## 1AC

### 1AC – Advantage

#### The member nations of the European Union ought to recognize and unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Strike rights are backsliding in Eastern Europe – especially after COVID

Lynch 21 [Esther Lynch was elected as a deputy general secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation at its Vienna Congress in 2019, having previously been a confederal secretary. "Time to put an end to union-busting." https://socialeurope.eu/time-to-put-an-end-to-union-busting]

The right to join a trade union and to bargain collectively is recognised as a fundamental human right by numerous European and international charters and conventions. And yet union-busting is on the rise in Europe.

Over the last year, the European Trade Union Confederation has been receiving alarming reports of union rights violations—of obstacles, victimisation and discrimination in a number of countries—sometimes using the pandemic as a pretext. The ETUC is calling on the European institutions to take a stand and put an end to union-busting, by including measures in the proposed directive on adequate minimum wages to halt anti-union practices and to guarantee trade union access to workplaces and protection from victimisation.

The best way to secure fair wages is through collective bargaining by trade unions. The draft directive recognises this in article 4, calling for the ‘promotion of collective bargaining on wage setting’. This obliges member states to work with social partners (unions and employers) to encourage ‘constructive, meaningful and informed’ negotiations and strengthen sectoral or cross-industry bargaining. In countries where fewer than 70 per cent of workers are covered by collective agreements, governments will have to draw up action plans to promote bargaining.

All this is welcome but fails to require member states to tackle employers’ attacks on workers’ ability to organise and act together—if necessary through strike action—without risk of reprisals, victimisation, dismissal or discrimination.

Legally binding

The obligation on the European Union and its member states to act could not be clearer. The legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (article 12) establishes ‘the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests’. Several International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions reinforce the right to negotiate on behalf of workers, including the Collective Bargaining Convention (1981). Principle 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights further encourages the social partners ‘to negotiate and conclude collective agreements in matters relevant to them, while respecting their autonomy and the right to collective action’.

The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association Digest of Case Law affirms:

The right to bargain with employers with respect to conditions of work constitutes an essential element in freedom of association, and trade unions should have the right, through collective bargaining or other lawful means, to seek to improve the living and working conditions of those whom the trade unions represent. The public authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.

Yet ‘interference’ is happening throughout Europe. Union representatives are being victimised, detained or denied the right to communicate with the workers they represent.

The International Trade Union Confederation’s Global Rights Index 2020 revealed that 38 per cent of European countries excluded workers from the right to join or set up a union, 56 per cent failed to uphold the right to collective bargaining and no fewer than 72 per cent violated the right to strike. Many employers are refusing to enter talks or are choosing to bypass legitimate trade unions in favour of non-union and non-representative ‘sweetheart’ organisations.

Growing evidence

The ETUC has growing evidence of anti-union activities by well-known companies, such as McDonald’s and Intercontinental Hotels. In Ireland, the bookmaker Paddy Power and retailer Dunnes Stores have used police to expel trade union representatives from their premises. In Latvia, legislation allows employers to set up ‘yellow’ unions, to prevent legitimate trade unions from reaching collective agreements.

Just last month, a court in Italy found that a Deliveroo algorithm discriminated against riders who took strike action and ordered the company to pay damages to trade unions. Elsewhere, ending the automatic ‘check-off’ payment of union dues from wages has had a severe impact on union finances.

A recent Vice report detailed how the notoriously anti-union Big Tech company Amazon subjected employees to surveillance in a number of EU countries, including Spain, Austria and Czechia, using ‘professional’ union-busters and private detectives to spy on trade union activities. Indeed, union-busting is now big business—and forms part of the business model of major companies such as Ryanair.

Governments are complicit in these activities. Trade unionists are still arrested and prosecuted for carrying out their duties, for instance in Turkey and Belgium. A number of countries fail to protect union members from discrimination or victimisation, including Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, where some categories of workers also do not have the right to organise.

And now some member states have adopted so-called emergency procedures in response to Covid-19, seriously limiting trade union rights such as holding demonstrations. In Hungary, a new law, introduced without consultation, prohibits collective bargaining, outlaws strikes and terminates all existing agreements in the healthcare sector.

#### The right to strike is key to global democracy – organized and empowered labor secures reforms in every area

Puddington 10 [Arch Puddington is currently Senior Scholar Emeritus at Freedom House. He also previously served as the Senior Vice President for Research at Freedom House. "The Global State of Workers’ Rights: Free Labor in a Hostile World." https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline\_images/WorkerRightsFULLBooklet-FINAL.pdf]

Some 30 years ago, in August 1980, workers in communist Poland formed the independent Solidarity trade union movement, thereby challenging one of the totalitarian system‘s fundamental principles: control of labor organizations by the party-state. The strike that led to Solidarity‘s establishment was launched at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk. It quickly spread throughout Poland, and its program escalated from workplace issues to a sweeping demand for freedom to create the institutions that undergird a democratic society. After a decade of tumult and repression, Solidarity emerged triumphant, compelling the country‘s communist authorities to allow competitive elections that resulted in a landmark victory for the democratic opposition. This in turn led to the domino-like collapse of communist rule throughout Central and Eastern Europe and, two years later, the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The question some are asking today is whether a phenomenon similar to Solidarity might be possible in what is now the world‘s most powerful authoritarian country, China. In recent years, evidence of worker unrest there has steadily mounted. Strikes and other forms of labor protest occur regularly; just in the last few months, workers have called high-profile strikes at installations operated by some of the world‘s largest multinational corporations. As was the case in Poland, the official labor umbrella group, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), has played an obstructive role by trying to force striking workers back into their enterprises and in some instances acting as strikebreakers. There are also signs that some within the ACFTU, unlike in the official Polish union, see a need for change that seems to be lost on the leadership.

