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#### Plan: The appropriation of outer space by private entities in The People's Republic of China is unjust.

#### 1] China’s dependent on private companies for space expansion, satellite deployment, and mining

Fernandez 21 — (Ray Fernandez, Writer at ScreenRant, “Hundreds Chinese Companies Called To Boost Space “, ScreenRant, 11-27-2021, Available Online at https://screenrant.com/chinese-companies-boost-space-development/, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR)

In a new move to boost space development, China has opened up space to private companies. China's space program is heavily linked with the military and wrapped up in secrecy. However, recent Chinese space accomplishments, rovers on the Moon and Mars, new satellites and new space stations were primarily developed by government efforts.

The U.S. brought in the private sector as a strategy to boost its space program and develop expensive and ambitious new projects. Now China is doing the same. The last time China used national private companies to increase development was when it declared Artificial Intelligence a national priority. Fast forward a few years, Chinese AI dominates globally.

At the 7th China (International) Commercial Aerospace Forum, national private companies presented many new and ambitious projects, including spaceplanes, space resources, a massive constellation of satellites and more. One of the companies at the event was the space giant China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC). The Ministry of Science and Technology, China National Space Administration, and other government arms sponsored and supervised the event.

CASIC said that the Xingyun constellation — made up of 80 satellites is moving full speed ahead. The corporation announced that the intelligent space satellite production factory was operating. They are now launching rockets from their own rocket park in the city of Wuhan. Today the rocket park and smart sat factory produce 20 solid-fuel launches and 100 satellites per year but plans to increase capacities are on their way. CASIC is also working on the Tengyun spaceplane, recently flight-testing an advanced turbine-based combined cycle engine in the Gobi desert.

CASIC is not the only private company developing space planes in China. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. and iSpace also presented their plans for space planes and space crafts. iSpace has designed two missions to the Moon, which they assure will be the first commercial missions to the natural satellite. China is getting some **inspiration from U.S. companies**. Local companies in China are looking into space tourism with suborbital and orbital flights. And Deep Blue Aerospace is developing a reusable launcher that looks very much like the Heavy Falcon of SpaceX.

The event's **main themes** were IoT space networks, multi-purpose satellite constellations, **space** resources (mining) and taking the Chinese space sector to a new level with private participation. While the U.S. has its eye on Chinese military space vehicles, it may have overlooked and underestimated the impact that the Chinese private sector will have. Hundreds of new companies have responded to the government's call to "start a new journey for commercial aerospace" in China. It is only a matter of time until their full power and capabilities are unleashed into space.

#### 2] Xi commitments, manufacturing capacity, and FDI make the CCP’s private sector integral to 21st century space competition

Patel 21 — (Neel V. Patel, Neel is the space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and he writes The Airlock newsletter. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where he grew and led the website’s space coverage., “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US“, MIT Technology Review, 1-21-2021, Available Online at https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR)

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

**“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,”** says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

#### 3] Mining basing competition causes war

Jamasmie 21 — (Cecilia Jamasmie, Cecilia has covered mining for more than a decade. She is particularly interested in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Diamonds and Latin America. Cecilia has been interviewed by BBC News and CBC among others and has been a guest speaker at mining conventions, including MINExpo 2016 and the World’s Copper Conference 2018. She is also member of the expert panel on Social License to Operate (SLO) at the European project MIREU (Mining and Metallurgic Regions EU). She holds a Master of Journalism from the University of British Columbia, and is based in Nova Scotia., “Experts warn of brewing space mining war among US, China and Russia“, MINING, 4-29-21, Available Online at https://www.mining.com/experts-warn-of-brewing-space-mining-war-among-us-china-and-russia/, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR)

A brewing war to set a mining base in space is likely to see China and Russia joining forces to keep the US increasing attempts to dominate extra-terrestrial commerce at bay, experts warn.

The Trump Administration took an active interest in space, announcing that America would return astronauts to the moon by 2024 and creating the Space Force as the newest branch of the US military.

It also proposed global legal framework for mining on the moon, called the Artemis Accords, encouraging citizens to mine the Earth’s natural satellite and other celestial bodies with commercial purposes.

The directive classified outer space as a “legally and physically unique domain of human activity” instead of a “global commons,” paving the way for mining the moon without any sort of international treaty.

Spearheaded by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Artemis Accords were signed in October by Australia, Canada, England, Japan, Luxembourg, Italy and the United Emirates.

“Unfortunately, the Trump Administration exacerbated a national security threat and risked the economic opportunity it hoped to secure in outer space by failing to engage Russia or China as potential partners,” says Elya Taichman, former legislative director for then-Republican Michelle Lujan Grisham.

“Instead, the Artemis Accords have driven China and Russia toward increased cooperation in space out of fear and necessity,” he writes.

Russia’s space agency Roscosmos was the first to speak up, likening the policy to colonialism.

“There have already been examples in history when one country decided to start seizing territories in its interest — everyone remembers what came of it,” Roscosmos’ deputy general director for international cooperation, Sergey Saveliev, said at the time.

China, which made history in 2019 by becoming the first country to land a probe on the far side of the Moon, chose a different approach. Since the Artemis Accords were first announced, Beijing has approached Russia to jointly build a lunar research base.

President Xi Jinping has also he made sure China planted its flag on the Moon, which happened in December 2020, more than 50 years after the US reached the lunar surface.

#### 4] Russia’s long-term space strategy is contingent on the Chinese private sector

Curcio 21 — (Blaine Curcio, Blaine Curcio is an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally and the broader space industry in China., “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector“, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), 8-24-2021, Available Online at https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR) //Blaine Curcio is the interviewee; the interviewer is lura Winfrey, an intern with the Center for Innovation, Trade, and Strategy at NBR.

