# 1NC vs San Mateo ZS

## 1

### 1nc – t

#### Interpretation - the affirmative may not claim offense from anything other than the instrumental implementation of a policy stating that outer space appropriation by private entities is unjust.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Violation – they say they defend the res but literally look at the next section – “they employ the concept of the inhuman” which means they don’t defend a policy action. If they say that they do, their aff is independently extra topical since it additionally adds on sections to the res by changing their relationship to technology, which still links into our offense about which is a voter for Limits and clash since they can add any amount of infinite planks to the aff to solve for all neg arguments. Hold the line.

#### Topical version of the aff: The united states should ban all appropriation of outer space with an advantage about next generational technology and data warfare that solves their offense by criticizing technology with a locus point of the res. Any reason why the TVA is a bad is a reason to vote neg since that proves that the neg can engage with aff offense

**Vote Neg – The resolution is the only common stasis point that anchors negative preparation. Allowing any aff deviation from the resolution is a moral hazard which justifies an infinite number of unpredictable arguments with thin ties to the resolution. Because debate is a competitive game, their interpretation incentivizes affirmatives to run further towards fringes and revert to truisms which are exceedingly difficult to negate**

#### 1 – Fairness is necessary for useful debates—it lets the aff train with the heavy bats of prepared negative strategies which internal link turns their ability to advocate change outside of debate. It enables both teams to more effectively challenge injustice and support movements for change. If debate is key to their movement, their aff has to be debateable. Only we have advanced criteria about how you can weigh between relative proposals and determine debatability in the first place.

#### 2 – Clash – letting the aff pick the topic skews the balance of prep to unpredictable literature bases and ensures that our research is always irrelevant. Tying the aff to a previously agreed-upon topic is key to incentivize in-depth strategies that directly clash with the 1AC – they force us to rely on generics which results in worse debates overall and undermines the educational value of the activity.

#### Debate doesn’t have any effect on the political and the individual arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption.

#### SSD solves their offense - playing devils advocate and researching and debating both sides encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issue which encourages better affs in the future

#### T should be evaluated through competing interps – reasonability invites judge intervention

#### No impact turns and RVIs – presumes that your args are evaluated fairly + we don’t force a norm but just say that a certain interpretation is good since it’s a question of models of debate.

#### They do NOT get to weigh the case – I couldn’t engage with the aff due to a lack of preparation, and anything else would break debate.

## 2

### 1nc – k

#### Settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers. The appropriation of land turns Natives into ghosts and chattel slaves into excess labor.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### The frontier has always been defined by a chaotic blurring of borders both physical and not – reject their mystification and confusion of meaning as it is the MO of settler colonialism

**Young 2013** [Alex Trimble, graduate student at the University of Southern California. He is at work on a dissertation on the use of frontier rhetoric and the origins of postmodernism in the post-1945 countercultural literatures of the United States, “Settler Sovereignty and the Rhizomatic West, or, The Significance of the Frontier in Postwestern Studies,” *Western American Literature*, Volume 48, Numbers 1 & 2, Spring/Summer]

