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**Academic philosophy is anti-Black – the 1AC’s abstraction from the material consequences of racialized violence absolves white philosophers of their contributions to America’s apathy towards racism**

Tommy J. **Curry and Curry 18** [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

We begin with the first author’s reflections on philosophy and its recurring problem of denying the realities of race and racism, reflections that have arisen as a Black (male) philosopher whose life has been threatened for doing Black philosophy. The experience of confronting death, being fearful of being killed doing my job as a critical race theorist, and being threatened with violence for thinking about racism in America has a profound effect on concretizing what is at stake in our theories about anti-Black racism. Whereas my work on race and racism in philosophy earlier in my career was dedicated to the problems created by the mass ignorance of the discipline to the political debates and ethnological history of Black philosophers in the 19th and 20th centuries, I now find myself thinking more seriously about the way that **philosophy**, really theory itself—our present categories of knowledge, such as race, class, and gender, found through disciplines—actually **hastens the deaths of subjugated peoples in the U**nited **S**tates. **Academic philosophy routinely abstracts away from**—directs thought to not attend to the realities of death, dying, and despair created by—**antiBlack racism. Black, Brown, and Indigenous populations are routinely rationalized as disposable flesh. The deaths of these groups launch philosophical discussions** of social injustice and spark awareness by whites, **while the deaths of white people direct policy and demand outrage. Because racialized bodies are confined to inhumane living conditions that nurture violence** and despair **that become attributed to the savage nature of nonwhites and evidence of their inhumanity, the deaths of these** **dehumanized peoples are** often **measured against the dangers they are thought to pose to others**.

**The interpretation of the inferior position that racialized groups occupy in the U**nited **S**tates **is grounded in how whites often think of themselves in relation to problem populations. This relationship is** often **rationalized by avoidance and by** the **denials** of whites **about being causally related to the harsh conditions imposed on nonwhites in the world. Philosophy, and its glorification of the rational individual, ignores the complexity of anti-Black racism by blaming the complacency**, if not outright hostility, **towards Blacks on the mass ignorance of white America**. To remedy this problem, Black philosophers are asked to respond by gearing their writings, lectures, and professional presence to further educate and dialogue with white philosophers in order to enable them to better understand anti-Black racism and white supremacy (Curry 2008, 2015). This therapy is often rewarded as scholarship. **Philosophical positions that analyze racism as a problem of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and ignorance** (philosophies predicated on the capacity of whites to change) **are rewarded and praised as the cutting edge and most impactful theories about race and racism. Reducing racism to a problem of recognition** and understanding **allows white philosophers to remain absolved of their contribution to the apathy that white America has to the death** and subjugation **Black Americans endure** at the hands of the white race.

To some readers, speaking about races as different groups with opposite, if not antagonistic, social lives seems to run contrary to the idea that there are no real races, just people, only the human race. This is the core of **race-neutral theory** in academic philosophy. Race neutrality **asserts that while race, class, and gender may** in fact **differentiate bodies, the capacity for reason—the human essence beneath it all—is what is ultimately at stake in the recognition of difference**. While **this mantra** has been offered to whites since the integrationist strategies of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s under Chief Justice Earl Warren, it **has had little effect in restructuring the psychology of white individuals or remedying** the **institutional** practices of **racism that continue to exclude** or punish **Black Americans**. How are Black scholars to speak about racism, specifically the violence and death that seem to gravitate towards Black bodies if the rules of philosophy and the fragility of white Americans insist that racism is not the cause of the disproportionate death Black Americans suffer and race is not a significant factor in Black people’s lives?

This article is an attempt to debunk the seemingly neutral starting point of academic philosophy. **For decades, Black philosophers have attempted to** educate white philosophers and **reorient the philosophical anthropologies of the discipline. Black, Brown, and Indigenous philosophers have dedicated their lives** and careers **to educating white philosophers** and students, **with little to no effect on the composition** and disposition **of the discipline**. While it is not uncommon for philosophy departments to say they support diversity, the reality is that many, if not most, Black philosophers continue to write about the problem of racism, their experiences of marginalization, and the violence they suffer from white colleagues, disciplinary organizations, and universities. **This article should be read as an attempt not to amend the Western metaphysical tradition but to reveal the obstacles that indicate its perennial failure**. It is the position of the authors that many of the demands for disciplinary change are often expressed as politics, when in reality **there are issues of metaphysics** (the concerns of being) **and philosophical anthropology** (the concerns about the (non)being capable of thinking) **that are unaddressed in much of the current literature**. Section I of this article describes what Black philosophy has taken to be the problem of racism in academic philosophy more broadly. Since the 1970s Black philosophers have criticized, attacked, and attempted to reform the discipline with little effect. This section interrogates why that is the case. Section II argues that the failure of philosophy to change is a problem of metaphysics or the illusion that Blackness is compatible with the idea of the white human. Section III presents the social scientific evidence demonstrating the seeming permanence of anti-Black racism and the dangerous nature of colorblind ideology, which does not recognize that societal organization and racism determine the life chances of Blacks. This article ends with a suggestion of what Black philosophy would look like if its primary mandate were not to persuade whites to remedy their own racist practices, but to diagnose and build strategies against the present problems of racism in philosophy before us.

**Even if they win that their theory is theoretically ideal, it is practically impossible because racialized bodies are marked by their skin color – the psychological construction of Black as inferior makes their impacts inevitable**

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Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2010: 15) explains that **colorblind racism emerged as a new racial ideology in the late 1960s** concomitantly with the crystallization of the “new racism” as America’s new racial structure. **Whites could no longer get away with the overt racist practices** that were used before the civil rights movements **but instead depended on more subtle ways to maintain their racial dominance** without using race. In today’s society, there are very few whites who outwardly consider themselves to be racist, but they will still support systems that create inequalities among minority populations.

