## 1AC – King RR

#### Plan: Private entities ought to restrict asteroid mining involving artificial asteroid capture.

#### 1] Mining is inevitable down the line regardless of capital limits because of oligopolistic consolidation

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The proliferation of a lunar economy rests upon patient access to capital and fostering innovative ideas for large-scale development. At the moment, capital requirements for lunar miners are too high for companies to succeed in a perfectly competitive market. For the lunar economy, the emergence of large, vertically integrated companies will lead to the economies of scale necessary for proliferation. Terrestrially, when an industry becomes mature and beholden to traditional economics, like scarcity, a focus on profit margins takes over, and limitations emerge in the form of price manipulation and a lack of competition. As mentioned, the lunar economy will operate privately, and independent of scarcity, using profit margins to increase cash flow for innovation. An oligopoly of dedicated space holding companies, each comprised of diverse companies along the value chain, funded by the parent company and incentivized by prizes, will maintain a culture of innovation and competition. Rather than a few concentrated entities, each sacrificing their identity to their acquirer, the lunar economy will be an oligopoly of teams.

#### 2] Dangerous mining greatly increases the risk of space debris.

Sarah Scoles 15, “Dust from asteroid mining spells danger for satellites,” New Scientist, 5-27-2015, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22630235-100-dust-from-asteroid-mining-spells-danger-for-satellites/

NASA chose the second option for its Asteroid Redirect Mission, which aims to pluck a boulder from an asteroid’s surface and relocate it to a stable orbit around the moon. But an asteroid’s gravity is so weak that it’s not hard for surface particles to escape into space. Now a new model warns that debris shed by such transplanted rocks could intrude where many defence and communication satellites live – in geosynchronous orbit. According to Casey Handmer of the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena and Javier Roa of the Technical University of Madrid in Spain, 5 per cent of the escaped debris will end up in regions traversed by satellites. Over 10 years, it would cross geosynchronous orbit 63 times on average. A satellite in the wrong spot at the wrong time will suffer a damaging high-speed collision with that dust. The study also looks at the “catastrophic disruption” of an asteroid 5 metres across or bigger. Its total break-up into a pile of rubble would increase the risk to satellites by more than 30 per cent (arxiv.org/abs/1505.03800). That may not have immediate consequences. But as Earth orbits get more crowded with spent rocket stages and satellites, we will have to worry about cascades of collisions like the one depicted in the movie Gravity. Handmer and Roa want to point out the problem now so that we can find a solution before any satellites get dinged. “It is possible to quantify and manage the risk,” says Handmer. “A few basic precautions will prevent harm due to stray asteroid material.”

#### 3] Clustering makes the risk of collisions *uniquely high* and the risk is understated

Dr. Darren McKnight 17, Ph.D., Technical Director for Integrity Applications, Previously Senior Vice President and Director of Science and Technology Strategy at Science Applications International Corporation, “Proposed Series of Orbital Debris Remediation Activities,” 3rd International Conference and Exhibition on Satellite & Space Missions, 5/13/2017, https://iaaweb.org/iaa/Scientific%20Activity/debrisminutes03166.pdf [graphics omitted]

In the future, this population will be added to primarily from collisions between large objects in orbit as the number of LNT produced is proportional to the mass involved in a collision (or explosion).2 Cataloged debris produced from a catastrophic collision will be liberated at about 1-3 fragments per kilogram of mass involved while LNT production is around 10-40 fragments per kilogram of mass involved. The Iridium/Cosmos collision involved a total mass of 2,000kg and produced over 3,000 trackable fragments and likely 10,000-15,0003 LNT debris. The Feng-Yun purposeful collision yielded over 2,200 trackable fragments and likely over 30,000 LNT from only ~850kg of mass involved. While it is important to prevent these types of events from occurring in the future, the consequence of a collision (based on number of LNT produced) will be proportional to the mass involved in the collision. The term “mass involved” implies a good coupling of the impactor mass with the target mass. For a large fragment (e.g., several kilograms) striking a typical payload (that is densely built) in its main satellite body (vice striking a solar array or other appendage) at hypervelocity speeds (i.e., above 6km/s) will result in all the mass being “involved” in the debris. However, a large fragment striking a derelict rocket body, due to the way that the mass is concentrated at the ends of a rocket body, will likely not result in all of the mass being “involved” in the liberated debris. However, it is likely that when two large derelicts, either rocket bodies or payloads, collide with each other, then all of the mass will be involved due to the likely direct physical interaction between the mass. The table below summarizes the mass involvement scenarios which highlight why the massive-on-massive collisions are the focus of our analyses. Therefore, it is best to prevent the collision of the most massive objects with each other (higher consequence) and the ones that are the most likely (higher probability) since risk is probability multiplied by consequence. Our ability to model and predict the rate of collisions is based empirically upon only one catastrophic accidental collision event and a model developed on the kinetic theory of gases (KTG). However, clusters of massive objects that have identical inclinations plus similar and overlapping apogees/perigees may indeed have a greater probability of collision than predicted by the KTG-based algorithms as they are not randomly distributed and their orbital element evolution (e.g., change in right ascension of ascending node and argument of perigee) is also similar. It is hypothesized that these similarities could result in resonances of collision dynamics that may lead to larger probability of collision values than predicted with current algorithms. The not well-known fact is that many of the most massive objects are in tightly clumped clusters that will likely produce greater probability of collision than estimated by the KTG approach (see attached paper) and with the much larger consequence (i.e., creation of catalogued LNT fragments). The attached paper that studied this possibility shows some initial indications that this may indeed be true but much more analysis is needed to provide this conclusively. This table of clusters represents well over 50% of the total derelict mass in LEO. However, no one is currently monitoring these potential events. It is proposed that it would be a prudent risk management approach for space flight safety to monitor and characterize this inter-cluster collision risk. The Massive Collision Monitoring Activity (MCMA) is proposed whereby the encounters between members of these clusters are constantly monitored and close encounter information collected, plotted, analyzed, and shared. This would provide a rich research base for scientists and a predictive service for spacefaring countries. I am currently executing a subset of this proposed activity in an ad hoc fashion in conjunction with JSpOC. I have been monitoring the interaction dynamics between the SL-16 population in the 820- 865km altitude region for the last nine months.

