# Valley-Round 2- 1NC

## 1

#### I value morality, the standard is consistency with consequentialism.

#### 1] only it can explain degrees of wrongness- it is worse to kill thousands than to lie to a friend- either ethical theories cannot explain comparative badness, or it collapses

#### 2] debate requires prioritizing mitigating material violence- ideal theory or a focus on diagnosing the problem as opposed to generating discussions on how to solve concrete oppression allows academics and students to elide their responsibility towards reducing injustices- complexity of social problems, understandings of risk, and epistemic limitations means that moral theories must prioritize action and reject totalizing ideological frames- intuitions that oppression and death are bad must be prioritized in your ethical calculus since people instinctively want to avoid them and because they preclude the possibility of accessing other values- this means you should reject absolutism or moral purity- it’s just an excuse to remain complicit in suffering

#### 3] actor spec-

#### A] no act-omission or intent-foresight distinction- gov’ts must create permissions and prohibitions so inaction is functionally an action and policymakers have to take the global perspective since they are responsible for the public and lack the relevant features of individual agents like autonomy that justify such a distinction

#### B] gov’ts have to aggregate since all collective actions require trade-offs that benefit some and worsen others- side-constraints freeze action and render ethics inoperable- takes-out and turns calc indicts- consequentialism is hard but not impossible, it’s empirically false since we calculate all the time, and the alt is no action which is worse

#### C] Utilitarianism is the only moral framework for making public decisions – it would be irresponsible for policymakers to sacrifice public good for individual morals

GOODIN 1995 (Robert E. Goodin, Professor of Social Sciences & Philosopher at the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, p. 8-10)

The strength of utilitarianism, the problem to which it is a truly compelling solution, is as a guide to public rather than private conduct. There, virtually all its vices - all the things that make us wince in recommending it as a code of personal morality - loom instead as considerable virtues. Consider first the raft of criticisms couched in terms of the impersonality of utilitarianism. Like all universalist philosophies, utilitarianism asks us to take "the view from nowhere." There is no obvious place within utilitarian theories for people's idiosyncratic perspectives, histories; attachments, loyalties or personal commitments. That rings untrue to certain essential qualities of personal life. The essence of the communitarian challenge is that everyone comes from somewhere. There are no free-floating individuals, of the sort with which liberals generally, and utilitarians paradigmatically, populate their moral theories.' People have, and upon reflection we think they should have, principled commitments and personal attachments of various sorts." As an account of the peculiar role responsibilities of public officials (and, by extension, of ordinary individuals in their public capacities as citizens) that vice becomes a virtue, though. Those agents, too, have to come from somewhere, bringing with them a whole raft of baggage of personal attachments, commitments, principles and prejudices. In their public capacities, however, we think it only right and proper that they should stow that baggage as best they can. Complete neutrality might be an impossible ideal. That is another matter." But it seems indisputable that that is an ideal which people in their public capacities should strive to realize as best they are able. That is part (indeed, a central part) of what it is to be a public official at all. It is the essence of public service as such that public servants should serve the public at large. Public servants must not play favorites. Or consider, again, criticisms revolving around the theme that utilitarianism is a coldly calculating doctrine." In personal affairs that is an unattractive feature. There, we would like to suppose that certain sorts of actions proceed immediately from the heart, without much reflection much less any real calculation of consequences. Among intimates it would be extremely hurtful to think of every kind gesture as being contrived to produce some particular effect. The case of public officials is, once again, precisely the opposite. There, it is the height of irresponsibility to proceed careless of the consequences. Public officials are, above all else, obliged to take care: not to go off half cocked, not to let their hearts rule their heads. In Hare's telling example, the very worst thing that might be said of the Suez misadventure was not that the British and French did some perfectly awful things (which is true, too) but that they did so utterly unthinkingly. Related to the critique of utilitarianism as a calculating doctrine is the critique of utilitarianism as a consequentialist doctrine. According to utilitarianism, the effects of an action are everything. There are no actions which are, in and of themselves, morally right or wrong, good or bad. The only things that are good or bad are the effects that actions produce." That proposition runs counter to certain ethical intuitions which, at least in certain quarters, are rooted deeply. Those who harbor a Ten Commandments view of the nature of morality see a moral code as being essentially a list of "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots" - a list of things that are right or wrong in and of themselves, quite regardless of any consequences that might come from doing them. That may or may not be a good way to run one's private affairs." Even those who think it is, however, tend to concede that it is no way to run public affairs. It is in the nature of public officials' role responsibilities that they are morally obliged to "dirty their hands" - make hard choices, do things that are wrong (or would ordinarily be wrong, or would be wrong for ordinary private individuals) in the service of some greater public good." It would be simply irresponsible of public officials (in any broadly secular society, at least) to adhere mindlessly to moral precepts read off some sacred list, literally "whatever the consequences."" Doing right though the heavens may fall is not (now-adays, anyway) a particularly attractive posture for public officials to adopt.

