# 1

#### Topic is: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### The s at the end of medicines implies plurality meaning more than one medicine

#### Violation – they cant spec medicines – they did.

#### Negate for limits and ground – their interp opens up the floodgates to affs that would reduce IP for any small thing… if crispr counts as a medicine then anything could count as a medicine because it is medical tech. for example, a stethoscope is medical tech so a stethoscope aff would be allowed under their interp.

#### Count the affs FDA ‘21

FDA. “FACT SHEET: FDA AT A GLANCE.” Retrieved October 16, 2021. <https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-basics/fact-sheet-fda-glance>

FDA is responsible for the oversight of more than $2.8 trillion in consumption of food, medical products, and tobacco.

FDA-regulated products account for about 20 cents of every dollar spent by U.S. consumers.

FDA regulates about 78 percent of the U.S. food supply. This includes everything we eat except for meat, poultry, and some egg products.

**There are over 20,000 prescription drug products approved for marketing**.

FDA oversees **over 6,500 different medical device** product **categories**.

There are over **1,600** FDA-approved **animal drug products.**

There are about **300** FDA-licensed **biologics products.**

FDA oversees over 90,000 tobacco products, not including e-liquids. The estimated number of regulated products is continually assessed for accuracy and reliability.

#### Precision matters –

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for—there’s no way for the negative to know what constitutes a “reasonable interpretation” when we do prep – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom, proliferating abuse

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.

# 2

#### Regulating intellectual property participates in a scarcity logic that re-affirms a broader market ownership over information – that consolidates neoliberal control through a shift to private protections, even if the individual act of the aff is good

**Soderberg 1** [Johan, BA from Falmouth College of the Arts. “Copyleft vs Copyright: A Marxist Critique” https://firstmonday.org/article/view/938/860]

"The contradiction that lies at the heart of the political economy of **intellectual property** is between the low to non-existent marginal cost of reproduction of knowledge and its **treatment as scarce property**" [23].

This contradiction [24], May demonstrates, is concealed by information capitalists whose interests are best served if ideas are treated as analogous to **scarce, material property** [25]. The privatisation of cultural expressions corresponds to the enclosure of public land in the fifteenth to eighteenth century.

As then, the new enclosure is concerned with creating conditions for excludability. Lawrence Lessig lists four methods to direct the behaviour of the individual to comply with property regulation: social norms, markets, architecture (including technology and code), and law. "Constraints work together, though they function differently and the effect of each is distinct. Norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes; markets constrain through the price that they extract; architectures constrain through the physical burdens they impose; and law constrains through the punishment it threatens" [26].

Several new national laws have been passed in recent years on intellectual property rights. In the U.S. the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was passed in 1998 and has been imitated by legislation in Europe. The European Patent Office circumvented scheduled political decisions to be taken by European governments, and decreed a regulation that authorises patent claims to computer programmes [27]. These national laws were implemented under the direction of what is known as the Uruguay Round agreements [28], established by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As a part of the bargain came the treaty of Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIP), and its importance lies in two respects: "as an extension of the rights accorded to the owners of intellectual property and as part of the extension of a **property-based market liberalism into new areas of social interaction,** previously outside market relations" [29]. **Simply by coordinating national regulations** on a global level the **net of intellectual property is tightened**. TRIP was backed by American and European pharmacy companies and entertainment industries, and unsuccessfully opposed by the developing nations and northern civil society.

Despite the **rigged debate** on intellectual property in the mainstream media [30], the rhetoric of 'piracy' has not transformed social norms to any greater extent. The failure to curb copying is linked with the low costs and low risks for individuals to copy, i.e. the non-existent constriction of the market. However, Bettig remarks "The initial period following the introduction of a new communications medium often involves a temporary loss of control by copyright owners over the use of their property" [31].

Similarly, Lessig warns against the false reliance, common among hackers, that information technology is **inherently anarchistic**. The industry is determined to re-design hardware and software to command compliance with the intellectual property regime. "Code can, and will, displace law as the primary defence of intellectual property in cyberspace" [32]. It is predominantly this struggle that I now will attend to.

#### Capitalism is quickly reaching its ecological, structural, and psychological limits and causes near-term extinction – laundry list.