The burgeoning workers‘ resistance in China has drawn supporters and participants from many segments of the economy, including cab drivers, teachers, and factory workers. Despite their lack of experience as union activists, they have embraced the tried-and-true tactics of labor protest— sit-down strikes and roadblocks, for example—and have eschewed violence. These youthful workers have also used mobile telephones and the internet to draw attention to their causes. The stories they tell about conditions at the workplace are eerily familiar to anyone who is acquainted with the history of the trade union struggle in Europe and North America: low pay within the context of rapidly expanding inequality, punishing hours, harsh supervisors, and a consuming work routine that discourages family life.

The most recent strike wave has taken many observers outside China by surprise. The growth of the Chinese industrial juggernaut gave rise to myths about Chinese workers, who were widely regarded as docile, willing to work remarkably long hours without complaint, uninterested in unions or collective action, inspired by patriotic love for the Communist Party leadership, and unwilling to challenge authority. Among those caught unaware were the owners and managers of multinational corporations whose investments in China have been predicated on the assumption of cheap, compliant Chinese labor. Indeed, the American Chamber of Commerce in China was sharply critical of changes to Chinese labor laws that were adopted in 2008, issuing a thinly veiled warning that enhanced protections for workers would lead multinationals to look elsewhere for new installations.

Unlike the state-owned enterprises in communist Poland, the strike targets in modern China are foreign-owned, private firms. Accordingly, the strikers do not confront the state directly, and the strikes are thus not regarded as overtly political. Still, the increasing willingness of Chinese workers to risk arrest and jail to defend workplace rights is a potent signal to the government of the power of independent worker action.

The Chinese case is a cogent reminder of the central role played by the struggle for worker rights in the past century‘s broader movement toward democratic freedom. From South Africa to South Korea, Chile to the Czech Republic, the democracy and workers‘ rights movements have been closely linked. This relationship was well understood by fascist, communist, and authoritarian dictators who feared the strength of democratic trade unionists.

A number of important qualities distinguish free trade unions from other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that promote democratic reform. First, unlike most NGOs, they have a mass membership. Second, if they are run democratically, they can act as a training ground for democracy activists, who learn how to campaign on issues, muster support, and get themselves elected to union offices. And third, trade unions are one of the few NGOs that operate simultaneously in the social, economic, and political spheres, making them a potential counterweight to the concentrated power of economic and political elites.

It is no surprise, then, that a principal goal of totalitarians and dictators of both the right and the left has been to secure absolute control over organized labor and transform unions into pliant instruments of the party-state. Communist movements of the past, which claimed to draw legitimacy from the working classes, were particularly eager to capture and destroy independent labor organizations.

Today, repressive regimes are still wary of the power of organized workers. In a number of societies, unions and workers remain in the forefront of movements that seek human rights, fair elections, a free press, and laws to stem rampant corruption. Unions have played a crucial role, for example, in the effort to bring reforms to Zimbabwe in the face of murderous reprisals by the regime of President Robert Mugabe. In South Africa, it was the labor movement that prevented the transshipment of Chinese weapons to Zimbabwe at a time when the government of President Thabo Mbeke went out of its way to befriend Mugabe. In Iran, bus drivers and other workers have been important forces in the struggle for democracy; threatening statements issued in recent months by the country‘s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have paid special attention to the role of workers in the opposition. In Guinea, unions were a critical force in demonstrations that sought democratic change, and union members were prominent among those massacred by the country‘s military junta in September 2009. And in Venezuela, unions have strongly resisted attempts by President Hugo Chavez to bring the entire labor movement under his personal control.

The political leaderships of many authoritarian countries—such as Russia, China, Iran, and Egypt—are acutely aware of the Solidarity example and are determined to forestall a repetition on their territory. However, only the most oppressive regimes—North Korea and Cuba, for example—exert the degree of tight control that marked previous eras, and relatively few countries respond to trade union activism with the sort of thuggery employed by Mugabe. Just as they have developed sophisticated mechanisms to muzzle independent voices in the media, control the activities of civil society organizations, and marginalize opposition political parties, modern authoritarian regimes have devised more nuanced strategies to keep organized labor under control. Thus the Communist Party leadership in China has developed an approach that combines concessions to striking workers with efforts to restrict press attention to labor unrest, prevent labor complaints from reaching higher authorities in the state or party, and above all block the formation of a nationwide workers‘ movement that could become an autonomous source of power like Solidarity.

The problems of workers are not restricted to countries with authoritarian political environments. Societies that otherwise observe a wide array of democratic freedoms—those that tolerate robust debate in the media, are sensitive to the rights of minorities, and have adopted a series of policies to achieve gender equality—may still take steps to limit the power of trade unions as agents of collective bargaining and sources of independent political power. The most glaring example of this phenomenon is the United States. While the country has adopted laws that in principle guarantee the rights of workers to form unions, engage in collective bargaining, and conduct strikes and other forms of workplace protest, these rights have been circumscribed in practice over the past three decades through a combination of court decisions, political initiatives, and government policies.

The status of workers‘ rights must also be viewed within the context of a global decline in freedom of association. Authoritarian governments have singled out the institutions of civil society for special attention in recent years. Targets include democratic political parties, human rights organizations, women‘s advocates, groups that investigate corruption or monitor abuse by security services, organizations that seek legal reform, and groups that champion minority rights or religious freedom—organizations, in other words, that aim to provide ordinary people with a voice or influence on public policy.

