# 1NC – round 1 – HWL

## 1

#### India private sector is key to space success – low cost operations, transparency, and accountability.

Rajagopalan ’20 [Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi., 5-24-2020, "India’s Space Programme: A role for the private sector, finally?," ORF, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-space-programme-a-role-for-the-private-sector-finally-66661/>] TDI

India’s finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced last week that India’s private sector will play a key role in augmenting India’s space programme, and that the government intends to share the facilities of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) with the private sector. This announcement was part of the Narendra Modi government’s call for new and bold reforms in an effort to promote its ‘self-reliant India’ mission. It is the fourth segment of the Rs 20 lakh crore Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan special economic stimulus.

Sitharaman’s announcement entails a role for the private sector, possibly with the goal of greater investments in technology development and acquisition, capacity-building and space exploration, including planetary exploration. The minister, while announcing these reforms, appeared to understand that the private sector can help augment India’s space capability. While praising the work done by ISRO, she also pointed out that the private sector is also doing a lot of work in developing space technology. She also acknowledged that the existing regulations prevent private entities from using or even testing their products.

Therefore, to level the playing field, the government “will make a provision for the private sector to benefit from the assets which are available to ISRO and for India (in general) to benefit from.” The minister also said the new reforms would allow the private sector to play an active role in “satellites, launches and space-based services”.

But as always, implementation is key. Properly executing these reforms will require enabling policies and appropriate regulatory frameworks.

That the new reforms will allow private sector players to use ISRO facilities is a big deal. This indeed must be music to the ears of commercial players who have been seeking to get a fair share of the pie in terms of manufacturing of satellites and propellant technologies, among other areas. It should not be too difficult for India’s private space sector because there is a sizeable talent pool available outside ISRO. More importantly, the entry of the private sector, as in the telecom sector, can bring several advantages in terms of cost and access.

Following the announcement, ISRO tweeted that it will follow the government’s guidelines to allow the private sector to undertake space activities in the country. Though this did not seem particularly welcoming of the government’s initiative, ISRO’s support is critical to making it a success.

ISRO has in the last few years been opening up to the Indian private space sector in a gradual manner – mostly as a matter of compulsion because ISRO simply does not have the in-house capacity to address India’s growing requirements. Today, the Indian space programme is not just about civilian applications for remote-sensing, meteorology and communication, as in the early decades. India’s space sector and its requirements have grown enormously in the last decade to include television and broadband services, space science and exploration, space-based navigation and, of course, defence and security applications.

Among others, Ambassador Rakesh Sood has articulated the need for legislation to facilitate ISRO’s partnership with industries and entrepreneurs. Narayan Prasad and Prateep Basu, two prominent faces in the Indian space start-up segment, have argued that despite ISRO’s successes, “India’s space competitiveness has suffered from the absence of a globally reputed, private space industry.”

The private sector, especially the NewSpace industry and start-ups, have an advantage in terms of low-cost operations, which itself should be a big incentive for the government to make it an active stakeholder. A certain amount of democratisation of space technology with the participation of the private sector can ensure costs are kept low. And expanding the number of stakeholders will also ensure more transparency and better accountability and regulatory practices. This has been missing in India’s space sector. The same agency has undertaken promotion, commercialisation and regulatory functions – which is not healthy.

#### India space key to soft power

Hickert 17 Cameron Hickert, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Schwarzman Scholars, "Space Rivals: Power and Strategy in the China-India Space Race - Schwarzman Scholars", August 14, 2017, <https://www.schwarzmanscholars.org/events-and-news/space-rivals-power-strategy-china-india-space-race/> TDI

The regional rivalry between India and China has long simmered, and the next frontier increasingly appears to be space. Beyond the hard power dimension, this regional space race has taken on many of the soft power characteristics of the competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. It should not be forgotten, “a major factor in the Asian space race is prestige, as rapidly developing countries there use technology to jockey for status. Space technology in particular, being flashy and complex, often captures the most cache.” Because soft power is about perception and attraction, demonstrating prowess in space capabilities is a crucial step in building this power regionally. Many of the feats that China and India are pursuing have already been achieved by the U.S., so mistakes are costlier in terms of international credibility – failures are perceived as worse when another nation has already been successful. Yet the attraction power of spaceflight achievements is more lucrative than in the past, as private entities around the world face tighter competition and shorter timelines in launching satellites, and are therefore willing to bring their business to any nation that can demonstrate the ability to launch cargo safely and cheaply. A prime example is India’s recent launch of 20 satellites on a single rocket; this mission included satellites from around the world, including the United States. The increased soft power borne out of a successful space program therefore is not only useful in the struggle for regional prestige, but also paves the way for increased economic success in a fast-growing industry.