The Russian and U.S. space industries are the two oldest. They have a lot of space programs, experts, and related intellectual property and have been integrated into the space ecosystem. The Chinese space sector has developed primarily independently from the U.S.-Russia system. There has been some collaboration between China and Europe since the Wolf Amendment, but the absence of any kind of commercial space companies until recently, combined with the sensitivity around the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (a U.S. export-control regime), has forced the Chinese space ecosystem to develop pretty much independently. Russia, though a nation in decline, still likes projects involving space to bolster national pride. As a result, there has been a broader trend over the last five to ten years of a gradual realignment of the Russian space sector toward China in terms of both the government and the industrial base.

**More Russian companies are looking to China to buy products.** Historically these companies have bought material from Europe, but they have recently turned more to China because of how weak the Russian ruble is, making imports more expensive. At the same time, Chinese companies are looking to Russia as an export market as well as to Russia and former Soviet states as investment opportunities. There is synergy, for example, between a Chinese rocket company that sees a relatively cheap Ukrainian rocket company with specific technology that it wants and a Ukrainian company that has all the technology, intellectual property, and “know-how,” but does not have that much money.

The international lunar research station is beneficial to the commercial space sector to the extent that the national team would be occupied with the space station. As the national team gets bigger and takes on more sophisticated projects, this may help free up the kind of lower-end work companies were doing before and create more room for commercial competition.

Moving forward, if there are massive lunar projects and a large Chinese space station, these developments are all things that will occupy a lot of top engineers and SOEs. There will be a need for a bigger commercial sector to contribute to emerging projects and complete the technological development of the more commercial, as opposed to institutional or national-level, projects in the space sector.

What is the relationship between China’s space industry development and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, and how is this affecting the commercial space sector?

There are two main types of impact: the technological impact and the broader policy impact. As part of the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the Chinese government wants to develop specific capabilities and emphasize specific technologies, which produce the technological impact. From that perspective, this strategy dictates what the commercial space sector does in terms of R&D, and the technological direction it takes. Zhuhai satellite is an example of this strategy. Since Zhuhai satellite was a spinoff from the Harbin Institute of Technology, which has a military link, there is a possibility that it is pursuing more space technologies that are related to Military-Civil Fusion.

The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive.

#### 5]Space Sino-Russian alliance causes space conflict and nuclear war

Taichman 21 — (Elya Taichman, Elya Taichman is the former legislative director for then-Rep. Michelle Lujan Grisham, where he focused on space, national security, and foreign policy., “Opinion“, POLITICO, 1-29-2021, Available Online at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/29/biden-space-diplomacy-russia-china-455963, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR)

Instead, the Artemis Accords have driven China and Russia toward increased cooperation in space out of fear and necessity. China opposes the Artemis Accords, with experts likening the American-led coalition of ten nations to Britain’s colonial Enclosure Movement. Dmitry Rogozin, Chief of Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, compared them to an invasion of the moon and their international coalition to the NATO military alliance.

Moreover, Russia’s space program required increased funding that China could provide in exchange for the Russian expertise it craved. The pair even announced they were considering building a lunar research base together. Nevertheless, it is clear this new friendship will create a destabilizing counter-system in space.

To be fair, there is good reason for the United States to pursue the Artemis Accords without Russia and China. China’s official policy is to become the preeminent space power by 2045. This means a nuclear-powered space fleet, space transport for humans, and mining colonies on the Moon, Mars, and asteroids. President Xi Jinping described the Chinese space program as “part of the dream to make China stronger.” Furthermore, for nearly a decade the annual Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations bills included the Wolf Amendment, which has prohibited NASA from cooperating with China to prevent technology theft.

Russia also represents a serious threat in space and the need for a counter-coalition. In November 2019, Russia launched a single satellite that subsequently and unexpectedly “birthed” a twin. In January 2020, the pair floated near KH-11, a multi-billion-dollar U.S. military reconnaissance satellite. After the United States complained, Moscow moved the satellites away from KH-11.

However, on July 15, 2020, the “birthed” satellite launched a missile into outer space. Russia claimed the satellites were non-military, but these “Nesting Doll” satellites demonstrate the dual nature of space technology: that Russia and China can readily turn allegedly benign infrastructure into military weapons to threaten the United States. Thus, although the Artemis Accords govern commercial space activities, assembling a like-minded coalition ready to challenge American foes seems prudent.

The Sino-Russo partnership not only undermines national security, but also risks the very aim of the Artemis Accords: the expansion of space commerce. A competing alliance in space will prevent the Artemis Accords from developing into customary international law that would increase stability.

For example, under the Artemis Accords, nations agree to increase transparency and employ “safety zones” for activities like lunar mining. As nations and corporations compete over the best locations on the moon to extract lunar ice to create rocket fuel, it is important that a single system govern who may operate where. Otherwise, potential conflicts lack peaceful means of resolution.

#### 6] That goes nuclear – space is fragile and offense dominant, so even small incidents escalate

Laura Grego 18, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf>

Why space is a particular problem for crisis stability

For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge.

The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives

Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets.

Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway.

A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way:

First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur.

For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites.

Short timelines and difficulty of attribution

The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way.

Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes).

In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive.

Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions

During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk.

However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it.

Misperception and dual-use technologies

Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks.

Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21

Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22

Discrimination

The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective.

However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably.

In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame, or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24 warned that it was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons:

As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employed to achieve limited national objectives.

Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionality

States have fairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea, built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets).

Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons.