#### 4] Debris cascades cause global nuke war

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Whatever the initial cause, the result may be the same. A satellite destroyed in orbit will break apart into thousands of pieces, each traveling at over 8 km/sec. This virtual shotgun blast, with pellets traveling 20 times faster than a bullet, will quickly spread out, with each pellet now following its own orbit around the Earth. With over 300,000 other pieces of junk already there, the tipping point is crossed and a runaway series of collisions begins. A few orbits later, two of the new debris pieces strike other satellites, causing them to explode into thousands more pieces of debris. The rate of collisions increases, now with more spacecraft being destroyed. Called the "Kessler Effect", after the NASA scientist who first warned of its dangers, these debris objects, now numbering in the millions, cascade around the Earth, destroying every satellite in low Earth orbit. Without an atmosphere to slow them down, thus allowing debris pieces to bum up, most debris (perhaps numbering in the millions) will remain in space for hundreds or thousands of years. Any new satellite will be threatened by destruction as soon as it enters space, effectively rendering many Earth orbits unusable. But what about us on the ground? How will this affect us? Imagine a world that suddenly loses all of its space technology. If you are like most people, then you would probably have a few fleeting thoughts about the Apollo-era missions to the Moon, perhaps a vision of the Space Shuttle launching astronauts into space for a visit to the International Space Station (ISS), or you might fondly recall the "wow" images taken by the orbiting Hubble Space Telescope. In short, you would know that things important to science would be lost, but you would likely not assume that their loss would have any impact on your daily life. Now imagine a world that suddenly loses network and cable television, accurate weather forecasts, Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, some cellular phone networks, on-time delivery of food and medical supplies via truck and train to stores and hospitals in virtually every community in America, as well as science useful in monitoring such things as climate change and agricultural sustainability. Add to this the crippling of the US military who now depend upon spy satellites, space-based communications systems, and GPS to know where their troops and supplies are located at all times and anywhere in the world. The result is a nightmarish world, one step away from nuclear war, economic disaster, and potential mass starvation. This is the world in which we are now perilously close to living. Space satellites now touch our lives in many ways. And, unfortunately, these satellites are extremely vulnerable to risks arising from a half-century of carelessness regarding protecting the space environment around the Earth as well as from potential adversaries such as China, North Korea, and Iran. No government policy has put us at risk. It has not been the result of a conspiracy. No, we are dependent upon them simply because they offer capabilities that are simply unavailable any other way. Individuals, corporations, and governments found ways to use the unique environment of space to provide services, make money, and better defend the country. In fact, only a few space visionaries and futurists could have foreseen where the advent of rocketry and space technology would take us a mere 50 years since those first satellites orbited the Earth. It was the slow progression of capability followed by dependence that puts us at risk. The exploration and use of space began in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union. The United States soon followed with Explorer 1. Since then, the nations of the world have launched over 8,000 spacecraft. Of these, several hundred are still providing information and services to the global economy and the world's governments. Over time, nations, corporations, and individuals have grown accustomed to the services these spacecraft provide and many are dependent upon them. Commercial aviation, shipping, emergency services, vehicle fleet tracking, financial transactions, and agriculture are areas of the economy that are increasingly reliant on space. Telestar 1, launched into space in the year of my birth, 1962, relayed the world's first live transatlantic news feed and showed that space satellites can be used to relay television signals, telephone calls, and data. The modern telecommunications age was born. We've come a long way since Telstar; most television networks now distribute most, if not ali, of their programming via satellite. Cable television signals are received by local providers from satellite relays before being sent to our homes and businesses using cables. With 65% of US households relying on cable television and a growing percentage using satellite dishes to receive signals from direct-to-home satellite television providers, a large number of people would be cut off from vital information in an emergency should these satellites be destroyed. And communications satellites relay more than television signals. They serve as hosts to corporate video conferences and convey business, banking, and other commercial information to and from all areas of the planet. The first successful weather satellite was TIROS. Launched in 1960, TIROS operated for only 78 days but it served as the precursor for today's much more long-lived weather satellites, which provide continuous monitoring of weather conditions around the world. Without them, providing accurate weather forecasts for virtually any place on the globe more than a day in advance would be nearly impossible. Figure !.1 shows a satellite image of Hurricane Ivan approaching the Alabama Gulf coast in 2004. Without this type of information, evacuation warnings would have to be given more generally, resulting in needless evacuations and lost economic activity (from areas that avoid landfall) and potentially increasing loss of life in areas that may be unexpectedly hit. The formerly top-secret Corona spy satellites began operation in 1959 and provided critical information about the Soviet Union's military and industrial capabilities to a nervous West in a time of unprecedented paranoia and nuclear risk. With these satellites, US military planners were able to understand and assess the real military threat posed by the Soviet Union. They used information provided by spy satellites to help avert potential military confrontations on numerous occasions. Conversely, the Soviet Union's spy satellites were able to observe the United States and its allies, with similar results. It is nearly impossible to move an army and hide it from multiple eyes in the sky. Satellite information is critical to all aspects of US intelligence and military planning. Spy satellites are used to monitor compliance with international arms treaties and to assess the military activities of countries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Figure 1.2 shows the capability of modem unclassified space-based imaging. The capability of the classified systems is presumed to be significantly better, providing much more detail. Losing these satellites would place global militaries on high alert and have them operating, literally, in the blind. Our military would suddenly become vulnerable in other areas as well. GPS, a network of 24-32 satellites in medium-Earth orbit, was developed to provide precise position information to the military, and it is now in common use by individuals and industry. The network, which became fully operational in 1993, allows our armed forces to know their exact locations anywhere in the world. It is used to guide bombs to their targets with unprecedented accuracy, requiring that only one bomb be used to destroy a target that would have previously required perhaps hundreds of bombs to destroy in the pre-GPS world (which, incidentally, has resulted in us reducing our stockpile of non-GPS-guided munitions dramatically). It allows soldiers to navigate in the dark or in adverse weather or sandstorms. Without GPS, our military advantage over potential adversaries would be dramatically reduced or eliminated.

#### 5] Unregulated mining turns DA’s and benefits from appropriation

Fengna Xu 20, Law School, Xi’an Jiaotong University, “The approach to sustainable space mining: issues, challenges, and solutions,” Fengna Xu 2020 IOP Conf. Ser.: Mater. Sci. Eng. 738 012014

3.1. Conflicts between multiple States Space resources, as res communis [3], can be appropriated to some extent on the basis of freedom of exploration and use of the outer space. However, it is likely to follow a ‘first come, first served’ approach to space resources activities. In fact, the ‘first come, first served’ approach drove early and rapid development of oil industry of the US in the 19th century, although a frenetic race among surface owners followed and led to an extraordinary waste of oil and gas. Given that so far there are no agreement or property rights on space resources, they are essentially in a ‘state of nature’. Allocation by the ‘first come, first served’ approach is simple and requires very little government involvement to deter another one (called a ‘junior’) from displacing the rightful first comer (called a ‘senior’). However, overprotecting the senior by priority rights could run the risk of disorder, waste, inequality, and even monopoly. The Outer Space Treaty, requires State parties to conduct all their activities in outer space ‘with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties’. Without specific coordinating rules, conflicts between multiple States are likely to happen. Private entities may choose to arm themselves to safeguard their own interests. In extreme cases, States may also protect them by placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space if necessary [4]. As a result, priority rights should not be absolute but subjected to some arrangements. 7

#### 6] AAC involves intentional relocation

Neeness ND— (Neeness, Neeness’ founder runs several websites: Cyber Insight, Apassant, Crow Survival, and Planted Shack. Neeness started as a blog where the founder could share their love for animals., “Which mission is meant for asteroid?“, Neeness, Available Online at https://neeness.com/which-mission-is-meant-for-asteroid/, accessed 3-25-2022, HKR-AR)

Can you push an asteroid?

Natural asteroid capture is ballistic capture of a free asteroid into orbit around a body such as a planet, due to gravitational forces. Artificial asteroid capture involves **intentionally** exerting a force to insert the asteroid into a specific orbit.

