### 1NC

#### Interpretation: The aff may not specify unjust types of space appropriation.

#### Violation – They specified large sats in LEO

#### Standards:

1] **Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend any combination of appropriation in any geopolitical context which explodes negative burden and causes random affs every tournament**

#### Drop the debater:– we can’t restart the round from the 1AC and I’m skewed for the rest of the debate.

### NC – OFF

#### LEO is uniquely accessible to African industry due to cheaper launch and production costs – that solves Earth Observation, internet, national security, and spills over to enrich the economy

Samanga 21 Ruvimbo Samanga, Zimbabwean scholar and lawyer working with the Space Law & Policy, holds a BA Law (cum laude), an LLB and an LLM in International Trade and Investment Law from the University of Pretoria. "Why Africa Should Expand its Mega-Satellite Constellation Capacity." Space Legal Issues, 3 May. 2021, www.spacelegalissues.com/why-africa-should-expand-its-mega-satellite-constellation-capacity.

Since 1988, Africa has spent approx. USD$4 billion towards the launch of 41 satellites (excluding the cost of the RASCOM-QAF 1R replacement). 30 of these satellites fall into the Small Satellite market. The majority of satellites owned by African institutions typically involves satellites with less than 600kgs in fueled mass and 24 of these satellites have less than 200kg fueled mass. The reason for the interest in the miniaturized satellites? In a nutshell, they offer cheaper design alternatives, coupled with the ease of mass production. They are also significantly more versatile in certain applications, owing to their reduced size. For example, they are the satellite of choice for low data rate communications, being launched in large multi-coverage constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). It comes as no surprise then that small satellites are growing increasingly popular amongst developing countries, no less within the region, for the accessibility. The growth of the small satellite industry is evident in commercial as well as large programs which exhibit steady growth. In 2019, 5 African countries launched 8 satellites, 6 of which were small satellites. It is expected that by the year 2024, 19 African countries would have launched additional satellites into space. These small, sometimes called nano-satellites, are really driving the African space program, especially in line with the African Union’s (AU) science and technology ambitions which are expected to reap huge benefits for the continent. Most importantly through the AU Science, Technology and Innovation Science Strategy for Africa – 2024 (STISA-2024). Small satellites are categorized as space systems of up to 600 kg (falling into the categories of Minisatellites, Microsatellite, Nanosatellite, Picosatellite, and Femto Satellites). They range across different applications (Satellite Communications, Imaging & Earth Observations, Space Situational Awareness, and Technology Development), and have different end users (Government & Defense, and Civil & Commercial). Of the 8 satellites launched in 2019, 6 were small satellites (3 Nanosatellites, 2 Microsatellites, and 1 Picosatellite). Satellite communications mega-constellations are on the rise, however this growing interest is not without its challenges and uncertainties. The biggest risks in the small sat interest in the coming years are mostly ascribed to investor’s rick assessment & funding availability; Securing customers & Return on Investment (ROI); Stronger regulations; Competition from heavier satellite, and reliability. This is also further compounded by the fact that establishing a satellite service industry which is sustainable requires adequate funding. Skillset deficit is also a prominent challenge. Even though Africa has and will in future have the largest population of young people, the youth are generally not interested in pursuing careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). You can expect more satellites to be launched despite these crises. As regards the African Small Sat market, the growth perspectives seem to point towards predominant university projects which demonstrates a capacity to operate Smallsats, also attesting to the affordability of the systems. This is also a sign of government effort to support the growth of this industry, and the contributions of the youth in satellite development. Indeed the manufacturing ability is extremely important, but also the service capability and development prospects. Despite these positive steps there is still quite a need for funding in this area. Of the overall revenue and results, Earth Observation is the most predominant small sat use, however it is expected in the next few years this may shift to internet broadband, but ultimately, creating value for users and enabling services that drive industry development will be the ultimate determining factor. Internet coverage allows people to create capacity and this might undoubtedly be Africa’s most prolific use of small satellite solutions. CubeSats which are around 50 kg, are the most popular and are only getting bigger because of the interest for carrying larger payloads. But in future it may become less stringent to use the restricted platform, but the threshold is bound to switch to a smaller regular platform. These services are enabled through satellite mega-constellations. Satellite mega-constellations operate in the Lower Earth Orbit which is described as the orbit located no more than 2,000 kilometers from the Earth’s surface. There is room for LEO regarding low-latency connectivity. But this does not mean that the Geostationary Orbit will become redundant, rather, and on the other hand GEO will remain an asset for broadband, because of its efficiency and coverage as well as less-sophisticated ground segments. Nevertheless, the LEO offers the most advantageous orbital resource to come and deserves much policy intervention to regulate, owing to the fact that it is a finite, scare resource. At the end of the day, whether Smallsats are launched in a constellation or as individual space systems, they offer a cost-effective alternative to traditional space objects, and would allow Africa the opportunity to release its potential in various areas of interest including but not limited to communications, global positioning and navigation, and Earth observation. Africa would be enriched by the ability to use this new technology to enable users through diverse services, to protect assets within the value chain, or simply to monitor areas of national security such as the environment and borders. These are all aspects which will have a substantial developmental impact in the African economy, and is well aligned to the African space policy which speaks towards increase of space and satellite capacity in an affordable and beneficial manner.

#### LEO Earth Science Observation Satellites uniquely solve a host of environmental threats – pollution, climate change, biod, defo, soil erosion

Ustin and Middleton 20 Ustin, S.L. [John Muir Institute of the Environment, University of California, Davis] , Middleton, E.M [NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center (Emerita)]. Current and near-term advances in Earth observation for ecological applications. Ecol Process 10, 1 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13717-020-00255-4

There is an unprecedented array of new satellite technologies with capabilities for advancing our understanding of ecological processes and the changing composition of the Earth’s biosphere at scales from local plots to the whole planet. We identified 48 instruments and 13 platforms with multiple instruments that are of broad interest to the environmental sciences that either collected data in the 2000s, were recently launched, or are planned for launch in this decade. We have restricted our review to instruments that primarily observe terrestrial landscapes or coastal margins and are available under free and open data policies. We focused on imagers that passively measure wavelengths in the reflected solar and emitted thermal spectrum. The suite of instruments we describe measure land surface characteristics, including land cover, but provide a more detailed monitoring of ecosystems, plant communities, and even some species then possible from historic sensors. The newer instruments have potential to greatly improve our understanding of ecosystem functional relationships among plant traits like leaf mass area (LMA), total nitrogen content, and leaf area index (LAI). They provide new information on physiological processes related to photosynthesis, transpiration and respiration, and stress detection, including capabilities to measure key plant and soil biophysical properties. These include canopy and soil temperature and emissivity, chlorophyll fluorescence, and biogeochemical contents like photosynthetic pigments (e.g., chlorophylls, carotenoids, and phycobiliproteins from cyanobacteria), water, cellulose, lignin, and nitrogen in foliar proteins. These data will enable us to quantify and characterize various soil properties such as iron content, several types of soil clays, organic matter, and other components. Most of these satellites are in low Earth orbit (LEO), but we include a few in geostationary orbit (GEO) because of their potential to measure plant physiological traits over diurnal periods, improving estimates of water and carbon budgets. We also include a few spaceborne active LiDAR and radar imagers designed for quantifying surface topography, changes in surface structure, and 3-dimensional canopy properties such as height, area, vertical profiles, and gap structure. We provide a description of each instrument and tables to summarize their characteristics. Lastly, we suggest instrument synergies that are likely to yield improved results when data are combined. Background Many environmental scientists have concluded that the Earth is at or near one or more perilous climate tipping points (Krieger et al. 2009; Lenton, 2011, Lenton and Williams 2013; Brook et al. 2013; Hickman et al., 2019). Climate change interacts with and exacerbates many other environmental and societal problems. These include air and water pollution that compound health issues (Harlan and Ruddell 2011; Kan et al. 2012), especially in poor communities (Schlosberg and Colins 2014; Hallegatte and Rozenberg 2017), widespread and/or frequent droughts linked to extensive fires (Amiro et al. 2001; Littell et al. 2016), diminished resources for drinking water and irrigation (Jackson et al. 2001; Oki and Kanae 2006), and large-scale biodiversity losses (Lindenmayer and Likens 2011; Pires et al. 2018) , including species extinctions (Cahill et al. 2013). Related factors include deforestation (Green and Sussman 1990) and soil erosion (Hill et al., 2009, consequences of over-exploitation of resources (Giri et al. 2007) due to massive global conversion of natural resources for human uses (Seto et al. 2002. Documentation of all of these problems and many others are of interest to the broader ecological community at scales from local to global. This can only realistically be accomplished with satellite observations in combination with process and statistical models to reveal patterns and trends that enlighten understanding about how current conditions have developed from past environmental drivers in order to predict future conditions.

