### Framework

#### Interp: Affirmatives must only defend the implementation of a law that limits the appropriation of outer space by private entities

#### This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the *topic* should determine the debate’s subject matter.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Violation – they do not defend the enactment of a law

#### TVA – you could defend barring the appropriation of outer space by private entities framed through gender, such as a whole res aff that discusses the gendered and patriarchal nature of billionaires’ expansion into space – you can still include performance and the criticism. Disads to the TVA prove neg ground and no right to a perfect 1ac

#### Switch side debate – critiques of liberalism and performance can be read on the neg – solves dogmatism by testing different viewpoints

**Vote Neg – The resolution is the only common stasis point that anchors negative preparation. Allowing any aff deviation from the resolution is a moral hazard which justifies an infinite number of unpredictable arguments with thin ties to the resolution. Because debate is a competitive game, their interpretation incentivizes affirmatives to run further towards fringes and revert to truisms which are exceedingly difficult to negate—this asymmetry is compounded by their monopoly on preparation**

#### That outweighs – The competitive incentive from debate creates pressures for research and focused clash which generates important skills and makes debate a training ground for future work. The impact Successful movement organizing is analogous to mainstream politics – it requires skilled organization, negotiating relationships, strategic leadership, and proto-institutionalism – sacrificing debate as training ensures we never translate opinion into political power, but requiring the aff defend contestable positions linearly increases debate’s capacity for movement advocacy as they get more predictable

Han and Barnett-Loro 18 [Hahrie Han, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara. Carina Barnett-Loro, Climate Advocacy Lab, San Francisco. To Support a Stronger Climate Movement, Focus Research on Building Collective Power. December 19, 2018. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2018.00055/full]

Building public will to address the climate crisis requires more than shifting climate change opinion or engaging more people in activism (Raile et al., 2014). By many measures, the climate movement today is stronger than ever: more people taking actions, more financial resources, and deeper concern. Nonetheless, despite increasingly widespread popular demand for sensible climate solutions (Leiserowitz et al., 2017; Hestres and Nisbet, 2018) and broad organizational infrastructure to support climate activism across most Westernized democracies (Brulle, 2014), public will that translates into the political power needed to effect meaningful change has been elusive (McAdam, 2017). Even the 2014 and 2017 People's Climate Marches that drew hundreds of thousands to the streets, demonstrations in support of the Paris Climate Accords, and large-scale acts of civil disobedience in opposition to the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines have resulted in only short-lived campaign victories. Nearly 10 years after the failure to pass comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation at the federal level, experts largely agree there is “little hope” existing policies are sufficient to address the scale of the crisis (Keohane and Victor, 2011).

How can research help bridge the gap not only between opinion and action, but also between action and power? Many articles in this special edition examine the question of the conditions that make it more likely individuals will take action around climate issues. Indeed, the gap between opinion and action is well-known (Kahan and Carpenter, 2017), and burgeoning research in many fields of social science seeks to bridge it (Rickard et al., 2016; Doherty and Webler, 2016; Feldman and Hart, 2018). One of us works for the Climate Advocacy Lab, which supports field experimentation through direct funding and in-kind research assistance to build our collective understanding of the most effective strategies for moving people into action.

There is less attention, however, to the question of how those actions might translate into political influence. The challenge is this: in most cases, the null assumption is that activism becomes power at scale: that collective action is merely the sum of its parts, and the more people who take action, the more likely a movement is to achieve its goals. All things being equal, it is true that more is better (Madestam et al., 2013). Additional research, however, shows that for our stickiest social problems (like climate change), simply having more activists, money, or other resources is not sufficient to create and sustain the kind of large-scale change needed (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Canes-Wrone, 2015). Instead, we need a social movement that translates our actions into power. Social movements are a set of “actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” (Amenta et al., 2010). Instead of focusing only on resources, movements focus on power. Instead of focusing only on individual action, they focus on collective action. To become a source of power, collective action must be transformative.