#### Establishing an unconditional right to strike is key – it’s the backbone of organized labor activities in every sector

Pope 18 [James Gray Pope is a distinguished professor of law at Rutgers Law School and serves on the executive council of the Rutgers Council of AAUP/AFT Chapters, AFL-CIO. He can be reached at jpope@law.rutgers.edu. "Labor’s right to strike is essential." https://www.psc-cuny.org/clarion/september-2018/labor%E2%80%99s-right-strike-essential]

The recent teacher strikes underscore another, equally vital function of the strike: political democracy. It is no accident that strikers often serve as midwives of democracy. Examples include Poland in the 1970s, where shipyard strikers brought down the dictatorship, and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, where strikers were central to the defeat of apartheid. Even in relatively democratic countries like the United States, workers often find it necessary to withhold their labor in order to offset the disproportionate power of wealthy interests and racial elites. During the 1930s, for example, it took mass strikes to overcome judicial resistance to progressive economic regulation. Today, workers confront a political system that has been warped by voter suppression, gerrymandering and the judicial protection of corporate political expenditures as “freedom of speech.” With corporate lackeys holding a majority of seats on the Supreme Court, workers may soon need strikes to clear the way for progressive legislation just as they did in the 1930s.

But if the right to strike is a no-brainer, then how did Cuomo and de Blasio justify attacking it? “The premise of the Taylor Law,” said Cuomo, “is you would have chaos if certain services were not provided,” namely police, firefighters and prison guards. If that’s the premise, then why not endorse Nixon’s proposal as to teachers and most public workers, and propose exceptions for truly essential services? That’s the approach of international law, and that’s what Nixon clarified she supports. But Cuomo couldn’t explain why teachers and other non-essential personnel should be denied this basic human right. As for de Blasio, he claimed that the Taylor Law accomplishes “an important public purpose” and that “there are lots of ways for workers’ rights to be acknowledged and their voices to be heard.” What public purpose? Forcing workers to accept inadequate wages and unsafe conditions? What ways to be heard? Groveling to politicians for a raise in exchange for votes?

The ban forces once-proud unions to serve as cogs in the political machines of Wall Street politicians. No sooner did Nixon endorse the right to strike than two prominent union leaders rushed to provide cover for Cuomo. Danny Donohue, president of the Civil Service Employees Association, called her “incredibly naive” and charged that “clearly, she does not have the experience needed to be governor of New York.” Evidently Cuomo, who was elected governor on a program of attacking unions and followed through with cuts to public workers’ pensions and wages, does have the requisite experience. John Samuelsen of the Transport Workers Union, which represents more than 40,000 New York City transit workers, also lashed out, saying, “I believe that she will cut and run when we shut the subway down…. As soon as her hipster Williamsburg supporters can’t take public transit to non-union Wegmans to buy their kale chips, she will call in the National Guard and the Pinkertons.”

Tough talk. Roger Toussaint, the TWU Local 100 president who led a subway strike in 2005 and was jailed for it, once tagged Samuelsen a “lapdog” for Cuomo. But “attack dog” might be more accurate in this case. Presented with a rare opportunity to trumpet workers’ most fundamental right in the glare of media attention, Samuelsen chose instead to drive a cultural wedge between traditionally minded workers and nonconformists, many of whom toil as baristas, restaurant servers and tech workers – constituencies that are fueling the anti-Trump resistance and pushing the Democratic Party to break with Wall Street.

Here we see shades of former AFL-CIO President George Meany, who helped to elect a very different Richard Nixon by refusing to endorse George McGovern, one of the most consistently pro-labor candidates in US history, on the ground that he was supported by “hippies.”

Samuelsen’s descent to Cuomo attack dog is inexplicable except as a response to the crushing pressures generated by the Taylor Law. He stands out from most other public-sector labor leaders not for sucking up to establishment politicians, but for minimizing it. Just two years ago, Samuelsen was one of the few major labor leaders who had the guts to endorse Bernie Sanders over Wall Street’s choice, Hillary Clinton. And when he was elected president of the New York local, it was on a promise to be more effective at mobilization and confrontation than Toussaint. Once on the job, however, he and his slate had to confront the devastating results of the strike ban. In addition to jailing Toussaint and penalizing strikers two days’ pay for each day on strike, a court had fined the union millions of dollars and stripped away its right to collect dues through payroll deductions. No wonder Samuelsen quietly redirected the union’s strategy away from striking and toward less confrontational mobilizations and political deal-making.

A WAY FORWARD

Any way you look at it, striking will be absolutely essential if American organized labor, now down to 11 percent of the workforce, is to revive. As AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka once warned, workers must have “their only true weapon – the right to strike,” or “organized labor in America will soon cease to exist.” Red-state teachers have shown the way, exercising their constitutional and human right to strike in defiance of “law.” Will Democrats and labor leaders celebrate their example, or will they follow Cuomo, de Blasio and the Republicans down the path of suppression?

#### Now is key – Trump stress-tested global democracy, shoring up cohesion now solves norms on emerging tech

Rasmussen 12/15 [Anders Fogh Rasmussen was NATO secretary general, 2009-14. He founded the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in 2017, "A New Way to Lead the Free World", 12/15/20, https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/a-new-way-to-lead-the-free-world-11608053780]

President-elect Joe Biden has a queue of America’s weary allies outside his door. We are yearning for a determined leader and, from experience, I believe Joe Biden will seize this opportunity.

In 2018 I launched the first Copenhagen Democracy Summit, under the auspices of my Alliance of Democracies Foundation. The summit convenes national leaders, democracy activists, and representatives from tech and civil society to strengthen the forces of democracy. The former vice president opened the first summit and co-founded a new trans-Atlantic initiative, with former Republican Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and me, to fight foreign election meddling.