Bonilla-Silva’s (1996) account of racism leads him to develop the idea of racialized social systems, a term that refers to societies where economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories. Bonilla-Silva theorizes that **the racialized system incentivizes how racialized persons develop their identities within racist structures. Race is not simply imposed on bodies but is psychologically invested in by individuals in terms of how dominant racial groups identify themselves in relationship to the** **groups** and individuals **they construct as inferiors. For some groups assimilation is possible. This is the case for ethnic groups like the Irish and the Jews because their skin color is closer to that of whites, but it would be impossible for Black groups to similarly disappear. Colorblindness could exist in theory, but in reality, people see skin color, and in America, white skin stands for superiority.**

Racial **segregation** has been a mainstay of the American race problem since the beginning of slavery. Assigning the places that Blacks belonged, whether it be in the fields or as the “house Negro,” **has been one of the primary ways that racism has been enforced against Blacks**. Even after the end of slavery, **Jim Crow was established to terrorize Blacks into staying confined by their segregated spaces**. We would argue that **even today**, the established racial dynamic in America maintains racial segregation. In The Hidden Cost of Being African American, Thomas Shapiro (2004: 152) has shown how **whites have been able to move into the neighborhoods with the better schools and resources with the help of their inheritances**. Many of the people he interviewed about their housing location stated that they did not look at race when deciding to move to certain neighborhoods but rather they focused on the lifestyle and “standards” of the people. **Most stated that “it just happened” that there were no African Americans at the school their child attends. These understandings of “standards” and lifestyle are nested in the notion that white culture defines the norms and standards**. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s concept of “white habitus” explains the tendency whites have for racial segregation, namely, their preference for moving to all-white neighborhoods and the effects this practice has on African Americans.

Shapiro’s work parallels the findings of Bonilla-Silva’s theory of white habitus. Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006: 233) describe “white habitus” as a racialized, uninterrupted socialization process that conditions and creates whites’ racial taste, perceptions, feelings, and emotions and their views on racial matters. The most pronounced effect of white habitus is that “it promotes a sense of group belonging (a white culture of solidarity) and negative views about nonwhites.” **In these all-white spaces, whites become the standard or norm while anything or anyone different becomes unnatural or problematic**. White habitus promotes minorities being viewed based on stereotypes and generalizations perpetuated by the media or through other second-hand sources. **The greatest irony of Bonilla-Silva et al.’s interviews was their finding that “whites do not interpret their racial isolation and segregation from Blacks as something racial.”** This qualitative project shows that **even when whites are communally segregated** from Blacks, **they do not interpret this as a racialized or racist environment**. The absence of Blacks is thought to be compatible with how white Americans think about colorblindness. The idea of white superiority, or whiteonly neighborhoods, is not understood by many white Americans as racist. In one of Shapiro’s (2004: 152) interviews, the participant states that she has “Black friends.” However, Bonilla-Silva et al. (2006: 248) point out that when whites claim to have Black friends, they usually are referring to formal activities such as sports or classroom work groups. Once the activity is over the relationship ends; the so-called Black “friends” are not actual neighbors or friends who live within their social environment. **Academic philosophy operates similarly**.

**Racism deems Black life disposable and demands racialized violence – we’re not an ad-hom that criticizes the positionality or personal views of their authors – their philosophy is actively used as an expression of white supremacy**

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**Far too often, the Black philosopher is charged with making sense of the irrationality of white America’s erroneous perceptions of Black, Brown, and Indigenous people. The histories of terror, death, rape, and murder are** often **said to be remnants of the past. To speak of anti-Black racism as an ever-threatening doom**—a looming threat of death and dying—**after** the presidency of Barack **Obama seems heresy to many white Americans**. Despite the horrors that now confront the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump, it is often very difficult for Black speakers to convince white audiences of the divergent worlds codified by anti-Blackness. Black philosophers, especially Black men, often try to persuade academic audiences, who fear being in the same room as them, of their humanity through the academic endeavor. Because this Black person is a professor, there is, standing in front of the white audience, evidence that Black people are not all criminals, and that Black males specifically are not all violent or dangerous. In performing what a human being is thought to be by whites, the Black philosopher imitates that human for whites in hopes of being interpreted as human and consequently heard. To be a Black philosopher is to assert that the perilous nature of being Black is outside of the human. Whereas white philosophers often share a similar language with other whites, namely, that all people are human beings and rational individuals, Black philosophers who study race often speak in terms of their negations: non-being. Harris (2018) refers to this as “necro-being.” Curry (2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b) speaks of the Man-Not. Wilderson (2009) writes of the slave.

**To be Black is to render the very grammar of the academy delusional. To speak of impending death and sub-personhood** and explain the experiences of violence and dehumanization that accompany this position to white individuals who only think of their existence in terms of always being human and persons is ineffable. **Perhaps** the theorist Calvin **Warren best captures this problem in his book Ontological Terror**: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation. Warren (2018: 2) argues:

**The human being provides an anchor for the declaration, and since the being of the human is invaluable, then Black life must also matter, if the Black is a human** (the declaration anchors mattering in the human’s Being). **But we reach a point of terror with this syllogistic reasoning. One must take a step backward and ask the fundamental question: is the Black, in fact, a human being?** Or **can Black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human? If it cannot, then on what bases can we assert the mattering of Black existence?**

The consequence of attending to the problem of Blackness and the realities of death is that **the theories that emerge to account for what is taken to be the accidental positionality of whites who are thought to be human**, individuals, citizens, and persons **must make sense of a reality where to be Black is to be nonhuman, savage, alien, and reified and consequently subject to violence and wished dead. As** the late Critical Race Theorist, **Derrick Bell** (1997: 23) **once said**:

**We have never understood that the essence of the racism we contended against was not simply that we were exploited in slavery**, degraded by **segregation, and** frustrated by **the unmet promises of equal opportunity. The essence of racism in America was the hope that we who were Black would not exist**.

