# Case

## OFF

#### Interpretation – the affirmative must defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Violation – they also defend the c

#### Extra-T is a voting issue for fairness and education it makes being negative impossible

#### A) Infinitely regressive – they can attach literally anything onto the resolution – that lets them fiat out of Kritik links and any disad by attaching as many words onto the plan as they want

#### B) Predictable limits – infinite options means we can’t predict advantage areas – this leads to terrible debates where we’re forced to go for generics – that crushes topic education

#### C) Clash – they circumvent clash by justifying adding on anything onto the resolution – its not what they do its what they justify – clash is the most portable skill in debate because it’s the only unique advantage to the activity that can’t be solved anywhere else. Our interp is key to third and fourth level testing of the aff which results in more rigorous and nuanced debates

#### c/i

#### no rvis

## OFF

#### The standard is maximizing expected well being

#### Life is intrinsically and infinitely valuable because it is a prerequisite to any subjective pleasure – it should be preserved as an apriori issue.

Kacou 08 [Amien, “Why Even Mind? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2, 2008, cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184]//JIH

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex. We may have to think beyond the fact that bare life has some value a priori—the fact that there is some value in any life—(which basically gets us back to the fact that we already have some desire for it or that we can have pleasure in it), and consider the possibility that there might be some value in not living also, and that it might be greater than or cancel out the value we find to be primitively characteristic of life. (This would not be an a posteriori or circumstantial comparison, nonetheless, because life and death are basically logical extensions of one another—like “p” and “not-p.”) This last question invites two approaches—perhaps only nominally distinct. One is to ask whether, where life (with the desire for life) already exists, there is also something primitively, and then relatively, desirable about dying: something that would be a priori preferable to that which we already desire in staying alive. Simply put: in general, would dying be better than living? (This concerns the value of our survival.) Just as we have assumed pleasure to be something primitively desirable attainable in living, we can assume the absence of pain (of displeasure) to be something primitively desirable attainable in death. (On the model of pleasure, we adopt a broad definition of pain: it is dissatisfaction with consciousness, or the experience of disliking things.) Ideally, we would be able to answer any call to judge the value of life (a priori or a posteriori) by simply balancing the good and bad it involves as follows: (1) the “amount” of present bad plus the odds of future bad, against (2) the “amount” of present good plus the odds of future good. This comparison would require two assumptions: (1) equal amounts of good and bad neutralize each other, and (2) any moment in life (outside of “heaven” or “hell” at least) always preserves the possibility of both future good and future bad. Accordingly, in terms of pleasure and pain, our question on the value of life over death could be reframed as follows: whether the absence of pain (present and future) guaranteed by death is worth losing all access to pleasure (present and future) included in life a priori when such access also involves access to pain.[18] The other approach is to consider whether it can ever make sense to say that it would have been better, or even “just as well,” if we had never come to life in the first place—if experience had never appeared. (This concerns the value of our birth.) According to Cioran, “not to be born is undoubtedly the best plan of all. Unfortunately it is within no one’s reach.”[19] But can his point be disputed in a reasoned manner? The issue can be framed as follows: whether the mere fact that experience exists can be said to be a good or a bad thing. Before we can tackle these questions properly, however, we must return to the sense of Heidegger’s remark (in the epigraph above). What Heidegger was emphasizing is that consciousness does not merely incidentally support value, as if it were an external (incidental) agent—like a rock may serve the one who throws it. Since it does not necessarily follow that there is no consciousness without pleasure from the fact there is no pleasure without consciousness, we might be tempted to infer that value in general might be only an occasional “entertainment” of consciousness. Instead, Heidegger points out that consciousness, in and of itself, presupposes and always is an expression—not a detached medium—of value, or “care” (i.e., an expression of “interest in things,” one might say). Let us elucidate what “care” signifies (for our purposes, at least) and how consciousness expresses it. III. Axiology It is not only the case that all desire invokes a question of value, but also that only desire creates value: there is no value beyond the desirable; all value is a function of some desire. For instance, the value of health comes from the fact that we desire survival, and pleasure, and offspring, etc… Consider: although what is desirable may sometimes require elucidation, what we cannot recognize in any way to be (or to further) something desirable, we simply cannot recognize as being valuable.[20] a. The importance of difference To value anything is to care about something, to have desires (wants) for things, to have preferences over things; and to have a preference entails caring about a difference in the way things can be—favoring one contingent way for things to be over another. (This reflects the essential axiological dichotomy between good and bad.) Where there is no difference in the way things can be (no contingency), there also can be no preference one way or another—there can only be indifference. Note that this seems to entail that a “heaven” where nothing bad can occur is impossible—and the same for a “hell” where nothing good can occur. (Certainly, the notion of a heaven or hell leaving its inhabitants in indifference is oxymoronic.) b. Awareness Loosely speaking, care manifests itself either in what one “undergoes” or in what one “does”—it has both passive and active expressions. More explicitly, the capacity for caring consists in being disposed to feel or sense or otherwise behave with preference—again, regardless of whether or not we “know” our own preference (that is, whether or not as bearers of particular preferences we have a clear and distinct, definite and accurate concept or understanding of them).[21] Feeling and sensing are ways of behaving with preference. (Thus, speaking of one’s having “feelings of preference” for something would be redundant, at least strictly speaking.) All feeling is a sign of caring; it is or carries an expression of preference. All awareness presupposes caring about the way things are or can be.[22] In Heidegger’s words: “care lies ‘before’ every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘position’ of dasein, that is, it is always already in them as an existential a priori.”