#### Warming causes extinction

David **Spratt 19**, Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Ian Dunlop, member of the Club of Rome, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, May 2019, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0\_b2c0c79dc4344b279bcf2365336ff23b.pdf

An existential risk to civilisation is one posing **permanent large negative consequences** to humanity which may never be undone, either **annihilating intelligent life** or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential.

With the commitments by nations to the 2015 **Paris** Agreement, the current path of warming is 3°C or more by 2100. But this figure does not include “long-term” **carbon-cycle feedbacks**, which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the **unprecedented** **rate** at which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the Paris path would lead to around 5°C of warming by 2100.

Scientists warn that warming of 4°C is incompatible with an organised global community, is **devastating** to the **majority of** **ecosystems**, and has a **high probability** of not being stable. The World Bank says it may be “**beyond adaptation**”. But an existential threat may also exist for many peoples and regions at a significantly lower level of warming. In 2017, 3°C of warming was categorised as “catastrophic” with a warning that, on a path of unchecked emissions, low-probability, high-impact warming could be catastrophic by 2050.

The Emeritus Director of the Potsdam Institute, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, warns that “climate change is now reaching the **end-game**, where very soon humanity must choose between **taking** **unprecedented action**, or accepting that it has been left too late and **bear** **the consequences**.” He says that if we continue down the present path “there is a very big risk that we will just **end** **our** **civilisation**. The human species will survive somehow but we will destroy almost everything we have built up over the last two thousand years.”11

Unfortunately, conventional risk and probability analysis becomes useless in these circumstances because it excludes the full implications of outlier events and possibilities lurking at the fringes.12

Prudent risk-management means a tough, objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed, especially at those **“fat-tail” events**, which may have consequences that are damaging beyond quantification, and **threaten** **the** **survival** **of human** **civilisation**.

Global warming projections display a “fat-tailed” distribution with a **greater likelihood** of warming that is well in **excess of** **the** **average amount** **of warming** **predicted by** **climate** **models**, and are of a higher probability than would be expected under typical statistical assumptions. More importantly, the risk lies disproportionately in the “fat-tail” outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1.

#### instability causes global war

**Mead 13** – (Walter Russell, Foreign Affairs Prof @ Bard, “Peace In The Congo? Why The World Should Care”, American Interest; http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/)

The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are **dynamite**, and that the potential for **new conflicts** on the scale of the **horrific** **wars of the 20th century** is very much **with us** **today.** The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that **these wars spread**. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to **spread to places** that we do care **very much about**. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a **very remote place** triggers problems in places that we **care about** very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or trigger wider conflict with India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is **of** **more** **importance** to American security than many people may **understand**. The line between **Africa and the Middle** **East is** a **soft** one. The weak states that straddle the **southern approaches** of the Sahara are **ideal petri dishes** for **A**l **Q**aeda **type groups** to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential **access to funds**, **fighters**, **training** and **weapons** from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to **create the swirling underworld** of **arms trading**, **money transfers**, **illegal commerce** and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us. This is why the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations (representing three very different kinds of American politics) have all been engaged in efforts like the peace keeping effort in the Congo. It is why, despite our budget problems at home and despite our often justifiable impatience with the complexities of dealing with international coalitions and the inadequacies of international institutions, we need to continue the slow and painstaking work that makes agreements like this one possible. The world we live in is an **explosive** one. There are **all kinds of things that can go horribly wrong**, and what happens in one corner of the world doesn’t necessarily stay there. Reducing the danger requires an active, global American foreign policy whether we like it or not. The potential for new communal and religious wars that kill millions of people and endanger American security and world peace is very real. The world seems safer than the world of the 1930s and 1940s in part because the United States and many of our friends and allies are working quietly around the world to contain outbreaks of violence, address the issues that exacerbate hatred and distrust, and in the last analysis are willing to provide the security guarantees and deterrents that prevent mass mayhem.

#### Independent African satellite constellation key to push out foreign, Chinese investment – which kills African democracy

Tuerk 20 Tuerk, Miriam. CEO and cofounder of Clear Blue Technologies Inc."Africa Is The Next Frontier For The Internet." Forbes, 8 June 2020, www.forbes.com/sites/miriamtuerk/2020/06/09/africa-is-the-next-frontier-for-the-internet/?sh=1f5e9eec4900.

Expanding network connectivity across sub-Saharan Africa will open up digital services that many of us now take for granted. Mobile Banking, Whatsapp Chatting and video, e-health, e-education are key services only possible with reliable internet connectivity. For a geographically disparate population, it will mean greater access to essential services, including e-agri services. There are hugely populous cities in sub-Saharan Africa – Lagos in Nigeria is one of the fastest growing cities in the world – but even in the center on Victoria Island, the internet connection can be patchy and face frequent outages. For those populations, access to the internet means being able to save, invest and borrow money, getting an education, having access to basic healthcare, and being able to trade with bigger markets; are all fundamental to socioeconomic advancement. That has been a powerful force fueling economic growth over the past century across Europe, North America and Asia. The Demand Is There There is a lot of pent-up demand for internet services in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, a substantial portion of mobile phones have internet and messaging capabilities. Mobile usage in sub-Saharan is more widespread than electricity – in 2016, The Economist found that while less than half the population has access to electricity, two-fifths own a mobile phone. In a Pew Research survey of six sub-Saharan Africa countries, a median of 41% used the internet occasionally or had access to an internet-capable smartphone – that compares to 89% of Americans. Digital innovations have also taken off quickly in sub-Saharan Africa, partly because the younger demographic is more ready for adoption of new technologies. Compared to aging populations in developed countries, the median age in Africa is 19.2 years old. In a study by Pew Research, it notes that adults younger than 30 in six sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to use the Internet, echoing trends seen elsewhere. We’ve seen this in the quick adoption of digital technologies. Safaricom, Kenya’s largest telecom operator, has seen widespread adoption of its mobile payment app, M-Pesa, since it was launched in 2007. The app now has 24.5 million users, representing over 70% of the mobile money market in Kenya, and can be used to send and receive funds via SMS without having a bank account. The Supply Is Growing, But Still Faces Bottlenecks There are a number of mobile carriers now seeking to expand network coverage in Africa, especially in rural areas. Governments are pushing for these infrastructure roll outs as they recognize that communications and renewable energy are two key tenets of development for their countries. Telecom technology over the past decade has advanced significantly, with specialized product development to address the needs of Rural telecom particularly in terms of the off-grid renewable energy, resilience to extreme temperatures, and software driven base stations meaning that masts can placed almost anywhere. The wider need for infrastructure development in telecom and renewable energy is well recognized. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that the continent of Africa will need investment of at least US$130 billion to $170 billion annually. In recent years, the majority of that capital investment into African infrastructure has come from China – foreign direct investment from China has grown 40% annually over the past decade, and it could be even higher, dwarfing investment from other economic partners, including the U.S. ZAMBIA CHINA A pedestrian runs past a Huawei Technologies Co. mural painted on a wall in Lusaka, Zambia, on ... [+] © 2018 Bloomberg Finance LP Huawei, ZTE and China Telecom CHA 0.0% have all made in-roads into the region. Huawei recently announced that it was launching a 5G transport network with Rain in South Africa, the first network operator in the country to deploy 5G. Huawei’s growth in the region has raised concerns that it could be used for surveillance; The Wall Street Journal reported last year that technicians from the company helped African governments to spy on their political opponents. At the same time, Western companies such as Vanu and Parallel Wireless are developing innovative solutions and products. While growth in technology is overall a good thing for society, it cannot come at the cost of democracy. Western governments need to do more to invest in African telecoms to secure the future of this region and our economic relationships with it.