Instead of racism being defined as a set of attitudes or beliefs about racial groups held by biased individuals, the authors prefer to understand racism as

a complex nexus, a cognitive architecture used to invent, reimagine, and evolve the presumed political, social, economic, sexual, and psychological superiority of the white races in society, while materializing the imagined inferiority and hastening the death of inferior races. Said differently, racism is the manifestation of the social processes and concurrent logics that facilitate the death and dying of racially subjugated peoples. (Curry 2017a: 4)

**Racism is a social process that demands the extinguishing of Black life. Racism craves death**. It is constructed, then legitimized through cultural and individual complacency. **When a young Black boy is killed, the instruments of the state, the authority of the police, and the vulnerability of the Black male body converge in the ultimate expression of violence** that results in death. **The public then rationalizes this exercise of state violence** and the individual will of the police officer who killed the Black boy **through empathy**. The white individual who sees the dead Black male body understands the need to kill the Black boy because Blackness socially expresses criminality, danger, and the possible death of a white life. **This fear of Blackness creates empathy for the officer who killed the Black boy**. He is thought of by the white interpreter who is watching the dead Black male body as a corpse. The fear shared between the officer and white onlooker is legitimated by the state because the state offers its society security from this Black male threat. **This is how populations feared by the society are simultaneously constructed and destroyed**.

This brief example describes the depth of the problem involved with racism. **Black philosophers are not simply objecting to the thoughts individuals hold about different groups of people, but how the thoughts that white individuals hold can be supported and expressed in violence against Black men and women in the world**. Because a white supremacist world supports the fears of the white racist, **the** individual **racist’s anti-Blackness is aspirational. It is expressed as a will for there to be no Black bodies** there. **As such, the human becomes an untenable account of Black life, given this disposability**. The world is simply not organized in such a way that allows Blackness to not be seen, perceived, and dehumanized in relation to whites. **No amount of evidence** or argument **seems to be able to displace the faith philosophers have in education, dialogue, and mutual understanding** between Blacks and whites as the remedies of racism (Curry 2008). Generations of nonwhite philosophers have spent their careers and research showing the discipline the horrors of racism, xenophobia, and ethno-nationalist thinking, but there has been little to no change in departments or the discipline at large.

For many philosophers, the idea that racism is permanent is unthinkable. Despite the words and works of Black political theorists like the lawyer Robert F. Williams or Dr. Huey P. Newton, or even more canonically established Black figures like W. E. B. DuBois, Carter G. Woodson, Frantz Fanon, or Derrick Bell, philosophy as a discipline and **philosophers** more generally **refuse to acknowledge that racism remains the core and most determining aspect of America’s social processes**. Enamored by the stories of Blacks suffering, many scholarly conversations about Blackness and racism focus on the harm that Black individuals suffer at the hands of whites or the discipline of philosophy. Relatively few works actually analyze racism structurally or beyond identity at all. **Philosophical analyses do not revolve around death or the material consequences of anti-Blackness**. Instead, the fear and anxiety that Black philosophers and graduate students share with whites become more worthwhile topics.

**This turns the aff – America is organized around the subjugation and death of non-white people – discriminatory applications of their policy are inevitable absent a recognition of racialization in the law – their colorblindness is mutually exclusive with the necessary upheaval of the racial dynamics that necessitate inequality.**

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It is now accepted fact that **scientists have been able to demonstrate that race does not exist on a biological level, but instead was constructed by society**. Classifying race as a social construct conveys that there is a “process of endowing a group or concept with a delineation, name or reality” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012: 155). Race has a reality to it, a substance given by the historical and cultural projections of the specific society within which it is birthed. **While philosophers commonly entertain**, at least at the theoretical level, **the idea that race does not have any real consequence, that is a pernicious supposition**. Tessman and On (2001: 5) suggest that “**an analysis of racialization as the process of the social construction of race can lead theorists away from the possibility of race-conscious strategies for struggling against racism**.” **If the issues surrounding race and racism are not addressed, minorities will still fall victim to unfair treatment in education, housing, and the court systems**.

Although the concept of race is socially constructed, the populations most affected by racialization and racial disparities agree that **there are still real consequences to race because of its embeddedness within** practically **all facets of American society. Race consciousness is necessary to diagnose the function** and effects **of racialization in law, policy, and social interactions**. As the sociologist Michael Banton (2001: 164) argues, some elements of the racial idiom are still needed in law because “the concept of a racial group is the price to be paid for a law against indirect discrimination.” Contrary to the idea that race is mere societal rhetoric, Banton argues that the language of race is needed in law to combat prejudice and discrimination against victim groups. This point is made extremely clear by the data presented by Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow: Colorblindness in the Age of Mass Incarceration. She argues that **racism is a driving force behind social organization—an architecture around which social hierarchy and disparity accumulate. Racism explains why the penal system is filled with Black men who are incarcerated and how labeling them as felons**, primarily due to the criminalization of drugs, **causes them to lose their basic civil rights**. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, passed by Congress as part of the War on Drugs, called for strict lease enforcement and eviction of public housing tenants who engage in criminal activity (Alexander 2010: 142). In the spirit of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Clinton Administration sought to strengthen the law in 1996, adding **the “One Strike and You’re Out”** legislation whose goal is to prevent people with criminal records from being able to live in public housing. This **measure to “crack down” on crime has had a debilitating effect on the family lives of people of color living in public housing units**.

**America is organized around the subjugation, death, and political suppression of racialized people’s voice**. Even under the ethno-nationalist regime of Donald Trump, there is a reactionary consensus that has reemerged, namely, that a truly white supremacist society is colorblind. This follows a similar logic as the dissent of Justice John Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896):

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.

**Notice** how **the assumption** behind Harlan’s words asserts **that the law guarantees equality, while the disparities in society are due to the racial superiority of the white race. In this sense, race is irrelevant in law, but undergirds the dynamics that produce inequality in the society**. Harlan believed that white supremacy was natural. He suggested, like many white liberals and conservatives today, that race should not matter in policy and the law, and that the social consequences that befall racial groups are the result of their superior or inferior racial traits.