[23] In other words, we could say that interest in things “precedes” (to use a Sartrian term) awareness of things—and the attendant formation of propositional attitudes. Better yet, it engenders those other kinds of phenomena. All belief, for instance, as a species of propositional attitude, is produced ultimately for the business of some desire. In sum, the existence of desire generally explains the existence of consciousness and attitudes—desire goes beyond experience. Hence, it would be impossible to have consciousness without a sense of good and bad: a perfectly axiologically indifferent state of consciousness is perfectly impossible. Hence, awareness can be thought of as part of a simply inestimably larger condition of interest in things. (Again: the fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) From the restrictive point of view of a reductionist materialist (if she is also a functionalist perhaps), this condition could be distinguished as merely a way that organic entities distinguish themselves from the rest of Nature. (One could say that awareness is for those entities a device favored through evolution for bettering their chances of biological “success”—notably, by ameliorating their capacity for spatial orientation, as suggested earlier.) Alternatively, the condition could be that of a larger, more comprehensive entity for which organic life represents nothing but one avatar—e.g., Schopenhauer’s “Will,” or a pantheist’s “God.” These explanatory speculations, however, are still beyond our inquiry. Overall, it now appears that consciousness is inherently, always, “value-entertaining,” so to speak: there is no state of consciousness that is not value-laden. In other words, consciousness is, in every moment, either a satisfaction of a desire or another event within the quest for the satisfaction of a desire; experience is always “motivated.” At the same time, we repeat, it is also clear that what we desire is not always something we conceive of distinctly in consciousness. In fact, what we think we desire is a function of capacities and circumstances—robust thinking or analysis, information, reaction under stress, and so on—that could make us think we want what we do not want. (Consider, e.g., Oedipus’ case.) c. The logic of desire It is impossible a priori to both actually want something to be the case and at the same time want it not to be the case: it is impossible to simply desire that any desire that we presently have not be satisfied (in which case it would not be desired). This is not withstanding the possibility of having, a posteriori, different, independent, circumstantial desires simultaneously, therefore potentially conflicting. (Such conflicts of desires may occur on account of problems and dilemmas imposed by external circumstances, including defective judgment or insufficient information.) It is therefore also impossible to desire that our present generally consistent desires be extinguished before they are satisfied—regardless of whether or not our dispositions for them can crumble (from death, illness…). Two approaches remain—again, perhaps only nominally distinct: (1) whether it is also impossible ever to desire (a priori) no longer to desire anything in the future (which may depend on the kind of satisfaction involved, as discussed below), and (2) whether desire-as-such implicates a satisfaction with its own existence (which is another way of asking whether the mere fact that value exists can be said to be itself valuable). The first approach aims at determining the value of the survival of value or desire, and will be addressed below; the second approach aims at the value of the birth or mere existence of value, and needs not be addressed separately in the present inquiry. d. Metaphysics of desire There are two fundamental general forms of desire: we can call them finite desire and infinite desire. A finite desire can only be satisfied with a limit: it is to be definitively satisfied by a specific numerical value or a finite event in space-time—for example: going to the beach, or reaching sexual orgasm, or passing the bar exam, or ending a particular pain, etc… A finite desire is essentially circumstantial: the meeting of circumstances produces its terms and it reflects the limits that this meeting creates. An infinite desire, on the other hand, has no definitive satisfaction in number, space or time. For example, the desire for general pleasure (the desire to like how we feel) has clearly no temporal limit: it is constant; it aims at no final end.[24] (Strictly speaking, nobody would like not to like how he or she feels at any time—including masochists.) Accordingly, there can be no such thing as a particular pleasure that could satisfy all desire for pleasure “once for all.” In other words, the infinite desire for pleasure finds its highest satisfaction in continuity (or perpetuity). The greatness of Baudelaire’s poetry, when in The Bad Glazier (1862) he says, “what does an eternity of damnation matter to someone who has found in one second the infinity of pleasure?” is to be found precisely in the paroxysm that seems to make logic irrelevant.[25] But it is, strictly speaking, impossible to find in finite time an infinity of pleasure, because finite time always entails finite space. Within any particular moment of consciousness, both aspects of desire are present—“perpendicular” to one another, as it were (like, say, particle and wave, or space and time). There is no one moment when we are awake when we do not entertain a finite desire, and there is no moment when we are awake when we do not have the infinite desire for pleasure. e. The essential form of desire According to Schopenhauer, “all endeavor springs from deprivation—from discontent with one’s condition—and is thus suffering as long as it is not satisfied.”[26] One might imagine that “need” (in a sense implying imperfection, lack, deficiency, dependency, oppression, unsettlement) is the fundamental form of desire. And, accordingly, just as the absence of such “need” is easily thought of as a state of “freedom” or “peace,” one could imagine that the disposition to care about things is essentially the expression of some kind of original, genetic “disturbance” from an ideal state of axiological indifference (which could be the fundamental state of Nature, notwithstanding Schopenhauer’s theory of the Will as “thing-in-itself”), and that the foundation of all moral concern is really a constant attempt to escape, or do away with, the oppression of having to care in the first place—and to near or return or otherwise reach that state of indifference (i.e., to die, if we assume that death is the end of experience). In other words, all desire would be traced back to a fundamental desire to stop desiring. Our not letting ourselves die easily (or killing ourselves), however, might then be explained by the difficulty of overcoming so sophisticated a form of oppression as to have befuddled us so dramatically or to have buried our behavioral capabilities under ranges and ranges of obstacles (in the form of our body’s reflexes, social norms, theologies, etc…). Hence, in this context, our survival instinct would, at best, appear essentially a psychological restraint reflecting the intricacy of our conditioning and, in effect, the depth of our captivity under the “bio-regime.” There is a critical problem with this reductive picture, however: it is based on a subtle misunderstanding of the form of desire (by Schopenhauer and others). We could approach this problem by noticing that the notion of desire as being, fundamentally, a disturbance—a problem—implies that all desires must be consistent with a preference that they could end “once for all” or had never existed. Pain, or suffering, is a problem precisely because we want it to disappear. (The “essential problem” in all problems, we could say, is that they exist.) Under this logic, for all desires, one single great definitive satisfaction (end) would have to be superior to several satisfactions. Just as, by analogy, vaccines are superior to cures or therapies. Accordingly, pleasure might have to be seen as a sort of consolation we reach for faute de mieux, while hoping for the coming of that ideal eschatological liberation that is death—even if we cannot normally think of it so straightforwardly. Pleasure would be basically indistinct from pain-relief. We have seen, however, that (1) it is impossible to desire that our present generally consistent desires be extinguished before they are satisfied, and (2) the general desire for pleasure naturally aspires a priori to continuous (or continual) satisfaction across time.