While discussion of Weizman’s work on the Israeli military’s use of A Thousand Plateaus has almost become a commonplace in contemporary critiques of Deleuze and Guattari, his less-discussed work on the spatial forms that Israeli settlers have employed in their efforts to colonize the West Bank since 1967 offers an equally important analysis of the relationship of rhizomatic assemblages to settler state power. In a chapter titled “Frontier Architecture” in his 2007 monograph Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, Weizman tracks the growth of a single Israeli settlement in the West Bank, the “illegal” outpost of Migron. In Weizman’s description of the “elastic geography” of the development of this Israeli frontier, the rhetorical parallels to Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the rhizome are striking: The frontiers of the Occupied Territories are not rigid and fixed at all; rather, they are elastic, and in constant transformation. The linear border, a cartographic imaginary inherited from the military and political spatiality of the nation state has splintered into a multitude of … border-synonyms. … These borders are dynamic, constantly shifting, ebbing, andflowing. … The anarchic geography of the frontier is an evolving image of transformation. Like so many settler colonies on the United States’ nineteenth-century western frontier (the Deadwood camp perhaps being the most familiar example), the rhizomatic nature of Israel’s frontier outposts often defies containment by its juridical order: the founding of Migron was not sanctioned by the arborescent power structure of the state. That said, the pioneers of this frontier, “equally influenced by the myth of rough and rugged Western heroes as by the Israeli myth of the pioneering Zionist settlers of the early twentieth century,” while acting outside the law, could hardly be said to be acting in a manner contrary to the interests of the expanding settler society itself (4). The Israeli state has long cast a blind eye on the expansion of illegal settlements such as Migron, and many once-illegal frontier outposts have been incorporated into Israel’s legally sanctioned network of West Bank settlements.14 Weizman argues that the plenary power of the Israeli state is, in fact, extended by the rhizomatic nature of frontier settlement even as the letter of Israeli law condemns it. This “selective absence of government intervention promotes an unregulated process of violent dispossession” (5), in which the erratic and unpredictable nature of the frontier is exploited by the government. Chaos has its peculiar structural advantages. It supports one of Israel’s foremost strategies of obfuscation: the promotion of complexity—geographical, legal, or linguistic. Sometimes, following a terminology pioneered by Henry Kissinger, this strategy is openly referred to as “constructive blurring.” This strategy seeks simultaneously to obfuscate and naturalize the facts of domination. Across the frontiers of the West Bank it is undertaken by simultaneously unleashing processes that would create conditions too complex and illogical to make any territorial solution in the form of partition possible. Through this process of “constructive blurring,” settler sovereignty is not established through a “gridding” process of rationalizing space but rather through chaotic and often extralegal acts of expansion: settlers follow “lines of flight” made possible by the “smoothing” of indigenous space.

#### **Geopolitics DA – their explanation of racial violence as a product of symbolic systems and discursive power dynamics is a move towards spatial neutrality that naturalizes the clearing of land in the formation of white supremacy**

Rifkin 9 – Associate Professor of English & WGS @ UNC-Greensboro

(Mark, “Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the ‘Peculiar’ Status of Native Peoples,” *Cultural Critique*, Number 73, pp. 88-124)

In using Agamben’s work to address U.S. Indian policy, though, it needs to be reworked. In particular, his emphasis on biopolitics tends to come at the expense of a discussion of geopolitics, the production of race supplanting the production of space as a way of envisioning the work of the sovereignty he critiques, and while his concept of the exception has been immensely influential in contemporary scholar- ship and cultural criticism, such accounts largely have left aside discussion of Indigenous peoples. Attending to Native peoples’ position within settler-state sovereignties requires investigating and adjusting three aspects of Agamben’s thinking: the persistent inside/outside tropology he uses to address the exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of “bare life” as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions.5 Such revision allows for a reconsideration of the “zone of indistinction” produced by and within sovereignty, opening up analysis of the ways settler-states regulate not only proper kinds of embodiment (“bare life”) but also legitimate modes of collectivity and occupancy—what I will call bare habitance.¶ If the “overriding sovereignty” of the United States is predicated on the creation of a state of exception, then the struggle for sovereignty by Native peoples can be envisioned as less about control of particular policy domains than of metapolitical authority—the ability to define the content and scope of “law” and “politics.” Such a shift draws attention away from critiques of the particular rhetorics used to justify the state’s plenary power and toward a macrological effort to contest the “overriding” assertion of a right to exert control over Native polities. My argument, then, explores the limits of forms of analysis organized around the critique of the settler-state’s employment of racialized discourses of savagery and the emphasis on cultural distinctions between Euramerican and Indigenous modes of governance. Both of these strategies within Indigenous political theory treat sovereignty as a particular kind of political content that can be juxtaposed with a substantively different—more Native-friendly or Indigenous-centered—content, but by contrast, I suggest that discourses of racial difference and equality as well as of cultural recognition are deployed by the state in ways that reaffirm its geopolitical self-evidence and its authority to determine what issues, processes, and statuses will count as meaningful within the political system. While arguments about Euramerican racism and the disjunctions be- tween Native traditions and imposed structures of governance can be quite powerful in challenging aspects of settler-state policy, they cannot account for the structuring violence performed by the figure of sovereignty. Drawing on Agamben, I will argue that “sovereignty” functions as a placeholder that has no determinate content.6 The state has been described as an entity that exercises a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence, and what I am suggesting is that the state of exception produced through Indian policy creates a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, an exclusive uncontestable right to define what will count as a viable legal or political form(ul)ation. That fundamentally circular and self-validating, as well as anxious and fraught, performance grounds the legitimacy of state rule on nothing more than the axiomatic negation of Native peoples’ authority to determine or adjudicate for themselves the normative principles by which they will be governed. Through Agamben’s theory of the exception, then, I will explore how the supposedly underlying sovereignty of the U.S. settler-state is a retrospective projection generated by, and dependent on, the “peculiar”-ization of Native peoples.