#### Growth key to Indian soft power - solves regional instability

**Sridharan 17** (Eswaran Sridharan, phd, Associate Research Professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi “Where is India headed? Possible future directions in Indian foreign policy” Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs; International Affairs 93: 1, 2017 pg 51-68)

Conclusion

All three of the broad scenarios outlined above assume sustained high growth of the Indian economy and domestic political stability. In the absence of either, India’s prospects of rising to the position of a leading power, if not a Great Power, in a more multipolar world **are dim**. **It will remain a middle power and a struggling one at that**. If, however, **sustained** **high** **growth and** **the associated** **domestic political stability increase** its weight and influence in the world economy, then various rising power possibilities open up.

If India’s prospects for rising from a middle to a Great Power over the next decade or two appear limited, what other roles could it play, given its expanding relationship with the United States and its Asian allies? India has good prospects of building itself up as an important coalitional and bridging power between west Asia and Pacific Asia. It could, however, by virtue of its participation in broader US-led Asia–Pacific security (particularly naval security) partnerships, become something of **an** **extraregional** **net** **security provider** **for south-east Asia**, **and perhaps the Gulf and Indian Ocean**, without being a fully fledged regional power in south Asia. It can increasingly be seen as an attractive coalition partner on a range of international economic and Asian regional issues, **including** **regional** **and oceanic** **security**, **conflict resolution and environment**, spanning different subregions and **international coalitions from the Gulf to south-east Asia and the western Pacific**. And, as its economy grows, it can play a larger role in international and Asian regional institutions.

#### Indian soft power turns every impact

Dr. Mira **Kamdar** **7**, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute, Associate Fellow of Asia Society, PhD from UC Berkeley, BA from Reed College, Planet India: How the Fastest Growing Democracy is Transforming America and The World, p. 3-5

The World in Microcosm

**No** **other** **country** matters more to the **future of** **our planet** than India. There is **no challenge** we face, no opportunity we covet where India does not have **critical relevance**. From **combating global** **terror** to finding cures for **dangerous** **pandemics**, from dealing with the **energy crisis** to averting the worst scenarios of **global** **warming**, from **rebalancing stark global** **inequalities** to spurring the **vital** **innovation** needed to create jobs and improve lives—India is now a **pivotal** player. The world is undergoing a process of profound recalibration in which the rise of Asia is the most important factor. India **holds the key** to this new world.

India is at once an ancient Asian civilization, a modern nation grounded in Enlightenment values and democratic institutions, and a rising twenty-first-century power. With a population of 1.2 billion, India is the world’s largest democracy. It is an open, vibrant society. India’s diverse population includes Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, Jews, and animists. There are twenty-two official languages in India. Three hundred fifty million Indians speak English.

India is the **world in microcosm**. Its geography encompasses every climate, from snowcapped Himalayas to palm-fringed beaches to deserts where nomads and camels roam. A developing country, India is divided among a tiny affluent minority, a rising middle class, and 800 million people who live on less than $2 per day. India faces all the critical problems of our time—extreme social inequality, employment insecurity, a growing energy crisis, severe water shortages, a degraded environment, global warming, a galloping HIV/AIDS epidemic, terrorist attacks—on a scale that defies the imagination. India’s goal is breathtaking in scope: transform a developing country of more than 1 billion people into a developed nation and **global leader** by 2020, and do this as a democracy in an era of resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The world has to cheer India on. If India fails, there is a real risk that our **world will become hostage** to **political chaos**, **war over** **dwindling** **resources**, a **poisoned environment**, and **galloping disease**. Wealthy enclaves will employ private companies to supply their needs and private militias to protect them from the poor massing at their gates. But, if India succeeds, it will demonstrate that it is possible to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.  It will prove that multiethnic, multireligious democracy is not a luxury for rich societies.  It will show us how to save our environment, and how to manage in a fractious, multipolar world.  India’s gambit is truly the venture of the century.

