scenario that occurred with the tobacco industry needs to occur with methane gas and the fossil fuel industry. The major difference in these two scenarios is that that this fossil fuel product doesn’t just threaten the lives of individuals who voluntarily breathe it in – it threatens the lives of not only every human being, but also all life on the planet. The outcome of this scenario needs to be a moratorium and eventual end to all use of methane gas as an energy source. For the sake of all of us, our communities, and world, the sooner the better. This abomination is different. There is no time to waste.

#### No miscalc or escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No space war--- interdependence and deterrence check.

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Everyone needs space

While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

#### No space war and terrestrial conflict turns it

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The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites. If a less satellite-dependent opponent launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, it would have far greater impact on the U.S. than the attacker. However, it’s not as simple as that – for the following reasons:

1. An ASAT attack would likely be part of a larger, terrestrial attack. An attack on space assets would be no different than an attack on territory or other assets on earth. This means that no space war would stay limited to space. An ASAT campaign would be part of a larger conventional military conflict that would play out on earth.

2. Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs satellites. While the United States is the most dependent on military satellites, most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a vested interest in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely hurt them far more than it would hurt the United States.

3. Destruction of satellites could create a damaging chain reaction. Scientists warn that the violent destruction of satellites could result in an effect called an ablation cascade. High-velocity debris from a destroyed satellite could crash into other satellites and create more high-velocity debris. If an ablation cascade were to occur, it could render certain orbital levels completely unusable for centuries.

4. Any country that threatened access to space would threaten the global economy. Even if a full-blown ablation cascade didn’t occur, an ASAT campaign would cause debris, making operating in space more hazardous. The global economy relies on satellites and any disruption of operations would be met with worldwide disapproval and severe economic ramifications.

5. International Prohibits the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly prohibit signatory nations from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain.

While it remains necessary for military planners to create contingency plans for a, space war it is a highly unlikely scenario. All involved parties are incentivized against attacking. However, if a space war did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth. Those concerned about the potential for war in space should be more concerned about the potential for war, period.

#### Sino-Russian relations breakdown is the most likely scenario for nuclear war---last time barely averted nuclear exchange and the next time will be worse