Mr. Biden’s speech made a strong argument for renewing alliances and standing up for democracy. “Democracy’s all about one simple thing,” he said: “freedom, freedom, freedom.” During his campaign this year, he pledged to host a similar summit of democratic leaders as president.

America will lead the endeavor, but it won’t be alone. Democracies in the Indo-Pacific, from Taiwan to Australia, India and Japan, are also looking for like-minded friends to counter China’s aggressive posture.

In Europe, a post-Brexit U.K. will host the Group of Seven summit in 2021, bringing together the world’s top democratic and economic firepower. London intends to use this opportunity to make what one senior politician described to me as an “overture to the free world.” It has already floated a potential “Democratic 10,” or D-10, opening the top global table to other major democracies such as India, Australia and South Korea. And Britain will try to build new consensus on economic resilience in areas such as foreign subsidies, global trade reform and technological advancement.

It’s that last topic, tech, that poses an existential challenge for democracies. The world is in a figurative technological arms race. Whoever wins that race will lead in setting rules, standards and norms for emerging technological systems, from facial recognition to weapons of war. If China wins the race, freedom will wane

The free world should learn from its internal tussles over Huawei and TikTok and build a digital alliance to prepare for the next set of challenges. This includes setting common privacy standards for transferring the metadata needed to develop cutting-edge artificial intelligence, cooperating on how to regulate internet platforms, and combining firepower to develop telecom networks, quantum computing and artificial intelligence—all faster, better and freer than China.

Not every U.S. ally is fully convinced of the need for a global democratic caucus. France and Germany may be concerned that an alliance of democracies would supplant the global multilateral system represented by the United Nations. And a resurgence of the trans-Atlantic alliance could reduce the imperative for Europe to develop strategic independence from the U.S.

On both of these concerns, I disagree. Strengthening the global democratic alliance would enable member nations to rebuild multilateralism, not bypass it. We need to talk to China, about climate change and other struggles, but let’s do so from a position of relative strength. And Europe should simultaneously continue to be more self-sufficient and invest more in its own security, because a stronger Europe means a freer world.

Thirty years ago advanced democracies were told that they’d reached the “end of history,” and that the continued advance of freedom was inevitable. The opposite has been the case: Freedom has retreated as America retreated from its place as the global leader. We may not see a better opportunity again to recover from the West’s crippling disease of democratic self-doubt. It’s time to build an alliance of democracies.

#### 4 distinct scenarios from winning the aff solves democracy –

#### Scenario 1 is democracy –

#### Democracy prevents extinction from automation, strategic stability, genetic engineering, which authoritarianism would spur

Jain 19 [Ash Jain is a senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he oversees the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D-10 Strategy Forum, Matthew Kroenig, "Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System", 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf]

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way.

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction.

The other technologies on this list similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.

Perhaps the greatest risk to global strategic stability from new technology, however, comes from the risk that revisionist autocracies may win the new tech arms race. Throughout history, states that have dominated the commanding heights of technological progress have also dominated international relations. The United States has been the world’s innovation leader from Edison’s light bulb to nuclear weapons and the Internet. Accordingly, stability has been maintained in Europe and Asia for decades because the United States and its democratic allies possessed a favorable economic and military balance of power in those key regions. Many believe, however, that China may now have the lead in the new technologies of the twenty-first century, including AI, quantum, 5G, hypersonic missiles, and others. If China succeeds in mastering the technologies of the future before the democratic core, then this could lead to a drastic and rapid shift in the balance of power, upsetting global strategic stability, and the call for a democratic-led, rules-based system outlined in these pages.63

The United States and its democratic allies need to work with other major powers to develop a framework for harnessing emerging technology in a way that maximizes its upside potential, while mitigating against its downside risks, and also contributing to the maintenance of global stability. The existing international order contains a wide range of agreements for harnessing the technologies of the twentieth century, but they need to be updated for the twenty-first century. The world needs an entire new set of arms-control, nonproliferation, export-control, and other agreements to exploit new technology while mitigating downside risk. These agreements should seek to maintain global strategic stability among the major powers, and prevent the proliferation of dangerous weapons systems to hostile and revisionist states.

#### Scenario 2 is European Populism –

#### The RTS spills over – democratized labor creates a culture of participation that offsets authoritarian populism

Spiegelaere 18 [Stan De Spiegelaere is a researcher at the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). "An Unlikely Cure For Populism: Workplace Democracy." https://socialeurope.eu/an-unlikely-cure-for-populism-workplace-democracy]

Trump in the White House, Orban in Hungary, the Law and Justice party in Poland, the AfD in Germany, Erdoğan in Turkey… It seems like the list of challenges to our democracies is becoming worryingly extensive. Time to act! And the area where one should act might surprise you: our companies.

Democracy lives on values of speaking up, participating in decision making and being involved. It’s when societies think their voices and votes don’t matter, that democracies are threatened in their core. Yet, the place where we spend a good deal of our active days, companies, is quite authoritarian. Speaking up is not always values, participating in decision making not welcome and don’t even think about suggesting to vote out your management.

Think about it. Our societies want us to spend about 40 hours a week in non-democratic environments, doing as we are told and at the same time be critical, voicing and engaged citizens in the remaining time. No surprise that many resolve this cognitive dissonance by retreating from political democracy altogether, with all due consequences.

Democracy starts at work

It’s not the first time our societies are confronted with this limbo between democracy and the capitalist organization of the firm. And many countries have found ways to at least lessen this painful spread by introducing some types of democracy in the companies: employees are given a vote. Not to choose the company management (yet), but to choose some representatives that can talk with the management on their behalf.