**Robinson 16** (William, Professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. His most recent book is Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. | “Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis” in *Truth-out*, April 12, 2016. <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis> )//tbrooks

The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam [published a follow-up](https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2016-01-18/62-people-own-same-half-world-reveals-oxfam-davos-report) to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "[The World Economy: Out of Ammo?](http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21693204-central-bankers-are-running-down-their-arsenal-other-options-exist-stimulate)" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." [We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas](http://www.amazon.com/Ecological-Rift-Capitalisms-War-Earth/dp/1583672184/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1460153228&sr=8-1&keywords=the+ecological+rift) -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, [The Sixth Extinction](http://www.amazon.com/Sixth-Extinction-Unnatural-History/dp/1250062187/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1457393458&sr=1-1&keywords=the+sixth+extinction). "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." [Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible](http://www.amazon.com/Collapse-Societies-Choose-Succeed-Revised/dp/0143117009/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1460153265&sr=8-1&keywords=collapse+book). The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation.

#### The alternative is to engage in anticapitalism, an act of radical resistance grounded in grassroots movements. Anticapitalism does not represent an unattainable utopia but challenges common myths about capitalism as a whole.

**Rogers 14** (Chris Rogers, author, *Capitalism and Its Alternatives: A Critical Introduction*, Zed Books, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1758713>.) AM

*A note on terminology* The book will draw on four core concepts. The first of these is capitalism. The term capitalism is used throughout the book to refer to the prevailing form of social organization. While acknowledging that the ways in which capitalism operates and the implications of these operations are contested, this book defines capital ism in terms of one commonly accepted distinguishing feature: that capitalism is a system that organizes the production, distribution and exchange of goods, on the basis of private property, with a view to realizing profit and therefore increasing wealth. The second term is alternative capitalism, which is used to describe a system where the capitalistic relationship between state and market is re-regulated, but not fundamentally reformed, in order to try to produce optimal social and economic outcomes. The aim of an alternative capitalism is to maximize wealth and profit by introducing a different structure of rules to govern capitalism. The third concept is that of an alternative to capitalism. An alternative to capitalism is distinct from capitalism because it places an emphasis on social and civic goals, rather than purely focusing on pecuniary gain. In contrast to capitalism, an alternative to capitalism is founded on collective or community property rights, rather than individual property rights, although the form and extent of collective or community property rights may vary. Where the book is referring to either an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, it uses the form ‘alternative (to) capitalism’. The final concept the book uses is anti-capitalism. It uses the term anti-capitalism to refer to the act of resisting capitalism, whether this occurs by attempting to influence the state, taking control of the state, or actions taken independently or outside of the state. An individual who pursues or wishes to pursue an alternative to capitalism can therefore be described as an anti-capitalist.

Traditions of Resistance   
In its consideration of capitalism and its alternatives, this book accepts that it is possible to perceive capitalism and its con sequences in different ways. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the way in which capitalism and its consequences are perceived will have a fundamental impact on whether people deem capitalism to be desirable, whether they would prefer an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, and therefore whether they believe that it is important and worthwhile engaging in resistance to capitalism through the social act of anti-capitalism. However, the central argument of this book is that **capitalism displays intrinsic tendencies towards crisis that make an alternative to capitalism desirable, and so justifies anti-capitalist action**. In doing so, it argues that capitalism is a product of social interaction between people, and that it is remade or resisted through our social action. This emphasis on social constitution challenges common assertions about the inevitability of capitalist logic, and in the process shows that the prospect of realizing an alternative to capitalism is more than wishful thinking. In its discussions of alternatives to capitalism, however, this book guards against thinking of alternative forms of social organization as outcomes or utopias. Rather, it shows how various forms of alternative social and economic organization have shown a tendency to degenerate over time, or to reproduce injustices of capitalist social relations. It therefore suggests that **alternatives to capitalism should be thought of as processes that need to be continually made and remade if they are not to degenerate or reproduce the injustices of capitalist social relations, and if desirable outcomes are to be realized**. Reflecting the book’s emphasis on the social constitution of economy and society, it rejects ‘top-down’ attempts to impose an alternative to capitalism by political means, and argues that anticapitalist action should take a ‘bottom-up’ form, which requires democratic and pluralistic experimentation with different models of social and economic organization to expand the space in which non-capitalist activity takes place.