#### 7] Commercialized proximity mining operations create dual-use deflection risks – inherent interoperability makes dangerous repurposing easy and likely

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Extensive and prolonged proximity operations will be an essential element of most types of planetary defense mitigation missions. The most technologically mature method for fragmentation or deflection of a hazardous object is through a surface, subsurface, or stand-off nuclear explosion: The tremendous impulsive force of the blast and resulting surface ablation could, in one moment, deliver the necessary velocity change to the body to miss its future collision with Earth. Time permitting, to assure exact positioning and maximum deflective or fragmentation effect, the nuclear device would be buried, anchored to the surface, or orbiting just above the asteroid, an effort that would involve precise proximity operations.

On the opposite end of the spectrum for deflecting an inbound body are the “slow push" methods, which would deliver a minute but steady deflective force to the asteroid or comet, over time providing a cumulative change in velocity. With few exceptions, every proposed slow push technique would be dependent on extended operations in close proximity to the body. Gravity tractors would hover a spacecraft near the asteroid for years or decades, slowly imparting a deflective gravitational force; an enhanced gravity tractor would first collect boulders or regolith from the threatening body, to increase the mass and gravitational pull of the spacecraft. Laser or solar ablation methods would require the stationing of a spacecraft near the asteroid to direct the ablative beam. Using thrusters or a space tug would require direct physical contact with the body for years on end, nudging it to alter its velocity. Mass driver systems would land and anchor a robotic mining apparatus on the asteroid’s surface, to cast a steady stream of regolith into space and produce a minute but steady deflective counterforce.

Similarly, asteroid or comet mining would rely entirely on the ability to conduct reliable, long-term, repetitive proximity operations. Several mining concepts have been analyzed. The most common concept would land and anchor robotic mining and support systems on the asteroid or comet; these systems would methodically drill, scrape, crush, lift, or scoop the desired minerals or ice from the body. Support systems would discard unwanted tailings and transport the ore to a processing station or collection facility. The mining operation could occur on the surface, in pits, or in caverns cut into the interior of the asteroid or comet.

Alternative mining methods include leaching minerals through the injection of high pressure steam, fully encapsulating a small asteroid or comet and capturing the escaping water as the container is heated by the Sun, and collecting water vapor from a passing comet using a spacecraft stationed in a trailing position behind it. Each of these activities would require the ability to operate on and near the surface of the body for long periods.

The commonalities between planetary defense and asteroid mining are extensive for the wide range of proximity operations. For both endeavors, hovering, orbiting, landing, and anchoring on the space body are essential competencies. The same base technologies that can be used to mine metals could be employed in burying a nuclear device to fragment an asteroid, or as a mass driver apparatus used in deflection. The technologies that could be employed to secure thrusters or a solar sail to a tumbling asteroid to change its orbit could be adapted to anchor a full suite of mining equipment to the surface of a resource-rich body.

#### 8] That increases the risk of accidental collisions, astro-terror, and space weaponization

Mares 15 [Miroslav Mares, Professor, at the Division of Security and Strategic Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. Jakub Drmola PhD student, at the Divison of Security and Strategic Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. Revisiting the deflection dilemma. October 1, 2015. https://academic.oup.com/astrogeo/article/56/5/5.15/235650]

Sooner or later, in order to avoid the fate of the dinosaurs, humanity needs to develop scientific and technological capabilities to prevent extinction-level impact events. But most solutions bring about new challenges, because new technologies rarely have only one application. Here lies the dilemma: any technology allowing us to deflect asteroids from a collision trajectory with the Earth could also be used to direct them towards the Earth. This means we could potentially turn any future near-miss into an impact, with all its devastating consequences.

Sagan & Ostro (1994b) concluded that this is a risk not worth taking. Considering the very low probabilities of impacts with objects larger than 1 km (generally less than 1 in 5000 for a given century), they were more worried about the misuse of such trajectory-altering technology than the undiverted asteroids themselves. Humans visited a great deal of violence upon each other during the 20th century; war has been prevalent and increasingly technological. The beginning of the 21st century does not seem overly promising either. The risk that one of humanity's irrational totalitarian powers decides to have some nearby asteroid steered towards Earth might simply be too high. Many people still see the default cosmic odds as preferable to the lessons of recent history.

Later on, a modification of sorts to the deflection dilemma appeared, positing that the “real” dilemma (Schweickart 2004, Morrison 2010) lies in putting various parts of the Earth and its population in harm's way during a deflection attempt. Inevitably, any mission to deflect an object that is on a collision course with the Earth will involve moving its supposed point of impact across the surface until it misses the planet entirely. Should such a deflection attempt fail to modify the trajectory sufficiently, the impact would still occur, albeit in a different area. This could expose to risk countries that were not originally threatened by the asteroid (depending on its size and path), while diminishing the risk to those living near the original point of impact. The damage and casualties around this new and modified point of impact would then, to some extent, be caused by those who tried but failed to deflect the asteroid. The repercussions of such an event would certainly be grave.

Privatization and industry

Both of these versions of the deflection dilemma are essentially state-centric and neither presumes that this technology might be wielded by private companies and non-state actors. But the current trend of greater involvement of private companies in space suggests that states might be unable (or unwilling) to maintain their exclusive hold on the advanced space technologies. The private sector is currently hot on the heels of national and international space agencies in exploring feasible and economically viable options. At the moment, private companies are already in the business (or at least in the process of making it a profitable business) of resupplying the International Space Station, taking tourists to the edge of space and operating communication satellites. And, recently, a new area of potential commercialization of space, asteroid mining, has received increased attention and investment. It has already spawned private companies (such as Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources, Inc.); this industry is highly relevant to the deflection dilemma (Ostro 1999).