Unions, works councils and similar institutions take democracy down to the company floors. Imperfect, sure, but they give at least a slim democratic coating to our rather autocratic working lives. They enable workers to voice their demands, suggest changes and denounce issues without risking personal retaliation.

And by doing so, they create an environment in which individual employees feel more comfortable to speak up too about their own work. About how it can be improved, about when to do what. And these hands-on experiences of democracy breed a more general democratic culture. According to two recent studies, employees being involved in decision making about their work are more likely to be interested in politics, have a pro-democratic attitude, vote, sign a petition or be active in parties or action groups. And this is what democracy is all about. It’s more than just casting a vote every so often, it’s about being engaged and involved in decision making that affects you.

The picture is quite clear: if we want political democracy to succeed we need citizens to have practical experiences with participation and involvement. And where better to organize this then in companies by giving people a vote on their representatives and a say in how they do their day-to-day work. Empowered employees bring emancipated citizens. No coincidence the European Trade Union Confederation aims to put this back on the policy agenda.

Populism gives us a fish, workplace democracy teaches us how to fish

Lacking voice in the workplace, lacking hands on experiences with the (often difficult) democratic decision making, many turn to politicians promising to be their voice. “I am your voice” said Trump to working America in 2016. Similarly, the German AfD stressed to be the voice of the ‘little man’.

They all promise of restoring ‘real democracy’ by being their voice on the highest level. At the same time, all these populists take measures which break the voice of workers on the company level. Trump is making it harder for unions to organize or bargain collectively. In Hungary, the Orban government has limited the right to strike and made organizing more difficult.

#### European populism causes nuke war

von der Heyden 17 [Karl von der Heyden, Co-Chairman of the American Academy in Berlin, was awarded the Duke University Medal for Distinguished Meritorious Service, recipient of The International Center in New York's Award of Excellence, M.B.A. from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, “I Survived World War II. Nationalism Is a Path to War”, 2017, https://time.com/4815170/wwii-nationalism-donald-trump-america-first/]

This collective tendency to forget is not a new phenomenon. After the horrors of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe was given a new order of nation states under the Treaty of Vienna, signed in 1815. The new order lasted relatively well, surviving the revolutions of 1848 and the subsequent Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars. By the time World War I began in 1914, institutional and personal memories of the post-Napoleonic order had been weakened or forgotten.

Similarly, seventy years after World War II, millions of people in the U.S. and Europe have forgotten the lessons learned from that war and from the peace that followed. Nascent nationalist and popular movements converged in Britain to produce a vote to leave the [European Union](https://time.com/4696437/european-union-future-maastricht/). Similar coalitions heavily influence the American political scene today, as they do in Poland, Hungary and even the Netherlands. White House communications that appear to realign foreign policy put in place over the last half-century are beginning to concern America’s allies.

I understand why the “[America First](https://time.com/4569845/donald-trump-america-first/)” movement propagated by Donald Trump sounds patriotic to many voters, as do other movements that favor isolationism. It is natural to blame others for our failure to adjust to new technologies, to immigration and to competition from countries whose growth rates are higher than our own. But the truth is that the “America First” movement runs the risk that it could trigger a global decline in productivity. Free trade has benefitted the U.S, Europe and much of the rest of the world. Many new businesses, particularly in information technology, can now start with a global footprint on Day One instead of being confined to a local market. NATO has preserved the freedom of the Western World from Communism. It has recently become more relevant again in view of the Russia’s efforts to disrupt it.

Perhaps most worrisome is the apparent cooling of relations between European NATO allies and the United States, which has compelled German Chancellor [Angela Merkel](https://time.com/4797241/angela-merkel-us-german-tensions-g7-summit/) to say, “The times when we could fully rely on others are to some extent over… We Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands.”

Problems arise when we start classifying our own and other countries as “winners” or “losers.” Free trade, immigration and the treatment of refugees will never be perfect — far from it. But the alternatives of walling off people, as well as trade, are worse. Appealing to ultra-nationalist and xenophobic feelings is playing with fire. With easy access to weapons of mass destruction, the danger is greater than ever.

Growing up in Germany, I saw the dangers of fascism and nationalism. I saw leaders who only made matters worse by appealing to the majority of voters who feared minorities and foreigners.

Anyone who appreciates history would know better than to make even casual references to the possibility of [nuclear war](http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/18/politics/kfile-trump-north-korea-nuclear-war/index.html).

#### Nuclear war ends the human race through winter, firestorms, EMP blasts, ozone damage, and meltdowns

Starr 14 {Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility, Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program (Missouri), commentator in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” Global Research: Centre for Research on Globalization, 6/5, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611}

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii]¶ These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life.¶ A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating:¶ “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.”¶ In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer.¶ Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations.¶ Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield.

#### Scenario 3 is NATO –

#### Internal divergence is greater than ever before – authoritarianism will unravel NATO and cause global war

Kagan 18, [King Robert Kagan is a Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Project on International Order and Strategy, Heg daddy, NATO’s global peace is unraveling and we can’t see it, July 15, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/15/natos-global-peace-is-unraveling-and-we-cant-see-it/]

All true, but unfortunately beside the point. Small troop deployments and incremental defense increases don’t mean much when the foundations of the alliance are crumbling—as they are and have been for some time. And pointing to previous differences ignores how much political and international circumstances have changed over the past decade. Europe faces new problems, as well as the return of some of the old problems that led to catastrophe in the past; and Americans have a very different attitude toward the world than they did during the Cold War. This is not just another family quarrel.