#### 7] NEA scarcity and ilaw ambiguity makes US-China competition go nuclear

Gautel 21 — (Gidon Gautel is currently an Analyst in the space industry. He was previously the Project Coordinator of China Foresight and Project Manager of the Economic Diplomacy Commission at LSE IDEAS. Gidon holds a BSc in Government and Economics with first class honours from the London School of Economics & Political Science, and an MSc in Innovation, Entrepreneurship & Management with distinction from Imperial College Business School., [insert quals], “Coordination Failure: Risks of US-China competition in space“, Medium, 4-29-2021, Available Online at https://lseideas.medium.com/coordination-failure-risks-of-us-china-competition-in-space-7112ca4f4da1, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR)

Finally, a lack of coordination increases the risks for lunar crewmembers, once these arrive on the moon. The disruptions of the kind described above should be self-explanatory in their risk to humans attempting to establish a permanent presence. However, more insidious factors also abound. One of these is the lack of standardisation driven by a bifurcation into geopolitical blocs of lunar activity. As has been pointed out, widely adopted standards of lunar exploration promise considerable benefits[16]. A balkanisation of standards would do the opposite, limiting any attempt of future cooperation in exploration and scientific endeavour. In the most extreme cases, it endangers lives. Mutual aid is a core tenet of both the Outer Space Treaty and the Artemis Accords. Yet, a lack of universally accepted technological standards for lunar (and beyond) crewed operations potentially makes such action considerably more difficult. As the ISS has proven, any inter-operational system must be designed from the outset to be inter-operational. For future lunar activities, this presently seems impossible. Though currently remote, the possibility of the loss of life due to conflicting standards of crewed lunar technology is nevertheless a tragedy worth contemplating.

Again, the described issues are most likely to occur should terrestrial geopolitical tensions between the US and China preclude proactive coordination and information sharing. While the establishment of separate lunar operations can, at this point, be taken as a given, it is far from too late to establish functionally sufficient coordination mechanisms to prevent a major international incident. While US-China coordination is limited by the Wolf Amendment, it is not wholly precluded, as indicated by NASA’s monitoring of the Chang’e 4 mission, utilising the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter[17], and, more recently, an exchange of data to mitigate the risks of an orbital collision of Mars orbiters[18]. Ideally, therefore, the United States would proactively take the necessary bilateral steps to work with China to coordinate its respective beyond-Earth surface activities and prevent harmful interference.

Alongside, and regardless of, these efforts, it will be the task of members of international bodies, such as The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to facilitate coordination activities. In the midst of such efforts, ESA member states are primary actors eligible for leading such initiatives, with ESA having engaged in collaborative activities in space with both the US and China. While diplomats active within UN COPUOS will be well aware of these issues, and their role in enabling such necessary coordination, it is incumbent upon national governments allied to the US to recognise these flashpoints and spearhead broader policy responses to proactively support coordination and the activities of their diplomats at the UN. The UK government, whose diplomats already play a major role in coordinating international space activities, must lend them its full support.

Beyond the moon, the issue of geographically concentrated sites of interest is only likely to prevail. While space is boundless, areas of economical or scientific value are nonetheless often concentrated. Some preliminary analysis, for example, places the number of economically viable near-Earth asteroids at around only ten[19], due to the fact that metallic, accessible, and economically viable near-Earth asteroids are comparatively rare in number. Given the considerable geographic challenges associated with on-asteroid operations, the need for multi-actor coordination will only become more pressing, especially if terrestrial US-China competition intensifies.

Failures to Coordinate

The risks outlined above are non-exhaustive, and do not touch upon the military dimension of space which carries equal if not greater weight. However, they demonstrate clearly the fact that US-China coordination in space will become ever more pressing as the exploration and commercialisation of space advances. Such risks will only manifest themselves if the US and China are unable to coordinate their activities sufficiently and allow geopolitical tensions to obstruct this crucial work.

Looking forwards, all third-party actors in space should closely monitor terrestrial US-China relations and map these to their own activities relating to space (be this in the realm of space exploration or applications), taking mitigating measures as necessary should tensions spill over beyond Earth. In tandem, states with notable diplomatic influence should increase further efforts to enable frictionless coordination and information sharing between the two great powers. Crucially, should formal coordination mechanisms in orbit, on the moon, or beyond be in sight, imperfect coordination should be prioritised if institutional gridlock driven by the pursuit of national interest is the alternative.

#### 8] China will long-term outpace the US in space – mining, first-mover advantage, lunar projects

Fabian 21 — (Chris Fabian, Capt. Chris Fabian, U.S. Space Force, is a crew commander in the 3rd Space Operations Squadron supporting the Delta 9 mission. , “A call to action for strategic space competition with China“, TheHill, 6-22-2021, Available Online at https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/558979-a-call-to-action-for-strategic-space-competition-with-china?rl=1, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR)

To compete with China’s space power, the United States needs ambitious visions, not business as usual. China aims to be a dominant space power by 2045, raising concerns that it seeks to establish itself as a space hegemon. The meteoric rise of China’s space program and its lofty ambitions could result in China outpacing the United States in space. China understands that a vibrant space industry is critical infrastructure for economic development, would achieve potent soft-power effects, and provide vital capabilities to Chinese national security and economic development.

China sent its first astronaut into orbit in 2003, yet in 2018 conducted more space-oriented operations than any other nation. Last December, China landed on the moon, planted its flag, collected moon rock samples, returned to Earth, and plans to install a permanent lunar space station by 2031. Months after China reached Mars’ orbit, its Zhurong rover landed on the red planet surface in May. China has begun talks with Russia to secure partnership for a lunar base project. Between 2036-2045, China plans to have a long-term human presence at the Lunar South Pole. These are amazing accomplishments and an ambitious vision for a nation that launched its first satellite only recently, in 1970.