#### expansion in Africa escalates absent democratic relations

Maru 19 - a scholar of peace and security, law and governance, strategy and management, human rights and migration issues. (Mehari, “A new cold war in Africa” Aljazeera. July 1, 2019. DOA: November 17, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/cold-war-africa-190630102044847.html)//MGalian

Increasing tensions between China and the US will be detrimental to African prosperity and peace. Last week, the 12th US-Africa Business Summit, a high-level event attended by 11 African heads of state and government and some 1,000 business leaders, was held in Maputo, Mozambique. During the three-day event, US officials unveiled a $60bn investment agency which will seek to invest in low and middle-income countries, with a special focus on Africa. The announcement came six months after National Security Advisor John Bolton presented the Trump administration's "New Africa Strategy". According to the document: "Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States." Although both China and Russia are mentioned, over the past few months, the US has demonstrated that it is mainly concerned about the former. In fact, it already appears that Africa is set to become yet another battleground for the escalating trade war between Beijing and Washington. With increasing foreign military presence and growing diplomatic tensions, the continent is already witnessing the first signs of an emerging new cold war. And just like the previous one devastated Africa, fuelling wars and forcing African governments to make economic choices not in their best interests, this one will also be detrimental to African development and peace. Economic war China's approach to Africa has always been trade oriented. The continent became one of the top destinations for Chinese investment after Beijing introduced the so-called "Go Out" policy in 1999 which encouraged private and state-owned business to seek economic opportunities abroad. As a result, Chinese trade with Africa has increased 40-fold over the past two decades; in 2017, it stood at $140bn. Between 2003 and 2017, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have also jumped more close to 60-fold to $4bn a year; FDI stocks stand at $43bn - a significant part of which has gone to infrastructure and energy projects. China has significantly expanded African railways, investing in various projects in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Angola and Nigeria; it is currently building a massive hydropower plant in Angola and have built Africa's longest railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti; it has built the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa and the West African regional bloc ECOWAS in Abuja. By contrast, for a long time the US has viewed Africa as a battlefield where it can confront its enemies, whether the Soviets during the Cold War, terrorists after 9/11 or now the Chinese. Washington has never really made a concerted effort to develop its economic relations with the continent. As a result, trade between the US and Africa has decreased from $120bn in 2012 to just over $50bn today. US FDI flows have also slumped from $9.4bn in 2009 to around $330m in 2017. The new $60bn investment fund announced last week is a welcome initiative from the US but it will not be able to challenge Chinese economic presence on the continent. Just last year Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $60bn too but dedicated it solely to investment in Africa. The US has repeatedly accused China of using "debt to hold states in Africa captive to [its] wishes and demands" and has warned African states to avoid Chinese "debt diplomacy" which is supposedly incompatible with the independence of African nations and civil society and poses "a significant threat to US national security interests". Yet, Africa is only the fourth-biggest recipient of Chinese FDI after Europe (mainly Germany, UK and Netherlands), the Americas (mainly the US and Canada), and Asia. The US has also borrowed heavily from China; currently its debt to its rival stands at $1.12 trillion. By contrast, Africa owes China around $83bn. Africans are fully aware of and concerned about high indebtedness, trade imbalances, the relatively poor quality of Chinese goods and services and Beijing's application of lower standards of labour and environmental practices. But many do not share the American perspective that their economic relationship with China is to their detriment and rather see it as an opportunity that provides much-needed unconditional funding and that takes into account local priorities. As Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh has pointed out, "The reality is that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term partnership." The pressure the US is currently exerting on African countries to move away from partnerships with China could hurt African economies. It could force African countries into making choices that are not in their best economic interests and miss out on important development projects or funding. Meanwhile, the US-China trade war is already affecting the continent. According to the African Development Bank, it could cause as much as a 2.5 percent decrease in GDP for resource-intensive African economies and a 1.9 percent dip for oil-exporting countries. Militarisation The escalating tensions between the US and China could also end up threatening the security of the continent**.** Both countries are militarily involved in Africa. Over the past 15 years, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has been engaged in a number of security missions across the continent, making modest auxiliary troop contributions to peacekeeping operations in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has also contributed millions of dollars of peacekeeping equipment to the African Union Mission in Somalia and provided significant funding to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development for its mediation in South Sudan. In 2017, the first Chinese overseas military base was opened in Djibouti. The facility, which currently hosts some 400 staff and troops, and has the capacity to accommodate 10,000, is officially supposed to provide support for the ongoing anti-piracy operations of the Chinese navy, but it also plays a role in securing maritime routes, part of the Belt and Road Initiative. There has also been speculation that this is the first of a number of planned bases meant to secure Chinese interests in Africa. China's military presence in Africa, however, pales in comparison to that of the US. Over the past few years, US Africa Command has run some 36 different military operations in 13 African countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia. It has more than 7,000 troops deployed on the continent. It has a large base in Djibouti - the biggest and only permanent US military base in Africa - but it also runs at least 34 other military outposts scattered across the west, east and north of the continent where US troops are deployed and military operations (including drone attacks) are launched from. The US also directly supports the armies of Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger and others as well as the G5 Sahel force tasked with counterterrorism. While a direct confrontation between US and Chinese forces in Africa is unlikely, their growing presence is becoming an increasingly destabilising factor. Already Washington's strategy to contain Chinese influence over Africa is playing out at different conflict and social upheaval hotspots across the continent. The fallout of the US-Chinese competition is particularly apparent in the strategic Red Sea region, through which passes one of the most important maritime routes. Countries in the region are not only feeling growing US and Chinese pressure to take one side or the other, but are also increasingly exposed to outside interference by various regional powers. Growing regional tensions Djibouti has recently found itself at the centre of US-Chinese diplomatic confrontation. Being a host to military bases of both superpowers, the small country has had to play a difficult balancing game. In 2018, Djibouti seized control of its Doraleh Container Terminal from the Emirati company DP World, claiming its operation of the facility was threatening its sovereignty. The Djibouti authorities had feared that the UAE's investment in the nearby Port of Berbera in the autonomous Somali region of Somaliland could challenge its position as the main maritime hub for Ethiopia's large economy. Its decision to terminate the contract with DP World, however, triggered a sharp reaction from Washington, a close Emirati ally. The Trump administration fears that Djibouti could hand over control of the terminal to China. Bolton has warned: "Should this occur, the balance of power in the Horn of Africa - astride major arteries of maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia - would shift in favour of China. And, our US military personnel at Camp Lemonnier could face even further challenges in their efforts to protect the American people." Djibouti was forced to declare publicly that it would not allow China to take over the terminal but that has not assuaged US fears. Ever since, the US sought to secure a possible alternative location for its African military base: neighbouring Eritrea. It encouraged regional actors, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pull Eritrea out of its decades-long isolation. In a matter of months, long-time enemies Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded a peace agreement to end their 20-year-old cold conflict, while the UN lifted sanctions on Asmara. As a result, Eritrea could emerge as a strategic rival to Djibouti, offering its coast for foreign military and economic facilities. The UAE, for example, has already set up a military base near the port of Assab. Sudan, to the north, has also been the battleground of the ongoing superpower turf war. China had been a long-term supporter of President Omar al-Bashir. Under his rule, Beijing came to dominate its oil industry, buying some 80 percent of its oil and thus providing Khartoum with much-needed cash to wage war against various rebel groups. It was also one of the few countries, along with Russia, that would break the UN arms embargo and sell weapons to al-Bashir's regime. After South Sudan gained independence in 2011, China continued to be a close partner of the Sudanese regime, remaining its main trading partner. Sudan in fact became the biggest beneficiary of the $60bn Africa investment package China pledged in 2018, having some $10bn in Chinese debt written off. The Chinese government also made a lot of plans to develop facilities in Port Sudan, where it already operates an oil terminal. Qatar and Turkey also signed deals with al-Bashir for various facilities in the port city. When mass protests erupted in December last year, Beijing stood by al-Bashir, who it saw as the main guarantor of stability in the country, which falls on strategic routes, part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, the US had repeatedly demonstrated that it did not want al-Bashir running for another term. His removal was approved in Washington, which has since appeared to back the interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the country. The two Gulf states currently hope to install another strongman sympathetic to their regional politics, who would maintain Sudan's participation in the war in Yemen and curb Turkish and Qatari influence. At this point, it seems China is at risk of being sidelined by the significant sway the UAE and Saudi Arabia have with Sudan's Transitional Military Council (TMC). Apart from Djibouti and Sudan, various other countries in the region have felt the consequences of the US bid to contain China. This political confrontation has also added to the already rising tensions between other players in the region, including Egypt, Gulf countries, Iran and Turkey. The Trump administration has particularly favoured Emirati, Saudi and Egyptian interests which have emboldened these three countries in their efforts to shape regional dynamics to their advantage. Thus, in the long-term, given the pre-existing faultlines and conflicts in the region, the US-China cold war could have a detrimental effect, not only on its economy but also on its security. At this point, to preserve its interests and its peace, Africa has only one option: to reject pressures to swear allegiance to either of the two powers. African countries should uphold their sovereignty in policy and decision-making and pursue the course that is in the best interests of their nations. If the US wants to compete with China on the continent, it should do so in good faith. It can gain a competitive advantage by offering African countries better, more credible and principled alternatives to those put forward by China. But that can only happen if the US develops a strategy that focuses on Africa itself, not on containing and undermining the business of a third party.