#### Thus, the only alternative is decolonization. It solves all of the case – rejecting the settler state inherently allows for a removal of technology in the squo which solves ALL of their offense and if anything is MORE radical than the aff. The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and resistance – any ethical commitment requires that the aff places itself in the center of native scholarship and demands.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.*when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures* -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

#### Asterisks DA – they don’t get a permutation. It’s a token gesture and settler move to innocence that moves indigenous nations to the margins and assimilates Native sovereignty

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Moves to innocence V: A(s)t(e)risk peoples This settler move to innocence is concerned with the ways in which Indigenous peoples are counted, codified, represented, and included/disincluded by educational researchers and other social science researchers. Indigenous peoples are rendered visible in mainstream educational research in two main ways: as “at risk” peoples and as asterisk peoples. This comprises a settler move to innocence because it erases and then conceals the erasure of Indigenous peoples within the settler colonial nation-state and moves Indigenous nations as “populations” to the margins of public discourse. As “at risk” peoples, Indigenous students and families are described as on the verge of extinction, culturally and economically bereft, engaged or soon-to-be engaged in self-destructive behaviors which can interrupt their school careers and seamless absorption into the economy. Even though it is widely known and verified that Native youth gain access to personal and academic success when they also have access to/instruction in their home languages, most Native American and Alaskan Native youth are taught in English-only schools by temporary teachers who know little about their students’ communities (Lomawaima and McCarty, 2006; Lee, 2011). Even though Indigenous knowledge systems predate, expand, update, and complicate the curricula found in most public schools, schools attended by poor Indigenous students are among those most regimented in attempts to comply with federal mandates. Though these mandates intrude on the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, the “services” promised at the inception of these mandates do little to make the schools attended by Indigenous youth better at providing them a compelling, relevant, inspiring and meaningful education. At the same time, Indigenous communities become the asterisk peoples, meaning they are represented by an asterisk in large and crucial data sets, many of which are conducted to inform public policy that impact our/their lives (Villegas, 2012). Education and health statistics are unavailable from Indigenous communities for a variety of reasons and, when they are made available, the size of the n, or the sample size, can appear to be negligible when compared to the sample size of other/race-based categories. Though Indigenous scholars such as Malia Villegas recognize that Indigenous peoples are distinct from each other but also from other racialized groups surveyed in these studies, they argue that difficulty of collecting basic education and health information about this small and heterogeneous category must be overcome in order to counter the disappearance of Indigenous particularities in public policy. In U.S. educational research in particular, Indigenous peoples are included only as asterisks, as footnotes into dominant paradigms of educational inequality in the U.S. This can be observed in the progressive literature on school discipline, on ‘underrepresented minorities’ in higher education, and in the literature of reparation, i.e., redressing ‘past’ wrongs against non- white Others. Under such paradigms, which do important work on alleviating the symptoms of colonialism (poverty, dispossession, criminality, premature death, cultural genocide), Indigeneity is simply an “and” or an illustration of oppression. ‘Urban education’, for example, is a code word for the schooling of black, brown, and ghettoized youth who form the numerical majority in divested public schools. Urban American Indians and Native Alaskans become an asterisk group, invisibilized, even though about two-thirds of Indigenous peoples in the U.S. live in urban areas, according to the 2010 census. Yet, urban Indians receive fewer federal funds for education, health, and employment than their counterparts on reservations (Berry, 2012). Similarly, Native Pasifika people become an asterisk in the Asian Pacific Islander category and their politics/epistemologies/experiences are often subsumed under a pan-ethnic Asian-American master narrative. From a settler viewpoint that concerns itself with numerical inequality, e.g. the achievement gap, underrepresentation, and the 99%’s short share of the wealth of the metropole, the asterisk is an outlier, an outnumber. It is a token gesture, an inclusion and an enclosure of Native people into the politics of equity. These acts of inclusion assimilate Indigenous sovereignty, ways of knowing, and ways of being by remaking a collective-comprised tribal identity into an individualized ethnic identity. From a decolonizing perspective, the asterisk is a body count that does not account for Indigenous politics, educational concerns, and epistemologies. Urban land (indeed all land) is Native land. The vast majority of Native youth in North America live in urban settings. Any decolonizing urban education endeavor must address the foundations of urban land pedagogy and Indigenous politics vis-a-vis the settler colonial state.