Not even a decade ago, white America celebrated being post-racial. The election of President Barack Obama seemed to be a great leap forward and evidence that the United States, as a majority white country, had indeed moved to a place where race did not indicate the capacity of an individual. However, racial progress is interpreted differently by the oppressed populations. **Racism has always existed in American society and continues to be a major problem for** many **people of color** who live in the United States. **The** recent **election of** President Donald **Trump showed that there are always going to be consequences for disrupting** the grand narrative of **white supremacy**. Perhaps the best way to understand this backlash that resulted in the election of Trump is through a measure of covert or overt racism. **While many philosophers maintain that it is desirable to live in a colorblind society where race does not matter, social science research has vehemently rejected this notion**. Joe Feagin’s theory of systemic racism is beneficial for race analysis because it places white agents at the front of racial oppression. **Feagin** (2012: 937) **refers to systemic racism as “the foundational, large-scale and inescapable hierarchical system of US racial oppression devised and maintained by whites and directed at people of color.”** Racism is seen from a structural view and negatively impacts people of color because whites dominate the structures that dictate the order and organization of society. Systemic racism, as described by Feagin (2006), consists of six parts: the patterns of impoverishment and unjust enrichment and their transmission over time; the resulting vested group interests and the alienating racist relations; the cost and burdens of racism; the important role of white elites; the rationalization of racial oppression in a white-racist framing; and continuing resistance to racism. Feagin challenges Harlan’s explanation for white supremacy: instead of **whites** being inherently superior, they **rely on institutional racism to produce social structures that reward and elevate whites**.

**Instead, the alternative is to affirm Black philosophy as a site to engage in radical theorizations that are a genuine reflection of Black experience – attempts at integration commodifies Black philosophers as extensions of white thinkers which waters down Black philosophy to a form for white philosophers to deem respectable scholarship – a fundamental reorientation of the discipline away from universal reason is key.**

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The debate about what constitutes or is real philosophy continues to dominate the discussions concerning race and racism. Drawing from the inclusion/exclusion or integrationist/segregationist paradigms, the problem of race and racism in philosophy is routinely understood as what is allowed to stand within or excluded from the discipline. The integrationist or post-civil-rights understanding of racism in philosophy routinely misses that **racism involves a complex and denaturing dynamic regarding the thought and perceptions of oppressed groups**. This is a paradigmatic and methodological problem introduced by Curry (2011a, 2011b) as signs of Black philosophy’s “derelictical” crisis. As Curry (2011a: 144) explains:

At its most basic level, philosophy is an activity of inquiry into the world which is supposed to guarantee its practitioners some level of assuredness in the ways we interpret the realities before us. If we take African American philosophy to be philosophical activity, then we should expect, by necessity of being philosophy, that Africana philosophy should result in the same methodological rigor—some assuredness in the ways that Africana people have used to interpret their realities. Unfortunately, the present day crisis of African American philosophy makes this simple formulation an impossibility. By making the methodological rigor of Africana philosophy dependent on its popular acceptance; its closeness to the political dogmas of our racial era, we condemn our area of study to under-specialization whereby our works of philosophical genius, past and present, will be judged solely by the degree to which they extend the universalizing character of Europe and her theories. **To the extent that African American philosophy chooses to abandon the genealogical patterns of Black thought for philosophically privileged associations with white thinkers, it remains derelictical—continuing to neglect its only actual duty**—the duty **to inquiry into the reality of African-descended people as they have revealed it**.

We begin with the premise that **racism permeates the discipline of philosophy**. We are attempting to bring attention to the ways in which **authentic Black philosophy has been revised and denatured into a form that whites in the discipline accept as philosophical**. Whereas all disciplines have norms or rules of scholarly rigor, **philosophy demands that Black thinking and thought tend towards specific political ends in order to be considered philosophy**. Whether or not the thought and texts of Black philosophers are correctly interpreted, understood, or even read ultimately becomes irrelevant to the larger political orientation of the discipline.

**Black philosophers are read as extensions of white thought. A Black philosophical figure is relevant only to the extent that he or she can be understood as the unrealized intentionality of canonical white figures. Black historical figures are made philosophical by the extent to which their voice can be imagined as what Dewey, Hegel, Addams, or Foucault would have said if they thought more seriously about race** and racism. Consequently, writes Curry (2011b: 141):

**Black thinkers function as the racial hypothetical of European thought whereby Black thought is read as the concretization of European reflections turned to the problem of race, and Black thinkers are seen as racial embodiments of white thinkers’ philosophical spirits**. In this vein, the most studied Black philosophers are read as the embodiment of their white associates; **W. E. B. Du Bois is read as the Black Hegel, the Black James, the Black Dewey, and Frantz Fanon as a Black Sartre**, or Black Husserl. **This demonization of Black thinkers by the various manifestations of the European logos as necessary to the production of AfricanAmerican philosophy is a serious impediment to the development of a genuine genealogy** of the ideas **that actually define Africana philosophy’s Diasporic identity**.

**The insistence that Black philosophy parallel white philosophical traditions, such as pragmatism, feminism, and Rawlsianism, and arrive at integrationism as the concluding political goal suggests that the study of Black philosophy is little more than a disciplinary ruse. Critical Race Theory is consistently revised away from materialist interpretations** of racism and racist institutions **towards a focus on the history and racism of particular white European thinkers** (Curry 2017b). This derelictical demand is so powerful that **Black philosophers are rarely asked to verify, empirically or historically, their theories about racism. Instead, they are evaluated on the basis of the extent to which white philosophers can or do agree with their position**. Said differently, the racism of philosophy is so overwhelming and severe that **the question of whether or not a claim or statement about racism or Black people is true or false is arbitrated by whether or not there is a white consensus supporting or rejecting the claim**. Often, manifestly false statements about Black people are made by white and Black philosophers that are taken to be fact because white philosophers and the discipline at large agree to act and think as if the statement is true. These debates often concern easily verifiable facts of underrepresentation, the use of discourse and education to solve racism, and gender dynamics both intra- and inter-racially.

The problem of dereliction emphasizes the point that **philosophy is constructed with a white audience and public in mind. The admission of Black, Brown, and Indigenous students** into graduate programs across the country **is not meant to fundamentally change or reorient the discipline**. As a matter of professional survival, **racialized minority students are being professionalized to accept that their work must focus on global problems and sustain the supposed universalism of reason, ethics, and dialogue**, even while they rhetorically claim they reject such an orientation. Ensuring that young Black philosophers fear being labeled as too radical, or having their work designated as controversial or unsafe, is reason enough to self-censor and revise the original thinking of Black scholars. As such, **Black philosophy becomes a discipline accepted as philosophy by the extent to which it mirrors, or Blackfaces, the insights of white thinkers and theories**. Philosophy departments have ensured that conversations go unattended that concern the permanence of racism and the histories of trauma and bidirectional violence amongst Blacks (Hernandez et al. 1993; Cascardi and Avery-Leaf 2015; Curry and Utley 2018c). They have also ignored the imperialism and colonial heritage of feminism and the paternal benevolence that white women receive from patriarchal power and sexism, despite decades of research that documents the truth of such positions in the social sciences and history (Newman 1999, 2007; Glick and Fiske 2001).

Black philosophy is forced to interpret the world in the most elementary terms of white theory. Ellen Pence, one of the founders of the Duluth model, admitted that she simply made up the idea that patriarchy and sexist attitudes are causally linked to intimate partner violence, but Black philosophy commits itself to propagating this theory despite countless studies showing this is not true in white culture, and has never been the case amongst Blacks (Pence 1999; Mills 2009; Caetano et al. 2005). The intellectual repression of Black philosophers is so severe that popularly held opinions and majority (white) consensus can dictate the interpretations of race, class, and gender amongst Blacks. Many of the theories proposed by Black philosophers concerning racism, intimate partner violence, classism and privilege, underrepresentation, and sexism are routinely found to be out of line with, if not outright rejected by, the scientific accounts of the very same social problems. **The social sciences**, history, and epidemiology **have shown that the causes of social problems in white communities often have very different causes when analyzed in Black or Brown communities. In philosophy, however, there are no distinctions in causation. All social ills stem from** ignorance, patriarchy, or **some incredibly general theory that often lacks cultural specificity or racial nuance**. To appear legitimate, these categories simply mimic the already established thinking of whites and in doing so gain the appearance of truth. No matter the empirical findings or authoritative literatures by experts in other disciplines, all conversations about racism and Black folk that run contrary to the endorsed whites are effectively banned by social stigma and punished through professional ostracism.

**Black philosophy has a responsibility to engage the Black experience as a genuine site of existential reflection and epistemological tool making. The idea that Black experience and reality must be accounted for by white theories of causality or aim towards the same ends of white philosophy is delusional. Black philosophy must engage in radical theorizations that can be traced back to the problems tackled in the texts and debates of Black thinkers**. The **social prognoses suggested** by Black philosophers **should also have some accountability to the realities that Black people are facing in the U**nited **S**tates, **if not the world**. There is no time for idle thought that simply attempts to imitate white theories of causality and canonical traditions in order to be accepted. How can we demonstrate the importance of Black philosophy, if not for what we observe and verify in the lives of Black people in the world? **Its ability to express the full complexity of Black life and death in theory at the most abstract levels of thought is what is at stake in the Black philosophical project**.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse a pedagogical investment of rejecting racism – they have to win that the aff is not racist to engage in the first place – it comes first because it determines academic spaces and is an accessibility magnifier

#### Don’t evaluate the plan if we win a link: colorblindness is the structuring ideological conflict of debate that pervades the performances and behavior of the community

#### 1. prior question

#### 2. flips skills

#### 3. Performance DA

#### We still win even if we lose fw

## Case

### t/l

#### prefer materiality and consequences, but not necessarily existential threats first – racism o/ws – that was the K

#### Science proves non consequentialist ethics are impossible and our version of util solves all aff offense

Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University

(The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

**What turn-of-the-millennium science** **is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise**, that our **moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural**. **Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions**. Moreover, **anyone who claims to have such a theory**, or even part of one, **almost certainly doesn't**. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that **rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here**. Instead, I suspect, **they** **will insist that I have simply misunderstood what** Kant and like-minded **deontologists are all about**. **Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition**. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. **Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously**. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). **This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view**, as I've suggested, **may be misleading**. **The problem**, more specifically, **is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological**, though they may appear to be from the inside. **Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love**, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." **This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things**. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of **the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics**. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that **consequentialists**, as much as anyone else, **have respect for persons**, **are against treating people as mere objects,** **wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc**. **A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process**. **Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial**. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. **If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get** characteristically deontological **answers**. Some **will be tautological**: **"Because it's murder!"** **Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means**." "You have to respect people's rights." **But**, as we know, **these answers don't really explain anything**, because **if you give the same people** (on different occasions) **the trolley case** or the loop case (See above), **they'll make the opposite judgment**, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. **Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism**. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, **there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions**. **But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question**.

#### Actor specificity:

#### [A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. [B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. [C] No act- omission distinction— governments must vote on bills, so inaction is an explicit act taken, and governments are responsible for the public sphere so they must aggregate. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings.

#### The goodness of a consequence should be measured through hedonism because [a] everyone can feel the goodness of pleasure and badness of pain in some form [b] all other goods collapse to pleasure – eg freedom matters because it lets agents pursue their own ends but those ends matter to us because they terminate in some sort of desirable pleasure.

### Uv

#### On presump – permis, they negate

#### 1. probability – 1 truth

#### 2. actor spec

#### On 1ar theory:

#### 1. Err neg on theory and implicit neg flex standard on all their offense- no timeskew since we both get 13 min speaking time, aff gets first and last word, means they have a persuasiveness advantage which 2n collapse doesn’t check cause no 3n, they set the playing field with advocacy choice, neg is reactive, and they get infinite prep. Skew inevitable- all args are designed to skew the aff. Being neg is harder on this topic since DA’s are nonunique. This answers all aff flex warrants.

#### 2. Reasonability- persuasive defense on theory means you ignore it- crowds out substance and boxes out the neg by winning on a risk of offense.

### Kant fw

#### 1. Rarity objection- I could tailor a maxim super specifically to a particular instance so that it wouldn’t fail the test of universalizability but would still be bad- there’s no brightline for what constitutes a morally relevant feature of a maxim.

#### 2. Bad action problem.

Garnett, 11 -- Senior Lecturer in Philosophy @ University of London, Birkbeck and currently both Admissions Tutor for Research Students and Programme Director for the MA. He received his BA and MPhil in philosophy at Cambridge University, before proceeding to a PhD at the University of Toronto [Michael Garnett, Practical Reason and the Unity of Agency, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 449 Volume 41, Number 3, September 2011, pp. 449-468. Critical Notice of CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009. Pp. xiv-t-230.]

This line of thought is subject to a well-known objection, which is that it makes a mystery of irrational action. Irrational action is action in violation of the principles of practical reason. But if these principles are constitutive of action, then nothing that is an action can be in violation of them. So, if the principles of practical reason are constitutive of action, then irrational action is impossible. But irrational action is clearly possible. So the principles of practical reason cannot be constitutive of action.

#### On performativity

#### 1. It begs the question of why it’s morally valuable- if we win util, then all that matters is states of affairs.

#### 2. Freedom violations inevitable because states have to weigh tradeoffs.

On conseq fails

Empirics disprove calc indicts, and it proves calc hard not impossible

#### On universalizability –

#### Util straight turns universalizability

On TJFS

#### 1. Reject TJFs- they’re arbitrary and beg the question because winning our framework substantively and disproving theirs means our framework is fairer and more educational. At worst, only a reason why *unfair* frameworks are bad.

#### 2. consequentialism good

#### 3. kant bad

#### Callahan is wrong

### Kant offense

#### 1 – Absence of IPP allows free-riding where individuals use others’ work. Free-riding violates equal freedom.

Ripstein '9 (Arthur Ripstein; Arthur Ripstein is Professor of Law and Philosophy and University Professor. He was appointed to the Department of Philosophy in 1987, promoted to Full Professor in 1996, appointed to the Faculty of Law in 1999, and appointed to the rank of University Professor in 2016. He received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, a master’s degree in law from Yale, and an undergraduate degree from the University of Manitoba. He was Chair of the Philosophy Department 2011-14 and Acting Chair 2019-20; 10-15-2009; *Force and Freedom*, accessed 8-20-2020;

So mandatory cooperation cannot treat terms of interaction as reciprocal because they are voluntary. Instead, there is a more direct requirement of reciprocity: everyone must do his or her own part; the person who fails to do so violates reciprocity by taking advantage of the cooperative efforts of others, like the one who fails to keep up his end of a contract. From this perspective, the “free rider” wrongs his fellow citizens by taking advantage of their efforts. The free rider may claim—and it may even be true— that he or she would rather do without the rightful condition and go it alone. That claim is beside the point, because the obligation to enter a rightful condition is unconditional, that is, it does not depend upon any particular person’s subjective assessment of the benefits it will yield. Others are entitled to treat the creating and sustaining of a rightful condition as one of the free rider’s purposes, quite apart from what he may have to say about it. Thus they can rightly complain that they are being required to work for the purposes of another, or that they are being used by the free rider, and they can make this claim even if the free rider’s failure to con- tribute costs them nothing. The mandatory character of such cooperation generates a presumption in favor of an equal division of its burdens. Kant suggests that legislation that “goes against the law of equality in assigning the burdens of the state in matters of taxation, recruiting and so forth”30 is defective. Citizens are entitled to petition against such laws, because equal division is the basic case of mandatory cooperation. If everyone must do his or her part in jointly providing public spaces, those parts will be equal unless there are positive grounds for differentiation.

#### 2 – The government is obligated to protect IP. The inventor has a right to own their creation. The same applies to intellectual property. A world where everyone can use the inventions of another without consent is stealing which violates the categorical imperative since people who steal do not wish to be stolen from.

#### Lbl their args

#### Pievtolo is wrong – just indicates that people can possess property but that doesn’t mean that theres some kind of innate right for medicine

#### Merges is in the context of physical property, not property protections so it doesn’t apply and means nothing

#### Cernea and uszaki

### Covid adv

#### Literally zero inherency, Moderna already released COVID Vaccine IP

**Moderna** On, **10-8-2020**, "Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters during the COVID-19 Pandemic," Moderna, Inc., <https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid-19> *(Harker AM)*

Moderna is a pioneer in the development of messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines and therapeutics. From its inception in 2010, Moderna saw the potential of this new class of medicines to make a significant difference in patients’ lives. With the support of our investors we have invested billions of dollars into research and development to make mRNA medicines a reality. One of the exciting discoveries advanced by Moderna was the combination of mRNA and lipid nanoparticles (LNPs) to make vaccines, and the demonstration of this potential in human clinical trials for eleven different infectious disease vaccines since 2015. Those discoveries and the expertise we developed have uniquely positioned Moderna to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic quickly. Information on our work toward a COVID-19 vaccine can be found here. As a company committed to innovation, Moderna recognizes that intellectual property rights play an important role in encouraging investment in research. Our portfolio of intellectual property is an important asset that will protect and enhance our ability to continue to invest in innovative medicines. A summary of our intellectual property can be found here. A selection of representative issued US patents relevant to our mRNA-1273 vaccine against COVID-19 is available here. Beyond Moderna’s vaccine, there are other COVID-19 vaccines in development that may use Moderna-patented technologies. We feel a special obligation under the current circumstances to use our resources to bring this pandemic to an end as quickly as possible. Accordingly, while the pandemic continues, Moderna will not enforce our COVID-19 related patents against those making vaccines intended to combat the pandemic. Further, to eliminate any perceived IP barriers to vaccine development during the pandemic period, upon request we are also willing to license our intellectual property for COVID-19 vaccines to others for the post pandemic period. Moderna is proud that its mRNA technology is poised to be used to help end the current pandemic.

#### Pfizer doesn’t enforce it’s patents on vaccine production for LDCS

**Pfizer 20** –Pfizer, Patent Rights. Issued by Policy, Public Affairs and Corporate Communications, Pfizer Inc. May 2020/ <https://cdn.pfizer.com/pfizercom/Patent-Rights-Final-May2020.pdf> *(Harker KB)*

Pfizer is committed to improving patient health and well-being at every stage of life. Meaningful patent protection worldwide encourages medical progress and further investment in the discovery and development of newer and more effective medicines and vaccines that address unmet medical needs of patients. Pfizer continuously reevaluates its patent filing strategy in all markets to ensure continued innovation and access to medicines for the benefit of patients. Enforcement of patent rights is driven by numerous factors particular to each case; however, Pfizer has a policy of patent non-enforcement in Least Developed Countries.

#### No credible scenario for extinction—outdated fringe science and well-meaning threat inflation

Scouras 19 (James Scouras, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, formerly served on the congressionally established Comission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, “Nuclear War as a Global Catastrophic Risk”, Cambridge Core, 9-2-2019, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/nuclear-war-as-a-global-catastrophic-risk/EC726528F3A71ED5ED26307677960962, accessed 12-1-2019, HKR-cjh)

\*footnotes 2 and 4 included

It might be thought that we know enough about the risk of nuclear war to appropriately manage that risk. The consequences of unconstrained nuclear attacks, and the counterattacks that would occur until the major nuclear powers exhaust their arsenals, would far exceed any cataclysm humanity has suffered in all of recorded history. The likelihood of such a war must, therefore, be reduced as much as possible. But this rather simplistic logic raises many questions and does not withstand close scrutiny. Regarding consequences, does unconstrained nuclear war pose an existential risk to humanity? The consequences of existential risks are truly incalculable, including the lives not only of all human beings currently living but also of all those yet to come; involving not only Homo sapiens but all species that may descend from it. At the opposite end of the spectrum of consequences lies the domain of “limited” nuclear wars. Are these also properly considered global catastrophes? After all, while the only nuclear war that has ever occurred devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was also instrumental in bringing about the end of the Pacific War, thereby saving lives that would have been lost in the planned invasion of Japan. Indeed, some scholars similarly argue that many lives have been saved over the nearly threefourths of a century since the advent of nuclear weapons because those weapons have prevented the large conventional wars that otherwise would likely have occurred between the major powers. This is perhaps the most significant consequence of the attacks that devastated the two Japanese cities. Regarding likelihood, how do we know what the likelihood of nuclear war is and the degree to which our national policies affect that likelihood, for better or worse? How much confidence should we place in any assessment of likelihood? What levels of likelihood for the broad spectrum of possible consequences pose unacceptable levels of risk? Even a very low (nondecreasing) annual likelihood of the risk of nuclear war would result in near certainty of catastrophe over the course of enough years. Most fundamentally and counterintuitively, are we really sure we want to reduce the risk of nuclear war? The successful operation of deterrence, which has been credited – perhaps too generously – with preventing nuclear war during the Cold War and its aftermath, depends on the risk that any nuclear use might escalate to a nuclear holocaust. Many proposals for reducing risk focus on reducing nuclear weapon arsenals and, therefore, the possible consequences of the most extreme nuclear war. Yet, if we reduce the consequences of nuclear war, might we also inadvertently increase its likelihood? It’s not at all clear that would be a desirable trade-off. This is all to argue that the simplistic logic described above is inadequate, even dangerous. A more nuanced understanding of the risk of nuclear war is imperative. This paper thus attempts to establish a basis for more rigorously addressing the risk of nuclear war. Rather than trying to assess the risk, a daunting objective, its more modest goals include increasing the awareness of the complexities involved in addressing this topic and evaluating alternative measures proposed for managing nuclear risk. I begin with a clarification of why nuclear war is a global catastrophic risk but not an existential risk. Turning to the issue of risk assessment, I then present a variety of assessments by academics and statesmen of the likelihood component of the risk of nuclear war, followed by an overview of what we do and do not know about the consequences of nuclear war, emphasizing uncertainty in both factors. Then, I discuss the difficulties in determining the effects of risk mitigation policies, focusing on nuclear arms reduction. Finally, I address the question of whether nuclear weapons have indeed saved lives. I conclude with recommendations for national security policy and multidisciplinary research. 2 Why is nuclear war a global catastrophic risk? One needs to only view the pictures of Hiroshima and Nagasaki shown in figure 1 and imagine such devastation visited on thousands of cities across warring nations in both hemispheres to recognize that nuclear war is truly a global catastrophic risk. Moreover, many of today’s nuclear weapons are an order of magnitude more destructive than Little Boy and Fat Man, and there are many other significant consequences – prompt radiation, fallout, etc. – not visible in such photographs. Yet, it is also true that not all nuclear wars would be so catastrophic; some, perhaps involving electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks 2 Many mistakenly believe that the congressionally established Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack concluded that an EMP attack would, indeed, be catastrophic to electronic systems and consequently to people and societies that vitally depend on those systems. However, the conclusion of the commission, on whose staff I served, was only that such a catastrophe could, not would, result from an EMP attack. Its executive report states, for example, that “the damage level could be sufficient to be catastrophic to the Nation.” See www.empcommision.org for publicly available reports from the EMP Commission. See also Frankel et al., (2015).2 using only a few high-altitude detonations or demonstration strikes of various kinds, could result in few casualties. Others, such as a war between Israel and one of its potential future nuclear neighbors, might be regionally devastating but have limited global impact, at least if we limit our consideration to direct and immediate physical consequences. Nevertheless, smaller nuclear wars need to be included in any analysis of nuclear war as a global catastrophic risk because they increase the likelihood of larger nuclear wars. This is precisely why the nuclear taboo is so precious and crossing the nuclear threshold into uncharted territory is so dangerous (Schelling, 2005; see also Tannenwald, 2007). While it is clear that nuclear war is a global catastrophic risk, it is also clear that it is not an existential risk. Yet over the course of the nuclear age, a series of mechanisms have been proposed that, it has been erroneously argued, could lead to human extinction. The first concern3 arose among physicists on the Manhattan Project during a 1942 seminar at Berkeley some three years before the first test of an atomic weapon. Chaired by Robert Oppenheimer, it was attended by Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, Emil Konopinski, and other theoretical physicists (Rhodes, 1995). They considered the possibility that detonation of an atomic bomb could ignite a self-sustaining nitrogen fusion reaction that might propagate through earth’s atmosphere, thereby extinguishing all air-breathing life on earth. Konopinski, Cloyd Margin, and Teller eventually published the calculations that led to the conclusion that the nitrogen-nitrogen reaction was virtually impossible from atomic bomb explosions – calculations that had previously been used to justify going forward with Trinity, the first atomic bomb test (Konopinski et al., 1946). Of course, the Trinity test was conducted, as well as over 1000 subsequent atomic and thermonuclear tests, and we are fortunately still here. After the bomb was used, extinction fear focused on invisible and deadly fallout, unanticipated as a significant consequence of the bombings of Japan that would spread by global air currents to poison the entire planet. Public dread was reinforced by the depressing, but influential, 1957 novel On the Beach by Nevil Shute (1957) and the subsequent 1959 movie version (Kramer, 1959). The story describes survivors in Melbourne, Australia, one of a few remaining human outposts in the Southern Hemisphere, as fallout clouds approached to bring the final blow to humanity. In the 1970s, after fallout was better understood to be limited in space, time, and magnitude, depletion of the ozone layer, which would cause increased ultraviolet radiation to fry all humans who dared to venture outside, became the extinction mechanism of concern. Again, one popular book, The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan Schell (1982), which described the nuclear destruction of the ozone layer leaving the earth “a republic of insects and grass,” promoted this fear. Schell did at times try to cover all bases, however: “To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out” (Schell, 1982). Finally, the current mechanism of concern for extinction is nuclear winter, the phenomenon by which dust and soot created primarily by the burning of cities would rise to the stratosphere and attenuate sunlight such that surface temperatures would decline dramatically, agriculture would fail, and humans and other animals would perish from famine. The public first learned of the possibility of nuclear winter in a Parade article by Sagan (1983), published a month or so before its scientific counterpart by Turco et al. (1983). While some nuclear disarmament advocates promote the idea that nuclear winter is an extinction threat, and the general public is probably confused to the extent it is not disinterested, few scientists seem to consider it an extinction threat. It is understandable that some of these extinction fears were created by ignorance or uncertainty and treated seriously by worst-case thinking, as seems appropriate for threats of extinction. But nuclear doom mongering also seems to be at play for some of these episodes. For some reason, portions of the public active in nuclear issues, as well as some scientists, appear to think that arguments for nuclear arms reductions or elimination will be more persuasive if nuclear war is believed to threaten extinction, rather than merely the horrific cataclysm that it would be in reality (Martin, 1982). 4 As summarized by Martin, “The idea that global nuclear war could kill most or all of the world’s population is critically examined and found to have little or no scientific basis.” Martin also critiques possible reasons for beliefs or professed beliefs about nuclear extinction, including exaggeration to stimulate action.4 To summarize, nuclear war is a global catastrophic risk. Such wars may cause billions of deaths and unfathomable suffering, as well set civilization back centuries. Smaller nuclear wars pose regional catastrophic risks and also national risks in that the continued functioning of, for example, the United States as a constitutional republic is highly dubious after even a relatively limited nuclear attack. But what nuclear war is not is an existential risk to the human race. There is simply no credible scenario in which humans do not survive to repopulate the earth.