While the idea of mining asteroids carries with it an air of science fiction (as all space-based endeavours do, at some stage), it is based on science fact. One of the most significant facts on which to base a space mining industry is the apparent abundance of highly valued raw materials in asteroids. Platinum, rhodium and other precious metals are extremely useful because of their catalytic and electrical properties, but are also exceedingly rare in the Earth's crust. While such metals sank deep into the planet during core formation, asteroids retained their original composition and even delivered much of the accessible reserves to our planet in the form of meteorite bombardment (Willbold et al. 2011). Some of the largest known deposits of these metals on Earth are found within ancient impact craters. Platinum-group metals are deemed critical to our modern technology-based civilization, without substitutes in many applications, and their supply is at risk of “geopolitical machinations” (Graedel 2013). The combination of natural scarcity and industrial demand leads to their high price, which easily rivals that of gold. Because space missions are inherently expensive, these precious metals are prime high-value candidates for economically viable asteroid mining. Since the projected market value of these metals within an asteroid is in the order of billions or even hundreds of billions of US dollars (depending on the size of the asteroid), the success of the industry comes down to developing technically feasible and cost-effective methods of mining them and retrieving them (Blair 2000, Gerlach 2005). The other interesting and potentially worthwhile resource we could harvest from asteroids is water. Not only is liquid water required by astronauts to survive, but it can also be broken down into oxygen and hydrogen to be used as fuel. And, while water is abundant and cheap here on Earth, it is very expensive to transport it to orbit. It costs $3000–$10 000 per kilogramme to launch water (or anything else) to low Earth orbit and about two or three times more for geostationary transfer orbit (Jain & Trost 2013). It is not the prospect of procuring something we covet here on the surface of the Earth that makes this venture attractive, but rather the idea of not having to wage an expensive battle with Earth's gravity each time we want to make use of something as mundane as water in space. If the costs associated with mining water from asteroids can be brought below the cost of launching water from Earth, this seemingly counter-intuitive industry might take off and become profitable. Additionally, through the use of some form of refuelling depots, it would probably in turn make space endeavours more affordable and sustainable. The same would apply if some of the more common metals found in asteroids (such as iron or nickel) were used to build structures directly in orbit instead of launching them from the Earth. The risks of mining asteroids There are two basic ways to go about moving the resources contained within a given asteroid to the Earth. They can be extracted from the asteroid during its natural orbit and then transported to the Earth, or the entire asteroid might be moved closer to a more convenient location before starting mining. Thus repositioned, it might even be used as a shielded habitat, once hollowed out (Ostro 1999). There are different speculative costs and benefits associated with either option, which would vary with the size, orbit and composition of the asteroid. But, crucially, the second option would entail putting asteroids into orbit around the Earth, the Moon or possibly at one of the Earth's Lagrangian points. Indeed, NASA has already planned a mission to capture a small asteroid and place it in a high cislunar orbit, where it would serve as a destination for future manned missions and experiments. This “Asteroid Redirect Mission” is to take place in the next decade and is being pitched mainly as a stepping stone towards a future mission to Mars (see box “NASA's Asteroid Redirect Mission”; Brophy et al. 2012, Burchell 2014, Gates et al. 2015).

Programmes to redirect asteroids and, especially, plans to mine asteroids on an industrial scale essentially resurrect the deflection dilemma. But it is no longer a matter of superpowers intentionally misusing technology designed to prevent dangerous impacts. It becomes an issue of proliferation among private entities. Once private mining companies acquire the technical ability to redirect suitable NEOs (Baoyin et al. 2011) in order to extract platinum or water from them, perilous inflections become more likely.

The probability of accidents will rise with the number of asteroids whose trajectories we decide to manipulate. Such accidents might be very unlikely, but even a tiny technical or human error in the execution of an inflection meant to place an asteroid into the lunar or geocentric orbit might send it crashing into the Earth with potentially devastating consequences. And while we might find solace in the low probabilities associated with such an accident, even contemporary industries which are considered very safe suffer from unlikely tragedies. Despite being dependable and reliable, airliners do crash; there are a lot of them flying and very improbable accidents do happen if the dice are rolled often enough. Undoubtedly, we will not be steering as many asteroids as we steer planes any time soon, but industries tend to be more accident-prone during their infancy. Furthermore, a single asteroid can do a lot more damage than a single plane. And who is to say how much metal or water we are going to need in space over the course of the 21st century, or the next?

The second source of risk is the intentional misuse, similar to the original deflection dilemma. But the entry barrier for asteroid weaponization gets much lower if mining them and moving them around becomes a common industrial activity. This is in stark contrast to the original scenario which envisioned this technology to be used solely for planetary defence and under control of a very small number of the most powerful countries (Morrison 2010). If such a powerful technology becomes widely and commercially available, even rogue states and well-funded terrorist groups might be tempted to use it for an unexpected and devastating attack. In addition, an active asteroid mining industry would make it more difficult to detect any hostile inflection attempts among the number of legitimate and benign ones.

#### 9] The dilemma causes the most power WMD ever – it’s more likely than natural hits and structurally outweighs

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While asteroids loom large in the horizons of habitat and some military expansionists, they receive little attention from arms controllers and most global security thinkers. As a planetary defense project, diverting asteroids seems a logical part of a Whole Earth Security program and international space infrastructure security cooperation, but opponents of military space expansion are sharply divided about asteroidal diversion. In part these disputes carry over from Cold War nuclear debates, with Edward Teller, Darth Vader for arms controllers, pushing nuclear solutions to the asteroid threat, and arms controllers raising alarms.

An important analysis of the dangers inherent in the deflection of asteroidal bodies is provided by Carl Sagan and Stephen Ostro.67 Few figures of the Space Age have been as productive and prominent as Sagan, a planetary astronomer, science educator, and SF author.68 Over the later decades of the twentieth century Sagan’s work on planetary science, particularly Mars, his television series Cosmos, and his science fiction, most notably Contact (coauthored with Ann Druyan), made him an international celebrity and influential voice for science and space exploration. Unlike virtually all other space scientists and engineers of his era, Sagan also was active in advancing nuclear arms control, studying— and publicizing—the “nuclear winter” hypothesis and promoting cooperation in space to improve Soviet-American relations.69 Although a strong supporter of the larger habitat expansionist vision, Sagan insists large-scale space activities should occur only after nuclear disarmament and planetary habitat stability have been achieved because of an ominous asteroid “deflection dilemma.”70

The essence of the deflection dilemma is simple: species and civilizational survival inevitably will eventually require the development of the ability to deflect asteroids and comets away from Earth, but this technology also inherently creates the possibility that such objects could be directed toward the Earth. The existential stakes are clear: “the destructive energy latent in a large near-Earth asteroid dwarfs anything else the human species can get its hands on,” making them potentially “the most powerful weapon of mass destruction ever devised”71 (see Table 7.4. A and B).72 Once the population of these bodies is fully mapped, and technologies to deflect them are developed, Sagan argues, the prospects for collision increase over the natural rate due to the possibility of intentional bombardment. Given these possibilities, perhaps the reason the dinosaurs lasted for nearly two hundred million years is because they did not have a space program.

In his major book on the human space future, Pale Blue Dot, Sagan lays out several scenarios for intentional collisions. His arguments are essentially the arguments of nuclear arms controllers. Madmen exist, and some “achieve the highest levels of political power in modern industrial nations.”'3 Recalling the extreme destruction caused by Hitler and Stalin, Sagan posits the possibility that a “misanthropic psychopath” or a “megalomaniac lusting after ‘greatness’ or glory, a victim of ethnic violence bent on revenge, someone in the grip of severe testosterone poisoning, some religious fanatic hastening the Day of Judgment, or just some technicians incompetent or insufficiently vigilant” will bring about a catastrophic collision.74 Earth-approaching asteroids amount to “30,000 swords of Damocles hanging over our heads,” for which “there is no acceptable national solution.”75 And, like Cole and Salkeld (not mentioned), Sagan points to the possibilities of clandestine use of this technology.

#### 10] Accidental and intentional deflection attacks outweigh the threat of conventional hits – only building in response time with enhanced tracking and attribution solves rogue strikes that bypass conventional deterrence

Dello-Iacovo 18 [Michael, PhD candidate (Mining Engineering), emphasis on space science, looking at asteroid exploration, mining and impact risk @ University of New South Wales. “Asteroids and comets as space weapons,” <http://www.michaeldello.com/asteroids-comets-space-weapons/>]

Ignoring accidental deflection, which might occur when an asteroid is moved to an Earth or Lunar orbit for research or mining purposes (see this now scrapped proposal to bring a small asteroid in to Lunar orbit), there are two categories of actors that might maliciously deflect such a body; state actors and terrorist groups.