## 3

### 1nc – cp

#### Vote negative to employ the concept of the inhuman to reject cybernetics and reconfigure our relationship with technology. To clarify, the counterplan solves the aff’s offense and method but PICs out of their defense of the resolution.

#### Solves 100% of their offense – literally Leah I dare you find one line in the aff that indicates that private space appropriation is unjust means that their offense still applies. If we embrace their method, then we still reject cybernetics which the aff says is good

#### The CP competes –

#### a) they willingly chose to put in that they “defend the res,” which we contested on T but it was an active decision by the 1AR to put that in

#### b) If they say that the CP doesn’t compete this proves our violations on T which means vote neg because they are being shifty and their model of debate is bad

#### Here is a DA to their defense of the res.

#### Business confidence is strong now, but it’s close – unpredictable shifts like a rejection of appropriation of outer space ruins biz con AND overall growth

Sarah Chaney Cambon 21, Reporter on The Wall Street Journal's Economics Team, BA in Business Journalism from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, “Capital-Spending Surge Further Lifts Economic Recovery”, Wall Street Journal, 6/27/2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/capital-spending-surge-further-lifts-economic-recovery-11624798800

Business investment is emerging as a powerful source of U.S. economic growth that will likely help sustain the recovery.

Companies are ramping up orders for computers, machinery and software as they grow more confident in the outlook.

Nonresidential fixed investment, a proxy for business spending, rose at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 11.7% in the first quarter, led by growth in software and tech-equipment spending, according to the Commerce Department. Business investment also logged double-digit gains in the third and fourth quarters last year after falling during pandemic-related shutdowns. It is now higher than its pre-pandemic peak.

Orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft, another measure for business investment, are near the highest levels for records tracing back to the 1990s, separate Commerce Department figures show.

“Business investment has really been an important engine powering the U.S. economic recovery,” said Robert Rosener, senior U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley. “In our outlook for the economy, it’s certainly one of the bright spots.”

Consumer spending, which accounts for about two-thirds of economic output, is driving the early stages of the recovery. Americans, flush with savings and government stimulus checks, are spending more on goods and services, which they shunned for much of the pandemic.

Robust capital investment will be key to ensuring that the recovery maintains strength after the spending boost from fiscal stimulus and business reopenings eventually fades, according to some economists.

Rising business investment helps fuel economic output. It also lifts worker productivity, or output per hour. That metric grew at a sluggish pace throughout the last economic expansion but is now showing signs of resurgence.