#### 4] existential threats outweigh-

#### A] universalism

Baum and Wilson 14 — (Seth D. Baum and Grant S. Wilson are co-editors for the Global Catastrophe Risk Institute, “The Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering “, 1-7-2014, Available Online at https://sethbaum.com/ac/2013\_BioengineeringGCR.pdf, accessed 10-30-2018 | HKR-AT) \*\*bracketed for gendered language

B. Space-Time Universalism In consequentialism, universalism can be defined as the view that any given phenomenon holds the same intrinsic value regardless of when or where it exists.21 For example, universalist anthropocentric utilitarianism would value all human utility equally, regardless of where or when that utility exists. The utility of someone in India or Paraguay would hold the same intrinsic value as the utility of someone in Denmark or Senegal. Likewise the utility of someone alive in 2013 would hold the same intrinsic value as the utility of someone alive in 2014 or 2114 or even year 21114. Strong arguments can be made in favor of universalism. The simplest is to use a ‘God’s eye view’, looking at the world from ‘above’. From this standpoint there is no reason to value anyone any more or less than anyone else. Similar is the ‘veil of ignorance’, in which decisions are made as if the decision-maker doesn’t know which member of society she will end up being.22,23 In this case the decision-maker is forced to be equally fair to everyone since she has an equal chance of being any of these individuals. There is also a material logic to universalism: The same material phenomenon should have the same value in each of its instantiations, because each is materially identical. Finally, one might ask: Why is location in time or space a morally relevant criterion? Why should someone be intrinsically valued any differently just because of where or when she lives? We object to such bias,24,25 and indeed it reminds us of other objectionable biases such as racism and sexism. We therefore conclude in favor of universalism. Universalism is important to GCR because global catastrophes affect so many people – or ecosystems, or whatever global catastrophes are defined to affect. Suppose global catastrophes are defined in the usual anthropocentric fashion. Then global catastrophes affect millions or even billions of people throughout the world. Furthermore, global catastrophes (especially the largest ones) can affect future generations, denying many people the chance to exist. The extreme case of human extinction would kill everyone around the world and prevent everyone in all future generations from existing. A selfish person would care about none of this loss of life, except her own. A global catastrophe would be no more important than her own death. A car accident that kills her would be equally tragic as a nuclear war from which humanity never recovers. On the other hand, a universalist would care deeply about global catastrophes. Indeed, the universalist would not care much about her own death relative to all the others dying in a global catastrophe. As long as other people continue to exist, [their] her values would be realized. A global catastrophe would prevent many other people from continuing to exist, and so [they] she would care deeply about this. An important result is that GCR is considered equivalently for universalist variants of anthropocentric utilitarianism and several non-anthropocentric consequentialisms, including non-anthropocentric utilitarianism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. As long as each ethical view places positive intrinsic value on the continued existence of Earth-life (in contrast to e.g. negative utilitarianism), then these views all reach the same conclusion about GCR, namely that preventing the permanent destruction of human civilization is the key priority for this era. Reaching this conclusion requires looking to the very far future. First, note that life on Earth can continue to exist for about five billion more years, until the Sun becomes too hot and large for Earth life. Second, note that the rest of the galaxy could support life for many orders of magnitude longer,26 if Earth-originating life is able to colonize space. A similar orders of magnitude difference exists across space between Earth and the galaxy. If we are truly universalist – if we truly do assign intrinsic value equally for all locations in space and time – then this includes spaces and times beyond that of this planet. Most of the opportunity for intrinsic value exists beyond Earth, and so space colonization becomes a crucial objective, to spread intrinsic value throughout the galaxy. The importance of space colonization holds regardless of whether intrinsic value is placed on humans or non-humans. But presumably only humans can colonize space, as our species is the only one on the planet with the requisite advanced technology. And so, universalist consequentialism will recommend that humanity eventually colonize space to spread intrinsic value 4 throughout the galaxy. However, space colonization need not be an immediate goal. Humanity still has about five billion years left on Earth to figure space colonization out. Instead, the immediate goal should be to prevent global catastrophe, so that future generations can go on to colonize space.5,8 The importance of eventual space colonization provides some focus on which global catastrophes are most important, namely the global catastrophes that would prevent Earthoriginating civilization from eventually colonizing space. This focus is worth bearing in mind when evaluating specific GCRs. Finally, it should be noted that concern about GCR does not require universalism. As a simple case, imagine weighting everyone equally except yourself, and weighting yourself twice as much as everyone else. In this case GCR is only negligibly less important than under universalism. Another case involves applying a temporal discount rate (e.g. an exponential decay function) such that future times are valued less. In this case GCR can still be quite important, especially if the global catastrophe were to occur relatively soon. Similar logic holds for applying a spatial discount rate such that distant places are valued less. And so even of the case for universalism is not accepted, there still can be much concern for GCR.