A state actor might be incentivised to authorise an asteroid strike on an enemy or potential enemy in situations where they wouldn’t necessarily authorise a nuclear strike or conventional invasion. For example, let us consider an asteroid of around 20 m in diameter. Near Earth orbit asteroids of around this size are often only detected several hours or days before passing between Earth and the Moon. If a state actor is able to identify an asteroid that will pass near Earth in secret before the global community has, they can feasibly send a mission to alter its orbit to intersect with Earth in a way such that it would not be detected until it is much too late. Assuming the state actor did its job well enough, it would be impossible for anyone to lay blame on them, let alone even guess that it might have been caused by malicious intent.

An asteroid of this size would be expected to have enough energy to cause an explosion 30 times the strength of the nuclear bomb dropped over Hiroshima in WWII.

#### 11] Even limited deflection failures cause nuke war because they look like preemptive strikes and the risk is inversely proportion to size

Lovett 19, [Richard Lovett is a Cosmos contributor, The biggest danger about an asteroid strike? Lawyers, Blasting away at incoming space rock raises real risks of nuclear war, experts say. Richard A Lovett reports, May 7, https://cosmosmagazine.com/space/the-biggest-danger-about-an-asteroid-strike-lawyers]

Governments and space agencies seeking to protect the Earth by changing the courses of potentially hazardous asteroids might face major legal hurdles, even if our planet is in the crosshairs of a bolide big enough to kill millions, experts say. One problem is what would happen if one country, worried about protecting its own citizens, attempted to deflect the asteroid, screwed up, and accidentally dumped it on a neighbour. Space law, says David Koplow of Georgetown University Law Centre, Washington DC, is based on the principle of strict liability. “The concept is that space activities are hazardous and therefore the harm should not fall on an innocent bystander,” Koplow says. Another problem stems from the fact that only a few countries have the technological ability to deflect an incoming asteroid, and there is, at present, no international authority tasked with making sure everyone else is represented in the decision-making process. In fact, says Cordula Steinkogler, a space law expert at the University of Vienna, Austria, current treaties don’t even require nations to share information about such hazards, let alone act to protect each other. She notes, however, that the United Nations charter does establish a “very general” duty for them to act toward solving international problems that affect economic, social, cultural, educational, and health wellbeing. Failure to share information can be more than just an inconvenience. To start with, says Petr Boháček, of Charles University in Prague in the Czech Republic, it could make countries wonder if, instead of international cooperation, the rule is actually everyone for themselves. It’s a particularly important problem, he says, because the nations at risk of being hit by an asteroid may not be the ones with the greatest geopolitical power. “Asteroids do not discriminate,” he notes. The nation-state concept of sovereignty, he adds, dates back several hundred years. “I’m not sure how many concepts from the seventeenth century you use in your decision-making,” he says, “but making decisions for planetary defence based on this dinosaur method of decision-making may not be the best choice.” Another problem is that the nation hit by an asteroid might see it as an attack by a foe, and retaliate. “[It] could look like the damage of a nuclear attack,” says Seth Baum, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, a US-based think tank, “so the prospect [of] a counterattack seems like something worth taking very seriously.” Ironically, the risk of this is probably inversely proportional to the size of asteroid. A big asteroid, capable of wiping out an enormous swath of territory, would be seen coming well in advance, and have generated a media frenzy (assuming people didn’t brand it as “fake news”).

#### 12] The mining itself increases the risk of asteroid collisions

Byers and Boley 19 [Michael Byers, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, BA in Political Studies and Phd in International Law from Cambridge, Byers has written a number of op-ed articles on space issues. Relax: An asteroid will just miss hitting Earth. But our actions could still have a deep impact. March 19, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-relax-an-asteroid-will-just-miss-hitting-earth-but-our-actions-could/]

Beyond the battle over resource extraction lies a more existential threat: the act of removing large quantities of mass from an asteroid could change its trajectory, potentially leading to a human-caused Earth impact. For this reason, any asteroid mining will have to be fully informed by astrodynamics, and closely regulated under international rules. And while the U.S., Luxembourg and Russia might regulate asteroid-mining companies closely with the involvement of planetary scientists, what would happen if a mining company were to incorporate a “flag of convenience state” such as Panama or Liberia? Would the same respect be paid to science and safety?

#### 13] They cause nuke war, miscalc, and extinction

Baum 19 (Executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute,“Risk-Risk Tradeoff Analysis of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection,” May 31, 2019, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/risa.13339.)

The most severe asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can cause global environmental effects. The core mechanism is the transport of particulate matter into the stratosphere, where it can spread worldwide and remain aloft for years or decades. Large asteroid collisions create large quantities of dust and large fireballs; the fire heats the dust so that some portion of it rises into the stratosphere. The largest collisions, such as the 10km Chicxulub impactor, can also eject debris from the collision site into space; upon reentry into the atmosphere, the debris heats up enough to spark global fires (Toon, Zahnle, Morrison, Turco, & Covey, 1997). The fires are a major impact in their own right and can send additional smoke into the stratosphere. For nuclear explosions, there is also a fireball and smoke, in this case from the burning of cities or other military targets.

While in the stratosphere, the particulate matter blocks sunlight and destroys ozone (Toon et al., 2007). The ozone loss increases the amount of ultraviolet radiation reaching the surface, causing skin cancer and other harms (Mills, Toon, Turco, Kinnison, & Garcia, 2008). The blocked sunlight causes abrupt cooling of Earth’s surface and in turn reduced precipitation due to a weakened hydrological cycle. The cool, dry, and dark conditions reduce plant growth. Recent studies use modern climate and crop models to examine the effects for a hypothetical IndiaPakistan nuclear war scenario with 100 weapons (50 per side) each of 15KT yield. The studies find agriculture declines in the range of approximately 2% to 50% depending on the crop and location.11 Another study compares the crop data to existing poverty and malnourishment and estimates that the crop declines could threaten starvation for two billion people (Helfand, 2013). However, the aforementioned studies do not account for new nuclear explosion fire simulations that find approximately five times less particulate matter reaching the stratosphere, and correspondingly weaker global environmental effects (Reisner et al., 2018). Note also that the 100 weapon scenario used in these studies is not the largest potential scenario. Larger nuclear wars and large asteroid collisions could cause greater harm. The largest asteroid collisions could even reduce sunlight below the minimum needed for vision (Toon et al., 1997). Asteroid risk analyses have proposed that the global environmental disruption from large collisions could cause one billion deaths (NRC, 2010) or the death of 25% of all humans (Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Morrison, 1994; Morrison, 1992), though these figures have not been rigorously justified (Baum, 2018a).

The harms from asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can also include important secondary effects. The food shortages from severe global environmental disruption could lead to infectious disease outbreaks as public health conditions deteriorate (Helfand, 2013). Law and order could be lost in at least some locations as people struggle for survival (Maher & Baum, 2013). Today’s complex global political-economic system already shows fragility to shocks such as the 2007- 2008 financial crisis (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Windawi, 2015); an asteroid collision or nuclear war could be an extremely large shock. The systemic consequences of a nuclear war would be further worsened by the likely loss of major world cities that serve as important hubs in the global economy. Even a single detonation in nuclear terrorism would have ripple effects across the global political-economic system (similar to, but likely larger than, the response prompted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001).