How, then, do we build the kind of movements that generate the collective action necessary to shift existing power dynamics? For scholars, what research can help advocates understand how to translate individual actions into the powerful, and transformative collective action necessary to create change? To examine this question, we co-hosted a conference that brought social scientists together with climate advocates in the United States. At this convening, movement leaders argued that to better support building a robust climate movement, research should move beyond traditional public opinion, communications, messaging, and activism studies toward a greater focus on the strategic leadership and collective contexts that translate opinion and action into political power. This paper thus offers a framework, described in Table 1, for synthesizing existing research on movement-building and highlighting the places where additional research is needed. We hope this framework can help focus more future research on the collective, relational contexts and strategic leadership choices necessary to generate collective action that translates into power. In describing the framework, we draw on Slater and Gleason's (2012) typology to show what we know and do not know about supporting movement actors seeking to make more impactful choices.

Assessing the State of Research on Climate Movement Building

How do movement leaders translate supportive public opinion and grassroots activism into political influence? Answering this question rests on first understanding a few key points about social movements. First, movements operate in an environment of uncertainty. For the climate movement, everything from oil spills to hurricanes, domestic elections to international treaties, legal decisions, and market forces can affect the terrain they must navigate. Movement leaders cannot directly control many of these things. Second, policy change is not power. A given policy change will not automatically effect change in the world consistent with movement interests (Hacker, 2004). Moreover, policies can be easily overturned, as exemplified by the transition from Obama to Trump, and immediate rollback of key policies including the Clean Power Plan, restrictions on drilling and mining on public lands, and coal ash protections. To create lasting power, movements need broad constituencies that persist through the ups and downs and whims of different administrations. Third, there is no direct line from activism to power, because power is a dynamic relationship between movements and their targets. To wield power, movements use their resources to act on the interests of political decision-makers (Hansen, 1991). In fact, some research suggests the advocacy group resources most predictive of large-scale policy change are relationships with decision-makers—more so than lobbying money, campaign contributions, or the number of grassroots members (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Some argue that the climate movement's failure to build and sustain the kind of constituency that would pressure decision-makers contributed to the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in 2010 (Skocpol, 2013).

Given these three factors—persistent uncertainty, the need to focus on power not policy, and the complex interests of movement targets—what are the questions movement leaders need to answer to build a more effective climate movement? We argue that most research has focused either on documenting trends in the political environment in which movements work or on questions of how the movement can focus on building more of its resources (such as more supportive public opinion or more activists). Those questions are important. Particularly in today's uncertain, dynamic political environment, however, we also need research on strategy: how do movements create the leadership capacities and organizational (or “meso-level”) conditions needed to navigate uncertain political situations and shifting relationships, and thus translate resources to power?

Organizations that have successfully wielded power in other issue areas can be instructive in showing why understanding strategic leadership and meso-level, collective contexts matters. Consider the gun debate in the United States. Polls show strong public support for stricter regulation of guns, advocates like Michael Bloomberg have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the fight, and protests have brought millions of people into the streets for gun control. Nonetheless, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has been more effective in translating its activists and resources into political power. Why? First, leaders within the NRA undertook an intentional campaign to build an ardent constituency of gun owners that was willing to stand together, again and again, through ups and downs of any political fight, to support gun rights. As recently as the early 1970s, the NRA supported sensible gun regulations. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a group of hardline conservatives took control of leadership of the organization (Melzer, 2009). To build constituency, they used three key tactics: widespread benefits provided to gun owners from the national organization, strong appeals to identity, and a complex latticework of interpersonal relationships sustained at the local level (LaCombe, forthcoming). Second, leaders strategically leveraged this constituency to negotiate relationships with the Republican Party. The recurrent ability of leaders to deliver support from this constituency for policymakers became the basis through which the NRA built high-level relationships with elected officials and the Republican Party, thus cementing its hold over gun policy in the United States. By linking base-building with elite politics, the NRA transformed the political dynamics around gun rights.

#### Debate doesn’t have any effect on the political and the individual arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused, nuanced research and clash is the only chance to change attitudes long term—which means they can’t solve their impact turns but our model can.