#### B] extinction o/ws under any framework- moral uncertainty and future gens

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### C] prereq to their offense- it forecloses all future value and causes massive structural violence

## 2

**Innovation is getting better each year in Medicine – the speed in which the COVID vaccine was developed proves.**

**Ball 20**, Philip Ball, 12-18-2020, "The lightning-fast quest for COVID vaccines — and what it means for other diseases," No Publication, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03626-1> Harker PG

When scientists began seeking a vaccine for the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus in early 2020, they were careful not to promise quick success. The fastest any vaccine had previously been developed, from viral sampling to approval, was four years, for mumps in the 1960s. To hope for one even by the summer of 2021 seemed highly optimistic. But by the start of December, the developers of several vaccines had announced excellent results in large trials, with more showing promise. And on 2 December, a vaccine made by drug giant Pfizer with German biotech firm BioNTech, became the first fully-tested immunization to be approved for emergency use. That speed of advance “challenges our whole paradigm of what is possible in vaccine development”, says Natalie Dean, a biostatistician at the University of Florida in Gainesville. It’s tempting to hope that other vaccines might now be made on a comparable timescale. These are sorely needed: diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and pneumonia together kill millions of people a year, and researchers anticipate further lethal pandemics, too. The COVID-19 experience will almost certainly change the future of vaccine science, says Dan Barouch, director of the Center for Virology and Vaccine Research at Harvard Medical School in Boston, Massachusetts. “It shows how fast vaccine development can proceed when there is a true global emergency and sufficient resources,” he says. New ways of making vaccines, such as by using messenger RNA (mRNA), have been validated by the COVID-19 response, he adds. “It has shown that the development process can be accelerated substantially without compromising on safety.” The world was able to develop COVID-19 vaccines so quickly because of years of previous research on related viruses and faster ways to manufacture vaccines, enormous funding that allowed firms to run multiple trials in parallel, and regulators moving more quickly than normal. Some of those factors might translate to other vaccine efforts, particularly speedier manufacturing platforms.

#### IP protections motivate innovators to take risks – that triggers tech prolif in medicine and related fields – guarantees long-term development due to continuous incentives and innovation is strong now.

Bacchus '20 (James Bacchus; James Bacchus is a member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.; 12-16-2020; "An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines"; https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines#, Cato Institute, accessed 7-21-2021; JPark)