#### They get theory but it’s not DTD- 1ar time advantage-, abuse is self-imposed b/c they could always better develop the shell in the 1ar, over-punishment- reading theory cancels out the abuse, and no reason short speech means drop the debater- just get more efficient, short shells already force 2n split; also encourages theory collapses in every debate because of incentive and it becomes the default highest layer

### NC – OFF

#### Counterplan:

#### The appropriation of outer space by Starlink, OneWeb, and Telesat via Large Satellite Constellations in Lower Earth Orbit is unjust.

#### The integration of blockchain security technology by private entities into Large Satellite Constellations in Lower Earth Orbit is just.

#### The use of Antisatellite Weapons by states is unjust .

#### Plank 1 solves almost all of advantage 1 – the cards are overwhelmingly about Starlink

#### Plank 2 solves any residual offense – blockchain makes hacking computationally impossible

Adams ’19 (Dr. Victoria Adams has over 30 years of experience in the technology and consulting industry. She currently leads ConsenSys’s US Public Sector Practice. Prior to joining ConsenSys, she has worked for many of the Big Four consulting firms and has led her own startups. She is deeply involved in fighting the Opioid Epidemic as an activist and in a professional capacity. She has worked with harm reduction groups and spoken extensively on the topic to medical professionals, technologists, and senior policymakers. She has written numerous articles and books on the subject of technology and the public sector. She has a PhD in economics and public policy and a Masters in public administration. Mar 5, 2019 “Why Military Blockchain is Critical in the Age of Cyber Warfare” <https://media.consensys.net/why-military-blockchain-is-critical-in-the-age-of-cyber-warfare-93bea0be7619> | SP)

Blockchain is an incorruptible, decentralized, digital ledger of transactions that can be programmed to record not only exchange of information. Critically, for information to be exchange between any two nodes within in a blockchain system, all nodes (or most nodes, depending on the structure) must agree that the exchange of information is legitimate. They do this through a variety of methods; either acting as a recognized trusted party or my solving complex cryptographic problems. Once the exchange is accepted, that exchange is written into a shared copy of a digital ledger that contacts all records of transactions that is effectively unchangeable.

Thus, a clear, accountable record of all transactions is available to approved parties within the network. Any attempt to hack the ledger or send an illegitimate order would require attacking all nodes simultaneously. The computing power to achieve this level of penetration is currently beyond even state actors. Moreover, smart contracts or decision rules can be encoded into a blockchain that can automate key functions and trigger intelligent subroutines.

#### Plank 3 solves the second advantage – their only internal link is state based ASAT attacks. We stop them!

### Case -- Debris

#### 1] Squo solves debris – private tracking, surveillance, in-orbit servicing and green satellite tech all happening now – includes Starlink

CSTP 20 – OECD Committee, The strategic objectives of the Committee as defined in its Mandate and by the work priorities agreed by Member countries' Ministers responsible for science and technology provide the framework for the Secretariat's proposals for activities to be developed or initiated under the aegis of the Committee itself or its subsidiary bodies (NESTI, TIP, GSF, BNCT and IPSO) [This paper was approved and declassified by written procedure by the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (CSTP) on 11 March 2020 and prepared for publication by the OECD Secretariat, “SPACE SUSTAINABILITYTHE ECONOMICS OF SPACE DEBRIS IN PERSPECTIVE,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, April 2020, No. 87, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/space-sustainability\_a339de43-en]

An emerging “space debris economy”?

* Will we see a more intensive use of cubesats and miniaturised technologies in lower orbits? Cubesats have been the fastest-growing category of launched satellites in the last years and, when launched at lower altitudes, are naturally compliant with debris mitigation guidelines. They are also ever more performant and affordable, and dedicated launch opportunities become more widespread. Furthermore, they increasingly receive preferential treatment in risk-based national legislations (e.g. introduction of sliding scale in the UK Outer Space Act for insurance requirements).
* Space surveillance and tracking capabilities, in both GEO and LEO: New (private) sources of situational awareness data are becoming increasingly important, with data analytics and modelling fuelled by advances in digital technologies. Private sector debris catalogues and tracking capabilities for the geostationary orbit may now be almost as good as government capabilities (IDA, 2016[76]), while solutions for the low-earth orbit are emerging. Start-ups such as LeoLabs provide data and services based on low-cost ground equipment and sophisticated data analysis. The company, which in October 2019 had three radars in the United States and New Zealand, has developed a cloud-based “Space Regulatory and Sustainability Platform” for the New Zealand Space Agency, a first of its kind, destined to track objects launched from New Zealand to ensure compliance with permit conditions (MBIE, 2019[77]). A novel project called TruSat intends to use blockchain technology to crowdsource and validate satellite orbital positions worldwide via open source software (TruSat, 2019[78]). The US Air Force Research Laboratory has signed agreements with several commercial space situational awareness data providers (e.g. Numerica, LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics) to get access to sensor networks and algorithms (Numerica, 2019[79]). The Space Situational Awareness (SSA) open-architecture data-sharing platform under development by the US Department of Commerce, including data from different government agencies, is also expected to spur innovative value-added products and services.
* In-orbit servicing solutions: Several governmental agencies and commercial companies have developed, or are in the process of acquiring, some capabilities for in-orbit servicing (e.g. NASA, DARPA, ESA, JAXA). In-orbit servicing involves a number of complex operations in space: the servicing of space platforms (e.g. satellite, space station) to replenish consumables and degradables (e.g. propellants, batteries, solar array); replacing failed functionality; and/or enhancing the mission through software and hardware upgrades. This is a major challenge as, when on orbit, space platforms can move at speeds of several kilometres a minute. The first commercial in-orbit servicing mission was launched in 2019, by a MEV-1 spacecraft developed by Orbital ATK for an Intelsat geostationary satellite. The main short-term market is seen in the life extension of geostationary satellites, with some 300 potential candidates, at least in theory (Kennedy, 2018[80]). However, the key benefits of in-orbit servicing are expected in the future. Satellite design is currently heavily restricted by extreme launch conditions, but the possibility of servicing could enable a much more flexible and modular satellite design, able to take advantage of the latest advances in materials and electronics, beyond software upgrades (Jaffart, 2018[81]). Market forecasts estimate a USD 3 billion market for in-orbit servicing over the 2017-27 period, mainly driven by life extension services (Northern Sky Research, 2018[82]).
* Active debris removal solutions: Active debris removal is at a less mature technological level, but several firms are preparing demonstration missions (e.g. Astroscale in 2020). Potential candidates for removal include more than 200 critical debris objects (3-9 tonnes); mainly rocket bodies, but also the European Envisat satellite. JAXA, has formally launched a project to remove a large piece of debris by 2025 (a Japanese rocket body) in a public-private partnership (Japanese Delegation to UNCOPUOS, 2019[83]). Both Airbus and Thales Alenia Space are developing in-orbit servicing vehicles with debris removal functions, some of which have been tested on the RemoveDEBRIS mission (Surrey Space Centre, 2019[84]; OECD, 2019[11]).