The arguments of the book therefore fit with a long tradition of anti-capitalist resistance. One of the most well-known instances of this kind of resistance was the insurrections of 1968, typified by the student revolts in Paris in May of that year. However, as Michael Watts (2001: 167) noted, the events of 1968 were far more than a local phenomenon; over seventy countries ‘had major student actions during that year [and between] October 1967 and July 1968 there were over 2000 incidents worldwide of student protest alone’. Furthermore, it was not just students engaged in the act of protest, the act of anti-capitalism. According to Watts’ (ibid.: 167) study, ‘if one were to add the related worker and other nonstudent demonstrations each country in the world would, on average, have had over 20 “incidents” over the nine-month period’. Nor was the substance of the protest uniform; 1968 had what Watts (ibid.: 171– 2) has described as its Eastern, Western and Southern moments. In the first, typified by the Prague Spring and the Cultural Revolution in China, the focus of protests was anti-bureaucratic, and directed against the ‘Old Left’ and the corruption people perceived in it. In the second, typified by student protests in Paris and Berkeley, the focus of protests was opposition to consumerism and the pursuit of civil and social rights. In the third, the focus was the rejection of authority in the first generation of independent states in Africa and Latin America, where military dictatorship had displaced democratic rule.

Luc Boltanski (2002: 6) also highlights the diversity of the 1968 movement by distinguishing between its social and artistic critiques, where the former focused on inequality and poverty stemming from capitalism, and the latter on liberation, individual autonomy and authenticity. Michael Löwy (2002: 95) links this distinction between the social and artistic critique of capitalism to romanticism, which he defines as ‘rebellion against modern capitalist society, in the name of past or premodern social and cultural values, as a protest against the modern disenchantment of the world’. Therefore, the significance of 1968 can be seen not just across space, but also as a reflection of long-established traditions of resistance to prevailing social, political and economic forms or organization. On such readings, the events of 1968 can be interpreted as a demonstration of long-standing anti-capitalist feeling that rested on a critique of the world we live in and the injustices it creates, and in turn motivated action in order to try to address them.

# Case

#### No way CRISPR solves all disease - lifestyle factors, mistakes

Radcliffe 17 Radcliffe, Shawn. Shawn Radcliffe is a science writer and yoga teacher in Ontario, Canada. "Will Gene Editing Allow Us to Rid the World of Diseases?" Healthline, 26 Aug. 2017, www.healthline.com/health-news/will-gene-editing-allow-us-to-rid-world-of-diseases.

CRISPR-Cas9 is a powerful tool, but it also raises several concerns. “There’s a lot of discussion right now about how best to detect so-called ‘off-target effects,’” said Hochstrasser. “This is what happens when the [Cas9] protein cuts somewhere similar to where you want it to cut.” Off-target cuts could lead to unexpected genetic problems that cause an embryo to die. An edit in the wrong gene could also create an entirely new genetic disease that would be passed onto future generations. Even using CRISPR-Cas9 to modify mosquitoes and other insects raises safety concerns — like what happens when you make large-scale changes to an ecosystem or a trait in a population that gets out of control. There are also many ethical issues that come with modifying human embryos. So will CRISPR-Cas9 help rid the world of disease? There’s no doubt that it will make a sizeable dent in many diseases, but it’s unlikely to cure all of them any time soon. We already have tools for avoiding genetic diseases — like early genetic screening of fetuses and embryos — but these are not universally used. “We still don’t avoid tons of genetic diseases, because a lot of people don’t know that they harbor mutations that can be inherited,” said Hochstrasser. Some genetic mutations also happen spontaneously. This is the case with many cancers that result from environmental factorsTrusted Source such as UV rays, tobacco smoke, and certain chemicals. People also make choices that increase their risk of heart disease, stroke, obesity, and diabetes. So unless scientists can use CRISPR-Cas9 to find treatments for these lifestyle diseases — or genetically engineer people to stop smoking and start biking to work — these diseases will linger in human society. “Things like that are always going to need to be treated,” said Hochstrasser. “I don’t think it’s realistic to think we would ever prevent every disease from happening in a human.”

#### No extinction from pandemics

* Death rates as high as 50% didn’t collapse civilization
* Fossil fuel record caps risk at .1% per century
* health, sanitation, medicine, science, public health bodies, solve
* viruses can’t survive in all locations
* refugee populations like tribes, remote researchers, submarine crews, solve

Ord 20 Ord, Toby. Toby David Godfrey Ord (born 18 July 1979) is an Australian philosopher. He founded Giving What We Can, an international society whose members pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to effective charities and is a key figure in the effective altruism movement, which promotes using reason and evidence to help the lives of others as much as possible.[3] He is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, where his work is focused on existential risk. BA in Phil and Comp Sci from Melbourne, BPhil in Phil from Oxford, PhD in Phil from Oxford. The precipice: existential risk and the future of humanity. Hachette Books, 2020.