#### filter their impacts through predictable testability ---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

No RVIs – this includes impact turns and independent voting issues –

1 – exclusions are inevitable – we only have 45 minutes to discuss things – doesn’t prove harmful intent

2 – T is an aff burden – doesn’t justify them winning

3 – forces unreasonable standard of epistemic perfection – bad arguments should be rejected, but that doesn’t implicate the team

### K

#### The aff’s focus on identity divorces violence against women from the neoliberal agenda that circumscribes it – that greenlights broader capitalist oppression

Brown 93 (Wendy Brown, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Wounded Attachments ,” POLITICAL THEORY, August 1993)

In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of progressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resentment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resentments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social independence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, commodification, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### Neoliberalism causes extinction – resource wars, climate change, and structural violence

Williams & Srnicek 13 (Alex, PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis entitled 'Hegemony and Complexity', Nick, PhD candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics, Co-authors of the forthcoming Folk Politics, 14 May 2013, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/)

At the begin­ning of the second dec­ade of the Twenty-​First Cen­tury, global civilization faces a new breed of cataclysm. These com­ing apo­ca­lypses ridicule the norms and organ­isa­tional struc­tures of the polit­ics which were forged in the birth of the nation-​state, the rise of cap­it­al­ism, and a Twen­ti­eth Cen­tury of unpre­ced­en­ted wars. 2. Most significant is the break­down of the planetary climatic system. In time, this threatens the continued existence of the present global human population. Though this is the most crit­ical of the threats which face human­ity, a series of lesser but potentially equally destabilising problems exist along­side and inter­sect with it. Terminal resource depletion, especially in water and energy reserves, offers the prospect of mass starvation, collapsing economic paradigms, and new hot and cold wars. Continued financial crisis has led governments to embrace the para­lyz­ing death spiral policies of austerity, privatisation of social welfare services, mass unemployment, and stagnating wages. Increasing automation in production processes includ­ing ‘intel­lec­tual labour’ is evidence of the secular crisis of capitalism, soon to render it incapable of maintaining current standards of living for even the former middle classes of the global north. 3. In con­trast to these ever-​accelerating cata­strophes, today’s politics is beset by an inability to generate the new ideas and modes of organisation necessary to transform our societies to confront and resolve the coming annihilations. While crisis gath­ers force and speed, polit­ics with­ers and retreats. In this para­lysis of the polit­ical ima­gin­ary, the future has been cancelled. 4. Since 1979, the hegemonic global political ideology has been neoliberalism, found in some vari­ant through­out the lead­ing eco­nomic powers. In spite of the deep struc­tural chal­lenges the new global prob­lems present to it, most imme­di­ately the credit, fin­an­cial, and fiscal crises since 2007 – 8, neoliberal programmes have only evolved in the sense of deep­en­ing. This continuation of the neo­lib­eral pro­ject, or neo­lib­er­al­ism 2.0, has begun to apply another round of structural adjustments, most sig­ni­fic­antly in the form of encour­aging new and aggress­ive incur­sions by the private sec­tor into what remains of social demo­cratic insti­tu­tions and ser­vices. This is in spite of the immediately negative eco­nomic and social effects of such policies, and the longer term fun­da­mental bar­ri­ers posed by the new global crises. 5. That the forces of right wing gov­ern­mental, non-​governmental, and cor­por­ate power have been able to press forth with neoliberalisation is at least in part a result of the continued para­lysis and ineffectual nature of much what remains of the left. Thirty years of neoliberalism have rendered most left-​leaning political parties bereft of radical thought, hol­lowed out, and without a pop­u­lar man­date. At best they have responded to our present crises with calls for a return to a Keynesian economics, in spite of the evidence that the very conditions which enabled post-​war social democracy to occur no longer exist. We can­not return to mass industrial-​Fordist labour by fiat, if at all. Even the neo­socialist regimes of South America’s Bolivarian Revolu­tion, whilst heart­en­ing in their abil­ity to res­ist the dog­mas of con­tem­por­ary cap­it­al­ism, remain disappointingly unable to advance an alternative beyond mid-​Twentieth Century socialism. Organised labour, being systematically weakened by the changes wrought in the neo­liberal project, is scler­otic at an insti­tu­tional level and — at best — capable only of mildly mitigating the new structural adjustments. But with no systematic approach to building a new economy, or the structural solidarity to push such changes through, for now labour remains rel­at­ively impotent. The new social movements which emerged since the end of the Cold War, exper­i­en­cing a resur­gence in the years after 2008, have been similarly unable to devise a new political ideological vision. Instead they expend considerable energy on internal direct-​democratic process and affective self-​valorisation over strategic efficacy, and frequently propound a variant of neo-​primitivist localism, as if to oppose the abstract violence of globalised capital with the flimsy and ephemeral “authenticity” of communal immediacy. 6. In the absence of a radically new social, political, organisational, and economic vision the hegemonic powers of the right will continue to be able to push forward their narrow-​minded imaginary, in the face of any and all evidence. At best, the left may be able for a time to partially resist some of the worst incursions. But this is to be Canute against an ultimately irresistible tide. To generate a new left global hegemony entails a recovery of lost possible futures, and indeed the recovery of the future as such.