With the belief that medicines should be “public goods,” there is literally no support in some quarters for the application of the WTO TRIPS Agreement to IP rights in medicines. Any protection of the IP rights in such goods is viewed as a violation of human rights and of the overall public interest. This view, though, does not reflect the practical reality of a world in which many medicines would simply **not exist** if it were not for the existence of IP rights and the protections they are afforded. Technically, IP rights are exceptions to free trade. A long‐​standing general discussion in the WTO has been about when these exceptions to free trade should be allowed and how far they should be extended. The continuing debate over IP rights in medicines is only the most emotional part of this overall conversation. Because developed countries have, historically, been the principal sources of IP rights, this lengthy WTO dispute has largely been between developed countries trying to uphold IP rights and developing countries trying to limit them. The debate over the discovery and the distribution of vaccines for COVID-19 is but the latest global occasion for this ongoing discussion. The primary justification for granting and protecting IP rights is that they are incentives for innovation, which is the main source for long‐​term economic growth and enhancements in the quality of human life. IP rights **spark innovation** by “enabling innovators to capture enough of the benefits of their own innovative activity to justify taking considerable risks.”18 The knowledge from innovatiions inspired by IP rights spills over to inspire other innovations. The protection of IP rights promotes the diffusion, domestically and internationally, of innovative technologies and new know‐​how. Historically, the principal factors of production have been land, labor, and capital. In the new pandemic world, perhaps an even more vital factor is the creation of knowledge, which adds enormously to “the wealth of nations.” Digital and other economic growth in the 21st century is increasingly ideas‐​based and knowledge intensive. Without IP rights as incentives, there would be less new knowledge and thus less innovation. In the short term, undermining private IP rights may accelerate distribution of goods and services—where the novel knowledge that went into making them **already exists**. But in the **long term**, undermining private IP rights would **eliminate** the **incentives** that inspire innovation, thus preventing the discovery and development of knowledge for new goods and services that **the world needs**. This widespread dismissal of the link between private IP rights and innovation is perhaps best reflected in the fact that although the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 aspire to “foster innovation,” they make no mention of IP rights.19

#### Pharmaceutical innovation is key to protecting against future pandemics, bioterrorism, and antibiotic resistance.

Marjanovic and Fejiao ‘20 Marjanovic, Sonja, and Carolina Feijao. Sonja Marjanovic, Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitive biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon. "Pharmaceutical Innovation for Infectious Disease Management: From Troubleshooting to Sustainable Models of Engagement." (2020). [Quality Control]

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sci-ences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a **bioterrorism con-text**.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by **antimicrobial resistance** is also **well-recognised** as an area **in need of pharmaceutical innovation**. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and compe-tition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an **indispensable** partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceu-tical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is **essential** for socially responsible companies in the sec-tor.2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing indus-try-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing com-pounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID-19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating tri-als for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accel-erate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to **benefit patients** and wider **population health**. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be rela-tively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pres-sure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing com-bination product that is being tested for therapeutic poten-tial against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other **infectious diseases**, **bioterror-ism** agents **and antimicrobial resistance**) are **urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation**, **even if their impacts are not as visible** to society **as COVID**-19 is in the imme-diate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infec-tious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contribu-tions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still **low**.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innova-tion conditions.

#### Bioterror is the largest medical threat—it outweighs natural pandemics

Bakerlee ‘21 Chris Bakerlee is a Ph.D. candidate studying evolutionary genetics at Harvard University and a fellow in the Council on Strategic Risks’s Fellowship for Ending Bioweapons Programs. "Mother Nature is not 'the ultimate bioterrorist' - STAT." STAT, 8 Jan. 2021, www.statnews.com/2021/01/08/mother-nature-is-not-the-ultimate-bioterrorist. [Quality Control]