The transatlantic community was in trouble even before Trump took office. The peaceful, democratic Europe we had come to take for granted in recent decades has been rocked to the core by populist nationalist movements responding to the massive flow of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. For the first time since World War II , a right-wing party holds a substantial share of seats in the German Bundestag. Authoritarianism has replaced democracy, or threatens to, in such major European states as Hungary and Poland, and democratic practices and liberal values are under attack in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. France remains one election away from a right-wing nationalist leadership, and Italy has already taken a big step in that direction. Meanwhile, Britain, which played such a key role in Europe during and after the Cold War, has taken itself out of the picture and has become, globally, a pale shadow of its former self. The possibility that Europe could return to its dark past is greater today than at any time during the Cold War.

Some of that has to do with the changing attitude of the United States in recent years. It’s little secret that President Barack Obama had no great interest in Europe. Obama, like Trump, spoke of allied “free riders,” and his “pivot” to Asia was widely regarded by Europeans as a pivot away from them. Obama rattled Eastern Europe in his early years by canceling planned missile-defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic as an inducement to Vladimir Putin to embrace a “reset” of relations. In his later years he rattled Western Europe when he did not enforce his famous “red lines” in Syria. Both actions raised doubts about American reliability, and the Obama administration’s refusal to take action in Syria to stem the flow of refugees contributed heavily to the present strain.

Obama was only doing what he thought the American people wanted. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the 2008 financial crisis, left Americans disenchanted with global involvement and receptive to arguments that the alliances and institutions they supported for all those years no longer served their interests. The Obama administration tried to pare back the American role without abandoning the liberal world order, hoping it was more self-sustaining than it turned out to be. But the path was open to a politician willing to exploit Americans’ disenchantment, which is precisely what Trump did in 2016.

NATO has never been a self-operating machine that simply chugs ahead so long as it is left alone. Like the liberal world order of which it is the core, it requires constant tending, above all by the United States. And because it is a voluntary alliance of democratic peoples, it survives on a foundation of public support. That foundation has been cracking in recent years. This week was an opportunity to shore it up. Instead, Trump took a sledgehammer to it.

Never mind the final communique that Trump deigned to sign, or his reassurance at the end that the alliance was “very unified, very strong, no problem,” and or his claim that “I believe in NATO.” In his press comments alongside NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in his tweets and in his private comments to European leaders, Trump made clear that he does not believe in NATO. In fact, he used this summit to lay out for the American people why NATO was not only “obsolete,” as he once said, but also a rotten deal for them.

Consider the question of allied military spending. As many pointed out, Trump could have come to Brussels and taken credit for the increased commitments that the Allies have made—and of course he did force Stoltenberg to give him credit. But then he moved the goal posts. He insisted the 2 percent of gross domestic product mark must be reached not by 2024, as agreed by the alliance (including the United States), but by January—something he knows is impossible. Then he went further, insisting that the allies spend 4 percent of their GDP on defense, higher even than his own defense budget.

These are not negotiating tactics. They are the tactics of someone who does not want a deal. In the private meeting, Trump is reported to have warned the allies that if they did not meet the 2 percent standard by January the United States would “go it alone.” To Stoltenberg he publicly warned that the United States was “not going to put up with it.” Whether he has any intention of making good on such threats scarcely matters. In his tweets, he asked, “What good is NATO” if Germany was paying Russia for gas? Why should the United States pay billions to “subsidize Europe” while it was losing “Big on Trade”? Those comments were not aimed at Europe. They were designed to discredit the alliance in the eyes of his faithful throng back home.

But even Trump must know the likely response in Europe. The insults and humiliations he inflicted on allied leaders will not be forgotten or forgiven. They will make it impossible for European leaders to win public support for the spending Trump disingenuously claims to want. What German leader after such a tongue-lashing could do Trump’s bidding and hope to survive politically?

Any student of history knows that it is moments like this summit that set in motion chains of events that are difficult to stop. The democratic alliance that has been the bedrock of the American-led liberal world order is unraveling. At some point, and probably sooner than we expect, the global peace that that alliance and that order undergirded will unravel, too. Despite our human desire to hope for the best, things will not be okay. The world crisis is upon us.

#### Scenario 4 is EU Breakup –

#### European authoritarianism breaks the EU

Cassidi Beck 20. Masters Thesis in Political Science at Stellenbosch University. “The Rise of Strongmen Leaders: A Threat to Global Security”.

A power like the European Union can export stability to its surrounding neighbours, but once it becomes a hostile state, now only does it now export this stability, but it also destabilises the entire region (Drozdiak, 2017:213; Emmott, 2017:125; Kearns, 2018:3-5; Wright, 2017:96). Evidence suggests that an unstable EU will likely lead to increased conflict, as unity between nations is no longer fostered – if the transatlantic relationship is badly damaged, a host of economic and security interests will be at risk (Gillingham, 2018). The rejection of organisations that seek to build and sustain the liberal, rules-based order is highly problematic; “were the EU to collapse, the pressure and restraint currently being applied, albeit weakly, to countries violating its values would disappear and the residual commitment to those values in some governments may well disappear” (Kearns, 2018:214).

For instance, Hungary’s illiberalism fostered under Orban’s leadership particularly undermines the EU and is in clear breach of the values on which it was founded (Frankopan, 2018:49; King, 2017:29). Hungary shows disdain of the Union’s democratic accession criteria, as it increasingly ignores the very laws it agreed to abide by once it was admitted as a member state. If a one-member state radically deviates from the EUs criteria and constitutional traditions, and undermines the rule of law, this poses a significant risk to the health of the EU. If Hungary can benefit from EU membership while following its own form of government, it allows other nations, whether members of not, to feel emboldened to do the same (Bugaric, 2014:25). The deviation of the Orban government has not only disrupted EU actions in many arenas, but it has also developed contaminating effects on other member states, representing a danger for democratic and liberal cohesion of the EU (Agh, 2016:286; Lendvai, 2017:54).