China’s space diplomacy and science efforts are biased toward exploring and exploiting natural resources in near-Earth objects and on the moon. China’s behavior in space may mirror its patterns of resource nationalism on Earth — that is to say, spending incredible political and economic capital to secure exclusive access to strategic resources. As Earth-based resources become scarce and technology makes space-mining feasible, space will become a frontier for strategic competition, especially resource nationalism. Mining even a single asteroid could disrupt global iron, nickel, platinum group metals (PGM) and precious metal-based economies, markets and industry supply chains, especially if controlled by a single state and used for in situ manufacturing and re-supply. Establishing a presence in cislunar space, as China clearly intends, provides capabilities and capacity for space mining, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), and first-mover locational advantages for space settlement.

This emerging competition differs from the Cold War-era race for symbolic space milestones that sought to prove the superiority of the U.S. market-based economic system for the benefit of unaligned nations. Today’s space race is about the actual economics of space-derived capabilities, access to space resources, and the technologies for acquiring and controlling them. The United States is at a crossroads: It can either prepare itself for this new paradigm, or be relegated to second-class status and look back on what could have been. Efficient and advantageous strategic investment now is better than doubling down later with a patchwork of expensive, rushed space programs.

#### 9] Space competition is inevitable and will determine hegemonic power on Earth–it’s just a question of who wins the race.

Jaewoo Choo 21(Professor of Chinese foreign policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University, Korea. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for East Asian Studies Program, the Brooking Institution and a Visiting Associate Professor at Georgia Institute of Technology. He graduated from Wesleyan University (BA in Government) and Peking University (MA & Ph.D. in International Relations). His research areas are Chinese foreign policy, multilateral security cooperation, and China-North Korea relations. He was a contributor to Asia Times on the Korean peninsula affairs), “The United States and China: Competition for superiority in space to protect resources and weapon systems,” OpenAsia, 03/11/2021, https://www.openasia.asia/the-united-states-and-china-competition-for-superiority-in-space-to-protect-resources-and-weapon-systems/

**The strategic competition between the U.S. and China is fierce** even **in** **space** outside of the earth. What do the two countries compete for in space? What are their objectives and what strategic calculations did they start from? Will the space race between the two countries lead to competition over space hegemony? This is one of the most interesting issues for U.S.-China observers in recent days. The space race between the U.S. and China is not just a number fight. How many satellites and spaceships have been launched and how many space stations have been established are the questions that mattered in the past. These mattered for the convenience and benefit for mankind. It could also make possible for some of the curiosity about the universe to be solved. However, starting the 21st century, the space race between the U.S. and China has progressed into an intense, high-level strategic battle. **Whoever rules space rules the future** There is one reason why **the** two **countries' space strategy competition will inevitably lead to a hegemony competition**. This is **because they try to conquer the space order**. Conquering the space order is to define and establish the space order. **Those who dominate space will dominate almost all sectors of the future world, including economy, technology, environment, cyberspace, transportation and energy**. That's why the United States is considered as a hegemonic country on Earth today. **The U.S. is recognized as a hegemonic country because it establishes and leads the economic, financial, trade, political, and diplomatic order.** There are two areas in the world today where international order has not been established. One is virtual space, which is the cyber world. The other is the space. Since the international order of these two areas is closely correlated with each other, it is likely that the establishment of the order in these two areas will be pursued simultaneously. This means that cyber order cannot be discussed without discussing satellite issues. The Communist Party of China recognized this early on. At the 19th National Communist Party Congress in 2017, it expressed its justification for establishing space order. President Xi Jinping declared that China's diplomatic stage in the 21st century has expanded beyond the Earth into space and virtual space. It was the moment when China defined the concept of diplomatic space as the "universe" beyond the Earth. He then explained that the establishment of a system that can even manage the order of the universe and the virtual world eventually means the establishment of practical governance. Therefore, he justified that China's diplomatic horizon has no choice but to expand into space. Furthermore, he stressed that he is confident that the ideation of building such governance serves as the foundation for the community of common destiny for mankind which China pursues. In other words, he publicly urged China to have the capabilities and means to become a key country in building governance in these two areas. This led the Trump administration to spare no effort to develop space science and technology and space projects, which are the basis of space order. Since President George W. Bush, the maintenance work for supremacy in space has been carried out. President Obama also introduced a policy to encourage U.S. private companies to participate in space projects to expand the foundation for supremacy in space. It was President Trump who actualized all these. He was the one who legalized private companies' space development projects under the Space Policy Directive-I. He also thoroughly reflected his “America First” principle in the space business. For example, all the substances obtained in space, including minerals, were no longer defined as "common goods." He also promised that space activities by private companies in the United States would be free from restrictions such as the Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 resolution by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. **Space and the moon were known as repositories of resources. As it became known that the resources that are scarce or will be depleted on Earth are very abundant outside the Earth in space, the space race has gotten intense. This is why the space race has been promoted on a geoeconomic level**. However, in order to secure these benefits of geoeconomic strategies, geopolitical strategies must be accompanied. In other words, military defenses should be backed up to protect the resource acquisition process. Fearing this, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space strictly regulates the military use of space. However, the fact that the logic of developing naval power to protect long-range foreign interests on Earth is reflected in the strategic thinking of securing space profits is the decisive factor that has driven the space race today. The repositories of resources and future energy sources There are three strategic benefits that drive the U.S.-China competition for supremacy in space. The first is the infinite resource in space. **There are endless resources buried in more than 10,000 asteroids orbiting the Earth.** **They are known to have an abundance of resources such as carbon, zinc, cobalt, platinum, gold, silver and titanium, in which platinum and titanium, for example, can be sold for $30,000 to $50,000 per kilogram.** Second, the **future energy source lies in space**. **Power supply using solar energy will be possible by establishing a space power plant that concentrates solar energy in the Earth-Moon area and transmitting it to Earth through laser beams. Here, the supplied solar power is known to be 35 to 70% more powerful than the solar energy on Earth. By 2100, 70 terawatts of energy will be needed, and it is expected that 332 terawatts can be supplied through the development of space solar power plants in a geostationary orbit. Third, the desire to dominate space for hegemony has established the space competition relationship between the U.S. and China. Although each started from different strategic interests, in the end, they have one common goal.** First of all, **China** wants to be free from the U.S. GPS system. This is because only through the freedom China can prevent its future weapons system from becoming vulnerable to U.S. control and restrictions. It **is planning to achieve its goal of establishing a so-called "Space Silk Road" by expanding China's "BeiDou" navigation system to the regions within One Belt One Road and the national satellite and communication systems. The U.S. also plans to spend $25 billion to develop GPS3 systems with stronger defense capabilities against Chinese space and cyberattacks, by 2025.** **The competition between the U.S. and China to establish a space station in order to secure the benefits from space strategies is inevitable.** This is because a space station is the foundation for establishing space order. As the space station has the purpose of protecting and defending from enemies**, militarization is inevitable in the process. It is clear that the outcome will lead to a space arms race. This is why the competition over supremacy in space between the U.S. and China has the aspects of the New Cold War outside the Earth.** Space is a blue ocean. It is a world without order. Preemption is therefore important. In order to prepare space order and accompanying laws, norms, and systems, the U.S. and China have been engaged in a fierce battle through space projects. This is because **space is the decisive factor in the operation of energy, resources, environment, communication, and advanced military weapons systems in the future. Space is no longer a dream world.** Of course, it takes a lot of time for these strategic benefits to become a reality. However, the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the development of AI (Artificial Intelligence) technology will speed up the pace. This is because economic problems can be solved if spacecraft recycling is made possible with the participation of private companies and facilities related to space stations and mineral mining equipment are set up with 3D printers.