[27] There can be no such thing as an ultimate pleasure that could satisfy all desire for pleasure “once for all,” regardless of its nature or “intensity:” again, the desire for pleasure finds its highest satisfaction in continuity (or perpetuity). Accordingly, the desire for pleasure cannot be squarely reduced to a desire for the resolution of a problem—it is not merely the desire for the end of pain. The first is an infinite desire, and the second a finite desire (i.e., the desire for the end of pain would ideally be satisfied by a single event, such as the end of experience, but the desire for the continuation of pleasure could not). Therefore, it could not be the case that, for all desires, one single great definitive satisfaction would be superior to several satisfactions. This should already suggest that the form of problems is not the essential form of all desire. Yet we can go further. The general form of desire is not that of a problem, but that of a stake (in french: enjeu). On the one hand, the general form of problems could be expressed as follows: “something is wrong.” Since it aims at an end, it does not entail definitive dissatisfaction; it entails hardship (which, sometimes at least, means the worsening of the conditions for satisfaction of a desire). In other words, a problem presents an obstacle that is not inherent to desire. It implicates, not only the elements of all quests (mainly, a consideration of time) but also, an additional element—a circumstance beyond the mere delay that time imposes. This entails that “lack of satisfaction” needs not be synonymous with “hardship,” or “dissatisfaction” for that matter. For example, suppose that I want to eat some ice cream tonight, and there is only one ice cream shop in town. If I drive to the shop and it is closed, then I am dissatisfied. If on my way to the shop I encounter a traffic jam just minutes before it is set to close, then I am experiencing hardship. Merely driving to the shop (initially), however, neither dissatisfies me nor makes my dissatisfaction more likely, in the relevant sense. On the other hand, the general form of stakes could be expressed as follows: “something can go wrong.” (As suggested earlier, contingency is essential to desire.) The essential form of desire is not that of problems or obstacles, but that of the possibility of problems or obstacles. Schopenhauer’s understanding of the notion stems from a confusion between the two—a confusion of modalities. “We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.”[28] It seems that a misleading analogy makes this confusion more likely. (“Philosophy points out the misleading analogies in the use of our language.”[29]) The analogy is based on facts such as that, as suggested earlier, vaccines are superior to cures or therapies—in other words, it is better to be inoculated from a disease than it is to be cured of, or treated for, the disease. What escapes notice in this case is that what makes vaccines superior is not that they may end the general possibility of disease (which they may not); it is that they may end (or reduce) some specific possibility (or likelihood) of disease. This distinction can be highlighted, for instance, in the fact that an actual measurement of risk could conceivably be assigned to the latter, whereas no such measurement could be assigned to the former. What makes us susceptible to the confusion is the same thing (whether shallow error in thinking or deep irrational paroxysm of desire) as what makes us believe that a “heaven” where nothing bad can occur is possible. IV. Is life “better than” death a priori? a. The value of survival We are now in a position to state an answer to our main question. As we have shown, we are animated (at the very least) by an infinite desire for pleasure and it is impossible to desire that our present generally consistent desires be extinguished before they are satisfied. Therefore, it is impossible to desire the end of what makes pleasure possible (namely, experience, “life”) unless perhaps pain is a constant of that condition—that is, unless life presents a constant problem. Indeed, according to Schopenhauer, “essentially all life is suffering.”[30] We have seen that pain has the form of a problem—it signals non-definitive (thus temporary!) dissatisfaction with consciousness, or hardship. In other terms: [simple pain] = [(consciousness\*desire) + obstacle]. On the other hand: [consciousness\*desire] = [desire for satisfaction including pleasure]. Therefore: [Simple pain] = [desire for satisfaction including pleasure + obstacle]. Since, as shown above, consciousness is always an expression of desire, then [consciousness\*desire] can be simplified to [consciousness]. In this way, pain can be seen to address an additional circumstance (the obstacle it signals) seemingly outside of the essence of consciousness. Nonetheless, perhaps we could imagine that such circumstance always subsists with consciousness, or even “precedes” it in some way (in which case, we might be more inclined to relax our restriction to a priori matters). What if, for instance, we were to theorize that the birth of consciousness is explained by the circumstantial advantage it confers—say, toward organic survival, as aforesaid? (For instance, it provides a sense of orientation.) Perhaps this could be expressed by saying that, at its foundation, consciousness (“life” in the relevant sense) is an expression of a will to such power as would allow organisms to survive. It would return us to the view that consciousness is, at its essence, valuable as a security device or capacity instrumental to something else whose value could also be questioned. The issue would be whether that circumstantial advantage addresses an “obstacle” explaining the need for the advantage. If so, then the nature of the desire for pleasure could more accurately be described, not as “infinite,” but rather as “indefinite”—pleasure would have value only so long as the advantage is needed. However, such an image would also be the result of what we characterized earlier as a confusion of modalities. The fact is that the advantage, the power, which consciousness is supposed to confer, fails as a whole to correspond to any problem or obstacle. Were the fundamental value of consciousness considered to be that it furthers our security interests in general simply by ameliorating our capacity for orientation away from undesirable circumstances (relative to some desire other than that for pleasure), then the general “circumstance” that the advantage of having consciousness addresses could simply be described as follows: it is the fact that undesirable circumstances can exist. In other words, consciousness could be seen as an advantage vis-à-vis the simple fact that things can go wrong—which, as we have seen, is a condition of the existence of value itself. Thus the advantage would not be aimed at a problem or obstacle. Rather, it would be aimed at the possibility of problems and obstacles, perfectly reflecting the form of desire itself. Accordingly, desiring the end of the condition for which the advantage is needed a priori would be the same as desiring the end of the possibility of problems, which, in turn, would be the same as desiring the end of desire—the disappearance of value.[31] In sum: no problem for consciousness precedes or is inherent to consciousness, which indeed involves an infinite desire for pleasure. Therefore, it is false to say as Schopenhauer said that “essentially all life is suffering.” Whereas the end of pain can only be desired, it is impossible to desire the end of the essence of life, because it would have to involve a satisfaction with the end of an unproblematic infinite desire. In other words, we cannot help but desire the continuation of life-as-such: our survival is good a priori. Life at its essence is not suffering—pain is an a posteriori (i.e., circumstantial) phenomenon of consciousness. Furthermore, since, as we have seen, life is an expression of desire (and no state of desire can be one of indifference), then life “at its essence” cannot be indifference. The value of our situated (i.e., a posteriori) experiences can be assumed to be entirely variable. For instance, anyone of us could imaginably be born with a health condition that causes chronic headaches, or instead with a tendency for joyful reverie, or something else. However, the initial value of experience (to the extent we can distinguish experience from its objects—to the extent we commit to assign a value to all life in general) is the same for all. It follows that life at its essence is pleasure. Life inherently, initially, “produces” pleasure. It “begins” as pleasure, so to speak, only to be countered, frustrated, a posteriori, by pain. (We can think of pain as thwarted pleasure—but not of pleasure as thwarted pain.)[32] And the desire for pleasure appears more precisely as a quest, not really to find or discover pleasure,[33] but rather to sustain (continue), and then augment (intensify) or expand (diversify) pleasure. In conclusion, since the infinite desire for pleasure finds its greatest satisfaction a priori in its own perpetuation, then life finds its greatest satisfaction a priori in its own perpetuation. The fact that the circumstances of life (limited life expectancy, torture, etc…) do not allow, or frustrate, such perpetuation, however, forces us to reevaluate our death. But this issue belongs to another type of inquiry—on the subjective or circumstantial or a posteriori value of life.

#### Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Plummer, PhD, 15

(Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe **there is** at least **one thing** **it is reasonable to agree on** right now, **whatever** general **moral view we adopt**: that **it is** very **important to reduce** **the risk that** all intelligent **beings** on this planet **are eliminated by** an enormous **catastrophe**, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that **we** – **whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists** – **should all agree that we should try to save the world.** According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. **There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world**, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. **Even on a wholly person-affecting view** – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – **the case for reducing existential risk is very strong**. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. **You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only.** **There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations** (the goodness of outcomes), **it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists**. **But that is a huge mistake**. **Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness** **than** the goodness of **consequences** or outcomes; **it is not the view that the latter don’t matter**. **Even** John **Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account** in judging rightness. **One which did not would simply be irrational**, crazy.” **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view**. **They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk**, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism**, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, **might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that **most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations** of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. **So obviously** if Scheffler were right **I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk**. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** W**hat is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain** not (only**) about** the empirical facts, but also about the **moral facts?** I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even **those** (hedonistic egoists) **who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken,** and that one of the above views is correct. **Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk**. Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters**, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, **reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world**. Again, this is largely **for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future –** there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation**). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives**. It’s possible they’ll be miserable**. It is enough** for my claim **that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world**. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And **even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to**. I suspect that **most of us alive today** – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – **have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve**. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### They didn't make an arg for this in the 1ac so I should get my pick

# Case

#### The world isn’t hyperreal –

1. **The ability to diagnose that system from the inside disproves that it’s not a totalizing system of power**
2. **Every existing progressive movement disproves that gap between representation and politics**
3. **There isn’t a logical basis for judging their arguments that doesn’t link to itself**
4. **The logical conclusion of every critique of debate is to vote neg even if they win**

#### Can't solve — plan in response to private entities but they have consistently made the claim that nasa has a colonial desire to space which makes all of their impacts inevitable

#### Public space tourism will fill in

Seedhouse 18 [Erik, editor at the Encyclopedia Britannica, “Space Tourism” https://www.britannica.com/explore/space/space-tourism/]

Space tourism, recreational space travel, either on established government-owned vehicles such as the Russian Soyuz and the International Space Station (ISS) or on a growing number of vehicles fielded by private companies. Since the flight of the world’s first space tourist, American businessman Dennis Tito, on April 28, 2001, space tourism has gained new prominence as more suborbital and orbital tourism opportunities have become available. Orbital space tourism The advent of space tourism occurred at the end of the 1990s with a deal between the Russian company MirCorp and the American company Space Adventures Ltd. MirCorp was a private venture in charge of the space station Mir. To generate income for maintenance of the aging space station, MirCorp decided to sell a trip to Mir, and Tito became its first paying passenger. However, before Tito could make his trip, the decision was made to deorbit Mir, and—after the intervention of Space Adventures Ltd.—the mission was diverted to the ISS. Tito, who paid $20 million for his flight on the Russian spacecraft Soyuz TM-32, spent seven days on board the ISS and is considered the world’s first space tourist. However, given the arduous training required for his mission, Tito objected to the use of the word tourist, and since his flight the term spaceflight participant has been more often used to distinguish commercial space travelers from career astronauts