### Heg adv

#### Mutually assured destruction prevents the aff’s conflict scenarios but unipolar hegemony entangles the U.S. in risky regions, forcing miscalculation

at: ibw

Craig 13 – Campbell Craig, Professor in International Politics. BA Carleton College MA University of Chicago PhD Ohio University, 2013 (“Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Volume 38, Number 2, Fall 2013, Project MUSE)

In making their case for maintaining the United States’ policy of “deep engagement,” Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth stress that the U.S. security commitment to states in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, together with the formidable specter of American preponde2rance, stifles regional rivalries and hinders the resurgence of a dangerous era of multipolar power politics. The authors contend that a policy of U.S. retrenchment could spark the “return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers,” whereas a continuing policy of deep engagement, by “supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management … lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities.”1 In short, they suggest, deep engagement reduces the chances of a major Eurasian war; a new strategy of retrenchment would increase them.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth do not acknowledge the possibility that a lack of conventional security competition among large Eurasian states, as well as their disinclination to balance against U.S. preponderance by traditional means,2 might be explained by the simpler fact that nuclear weapons make such activity both prohibitively dangerous [End Page 181] and strategically unnecessary.3 Perhaps would-be great powers in Eurasia would launch belligerent campaigns of expansion upon an American retreat to the Western Hemisphere, but they would have to weigh such policies against the reality that a regional war would quickly run the risk of an apocalyptic nuclear exchange. Britain, China, France, Israel, and Russia, after all, possess large nuclear arsenals, and it is impossible to imagine a war in which they would not use them if it came down to that or surrendering to a conquering aggressor. Under such conditions, nations do not envision waging protracted wars of grand territorial conquest.4 We are not in 1940 anymore.

Perhaps even more important, nuclear weapons provide states with the kind of protection that even the most formidable conventional forces could not offer before the nuclear era. If the specter of nuclear war dissuades nations from launching wars of conquest, then it also allows those in possession of substantial arsenals to threaten any foe considering an attack with nuclear retaliation. A putative superpower such as China knows that as long as its nuclear arsenal is invulnerable, it can avoid the military conquest of its territory.5 For what nation, no matter how rapacious, would try to conquer it if there were a good chance that it would suffer the immediate destruction of five or ten of its largest cities, much less total nuclear retaliation?6 Nations have engaged in balancing behavior for many reasons, but the core purpose has always been to accumulate sufficient power to avoid violent subjugation at the hands of their rivals.7 Because a secure retaliatory nuclear arsenal provides a uniquely efficient solution to that problem, nations such as China do not have to preoccupy themselves with the military capabilities and shifting allegiances of major rivals in the way that, say, Britain had to do around the turn of the twentieth century. plays a less preponderant role, would seem to bolster this claim.8

#### A large hegemonic power gap causes global backlash against U.S. power that makes effective exercise of leadership impossible

Maher 11 – Richard Maher, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, **world politics has been unipolar, defined by** American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This **material advantage** does not automatically **translate into America’s** preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. **Other states**, if now only at the margins, **are challenging U.S. power and authority**. Additionally, on a range of issues, **the U**nited **S**tates **is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions**. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This **decline in the U**nited **S**tate**s’ relative position is** in part **a consequence of the** **burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity**. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, **the U.S. position both internationally and domestically** may actually be strengthened **once** this period of **unipolarity has passed**.

On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. **The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The U**nited **S**tates today **accounts for** approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. **Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent**. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1

And yet, despite this material preeminence**, the U**nited **S**tates **sees its** political and strategic influence **diminishing around the world**. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, **one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse**. Russia **is using its vast energy resources to** reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. **Negotiations with** North Korea and Iran have **gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs**. Brazil’s **growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere**. And **relations with** Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, **are at their frostiest in decades**. To many observers, it seems that **America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes.**