#### 10] Heg solves nuclear war and global fascism

Kroenig 20 [Matthew Kroenig is an American political scientist, best-selling author, and an award-winning national security strategist. "The Return of Great Power Rivalry Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China." https://www.google.com/books/edition/The\_Return\_of\_Great\_Power\_Rivalry/dXLKDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover]

Indeed, China itself has been among the greatest beneficiaries of a U.S.- led international order. American military and economic power have provided the peace and macroeconomic stability that allowed China to grow into the major power that it is today.

There is little reason to believe that Russia and China will be as kind. These autocratic powers long to establish spheres of influence in their near abroad, and they have shown little concern for the sovereignty or personal freedoms of their own citizens or subjected populations. To get a vision of a world led by Russia or China, just look at how they treat the people that fall under their influence today. Russian dictator Vladimir Putin invades neighboring countries and murders critical journalists. And China takes contested territory from its neighbors through brute force and locks up one million Muslim minorities in “re-education” camps. And this is but a small taste of the brutality of these governments. If readers doubt these claims, they can simply ask citizens of American allies in Eastern Europe or East Asia whether they desire continued American leadership, or whether they would prefer to live under the thumb of Moscow or Beijing, respectively.

Moreover, just as consequentially for the globe, the decline of the United States could very well result in war. As noted earlier, international relations theory maintains that the decline of one dominant power and the rise of another often results in great power conflict.24 According to this telling, World War I and World War II were primarily the result of the decline of the British Empire and the rise of Imperial and then Nazi Germany. Falling powers fight preventive wars in a bid to remain on top, and rising powers launch conflicts to dislodge the reigning power and claim their “place in the sun.”25 Many fear that a power transition between Beijing and Washington would produce a similar catastrophic result.26 Continued American leadership, therefore, could forestall this transition and may be necessary for continued peace and stability among the major powers. s

#### 11] Heg is sustainable but not impervious to collapse

Hal Brands, 5-1-2021, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor At The Johns Hopkins School Of Advanced International Studies, China’s Creative Challenge—and the Threat to America, Commentary Magazine, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/hal-brands/chinas-geopolitical-challenge-threat-to-america//Khan