#### Baudrillard’s critique of representation and politics is wrong and shuts down resistance

Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 54-5

Lyotard and Baudrillard put forth a strong case for conceiving of postmodern capitalist culture as an economy of image-making. They both contend that the postmodern epoch transcends industrial production via the commodification of images and the “depthlessness” of the surface of postmodern human relationships. 33 But such a portrayal is too stark; the production of images has not supplanted the production of material use-values as the dominant form of capitalist production (and images themselves are “material” forms of production sold in the capitalist market). No doubt video games, “virtual reality,” and cyberspace are new forms of experience that compress and dislocate linear, physical conceptions of time and space. But while late capitalist “infotainment” production, at times, radically disjoins design and marketing (“symbolic manipulation”) from actual physical production (microchips designed in Silicon Valley while produced in Malaysia and the Philippines), the outsourcing of symbolic manipulation to software engineers in India and South Korea is rapidly breaking down this distinction.¶ But Lyotard’s and Derrida’s aestheticization of all reality equates not only philosophical texts with literary texts, but also treats material phenomenon as strictly texts read by the human mind. This tendency among post-structuralist influenced theorists leads them to downplay the structural constraints that systems of production—not only material, but also cultural and ideological— place upon human subjects. It also downplays the possibility for human communication, inter-subjectivity, and collective action. For Lyotard, the only social bond is linguistic; inter-subjective language does not yield a shared linguistic community, but an indeterminate number of language games. Yet, if reality consists solely of perpetually shifting fragments of failed representations, how can there be any communication, yet alone the comprehension of commands?34 If inter-subjective communication is impossible, then why and how do we write journal articles for our (admittedly small) intellectual communities? One need not be a Weberian to realize that “legitimate rule” depends more on the power to command—authority—than it does brute force. Such rules are rarely constructed in a truly democratic manner, as the unequal access to educational, social, and cultural capital decreases the possibility of democratic discourse among relatively well-informed equals. Yet much of the social glue that coheres contemporary societies remains conscious, shared human belief in communal norms and values—often ones that are as pre-modern (religious and ethnic conceptions of solidarity), as they are postmodern. The role of ideology as a form of communicative coherence has not withered away—nor has the material and ideological power of the state and of educational and legal systems. The social world in which we live is simply not as fragmented and de-situated as poststructural- influenced academics believe. In fact, the tight knit and cohesive nature of post-structural-influenced academic communities implicitly affirms philosophically “pragmatic” and communitarian conceptions of meaning more than they do post-structuralist theories of communicative fragmentation.

#### Their totalizing description of settler anxiety is non-falsifiable and undermines the capacity for indigenous agency in resisting colonial violence.

**Rowse 14** (Tim, Professor University of Western Sydney, "Indigenous Heterogeneity," Australian Historical Studies, 45:3, Page 300)

This settler colonial paradigm thus has the appealing quality of being empirically exhaustive: whether through the removal of children or the erection of a monument to the Stolen Generations, through the denial of native title or the recognition of native title, through the remembrance of violence or the forgetting of violence, the structure of erasure/elimination/repressive authentication does its work. The discursive power of the settler colonial state and society is inexorably effective. All representations of Indigenous Australians and all self-representations by them are subject to the suspicion that they are best understood as the tactical moves of a deeply cunning settler colonial governmentality.

I have three concerns about this influential paradigm. First, can it account for itself? If the settler colonial narrative is so pervasive, how can we be sure that our self-consciously critical historiography is not just another one of its tactics? If that question seems merely a clever debating point, consider my second point: those writing within this paradigm have trouble dealing with Indigenous agency. The ‘elimination thesis’ logically requires its adherents to postulate Indigenous difference and Indigenous agency. Rarely do they forget to note and honour Indigenous agency, crediting it with indomitable persistence against the shapeshifting settler colonial hegemony. However, the paradigm encourages hesitation about characterising Indigenous difference, for to formulate Indigeneity— that is, to describe the contingent content of its difference—risks falling into the trap set by the paradigm’s own critical hermeneutics: any construction of agency as ‘Indigenous’ might be just another version of that ‘authenticity’ that is said to be repressive. Every instance of Indigenous agency is under suspicion of being ‘state-conceded’. For practitioners of the eliminationist paradigm, the inscription of ‘Indigenous agency’ is something to be left to others; for the practitioners of the eliminationist paradigm any such characterisation is always already known to be yet another manifestation of elimination’s inexorable logic. Honouring Indigeneity as ineradicable ‘difference’ tends to be a gesture made at the end of a description of the settler colonial edifice. The tendency of this paradigm is to render Indigenous agency either as ‘state-conceded’ or as an empty, counterfactual narrative space, mentioned out of political piety. The resistant Indigenous subject is beyond empirical specification, an unrepresented and unrepresentable thing that is always already external to the exhaustive discursive work of the settler colonial imagination.

Sovereignty’s moral complexity

My third point has to do with the evocation of settler colonial collective agency as tactical, shape-shifting, never absent, but variously manifest. There seem to be two quite different versions of this settler colonial agency. On the one hand, one evokes its adaptive fluidity, as the structure of settler colonial society somehow finds and invents the agents that perform the myriad tasks of elimination, erasure and repressive recognition; the settler colonial structure is always tactically resourceful in the agencies of its deployment. On the other hand, settler colonial agency is evoked as a collective agent, an enduring national psyche that is anxious, divided, ambivalent, troubled by unresolvable tensions within its project. The attribution of affect to the settler colonial mentality or archive preserves the idea of a singular collective settler agency, as if settler colonies were persons.