It is possible for asteroid collisions to cause nuclear war. An asteroid explosion could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, prompting nuclear attack that is believed to be retaliation. For example, the 2013 Chelyabinsk event occurred near an important Russian military installation, prompting concerns about the event’s interpretation (Harris et al., 2015).

The ultimate severity of an asteroid collision or violent nuclear conflict use would depend on how human society reacts. Would the reaction be disciplined and constructive: bury the dead, heal the sick, feed the hungry, and rebuild all that has fallen? Or would the reaction be disorderly and destructive: leave the rubble in place, fight for scarce resources, and descend into minimalist tribalism or worse? Prior studies have identified some key issues, including the viability of trade (Cantor, Henry, & Rayner, 1989) and the self-sufficiency of local communities (Maher & Baum, 2013). However, the issue has received little research attention and remains poorly understood. This leaves considerable uncertainty in the total human harm from an asteroid collision or nuclear weapons use. Previously published point estimates of the human consequences of asteroid collisions12 and nuclear wars (Helfand, 2013) do not account for this uncertainty and are likely to be inaccurate.

Of particular importance are the consequences for future generations, which could vastly outnumber the present generation. If an asteroid collision or nuclear war would cause human extinction, then there would be no future generations. Alternatively, if survivors fail to recover a large population and advanced technological civilization, then future generations would be permanently diminished. The largest long-term factor is whether future generations would colonize space and benefit from its astronomically large amount of resources (Tonn, 1999). However, it is not presently known which asteroid collisions or nuclear wars (if any) would cause the permanent collapse of human civilization and thus the loss of the large future benefits (Baum et al., 2019). Given the enormous stakes, prudent risk management would aim for very low probabilities of permanent collapse (Tonn, 2009).

#### 14] detection fails

Jonti Horner, 3-22-2019, Professor (Astrophysics), University of Southern Queensland "Why dangerous asteroids heading to Earth are so hard to detect," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/why-dangerous-asteroids-heading-to-earth-are-so-hard-to-detect-113845

Earth is often in the firing line of fragments of asteroids and comets, most of which [burn up](https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-meteors-light-up-the-night-sky-35754) tens of kilometers above our heads. But occasionally, something larger gets through. That’s what happened off Russia’s east coast on December 18 last year. A [giant explosion occurred above the Bering Sea](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-47607696) when an asteroid some ten metres across detonated with an explosive energy ten times greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. So why didn’t we see this asteroid coming? And why are we only hearing about its explosive arrival now? Nobody saw it Had the December explosion occurred near a city – as [happened at Chelyabinsk in February 2013](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/15/hundreds-injured-meteorite-russian-city-chelyabinsk) – we would have heard all about it at the time. But because it happened in a remote part of the world, it went unremarked for more than three months, until details were unveiled at the [50th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference](https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/lpsc2019/) this week, based on [NASA’s collection of fireball data](https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/fireballs/). So where did this asteroid come from? At risk from space debris The Solar system is littered with material left over from the formation of the planets. Most of it is locked up in stable reservoirs – the Asteroid belt, the Edgeworth-Kuiper belt and the Oort cloud – far from Earth. Those reservoirs continually leak objects into interplanetary space, injecting fresh debris into orbits that cross those of the planets. The inner Solar system is awash with debris, ranging from tiny flecks of dust to comets and asteroids many kilometres in diameter. The vast majority of the debris that collides with Earth is utterly harmless, but our planet still [bears the scars of collisions](https://theconversation.com/target-earth-how-asteroids-made-an-impact-on-australia-92836) with much larger bodies. The largest, most devastating impacts (like that which [helped to kill the dinosaurs](https://theconversation.com/how-the-dinosaurs-went-extinct-asteroid-collision-triggered-potentially-deadly-volcanic-eruptions-112134) 65 million years ago) are the rarest. But smaller, more frequent collisions also pose a marked risk. In 1908, in Tunguska, Siberia, a [vast explosion](http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20160706-in-siberia-in-1908-a-huge-explosion-came-out-of-nowhere) levelled more than 2,000 square kilometres of forest. Due to the remote location, no deaths were recorded. Had the impact happened just two hours later, the city of St Petersburg could have been destroyed. In 2013, it was a 10,000-tonne asteroid that [detonated above the Russian city of Chelyabinsk](https://earthsky.org/space/meteor-asteroid-chelyabinsk-russia-feb-15-2013). More than 1,500 people were injured and around 7,000 buildings were damaged, but amazingly nobody was killed. We’re still trying to work out how often events like this happen. Our information on the frequency of the larger impacts is pretty limited, so estimates can vary dramatically. Typically, people argue that Tunguska-sized impacts happen [every few hundred years](https://academic.oup.com/astrogeo/article/50/1/1.18/201316), but that’s just based on a sample of one event. The truth is, we don’t really know. **What can we do about it?** Over the past couple of decades, a concerted effort has been made to search for potentially hazardous objects that pose a threat before they hit Earth. The result is the [identification of thousands of near-Earth asteroids](https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/stats/totals.html) upwards of a few metres across. Once found, the orbits of those objects can be determined, and their paths [predicted into the future](https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/ca/), to see whether an impact is possible or even likely. The longer we can observe a given object, the better that prediction becomes. But as we saw with Chelyabinsk in 2013, and again in December, we’re not there yet. While the catalogue of potentially hazardous objects continues to grow, many still remain undetected, waiting to catch us by surprise. If we discover a collision is pending in the coming days, we can work out where and when the collision will happen. That happened for the first time in 2008 when astronomers discovered the tiny [asteroid 2008 TC3](https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/news/2008tc3.html), 19 hours before it hit Earth’s atmosphere over northern Sudan. For impacts predicted with a longer lead time, it will be possible to work out whether the object is truly dangerous or would merely produce a spectacular but harmless fireball (like 2008 TC3). For any objects that truly pose a threat, the race will be on to deflect them – to turn a hit into a miss. **Searching the skies** Before we can quantify the threat an object poses, we first need to know that the object is there. But finding asteroids is hard. Surveys scour the skies, [looking for faint star-like points moving against the background stars](https://spaceguardcentre.com/what-are-neos/finding-and-observing-asteroids/). A bigger asteroid will reflect more sunlight, and therefore appear brighter in the sky - at a given distance from Earth. As a result, the smaller the object, the closer it must be to Earth before we can spot it. Objects the size of the Chelyabinsk and Bering Sea events (about 20 and 10 metres diameter, respectively) are tiny. They can only be spotted when passing very close to our planet. The vast majority of the time they are simply undetectable. As a result, having impacts like these come out of the blue is really the norm, rather than the exception! The Chelyabinsk impact is a great example. Moving on its orbit around the Sun, it approached us in the daylight sky - totally hidden in the Sun’s glare. For larger objects, which impact much less frequently but would do far more damage, it is fair to expect we would receive some warning. **Why not move the asteroid?** While we need to keep searching for threatening objects, there is another way we could protect ourselves. Missions such as [Hayabusa](https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/missions/hayabusa/in-depth/), [Hayabusa 2](http://www.hayabusa2.jaxa.jp/en/) and [OSIRIS-REx](https://www.asteroidmission.org/) have demonstrated the ability to travel to near-Earth asteroids, land on their surfaces, and move things around. From there, it is just a short hop to being able to deflect them – to change a potential collision into a near-miss. Interestingly, ideas of asteroid deflection dovetail nicely with the [possibility of asteroid mining](https://theconversation.com/mining-asteroids-could-unlock-untold-wealth-heres-how-to-get-started-95675). The technology needed to extract material from an asteroid and send it back to Earth could equally be used to alter the orbit of that asteroid, moving it away from a potential collision with our planet. We’re not quite there yet, but for the first time in our history, we have the potential to truly control our own destiny.