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10 The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15 In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk. Our population now is a thousand times greater than over most of human history, so there are vastly more opportunities for new human diseases to originate.17 And our farming practices have created vast numbers of animals living in unhealthy conditions within close proximity to humans. This increases the risk, as many major diseases originate in animals before crossing over to humans. Examples include HIV (chimpanzees), Ebola (bats), SARS (probably bats) and influenza (usually pigs or birds).18 Evidence suggests that diseases are crossing over into human populations from animals at an increasing rate.19 Modern civilization may also make it much easier for a pandemic to spread. The higher density of people living together in cities increases the number of people each of us may infect. Rapid long-distance transport greatly increases the distance pathogens can spread, reducing the degrees of separation between any two people. Moreover, we are no longer divided into isolated populations as we were for most of the last 10,000 years.20 Together these effects suggest that we might expect more new pandemics, for them to spread more quickly, and to reach a higher percentage of the world’s people. But we have also changed the world in ways that offer protection. We have a healthier population; improved sanitation and hygiene; preventative and curative medicine; and a scientific understanding of disease. Perhaps most importantly, we have public health bodies to facilitate global communication and coordination in the face of new outbreaks. We have seen the benefits of this protection through the dramatic decline of endemic infectious disease over the last century (though we can’t be sure pandemics will obey the same trend). Finally, we have spread to a range of locations and environments unprecedented for any mammalian species. This offers special protection from extinction events, because it requires the pathogen to be able to flourish in a vast range of environments and to reach exceptionally isolated populations such as uncontacted tribes, Antarctic researchers and nuclear submarine crews. 21 It is hard to know whether these combined effects have increased or decreased the existential risk from pandemics. This uncertainty is ultimately bad news: we were previously sitting on a powerful argument that the risk was tiny; now we are not. But note that we are not merely interested in the direction of the change, but also in the size of the change. If we take the fossil record as evidence that the risk was less than one in 2,000 per century, then to reach 1 percent per century the pandemic risk would need to be at least 20 times larger. This seems unlikely. In my view, the fossil record still provides a strong case against there being a high extinction risk from “natural” pandemics. So most of the remaining existential risk would come from the threat of permanent collapse: a pandemic severe enough to collapse civilization globally, combined with civilization turning out to be hard to re-establish or bad luck in our attempts to do so.

### Wto cred turn

#### Credible international trade undermines Chinese centralized involvement in the economy—hurts growth.

Zeng 2/7/13 (Ka, Professor of Political Science at University of Arkansas and co-author, most recently, of: Greening China: The Benefits of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, “China, America and the WTO”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/china-america-and-the-wto/)

Growing tensions in U.S.-China trade relations generated by the rapid expansion of Chinese exports to the U.S. have led both countries to frequently resort to the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Noticeably, both Washington and Beijing seem to be more frequently using the DSM to target issues of critical concern to their respective domestic constituencies. While the U.S.’ WTO trade disputes against China tend to target Chinese industrial policy and challenge the dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), cases involving antidumping duties (ADs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) have taken up a disproportionate share of China’s WTO disputes against the United States. Since its WTO accession, China has been the target of 29 WTO disputes initiated by its trading partners, with the United States accounting for the lion’s share of these cases. The Chinese measures being challenged by the United States include semiconductors, auto parts, intellectual property rights, trading rights and distribution services for certain products, grants and loans and, more recently, wind power equipment, renewable energy, and access to resources. Many of these cases involve the Chinese government supporting domestic enterprises through tariffs, subsidies, grants, refunds, and exemptions from taxes that either provided an unfair advantage to Chinese exporters, or restricted foreign market access in China. Washington's focus on Chinese industrial policy and the Chinese government’s continued support for domestic enterprises needs to be viewed against Beijing’s continued heavy involvement in the economy. Indeed, while economic reforms and WTO entry have streghtened the influence of free markets in China, the Chinese government has increased its reliance on industrial policy during the past decade. The 2008 global financial crisis, which led to a substantial contraction in China’s export markets, further reinforced the role of government stimulus spending, especially stimulus spending in the state sector, in ensuring the country’s sustained growth. As a liberal international economic institution, it is no surprise that the U.S. is using the WTO to target China’s state-centric model of development. If current trends continue the U.S. and other WTO members will continue to use the DSM to challenge China’s industrial policy and SOEs. These disputes will in turn raise important systemic issues for the organization regarding the impact of the state sector on trade flows and the ability of existing rules to cope with the challenges posed by large transitional economies such as China.