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The Sino-Soviet War The 1969 Sino-Soviet War was caused by broad ideological and political tensions, but clearly demonstrates the limited nature of conflict between two nuclear powers. It depicts the significant risks of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation and the difficulty in controlling a crisis once it begins. Military leaders on both sides encouraged escalation—and horizontal escalation nearly caused the crisis to spiral out of control. International actors and information operations were also critical influences on the conflict and on the eventual negotiated peace. The limited nature of the war, risk and external influences are all visible in the severely constrained military operations and in the strict control exercised by political leadership during the crisis. These constraints and influences significantly impacted the nature of military operations in 1969 and contributed to the complex strategic environment. The evolution of Sino-Soviet relations leading up to 1969 is complex and varied, ranging from deep military and economic cooperation to outright hostility. While the relationship between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong was functional, though sometimes tense, relations declined precipitously under Nikita Khrushchev.32 Under Khrushchev, deep ideological fissures became visible, along with tension over leadership of the communist world.33 By 1956, Khrushchev had said, “Conflict with China is inevitable.”34 Tension continued to grow; by 1959, border tension began to surface.35 Conflict along the border was a physical manifestation of broader political and ideological hostility.36 The specific dispute centered on differing interpretations of the 1860 Treaty of Peking, which identified the Amur and Ussuri rivers as forming the eastern border between China and Russia.37 Disagreements arose because of the perceived inequality of the Treaty of Peking and because of the potential location of the exact border.38 Negotiations over the border dispute began in February 1964, but broke down in July, by which time Mao was convinced that Russia posed a looming threat.39 Relations continued declining throughout 1965. Leonid Brezhnev’s ouster of Nikita Khrushchev on 14 October 1964 initially raised hopes that Sino-Soviet relations would improve, but they did not.40 In 1965, the Soviet Union began a major military buildup in the Far East—a build-up that included nuclear forces.41 China added to the regional instability when Mao initiated the Chinese Cultural Revolution in May 1966.42 But it was three key events in 1968 that really triggered the conflict that would occur in 1969. First, on 5 January 1968, a Sino-Soviet skirmish on Qiliqin Island resulted in four Chinese deaths.43 These were the first battle deaths in a long series of border altercations and skirmishes, all of which would significantly raise tensions.44 Second, on 20 August 1968, Soviet forces invaded Czechoslovakia to quell the Prague Spring.45 The invasion—and the resultant Brezhnev Doctrine, which claimed the Soviet Union’s right to intervene in socialist countries— caused Mao significant concern.46 Third, from 27 December 1968 to 25 February 1969, nine border incidents occurred on and around Zhenbao Island; for the first time, they included the use of weapons to fire warning shots.47 These increasing tensions caused China’s Heilonghiang and Shenyang military regions to recommend escalation in the form of an attack near Zhenbao Island at the end of January 1969.48 In the midst of growing acrimony, nuclear dynamics in the region continued to evolve. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon;49 by 1969, it had a large and diverse nuclear arsenal estimated at over 10,000 warheads.50 China and Russia signed the New Defense Technical Accord on 15 October 1957, committing Moscow to assist Beijing in developing a prototype nuclear bomb.51 However, by 1959, the Soviet Union had reneged on all nuclear assistance, withdrawing all advisors from China in August 1960.52 But, China continued developing its nuclear capabilities, and, in October 1964, conducted its first nuclear test.53 By 1969, China possessed rudimentary nuclear forces, numbering about 50 warheads capable of delivery by bombers and fewer than 10 single-stage, liquid-fueled, DF-2 medium-range ballistic missiles.54 Deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, escalating border violence, the ongoing Soviet military buildup, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine all combined to convince Mao that China must demonstrate strength and resolve against the perceived Soviet threat.55 Although Chinese documentary materials remain scant, the available evidence emphasizes China’s focus on deterrence and suggests that nuclear weapons had little impact on Mao’s initial decision to attack the Soviet Union.56 China essentially viewed its actions as defensive, as part of China’s overall “active defense” or “offensive defense” concepts.57 Interestingly, Mao believed that the Soviet Union would back down, partially because of the perceived Soviet capitulation during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.58 However, as Mao would later find, he wildly miscalculated and misunderstood Soviet capabilities and intentions.59 On 19 February 1969, the Chinese General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved the Zhenbao Island Counter-Interference Struggle Plan.60 China selected Zhenbao Island as the site to attack because it was clearly on the Chinese side of the thalweg, because Zhenbao was going to be allocated to China in the failed 1964 border talks and because the Chinese bank was elevated and only 100 meters from the island—it was 400 meters from the Soviets’ position (see figure 1).61 These strategic and tactical advantages combined to make Zhenbao the ideal site to give the Soviet Union a bloody nose and a sharp lesson. And so, on 2 March 1969, Chinese troops ambushed a group of Soviet border guards on Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River.62 On the night of 1–2 March, a battalion of Chinese troops infiltrated Zhenbao and dug in defensive positions.63 The next morning, approximately 25 Chinese border guards visibly marched across the ice toward Zhenbao.64 When a platoon of Soviet border guards approached to demand that the Chinese leave, the Chinese sprang the battalion ambush.65 After nearly two hours of fighting that would include Soviet reinforcements from another border outpost, the Chinese withdrew from Zhenbao.66 The fight eventually claimed an unknown number of Chinese casualties; 31 Soviets were killed and 14 were wounded.67 Both sides promptly issued statements and blamed the other for the violence, and massive protests broke out in both Moscow and Beijing.68 And then, contrary to Mao’s expectations, the Soviet Union escalated the crisis and counterattacked on 15 March.69 This time, both sides escalated vertically, using more forces and firepower.70 During the nine-hour fight, a Chinese regiment battled a Soviet regiment that was supported by 50 tanks and armored personnel carriers, artillery and air support.71 The Soviets fired approximately 10,000 artillery rounds, flew 36 aircraft sorties, deployed top-secret T-62 tanks and fired new BM-21 mobile rocket launchers on Zhenbao.72 They won decisively; 800 Chinese were killed, compared to only 60 Soviets.73 Immediately following the battle, Moscow alerted the strategic rocket forces in the Far East.74 In response, Mao readied his nuclear forces, saying, “We are now confronted with a formidable enemy. . . . Our nuclear bases should be prepared . . . for the enemy’s air bombardment.”75 However, Mao was also cognizant of his miscalculations, and he attempted to tamp down the crisis somewhat by ordering the People’s Liberation Army to “not fight anymore.”76 The Soviet Union’s response to the Sino-Soviet War emphasized coercive diplomacy that integrated limited force and nuclear threats to bring Beijing to the negotiating table. The Soviet Union wanted to punish China for its aggression, to demonstrate Soviet strength and resolve and to avoid a protracted conflict or major war.77 It executed this strategy by seeking to open negotiations on multiple occasions and in multiple forums and combined these diplomatic offers with increasing nuclear and conventional threats.78 Over time these threats grew more provocative and specific, but they were always followed by denial of the threats and by routinely discrediting Chinese claims of Soviet hysteria and war-mongering.79 Some specific instances that demonstrate increased Soviet threats include a move in June 1969 of bomber units from the west to Mongolia and Siberia, where they conducted practice strikes on mock Chinese nuclear facilities.80 The Soviet Union also promoted Colonel-General Vladimir Tolubko to command the Far Eastern Military District.81 Because Tolubko had been the Deputy Commander of the strategic rocket forces, Beijing could not miss the implication of the threat that his promotion signaled.82 Additionally, several Soviet military leaders, including the Defense Minister, advocated a preventive unrestricted nuclear attack to “once and for all get rid of the Chinese threat.”83 China’s initial responses to Soviet coercive diplomacy were muted; Beijing generally avoided both diplomatic responses and escalation.84 Their muted response could have stemmed from several causes.85 First, Mao may have been focused on domestic issues, especially the Cultural Revolution and Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, scheduled for April 1969.86 Second, tensions with Moscow were potentially useful for domestic political purposes.87 Third, China apparently did not believe a major war was likely because they thought that the Soviet Union was a “paper tiger,” and they felt little urgency to negotiate after the 15 March battle.88 However, in June and July, the border again flared up, and China accused the Soviets of inciting as many as 429 incidents.89 The most significant clash since Zhenbao occurred on 13 August in the Tielieketi area of the Xinjiang region.90 During the battle, Soviet troops using armor, two helicopters and artillery ambushed and killed 38 Chinese soldiers.91 This represented a horizontal escalation away from Zhenbao and moved tension near the Chinese border with Kazakhstan (see figure 2). Horizontal escalation toward Tielieketi was especially concerning to China because it highlighted their vulnerabilities in the west.92 The combination of Colonel-General Tolubko’s promotion, escalating border violence and international nuclear threats caused China to reassess the situation and recognize the nuclear danger of the crisis.93 In August 1969, the Soviets began issuing nuclear threats through third party states. Their previous threats had used official newspapers and radio broadcasts; this new strategy resulted in substantially increasing Soviet credibility and political resolve.94 The international community had already been watching events on the Sino-Soviet border and were concerned about nuclear escalation—this concern was only increased when Soviet leadership approached foreign capitals, inquiring about their potential reactions to a Soviet nuclear attack on China.95 On 18 August, Boris Davydov, the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, directly asked William Stearman, a mid-level U.S. State Department (DoS) official, what the United States would do if the Soviet Union attacked and destroyed China’s nuclear installations.96 This ignited a debate in the Nixon administration about U.S. policy toward this specific Soviet proposal and broader U.S. policy regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute.97 The DoS generally believed that a Soviet attack was unlikely, while Henry Kissinger, DoD and some intelligence agencies thought an attack was more likely.98 The United States eventually chose to remain neutral and balanced between Russia and China.99 However, Richard Helms, the Director of the CIA, did publicly state that the Soviets had probed the idea of attacking China’s nuclear program.100 Immediately following this revelation, China began preparing for major war.101 Beijing began establishing senior working groups, mobilizing the population, dispersing critical industries, digging air-raid shelters, stockpiling supplies and sending troops to the border.102 Their strategy essentially shifted to deterrence, using conventional rather than nuclear forces and threatening a massive protracted “people’s war.”103 Their preparations did cause concern in the Soviet Union; while their nuclear forces were relatively weak, China’s massive conventional army threatened key Soviet strategic interests.104 Threats to Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk and the Trans-Siberian Railroad forced Moscow to reconsider its coercive diplomacy.105 While Moscow’s nuclear threats were probably possible, they were arguably part of its coercive diplomacy strategy; a conventional attack would have been more likely.106 However serious their nuclear intentions may or may not have been, once Beijing received what they considered to be credible nuclear threats, the crisis began to spiral out of control. As escalation began, Moscow returned to diplomatic engagement.107 However, fog, friction, fear and paranoia took hold in Beijing. China would be convinced on three separate occasions that the Soviets were launching an attack. First, on 11 September 1969, after agreeing to a high-level meeting at the Beijing airport, Chinese leaders became certain that the Soviets would use the opportunity to attack with commandos and nuclear bombers.108 Following the meeting, their fear peaked again when they discovered that the Soviet premier had never disavowed a nuclear strike; naturally, Beijing increased war preparation.109 These activities included transferring elite military units from the south to the north, moving air defense forces north, forming new tank divisions and building more air-raid shelters.110 China also conducted its first underground nuclear test on 23 September and tested a thermonuclear device on 29 September.111 Moscow responded by suggesting that formal negotiations begin in October;112 Beijing received this suggestion favorably and negotiations were set to begin on 20 October.113 However, China remained fearful, especially on 1 October, Chinese National Day.114 On that day, their military was placed on “first-degree combat readiness” and they dispersed airplanes, placed obstacles on runways and armed airport workers.115 The eventual third incident resulted from China’s fear that the Soviets were planning a decapitating strike to occur during the 20 October meeting. Moving to counter this defensively, Mao suggested on 14 October that all Central Party, military and civilian leaders leave Beijing.116 They immediately dispersed to other cities or hardened wartime command centers.117 On 18 October, without Mao’s prior approval, China’s Defense Ministry issued “Number 1 Order,” directing regional commands (specifically the three northern commands) to disperse and prepare for war.118 This order also instructed China’s strategic forces, the Second Artillery, to execute “launching preparations.”119 This was the first and only time that China’s nuclear weapons were placed on combat alert.120 Luckily, either Moscow did not see the preparations, or else chose to ignore them and continued to deescalate the crisis. On 20 October, the Soviet Union and China finally began negotiating. Negotiations were protracted and complex, but they did resolve the crisis, i.e., the first direct conflict between nuclear powers.