#### 15] Causes war, ASAT deployment, and debris – don’t assume mining operations will be benevolent

Skibba 18 [Ramin Skibba is a science writer and astrophysicist based in Santa Cruz and San Diego. Mining in Space Could Lead to Conflicts on Earth. May 2, 2018. nautil.us/blog/-mining-in-space-could-lead-to-conflicts-on-earth]

Major space-faring nations are not among the 16 countries party to the treaty, but they should arguably come to some equitable agreement, since international competition over natural resources in space may very well transform into conflict. Take platinum-group metals. Mining companies have found about 100,000 metric tons of the stuff in deposits worldwide, mostly in South Africa and Russia, amounting to $10 billion worth of production per year, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These supplies should last several decades if demand for them doesn’t rise dramatically. (According to Bloomberg, supply for platinum-group metals is constrained while demand is increasing.)

Palladium, for example, valued for its conductive properties and chemical stability, is used in hundreds of millions of electronic devices sold annually for electrodes and connector platings, but it’s relatively scarce on Earth. A single giant, platinum-rich asteroid could contain as much platinum-group metals as all reserves on Earth, the Google-backed Planetary Resources claims. That’s a massive bounty. As Planetary Resources and other U.S. and foreign companies scramble for control over these valuable space minerals, competing “land grabs” by armed satellites may come next. Platinum-group metals in space may serve the same role as oil has on Earth, threatening to extend geopolitical struggles into astropolitical ones, something Trump is keen on preparing for. Yesterday he said he’s seriously weighing the idea of a “Space Force” military branch.

Moreover, the technology that might enable this free-for-all—versatile “nanosatellites,” no larger than a loaf of bread—is relatively inexpensive. While reporting for a story about these tiny satellites, also known as CubeSats, I came across some missions applicable to mining asteroids. In November, NASA will launch a satellite for a mission called Near-Earth Asteroid Scout, for example. It will deploy a solar sail, propel itself with sunlight, and journey to the asteroid belt, where it will scope out a particular asteroid and analyze its properties. NASA has also awarded grants to Planetary Resources to advance the designs of spectral imagers and propulsion systems for CubeSats, and other missions will develop the satellites’ abilities to communicate and network with each other. NASA also awarded Deep Space Industries contracts to assess commercial approaches for NASA’s asteroid goals, which may involve hosting DSI’s asteroid-prospecting equipment on its missions.

Like all forms of mining, it will be dangerous. If space-mining activities break up asteroids, the resulting debris could be hazardous for satellites, other spacecraft, and astronauts nearby. On the other hand, in a best-case scenario, space mining could be environmentally safe, capture only necessary minerals and water, and, in the more distant future even lead to the construction of a far-flung space station led by NASA and other space agencies, orbiting 200 million miles from Earth and serving as both a mining depot and a pit-stop for passing spacecraft.

But it’s not clear that a pact between the commercial space mining industry and NASA would align with the public’s interest. NASA’s increasing collaboration with space mining companies could distort and divert efforts previously focused on space exploration and basic research, and discourage public interest and engagement in astronomy.

#### 16] Motive exists

Miller 19 — (Gregory D. Miller, Gregory Miller is Chair of the Department of Spacepower and Director of the Schriever Scholars program at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL. His research interests include International Relations (especially alliances, reputation, and deterrence); terrorism; strategy; and space., Space Pirates, Geosynchronous Guerrillas, and Nonterrestrial Terrorists: Nonstate Threats in Space, 8-27-19, Available Online at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-33\_Issue-3/F-Miller.pdf, accessed 3-25-2022, HKR-AR)

Guerrillas are often domestic groups targeting their own government with the goal of establishing an independent state, or they are engaged in a struggle against a foreign power that they view as an occupying force.17 Historically, many of these types of groups were motivated by a revolutionary cause (the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, as an example, or the Maoist ideology of Peru’s Shining Path), where they sought a dramatic change in society and the government. Others are motivated by a desire for independence (like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka).18 They may receive aid or support from outside parties, which can include financial, ideological, and military support and even personnel, but they typically have local rather than global goals. As a result, attacks in space by guerrillas would likely target their own government’s capabilities or states that appear to be meddling in their national affairs. One example was the insurgency’s use of jamming during Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to the “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” insurgents deliberately jammed commercial satellite communications links used by the US military.19 As long as those actors stuck to purely military targets, they would remain—at least in an academic sense—guerrillas.

Because most guerrillas would like the international community to view them as having legitimacy, and they would like to govern themselves at some point, either as a separate state or in a newly reconstituted state, they often refrain from attacks that are potentially costly to the civilian population, though there are exceptions where guerrilla groups engaged in terrorist activities. Also, guerrillas often value the sympathy or support of other states and of the international community. As a result, it is unlikely that groups that fall closer to the guerrilla side of the spectrum will engage in attacks against space interests that have long-term and broader consequences. For instance, these groups are unlikely to use kinetic weapons to attack space assets. Such attacks would create a debris field that could subsequently damage other states’ assets and potentially hurt or inconvenience civilian populations. Such consequences would weaken international support and so guerrilla groups will likely refrain from such activities. That does not mean kinetic attacks will not happen, just that they are more likely to be the work of terrorists who are less concerned with international perceptions. Instead, attacks by guerrillas are more likely to focus on effects like degrading an orbit, disabling a capability (like a state’s communications satellites), or blinding a surveillance satellite to reduce a state’s military advantage when engaging with the guerrilla forces.

Because of the similarities between space and cyberspace, we should also expect groups to engage in multidomain attacks using any available new technologies. As early as 1999, hackers seized control of a British military communications satellite with a home computer.20 Guerrilla groups historically engage in a variety of cyber attacks, mostly to harass governments or to deny service to government agencies. For example, the LTTE, the now-inactive Tamil insurgent group in Sri Lanka referenced earlier, often engaged the Sri Lankan military in guerrilla warfare but also carried out terrorist attacks. It had a cyber unit as early as 1997 that frequently targeted the government. Beyond using its own website for propaganda and financing, the LTTE hacked government networks, engaged in denial of service attacks, and engaged in propaganda and counterpropaganda by hacking websites. In 2007, they even pirated a US satellite to send broadcasts to other countries.21 Similar types of attacks are likely to occur against space assets as more groups gain the capability to do so.