• “Green” satellite design and technology: The demand for space-environment friendly satellite design is picking up. This includes features to reduce or avoid debris creation (explosion-safe batteries, deorbit technologies) and/or facilitating active removal (e.g. markers or grapple fixtures). One example is OneWeb, which is installing grapple fixtures on their satellites. In Europe, all future Sentinel satellites will be designed for demise. Affordable deorbit technologies are already being tested on orbit. Canada’s three-kilo CanX-7 satellite was launched in 2016 and is currently using its four 1 m2 drag sails to deorbit at a significantly faster rate than it would have without the sails. Amazon’s Kuiper constellation intends to use unpressurised and non-explosive propellant to mitigate accidental explosions, and satellites losing contact with ground control would automatically deactivate themselves, first by self-passivation and orbit-lowering, then depleting all energy reservoirs and switching off charging circuits (FCC, 2019[85]). SpaceX’ Starlink satellites are equipped with automated collision avoidance systems (although it is unclear which role the system played in the near-collision with the ESA Aeolus satellite).

A recent promising initiative is the “Space Sustainability Rating” scheme, originally conceived by teams from the MIT Media Lab, European Space Agency, and World Economic Forum. The initiative intends to be similar to the most widely used green building rating system in the construction industry, called the LEED certification for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design. The objective is to promote mission designs and operational concepts that mitigate debris creation, and create a label that can encourage operators to behave more responsibly.

#### 2] Starlink ACA systems and de-orbiting solves any debris impact – Russian ASAT test proves and also non-uniques their impact

Kan 21 – [Michael, “Starlink Satellite Orbits Changed to Avoid Debris After Russia's Missile Test,” PC Mag, 12/1/2021, https://www.pcmag.com/news/starlink-satellite-orbits-changed-to-avoid-debris-after-russias-missile]

SpaceX has altered the orbits for its Starlink satellites, likely to prevent them from colliding with debris from Russia’s anti-satellite missile test.

On Tuesday, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk mentioned the issue after NASA abruptly delayed a spacewalk on the International Space Station due to the threat of space debris. In his tweet, Musk said: “We had to shift some Starlink satellite orbits to reduce probability of collision. Not great, but not terrible either.”

Musk didn’t explicitly blame the space debris on Russia’s anti-satellite missile test. Nevertheless, the “Not great, but not terrible” quote may be a subtle jab at the Russian government. The same line is used in the HBO series Chernobyl, which dramatizes the 1986 nuclear plant disaster in the Soviet Union. (In the show, a nuclear plant worker utters the line “Not great, but not terrible,” when in reality the conditions at the facility are catastrophic.)

Last month, the US was quick to condemn Russia’s anti-satellite missile test, which involved the Kremlin sending up a missile to destroy one of its own defunct satellites. The ensuing impact caused hundreds of thousands of pieces of debris to spill out into orbit, according to the US.

Because space debris can travel up to 17,500 miles per hour, even a small artifact can cause serious damage if strikes a spacecraft or an astronaut. "Russia's dangerous and irresponsible behavior jeopardizes the long-term sustainability of outer space,” the US State Department said at the time.

However, Russia claims the resulting debris poses no danger to any space activity. The Kremlin also points out other countries have embarked on their own anti-satellite missile tests too.

To avoid space debris, SpaceX has equipped each Starlink satellite with an “autonomous collision avoidance” system. The same satellites will eventually descend and burn up in Earth’s atmosphere within one to five years if the propulsion system on board ever fails.

In his tweet, Musk added that the International Space Station and SpaceX’s own Dragon craft possess “micrometeorite shields,” which can withstand high-velocity impacts. However, spacesuits lack such protection, hence the need for NASA to cancel the spacewalk.

#### 3] Low altitude orbits zeroes risk of collision and doesn’t contribute to overall debris in dense areas – even if satellites fail no impact

Grush 18 – [Loren, “SpaceX wants to fly some internet satellites closer to Earth to cut down on space trash,” 10/9/2018, <https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/9/18016962/spacex-internet-satellites-space-debris-trash-orbit-closer-earth-distance-atmosphere>]

SpaceX is revising its satellite internet initiative, Starlink, and it now hopes to operate some of its spacecraft at a lower altitude than originally planned. In a new filing to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), SpaceX is asking the agency to modify its license so that more than 1,500 Starlink satellites can operate at an altitude 600 kilometers lower than the company originally requested.

SpaceX argues that this change will make the space environment safer, as it will be easier to get rid of these satellites at this new altitude when they run low on fuel or can no longer function properly in orbit. This update could also explain the unexpected behavior of two of SpaceX’s test satellites for Starlink, which have remained in lower orbits than expected.

Back in March, the FCC approved SpaceX’s license for the first phase of its ambitious Starlink initiative — the company’s long-term plan to launch nearly 12,000 satellites into orbit to beam internet coverage down to Earth. Initially, SpaceX asked the FCC for permission to launch 4,425 satellites into orbits ranging between 1,110 to 1,325 kilometers high. But with this new filing, SpaceX is requesting that 1,584 of those satellites, which were supposed to operate at 1,110 kilometers, be allowed to operate at 550 kilometers instead.

SpaceX says moving the satellites to a lower altitude means it can do more with less. Originally, the company said it needed 1,600 satellites to operate at the 1,110-kilometer altitude, but moving them lower means the company can get the same results with 16 fewer spacecraft. And the lower altitude makes it easy to dispose of these satellites once they’re done in space. At this height, particles from Earth’s atmosphere bombard the spacecraft more rapidly, pushing them out of orbit and dragging them down to the planet. And on the way down, they burn up in the atmosphere.

Making sure these spacecraft come out of orbit in a timely manner is crucial because of the vast number of vehicles that SpaceX wants to put into orbit. A constellation the size of Starlink could dramatically increase the number of operational satellites in space, raising the risk of in-space collisions. A recent NASA study argued that 99 percent of these satellites will need to be taken out of orbit, reliably, within five years of launch, or the risk of satellite collisions goes up quite a bit.

De-orbiting a satellite typically entails bringing the vehicle to a low enough altitude with thrusters where Earth’s air particles and gravity drag the probe down so that it burns up. Now, with this new filing, SpaceX won’t have to significantly move 1,584 of its satellites to get rid of them. The atmosphere at 550 kilometers should do the job within a few years. That’s also helpful in case the spacecraft fails in orbit. Satellites that fail in higher altitudes could turn into unoperational space debris that stay in orbit for long periods of time. At lower altitudes, they can still fail, and the atmosphere will still swallow them up in a timely manner.

### Case – Hacking

#### 1] Hacking of SATs by the government nonuniques this advantage

#### a] 1AC Akoto proves – we’ve inserted in blue

Akoto 20 “Hackers could shut down satellites -- or turn them into weapons” February 13, 2020 William Akoto [a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Denver.] <https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2020/02/13/Hackers-could-shut-down-satellites-or-turn-them-into-weapons/4091581597502/> SM

This scenario played out in 1998 when hackers took control of the U.S.-German ROSAT X-Ray satellite. They did it by hacking into computers at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland. The hackers then instructed the satellite to aim its solar panels directly at the sun. This effectively fried its batteries and rendered the satellite useless. The defunct satellite eventually crashed back to Earth in 2011. Hackers could also hold satellites for ransom, as happened in 1999 when hackers took control of the U.K.'s SkyNet satellites.

Over the years, the threat of cyberattacks on satellites has gotten more dire. In 2008, hackers, possibly from China, reportedly took full control of two NASA satellites, one for about two minutes and the other for about nine minutes. In 2018, another group of Chinese state-backed hackers reportedly launched a sophisticated hacking campaign aimed at satellite operators and defense contractors. Iranian hacking groups have also attempted similar attacks.