It would be easy to exaggerate the idea that settler colonial ambivalence can be narrated as ‘anxiety’. While I have no doubt that there have been anxious agents, the characterisation of particular settler colonial agents as ‘anxious’ is not easy to support empirically, and as a reader I have often had the feeling that the writer depicting ‘anxiety’ is ‘presentist’: ‘From the standpoint of my values, what you did and said back then should have made you anxious’.

**A more impersonal analysis enables us to** move from anxious agents to contending structures**. It is more productive**, I suggest, **to account more impersonally for ‘settler colonial society’, to evoke it in terms of structures and tendencies to which agents get recruited; I am sympathetic to Wolfe's structuralism. However, I am not persuaded by his presentation of a** singular structure's **relentless consistency, its inexorable logic** (of ‘elimination’ or of anything else). **Wolfe's emplotment of settler colonialism interpellates the historian/reader in a compact of epistemological and political certainty: we know what's going to happen because it always does. My contrary preference is to see history as** less predictable, messier**, more surprising and occasionally more hopeful**. The recent contention of ‘Indigeneities’ has invigorated my uncertainties. **Settler colonial projects give rise to many different kinds of institutions and ethical cultures, and in the duration and physical size of settler colonies** (particularly Australia, a vast space whose colonial occupation remains a work in progress) **there are many opportunities for diverse settler colonial formations to** co-exist**. I emphasise ‘contending structures’ in order to distance my approach from the search for the single ‘structure’ that** seems to **drive** Patrick Wolfe **towards seeing so many different phenomena as manifestations of the structure of elimination**. The **tensions** structured **within the settler colonial project** interest me because they seem to me to **offer a better chance of understanding historically the diverse ‘Indigeneities’ that we now can see**.

#### Racial capitalism fails as a theory.

Go 21 – Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago (Julian, “Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 38-47, 2021)