The recovery in business investment is shaping up to be much stronger than in the years following the 2007-09 recession. “The events especially in late ’08, early ’09 put a lot of businesses really close to the edge,” said Phil Suttle, founder of Suttle Economics. “I think a lot of them said, ‘We’ve just got to be really cautious for a long while.’”

Businesses appear to be less risk-averse now, he said.

After the financial crisis, businesses grew by adding workers, rather than investing in capital. Hiring was more attractive than capital spending because labor was abundant and relatively cheap. Now the supply of workers is tight. Companies are raising pay to lure employees. As a result, many firms have more incentive to grow by investing in capital.

Economists at Morgan Stanley predict that U.S. capital spending will rise to 116% of prerecession levels after three years. By comparison, investment took 10 years to reach those levels once the 2007-09 recession hit.

Company executives are increasingly confident in the economy’s trajectory. The Business Roundtable’s economic-outlook index—a composite of large companies’ plans for hiring and spending, as well as sales projections—increased by nine points in the second quarter to 116, just below 2018’s record high, according to a survey conducted between May 25 and June 9. In the second quarter, the share of companies planning to boost capital investment increased to 59% from 57% in the first.

“We’re seeing really strong reopening demand, and a lot of times capital investment follows that,” said Joe Song, senior U.S. economist at BofA Securities.

Mr. Song added that less uncertainty regarding trade tensions between the U.S. and China should further underpin business confidence and investment. “At the very least, businesses will understand the strategy that the Biden administration is trying to follow and will be able to plan around that,” he said.

#### Decline cascades---nuclear war and extinction

Dr. Mathew Maavak 21, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

## Case

#### They didn’t read their ROB so you must use the neg’s ROB since a 1AR would be too new.

#### Presumption on their method – Vote neg because the aff doesn’t do anything!

#### [1] Process turn – using debate as a mode of advocacy ensures the failure of antitechnological movements– competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate – at worst you vote negative on presumption because they don’t use debate as a stepping stone for their advocacy outside the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac

#### [2] Academia turn – the 1ac is a regurgitation of knowledge that already exists within academia which proves they aren’t a departure from the status quo and voting aff is not intrinsic to affirming a rejection of cybernetics

#### [3] Competition turn – competition ensures San Mateo refines their method according to what best wins them ballots from judges not according to what actually best resolves violence for individuals outside debate – ensures their method can’t scale up and gets coopted by problematic norms in the debate community which turns all of their offense

#### [4] They can’t solve technology just in the debate space, so why even vote aff when they haven’t explained how the aff actually materially changes things in the squo

#### Kroker ev is incorrect – epigenetics is about the distinction between human and non-human, but that’s also turned by our ontology args on the K when we say that indigenous people literally die at the highest rates and are forced into violence and things like concentration. Their aff ignores those forms of violence for weird vague posturing that’s not material.

#### Conese is a bad card – how can they rectify this violence in bolivia in the debate space? They can’t so vote neg on presumption and proves our offense of the K ow/s

#### Duffield doesn’t make sense – addressing existential threats is turned by the PIC but also doesn’t matter if we win ontology. Independently there’s no internal link between some vague amount of instability and full existential threats especially when that’s not defined!

#### Dyer-Witheford isnt a root cause claim for cybernetics causing nuclear war – these technological revolutions arent things that the aff criticizes – that’s CX, so it deoesnt make sense

#### Von Hirschhausen is so wrong – technology can most definitively solve climate change. Even if it’s not perfect, you should presume an investment in future technology to solve climate change rather than try to hide in the 1900’s pollution. Carbon capture is just one type of this

#### Kroker – not a reason why saying the res is unjust is good – this is not about private space exploration but just about space in general, which isnt related to private appropriation at all! This also proves our T arguments for how they are extra t by defending an external method with an aff that “defends the res” but really doesn’t.