#### 2] No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### 3] Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

#### 4] States won’t do it and no war

Bragg et al, July 2018 - \*Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI’s Chief Analytics Officer (CAO) and Executive Vice President, PhD in IR @ NYU \*\*Dr. Robert Elder, PhD @ Emory, BA @ Clemson, Assistant prof of History @ Baylor \*\*\*Dr. Belinda Bragg, principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in polisci @ Texas A&M.;“Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf

Everyone needs space

While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

#### 5] No escalation - If we don’t have sufficient data we move the satellite to ‘lost’ category

Hoots ’15 [Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf>; RP]

The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. The dynamic models used for predicting satellite motion are not perfect; factors such as atmospheric density variation caused by unmodeled solar activity can cause the predicted position to gradually stray from the true position. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. This process of using observations to correct and refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is called catalog maintenance, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual intervention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag.

Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, if the satellite cannot be matched to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, the satellite information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days without a match, the satellite is placed on the lost list.

One of the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts potential close approaches three to five days in advance to allow time to plan avoidance maneuvers, if necessary. Unplanned maneuvers may disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like to have high confidence in the collision-risk predictions. The reliability of the predictions depends directly on the accuracy of the orbit calculation, which in turn depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, there are not enough tracking resources in the network to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog. Furthermore, many smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this tracking is infrequent. Most objects in the catalog are considered debris, which can neither maneuver nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some satellite operators depend exclusively on the satellite catalog to know where their satellites are, and users of the satellite orbital data depend on the catalog to know when the satellites will be within view.

This situation creates a challenging problem in balancing Space Surveillance Network resources to support the collision-warning task (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) while also providing highly accurate support to operational satellites (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). The practical solution is to perform collision risk assessment using a large screening radius to ensure no close approaches are missed despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level.

Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when residual fuel in an Ablestar rocket body exploded, creating 296 trackable pieces of debris. Since that time, there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept of the Fengyun-1C satellite, which created more than 3300 trackable fragments. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. Subsequent tracking improves the orbit to the point that the object can be named and numbered and moved into the catalog for automatic maintenance.

#### No miscalc – lack of attribution means no retal

Schwarzer et al ’19 [Daniela, Eva-Marie McCormack, and Torben Schutz; Director, Editor, and Associate Fellow in the Security, Defense, and Armaments Program at the German Council of Foreign Relations; Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, “Technology and Strategy: The Changing Security Environment in Space Demands New Diplomatic and Military Answers,” [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology\_and\_Strategy\_the\_Changing.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf);]

However, even a (misinterpreted) threat to space assets could start a chain reaction and quickly escalate an incident in space to a wider war. Successful deterrence, therefore, requires situational awareness, attribution capabilities and resilient assets. Especially the latter two are notoriously difficult to achieve in space. While it might be easy to attribute a kinetic attack executed with a missile, the same is not true for ASAT attacks by other satellites, and, especially, not for cyberattacks and electronic warfare measures. Without clear attribution, however, it is difficult to deter any adversary, since he could speculate that an attack cannot be traced back to him – making deterrence and retaliation more difficult. Although cross-domain deterrence, i.e. threatening an actor through potential retaliation attacks on or by other-than-space assets, is always possible, it also amplifies the problems involved in traditional deterrence: A response has to be timely and proportionate, and it should not further expand of the conflict.

#### Alt cause – glitches

Schwarzer et al ’19 [Daniela, Eva-Marie McCormack, and Torben Schutz; Director, Editor, and Associate Fellow in the Security, Defense, and Armaments Program at the German Council of Foreign Relations; Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, “Technology and Strategy: The Changing Security Environment in Space Demands New Diplomatic and Military Answers,” [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology\_and\_Strategy\_the\_Changing.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf); RP] \*Parentheses in original text

However, space assets can also decrease crisis stability as they are prone to technical glitches. This was, for instance, obvious during the Cold War, when early-warning satellites misinterpreted light reflected from clouds as missile launches. Such misinterpretations nearly led to nuclear exchanges on multiple occasions.

### Case – SATs

#### 1] No miscalc or escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### 2] This is entirely the public sector and they can’t solve ambiguity by governments – inserted in blue

Bernat 19 “The Inevitability of Militarization of Outer Space” Paweł Bernat [Assistant Professor, Polish Air Force University] Safety & Defense 5(1) (2019) 49–54 <https://philarchive.org/archive/BERTIO-52> SM

Currently, the dominant interpretations of this article argue that the placement of conventional weapons, including systems with nuclear drives, in orbit does not violate the provisions of the Treaty (Bourbonniere & Lee, 2008). The Treaty, according to these elucidations, does not also prohibit nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on trajectory passing through space, as it is the case with the Russian ballistic missile RS-28 Sarmat. However, it prohibits placing and keeping biological, bacteriological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in orbit (Boothby, 2017).

Of course, there are also other interpretations, according to which the Treaty has been infringed more than once. They are based on the quite right belief that in the case of modern weapons, one should talk about systems rather than a single ballistic missile. After all, the satellite navigation system was created as part of a ballistic missile guidance system with thermonuclear warheads (LaGrone, 2014). Therefore, we are dealing here with a very important philosophical and legal question whether the satellite being a part of such a system is a weapon and hence prohibited by the Treaty. This brings us back to the difficulty of clear and sound definition of the term “space weapon” addressed before. Does the fact that a civil communication satellite can be used (and often is) for military purposes make it a part of a weapon system? If so, what would be the consequences, especially if we took into consideration the fact that approximately 95% of satellites could be used that way? These questions, although theoretical in nature, bear significant consequences for the binding power of the Treaty, and therefore the whole outer space legal framework.

So far, however, the Treaty has been fulfilling its task quite well, and its provisions have been relatively seldom broken or violated. On the other hand, we are currently witnessing an undoubted renaissance of the space sector, which also applies to offensive and defensive military technologies and programs. The structure of the sector has changed as well – the twentieth-century traditional bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is long gone. New entities have appeared in the game, both, private companies, such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic and Virgin Orbit, Bigelow Aerospace, Rocket Lab, and national agencies – Indian ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization) or Chinese CNSA (China National Space Administration), which joined the key global actors like American NASA, Russian Roscosmos, European ESA, or Japanese JAXA. The record of orbital launches – 139, was set in 1967 (Kyle, 2019a). It may seem surprising that humanity has not been able to break this record for over 50 years. However, since the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, we have been observing a steady increase in the number of orbital launches (52 in 2005, 70 in 2010, 114 in 2018), and it seems that this record will be broken in 2019 because 173 starts are planned (Kyle, 2019b). The space sector is also growing as a market. It is estimated that it is currently worth about USD 350 billion, and according to various consulting companies, it should reach a value of between USD 1 and 2.7 trillion in 2040 (Foust, 2018).

The change in the sector means that the existing solutions, including the Space Treaty, are losing their significance (e.g., space mining cannot be reconciled with Article II of the Treaty), and the current geopolitical situation seems to exclude new, more adequate agreement that would be adapted to modern technologies. This situation, in turn, translates into more and more bolder violations of the existing laws, e.g., the already mentioned SPACE Act of 2015 or increasingly explicit orbital or suborbital weapons systems, which are clearly not developed “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding” as it is stated in the Art. III of the Outer Space Treaty (UNOSA, 1967), as, e.g., the programs of Prompt Global Strike (CRS, 2019).

3. Outer Space as a Theatre for Potential Conflict

The progressive development of the space sector brings forth, as a natural consequence, the growth of its strategic importance. Every year we launch more and more satellites into the orbit. They are part of communication, navigation, reconnaissance, or security systems, which are used more and more and play an increasingly important role in the economy and security. Among many examples, one may point to the already mentioned Prompt Global Strike guidance system, the European Galileo navigation system, or Starlink - a constellation of satellites, which is expected to provide broadband internet for the entire globe and consist of approximately 42,000 satellites (SpaceX has already obtained a permission to launch 12,000 satellites, and in October 2019 the company asked the International Telecommunication Union to arrange spectrum for 30,000 new ones) (Henry, 2019).