Taken together, these examples show that this meme no longer serves us well. It is undoubtedly a **mistake** to underestimate the **threats from natural pathogens**. At the same time, it is equally unwise to wield this 19-year-old expression like a magic wand, intending to briskly banish concerns about people causing harm with biology. We can’t afford to blind ourselves or others to the uncomfortable truth that, with each passing day, humans grow more capable of outdoing nature and harnessing biotechnology **to cause harm on a staggering scale**, by either cruelty or carelessness. Nature has no interests, motives, or political goals. To the extent it can be said to “want” anything, it is to perpetually enhance populations’ differential reproductive success, which only rarely aligns with causing greater harm to humans. Notably, the trillions of bacteria living in the average human’s colon appear to have adapted toward a peaceful and often mutually beneficial coexistence with their host. And even deadly pathogens may theoretically evolve toward making humans less sick if doing so opens up more opportunities for transmission between hosts. The process of natural selection, for all its power, is highly constrained in its ability to generate “superbugs” possessing a diabolical suite of traits. Like human bioengineers, natural selection must work around stubborn physiological trade-offs between traits, such as genome replication rate and mutation rate. But natural selection is also handicapped by near-sightedness, driving improvements in traits that enhance a population’s fitness in its current environment with **no attention to** maintaining or improving **traits that enhance fitness in other environments**. If creating an especially deadly pathogen were like winning a soccer match against a formidable opponent, natural selection would be competing with all the cunning of **a**n especially persistent **horde of 5-year-olds**, glued to the ball and only ever capable of playing offense, defense, or goalie at any one time. By contrast, modern **biologists are gaining the ability to see the whole field**, develop an intuition about where the ball will be next, and play multiple positions simultaneously. Through a combination of rational design, directed evolution, breeding, and brute force trial and error, they can increasingly engineer organisms that excel in multiple desired functions at once, such as the ability to grow quickly in a massive industrial fermenter while churning out commercially valuable biomolecules. This growing capability promises tremendous benefits for agriculture, industry, and human health, but its potential application to the creation of pathogens **poses serious concerns**. It is worth emphasizing that trained biologists — let alone terrorists — still have difficulty one-upping natural selection’s creative output. Our understanding of biology is very much in its infancy. Yet our knowledge and capabilities are maturing rapidly, as evidenced by Twist’s prolific gene synthesis capabilities, along with recent feats in predicting protein structure, gene editing, and genome assembly. We are much closer to this exciting but frightening horizon today than we were in 2001, and this trend will likely persist. It’s also worth noting that, when it comes to weapons-grade biotechnology, states likely pose a greater risk than non-state terrorists. States have vastly more resources to support the development of biological weapons, and about **23 are known or suspected to have** maintained **biological weapons** programs in the 20th century. Some programs, like North Korea’s, likely persist to this day. As countries jockey for advantage, state biological weapons programs remain an ever-present danger, despite the treaties and export controls designed to rein them in. Covid-19, which has exposed countries’ **vulnerability to biological threats**, has done little to mitigate this danger. **Accidental releases pose** an **additional** source of **anthropogenic biorisk.** Thanks to the U.S. government’s monitoring program, we know that **dozens of agents** and toxins with the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and agriculture **are** reported **accidentally lost or released** from U.S. labs **every year**. We also know that accidental releases around the world have already caused significant harm. Such risks increase as biotechnology expands across the world and gains in strength. Biotechnology, with all its promise and peril, is moving fast. It’s irresponsible of us to shrug off current and emerging biotechnological threats by reciting “Nature is the ultimate bioterrorist” like some article of faith. As with global warming, the cost of willful ignorance and inaction is high — and increasing. Our health security requires that we engage cautiously but honestly with the full spectrum of evolving biological risks, striving toward solutions with open eyes and moral courage.

## Case

### Underview

#### Discloser:

#### Counter interp: Aff debaters must only disclose positions they read in the wiki

#### Always problems with ways to disclose ie asking for people to disclose one way vs another – you can just open the open sourced doc and see what positions I read.

#### You could have just asked what my past 2nrs where – you chose not to disclose the aff to me

#### Wiki doesn’t have this as a rule so I should not have to meet this standard

#### They literally told me what the aff is 1 minute before the round started – that shifts all their offense back to them – I had no time to prep out the aff.

#### If the wiki doesn’t say we don’t have to do it, the entire shell is arbritrary bc they could just pic out of tiny problems with disclose – there is no way for me to know what everyone wants – you could have just told me to disclose this way and I woul

#### Disregard presumption and permissibility- there’s always credence in favor of a proposition or against it. It doesn’t require absolute certainty under util- just best calculation of expected utility and debate solves since we can debate about the best outcomes using evidence and predictions.

#### Overview- err neg on all 1ar theory-

#### 1] 2nr has to split between substance and over-cover theory b/c of the 7/6, 2 speech aff advantage and they get 2ar collapse and persuasiveness advantage and no 3nr to check

#### 2] Responses to the counter-interp will inevitably be new- implications-

#### A] Evaluate the theory debate after the 2nr- means you have to draw a strict line between 1ar and 2ar args- if they didn’t do the weighing, it’s their fault since it should’ve been in the 1ar

#### B] If intervention happens on theory, intervene to reduce theory and just vote on substance

#### 3] Reasonability- good is good enough- they create a race to the top of blippy theory debate which crowds out substance and internal link turns their education offense- potential abuse isn’t a voter- that’s infinitely regressive

### FW

#### No implications on independent reasons to vote aff out of the 1AC meaning new implications in the 1ar justify new 2nr responses.