#### Large Chinese state-owned enterprises necessary for macroeconomic and political stability

Li October 2008 (Minqi, a Chinese political economist, world-systems analyst, and historical social scientist, currently an associate professor of Economics at the University of Utah, “Three Essays on China’s State Owned Enterprises: Towards an Alternative to Privatization”, http://content.csbs.utah.edu/~mli/CV/China\_State%20Owned%20Enterprises\_Book.pdf)

State owned enterprises are not only productive enterprises. They perform important social functions, providing education and medical and child care to their employees. In the mid-1990s, they operated more than 18,000 schools with an enrollment of 6.1 million students and 600,000 teachers and other staff. Hospitals built and run by state owned enterprises account for one-third of all hospital beds in China (Lardy 1998: 51). State owned enterprises were mostly founded in the 1950s-70s when all of their profits were submitted to the government, including the implicit pension funds of employees. However, since the early 1980s state owned enterprises have been required to be responsible for their own profits and losses, and the pension funds of their retired employees have to be paid out of retained earnings. With the ratio of retired employees to current employees rising steadily, the internal funds of many state owned enterprises have been depleted. In 1994, the retired employees amounted to 25 percent of the total current employees of the state owned enterprises. The pension payment of the state owned enterprises amounted to 56 percent of the profits of the state owned enterprises (Wei and Shen 1997; Jin 1997: 120-121). The social services provided by state owned enterprises and their pension payments are public functions that should have been performed by the government. To the extent that the government fails to perform these functions and the financial burden of these functions falls upon state owned enterprises, they are implicit taxes imposed upon state owned enterprises. Moreover, a proper measure of state owned enterprises’ output needs to take into account not only the part of the output that has a market value, but also the benefits of these social services. While state owned enterprises provide comprehensive welfare to their employees and are required by law to practice “democratic management” (meaning workers’ participation in management through congress of employees’ representatives, more on this below), non-state owned enterprises are notorious for their violation of labor rights and ruthless exploitation in the form of long working hours, low wages, and unsafe or otherwise detrimental working environments. A study on rural township and village enterprises (including enterprises owned “collectively” by township and village governments and rural private enterprises) observes that it is quite common for the management to arbitrarily extend working time and many township and village enterprises do not allow their employees to rest on weekends and public holidays (Xu 1995: 141). A 1992 nationwide survey found that 82 percent of town and village enterprises operated under conditions that had harmful effects on the physical health of workers. A 1988 research reported that town and village enterprises accounted for 50.1 percent of the total deaths related to professional diseases in the City of Shanghai. Many major industrial accidents took place in town and village enterprises (Xu 1995: 143). In foreign invested enterprises, it is not uncommon for the managers to beat, humiliate, and abuse employees. Workers are searched before they leave the workplace. They are forbidden to go to the restroom during work hours. Some manager punished workers by forcing the workers stand under the sun or in the rain for hours. Some even locked a worker in a cage with a dog (Qiao 1995: 166). Some foreign invested enterprises not only pay extremely low wages to production workers, but also arbitrarily deduct or delay workers’ wage payment or impose fines on workers. Many have their workers work nine or ten hours a day with no extra pay (Qiao 1995: 174). A survey by the Health Department of Guangdong Province found that over 70 percent of the foreign invested enterprises investigated did not have the necessary dust-prevention and poison-prevention equipment to protect their employees. In 1992, foreign invested enterprises accounted for 20 out of 80 major fire accidents in China. One of these accidents killed 84 workers. Since a Taiwanese enterprise was established in1989, 43 accidents had occurred, each of which had cost some worker’s hands or fingers (Qiao 1995: 176). The conditions in domestic private enterprises are no better. A study using the Marxist concept of surplus value found that in 1990, a typical private enterprise had a rate of surplus value of 587% (Qi and Xu 1995: 199). While the law requires private enterprises practice eight hour working day, a survey in four provinces found that 85 percent of private enterprises had their workers work longer than eight hour a day, and it was not uncommon for workers to work more than twelve hours a day. Some workers worked to death during the work. Like rural township and village enterprises and foreign invested enterprises, domestic private enterprises typically fail to provide the minimum safety conditions at workplace (Qi and Xu 1995: 200-201). The records of labor rights in non-state owned enterprises raise serious questions against their apparent “technical” efficiency. It is quite possible that controlling for labor right conditions, state owned enterprises are actually more efficient. The failure of the government to enforce labor laws in non-state owned enterprises has amounted to implicitly subsidizing non-state owned enterprises. Non-state owned enterprises are allowed to prevail in competition with state owned enterprises by paying low to workers, forcing workers to work long