On the other hand, there is a growing threat of the democratization of weapons capable of destroying satellite systems. According to the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community describes the space threat as one of the most significant ones (Coats, 2018, p. 13). ASAT The anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) are currently in possession of four countries – the United States, Russia, China, and, more recently, India. However, it is reported that other nation-states have the potential to develop direct-ascent (DA) ASAT systems on the basis of their ballistic missiles, e.g., Iran and North Korea (Weeden, Samson, 2019, pp. 4.1-2, 5.1-2), and some believe that Israel’s Arrow 3 missile has been developed to gain such a capability (Opall-Rome, 2009). There are many indications that this technology will eventually also be available to traditionally weak actors who will acquire it through purchase or by developing their own systems. As it was already mentioned, the space sector is growing by leaps and bounds. National-states and private entities that did not invest much or at all in the space industry before are now developing launching technologies (e.g., New Zealand, Norway, Poland), what, as a consequence, must lead to the democratization of the technology. What is more, in addition to traditional groundspace or air-space ASAT missiles, new types of that kind of weapon can be developed (potentially it could also become available for traditionally weak actors), such as small kamikaze satellites1 , cyber-hacking involving redirecting the object to a cloud of cosmic debris leading to its destruction or a weapon system that would be capable of “blinding” the satellite or destroy its sensors without physically destroying the object.

Considering the above facts, it should not come as a surprise that in order to ensure the operability of increasingly important, also for national security, satellite systems, there are programs being implemented to create offensive and defensive systems for objects in orbit. And that, in turn, has generated the construction of countermeasures – weapons that would be able to neutralize the new systems – by the potential adversaries. As a consequence, we are witnessing an expansion of the potential conflict arena where outer space becomes a possible theatre for military operations. This process is still in its early stages, but there should be no doubts that it is taking place already. Countries with sufficient technological potential caring for their current and future interests have been developing and will continue working on defensive systems (also aimed at eliminating the threat from traditionally weak actors) and offensive systems (ensuring military superiority and deterrence factor). Space corps are established and developed for exactly these purposes.

There is no indication that this process will stop. On the contrary, it seems that due to the progressive development of space technologies and the privatization of the sector, as well as substantial potential revenues from space mining or the global satellite broadband internet system, it will accelerate. As it was demonstrated in the section dedicated to the legal framework of operating in outer space, the current laws and treaties have lost their significance, and they are not taken into account while planning future operations. The United Nations and its Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) are structurally and legally too weak to inflict punishment or sanction for breaking the rules. One may then risk the claim that further militarization of space is inevitable. It will undoubtedly further affect the validity of the Outer Space Treaty, which, over time, will not be respected at all. That, in turn, will open the door to the development of various kinds of space offensive weapon systems.

4. Militarization of Outer Space Is Imminent

The main argument of the paper provides the information why there will be a progressive increase of weapon systems placed in orbit, and various types of space corps will be further developed by national-states.

As was demonstrated above, we, as humankind, rely more and more on orbital communication, navigation, and security systems. Global and regional navigation satellite systems are continually developed and perfected by a progressive number of entities, mainly national states. Examples of GNSS include Europe’s Galileo, the US’s NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) and China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. There are, however, another two regional systems under development, i.e., Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) and Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). All of those satellites, apart from securing civil safety (e.g., in transportation, logistics, communication), play a crucial role in national security.

Another example is the mentioned already Starlink system that will provide broadband internet for the Northern US and parts of Canada already in 2020, and the plan is to create the global system before 2027 (Mosher, 2019). Again, the system, although designed for civil purposes, will be used by the military – the US Air Force is testing SpaceX’s Starlink technology in military aircraft to deliver high bandwidth into the cockpit of Air Force planes under a program called Global Lightning (Malik, 2019). The facts are straightforward – there are more and more satellite systems that play an essential role in countries’ security and are part of critical infrastructure, so in order to secure their interests and protect that infrastructure, these national states keep developing both defensive and offensive means. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community is very clear in its predictions in this regard:

We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems (Coats, 2018).

However, we must not forget about the democratization of the weapon systems that may pose a serious and real threat to satellite systems. Currently, there are four countries in possession of the ASAT weapons that could destroy a satellite in orbit. However, more and more entities, both national states and private companies have been working on their launch technologies, like New Zeeland, Norway, Poland, just to name a few. Moreover, it should be remembered that not only ASAT missile systems may be used to attack and destroy satellites – one may use small kamikaze satellites to crash into the target, cyber-hacking to direct the object into the cloud of space debris, “blinding” the satellites with ground-based lasers (Mizokami, 2019). These technologies are much more reachable. Therefore, in time, we should expect that traditionally weak actors, like rogue states or terrorist organizations, will gain have access to them (Bernat, Posłuszna, 2018).

#### 3] Sat attacks don’t cause nuke war

Zarybnisky 18 [Eric J. Zarybnisky, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. March 28, 2018. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf>]

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F 8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

#### 4] No miscalc from satellite disruptions or ASAT attacks – empirically denied

**Mazur 12** [Jonathan Mazur, Manager Engineering at Northrop Grumman, writing in Space & Defense, from the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies. Past U.S. Actions: Redlines in Space. Space & Defense, Volume 6, Number 1, Fall 2012. https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Space\_and\_Defense\_6\_1.pdf?ver=2018-09-06-135424-147]

**U.S. Reactions** To **Foreign Disruption** Of U.S. Capabilities

In the 1970s, it was suspected that a U.S. maritime communications satellite was turned off by the Soviets when it was outside of the range of U.S. tracking stations.25 There does **not** appear to be **any** documented **U.S.** **reaction**, and I suspect there was none. In the mid-1990s, satellite hackers in Brazil began hijacking U.S. military communication satellite signals to broadcast their own information, though it took until 2009 for Brazil to crack down on the illegal activity with the support of the DoD.26 In 1998, a U.S.-German satellite known as ROSAT was rendered useless after it turned suddenly toward the sun. NASA investigators later determined the accident was possibly linked to a cyber-intrusion by **Russia**.

The fallout? Though there was an ongoing criminal investigation as of 2008; NASA **security officials** have seemed **determined** to publicly **minimize** the **seriousness of** **the threat**.27 In 2003, a signal originating from Cuba—later determined to be coming from Iranian embassy property— was jamming a U.S. communications satellite that was transmitting Voice of America programming over Iran, which was publicly **referred to** as an **“act of war”** by a U.S. official. 28 Press reporting indicates the U.S. administration was [frozen]“paralyzed” about how to cope with the jamming that continued for at least a month, even after U.S. diplomatic protests to Cuba.29 In 2005, U.S. diplomats protested to the Libyan government after two international satellites were illegally jammed disrupting American diplomatic, military, and FBI communications.30 In 2006, press reporting indicates that China hit a U.S. spy satellite with a ground-based laser. This action was acknowledged by the then director of the NRO, though the DoD remained tight lipped about the incident.31

“We’re at a point where the **tech**nology**’s** out there, and the capability for people to do things to our satellites is there. I’m focused on it **beyond any single event**.” – **A**ir **F**orce Space Command Commander, General Chilton, 2006 32

In 2009, a U.S. commercial Iridium communications satellite—extensively used by the DoD—was accidently **destroyed** by a collision with a dead **Russian satellite**.33 The U.S. company, Iridium, was able to minimize any loss of service by implementing a network solution within a few days.34 As of early 2011, no legal action had been taken by the company either because it is not clear who was at fault or because it might be politically problematic for the United States, which is trying to enter into bi-lateral transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) with Russia regarding space activities.35 Since August of 2010, **No**rth **Ko**rea has been intermittently using **GPS** **jamming** equipment, which reportedly has been interfering with U.S. and **So**uth **Ko**rean military operations and civilian use south of the North Korean border.36 Reportedly, **only** **So**uth **Ko**rea and the **U**nited **N**ations International Telecommunications Union—at the request of South Korea—have issued letters to Pyongyang demanding the cessation of disruptive communications signals in South Korea.37

It appears that the **only time** the **U.S.** military has **responded with force** to a **disruption** in **U.S. space capabilities** was in 2003, a **few days** after the **start of** **the Iraq war**.38 According to U.S. officials, Iraq was using multiple GPS jammers—which supposedly did not affect military GPS functionality. However, the U.S. military bombed the jammers anyway after a diplomatic complaint to Russia.39 The **use** of military **force** against the GPS jamming threat was possibly because the **U**nited **S**tates was **already intervening** **in Iraq**, and the bombing probably **would not have occurred** if the **U**nited **S**tates was **not at war**.