#### They presuppose that extrinsic value refers to reason – however, it refers to the pleasure of a thing, because that’s the only objective thing that we all can feel and experience

#### And, other frameworks collapse to util – there’s no intrinsic value in freedom without a positive obligation to protect wellbeing. Chappell 05

Richard Chappell, PhD, Princeton University. Libertarian vs. Utilitarian Justice, Philosophy. June 2005. JC

Libertarians hold that each person owns themselves, and others may not make use of their property (i.e. them) without their consent.[28] Just as others have no right to shelter a homeless man in my house, so they have no right to tax the products of my labour and redistribute to the needy. But the free market requires ownership rights over both self and external resources,[29] and we have seen that the latter is problematic. Moreover, self-ownership is a merely ‘formal’ notion that does not guarantee substantive freedom or power over one’s own life. For suppose that natural resources are initially owned by everyone rather than no-one. On this view, a self-owning individual may not make use of the material world without others’ consent. But, as Kymlicka asks, “how can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others?”[30] Such merely formal freedom has no worth. Yet this is the position of the poor and disadvantaged within a libertarian capitalist society. Once we recognize the importance of substantive rather than merely formal freedom, our aim becomes to enable people to live the lives they want to live. This commits us to ensuring access to education, healthcare, and basic human needs like food and shelter, since all of these are essential prerequisites to any form of freedom worth having. If provision of these goods requires us to compromise self-ownership, so be it. The latter has no value in the absence of the former in any case. We are thus led back in the direction of utilitarianism.

#### Their framing presupposes the value of reason – focus on the material aspects of the world – proves that reason is just experience, justifies util

Yudkowsky 7 – (Eliezer Yudkowsky, AI theorist, rationalist philosopher, “A Priori”, LessWrong, October 8, 2007, Available Online at <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qmqLxvtsPzZ2s6mpY/a-priori>, accessed 7-20-18, HKR-AM)

If you are a philosopher whose daily work is to write papers, criticize other people's papers, and respond to others' criticisms of your own papers, then you may look at Occam's Razor and shrug. Here is an end to justifying, arguing and convincing. You decide to call a truce on writing papers; if your fellow philosophers do not demand justification for your un-arguable beliefs, you will not demand justification for theirs. And as the symbol of your treaty, your white flag, you use the phrase "a priori truth". But to a Bayesian, in this era of cognitive science and evolutionary biology and Artificial Intelligence, saying "a priori" doesn't explain why the brain-engine runs. If the brain has an amazing "a priori truth factory" that works to produce accurate beliefs, it makes you wonder why a thirsty hunter-gatherer can't use the "a priori truth factory" to locate drinkable water. It makes you wonder why eyes evolved in the first place, if there are ways to produce accurate beliefs without looking at things. James R. Newman said: "The fact that one apple added to one apple invariably gives two apples helps in the teaching of arithmetic, but has no bearing on the truth of the proposition that 1 + 1 = 2." The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines "a priori" propositions as those knowable independently of experience. Wikipedia quotes Hume: Relations of ideas are "discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe." You can see that 1 + 1 = 2 just by thinking about it, without looking at apples. But in this era of neurology, one ought to be aware that thoughts are existent in the universe; they are identical to the operation of brains. Material brains, real in the universe, composed of quarks in a single unified mathematical physics whose laws draw no border between the inside and outside of your skull. When you add 1 + 1 and get 2 by thinking, these thoughts are themselves embodied in flashes of neural patterns. In principle, we could observe, experientially, the exact same material events as they occurred within someone else's brain. It would require some advances in computational neurobiology and brain-computer interfacing, but in principle, it could be done. You could see someone else's engine operating materially, through material chains of cause and effect, to compute by "pure thought" that 1 + 1 = 2. How is observing this pattern in someone else's brain any different, as a way of knowing, from observing your own brain doing the same thing? When "pure thought" tells you that 1 + 1 = 2, "independently of any experience or observation", you are, in effect, observing your own brain as evidence. If this seems counterintuitive, try to see minds/brains as engines - an engine that collides the neural pattern for 1 and the neural pattern for 1 and gets the neural pattern for 2. If this engine works at all, then it should have the same output if it observes (with eyes and retina) a similar brain-engine carrying out a similar collision, and copies into itself the resulting pattern. In other words, for every form of a priori knowledge obtained by "pure thought", you are learning exactly the same thing you would learn if you saw an outside brain-engine carrying out the same pure flashes of neural activation. The engines are equivalent, the bottom-line outputs are equivalent, the belief-entanglements are the same. There is nothing you can know "a priori", which you could not know with equal validity by observing the chemical release of neurotransmitters within some outside brain. What do you think you are, dear reader? This is why you can predict the result of adding 1 apple and 1 apple by imagining it first in your mind, or punch "3 x 4" into a calculator to predict the result of imagining 4 rows with 3 apples per row. You and the apple exist within a boundary-less unified physical process, and one part may echo another. Are the sort of neural flashes that philosophers label "a priori beliefs", arbitrary? Many AI algorithms function better with "regularization" that biases the solution space toward simpler solutions. But the regularized algorithms are themselves more complex; they contain an extra line of code (or 1000 extra lines) compared to unregularized algorithms. The human brain is biased toward simplicity, and we think more efficiently thereby. If you press the Ignore button at this point, you're left with a complex brain that exists for no reason and works for no reason. So don't try to tell me that "a priori" beliefs are arbitrary, because they sure aren't generated by rolling random numbers. (What does the adjective "arbitrary" mean, anyway?) You can't excuse calling a proposition "a priori" by pointing out that other philosophers are having trouble justifying their propositions. If a philosopher fails to explain something, this fact cannot supply electricity to a refrigerator, nor act as a magical factory for accurate beliefs. There's no truce, no white flag, until you understand why the engine works. If you clear your mind of justification, of argument, then it seems obvious why Occam's Razor works in practice: we live in a simple world, a low-entropy universe in which there are short explanations to be found. "But," you cry, "why is the universe itself orderly?" This I do not know, but it is what I see as the next mystery to be explained. This is not the same question as "How do I argue Occam's Razor to a hypothetical debater who has not already accepted it?" Perhaps you cannot argue anything to a hypothetical debater who has not accepted Occam's Razor, just as you cannot argue anything to a rock. A mind needs a certain amount of dynamic structure to be an argument-acceptor. If a mind doesn't implement Modus Ponens, it can accept "A" and "A->B" all day long without ever producing "B". How do you justify Modus Ponens to a mind that hasn't accepted it? How do you argue a rock into becoming a mind? Brains evolved from non-brainy matter by natural selection; they were not justified into existence by arguing with an ideal philosophy student of perfect emptiness. This does not make our judgments meaningless. A brain-engine can work correctly, producing accurate beliefs, even if it was merely built - by human hands or cumulative stochastic selection pressures - rather than argued into existence. But to be satisfied by this answer, one must see rationality in terms of engines, rather than arguments.