### Case – Heg

#### Unipolarity wil inevitably fall

Mearsheimer 19 [John J. Professor of IR @ Uchicago, “Bound to Fail.” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4]

There is an additional problem linked to hyperglobalization that has little to do with the growing political opposition to the international order in liberal countries, and everything to do with the global balance of power. Until Trump came to power in 2017, Western elites, in keeping with their post–Cold War policy of engaging, not containing, China, were deeply committed to integrating China into the world economy, including all of its key economic institutions. An increasingly prosperous and wealthy China, they assumed, would eventually become a liberal democracy and an upstanding member of the liberal international order. What the architects of that policy did not realize, however, is that by helping accelerate Chinese growth, they were actually helping undermine the liberal order, as China has rapidly grown into an economic powerhouse with significant military capability. In effect, they have helped China become a great power, thus undercutting unipolarity, which is essential for maintaining a liberal world order. This problem has been compounded by the resurgence of Russia, which is once again a great power, although clearly a weak one. With the rise of China and Russia’s comeback, the international system has become multipolar, which is a death knell for the liberal international order. To make matters worse, neither China nor Russia has become a liberal democracy. Even if China and Russia had not become great powers and the world remained unipolar, the liberal order would still be falling apart today because of its intrinsic flaws. The election of Donald Trump, who sharply and frequently criticized all the key elements of the post–Cold War order during his presidential campaign, is evidence of how much trouble it was in by 2016. Thus, if the international system had remained unipolar, the liberal world order would have devolved into an agnostic order under President Trump, as realist orders have no place in unipolarity. There is certainly no evidence that he is committed to refashioning the existing liberal order. Indeed, he appears bent on wrecking it. With or without China, the liberal international order was destined to fail, because it was fatally flawed at birth

summary

The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefitted from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, and fueled support for nationalist leaders around the world.

Where Are We Headed?