### Case – Ozone

#### Timeframe – ozone depletion is super slow and incoherent there’s no brink argument or falsifiable data that explains the brink, 50 years of launches proves resilience

#### No debris impact – China and Russia ASAT tests outweigh the link, debris cleanup happening now solves any risk

#### Launches inevitable – massive privatization, increasing popularity, other countries thump

Helsinki Times 21 – “Global orbital rocket launches surge by 44% in H1 2021, U.S. leads,” 7/15/2021, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/business/19596-global-orbital-rocket-launches-surge-by-44-in-h1-2021-u-s-leads.html

Space missions are increasingly becoming popular, with companies moving towards enabling private citizens to have a glimpse of the orbit away from the professional astronauts. The interest in space travel is increasing the number of orbital launches.

Data acquired by Finbold indicates that the global number of orbital rockets launched in 2021 H1 surged 43.9% compared to the first half of 2020.

As of 2021, the orbital rocket launches stood at 59, while last year, the figure was at 41.

In 2021, the United States showed dominance, accounting for about 49% of the launches at 29. China recorded 18 launches, followed by Russia at seven. French space company Arianespace accounts for four orbital launches. The numbers are based on RocketLaunch.live data, which tracks orbital rocket launches worldwide.

Space tourism driving increase in orbital launches

The increase in orbital launches during the period highlights the increasing focus to make space travel a routine. The sector has witnessed the entry of private companies working towards making space travel available for private citizens and not just the professional astronauts of space agencies like NASA.

Worth mentioning is that despite 2020 being a challenging year due to the coronavirus pandemic, several space missions were initiated, with some arriving at their destination in 2021.

The increase in orbital launches also correlates with the entry of private companies into the sector that are jostling to make a name for themselves in space. For instance, Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin company is expected to have the inaugural space flight with the founder on board on July 20, 2021.

Notably, Virgin Galactic (SPCE) offered a glimpse of space tourism after the company’s aircraft successfully conducted a space mission with founder Sir Richard Branson on board.

Virgin Galactic may begin flying the first paying passengers next year after two more test flights. However, with tickets running into hundreds of thousands of dollars, the space experience remains viable for financially able individuals. But when the companies begin commercial operations, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic will be direct competitors.

Elsewhere, Elon Musk’s SpaceX is also an active player in the space industry with a reputation for conducting multiple short test flights over the past year. The company’s next step is to reach orbit. Furthermore, competition between private companies is also heating up.

For instance, Arianespace, the world’s first commercial launch company that dominated the market for sending big communications satellites into orbit, is now shifting its focus to smaller satellites. This shift is likely to give companies like SpaceX a run for their money.

#### No ozone impact

**Ridley 14** -- Matthew White Ridley, 5th Viscount Ridley DL FRSL FMedSci, known commonly as Matt Ridley, is a British journalist, businessman and author of popular science books. Since 2013 Ridley has been a Conservative hereditary peer in the House of Lords. “THE OZONE HOLE WAS EXAGGERATED AS A PROBLEM” http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/the-ozone-hole-was-exaggerated-as-a-problem.aspx

Serial hyperbole does the environmental movement no favours My recent [Times column](http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4206440.ece) argued that the alleged healing of the ozone layer is exaggerated, but so was the impact of the ozone hole over Antarctica: The ozone layer is healing. Or so said the news last week. Thanks to a treaty signed in Montreal in 1989 to get rid of refrigerant chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the planet’s stratospheric sunscreen has at last begun thickening again. Planetary disaster has been averted by politics. For reasons I will explain, this news deserves to be taken with a large pinch of salt. You do not have to dig far to find evidence that the ozone hole was never nearly as dangerous as some people said, that it is not necessarily healing yet and that it might not have been caused mainly by CFCs anyway. The timing of the announcement was plainly political: it came on the 25th anniversary of the treaty, and just before a big United Nations climate conference in New York, the aim of which is to push for a climate treaty modelled on the ozone one. Here’s what was actually announced last week, in the words of a Nasa scientist, Paul Newman: “From 2000 to 2013, ozone levels climbed 4 per cent in the key mid-northern latitudes.” That’s a pretty small change and it is in the wrong place. The ozone thinning that worried everybody in the 1980s was over Antarctica. Over northern latitudes, ozone concentration has been falling by about 4 per cent each March before recovering. Over Antarctica, since 1980, the ozone concentration has fallen by [40 or 50 per cent each September](http://bigstory.ap.org/article/scientists-say-ozone-layer-recovering) before the sun rebuilds it. So what’s happening to the Antarctic ozone hole? Thanks to a diligent blogger named Anthony Watts, I came across a press release also from Nasa about nine months ago, which said: “ Two new studies show that signs of recovery are not yet present, and that temperature and winds are still driving any annual changes in ozone hole size.” As recently as 2006, Nasa announced, quoting Paul Newman again, that the Antarctic ozone hole that year was “the largest ever recorded”. The following year a paper in Nature magazine from Markus Rex, a German scientist, presented new evidence that suggested CFCs may be responsible for less than 40 per cent of ozone destruction anyway. Besides, nobody knows for sure how big the ozone hole was each spring before CFCs were invented. All we know is that it varies from year to year. How much damage did the ozone hole ever threaten to do anyway? It is fascinating to go back and read what the usual hyperventilating eco-exaggerators said about ozone thinning in the 1980s. As a result of the extra ultraviolet light coming through the Antarctic ozone hole, southernmost parts of Patagonia and New Zealand see about 12 per cent more UV light than expected. This means that the weak September sunshine, though it feels much the same, has the power to cause sunburn more like that of latitudes a few hundred miles north. Hardly Armageddon. The New York Times reported “an increase in Twilight Zone-type reports of sheep and rabbits with cataracts” in southern Chile. Not to be outdone, Al Gore wrote that “hunters now report finding blind rabbits; fisherman catch blind salmon”. Zoologists briefly blamed the near extinction of many amphibian species on thin ozone. Melanoma in people was also said to be on the rise as a result. This was nonsense. Frogs were dying out because of a fungal disease spread from Africa — nothing to do with ozone. Rabbits and fish blinded by a little extra sunlight proved to be as mythical as unicorns. An eye disease in Chilean sheep was happening outside the ozone-depleted zone and was caused by an infection called pinkeye — nothing to do with UV light. And melanoma incidence in people actually levelled out during the period when the ozone got thinner. Then remember that the ozone hole appears when the sky is dark all day, and over an uninhabited continent. Even if it persists into the Antarctic spring and spills north briefly, the hole allows 50 times less ultraviolet light through than would hit your skin at the equator at sea level (let alone at a high altitude) in the tropics. So it would be bonkers to worry about UV as you sailed round Cape Horn in spring, say, but not when you stopped at the Galapagos: the skin cancer risk is 50 times higher in the latter place. This kind of eco-exaggeration has been going on for 50 years. In the 1960s Rachel Carson said there was an epidemic of childhood cancer caused by DDT; it was not true — DDT had environmental effects but did not cause human cancers. In the 1970s the Sahara desert was said be advancing a mile a year; it was not true — the region south of the Sahara has grown markedly greener and more thickly vegetated in recent decades. In the 1980s acid rain was said to be devastating European forests; not true — any local declines in woodland were caused by pests or local pollution, not by the sulphates and nitrates in rain, which may have contributed to an actual increase in the overall growth rate of European forests during the decade. In the 1990s sperm counts were said to be plummeting thanks to pollution with man-made “endocrine disruptor” chemicals; not true — there was no fall in sperm counts. In the 2000s the Gulf Stream was said to be failing and hurricanes were said to be getting more numerous and worse, thanks to global warming; neither was true, except in a Hollywood studio. The motive for last week’s announcement was to nudge world leaders towards a treaty on climate change by reminding them of how well the ozone treaty worked. But getting the world to agree to cease production of one rare class of chemical, for which substitutes existed, and which only a few companies mainly in rich countries manufactured, was a very different proposition from setting out to decarbonise the whole economy, when each of us depends on burning carbon (and hydrogen) for almost every product, service, meal, comfort and journey in our lives. The true lesson of the ozone story is that taking precautionary action on the basis of dubious evidence and exaggerated claims might be all right if the action does relatively little economic harm. However, loading the entire world economy with costly energy, and new environmental risks based on exaggerated claims about what might in future happen to the climate makes less sense.