What Is the “Race” in Racial Capitalism? We can now turn to the three tensions in the racial capitalism literature, beginning with the issue of race. This is critical. If the term racial capitalism is to have implications for social theory, it must offer rigorously defined concepts constituting a transposable conceptual apparatus. Surely one of those concepts would have to do with “race.” But what exactly is “race”? The problem is that “race” is not typically defined in the existing literature, so it is unclear whether other categories marking difference, such as ethnicity, are more appropriate than race. Should we be thinking about “ethnic capitalism” rather than racial capitalism? Robinson’s (2000) work is a prime example. Nearly all scholars claim that one of Robinson’s key contributions is to show that capitalism was forged from precapitalist racial divisions in Europe. Capitalism is “racial,” according to Robinson, “because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society,” and capitalism was built upon that racialism (Kelley 2017; Táíwò and Bright 1996). The problem is that Robinson himself was not entirely clear that precapitalist social differences were actually “racial.” On one hand, he did use the term race in his analysis. “Racism,” Robinson (2000:2; see also pp. 26–27, 66–67) wrote, served to structure “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” prior to capitalism, and capitalism seized on racism as it developed. On other hand, when discussing some of the presumably “racial” groups in feudal Europe, Robinson (2000:10–11) referred to linguistic rather than phenotypical differences, thus equating racial groups with linguistic groups. In fact, when discussing how migratory and immigrant labor formed the basis for the armies of the Absolutist states and for the production of value in early agrarian capitalism, he oscillated between calling them “races” and “ethnic” groups. For instance, Robinson (2000:23) used the phrase “ethnic divisions of sixteenth century immigrant labor,” and he referred to “national” differences when presumably speaking about premodern “racial” differences. Given these ambiguities, Robinson’s argument could be read differently from how it is conventionally taken. It is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, thereby turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into “racial” ones to legitimate its new exploitative structure. In this view, racialization—the process of turning groups into biological entities called “races”—was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor (cf. Omi and Winant 1986). In some passages, Robinson (2000) said this exactly: “the tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones” (p. 26). Of course, whether “race” preexisted capitalism does not alter the larger argument of the racial capitalism approach, which is that racial differentiation and capitalism are mutually supportive. Still, the tension in Robinson’s work manifests the deeper issue of whether “racial” capitalism refers to race or other identities. This issue permeates Walzer’s (2020) recent criticism of the racial capitalism concept. Walzer points to examples such as Russia and China, where capitalism does not rely on racial differences but rather on ethnic and religious differentiation. “It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia,” he wrote, “but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group.” On this basis, Walzer rejected the racial capitalism concept as limited at best and analytically debilitating at worse. Skeptics of Walzer have offered a rebuke: his argument misses the global dimensions of capitalism. At issue is not whether racial stratification articulates with capitalism within any single country but whether it permeates the world-capitalist system. Proponents of this argument could readily assemble evidence to show that, on a global scale, the vast majority of the world’s proletariat, subproletariat, and dispossessed—whether cultivating grapes or coffee on the farms of the Americas, cleaning up office floors in London, or making clothes in the sweatshops of New Delhi—are, to borrow DuBois’s (1935) phrase, “yellow, brown and black.” Against Walzer, this would retain the main claim of the racial capitalism approach that race and capitalism are intertwined. Yet this scaling upward of capitalism to a global level brings its own complications. It carries the danger of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) called “the cunning of imperialist [racialist] reason”: an analytic operation by which U.S.-centered scholars impose presumably U.S.-centric classifications (in this case, “race”) onto the rest of the world, thereby imposing racial classifications into contexts where they might not be operative. We would be obliged, for instance, to impose racial classifications onto Latin American contexts such as Brazil, where the salience of racial classifications is debatable (Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). In short, if we are to insist on the global character of racial capitalism, we must assume that analysts’ racial classifications are global as well. They may very well be, but racial capitalism’s founding texts, and more recent discussions, have not sufficiently problematized this tension.2 Can this tension be resolved? One way to do so is to raise the possibility that the racial capitalism concept works best for groups that have been undoubtedly racialized, such as members of the African diaspora in North America.3 Racial capitalism would thus refer mainly to the black ex-slave population, which has suffered some of the clearest and most virulent forms of racism. This might explain why the literature on racial capitalism has focused on African Americans and transatlantic slavery rather than other groups elsewhere in the world. Yet this seeming resolution would significantly reduce the scope of the racial capitalism concept. Racial capitalism would no longer depict a global system. Perhaps the best resolution is one that arrives through more reflexive research. We can explore how “race” is connected to capitalism in diverse sites and across historical periods, but we must be more conscious about whether we are referring to analysts’ definition of race or a category of practice. Put simply, we can arrive at a resolution only through careful research that more clearly defines “race.” The Inadequacy of Existing Theory A second tension in the racial capitalism literature has to do with the relationship between this literature and existing social theories of capitalism, in particular, Marxian theories of capitalism. Animating the racial capitalism approach is the claim that Marxian theories of capitalism are inadequate because they obfuscate the racial foundations of capitalism. For Robinson (2000), “Western Marxism . . . has proven insufficiently radical to expose and root out the racialist order that contaminates its analytic and philosophic applications” (p. 317). Historians’ use of the racial capitalism approach is premised on the idea that Marxism does not adequately acknowledge slavery’s role in capitalism or the ongoing importance of colonialism and “primitive accumulation,” which Marx presumably relegated to the margins of his theory (Smallwood 2018). This is exactly why scholars in this tradition insist on the term racial capitalism: because Marxian theory fails to theorize race, we must add the qualifier race to the signifier capitalism. But what if Marxian theory does in fact take into account race, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, and proponents of the racial capitalism approach merely misread Marx? If so, the warrant, if not the entire premise, for Robinson’s and others’ work on racial capitalism would crater by an unfortunate misreading of Marxian theory. A number of scholars, in fact, already push against the notion that Marxist thought does not account for race, slavery, or colonialism. Drawing largely on Marx’s journalistic writings, they show that Marx not only discussed race, slavery, and colonialism but saw them as central for capitalism. According to this argument, Marx saw race as so crucial for capitalism that his theory saw the true proletariat as black, brown, and yellow—directly contrary to Robinson’s claim that Marxist theory only saw the white European proletariat as the true subject of history (Anderson 2010; Foster, Holleman, and Clark 2020; Ralph and Singhal 2019). If true, the racial capitalism literature is based on a “misguided reading of Marx” (Ralph and Singhal 2019:864). How might this apparent aporia in Marxian theory be resolved, if at all? It is imperative here to register a distinction between Marx’s theory of capital and his theory of capitalism. 4 The former is sketched in Marx’s mature social theory in Capital and related writings such as The Grundrisse (Postone 1996). These writings offer a formalized and abstract representation of the inner workings of capital, its accumulation, its contradictions, and its necessary demise through a series of central categories that capture the key elements of the capitalist system. At this level of abstraction, the main categories of the theory (e.g., “value,” “surplus value,” “concrete labor,” “abstract labor,” “capital,” “socially necessary labor time”) are devoid of any historical specificity or social content and as such can be applied to distinct historical phases or social formations (e.g., capitalism in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world or Russia in 1998, or the twenty-first-century global system). Categories of race, gender, or ethnicity are therefore not central, because they are too concrete. Alternatively, a theory of capitalism refers to capitalist development and dynamics in their empirical specificity. It is meant to explain and describe specific capitalist formations and developments as they really exist in the world, not their abstract conceptual form. This theory can be extracted from Marx’s journalistic writings and other essays, and it is here where issues such as slavery and ethnicity arise: the essays refer to real events and pressing issues in actually existing capitalism, such as the Civil War or the Irish question (Anderson 2010). But these observations or statements on concrete processes and relations such as slavery in actually existing capitalism—that is, Marx’s theory of capitalism—do not disturb or reconfigure his theory of capital, which remains focused on the relations of wage labor induced to a highly abstract level from his analysis of textile production. If and when he did discuss things such as slavery, such as in “The Working Day” section in Capital, he treated slavery as a passing phase or outside capital’s inner logic, a sort of heuristic to better apprehend and illuminate the latter (Marx [1867] 1906:328–30; on slavery as a heuristic, see Smallwood 2018). This distinction between Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of capital helps us better approach the debate generated by the racial capitalism literature. When Robinson or other proponents of the racial capitalism idea critique Marx’s theory for eliding or deliberately occluding race, slavery, and colonialism, they are critiquing his theory of capital, not his theory of capitalism. Here proponents of the racial capitalism approach are on solid ground. Marx’s theory of capitalism does take into account race, slavery, and colonialism, but his theory of capital renders these things marginal at best.5 Hence the warrant for the racial capitalism approach: because Marx’s theory of capital does not center race, the racial capitalism concept and the research and theorizing that go under its banner can fill the void. The concept may provide the basis for an alternative theory not only of racial capitalism but also of racialized capital. Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11 A different and possibly more productive route would be to reframe the issue as one of social difference rather than race. Is racism necessary for capitalism? There are good reasons, as just mentioned, to think not. But is social difference of various types (from race to gender to ethnicity) necessary for capitalism?12 This is more demonstrable, both empirically (by reference to actually existing capitalism) and theoretically (by reference to the logic of capital accumulation). For example, Fraser’s argument about expropriation could be reformulated in the following manner: expropriation is logically necessary for exploitation, which is in turn necessary for capital accumulation, and expropriation requires differentiation among workers. This differentiation could be along racial lines, or it could be along other lines such as gender, but differentiation there must be. Note that this argument logically insinuates a racial component but remains abstract enough to account for other possible identities across different capitalist formations. It can account for racialized slave labor in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world (where “race” was a key axis of differentiation), twentieth-century Russia (where ethnicity or religion might be the important axis), or gender across all these formations. This is just one possibility. There are others. Chakrabarty (1993), for instance, seized on Marx’s categories of “abstract” and “real” labor to write difference into Marx’s theoretical architecture. “Abstract labor” generated by capitalism refers to a homogeneity among different and otherwise incommensurable labors. It is the register of the juridical free subject. But “real” labor marks have heterogeneity that registers the incommensurability of different labors. It therefore refers to a difference that stands “only as a Derridean trace of something that cannot be enclosed” (Chakrabarty 1993:1096). Exactly how persuasive is Chakrabarty’s rereading remains to be seen. The point is that this effort, and others like it, speak to theoretical possibilities that the racial capitalism literature opens up but has yet to pursue thoroughly. More could be done.13