FINALLY, CHINA is testing the patterns of history simply by taking on the United States. America is the most lethal competitor of the modern era, and it now has its sights set squarely on Beijing. Consider the historical record. In an environment populated mostly by hostile autocracies, America became a continental behemoth and the world’s strongest economy within a century. It then achieved something no other modern great power has managed—lasting, if periodically contested, hegemony in its home region. During the 20th century, America or the coalitions it supported decisively defeated a series of illiberal powers—Germany (twice), Japan, the Soviet Union—that challenged its vital interests. Along the way, Washington peacefully wrested global leadership from the United Kingdom. For over a century, the surest path to destruction has been inviting the focused hostility of the United States. America’s formidable record is the product of many factors. Vast resource endowments and uniquely advantageous geography have allowed America to project power globally without facing severe geopolitical threats near home. Similarly, the fact that America is powerful and far away leads countries all around the Eurasian periphery to ally with the United States against nearby predators that threaten their independence. The country’s relatively open economy has created great dynamism and innovation; its democratic institutions have allowed it, more often than not, to use its other advantages effectively. And the slowness with which America sometimes mobilizes to confront threats contributes to the single-mindedness with which it eventually combats them. The type of superpower America is also matters. Because America is a liberal nation, it has taken a liberal approach to global power. Since 1945, it has delivered freedom of the seas, a global reserve currency, and a massive market for foreign goods, in addition to providing security and stability in key regions. Those attributes have made other countries support the American cause, which makes American hegemony even harder to overturn. Neither China nor any other country can compete on these dimensions: Beijing lacks the ability to act as a global security provider and the willingness (as a neo-mercantilist actor) to anchor a truly open global economy. It cannot fully open its market without exposing key industries to competition and wrecking plans to reduce strategic dependence on the West. Even if China’s raw power exceeded America’s, its ability to act as a comparatively benign and popular hegemon would not. Having helped the United States defeat the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders understood the peril of provoking American hostility: This was the crux of Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum about “hiding” capabilities and “biding” time. Chinese statecraft in the post-Tiananmen era was meant to increase Beijing’s power while delaying an American response. The building of deep commercial and financial ties with the United States not only fueled Chinese growth; it also made it more painful for America to turn toward competition. The cultivation of American elites in academia, business, and politics strengthened supporters of continued engagement. Even as Chinese statecraft become more assertive after 2008, Beijing moved incrementally—in the South China Sea and elsewhere—to avoid giving America an eye-opening “Sputnik moment.” And even as the relationship deteriorated during the Obama years, the Chinese leadership used the lure of cooperation on climate change and talk of a “new type of great-power relations” to discourage a sharper pivot in American policy. Historians will one day marvel at how well this strategy—combined with America’s post-9/11 distraction—worked. It took two decades, from the time serious observers began warning about the Chinese challenge, for the United States to adjust its statecraft decisively. During that time, China gained access to technology, capital, and markets that powered its ascent; there emerged an incredibly complex interdependence that continues to retard multilateral mobilization against Beijing. If the United States loses the competition with China, it will be—in no small part—because Beijing successfully anesthetized Washington to a growing peril. The bad news, from Xi’s vantage point, is that the game is up. Predatory economic behavior that America once tolerated has become more threatening as Beijing worked its way up global value chains. Small nibbles at the status quo eventually added up to larger, more alarming shifts. The Chinese government prematurely let the mask slip after the 2008–09 financial crisis, with more assertive diplomacy that gradually made the thesis of America’s engagement policy—that Beijing would mellow over time—impossible to defend. And by the Trump era, China had simply gotten tired of waiting and disguising its ambitions. COVID then did more than any Committee on the Present Danger could ever have done to reveal both the utterly cynical nature of the CCP regime—which sought to stymie the virus’s spread within China even as it allowed continued travel from Wuhan to the world—and the fact that this behavior could mortally imperil Americans’ well-being. China is no longer the “stealth superpower”—there is now a bipartisan consensus that America must thwart its global designs. From here onward, Beijing must forcefully wrest influence from a dangerous hegemon that is alert to a new authoritarian challenge. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS don’t determine everything: History wouldn’t be very interesting if they did. The United States always had profound advantages over the Soviet Union, but it wouldn’t have won the Cold War had it not worked feverishly to shore up Western Europe in the late 1940s and maintain a military balance that made Soviet aggression seem suicidal. Strategic urgency and commitment were what ultimately allowed America to make the most of its strengths. That’s worth keeping in mind today. The fact that Chinese power and influence have grown so markedly in recent decades and that the resulting challenge has become so stark show the impact that determined, innovative strategy can have. The dilemmas that the United States confronts, in areas from 5G technology to the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, illustrate the costs of strategic lethargy. Indeed, America is fully capable of squandering its advantages if it degrades or destroys its own democracy, declines to make domestic reforms and investments to maintain its competitive edge, fails to rally the overlapping coalitions needed to resist Chinese ambitions, or delays in driving the military innovation required to shore up a sagging balance in the Western Pacific. The list of hard policy problems America must urgently solve to prevail against China is itself long and formidable. And even if Washington does prevail in that rivalry, America may absorb significant setbacks—and the international order may absorb significant damage—in the process. Yet as rough as the road ahead looks from Washington, it ought to look even rougher from Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party runs a profoundly illiberal regime that is trying to overcome centuries of liberal dominance. China is straining against a strategic geography and international system that surely seem more constraining than inviting. Chinese strategists must find a way of breaking America’s position in the Western Pacific while avoiding the potential cataclysm of major war. And Beijing is taking on a superpower that has thrashed all previous comers. Smart strategies have permitted Beijing to do remarkably well, so far, in managing these problems. But many of those strategies face an uncertain future, in part because the international complacency that allowed them to flourish has been replaced—gradually, but increasingly—with international concern. This isn’t to say that China’s ambitions are hopeless illusions. In the coming years, there will be an intense interaction between an America that is adapting its strategies to deal with a pressing threat and a China that will have to adjust its own approaches in light of that response. Even American success in this interaction could bring new dangers: If Chinese leaders perceive that their window to achieve grand geopolitical goals is closing, then the regime could become even more aggressive in seeking to revise the global order while it still can. Much thus hinges on the quality of decisions made in Washington and other capitals around the world. But the fact that so many characteristics of modern great-power politics seem to favor the United States probably gives the reigning superpower better options and more room for error than its autocratic challenger. Nothing is predetermined: Beijing may still succeed in displacing the United States as the primary power in Asia and, eventually, the world. Yet if it does, that outcome will represent a catastrophic failure of American statecraft—or an awesome triumph of Chinese strategy in overcoming the great obstacles that litter Beijing’s path to hegemony.

#### 12] Biden will inev try to regain it – proves try or die

Tepperman 21 – a former editor in chief of Foreign Policy and the author of The Fix: How Countries Use Crises to Solve the World’s Worst Problems. (Jonathan, "Biden Was Right: America Is Back," Foreign Policy, 2-23-2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/23/biden-was-right-america-is-back/, Accessed 11-17-2021, LASA-SC)

President Joe Biden’s declaration to the Munich Security Conference last Friday that “America is back”—lest anyone miss it, he repeated the line three times—hasn’t gone down very well in the days since. While I suspect many in the Zoom audience were quietly relieved to hear it, public responses have ranged from skeptical to hostile. At the same conference, for example, French President Emmanuel Macron insisted that France stake out greater “strategic autonomy” from the United States. His German counterpart, Angela Merkel, reminded the audience that U.S. and German interests “will not always converge.” And back in the United States, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said: “I don’t think the American people can afford to go back to eight more years of Barack Obama’s foreign policy.” While Pompeo’s sneering is easy to dismiss (why waste time worrying about the opinions of the worst secretary of state in U.S. history), the other comments deserve more attention. Yet they and the critiques of various pundits who have argued that the president’s pledge was both premature and hubristic also miss the key point. Biden surely didn’t mean to suggest that the United States has returned to the level of power, prestige, and importance it enjoyed in 2016. Or that it has recaptured its moral standing. He wasn’t arguing that he’d already repaired all the damage done by his predecessor; of course not. What Biden likely meant to convey—and what allies and adversaries should pay attention to—is the fact that Washington is trying again: trying to mend ties and restore cooperation with its friends. Trying to push back against authoritarian regimes and defend universal values. Trying to protect public goods like the environment. And, like it or not, trying to lead. If you have any doubt that America is back in this sense, just compare any of the five weeks Biden has been in office to any one of Donald Trump’s 208. Since taking charge, the new president has sought to wrap the country’s traditional allies in one of his trademark bear hugs: by returning to the G-7 (which Trump spurned), for example, or by reversing Trump’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany. Washington has rejoined the Paris Agreement on climate change and the World Health Organization (both of which Trump dumped). Biden has extended the New START nuclear arms treaty with Russia (which Trump was about to abandon) and broadcast his intent to reenter the Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He has stood up for democracy and human rights by imposing sanctions on the junta in Myanmar and preparing new measures to punish President Vladimir Putin and his cronies in Russia, as well as by ending U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen. And he has pledged up to $4 billion to COVAX, the global initiative to help vaccinate the developing world against COVID-19. That would be an impressive list of accomplishments for any monthlong period. When you remember that the Biden administration has pulled all this off while seriously understaffed (most of its key appointments have yet to be confirmed) and while the country is still suffering the aftershocks of last month’s violent insurrection (tremors that included Trump’s second impeachment), it looks even more remarkable—and makes recent criticisms of Biden’s foreign-policy record seem a little unfair. That’s especially so when you also factor in the administration’s overwhelming domestic to-do list, which includes small matters like passing a $1.9 trillion recovery package and speeding up the country’s COVID-19 vaccination Indeed, the fact that the administration is spending any time at all on foreign policy right now—let alone looking beyond immediate crises to longer-term priorities like restoring the country’s international standing—is yet more evidence for Biden’s claim that America is back. Such moves also firmly align the administration with a long-standing national tradition. One of the most unusual and distinguishing features of the country’s domestic and foreign-policy record isn’t the absence of mistakes—the United States makes as many or more of these than other countries. It’s the United States’ record of acting to repair the damage once it has been done and the moment has passed. The country has developed a remarkable mechanism for self-correction, a history of ensuring that, after every one of its disastrous bouts of inattention (think the interwar period) or destructive Jacksonian rage (think the aftermath of 9/11), the national pendulum swings back to the middle. Every Richard Nixon gets followed by a Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter, every George W. Bush by a Barack Obama. Some mistakes take a lot longer to address than others. But the country often gets there in the end. American exceptionalism has become a dirty word in recent years, but this is that exceptionalism in its best form. Of course, the United States still has an enormous way to go before it can claim to be “back” to the kind of prominence it enjoyed before Trump’s election. But the fact that it’s trying so hard to get there shows it is already back in a critical sense. And that’s something we should all be grateful for.

#### 13] Heg solves unstable nuclear alliances that cause war

Hayes 18 [Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California, USA; Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University. Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony. November 8, 2018. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525>]

During a **post-hegemonic era**, **long-standing** nuclear **alliances** are likely to be **replaced** by **ad hoc nuclear coalitions**, aligning and realigning around different congeries of threat and even actual **nuclear wars**, with **much higher levels** of **uncertainty** and unpredictability **than** was the case in the **nuclear hegemonic system**.

There are a number of ways that this dynamic could play out during the interregnum, and these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory. In some instances, the sheer **momentum** of past policy combined with bureaucratic inertia and the potency of political, military service and corporate interests, may ensure that **residual aspects** of the formerly **hegemonic postures** are adhered to even as formal nuclear alliances rupture. Even as they **reach for** the **old anchors**, these states may be forced to adjust and retrench strategically, or start to **take** their own **nuclear risks** by making **increasingly explicit nuclear threats** and deployments against nuclear-armed adversaries – as **Japan** has begun to do with reference to its “technological deterrent” since about 2012.9 This period could last for many years **until and when** **nuclear war breaks out** and leads to a post-nuclear war disorder; or a new, post-hegemonic strategic framework is established to manage and/or abolish nuclear threat.

**Under** full-blown **American nuclear hegemony**, **fewer states** had **nuclear weapons**, the **major nuclear** weapons **states** entered into **legally binding restraints** on force levels and they learned from nuclear near-misses to **promulgate rules** of the road and tacit understandings. The lines drawn during full-blown collisions involving nuclear weapons were stark and concentrated the minds of leaders greatly. In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first; the only question was which one. Now, with nine nuclear weapons states, and conflicts conceivably involving three, four or more of them, no matter how much leaders concentrate, it will not be evident who is aiming at who, who may fire first, and during a volley, who fired first and even who hit whom.

In a highly proliferated world, nuclear-armed states may feel driven to obtain larger nuclear forces able to deter multiple adversaries at the same time, sufficient to conduct not only a few nuclear attacks but configured to fight **more than one** protracted **nuclear war** **at a time**, especially in nuclear states torn apart by civil war and post-nuclear attack reconstruction. The first time nuclear weapons are used since 1945 will be shocking, the second time, less so, the third time, the **new normal**.