#### Hui – this is about the “body” and has ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with the resolution at all. You can’t solve aall of

#### Tech good –– Accurate predictions---the alt causes confirmation bias

Michael D. Ward 13, Professor of Political Science at Duke University, Niles W. Metternich, University of College London, Cassy L. Dorff, Max Gallop, Florian M. Hollenbach, Anna Schultz, and Simon Weschle, "Learning from the Past and Stepping into the Future: Toward a New Generation of Conflict Prediction", International Studies Review (2013) 15, 473-490

Political events are frequently framed as unpredictable. Who could have predicted the Arab Spring, 9/11, or the end of the cold war? This skepticism about prediction reflects an underlying desire to forecast. Predicting political events is difficult because they result from complex social processes. However, in recent years, our capacity to collect information on social behavior and our ability to process large data have increased to degrees only foreseen in science fiction. This new ability to analyze and predict behavior confronts a demand for better political forecasts that may serve to inform and even help to structure effective policies in a world in which prediction in everyday life has become commonplace. Only a decade ago, scholars interested in civil wars undertook their research with constrained resources, limited data, and statistical estimation capabilities that seem underdeveloped by current standards. Still, major advances did result from these efforts. Consider “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” by Fearon and Laitin (2003), one of the most venerated and cited articles about the onset of civil wars. Published in 2003, it has over 3,000 citations in scholar.google.com and almost 900 citations in the Web of Science (as of April 2013). It has been cited prominently in virtually every social science discipline in journals ranging from Acta Sociologica to World Politics; and it is the most downloaded article from the American Political Science Review.2 ¶ This article is rightly regarded as an important, foundational piece of scholarship. However, in the summer of 2012, it was used by Jacqueline Stevens in a New York Times Op-Ed as evidence that political scientists are bad forecasters. That claim was wildly off the mark in that Fearon and Laitin do not focus on forecasting, and Stevens ignored other, actual forecasting efforts in political science. Stevens’ point—which was taken up by the US Congress—was that government funding on quantitative approaches was being wasted on efforts that did not provide accurate policy advice. In contrast to Stevens, we argue that conflict research in political science can be substantially improved by more, not less, attention to predictions through quantitative approaches.¶ We argue that the increasing availability of disaggregated data and advanced estimation techniques are making forecasts of conflict more accurate and precise, thereby helping to evaluate the utility of different models and winnow the good from the bad. Forecasting also helps to prevent overfitting and reduces confirmation bias. As such, forecasting efforts can be used to help validate models, to gain greater confidence in the resulting estimates, and to ultimately present robust models that may allow us to improve the interaction with decision makers seeking greater clarity about the implications of potential actions.

#### Their theory of cybernetics is wrong – it’s historically inaccurate, immaterial, and doesn’t explain any of their impacts.

Gregory ’15 (Derek; 2015; Distinguished Professor at the University of British Columbia; Geographies of Knowledge and Power, “Gabriel’s Map: Cartography and Corpography in Modern War,” p. 116-118)