### LBL

#### On regress – just because we have reason doesn’t mean we have to guide all our actions – util is also an act of reason, reasoning why consequences happen

#### Action – just because we require reason doesn’t mean util doesn’t meet – util still has reasoning

#### Universalizability – governments act as different agents than individuals – all their phil is about individuals so universalizability doesn’t work with the way governments act. They need to win kant acts within individuals.

#### Universalizability test in the categorical imperative requires considering universal consequences of any particular action - devolves to consequentialism

#### Util is universalizable – all people can experience pleasure through hormones like dopamine that have been observed in everyone – means that pleasure’s universalizable. Independently, act util is a single law that does not contradict itself and is agent neutral, which means it is by definition universal.

#### If things are universalizable each action one person takes everyone else would have to also take that action. If I sit in a chair everyone would have to sit in that chair and we would be crushed.

#### Consequences explain intention – if you kill 10 people but you didn’t mean to you still deserve a punihsment for that action or it would justify people killing but defending their intention as something better.

#### Induction doesn’t fail – if I put my hand on the stove I know it is going to hurt – only know this because of induction

#### Is/ought gap – util doesn’t fail this, we ought to maximize well being

#### Just because each person doesn’t have the same experience doesn’t prove induction false – factual factors still exist.

#### Consequences do not fail – only way of finding out reason is through the consequence if we just base actions then infinite problems could be justified. No consequences for people who commit genocide or are slave masters fails.

#### Butterfly effect fails – each action has an ending consequence or a consequence that can be judged ie shooting someone leads to their death, direct action to a consequence.

#### Just because freedom exists doesn’t mean it outweighs – staying alive is prereq.

### Offense

#### If we win FW none of this offense matters and our offense outweighs anyways – extinction would take away everyone’s freedom and is a prereq bc staying alive controls the IL to freedom.

#### A free market and a free individual have no connection – we have a free market in the squo which means none of their offense links or makes sense.