#### The alternative is to affirm the form of the party—only a vertical organization, aimed at transformation of power structures, can actualize change

Dean and Mertz 16 (Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/)

CM: Great to have you on the show. Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.” JD: That’s a good point. The Tea Party took the Republican Party as its target. They decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system by getting people elected and basically by trying to take over part of government. That’s why they were able to have good effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize. The problem with many—but not all—leftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it, and leave it altogether. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and too much of the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and disperse and become fragmented. CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action. JD: There are multiple things. First, the fear of success: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. Where Communist and socialist parties “succeeded,” there was violence and purges and repression. One reason the left has turned its back is because of this historical experience of state socialism. And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn. Another reason that the left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. Those criticisms are real. But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality? So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and critical of collectivity. But I think that’s just a capitalist sellout. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just going in the direction of the dominant culture. That is actually not a left position at all. CM: So does identity politics undermine collectivism? And did that end up leading to fragmentation and a weakening of the left? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States. JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!” The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences. That has to be addressed on the left, and the left has been addressing that. But we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity. I’m trying to find a way around this to express that identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?” CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left? JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen. On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics. But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward? JD: We can think about the Black Panther Party as a neat example in the US context: A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to galvanize social power. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US. Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections. The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though political parties are, historically, forms that do that, that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations. That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case. And one more thing: there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. That has to change. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now. CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.” Did that kind of individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start? JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the rhetorics of consensus and horizontalism, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual, their interests, their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that people start looking for how their exact experiences and interests are not being recognized. I think that the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual. That’s a liberal assumption. Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that politics begins in groups. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class. Class is what determines where our political interests come from. I try to do everything I can in the book to dismantle the assumption that politics, particularly left politics, should begin with the individual. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart. CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive. When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you? JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats. My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist Party again as a force—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party. So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but the goal isn’t just being elected. The goal is overthrowing capitalism. The goal is being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles. Second, it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. But I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow. CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo? JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.” It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum. One last thing about the history of communism: every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that the countries we understand to have been ruled by Communist Parties were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves. We can say that state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals. I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting. CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy. “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.” So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy? JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy. When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, it’s not a political statement. Even at a march (fully permitted) that’s registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq, for example, or concern about the climate—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count. But the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.” It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more. We want actual equality. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have. CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production? JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace. What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication? There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party. I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution. CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response. How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone… JD: Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone. What this narrative did was produce the divided collectivity that we need. It’s great to undermine the ~~stupid~~ myth of American unity, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.

### Case

#### Isolating gender as the root cause essentializes women and reinforces oppression

Ticker 92 (Ann Ticker, 1992—professor at the School of International Relations, USC. B.A. in History, U London. M.A. in IR, Yale. PhD in pol sci, Brandeis U, Gender in International Relations Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security)