Terrorist attacks against space capabilities could come in a variety of forms based on numerous motivations. Terrorist motivations could be driven by nationalism or a revolutionary ideology, similar to what motivates guerrillas but targeting civilians to achieve the group’s goals. Groups also use terrorism for a variety of other reasons that may be local, regional, or global. Examples include religious differences, for **antitechnological purposes**, or simply as part of a neoanarchist movement hoping to prevent governments from becoming even more powerful through the exploitation of space.

Terrorists engage in several different types of tactics, against a variety of targets, though the target is often linked to the broader goals of the group. For instance, Marxist groups are more likely than others to target private businesses, religious groups are more likely than other types of groups to target other religions, and white supremacist groups often attack minorities or minority businesses. Given that terrorists—and guerrillas, for that matter—generally attack targets that are consistent with their strategic goals, what would motivate groups to target a country’s space assets? It could simply be a group that wants to reduce the power of the state or a group that opposes the state’s ideology. Also possible are attacks by groups that oppose the weaponization of space or that oppose technology more broadly, focusing on a state’s policies in space rather than the nature of the state itself, much as single-issue terrorists focus on a state’s treatment of animals or its abortion laws. Many Americans oppose spending money on space when there are economic or social problems at home, so it is not too much of a stretch to expect violence in opposition to using resources on space.22

### Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### Independently:

#### 1] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### 3] Non util ethics are impossible

Greene 07 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: <https://www.gwern.net/docs/philosophy/ethics/2007-greene.pdf>, pages 47-50)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

#### 4] That justifies util – it’s impartial, specific to public actors, and resolves infinite regress which explains all value.

Greene 15 — (Joshua Greene, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard, being interviewed by Russ Roberts, “Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism”, The Library of Economics and Liberty, 1-5-15, Available Online at <https://www.econtalk.org/joshua-greene-on-moral-tribes-moral-dilemmas-and-utilitarianism/#audio-highlights>, accessed 5-17-20, HKR-AM) \*\*NB: Guest = Greene, and only his lines are highlighted/underlined

Guest: Okay. So, I think utilitarianism is very much misunderstood. And this is part of the reason why we shouldn't even call it utilitarianism at all. We should call it what I call 'deep pragmatism', which I think better captures what I think utilitarianism is really like, if you really apply it in real life, in light of an understanding of human nature. But, we can come back to that. The idea, going back to the tragedy of common-sense morality is you've got all these different tribes with all of these different values based on their different ways of life. What can they do to get along? And I think that the best answer that we have is--well, let's back up. In order to resolve any kind of tradeoff, you have to have some kind of common metric. You have to have some kind of common currency. And I think that what utilitarianism, whether it's the moral truth or not, is provide a kind of common currency. So, what is utilitarianism? It's basically the idea that--it's really two ideas put together. One is the idea of impartiality. That is, at least as social decision makers, we should regard everybody's interests as of equal worth. Everybody counts the same. And then you might say, 'Well, but okay, what does it mean to count everybody the same? What is it that really matters for you and for me and for everybody else?' And there the utilitarian's answer is what is sometimes called, somewhat accurately and somewhat misleadingly, happiness. But it's not really happiness in the sense of cherries on sundaes, things that make you smile. It's really the quality of conscious experience. So, the idea is that if you start with anything that you value, and say, 'Why do you care about that?' and keep asking, 'Why do you care about that?' or 'Why do you care about that?' you ultimately come down to the quality of someone's conscious experience. So if I were to say, 'Why did you go to work today?' you'd say, 'Well, I need to make money; and I also enjoy my work.' 'Well, what do you need your money for?' 'Well, I need to have a place to live; it costs money.' 'Well, why can't you just live outside?' 'Well, I need a place to sleep; it's cold at night.' 'Well, what's wrong with being cold?' 'Well, it's uncomfortable.' 'What's wrong with being uncomfortable?' 'It's just bad.' Right? At some point if you keep asking why, why, why, it's going to come down to the conscious experience--in Bentham's terms, again somewhat misleading, the pleasure and pain of either you or somebody else that you care about. So the utilitarian idea is to say, Okay, we all have our pleasures and pains, and as a moral philosophy we should all count equally. And so a good standard for resolving public disagreements is to say we should go with whatever option is going to produce the best overall experience for the people who are affected. Which you can think of as shorthand as maximizing happiness--although I think that that's somewhat misleading. And the solution has a lot of merit to it. But it also has endured a couple of centuries of legitimate criticism. And one of the biggest criticisms--and now we're getting back to the Trolley cases, is that utilitarianism doesn't adequately account for people's rights. So, take the footbridge case. It seems that it's wrong to push that guy off the footbridge. Even if you stipulate that you can save more people's lives. And so anyone who is going to defend utilitarianism as a meta-morality--that is, a solution to the tragedy of common sense morality, as a moral system to adjudicate among competing tribal moral systems--if you are going to defend it in that way, as I do, you have to face up to these philosophical challenges: is it okay to kill on person to save five people in this kind of situation? So I spend a lot of the book trying to understand the psychology of cases like the footbridge case. And you mention these being kind of unrealistic and weird cases. That's actually part of my defense.

#### Complacency goes neg – academics and the wider public actively discount the probability AND magnitude of existential risks – only giving them extra attention in debate solves – that means our impact outweighs even in we lose the rest of framing

Javorsky 18 [Emilia Javorsky is a Boston-based physician-scientist focused on the invention, development and commercialization of new medical therapies. She also leads an Artificial Intelligence in Medicine initiative with The Future Society at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Why Human Extinction Needs a Marketing Department. January 15, 2018. https://www.xconomy.com/boston/2018/01/15/why-human-extinction-needs-a-marketing-department/]

Experts at Oxford University and elsewhere have estimated that the risk of a global human extinction event this century—or at least of an event that wipes out 10 percent or more of the world’s population— is around 1 in 10. The most probable culprits sending us the way of the dinosaur are mostly anthropogenic risks, meaning those created by humans. These include climate change, nuclear disaster, and more emerging risks such as artificial intelligence gone wrong (by accident or nefarious intent) and bioterrorism. A recent search of the scientific literature through ScienceDirect for “human extinction” returned a demoralizing 157 results, compared to the 1,627 for “dung beetle.” I don’t know about you, but this concerns me. Why is there so little research and action on existential risks (risks capable of rendering humanity extinct)?

A big part of the problem is a lack of awareness about the real threats we face and what can be done about them. When asked to estimate the chance of an extinction event in the next 50 years, U.S. adults in surveys reported chances ranging from 1 in 10 million to 1 in 100, certainly not 10 percent. The awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community as well, where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks. Developing viable risk mitigation strategies will require widespread civic engagement and concerted research efforts. Consequently, there is an urgent need to improve the communication of the magnitude and importance of existential risks. The first step is getting an audience to pay attention to this issue.

#### Ideal theory bad- ignores concrete conditions of the material world that shape action- allows academics to elide responsibility to challenging oppression- acting in imperfect conditions must always be assumed by ethical theories- it’s the conclusion of their Farr card

Farr 2

Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. JDN.

One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empirical character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents.