# 1NC vs Stockdale GS

## 1

### 1nc – t

#### Interpretation - the affirmative must only defend the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Violation: they defend global counteroperations

#### Extra-T is a voting issue for fairness and education it makes being negative impossible

#### A) Infinitely regressive – they can attach literally anything onto the resolution – that lets them fiat out of Kritik links and any disad by attaching as many words onto the plan as they want

#### B) Clash – they circumvent clash by justifying adding on anything onto the resolution – its not what they do its what they justify – clash is the most portable skill in debate because it’s the only unique advantage to the activity that can’t be solved anywhere else. Our interp is key to third and fourth level testing of the aff which results in more rigorous and nuanced debates

#### T should be evaluated through competing interps – reasonability invites judge intervention which reentrenches racist opinions

#### Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

#### No impact turns and RVIs –

#### presumes that your args are evaluated fairly + we don’t force a norm but just say that a certain interpretation is good since it’s a question of models of debate

## 2

### 1nc – k

#### Settler colonialism is the ontological permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers. Indigeneity must be theorized as a ghostly ‘thing,’ which requires a rejection of aff’s lens of bodily identity that is measurable through the metaphysics of absence and presence – there is no question of the link, all discourses can only ever possibly name the intransitive shadows of Indianness

Cornellier 13 -- Centre for Globalization and Cultural Studies @ U of Manitoba

(Bruno, “The ‘Indian thing’: on representation and reality in the liberal settler colony,” Settler Colonial Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 49-64)

Nevertheless, if in this case it is indeed Canada that makes the Indian its ‘thing’, this does not make Canada the Indian's undisputed master. For making the Indian its ‘thing’ means having to adhere to its law. Not the law that governs or regulates the order of things, but the law dictated by the ‘thing’ ‘as an implacable command … [or] an insatiable demand’.32 For while discourse, by making the Indian its ‘thing’, is not limited by the materiality, corporality, or existence of the Indian, it is always in the Indian's name that it hears itself speak (of the Indian). It is, in a word, because discourse has no other choice but to name the Indian and to give the Indian to ‘ourselves’ as a ‘thing’ that the ‘Indian thing’ imposes its law. As Scott Lauria Morgensen explains: ‘settler subjects normatively recall and perform indigeneity as a history they at once incorporate and transcend, inhabit and defer. Settlers thus are inexplicable apart from their relationality to Indigenous peoples.’33 Len Findlay insists, in a similar vein, that within the colonial settler state, ‘all communities live as, or in relation to, Indigenes. … [T]here is no hors-Indigene, no geopolitical or psychic setting, no real or imagined terra nullius free from the satisfactions and unsettlements of Indigene (pre)occupation’.34 Discourse pursues something that it cannot (or will not) touch, while at the same time remaining unable ever to free itself completely from the object of this pursuit. So that even if the ‘thing’ always slips from the grasp of the discourse or desire that seeks its presence, it still asks to be pursued incessantly and unsuccessfully.¶ Now this ‘thing’, although it has made this request, says nothing and means nothing. This means that nothing and no-one can ever guarantee the accuracy or the truth of what is said about it. Because it neither speaks (to us) nor asks (us) for anything at all, the ‘thing’ can be represented only by a desire that cannot not answer, that cannot not speak for it and in its name, that cannot not command it, forever unsuccessfully, to ‘exist’ or to signify someone or something. The silence of that ‘Indian thing’ commands speech. Or, if not speech, a reaction or a self-positioning that sometimes commands that we remain silent. So that it is possible to affirm that the ‘thing’ does not exist or that the fact of its existence is, at the very least, not pertinent; yet, speaking up in its name always produces something. And because the ‘thing’, emerging from the interval born out of the colonial encounter, demands to be spoken of, these speech acts can never be understood as mere solipsism or pure relativism. For to analyse these statements (or these representations) is also to analyse a relation of power in which we speak – not an act of speaking up for Indians or in one's capacity as an Indian, but in the name of that ‘Indian thing’. Thus, it is through inciting that ‘Indian thing’ to say something, although it is forever aphasic, that it becomes possible to produce and visualise Indian (and Canadian) differences and realities and, consequently, identities. In this way, settlers and Indigenous peoples seek to signify and appropriate for themselves, within a particular racial−colonial relation of power, the Indianness that exerts the perplexity of the identities interpellated by settler colonialism.¶ This explains Gerald Vizenor's refusal to acknowledge that there had ever been an absence of the Native in colonial representation. He invites us, rather, to observe ‘the eyes and hands in fugitive poses to see the motion of natives, and hear the apophatic narratives of a continuous presence’.35 I reiterate, then, that it is due to the intransigent presence and the eloquent silences of those who are designated as ‘Indians’ that the colonial project has to make the Indian its ‘thing’. Or rather, the colonial project's ‘thing’, its substance, its challenge, and its outcome are this Indianness – the Indianness of these absolutely other bodies and territories over which Europe folds itself. It is no longer the truth, then, or the reality of the representation (or the represented) that is at play here. For reality no longer constitutes the measure of the representation, but rather its effect. It will be necessary, then, to stop conceiving of a real Indian (in the flesh) by virtue of the degree of his or her presence or absence in representation (whether this representation is colonial, mainstream, native, or other) or indeed by virtue of a gradient of reality. Rather, it is henceforth incumbent upon us to affirm and come to terms with the ‘intransitive shadows’36 – neither presence nor absence – of the Indian in all of its representations.¶ The term-concept ‘thing’ offers us, in this respect, a way out of the paradigm of the imaginary Indian (or the discursive Indian) and its demands. That ‘Indian thing’ escapes the logic of imitation and the moral demands (or impediments) of truth and/or of the referential Indian. To conceive of Indianness as a ‘thing’ is to risk the ‘savage philosophies’ evoked elsewhere by Bracken, that is, that desire and taboo of Western metaphysics that enables the sign and the representation to exist beyond the opposition of presence and absence, and therefore beyond any and all guarantees of identity.37 Otherness, henceforth projected outside the self, no longer belongs to either the substance or the body of the other, but rather to the impossible expectation that is born from the meeting of bodies and subjectivities that share a certain propinquity. And if there is indeed a body or substance that exceeds or precedes the representation, this body is only insofar as it is given the gift of a presence. This is why I suggest that Indians, who also compete in the colonial struggle to designate that which is truly ‘Indian’, can never be constrained by the body that girds them. For it is not bodies but indeed that ‘Indian thing’ that constitutes the stakes, the quest, of the racial−colonial relation of power in Québec and Canada – and this, even though it is the bodies that, in the end, are marked, trod upon, and mobilised by the physical and epistemic violence of colonialism.¶ This said, while we may be obliged to acknowledge, with Veracini, that it is indeed a characteristic of settler colonialism that it veils its own conditions of production by continuously attempting to white out the indelible line separating the Indian from the settler (or Indianness from nationality), we will have to admit that the most colossal difficulty – the most pessimistic will call it an impossibility – that awaits the process of decolonisation in Canada will henceforth be to conquer and preserve the power, heretofore reserved for the Sovereign, to draw, signify, represent, and defend this boundary that makes it possible to define Indianness in the face of its exteriority. In other words, the space that asks to be conquered in the decolonisation effort is this ‘vantage point’ from which it is possible to lay claim to a certain authority or sovereignty in pointing one's finger at that ‘thing’ that truly aligns with Indianness.¶ In such a context, what will be primarily at stake in the politics of indigenous representation, within our liberal modernity, will be this vantage point from which the Sovereign seeks to regulate and limit access, more often than not, in the name of defending and preserving democracy and ‘human rights’. By presenting itself as a defender of the universal right to free expression of dissidence and differences, the liberal state generally manages to consolidate its sovereign power in the face of the actions performed by the dissident bodies that threaten its integrity and its borders. In so doing, liberalism, sanctioned by the universalist and humanist rhetoric that is its lifeblood, seeks to reduce representational work in a context of decolonisation or resistance to a simple exercise of poetic and symbolic expression, if not a political exercise of pure form or ‘tokenism’, at the edges of or alongside (either way, out of reach of) the normative authorities of political power. This is why I am affirming that, faced with the insurmountable task of decolonising settler colonial states, critical studies of film, media, and literary representations of Natives, if they are to be active participants in the resistance against colonial violence, will henceforth need to make it their duty to refuse to subscribe to any critical position that would make recognition of the true Indian in an ‘accurate’ (or revised, documented) representation a way of better apprehending ‘togetherness’ across the racial−colonial divide. To that effect, we must constantly be reminded that one of the very conditions of possibility for togetherness, in our liberal democracies, is to prevent Natives from extirpating themselves from the ascendancy and the power of death of the Sovereign.¶ Importantly, in the past 15 years, significant scholarly contributions in film and media studies have emerged that focus on processes of production and/or cultural mediation in Indigenous cinema, thus complicating such colonial and intercultural narratives of correction, misrepresentation, and liberal reconciliation.38 More recently, other scholars, while not indifferent to questions of appropriate or responsible representation, have also moved away from discourses that would turn Indigenous media and/or Native self-representation into possible tokens for transracial discourses of recognition that would make indigenous nationhood commensurate with the liberal settler state's multicultural economy of presence, identity, and selfhood. For instance, Corinn Columpar's work focuses instead on a definition of Fourth Cinema understood as an intersubjective nexus in which constant cultural and economic tensions, as well as the political (and not just cultural) identity of Indigenous communities, emerge as part of a struggle with the systematic nature of settler colonialism.39 In an analogous manner, Michelle H. Raheja's recent book describes tactical strategies of reading and making films that are ‘engaging and deconstructing white-generated representations of indigenous people’ as part of larger dialogues about Native American sovereignty.40 And yet, despite such ground-breaking academic contributions, one would be ill-advised to underestimate the continuous political, cultural, and popular resilience and influence, within journalistic, policy-making, and academic institutions, as well as within the documentary and indigenous film festival circuits, of such liberal philosophical intuition about the self as presence, absence, and/or re-emergence in representation – an intuition which is also conforming to the NFB's liberal democratic mandate of giving a voice to underrepresented minorities, thus ‘making [them] feel part of this great country’.41¶ Towards this end, the critical usefulness of the ‘Indian thing’, as a theoretical concept, is to remove us from an understanding of Indianness that was amalgamated with certain dichotomous oppositions – absence and presence, imaginary and referentiality, alienation and identity. However, it will also be important to recall that the ‘Indian thing’ does not belong to the exteriority of such dichotomous oppositions. Rather, it is born in the interval of these oppositions. It is that which is designated when, on either side of the racial−colonial boundary, an attempt is made to identify that which is Indian and that which is not. Canada and Québec, because their sovereignty rests on the moral and sovereign guarantee that ‘we’ are indeed at home in the territory of the ‘other’, have no other choice but to constantly make Indianness say ‘something’ that makes ‘us’ possible. The same will hold true for Natives who, in a colonial context as well as in a context of resistance vis-à-vis the state, cannot not also take a stand in regard to their Indianness, or, in other words, in regard to this designation that is born out of the colonial encounter – this or that ‘thing’ that I am in regard to you who are not that.¶ Faced with the impossibility of finding a way out of that ‘Indian thing’, I therefore maintain that such cultural and political predicament calls for alternative strategies of resistance, as part of which, we will no longer seek to restore an Indian reality that could be apprehended through the metaphysics of absence and presence supporting the moral and sovereign architecture of the liberal settler colony. Rather, the task before us will be to imagine a new textuality and to create political or media-based interventions that refuse to sanction the State's authority to designate what or who truly corresponds to that ‘Indian thing’ – or to categorically forbid the State to situate itself within the confines of Indianness. Importantly, such a proposition does not constitute an abrogation of the firm opposition between that which I am and who you are – you, who are also human – rather, it calls for a constant re-delineation of this opposition. As a result, it is the entire edifice of settler colonialism that is made visible – or at least, the possibility of not seeing this edifice no longer becomes an option. With the dramatisation and constant replotting of the irreducible racial−colonial dividing line that settler colonialism seeks to render invisible, will we thus contribute to denaturalising the sovereign, humanist discourse of the liberal state. As a result, we might perhaps be allowed to hope that such a rupture in the relationship between the nation and that ‘Indian thing’ might have the potential to force our liberal democracies to come into a profound, concrete, and consequential awareness of that which the contemporaneousness of the racial and colonial foundations of ‘our’ sovereignty requires in the relationships between the State, Native peoples, and non-Native racialised minorities – and this from both political and institutional standpoints. In the meantime, antiracist and anticolonial efforts must take on the task of keeping ardent, like an inextinguishable fire, the demands of conflict, incommunicability, fracture, and opposition if we hope to eschew the ultimate triumph of settler colonialism: its self-supersession.

#### The 1AC’s descriptions of Space aren’t neutral, but replicate the project of Western rationality and enlightenment that depend on the ongoing colonization of spacetime and disappearance of the Native as a backwards impediment to progress

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Settling time

As an empire of time rather than space … many significant American national theorists sought to escape the political paradoxes of space by conquering time. (Allen, 2008: 13)

Allen examines how U.S. empire depends upon three notions of time: a romanticized historical time recounting myths of the nation’s founding, the geological time of natural history, and the mechanized time of the clock and apparatuses of measurement. The organization and control over these three temporalities constitutes a colonial totality (Matson and Nunn, 2017) that works to settle time as much as space in the projection of settler futures.

The projection of settler futures depends on the ordering of time, constituted by ideologies of progress, of a mythologized past and present oriented toward the future. Scientific “progress” is positioned as a universal value key to constructing the future, while questioning the actions of Western science is positioned as irrational or reactionary. Concerning the TMT controversy, Casumbal-Salazar writes:

Relegated to the ‘dark ages’ of tradition, Native peoples appear as the agonistic menace of the modern scientific state. Delegitimized as irrational within the gendered hierarchies of Western science and philosophy … Hawaiians become suspect and subject to institutional anti-Native racism yet fetishized as an archeological remnant within multicultural society. (2017: 2)

In dominant discourses, Indigenous time is linked to the past, with the present constituted on assimilation and the future on complete erasure (Rifkin, 2017). The existence of contemporary Indigenous peoples poses a challenge to ongoing settler colonial hegemony. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua explains how “settler state officials cast the kiaʻi [land protectors, caretakers] as impediments on the road to ‘progress’ (aka settler futurity) … (mis)representing us as fixed in place, pinned in a remote time” (2017: 191–192). Enlightenment notions of universality erase difference and thus Indigenous claims to prior rights or sovereignty. While these conceptions of time have long been critiqued, they continue to shape the central logics of contemporary Western science, including space science.

Linear conceptions of time are necessarily produced out of complex practices that organize and control relative and variable spatio-temporal formations. Rifkin posits a multiplicity of temporalities, writing:

temporalities need to be understood as having material existence and efficacy in ways that are not reducible to a single, ostensibly neutral vision of time as universal succession. The concept of frames of reference provides a way of breaking up this presumed timeline by challenging the possibility of definitively determining simultaneity … Within Einsteinian relativity, simultaneity depends on one’s perspective based on one’s frame of reference. (2017: 20)

Einstein’s theory of relativity demonstrates how time is relative, variable, and dependent on acceleration, which is a function of location within a gravitational field. It is a relationship between space, masses, and matter. As Valentine explains:

gravity is a consequence of the relational warping of spacetime by matter … That is, gravitational effects are literally universal but emerge locally through relativistic and constantly shifting specific relations among the mass of cosmic bodies and spacetime, producing variable observations from differently situated observers of one another (2017: 189–190).

The practices of Western astronomy are dependent on variable and relative relations among space and time. Whether it is earth-bound astronomers punching the clock on Martian time (Mirmalek, 2020) or the stretching of temporal experience in a gravity well, the location of bodies matters as it produces ‘differently situated observers,’ who experience time differently based on their frames of reference. Yet, time is held as a stable frame of reference from which the colonial scientist constitutes the metric for a purportedly universal observer situated in a neutral position of observation. Even Western science’s own understanding of time refuses to conform to Enlightenment notions of universality, demonstrating a contradiction between this ontology and the broader political and social ideologies with which it is entangled.

While notions of linear, progressive time are used to justify settler colonial projects, the relative and contingent relationships among space, time, and matter complicate claims to universality. Time, like space, is subject to practices of organization and control that produce subject–object relations key to the Western colonial project. For instance, geologic time, or what Allen refers to as “vertical time,” is the spatial-temporal imaginary of geologic strata. He describes that, while “history often depicted time advancing horizontally across space, the geological revolution made it possible to imagine time extending perpendicularly into the territory beneath the nation” (Allen, 2008: 165). The deep time of geology historicizes Western civilization as the top layer, the apex of natural history, and thus stands to justify colonialism and its civilizational projects. The exploration of cosmological time in the space sciences extends the colonial project further into the far expanses of the future and the totality of the universe.

The apparatus

Gazing out into the night sky or deep down into the structure of matter, with telescope or microscope in hand, Man [sic] reconfirms his ability to negotiate immense differences in scale in the blink of an eye. Designed specifically for our visual apparatus, telescopes and microscopes are the stuff of mirrors, reflecting what is out there … Man is an individual apart from all the rest. And it is this very distinction that bestows on him the inheritance of distance, a place from which to reflect-on the world, his fellow man, and himself. A distinct individual, the unit of all measure, finitude made flesh, his separateness is the key. (Barad, 2007: 134, emphasis added)

In Barad’s deconstructive reading of Enlightenment science, linear time and evacuated space are both the product of active material processes through which a purportedly universal “Man” continually enacts a separation between himself and the universe. It is this supposed separation from the rest of existence that constitutes “Man” as the subject of a masculinist science and the remainder of the universe as the object of his will. Practices of scientific observation and colonial occupation work in tandem to re-enact and reinforce this fundamental subject–object relationship. Critical scholars of science have long argued against the purported passivity of observation, from critiques of the Archimedean point (Yaqoob, 2014) to feminist theories of the embodied and situated nature of knowledge production (Haraway, 1988). Yet, beyond simply noting the ontological impossibility of Man’s separation from the universe, Barad theorizes an emergent and contingent form of separability – what she calls agential separability – that is (re)produced through the material practices of apparatuses. Barad explains that “apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate boundaries and properties of entities within phenomena” (2007: 148). Apparatuses determine what comes to matter and how, thus producing differences between subject and object, which are not stable positions but rather enacted and contingent forms of relationality.

We employ the apparatus to explore how subject–object relations of Western colonial science are not universal and absolute, but rather enacted through material practices that selectively produce the privileged subject positions on which settler colonialism and space science both depend. Barad’s theory of spacetime mattering highlights the mutual constitution of space and time through the ongoing material re-configuring of the world. Apparatuses are

neither neutral probes of the natural world nor social structures that deterministically impose some particular outcome …  the notion of an apparatus is not premised on inherent divisions between the social and the scientific …  [they] are the practices through which these divisions are constituted. (Barad, 2007: 169)

Reconceiving subjectivity, objectivity, space, time, and matter in this way implies that questions of ethics are inseparable from apparatuses as practices that produce differences and iteratively construct the world. Apparatuses enact material changes through which some possibilities are realized while others are foreclosed.

Ontologically, apparatuses produce spatial, temporal, and material relations that constitute projects of Western colonial science. This approach helps elaborate arguments like those of Matson and Nunn that “even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy” (2017: n.p.). This is not to simply claim that telescopes are in some way symbolic of settler colonial relations, but to recognize how space science apparatuses actively orient relations of observation and materialize settler colonial relations.

Both TMT and HI-SEAS constitute apparatuses that extend spatially well beyond the infrastructural footprint on these mountains, to the island and surrounding ocean, into the atmosphere, to Moon, Mars, and cosmos. As part of these apparatuses, mountain environments of Hawaii become both a gateway to the cosmos and simulation of an alien landscape. Temporally, the apparatus stretches beyond contemporary scientific practices, drawing on longstanding histories of European imperialism, Western law, and settler colonial logics, and projecting these ideologies into offworld futures. Materially, these projects enroll technological, logistical, and physical systems, including roads, mirrors and lenses, sensors and surveillance devices, electromagnetic waves and domes, the geology of the Hawaiian landscape, and bodies of observer and observed.

#### **Geopolitics DA – their explanation of violence as a product of symbolic systems and discursive power dynamics is a move towards spatial neutrality that naturalizes the clearing of land in the formation of white supremacy and assimilates indigeneity**

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(Mark, “Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the ‘Peculiar’ Status of Native Peoples,” *Cultural Critique*, Number 73, pp. 88-124)

In using Agamben’s work to address U.S. Indian policy, though, it needs to be reworked. In particular, his emphasis on biopolitics tends to come at the expense of a discussion of geopolitics, the production of race supplanting the production of space as a way of envisioning the work of the sovereignty he critiques, and while his concept of the exception has been immensely influential in contemporary scholar- ship and cultural criticism, such accounts largely have left aside discussion of Indigenous peoples. Attending to Native peoples’ position within settler-state sovereignties requires investigating and adjusting three aspects of Agamben’s thinking: the persistent inside/outside tropology he uses to address the exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of “bare life” as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions.5 Such revision allows for a reconsideration of the “zone of indistinction” produced by and within sovereignty, opening up analysis of the ways settler-states regulate not only proper kinds of embodiment (“bare life”) but also legitimate modes of collectivity and occupancy—what I will call bare habitance.¶ If the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States is predicated on the creation of a state of exception, then the struggle for sovereignty by Native peoples can be envisioned as less about control of particular policy domains than of metapolitical authority—the ability to define the content and scope of “law” and “politics.” Such a shift draws attention away from critiques of the particular rhetorics used to justify the state’s plenary power and toward a macrological effort to contest the “overriding” assertion of a right to exert control over Native polities. My argument, then, explores the limits of forms of analysis organized around the critique of the settler-state’s employment of racialized discourses of savagery and the emphasis on cultural distinctions between Euramerican and Indigenous modes of governance. Both of these strategies within Indigenous political theory treat sovereignty as a particular kind of political content that can be juxtaposed with a substantively different—more Native-friendly or Indigenous-centered—content, but by contrast, I suggest that discourses of racial difference and equality as well as of cultural recognition are deployed by the state in ways that reaffirm its geopolitical self-evidence and its authority to determine what issues, processes, and statuses will count as meaningful within the political system. While arguments about Euramerican racism and the disjunctions be- tween Native traditions and imposed structures of governance can be quite powerful in challenging aspects of settler-state policy, they cannot account for the structuring violence performed by the figure of sovereignty. Drawing on Agamben, I will argue that “sovereignty” functions as a placeholder that has no determinate content.6 The state has been described as an entity that exercises a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence, and what I am suggesting is that the state of exception produced through Indian policy creates a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, an exclusive uncontestable right to define what will count as a viable legal or political form(ul)ation. That fundamentally circular and self-validating, as well as anxious and fraught, performance grounds the legitimacy of state rule on nothing more than the axiomatic negation of Native peoples’ authority to determine or adjudicate for themselves the normative principles by which they will be governed. Through Agamben’s theory of the exception, then, I will explore how the supposedly underlying sovereignty of the U.S. settler-state is a retrospective projection generated by, and dependent on, the “peculiar”-ization of Native peoples.

#### Symbolic exchange is premised on a modern/primitive binary which appropriates indigenous cultures and establishes a racist myth of noble savagery. Furthermore, their “world of simulation” and denial of objectivity are incorrect and are the tools of the colonizer to destabilize identities to rationalize the destruction of Native livelihood.

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In view of the above, it is clear to see how fluid boundaries, the relativizing of difference and negation of grand narratives—primarily serves whitestream America. The multiphrenia of postmodern plurality, its "world of simulation" and obliteration of any sense of objective reality, has given rise to a frenetic search for the "authentic" led by culture vultures and capitalist bandits fraught with "imperialist nostalgia."25 In response, American Indian communities have restricted access to the discursive spaces of American Indian culture and identity and the non-discursive borders of American Indian communities. In short, the notion of fluidity has never worked to the advantage of indigenous peoples. Federal agencies have invoked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for dismantling the structures of tribal life**.** Whitestream America has seized upon the message of relativism to declare open season on Indians, and whitestream academics have employed the language of signification and simulation to transmute centuries of war between indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle and Tones 1995, 141). Thus, in spite of its "democratic" promise, postmodernism and its ludic theories of identity fail to provide indigenous communities the theoretical grounding for asserting their claims as colonized peoples, and, more important, impede construction of transcendent emancipatory theories. Despite the pressures of cultural encroachment and cultural imperialism, however, indigenous communities continue to evolve as sites of political contestation and cultural empowerment. They manage to survive the dangers of colonialist forces by employing proactive strategies, which emphasize education, empowerment, and self-determination, and defensive tactics that protect against unfettered economic and political encroachment. Thus, whatever else the borders of indigenous communities may or may not demarcate, they continue to serve as potent geographic filters of all that is non-Indian—dividing between the real and metaphoric spaces that differentiate Indian country from the rest of whitestream America. Pedagogical Implications of Postmodern Theories As students learn to navigate the plurality of difference, it is equally important to avoid falling into the (postmodern) trap of relativism. A postmodern theory of difference that insists on impartiality masks the power and privilege that underpins whitestream culture and perspectives. In other words, American Indian students do not enter into a social space in which identities compete with equal power for legitimacy; rather, they are infused into a political terrain that presumes their inferiority. For example, postmodern musings of subjectivity as disembodied and free-floating ignore the fact that American Indian students, along with other indigenous peoples, are "engaged with the state in a complex relationship in which there are varying degrees of interdependency at play" (Alfred 1999, 85). As such, American Indian students are neither free to "reinvent" themselves nor able to liberally "transgress" borders of difference, but, rather, remain captive to the determined spaces of colonialist rule. These students experience the binds of the paradox inherent to current modes of identity theory and it becomes increasingly evident that "neither the cold linearity of blood-quantum nor the tortured weakness of self-identification" (both systems designed and legitimated by the state) will provide them any relief (Alfred 1999, 84). Thus, while postmodern theorists rightly question the whole notion of origins and work to disrupt the grand narrative of modernism, its hyperelastic and all-inclusive categories offer little to no protection against the colonialist forces of cultural encroachment and capitalist commodification.

#### **We control the RC and the alt solves the case – all contemporary neoliberal and technological violence, from the global war on terror to domestic racialized policing, borrows from a plethora of settler colonial techniques of social control based on the settler’s right to control surplus populace.**

#### Our theory of power explains the Outer Space phenomena they mention better: it’s not the libertarian imaginary, but Settler Colonialism that artificially inflates the benefits of space expansionism and drives modern space activity – it’s embedded within a broader metanarrative about Settler-Colonialism on the Earth, with Space being analogized to the “final frontier” that Settlers are naturally predestined to exploit. Support for the “validity” of the space expansion narrative then justifies all violent conquest and colonialism by positing it as the natural relation between humans, Earth, and the cosmos

Deudney 20 (Daniel Deudney – PhD in Political Science @ Princeton University, “Dark Skies: Space Expansionism, Planetary Geopolitics & The Ends of Humanity”, 2020, pgs. 12-13, EmmieeM)

The projects advanced by space expansionists, and the problems they seek to address, gain further intellectual power because they are embedded in a larger metanarrative about humanity, Earth, and cosmos, an epic story that connects past, present, and future. Space expansionism seamlessly combines Big History with Big Futurism. Space expansionism is more than the sum of its programmatic parts because it advances a comprehensive account, a narrative whole, in which its many projects are nested. The space expansionist narrative has extremely broad spatial and temporal scope, offering a macrohistorical, planetary scale account of human development and its interaction with nature. Space expansionists tell this large story about the human past and present, and then extrapolate it into imagined space futures. In this story, the present sits at a decisive intersection point, culminating millennia of steadily rising interdependence and interaction on the Earth, but at the threshold of an ultimately limitless expansion across the “final frontier” of cosmic outer space (see Figure 1.2). In an era when Grand Narratives—particularly those associated with the Enlightenment—have become suspect among the humanistic intelligentsia, space expansionists cast themselves as the avant-garde of technological civilization and advance the most comprehensively progressive Grand Narrative of Enlightenment modernity

This narrative employs numerous geohistorical analogies suggesting that expansion into outer space continues patterns of spatial expansion across Earth history. In the largest temporal frame, the space enterprise is likened to the expansion of organic life on Earth, as well as many historical terrestrial expansions of humanity on Earth. Familiar Earth geographic features, notably oceans, islands, and frontiers, are analogized with the features of outer space. In this story, technological advancement, from the control of fire and the invention of clothing to large sailing ships and malaria prophylaxis turn formidable natural barriers into new frontiers, enabling humans to expand their habitats through further exploration, conquest, and colonization, a pattern that will continue as new technologies enable expansions into outer space. This expansion narrative gains further credibility by incorporating powerful high modernist Promethean ideas about the cosmos, nature and life, and scientific and technological progress. Although expansionists claim space ventures will benefit all humanity, they also anticipate special advantage for those who first undertake them, while peoples who fail to seize opportunities for space expansion will fall behind.

#### **Vote negative for decolonization and refuse settler futurity.** The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.*when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures* -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

## 3

### 1nc – cp

#### CP: Vote negative to affirm global orbital counter-operations

#### To clarify, we PIC’d out of: In response to the unjust appropriation of outer space by private entities

#### Here’s how you should frame this debate

#### [1] They obviously put in the topic part in order to make themselves sound more topical – whatever CounterOps is, it doesn’t involve physically preventing private appropriation of Outer Space since their AFF would critique that so we need to win a 0.01% chance that we get a tiny sliver of offense so set the bar incredibly low for us

#### [2] Wedding their theory to the unethicality of private space appropriation means their CounterOps are misdirected – NewSpace is upheld by public space appropriation

Shammas and Holen 19 (Victor L. Shammas & Tomas B. Holen – I refuse to believe that you don’t know who these people are by the TOC, “One Giant Leap for Capitalistkind: Private Enterprise in Outer Space”, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9, 29 January 2019, EmmieeM)

But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in government subsidies (Hirsch, 2015). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen (2017) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual self-reliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.

## 4

### 1nc – da

#### The thesis of symbolic exchange denies the existence of masculinity and appropriates seduction theory which leads to victim blaming and exacerbates gendered violence.

Janssen 10 – Diederik Janssen is an independent writer for Men’s Studies. “THE OBSCENITY OF GENDER THEORY: BAUDRILLARD’S MASCULINITIES” Accessed 7/26/18. Published in 2010. (<http://www.mensstudies.info/OJS/index.php/CSM/article/view/51/19>; EG)

Masculinity used to be the order of production, cumulation, assertion, ra‐ tiocination; the mode of capital, society, law, dominion, and rights. As such it invaginated feminism where the latter aspired to agonistic politics, to emula‐ tion, identification (a getting even) with the aggressor. During the late 1980s, however, Baudrillard begins to claim masculinity doesn’t survive late capital‐ ism (Goshorn, 1994, pp. 283‐284): loss of virile mythologies as of feminine em‐ blems, and the reign of the transsexual, the figure of an in‐different, neutered excess of the sexual. Baudrillard would maintain in a 1988 interview that his “hypothesis is that masculinity does not exist, it is a gigantic story of simula‐ tion” (in Hunter, 1991, p. 290), its reign a “fable:” “but a residual, secondary and fragile formation, one that must be defended by retrenchments, institutions, and artifices ... eccentric, paradoxical, paranoid and tiresome” (1990, p. 16). Moreover, it would be exactly the hypermasculine momentum of the informa‐ tional scene (a drive toward hypervisibility and hyperfactuality) that brings about its reversal into a generalized indetermination (resisting both subjectiv‐ ity and objectivity), epitomized by the indifferent, irresponsive masses. If so, “All the endless commentaries on the sexual privilege of the mascu‐ line gender are thus mere foolishness” (1995 [1996, p. 117]) because privilege always lies elsewhere, in the situation of a critical excess, which is masculinity’s ultimate, and indeed “perpetual,” crisis. Theory is ambivalent. It lays claims to revealing a constitutive crisis at the heart of all masculine manifestations; equally, as the engine of an emancipatory drive, theory contributes to stasis re‐ sulting from pathological flux: both genders have succumbed to a generic nar‐ cissism under duress of a pervasive promiscuity of all sexual significations, and as such, neither centralized claims to power nor the decentral contestation of such claims remain truly eventful (2001, p. 136)—nor, ultimately, the twofoldness of gender. As Derrida’s politics of undecidability, Baudrillard wants to reinstate a radical responsibility lost first to a humanist metaphysics, and second to a hy‐ perreal semiotic Umwelt. Neither a Nature nor a twittering of all opinions leads to accountable “Man.” Yet Baudrillard’s poetic sensibility (see Coulter, 2008) proves decidedly resistant to any integration into “gender theory,” feminist pragmatics, or men’s studies. Erickson and Thomson (2004) suggest, in a move resembling the American appropriation of French thought into French theory, that Baudrillard can be situated within the wider contours of “seduction the‐ ory,” and that such theory can be productively deployed for precise political ends as a rhetorical stylistics that wrestles free from “ideology,” elicits “desire in subjects,” and delivers “liberation” and “empowerment” if only feminists could appropriate seduction’s “interpretive value and heuristic merit.” A comparably pragmatic approach to Baudrillard is presented by Elizondo (2005) with reference to “men’s studies.” As argued, however, such program‐ matic deployments seem to be integrally discordant to Baudrillard’s radical notion of seduction, which is pitted exactly against the transcendental merits of value, the heuristic moment, the desiring subject, its liberation, assertive power, its productive ethos and telos. Thus, as the authors note but for much more profound reasons than suggested, Baudrillard’s gestures touch upon basic “un‐ resolved tensions” (p. 314) between “seductive” and “productive” feminism, and (gender) theory more generally. “Integration,” then, is no option: Bau‐ drillard is “the model of an undisciplined thinker whose theorizing is undisci‐ plinable” (Genosko, 1998, p. 6)—but precisely where he announces the bankruptcy of all positive models.12 A number of inferences can be made, and they will have to remain specu‐ lative. First, the current “theoretical” scene of gender if anything seems to be an ambivalent situation in which the critical position serves to keep in a state of poetic vitality that which it simultaneously wants to decipher, disclose, dis‐ robe, and rob from its mystique. Early, and perhaps enduring, feminist resist‐ ance against the idea of men (“re”)claiming a position of critical authority over masculinity, was possibly only the panicked reinvocation (“constitutive reit‐ eration”) of a gendered scene that had ceased to exist save that reiteration—the crime scene of gender whose investigation is forever kept in a state of irreso‐ lution, and where the theoretical gesture has come to inhabit the otherwise unarticulated, yet vital, space of gendered assertion: where “it” could have lin‐ gered as an idiosyncratic motif or mythic vector, but where now reigns an end‐ less complaint against hegemony. Some commentators indeed follow Baudrillard in his assumption of a temporality after an intellectual orgy, of the‐ ory as perhaps only the epiphenomenon or echo of a disseminated irony, now having to deal with its own ubiquity, its own humorless victory. The current proclamation of “postfemininities” and “postfeminisms” (which features almost no reference to Baudrillard) seems to be evermore cautiously about dealing “productively” with a generalized situation of backlash; an engage‐ ment, then, with the Baudrillardian forensics and diagnostics of (hyper)as‐ sertive reality and rebound disappearance: a universal deregulation of all human relations as the paradoxical result of a total gender‐coding, the ennui of a perfect gender‐consciousness. Masculinity, in the French reading and by its own unshakable definition, is that which delimits femininity to a derivative, supplemental, residual, or complementary function. This begs the familiar questions of coalition and pub‐ lic relations: whether Baudrillard, and by extension all possible intruders and “pimps of postmodernism” (Moore, 1988), represents another derivational (“male”) tactic, or whether he can be allied to, or put to use in, a break with this tactical order. What Baudrillard may be suggesting, however, is that gender seeks evermore abstracted levels of strategizing as it becomes an evermore ironic posture, and mimics this situation by escalating the stakes to yet another level, at which “escape” proper must entail precisely the dissembling of guarded territorialism and strategic postures. Gender’s level of operation, in other words, may be indefinitely deferred (a Baudrillardian reversibility: what is masculine at one level becomes feminine where exhausted at the next level), such that any progressivist politics can only ever sustain itself as a guarded delim‐ itation of analytic scope, thus forfeiting its signature claim to a clever exterior‐ ity. Baudrillard’s trope of “event horizon” disarms gender’s plan de campagne: every linear tactic, followed through to its ultimate telos, will find itself having travelled on a Möbius strip, having gained a critical mass beyond which the stakes start to point to their own stakeness. It would be too much to claim that feminism is only ever masculinity’s most tragic hegemony embodied. Yet feminism’s claim to Woman, duplicated since the late 1970s in the name of “the Child”—victims of total conspiracies (the masculine, sexuality, culture), their entitled sexualities forever misappro‐ priated by faddish doctrines such as “queer theory”—has been only one of many unfruitfully productivist litanies that overproduce the Child‐Woman as the eternal dupe of a universe whose “sense of maleness” is, however, only too unproblematically embraced as women’s prospectus. If “man” amounts to a witnessing of this situation from the alleged position of the hegemon, “**men’s studies” may have to recognize itself as the inevitable ground zero of late modernity’s counterhegemonic surge**. The question is whether to be disci‐ plined or undisciplined: whether to co‐produce a “New Man” or viable queer‐ itude, reclaim some legal or biological justice, or instead lead astray all self‐centered movements, alliances, fundaments, and entitlements.

#### “Not my Baudrillard!” is silly and will lose them this debate:

#### a) justifies reading political doctrines from people like Hitler and saying “oh well he thought helping the environment was good so we can affirm him!” which is obviously repugnant and should be rejected apriori

#### b) even if not their entire aff is about baudrillard, they have made this debate about the need for form and content to be separated, and we’ve impact turned the forum in which they’ve introduced these pieces of evidence

## Case

#### 1) Vote neg on presumption –

#### a) Process turn – using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of counteroperations– competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate

#### b) Academia turn – the 1ac is a regurgitation of knowledge that already exists within academia which proves they aren’t a departure from the status quo and voting aff is not intrinsic to deconstructing liberal violence

#### c) Competition turn – competition ensures Stockdale refines their aff according to what best wins them ballots from judges not according to what actually best resolves violence for individuals outside debate – ensures their method can’t scale up and gets coopted by problematic norms in the debate community

#### 2) The world isn’t hyperreal –

**a) The ability to diagnose that system from the inside disproves that it’s not a totalizing system of power**

**b) Every existing progressive movement disproves that gap between representation and politics**

**c) There isn’t a logical basis for judging their arguments that doesn’t link to itself**

**d) The logical conclusion of every critique of debate is to vote neg even if they win**

#### 3) Can't solve — plan in response to private entities but they have consistently made the claim that nasa has a colonial desire to space which makes all of their impacts inevitable

#### 4) Aff non-uq and can’t solve – public space tourism will fill in

Seedhouse 18 [Erik, editor at the Encyclopedia Britannica, “Space Tourism” https://www.britannica.com/explore/space/space-tourism/]

Space tourism, recreational space travel, either on established government-owned vehicles such as the Russian Soyuz and the International Space Station (ISS) or on a growing number of vehicles fielded by private companies. Since the flight of the world’s first space tourist, American businessman Dennis Tito, on April 28, 2001, space tourism has gained new prominence as more suborbital and orbital tourism opportunities have become available. Orbital space tourism The advent of space tourism occurred at the end of the 1990s with a deal between the Russian company MirCorp and the American company Space Adventures Ltd. MirCorp was a private venture in charge of the space station Mir. To generate income for maintenance of the aging space station, MirCorp decided to sell a trip to Mir, and Tito became its first paying passenger. However, before Tito could make his trip, the decision was made to deorbit Mir, and—after the intervention of Space Adventures Ltd.—the mission was diverted to the ISS. Tito, who paid $20 million for his flight on the Russian spacecraft Soyuz TM-32, spent seven days on board the ISS and is considered the world’s first space tourist. However, given the arduous training required for his mission, Tito objected to the use of the word tourist, and since his flight the term spaceflight participant has been more often used to distinguish commercial space travelers from career astronauts.

#### I’ll LBL the rest of the aff top down – it makes negative sense and should be rejected for being problematic, repugnant, and also not solving anything!

#### 4) The thesis analytics of the aff don’t make much sense – their colonization arguments arent resolved by the aff bc counteroperations wont guarantee the destruction of racial cap

#### 5) images of newspace and symbolics are random preempts and prove all of our indicts and their arguments about settler colonial racial cap are just random preempts that don’t make sense – nothng the aff does will stop elon musk and other rich capitalists from trying to harm us all. Also saying set col =/= you solve it – it’s racial cap not set col – that was CX so they don’t solve and just proves that they throw away indigenous people when theyre not relevant in the 1ac

#### 6) genovese

#### a) is ridiculous – their arguments about hyperraeality are quoted from baudrillard and arent substantiated with evidence – there’s no specific way that the aff would rectify new space and nasa. Their disneyland args can’t be scaled up and are actively offensive since they disavow violence

#### b) incorrect - Their critique of representation and politics is wrong and shuts down resistance

Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 54-5

Lyotard and Baudrillard put forth a strong case for conceiving of postmodern capitalist culture as an economy of image-making. They both contend that the postmodern epoch transcends industrial production via the commodification of images and the “depthlessness” of the surface of postmodern human relationships. 33 But such a portrayal is too stark; the production of images has not supplanted the production of material use-values as the dominant form of capitalist production (and images themselves are “material” forms of production sold in the capitalist market). No doubt video games, “virtual reality,” and cyberspace are new forms of experience that compress and dislocate linear, physical conceptions of time and space. But while late capitalist “infotainment” production, at times, radically disjoins design and marketing (“symbolic manipulation”) from actual physical production (microchips designed in Silicon Valley while produced in Malaysia and the Philippines), the outsourcing of symbolic manipulation to software engineers in India and South Korea is rapidly breaking down this distinction.¶ But Lyotard’s and Derrida’s aestheticization of all reality equates not only philosophical texts with literary texts, but also treats material phenomenon as strictly texts read by the human mind. This tendency among post-structuralist influenced theorists leads them to downplay the structural constraints that systems of production—not only material, but also cultural and ideological— place upon human subjects. It also downplays the possibility for human communication, inter-subjectivity, and collective action. For Lyotard, the only social bond is linguistic; inter-subjective language does not yield a shared linguistic community, but an indeterminate number of language games. Yet, if reality consists solely of perpetually shifting fragments of failed representations, how can there be any communication, yet alone the comprehension of commands?34 If inter-subjective communication is impossible, then why and how do we write journal articles for our (admittedly small) intellectual communities? One need not be a Weberian to realize that “legitimate rule” depends more on the power to command—authority—than it does brute force. Such rules are rarely constructed in a truly democratic manner, as the unequal access to educational, social, and cultural capital decreases the possibility of democratic discourse among relatively well-informed equals. Yet much of the social glue that coheres contemporary societies remains conscious, shared human belief in communal norms and values—often ones that are as pre-modern (religious and ethnic conceptions of solidarity), as they are postmodern. The role of ideology as a form of communicative coherence has not withered away—nor has the material and ideological power of the state and of educational and legal systems. The social world in which we live is simply not as fragmented and de-situated as poststructural- influenced academics believe. In fact, the tight knit and cohesive nature of post-structural-influenced academic communities implicitly affirms philosophically “pragmatic” and communitarian conceptions of meaning more than they do post-structuralist theories of communicative fragmentation.

#### 7) The obama aanalytic doesn’t prove that the aff is a good idea, just that past policies have resulted in some regimes of imperialism. In this way, there’s no real way that the aff can solve symbolic violence if it’s true that we’re in a debate round

#### 8) Wilsin and Bayon are incorrect – their capitalism arguments that implicate the working masses are ridiculous bc

**a)** **Capitalist system collapse not coming now and won't absent the alt**

**Kaletsky ’10**

Anatole, Masters in Economics from Harvard, Honour-Degree Graduate at King’s College and Cambrdige, editor-at-large of The Times of London, founding partner and chief economist of GaveKal Capital, He is on the governing board of the New York– based Institute for New Economic Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007– 2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics outside the orthodoxy of “efficient markets.” From 1976 to 1990, Kaletsky was New York bureau chief and Washington correspondent of the Financial Times and a business writer on The Economist, “Capitalism 4 0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis”

The world did not end. Despite all the forebodings of disaster in the 2007– 09 financial crisis, the first decade of the twenty-first century passed rather uneventfully into the second. The riots, soup kitchens, and bankruptcies **predicted by many** of the world’s most respected economists **did not materialize**— and no one any longer **expects the global capitalist system to collapse**, whatever that emotive word might mean. Yet the capitalist system’s survival does not mean that the precrisis faith in the wisdom of financial markets and the efficiency of free enterprise will ever again be what it was before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. A return to decent economic growth and normal financial conditions is likely by the middle of 2010, but will this imply a return to business as usual for politicians, economists, and financiers? Although **globalization will continue** and many parts of the world will gradually regain their prosperity of the precrisis period, the traumatic effects of 2007– 09 will not be quickly forgotten. And the economic costs will linger for decades in the debts squeezing taxpayers and government budgets, the disrupted lives of the jobless, and the vanished dreams of homeowners and investors around the world. For what collapsed on September 15, 2008, was not just a bank or a financial system. What fell apart that day was an entire political philosophy and economic system, a way of thinking about and living in the world. The question now is what will replace the global capitalism that crumbled in the autumn of 2008. The central argument of this book is that global capitalism will be replaced by nothing other than global capitalism. The traumatic events of 2007– 09 will neither destroy nor diminish the fundamental human urges that have always powered the capitalist system— ambition, initiative, individualism, the competitive spirit. These natural human qualities will instead be redirected and reenergized **to create a new version of capitalism** that will ultimately be even **more successful and productive** than the system it replaced. To explain this process of renewal, and identify some of the most important features of the reinvigorated capitalist system, is the ambition of this book. This transformation will take many years to complete, but some of its consequences can already be discerned. With the benefit of even a year’s hindsight, it is clear that **these consequences will be different from the nihilistic predictions** from both ends of the political spectrum at the height of the crisis. On the Left, anticapitalist ideologues seemed honestly to believe that a few weeks of financial chaos could bring about the disintegration of a politico-economic system that had **survived two hundred years of revolutions**, depressions, and world wars. On the Right, free-market zealots insisted that private enterprise would be destroyed by government interventions that were clearly necessary to save the system— and many continue to believe that the crisis could have been resolved much better if governments had simply allowed financial institutions to collapse. A balanced reassessment of the crisis must challenge both left-wing hysteria and right-wing hubris. Rather than blaming the meltdown of the global financial system on greedy bankers, incompetent regulators, gullible homeowners, or foolish Chinese bureaucrats, this book puts what happened into historical and ideological perspective. It reinterprets the crisis in the context of the economic reforms and geopolitical upheavals that have repeatedly transformed the nature of capitalism since the late eighteenth century, most recently in the Thatcher-Reagan revolution of 1979– 89. The central argument is that capitalism has **never been a static system** that follows a fixed set of rules, characterized by a permanent division of responsibilities between private enterprise and governments. Contrary to the teachings of modern economic theory, **no immutable laws govern** the behavior of **a capitalist economy**. Instead, capitalism is an **adaptive social system that** mutates and **evolves** in response to a changing environment. **When capitalism is** seriously threatened by a systemic crisis, a new version emerges that is better suited to **the changing environment** and replaces the previously dominant form. Once we recognize that capitalism is not a static set of institutions, but an evolutionary system that reinvents and reinvigorates itself through crises, we can see the events of 2007– 09 in another light: as the catalyst for the fourth systemic transformation of capitalism, comparable to the transformations triggered by the crises of the 1970s, the crises of the 1930s, and the Napoleonic Wars of 1803– 15. Hence the title of this book.

#### b) their black hole symbolism and framing of metaphors is the same kind of logic of manifest destiny where settlers could get away with repugnant ideologies by justifying that they didn’t affirm them directly. Unless the aff proves that theyre real (which they arent, and they’ve explicitly argued symbolism) then vote neg on presumption

#### 9) Their argument about the logic of debate being machine learning is irrelevant

#### a) they are part of the form of debate and they cant divorce themselves from it – equally link in, they want ballots

#### b) offensive to say nothing has value bc real world violence does happen and disavowing that is racist and problematic

#### c) c/a baudy indictes

#### 10) their analytic about neoliberal fascism makes negative sense – their arguments about the final frontier and terra nullius are blatant preempts that are used as a justification for homogenizing indigneity and conceptualizing the aff as less metaphorical than it is, but they don’t solve this either because nothing about the aff specificailly helps indigenous people

#### 11) Advocacy

#### a) The aff sneaks the worst parts of liberal capitalism through the back door and shuts down political resistance – it’s far worse than nothing and turns the case

Goodfield 20 [Eric Lee Goodfield is Assistant Professor at the American University of Beirut, Civilization Studies Program and Department of Political Studies & Public Administration. Cultural Politics an International Journal · July 2020. "POSTMODERN PAPER TIGER.” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342664224\_Postmodern\_Paper\_Tiger\_Lyotard\_Baudrillard\_and\_the\_Contemporary\_Politics\_of\_Poststructuralist\_Subversion]

This article has illuminated ways in which emphases on the political potencies of language have brought about a variety of problems for the critical efficacies of poststructuralist political thought in the context of the global expanse of neoliberal capital. It initiated an original dialogue between two poststructuralist authors and raised this to a second engagement with current debates over the crises of critical thought and, by extension, carries contemporary relevance as well. As I have sought to argue, both authors deliver on a vision of radicalized autonomy through linguistic creativity that bears great similarity to and continuity with modern visions of the agonistic play of autonomies that have been integral to liberal conceptions of civil society and negative liberty. With Delanty (2000: 148), then, their work becomes representative of a deep entanglement of modern and postmodern thought in that “what liberalism and postmodernism share is a strong privatism and a skepticism about the possibility of universal validity and of foundations.” As Paul Patton (2006: 132) frames the relationship, liberal democratic “values and institutions are presupposed” by poststructuralist thinkers precisely “to concentrate attention on the conditions under which limits to their application may be overcome.” In essence, then, poststructuralist politics becomes a means of liberating liberalism to its better self and, further, I would argue, a rife ground for theoretical and practical cooperation with it. The continuity with liberal conceptions of liberty and diversity emerges with radical poststructuralist commitment to forms of linguistic pluralism, ones that lead to the conclusion, with Baudrillard (2015: 71), that “the world” cannot be brought to the subject but rather that the two stand permanently apart: “to clear a space, as it were, around the object, to act so that it shone out resplendent in all its indifference . . . so that the subject himself can attune himself to the world in a kind of symbolic exchange of indifference.” This bleak and fatalistic assessment commits postmodern persons and their political powers to forms of agency circumscribed by the boundaries of discursive power and, by extension, a destiny of attuning themselves to the neoliberal landscape as it is and as they find it. Having stripped history and politics bare to their discursive wills to power, their adaptations of pataphysical and paralogical agencies to the neoliberal landscape as sine qua nons of poststructuralist linguistic gaming become, paradoxically, capitulations to neoliberalism. In essence, their goal of securing persons and groups space for normative, political, and surely material leverage through linguistic forms of agency achieves, with Emilia Steuerman (1992: 100), “a radicalization that in no way challenges the modernity project as such” but instead entrenches and deepens its crises.

#### b) aff doesn’t solve either – they work within debate and abide by these things that thbey mention like speech time, reading evidence, spreading, et.c so they don’t even solve the vast majority of their offense bc to collapse debate within debate you have to game it entirely or not do it at all i.e. not reading a non-topical advocacy

#### 12) Mezzadra and Neilson

#### a) No way the aff accesses racial cap – what does counteroperations look like and how does the aff materially resolve violence?

#### b) stolen land argument is pallative and misses the boat – we have criticized the weay that the aff has employed authors like baudrillard and theories of symbolic exchange and the way they theorize space in the first place is problematic

#### c) Alternative systems worsen racial oppression

Jim Lindgren 18. Professor of Law at Northwestern University. "Can There Be Capitalism Without Racism? – Reason.com". No Publication. 8-20-2018. https://reason.com/volokh/2018/08/20/can-there-be-capitalism-without-racism/?amp

The website Campus Reform points to a multi-year academic program, Racial Capitalism, hosted at the UC-Davis Humanities Institute that explores the links between racism and capitalism (tip to Glenn Reynolds). Among the questions that were asked at the event launching the program are:

1. "Which came first, capitalism or racism?"
2. "Can there be capitalism without racism?"
3. "Is capitalism always racial?"

IMO, the answers to these questions are fairly obvious:

1. Racism came first. Every inhabited continent had slaves, and ethnic out-groups were among the most likely to be enslaved. It is the abolition of slavery that is particularly Western, as Orlando Patterson explains his books Freedom and Slavery and Social Death.
2. (and 3.) If there can be any economic system without racism (I suppose it depends on how high one's standards are), then capitalism is not always racist and there can be capitalism without racism. Capitalism is easier to square with a reduction in racism than most ideologies because (a) it is individualistic, (b) it is not built on envy for despised groups, and (c) in the United States at least, pro-capitalists tend to be less racist personally than anti-capitalists.

Indeed, in the general public it is the opposition to capitalism and the desire for redistribution that are positively associated with racism and intolerance.

I explore this relationship in "Redistribution and Racism, Tolerance and Capitalism," which analyzes data from 20 nationally representative surveys of the general public.

Abstract

In debates over the roles of law and government in promoting the equality of income or in redistributing the fruits of capitalism, widely different motives are attributed to those who favor or oppose capitalism or income redistribution. According to one view, largely accepted in the academic social psychology literature (Jost et al., 2003), opposition to income redistribution and support for capitalism reflect an orientation toward social dominance, a desire to dominate other groups. According to another view that goes back at least to the nineteenth century origins of Marxism, anti-capitalism and a support for greater legal efforts to redistribute income reflect envy for the property of others and a frustration with one's lot in a capitalist system.

In this paper I expand and test the first (social dominance) thesis using twenty nationally representative General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center between 1977 and 2010, involving over 21,000 respondents. I first show that respondents who express traditionally racist views (on segregation, interracial marriage, and inborn racial abilities) tend to support greater income redistribution. Traditional racists also express less positive views toward free-market capitalism and its consequences, tending to want the government to guarantee jobs for everyone and to fix prices, wages, and profits. Next, I report a similar pattern for those who express intolerance for unpopular groups on the fifteen Stouffer tolerance questions (regarding racists, homosexuals, communists, extreme militarists, and atheists). Those who express less tolerance for unpopular groups tend to favor income redistribution and to be less supportive of capitalism and its discontents. Using full latent variable structural equation modeling shows similar results. The data are broadly inconsistent with the standard belief in the social psychology literature that pro-capitalist and anti-redistributionist views are positively associated with racism and intolerance.