Building on the notion of hegemonic masculinity, the notion of the citizen-warrior depends on a devalued femininity for its construction. In international relations, this devalued femininity is bound up with myths about women as victims in need of protection; the protector/protected myth contributes to the legitimation of a militarized version of citizenship that results in unequal gender relations that can precipitate violence against women. Certain feminists have called for the construction of an enriched version of citizenship that would depend less on military values and more on an equal recognition of women's contributions to society. Such a notion of citizenship cannot come about, however, until myths that perpetuate views of women as victims rather than agents are eliminated. One such myth is the association of women with peace, an association that has been invalidated through considerable evidence of women's support for men's wars in many societies. 79 In spite of a gender gap, a plurality of- women generally support war and national security policies; Bernice Carroll suggests that the association of women and peace is one that has been imposed on women by their disarmed condition. 80 In the West, this association grew out of the Victorian ideology of women's moral superiority and the glorification of motherhood. This ideal was expressed by- feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman whose book Herland was first serialized in The Forerunner in 1915. Gilman glorified women as caring and nurturing mothers whose private sphere skills could benefit the world at large. 81 Most turn-of-the-century feminists shared Gilman's ideas. But if the implication of this view -was that women were disqualified from participating in the corrupt world of political and economic power by virtue of their moral superiority, the result could only be the perpetuation of male dominance. Many contemporary feminists see dangers in the continuation of these essentializing myths that can only result in the perpetuation of women's subordination and reinforce dualisms that serve to make men more powerful. The association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need of protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naive in matters relating to international politics. An enriched, less militarized notion of citizenship- cannot be built on such a weak foundation.

#### State based reform is key strategy for progressive gender politics supported by theory, method and empirical practice – alt makes actualization impossible

Connell 90 (R. W. Connell, “The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal”, Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 5, October, JSTOR)

The concept of rights is connected with a particular concept of the state. In this view the state is, or ought to be, a neutral arbiter between conflicting interests and a guarantor of individual rights. The right to a voice in its proceedings is given by citizenship. Liberal feminism adopts this view of the state, with one significant shift: it argues that empirical- ly the state is not neutral in its treatment of women. Liberal feminism, in effect, treats the state as an arbiter that has been captured by a par- ticular group, men. This analysis leads directly to a strategy for redress: capture it back. If women's situation is defined as a case of imperfect citizenship, the answer is full citizenship. If men presently run the governments, armies, and bureaucracies, the solution is more access, packing more and more women into the top levels of the state until balance is achieved. In its own territory this is a powerful and sharp-edged analysis. It underpins what successes the women's movement has had in dealings with the liberal state. The campaign for the suffrage itself was based on this analysis, as were the campaigns for married women's property rights last century and for equal pay in this century. More recently, lib- eral feminist logic has led to antidiscrimination laws, equal employment opportunity (EEO) programs, and an expanded recruitment of women to the middle levels of political power. The themes of the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-85) broadly followed liberal femi- nist notions of equal citizenship. Liberal feminism has developed enough leverage to receive occasional endorsement from the political leadership of the superpowers. Carter in his day endorsed the ERA; while Gorbachev seeks to include liberal-feminist themes in perestroi- ka: Today it is imperative for the country to more actively involve women in the management of the economy, in cultural development and public life. For this purpose women's councils have been set up throughout the country.' Cont… These conceptions are close to a view of the state widespread in the early gay liberation movement, which likewise broke with a liberal poli- tics of law reform in favor of mass mobilization and confrontation. Gay men in particular faced the state as direct oppressor, because their own sexuality was criminalized. Police homophobia has been an important issue; it is significant that the gay liberation movement was triggered by a confrontation between gay men and police in New York, the so-called "Stonewall riot" of 1969. Lesbians have experienced the state as oppressor in the courts (for example, in custody battles), in the exclu- sion of lesbian experience from education, and through experiences shared with heterosexual women. Gay and lesbian writers have not, however, produced much formal theorization of the state. What there is, notably the work of Fernbach, emphasizes the historical embedding of violent masculinity in the state with the creation of armies and em- pires.2" cont… This adds up to a convincing picture of the state as an active player in gender politics. Nobody acquainted with the facts revealed in this research can any longer accept the silence about gender in traditional state theory, whether liberal, socialist, or conservative. The research also demonstrates that the state is, at the very least, a significant vehicle of sexual and gender oppression and regulation. The general tendency of feminist theory to move toward a conception of the "patriarchal state" appears to be valid. But a theory constructed on this postulate alone would give no grip on strategy. To say that "government is women's enemy," as Presley and Kinsky do; or in Walby's more sophisticated language, "the state repre- sents patriarchal as well as capitalistic interests and furthers them in its actions"; gives no way of grasping what feminism in practice has seen in the state that makes the state worth addressing as a resource for pro- gressive sexual politics.28 To gain some purchase on that question requires an exploration of the changing circumstances in which state instrumentalities act, the strategic problems of state directorates, and the scope and limits of the state's embroilment in gender relations.