## Heg Good

#### Realism true

Marcelo **de Araujo** **14**, professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

#### Hegemony sustainable – prefer long term trends

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There is a widespread belief today that America is in decline. Standard & Poor’s recent downgrading of America’s long-term credit rating from AAA to AA-plus is but the latest occasion for an outpouring of pessimistic statements. Proponents of that view argue that the United States as a society, economy, and political power is weakening and that its international primacy is ebbing as a result of the rise of others—especially China.1 To be sure, the US faces both serious domestic problems and a significantly changed global environment, yet in evaluating America’s power position, it is essential to think broadly and long term. In this regard, it is sobering to consider how varied and volatile previous assessments have been. Observers in the US and abroad have periodically offered gloomy and even dire assertions about America. Yet time after time, these have proven to be far too pessimistic, even embarrassingly so. True, there has been a degree of erosion in America’s economic and military power relative to other countries. However, the margin of strength vis-a-vis other international actors has been so wide that despite some attrition, the US still remains in a unique position as compared with other countries. In contrast to the British experience of imperial decline a century ago, America continues to possess a substantial edge, whether measured in terms of its share of world GDP, depth and size of financial markets, technology, demography, or military power projection. In the percentage of GDP devoted to defense it is not truly overstretched. Even with the costs of war in Afghanistan and continuing military commitments in Iraq and elsewhere, current defense spending at 4.9 percent of GDP remains well below Cold War levels, which averaged 8.7 percent in the 1960s, 5.9 percent in the 1970s, and 5.8 percent in the 1980s.2

#### Heg decline causes great power war – primacy sustains peace

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This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### heg is key to restraint – transition causes more entanglement and lashout

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

#### Assume nuke war causes extinction because of uncertainty, limited research, and secondary effects

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Some new research has also examined the human impacts of nuclear winter. Researchers simulated agricultural crop growth in the aftermath of a 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war.5)The results are startling- the scenario could cause agriculture productivity to decline by around 10 to 40 percent for several years after the war. The studies looked at major staple crops in China and the United States, two of the largest food producers. Other countries and other crops would likely face similar declines. Following such crop declines, severe global famine could ensue. One study estimated the total extent of the famine by comparing crop declines to global malnourishment data.6) When food becomes scarce, the poor and malnourished are typically hit the hardest. This study estimated two billion people at risk of starvation. And this is from the 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario. Larger nuclear wars would have more severe impacts. This is where the recent research stops. To the best of my knowledge there are no recent studies examining the secondary effects of famines, such as disease outbreaks and violent conflicts. There are no recent studies examining the human impacts of ultraviolet radiation. That would include an increased medical burden in skin cancer and other diseases. It would also include further loss of agriculture ecosystem services as the ultraviolet radiation harms plants and animals. At this time, we can only make educated guesses about what these impacts would be, informed in part by what research was published 30 years ago. When analyzing the risk of nuclear winter, one question is of paramount importance: Would there be permanent harm to human civilization? Humanity could have a very bright future ahead; to dim that future is the worst thing nuclear winter could do. It is vastly worse than a few billion deaths from starvation. Not that a few billion deaths is trivial—obviously it isn’t—but it is tiny compared to the loss of future generations. Carl Sagan was one of the first people to recognize this point in a commentary he wrote on nuclear winter for Foreign Affairs.7) Sagan believed nuclear winter could cause human extinction, in which case all members of future generations would be lost. He argued that this made nuclear winter vastly more important than the direct effects of nuclear war, which could, in his words, “kill ‘only’ hundreds of millions of people.” Sagan was however, right that human extinction would cause permanent harm to human civilization. It is debatable whether nuclear winter could cause human extinction. Alan Robock, a leader of the recent nuclear winter research, believes it is unlikely. He writes: “Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive.”8) This is hardly a cheerful statement, and it leaves open the chance of human extinction. I think that’s the best way of looking at it. Given all the uncertainty and the limited available research, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of human extinction. I don’t have a good answer for how likely it is. But the possibility should not be dismissed. Even if some humans survive, there could still be permanent harm to human civilization. Small patches of survivors would be extremely vulnerable to subsequent disasters. They also could not keep up the massively complex civilization we enjoy today. It would be a long and uncertain rebuilding process and survivors might never get civilization back to where it is now. More importantly, they might never get civilization to where we now stand poised to take it in the future. Our potentially bright future could be forever dimmed.9) Nuclear winter is a very large and serious risk. But that on its own doesn’t mean much—just another thing to worry about. What’s really important are the implications of nuclear winter for public policy and private action.