hours, and saving on necessary safety expenses. In the reform period, the managers of state owned enterprises have been provided increasing autonomy with respect to the government. Moreover, the manager has acquired the power to hire and fire workers and to decide wage distribution. As a result, the balance of power between workers and management has been turned decisively in favor of management (Zhao 1995: 83). While the managers have acquired more power, the process of privatization has created enormous profit opportunities that induce the managers to abuse their power. They move assets out of state owned enterprises into newly founded non-state owned enterprises, which often become their own property. Alternatively, they lease or contract out state assets but the profits or interest payments never flow back to the state owned enterprise. One government office estimated that between 1987 and 1992, the annual loss of asset stripping from state owned enterprises amounted to 33 billion Yuan. A later estimate found that between 1990 and 1995 the annual loss rose to 50 billion Yuan (Lardy 1998: 51-52). In the privatization wave in the mid-1990s, in which tens of thousands of small state owned enterprises were privatized, the asset stripping problem became perceptibly worse (He 1998: 106-116). A leading Chinese economist, Hu Angang, recently estimated that the annual loss of public investment and public expenditure funds caused by corruption amounts to 257.5 to 341 billion Yuan (World Journal or Shijie Ribao, March 24, 2001). 6. Towards an Alternative to Privatization A comprehensive evaluation of the performance of state owned enterprises must not be restricted to microeconomic indicators. Arguably, a state sector has important positive externalities on the rest of the economy. State owned enterprises produce public goods, offer goods and services in natural monopoly industries without pursuing monopoly profits, function as model enterprises in protecting workers’ interests and the environment, lead the development of strategic industries, and helps to stabilize the macro-economy. There is some empirical evidence that higher share of state owned enterprises in the economy is associated with a higher economic growth rate (Doamekpor 1998). The experience of privatization in developing and transition economies suggests that privatization is not likely to be a good approach if the purpose of economic reform is to improve the performance of state owned enterprises and the performance of the economy as a whole. Given the fact that political and economic power is concentrated in a small group of elites, privatization provides an opportunity for the elites to break previously established social contracts with certain sections of working people and to profit from the process of privatization at the expense of the public interest. Thus, privatization is often associated with large-scale corruption, the looting of state assets, and rapid increases in inequality. For several reasons, privatization has failed to contribute to better economic performance. First, the new owners of the previously state owned assets are often not competent in productive management. Moreover, they are often more interested in selling the assets for quick profit and sending the money abroad where their illegitimately acquired assets would be safe, than in the productive management of these assets. Secondly, the breakdown of the previously established social contracts associated with the process of privatization results in a general loss of previously developed “social and organization capital,” and causes a decline of the society’s productive capability. Thirdly, the political instability associated with the distributive conflicts that arise in the process of privatization increases economic risks and discourages investment. Fourthly, where the privatized assets are put in productive use, they may be operated in a way that enhances private profit at the expense of the public interest. This is more likely to be the case in natural monopolistic industries (Green 1995: 72-76; Stiglitz 1999; Farazmand 2001: 13-14).8 If state owned enterprises serve important social and economic functions that cannot be performed by private enterprises, and privatization is not likely to be the right solution to the economic problems in developing and transition economies, an alternative to wholesale privatization has to be developed. This monograph argues that in the Chinese context, a large state owned enterprise sector is necessary for maintaining macroeconomic stability. It also argues that the performance of state owned enterprises can be significantly improved with more workers’ participation in management and a government policy that is committed to sufficient level of aggregate demand. The body of this monograph consists of three essays. In Chapter 2, I argue that a large state owned enterprise sector has made an important contribution to macroeconomic stability in the Chinese context. John Maynard Keynes pointed out that a market economy is fundamentally unstable and a large public sector is indispensable for a modern complex economy to sustain reasonable economic performance in the long run. Hyman P. Minsky argued that in the context of the U.S. economy, the federal government needed to be as large as about 20 percent of GDP to maintain macroeconomic stability and avoid severe economic downturns. This essay applies Minsky’s hypothesis to the Chinese context. It argues that public sector investment (primarily investments made by state owned enterprises) has played a crucial role in macroeconomic stabilization and the state owned enterprise sector needs to be sufficiently large so that the public sector investment accounts for about 50 percent of the total capital formation.

#### CCP instability causes extinction.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US.

It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.