Through the rise of illiberalism, the continuing conflict with Brussels and probing the limits of the EU’s power, the ramifications of the Strongmen’s actions could help foster EU fragmentation (Krastev, 2018:56). While the EU loses its credibility, not only are restraints on illiberal authoritarianism being removed, but it is being legitimised, giving it a massive boost across Europe and the world (Kearns, 2018:214). Leaders like Orban, Putin and Erdogan, along with rising European Strongmen, weaken the broader European convergence project. By asserting more national sovereignty and clawing back power from Brussels, Europe is undoubtedly heading towards a more fragmented future, or a long, slow collapse (Kagan, 2019:119; Kearns, 2018; Krastev, 2018:56).

The concern over European collapse is the volatility and insecurity it will likely create, as it is difficult to imagine a resulting liberal, open, tolerant and cooperative Europe. It will likely lead to difficulty in building consensus on key policy issues, including central issues such as migration, terrorism, climate change, trade and the rule of law (Drozdiak, 2017:81). The Transatlantic relationship would likely be damaged, which can lead to a host of European economic and security threats as states increasingly fail to cooperate (Kearns, 2018). The chaos of collapse would undermine the validity and credibility of the values and institutions that have been the foundation of the EU. They would be subject to harsher scrutiny while the cessation of cooperation would serve as a rebuke to all those claiming that international cooperation is essential to future progress. “The collapse of the EU would therefore be a historic defeat not only for the idea of European integration and cooperation but for a Europe of pluralistic governing institutions, serving a society built on the primacy of individual freedom” (Kearns, 2018:208). Without a democratic body like the EU monitoring the actions of Strongmen, it will become easier for nations to revert to illiberal forms of democracy. The current pressure and restraint being applied to countries violating its liberal democratic values would disappear and the residual commitment to those values in some governments may well disappear as well. For example, Hungary’s mistreatment of refugees and the Roma people would likely continue without consequence while Erdogan would be able to continue his mistreatment of human rights.

#### EU breakup causes nuclear war.

**Fiedler 18** [Lauren Fielder, Professor Fielder is Assistant Dean of Graduate and International Programs and Director of the Institute for Transnational Law at the University of Texas at Austin, ’18, “Is Nationalism the Most Serious Challenge to Human Rights? Warnings from BREXIT and Lessons from History,” 53 Tex. Int'l L.J. 212]

The political might of the EU is essential for peace and stability in the world. Brexit "fractures the Western alliance and weakens NATO solidarity and resolve." 224 The politics of scale and multilateralism foster peace and human rights with regard to third countries. 225 This can be seen in the work that the EU currently doing, albeit imperfectly, in trying to de-escalate the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a source of the conflict brewing in Yemen. 226 The clearest example of these politics of scale is the essential role of the EU in aiding the peaceful transition of former Eastern Bloc states into largely democratic and open societies upon the end of the Cold War. 227 The entry requirements into the EU reflected this European identity, including democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for minorities. 228 However, the transition to democracy is not finished: "It still could (with the enthusiastic support from Moscow) go into reverse." 229 Putin's Russia has a vital interest in the breakup of the EU, 230 and we see that the threat of nuclear war is not far behind us. 231 Further, current destabilization in parts of the Balkans is reminiscent of past patterns that preceded violence in the region. 232

The end of the European Union could return Europe to, as one writer describes, the "dark days of poisonous tribal hatreds" in which destructive forces could unleash the undoing of 70 years of statesmanship. 233 Indeed, the last seven decades, the [\*234] European Union has largely been a "place of peace, stability, prosperity, cooperation, democracy, and social harmony." 234 However, "[we would] be wrong to assume the permanence of European political and economic stability … . Across the grand sweep of European history, countries and empires disintegrating into smaller governing units or being violently subsumed into larger empires is the norm." 235

The EU is not just an international economic organization; it is an organization created from the destruction brought about by two World Wars and designed to promote peace and prevent conflict. 236 European integration is doubtless problematic but "the alternative is so much worse." 237 The history of Europe is fraught with violent conflict: "War, twice in the Twentieth Century and for ages previously, has plagued the European continent." 238 Conflict stretches back across the entire history of Europe. There has been an almost unbroken chain of war from the fifteenth century to World War II fought over family rivalries, religion, deep hatreds, and territorial expansion. In the fifteenth century, the War of the Roses was fought over a dispute over title to the English throne. 239 In the sixteenth century, there were religious wars in Austria, Germany, France, and Spain over Catholicism and Protestantism. 240 The seventeenth century included the Thirty Years' War - a war that started over religion, but expanded to include territorial acquisition - the English Civil War, France's Dutch wars that were fought over frontiers, and the War of the League of Augsburg, which was possibly the first war over the Alsace-Lorraine. 241 In the eighteenth century, European countries fought to block the coalition of France and Spain in the War of Spanish Succession; and, also fought in the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War, and the French Revolution. 242 In the nineteenth century, there were the Napoleonic Wars to build an Empire, the second and third French Revolutions, the Wars for Italian Unification, the Crimean War - which was the first modern war, with massive casualty rates, mechanized warfare, and modern weapons - and the wars for German unification. 243 Finally, in the twentieth century, there was the Russian Revolution, the First and Second Balkan Wars, World War I, and World War II. 244

#### Ensuring the right to strike solves democracy and inequality

Kiai 17 [Mr. Maina Kiai, Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, took up his functions as the first Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in May 2011. He is appointed in his personal capacity as an independent expert by the UN Human Rights Council. "UN rights expert: “Fundamental right to strike must be preserved”." https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21328&LangID=E]

The right to strike is also an intrinsic corollary of the fundamental right of freedom of association. It is crucial for millions of women and men around the world to assert collectively their rights in the workplace, including the right to just and favourable conditions of work, and to work in dignity and without fear of intimidation and persecution. Moreover, protest action in relation to government social and economic policy, and against negative corporate practices, forms part of the basic civil liberties whose respect is essential for the meaningful exercise of trade union rights. This right enables them to engage with companies and governments on a more equal footing, and Member States have a positive obligation to protect this right, and a negative obligation not to interfere with its exercise.