Paul Virilio’s (1989) account of War and cinema, and particularly his rendering of the logistics of perception during World War I, remains a **landmark analysis**. He made much of the connections between aviation and cinema, and his arguments have informed the opening sections of my own essay. In his eyes, aerial reconnaissance— which stood in the closest of associations to the cartographic—became successively “chronophotographic” and then cinematographic, as these new methods struggled both to keep pace with and to produce the new motility of a war that merely appeared to be static and fixed in place. But Virilio also advanced another, more problematic claim: “As sight lost its direct quality and reeled out of phase, the soldier had the feeling of being not so much destroyed as de-realized or de-materialized, any sensory point of reference suddenly vanishing in a surfeit of optical targets” (pp. 14–15). Here he continues to privilege the visual-optical register of cartography and **fails to register the bodily habitus** that, as I have shown in the closing sections, was **profoundly implicated** in the actions and affects of the ordinary infantryman. Virilio was not alone. A. M. Burrage (1930) wrote that [W]e are slowly realising that the job of the infantry isn’t to kill. It is the artillery and the machine-gun corps who do the killing. We are merely there to be killed. We are the little flags which the General sticks on the war-map to show the position of the front line. (p. 82) In sketching the outlines of a countervailing corpography established by those on that front line, I do not wish to privilege one mode of knowing over the other: each sutures knowledge to power in vital, significant but none the less **different ways**, and each both advances and repels military violence. But I do sympathize with Edmund Blunden’s (1928/2000) agonized question: Was it nearer the soul of war to adjust armies in coloured inks on vast maps at Montreuil or Whitehall, to hear of or to project colossal shocks in a sort of mathematical symbol, than to rub knees with some poor jaw-dropping resting sentry, under the dripping rubber sheet, balancing on the greasy fire-step . . . ? (p. 141) Of course, “a map is a weapon,” as Lt.-Col. E. M. Jack (“Maps GHQ”) insisted, and those “vast maps,” together with the panoply of trench maps, sketch maps, and all the rest, were some of the deadliest weapons in the staff officers’ armory; but they were **hardly sufficient sources** of knowledge. And so I understand, too, why Blunden (1928/2000) concluded that venturing into the killing fields armed with its pure, abstract, mathematical knowledge alone was sheer folly: [T]he new Colonel . . . sent forward from C Camp an officer fresh from England, and one or two men with him, to patrol the land over which our assault was intended, . . . This officer took with him his set of the maps, panoramas, photographs and assault programmes which had been served round with such generosity for this battle. He never returned ... (pp. 151–152) Coda In this essay I have been concerned with World War I but, as we approach its centenary, it is worth reflecting on the ways in which modern warfare has changed— and those in which **it has not**. Through the constant circulation of military imagery and its ghosting in video games, many of us have come to think of **contemporary warfare as optical war** hypostatized: a war fought on screens and through digital images, in which full motion video feeds from Predators and Reapers allow for an unprecedented degree of remoteness from the killing fields. In consequence, perhaps, many of us are **tempted to think** of the wars waged by advanced militaries, in contrast to World War I, as “surgical,” even body-less. These are wars without fronts, whose complex geometries have required new investments in cartography and satellite imagery, and there have been major advances in political technologies of vision and in the development of a host of other sensors that have dramatically increased the volume of geo-spatial intelligence on which the administration of later modern military violence relies. All of **this has transformed but not replaced** the cartographic imaginary. And yet, for all of their liquid violence, these wars are **still shaped and even confounded** by the multiple, acutely **material environments** through which they are fought. In Sebastian Junger’s (2011) remarkable dispatch from Afghanistan, he notes that for the United States and its allies “the war diverged from the textbooks because it was fought in such axle-breaking, helicopter-crashing, spirit-killing, mind-bending terrain that few military plans survive intact for even an hour” (p. 47). If that sounds familiar, then so too will MacLeish’s (2013) cautionary observations about soldiers as both vectors and victims of military violence: The body’s unruly matter is war’s most necessary and most necessarily expendable raw material. While many analyses of US war violence have emphasized the technologically facilitated withdrawal of American bodies from combat zones in favour of air strikes, smart bombs, remotely piloted drones, and privately contracted fighting forces, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan **could not carry on without the physical presence** of tens of thousands of such bodies. (p. 11) In consequence, the troops have had to cultivate an intrinsically practical knowledge that, while its operating environment and technical armature are obviously different, still owes much to the tacit **bodily awareness** of the Tommy or the Poilu: In the combat zone there is a balance to be struck, a cultivated operational knowledge, that comes in large part from first-hand experience about what can hurt you and what can’t . . . So you need not only knowledge of what the weapons and armor can do for you and to you but a kind of bodily habitus as well—an ability to take in the sensory indications of danger and act on them without having to think too hard about it first. When you hear a shot, is it passing close by? Is it accurate or random? Is it of sufficient caliber to penetrate your vest, the window of your Humvee or the side of your tank? (MacLeish, 2013, p. 76) In the intricate nexus formed by knowledge, space, and military power, later modern war still relies on cartographic vision—and its agents still **produce their own corpographies**.