### Framing

#### the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### Independently:

#### 1] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### 2] Complacency goes neg – academics and the wider public actively discount the probability AND magnitude of existential risks – only giving them extra attention in debate solves – that means our impact outweighs even in we lose the rest of framing

Javorsky 18 [Emilia Javorsky is a Boston-based physician-scientist focused on the invention, development and commercialization of new medical therapies. She also leads an Artificial Intelligence in Medicine initiative with The Future Society at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Why Human Extinction Needs a Marketing Department. January 15, 2018. https://www.xconomy.com/boston/2018/01/15/why-human-extinction-needs-a-marketing-department/]

Experts at Oxford University and elsewhere have estimated that the risk of a global human extinction event this century—or at least of an event that wipes out 10 percent or more of the world’s population— is around 1 in 10. The most probable culprits sending us the way of the dinosaur are mostly anthropogenic risks, meaning those created by humans. These include climate change, nuclear disaster, and more emerging risks such as artificial intelligence gone wrong (by accident or nefarious intent) and bioterrorism. A recent search of the scientific literature through ScienceDirect for “human extinction” returned a demoralizing 157 results, compared to the 1,627 for “dung beetle.” I don’t know about you, but this concerns me. Why is there so little research and action on existential risks (risks capable of rendering humanity extinct)?

A big part of the problem is a lack of awareness about the real threats we face and what can be done about them. When asked to estimate the chance of an extinction event in the next 50 years, U.S. adults in surveys reported chances ranging from 1 in 10 million to 1 in 100, certainly not 10 percent. The awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community as well, where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks. Developing viable risk mitigation strategies will require widespread civic engagement and concerted research efforts. Consequently, there is an urgent need to improve the communication of the magnitude and importance of existential risks. The first step is getting an audience to pay attention to this issue.

#### 3] Non util ethics are impossible

Greene 07 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: <https://www.gwern.net/docs/philosophy/ethics/2007-greene.pdf>, pages 47-50)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

#### 4] That justifies util – it’s impartial, specific to public actors, and resolves infinite regress which explains all value.

Greene 15 — (Joshua Greene, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard, being interviewed by Russ Roberts, “Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism”, The Library of Economics and Liberty, 1-5-15, Available Online at <https://www.econtalk.org/joshua-greene-on-moral-tribes-moral-dilemmas-and-utilitarianism/#audio-highlights>, accessed 5-17-20, HKR-AM) \*\*NB: Guest = Greene, and only his lines are highlighted/underlined

Guest: Okay. So, I think utilitarianism is very much misunderstood. And this is part of the reason why we shouldn't even call it utilitarianism at all. We should call it what I call 'deep pragmatism', which I think better captures what I think utilitarianism is really like, if you really apply it in real life, in light of an understanding of human nature. But, we can come back to that. The idea, going back to the tragedy of common-sense morality is you've got all these different tribes with all of these different values based on their different ways of life. What can they do to get along? And I think that the best answer that we have is--well, let's back up. In order to resolve any kind of tradeoff, you have to have some kind of common metric. You have to have some kind of common currency. And I think that what utilitarianism, whether it's the moral truth or not, is provide a kind of common currency. So, what is utilitarianism? It's basically the idea that--it's really two ideas put together. One is the idea of impartiality. That is, at least as social decision makers, we should regard everybody's interests as of equal worth. Everybody counts the same. And then you might say, 'Well, but okay, what does it mean to count everybody the same? What is it that really matters for you and for me and for everybody else?' And there the utilitarian's answer is what is sometimes called, somewhat accurately and somewhat misleadingly, happiness. But it's not really happiness in the sense of cherries on sundaes, things that make you smile. It's really the quality of conscious experience. So, the idea is that if you start with anything that you value, and say, 'Why do you care about that?' and keep asking, 'Why do you care about that?' or 'Why do you care about that?' you ultimately come down to the quality of someone's conscious experience. So if I were to say, 'Why did you go to work today?' you'd say, 'Well, I need to make money; and I also enjoy my work.' 'Well, what do you need your money for?' 'Well, I need to have a place to live; it costs money.' 'Well, why can't you just live outside?' 'Well, I need a place to sleep; it's cold at night.' 'Well, what's wrong with being cold?' 'Well, it's uncomfortable.' 'What's wrong with being uncomfortable?' 'It's just bad.' Right? At some point if you keep asking why, why, why, it's going to come down to the conscious experience--in Bentham's terms, again somewhat misleading, the pleasure and pain of either you or somebody else that you care about. So the utilitarian idea is to say, Okay, we all have our pleasures and pains, and as a moral philosophy we should all count equally. And so a good standard for resolving public disagreements is to say we should go with whatever option is going to produce the best overall experience for the people who are affected. Which you can think of as shorthand as maximizing happiness--although I think that that's somewhat misleading. And the solution has a lot of merit to it. But it also has endured a couple of centuries of legitimate criticism. And one of the biggest criticisms--and now we're getting back to the Trolley cases, is that utilitarianism doesn't adequately account for people's rights. So, take the footbridge case. It seems that it's wrong to push that guy off the footbridge. Even if you stipulate that you can save more people's lives. And so anyone who is going to defend utilitarianism as a meta-morality--that is, a solution to the tragedy of common sense morality, as a moral system to adjudicate among competing tribal moral systems--if you are going to defend it in that way, as I do, you have to face up to these philosophical challenges: is it okay to kill on person to save five people in this kind of situation? So I spend a lot of the book trying to understand the psychology of cases like the footbridge case. And you mention these being kind of unrealistic and weird cases. That's actually part of my defense.