Moreover, protecting the right to strike is not simply about States fulfilling their legal obligations. It is also about them creating democratic and equitable societies that are sustainable in the long run. The concentration of power in one sector – whether in the hands of government or business – inevitably leads to the erosion of democracy, and an increase in inequalities and marginalization with all their attendant consequences. The right to strike is a check on this concentration of power.

I deplore the various attempts made to erode the right to strike at national and multilateral levels. In this regard, I welcome the positive role played by the ILO’s Government Group in upholding workers’ right to strike by recognizing that ‘without protecting a right to strike, freedom of association, in particular the right to organize activities for the purpose of promoting and protecting workers’ interests, cannot be fully realized.’

I urge all stakeholders to ensure that the right to strike be fully preserved and respected across the globe and in all arenas”, the expert concluded.

### 1AC – Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected well being – that justifies util.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why

#### 2] Phenomenal introspection --- it’s the most epistemically reliable --- historical moral disagreement over internal conceptions of morality such as questions of race, gender, class, religion, etc prove the fallibility of non-observational based ethics --- introspection means we value happiness because we can determine that we each value it --- just as I can observe a lemon’s yellowness, we can make those judgements about happiness.

#### 3) - Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 4. Use comparative worlds-

#### A. Reciprocity- prevents infinite tricky NIBs- explodes neg side-bias.

#### B. Topic education- forcing them to disprove the plan requires research about the topic- only unique impact to topic rotation.

#### C. Inclusion- our interp includes all methods of debate- they exclude Ks which prevents deconstruction of harmful mindsets or racist language- independent reason to reject.

#### D. Collapses- truth is proven if it’s better than other worlds.

#### E. It’s not constitutive- theory proves we can redefine the rules and you can always just be a “*schm-udge*” without caring about constitutivism.

#### 5) Liberal institutions prevent unilateral wars and solve great power war – decline causes worse imperialism but continued engagement and reform solves their offense

Jackson 19 [Van Jackson is an associate editor at the Texas National Security Review, a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, and a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. He is the author of On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge University Press, 2018). The views expressed are solely those of the author. https://tnsr.org/roundtable/wagering-on-a-progressive-versus-liberal-theory-of-national-security/]

U.S. foreign policy debates routinely center on the merits of sustaining the mélange of international institutions that constitute the “post-war” or “liberal international” order: the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, among many others. These institutions play an essential role in how U.S. liberal internationalism conceives of keeping America secure.20 Collectively, they preserve a stable international trading system that facilitates conflict-deterring economic interdependence. The existence of international institutions also allows many (not all) nations around the world to escape the predations of international anarchy. The belief in reliable institutions lets many liberal-democratic states be liberal and democratic in their foreign policies — by focusing on trading relations and taking for granted the appearance of international stability. In the liberal internationalist theory of security, this partly explains why neither Europe nor Asia has experienced interstate wars in more than a generation — an architecture that combines U.S. military superiority and alliances with international institutions. It’s a package deal. The institutions part of that deal preserves a “capitalist peace”21 through economic interdependence, and at the same time encourages many states to opt out of militaristic foreign policies.

The left embraces international institutions in principle because they promote multilateralism and the rule of law, and can help attenuate conflict — all of which favors justice and egalitarianism. But some international institutions must be repurposed or reformed to serve a more democratic, and less corrupting, imperative. This is not just about justice for its own sake, but rather that justice, in the form of equality, lessens the likelihood of war. Progressives believe that yawning gaps in economic inequality are a structural cause of conflict. As Bernie Sanders remarked in 2017, “Foreign policy must take into account the outrageous income and wealth inequality that exists globally and in our own country. This planet will not be secure or peaceful when so few have so much, and so many have so little…”22

A progressive security policy would therefore bet significantly on international institutions, but in qualified ways that differ from default liberal internationalism. It would seek to essentially save capitalism from itself by regulating it. At the international level, this might translate into a more democratic distribution of voting rights or agenda-setting powers in international financial bodies — especially the World Bank and International Monetary Fund — and a more relaxed attitude toward economic protectionism in instances where fairness or just labor practices are called into question. Although anathema to the traditional liberal bargain, these steps would serve as a means of attenuating giant wealth transfers across borders, as well as the political corruption that often accompanies those transfers, as dictators around the world have learned to “play” globalization processes to enrich themselves.23 Such regulations of capitalism might also dramatically elevate the importance of the International Labor Organization, a moribund body that for decades has promoted not labor but rather pro-market deregulation trends.24 But the larger point is best summarized by Sanders: “[W]e have got to help lead the struggle to defend and expand a rules-based international order in which law, not might, makes right.” The progressive theory of security wagers on the same institutional arrangements that make up liberal internationalism, but argues for their reform, in order to address the inequality gap, transnational corruption, and authoritarianism, thus prioritizing long-term, systemic causes of conflict, even if it might risk the “capitalist peace” in the near term.