One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a “liberal-lite” world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build a meaningful liberal global order with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the liberal democracies have no choice but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world?

#### Balancing solves regional stability by expanding alliance networks and stopping favoritism that encourages regional aggression

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As an offshore balancer, the United States would establish normal relations with all countries in the region, instead of having “special relationships" with a few states and profoundly hostile relations with others. No country in the Middle East is so virtuous or vital that it deserves unconditional U.S. support, and no country there is so heinous that it must be treated as a pariah. The United States should act as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the eu do, maintaining normal working relationships with all states in the region -including Iran. Among other things, this policy would encourage rival regional powers to compete for U.S. support, instead of taking it for granted. For the moment, Washington should also make it clear that it will reduce its support for local partners if they repeatedly act in ways that undermine U.S. interests or that run contrary to core U.S. values. Should any state threaten to dominate the region from within or without in the future, the United States would help the rest balance against it, calibrating its level of effort and local presence to the magnitude of the danger.

#### Heg encourages allies to reduce defense spending and encourages risky behavior entanglement – turns Taiwan

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The United States stands at the center of a far flung global alliance system, which commits it to defend the security of countries rich and poor, great and small, liberal and illiberal. The principal U.S. formal alliances are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the Republic of Korea Treaty, and the Australia-New Zealand (ANZUS) treaty. The United States has less formal relationships with Israel and several Arab states, and many others around the world. The foreign-policy establishment insists that all of these alliances are central to our security. The reasons offered since the end of the Cold War to support this judgment are seldom clear, and the costs are always buried, if acknowledged at all. The value of U.S. alliances should be judged on their contribution to U.S. security--the ability to defend the safety, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the United States. The combination of the inherent strengths of the U.S. economy, the nature of modern military technology--both nuclear and conventional, along with the American military's mastery of those technologies--and two vast ocean barriers, make it either unbelievably foolhardy or hugely difficult for others to constitute a major threat to the U.S. homeland. Given the relative ease of ensuring U.S. security without extensive help from others, it is a challenge to show that the security value of these alliances exceeds the costs and risks incurred for them. In no case do current allies directly "defend" the United States, though some do occupy important strategic geography, which contributes to our military power. At best, our allies defend themselves with vast assistance from the United States. What does this assistance cost? Costs The United States bears four principal costs for these alliances: 1) the direct military costs; 2) the costs of wars waged mainly for the purpose of reassuring these allies; 3) the nuclear risks necessary to "extend" nuclear deterrence to these allies and 4) the "moral hazard" consequences of security guarantees, which have the perverse effect of driving down the defense efforts of allies and further driving up U.S. military costs. Supporters of the present alliance system routinely minimize its military costs. The Department of Defense's accounting systems make the calculation of such costs difficult. One cannot find a clear official statement that apportions the DOD budget to Europe, the MIddle East, and Asia. If a lay person attempts such a calculation, they will be brought up short by the defining characteristic of U.S. post-Cold War force structure: the U.S. military is essentially a global strategic reserve that can concentrate in defense of whichever ally is most in need of assistance. Small numbers of U.S. troops live abroad in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and these small numbers make the effort look tiny. We must therefore try to estimate the cost of the U.S. grand strategy that commits the country to defend all these places. I have argued that if the United States were more judicious in its promises abroad, perhaps a fifth of the defense budget could be cut (excluding the costs of actual wars), amounting to roughly one hundred billion dollars per year at current prices. This is a nontrivial sum with major opportunity costs: it could reduce the deficit; repair the country's crumbling infrastructure; retrain American workers to compete more effectively in the global economy, or simply be returned to the taxpayer. Instead it subsidizes the defense of prosperous allies, providing welfare for the rich. The "credibility" wars that the U.S. fights, or threatens are another cost of the alliance system. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s fall into this category. So far, the post-Cold War world has not seen very expensive wars of this kind, but there was nothing about the Balkan wars that threatened the United States. Currently, members of the foreign-policy establishment argue that the United States should be assisting Ukraine in its fight with Russia and subverting the brutal Assad regime, in part to convince others of U.S. credibility. Once committed to defend allies everywhere, a state becomes obsessed with its political and military prestige, and vulnerable to the claim that "small" wars must be fought in the hope of deterring large ones. This is especially true when the actual strategic value of these allies is modest.A third cost of these alliances is the commitment to nuclear war that they embody. We understood this during the Cold War, but no one discusses this anymore. Europe's principal potential challenger is Russia; Japan's is China; South Korea's is North Korea. To defend these regions or countries from their most plausible challengers, and to deter attack, the United States must convince those challengers that it would, if pressed, wage nuclear war on their behalf. (The difficulty of making its nuclear-escalation commitments plausible further tempts America to fight 'small' wars to build credibility.) Are these nuclear commitments strategically necessary? During the Cold War, at the margin, one could make the argument that they were. We did not want to see what the Soviet Union might extract from rich European states or Japan by way of extra resources, if it could cow or conquer them, and convert their economic assets into military power. Today, however, it is hard to argue that any of the challengers that these countries face today are capable of conquering these allies, or coercing them into making great contributions to the challenger's military war chest. The United States assumes nuclear risks in the absence of a clear case for doing so. To offer an extreme example, the Baltic states are members of NATO. The United States is committed to their defense if they are challenged by Russia. These states cannot defend themselves conventionally, and because of the peculiarities of their geography, neither can the United States (This was seldom discussed when these states were brought into NATO in the George W. Bush administration.) I believe that a full fledged Russian challenge over the Baltics is unlikely, but were it to occur the United States could face the alternative of a potentially irreversible military defeat or a dramatic and dangerous nuclear crisis. Finally, these alliance commitments create a special kind of "moral hazard." The extravagant insurance that we offer these countries encourages them to engage in risky behavior. For the Europeans and Japanese, this consists of buying too little military insurance for themselves. Their defense budgets are too small even to sustain their present force structures. U.S. defense secretaries from both parties dutifully chide allies for their shortfalls and then go on to ignore them as we move to provide more security welfare. In NATO, for example, all but four of the allies fail to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, an alliance commitment, while the United States spends 3 percent excluding war costs. (Germany, the fourth-most-productive economy in the world and the NATO ally best placed to assist the Baltic states, spends barely 1.2 percent.) Yet in the face of European concerns about Russian adventurism, the United States has rushed into the breach with five billion dollars of additional spending on European security over the last three fiscal years, which the Pentagon smuggled into the budget for Overseas Contingency Operations, whose purpose is to pay for actual unexpected war costs, and which therefore escapes the scrutiny of normal budget politics.

#### Retrenchment doesn’t cause conflict, lashout, or draw-in

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. **The** central **issue is whether** prompt retrenchment **is** **desirable** or probable. Some **pessimists counsel** that **retrenchment is** a **dangerous** policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, **warns, "A reduction** in defense spending . . . **would unnerve** American **allies and undercut** efforts to gain greater **cooperation**. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert **Kaplan** likewise **argues**, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on **being more of an offshore balancer**. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention **may encourage regional bullies**. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3

Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7

**These arguments have** **grim implications for** contemporary **international politics**. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, **politicians and interests groups in the U**nited **S**tates **will be** unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. **Perceptions of weakness and** declining U.S. credibility **will encourage policymakers to** hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, **despite their high costs** in blood and treasure.9 **Policymakers** in Washington **will** struggle to retire **from profitless military engagements** and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date **there has been** neither a comprehensive study **of great power retrenchment** **nor a study that lays out the case** for retrenchment **as a practical or probable policy**. **This article fills these gaps by** systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, **we challenge the** retrenchment pessimists' **claim that** domestic or international constraints **inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench**. In fact, **when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers**, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, **even over short time spans**. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. **When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies** or adversaries, **draw down** their military **obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations**.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, **great powers retrench for the same reason they expand**: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and **declining great powers face** **powerful incentives to contract their interests in a** **prompt and proportionate manner.** Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that **great powers facing acute decline are** less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. **Faced with diminishing resources**, **great powers** moderate their foreign policy ambitions **and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value**. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions **of critics,** retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. **Great powers** are able to **rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, **retrenchment can be successful**. **States that retrench** often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Heg causes war – best data – the Middle East and hard power investments prove.

Fettweis ‘17 (Christopher J, \*Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26:3, 423-451)//cmr

Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### China rise is peaceful

* China seeks limited predation not outright competition
* Strategy and policy moves show coop over conflict
* Care most about stability
* No evidence they are focused on heg – leaders understand risks of competition

Shifrinson 19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University. Should the United States Fear China’s Rise? Winter 2019. www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf]

In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly addressing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.”51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.”52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [... China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.”53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a still-potent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

#### Framing issue – their authors have been bamboozled by imperialist propaganda.

Fettweis ‘17 (Christopher J, \*Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26:3, 423-451)//cmr

The Political Psychology of Unipolarity Evidence supporting the notion that US power is primarily responsible for the New Peace is slim, but belief in the connection is quite strong, especially in policy circles. The best arena to examine the proposition is therefore not the world of measurable rationality, but rather that of the human mind. Political psychology can shed more light on unipolarity than can any collection of data or evidence. Just because an outcome is primarily psychological does not mean that it is less real; perception quickly becomes reality for both the unipolar state and those in the periphery. If all actors believe that the United States provides security and stability for the system, then behavior can be affected. Beliefs have deep explanatory power in international politics whether they have a firm foundation in empirical reality or not. Like all beliefs, faith in the stability provided by hegemony is rarely subjected to much analysis.79 Although they almost always have some basis in reality, beliefs need not pass rigorous tests to prove that they match it. No amount of evidence has been able to convince some people that vaccines do not cause autism, for example, or that the world is more peaceful than at any time before, or that the climate is changing due to human activity. Ultimately, as Robert Jervis explains, “we often believe as much in the face of evidence as because of it.”80 Facts may change, but beliefs remain the same. When leaders are motivated to act based on unjustified, inaccurate beliefs, folly often follows. The person who decides to take a big risk because of astrological advice in the morning’s horoscope can benefit from baseless superstition if the risk pays off. Probability and luck suggest that successful policy choices can sometimes flow from incorrect beliefs. Far more often, however, poor intellectual foundations lead to suboptimal or even disastrous outcomes. It is worthwhile to analyze the foundations of even our most deeply held beliefs to determine which ones are good candidates to inspire poor policy choices in those who hold them. People are wonderful rationalizers. There is much to be said for being the strongest country in the world; their status provides Americans both security and psychological rewards, as well as strong incentives to construct a rationale for preserving the unipolar moment that goes beyond mere selfishness. Since people enjoy being “number one,” they are susceptible to perceiving reality in ways that brings the data in line with their desires. It is no coincidence that most hegemonic stability theorists are American. 81 Perhaps the satisfaction that comes with being the unipolar power has inspired Americans to misperceive the positive role that their status plays in the world. Three findings from political psychology can shed light on perceptions of hegemonic stability. They are mutually supportive, and, when taken together, suggest that it is likely that US policymakers overestimate the extent to which their actions are responsible for the choices of others. The belief in the major US contribution to world peace is probably unjustified. The Illusion of Control Could 5 percent of the world’s population hope to enforce rules upon the rest? Would even an internationally hegemonic United States be capable of producing the New Peace? Perhaps, but it also may be true that believers in hegemonic stability may be affected by the very common tendency of people to overestimate their ability to control events. A variety of evidence has accumulated over the past forty years to support Ellen J. Langer’s original observations about the “illusion of control” that routinely distorts perception.82 Even in situations where outcomes are clearly generated by pure chance, people tend to believe that they can exert control over events.83 There is little reason to believe that leaders are somehow less susceptible to such illusions than subjects in controlled experiments. The extensive research on the illusion of control has revealed two further findings that suggest US illusions might be even stronger than average. First, misperceptions of control appear to be correlated with power: individuals with higher socioeconomic status, as well as those who are members of dominant groups, are more likely to overestimate their ability to control events.84 Powerful people tend to be far more confident than others, often overly so, and that confidence leads them to inflate their own importance.85 Leaders of superpowers are thus particularly vulnerable to distorted perceptions regarding their ability to affect the course of events. US observers had a greater structural predisposition than others, for example, to believe that they would have been able to control events in the Persian Gulf following an injection of creative instability in 2003. The skepticism of less powerful allies was easily discounted. Second, there is reason to believe that culture matters as well as power. People from societies that value individualism are more likely to harbor illusions of control than those from collectivist societies, where assumptions of group agency are more common. When compared to people from other parts of the world, Westerners tend to view the world as “highly subject to personal control,” in the words of Richard Nisbett.86 North Americans appear particularly vulnerable in this regard.87 Those who come from relatively powerful countries with individualistic societies are therefore at high risk for misperceiving their ability to influence events. For the United States, the illusion of control extends beyond the water’s edge. An oft-discussed public good supposedly conferred by US hegemony is order in those parts of the world uncontrolled by sovereign states, or the “global commons.” 88 One such common area is the sea, where the United States maintains the only true blue-water navy in the world. That the United States has brought this peace to the high seas is a central belief of hegemonic-stability theorists, one rarely examined in any serious way. Indeed the maritime environment has been unusually peaceful for decades; the biggest naval battles since Okinawa took place during the Falklands conflict in 1982, and they were fairly minor.89 If hegemony is the key variable explaining stability at sea, maritime security would have to be far more chaotic without the US Navy. It is equally if not more plausible to suggest, however, that the reason other states are not building blue-water navies is not because the United States dissuades them from doing so but rather because none feels that trade is imperiled.90 In earlier times, and certainly during the age of mercantilism, zero-sum economics inspired efforts to cut off the trade of opponents on occasion, making control the sea extremely important. Today the free flow of goods is vital to all economies, and it would be in the interest of no state to interrupt it.91 Free trade at sea may no longer need protection, in other words, because it essentially has no enemies; the sheriff may be patrolling a crime-free neighborhood. The threat from the few remaining pirates hardly requires a robust naval presence, and is certainly not what hegemonic-stability advocates mean when they compare the role played by the US Navy in 2016 to that of the Royal Navy in 1816. It is at least possible that shared interest in open, free commons keeps the peace at sea rather than the United States. Oceans unpatrolled by the US Navy may be about as stable as they are with the presence of its carriers. The degree to which 273 active-duty ships exert control over vast common parts is not at all clear. People overestimate the degree to which they control events in their lives. Furthermore, if these observations from political psychology are right about the factors that influence the growth of illusions of power, then US leaders and analysts are particularly susceptible to misperception. They may well be overestimating the degree to which the United States can affect the behavior of others. The rest of the world may be able to get along just fine, on land and at sea, without US attempts to control it. Ego-Centric and Self-Serving Biases in Attribution It is natural for people, whether presidents or commoners, to misperceive the role they play in the thinking process of others. Jervis was the first to discuss this phenomenon, now known as the “ego-centric bias,” which has been put to the test many times since he wrote four decades ago. Building on what was known as “attribution theory,” Jervis observed that actors tend to overestimate their importance in the decisions of others. Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be.92 This is not merely ego gratification, though that plays a role; actors are simply more conscious of their own actions than the other factors central to the internal deliberations in other capitals. Because people are more likely to remember their contributions to an outcome, they naturally grant themselves more causal weight.93 Two further aspects of the ego-centric bias make US analysts even more susceptible to its effects. First, the bias is magnified when the behavior of others is desirable. People generally take credit for positive outcomes and deflect responsibility for negative ones. This “self-serving bias” is one of the best-established findings in modern psychology, supported by many hundreds of studies.94 Supporters of Ronald Reagan are happy to give him credit for ending the Cold War, for instance, even though evidence that the United States had much influence on Premier Gorbachev’s decision making is scant at best.95 Today, since few outcomes are more desirable than global stability, it stands to reason that perceptions of the New Peace are prime candidates for distortion by ego-centric, self-serving biases. When war breaks out, it is not the fault of US leaders; when peace comes to a region, Washington is happy to take credit. There was for some time a debate among psychologists over just how universal self-serving biases were, or whether their effects varied across cultures. Extensive research has essentially settled the matter, to the extent that academic questions can ever be settled: a direct relationship appears to exist between cultural individualism and susceptibility to the bias, perhaps because of the value individualistic societies place on self-enhancement (as opposed to self-effacement).96 Actors from more collectivist societies tend to have their egos rewarded in different ways, such as through contributions to the community and connections to others. People from Western countries are far more likely to take credit for positive outcomes than those from Eastern, in other words, and subjects in the United States tower over the rest of the West. US leaders are therefore more culturally predisposed to believe that their actions are responsible for positive outcomes like peace. Second, self-perception is directly related to egocentric attributions. Individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to believe that they are at the center of the decision-making process of others than those who think somewhat more modestly. 97 Leaders of any unipolar state may well be more likely to hold their country in high regard, and therefore are more vulnerable to exaggerated egocentric perceptions, than their contemporaries in smaller states. It might not occur to the lead diplomat of other counties to claim, as did Madeleine Albright, that “if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.”98 It is not unreasonable to suspect that the US security community may be even more vulnerable to this misperception than the average group of people. For example, many in that community believed that the United States played a decisive role in Vladimir Putin’s decisions regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine. President Obama’s various critics argued that perceptions of American weakness inspired or even invited Russian aggression. The refusal to act in Syria in particular emboldened Moscow (despite the fact that in 2008, in the face of ample displays of US action in the Middle East, Moscow had proven sufficiently bold to invade Georgia). Other critics suggested that a variety of provocative US behaviors since the end of the Cold War, especially the expansion of NATO and dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, poisoned US–Russian relations and led to an increase in Kremlin paranoia and eventually to the invasion.99 So, either through provocative weakness or bullying, we were responsible for their actions. Egocentric misperceptions are so ubiquitous and pervasive that they generate something of a law of political psychology: we are probably less influential in others’ decision making than we think we are. This extends to their decisions to resolve contentious issues peacefully. While it may be natural for US policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, it is very likely that Washington exaggerates its importance in the decision making of others, and in the maintenance of international stability. The effect of the ego-centric bias may be especially difficult for the unipolar United States to resist, because other countries do regularly take Washington’s position into account before acting. But US leaders—and the people who analyze them—should keep in mind that they are still probably less important to calculations made in other capitals than they believe. They may well be especially unlikely to recognize the possibility that hegemony is epiphenomenal, that it exists alongside, but does not affect, global stability and the New Peace. Overestimated Benevolence After three years in the White House, Ronald Reagan had learned something surprising: “Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans,” he wrote in his autobiography. He continued: “Perhaps this shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did…I’d always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world…. During my first years in Washington, I think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.”100 Reagan is certainly not alone in believing in the essential benevolent image of his nation. While it is common for actors to attribute negative motivations to the behavior of others, it is exceedingly difficult for them to accept that anyone could interpret their actions in negative ways. Leaders are well aware of their own motives and tend to assume that their peaceful intentions are obvious and transparent. Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules. Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version. Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position. 105 The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent. Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence. Americans are more likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others. The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive. A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.”108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior. To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe.

#### Only restraint solves nuke war BUT the transition would be peaceful and create more resilient global governance, which is goldilocks and balances security with cohesion – that straight turns every answer

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A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony.

Reviving Global Governance

A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.

#### China’s not evil

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China

America’s post-Cold War China threat narrative has evolved significantly into one in which China’s growing capabilities have complemented its ambition to establish itself both as a great power with regional dominance and as a global actor – all in the service of transforming the current world order. As seen in Figure 1, 9 which illustrates the overall percentages of references in terms of source of threat, the China threat has been defined in aggregate by capabilities, either by itself or in combination with another source. Indeed, 44.6% of all references to the China threat defined it exclusively in terms of capabilities – i.e. not combined with any other source. One reason is that nearly 39% of all references were about China’s nuclear weapons or growing conventional assets. However, the aggregate view can be misleading, as seen in Figure 2, which details the data from Figure 1 annually. It shows that there were five distinct periods in which references to intentions spiked: 1996-1998, 2001, 2010, 2012, and 2018–2019.10 These corresponded to points of punctuation in which the

A picture containing timeline

Description automatically generated

threat narrative notably intensified, indicating that Chinese actions helped to significantly drive it.

Fueled by its rapid economic growth, strategic geographic location, and large population, China was recognized early as being well-placed to have a greater impact on the regional and world stages. The primary theme of the initial narrative was about China’s potential power. However, whether it would constitute a threat to U.S. interests and the region was placed primarily on the Chinese government and how it would employ its newfound power – that is, whether it would actively seek to undermine American regional dominance. In 1995, for example, China was noted as the chief exception to the global trend of declining military budgets, but special emphasis was placed on how it “might use its military forces” (S.Hrg.104-15 1995, 33). Specifically, “the rapid growth in China’s material strength has raised the importance of China in the Asian security equation” and the “peace, stability, and economic growth in the AsiaPacific region” was, in large part, dependent upon whether China sought friendly relations with its neighbors (S.Hrg.104-15 1995, 43). At this point, the notion that China could threaten American global position and the world order was not discussed. Instead, the possibility only was that China could use its rising power to challenge the regional order.

A significant intensification of the China threat narrative accompanied the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, in which China conducted a series of missile tests in waters surrounding Taiwan and mobilized its military across the strait. As seen in Figure 3, which illustrates China’s role in triggering regional instability within East-Asia as a percentage of annual references, there was a significant increase in this issue during the 1996 and 1997 hearings. This crisis was generated in response to a visit to the U.S. by Taiwan’s president, which the Chinese government considered an unacceptable symbolic act of American support for the more independence-leaning leader, and in the context of Taiwan’s 1996 election, in which he was standing for reelection. The U.S. eventually responded by sending two carrier battle groups to the area. The consequences of this crisis were still unfolding when the 1996 threat hearing was held, and it was the first time in which China was described as actually “threatening” and “serious questions” were raised “about Beijing’s intentions” and regional goals (S.Hrg.104- 510 1996, 5). Chinese “saber-rattling” was placed in the context of its preparations for “local and limited conflicts,” which ran counter to China’s claims that it sought constructive relations with its neighbors (S.Hrg.104-510 1996, 47). The reasons for its actions were not provided in the testimony nor were its concerns over Taiwan given any legitimacy. This narrative direction continued in 1997, with greater attention paid to China’s potential, and negative, impact in Asia-Pacific should it choose to become “more assertive and aggressive” (S.Hrg.105-201 1997, 16). The implication of this testimony was that the success of America’s policy of engagement with China was ultimately dependent upon Chinese intentions and not American policy.

Given China’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan, it is perhaps not surprising that its great power ambitions and revisionist goals were first introduced in 1996 and became recurring themes in American depictions of China over the next several years. By 2001, Chinese ambitions were described as having “come sharply into focus” and “one of the toughest challenges we face” (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 10). As seen in Figure 3, over 11% of these reports, on average, referenced China’s great power

Chart

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

ambitions in the decade following 1996. Significantly, this impulse stemmed from internal sources: a nationalist impulse to “[redress] what it often proclaims as a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of Western powers” (S.Hrg.106-580 2000, 18);“a centuries-old quest for national wealth and power” (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 28); and, domestic politics amongst Communist Party elites who feel “obliged to avoid any hint of being soft on the United States” (S.Hrg.107-597 2002, 134).11 This desire ultimately manifested itself in China’s goal to establish itself as the dominant power in East Asia (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 28). U.S. officials framed China’s economic growth, military spending, and desire for a sphere of influence as connected to, and in many ways a direct consequence of, its great power ambitions, which largely emerged from internal Chinese dynamics.

This narrative was also connected to one which described China as a revisionist power, with a commitment to a “multipolar world” – a phrase which was first used in regard to China in 2000 (S.Hrg.106-580 2000, 7). This goal rejected the U.S.-led unipolar international system and sought to establish a new geopolitical architecture. This assessment of Chinese goals can, in large part, explain why the China threat narrative again spiked in 2001: China was expected to consistently “attempt to limit or forestall American unilateral or US led actions judged adverse to China’s own interests because they seem to strengthen and perpetuate a unipolar world” (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 28). This new narrative was important because it rearticulated the China threat as directly inimical to America’s global position. While officials recognized that China saw the U.S. as its primary impediment to achieving regional goals, there was no acknowledgment from the U.S. side that its policies were in any way responsible. Furthermore, there was no sense that China had a legitimate concern regarding American unilateralism or its forward military positioning along China’s periphery. Rather, the implication was that Beijing’s perceptions were simply incorrect.

While these themes were repeated during hearings over the first decade of the 2000s, there was a lull in the amount of attention paid to China at this time associated with America’s preoccupation with the Global War on Terrorism. For example, there were only a few score references to China across all reports submitted in 2007, and these were almost entirely focused on recounting China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. But, after China became far more active in the South China Sea around 2008 and as the U.S. moved further away from 9/11, there was a meaningful intensification in the China threat narrative. The Obama administration’s intention to refocus U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific region through the so called “pivot” also played a key role in this narrative shift as a means to justify it (Ambrosio et al. 2018).

Thus, the China threat narrative which developed around this time depicted China as a far more active, confident threat, which was willing to assert its great power ambitions regionally and even extra-regionally – the latter reflected its growing engagement with Africa and Latin America (S.Hrg.110-634 2008, 28). Accordingly, China was characterized as dedicated to “assertive . . . behavior” and becoming “a more imposing and potentially difficult international actor” in the future (S.Hrg.112-159 2011, 16). This wider focus was backed by a military which (a)energetically sought to counter America’s military advantages in the region, to the point that it was beginning to emerge as a peer competitor, at least regionally; (b)adopted “an offensive operational [military] doctrine” and “possible preemptive action;” and, (c)was building the capacity to act extraregionally in support of its broader great power interests, such as establishing naval facilities in the Indian Ocean (S.Hrg.110-634 2008, 43). These actions were portrayed as ultimately connected to overturning America’s global position.

This increased threat narrative was evidenced by the 2010 spike in references to China’s great power ambitions, as seen in Figure 3, where nearly a third of all references to China mentioned these designs. This overall characterization was reinforced by an increased focus on Chinese actions in the South China Sea, with references to intentions reaching a high-point in 2012 (see Figure 2). Furthermore, China was depicted as a multifaceted threat dedicated to expanding its geographic profile, with an increased willingness to undertake cyberspace and foreign intelligence operations against the U.S., and prepared for conflicts in which space/counterspace capabilities would prove crucial. Over the next decade, each of these themes continued, becoming significantly more serious as U.S. perceptions of great power threat became central to the American narrative in the latter half of the 2010

#### No heg impact

* empirics and political psychology prove US posture is unrelated to great power peace
* other factors aren’t accounted for in their analysis

Fettweis 17 [Christopher Fettweis, associate professor of political science at Tulane University. Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace. May 8, 2017. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?needAccess=true]

After three years in the White House, Ronald Reagan had learned something surprising: “Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans,” he wrote in his autobiography. He continued: “Perhaps this shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did … I’d always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world…. During my first years in Washington, I think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.” 100 Reagan is certainly not alone in believing in the essential benevolent image of his nation. While it is common for actors to attribute negative motivations to the behavior of others, it is exceedingly difficult for them to accept that anyone could interpret their actions in negative ways. Leaders are well aware of their own motives and tend to assume that their peaceful intentions are obvious and transparent.

Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules. Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version.

Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position.105 The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent.

Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence. Americans are more likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others.

The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive. A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.” 108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior.

To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe.

In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end.

For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history.

The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it.