#### Indian leadership in governance prevents global war, terrorism, environmental decline, and food and water shortages---extinction

Ketan Patel 17, CEO and Founder of Greater Pacific Capital, Founder of the Strategic Group of Goldman Sachs, Former Managing Director in the Investment Banking Division at Goldman Sachs, “Path to Power: India’s Great Opportunity in the Changing World Order”, Greater Pacific Capital, 7/17/2017, https://greaterpacificcapital.com/path-to-power-indias-great-opportunity-in-the-changing-world-order/

Last month’s Sign of the Times highlighted what appear to be a series of US retreats from global leadership positions. With the geopolitical cards apparently being reshuffled across a wide range of defence, political and economic areas, America’s apparent withdrawal is creating opportunities for countries seeking to fill the resulting void, with China currently taking the most proactive steps among the potential contenders. Beijing has already made clear its intent to play a more active role in matters of globalisation, international trade and climate change, global issues that also align well with China’s domestic agenda and where it can leverage significant political and financial assets. Despite China’s head start over others and its apparent desire to lead, its efforts will likely face not only resistance from the West but also competition from a number of countries, both within Asia and abroad. Further, China’s inability to lead on a broader set of issues related to matters such as human rights or regional security acts as a counter-weight to its leadership efforts and provides opportunities for other countries to fill the gaps being left by the United States. Among potential contenders for regional and international leadership, India, as the world’s fastest growing economy, the largest democracy and (potentially[1]) the most populous country, clearly has critical assets to leverage across a number of spheres. Bringing these to bear though will require India to be far more bold and strategic in handling both international affairs and in making strong domestic progress, both are matters that have proved elusive to date. However, if India can achieve this, it has the potential to create a virtuous circle of domestic development and international leadership similar to the one that has underwritten US prosperity for over two generations.

The Need for Renewed Leadership

One of the most dangerous geo-political circumstances is a power vacuum and America’s actions in the last six months in particular, suggest that the execution of the Trump Administration’s ‘America First’ vision is creating vacuums across an increasingly broad range of fields. These are further being exacerbated by the accompanying weakening of (formerly US-led) international and multi-lateral institutions that have until recently underwritten the global order. This order consisted of, among other things, a shared commitment to liberal capitalism, clear rules of engagement in trade, policy and war, a high-level security architecture focused on nuclear non-proliferation, a recognition of states’ fundamental sovereignty and shared access to the earth’s global commons. A number of the key elements of this order were already under attack before America’s current retreat. In fact, the recent withdrawal by the US from what has historically been a muscular international leadership is in many ways a reaction to its own domestic challenges and the global economic, political and security issues that have built up over the past few decades. As pointed out in a previous Sign of the Times[2], many of these challenges are the direct consequences of the current world order, including, the lack of international and national policies to compensate for the uneven nature of growth based on globalisation which while being the key driver of the unprecedented rise in prosperity has also created increasing income divides and continued to cause massive environmental impacts from mass industrialisation. Among the challenges facing the world today are a number of issues of global scope and scale that will require coordinated international action, and that is unlikely to be achieved in the absence of clear leadership by either one country or a small group of tightly aligned countries. The issues, which require this vision and leadership, include:

1. Trade Protectionism and Fairness. The continued growth of global industrial trade is being threatened by increasing protectionism (e.g. a 51% increase in G20 country trade protectionist measures from 2010-15) and major withdrawals by countries from trade frameworks (e.g. the US withdrawal from the TPP and the UK’s Brexit). While this is based on a perception of the unfairness of trade or an infringed sovereignty, it is clear that the countries that have voted for more isolationist leaders and policies have been among free trade’s biggest historic beneficiaries with their economies still reliant on its continued growth.[3]

2. Income Inequality. The gaps between the have and the have nots globally is sharpening across a number of key dimensions, with the traditional north-south divide between countries being exacerbated by growing inequality within nations, too, with the GINI coefficient, a traditional measure of inequality rising by 10% across OECD countries and the ratio of top income decile to bottom income decile reached its highest level in 30 years. [4]

3. Climate Change and Rising Pollution. The global fight against climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, which have increased by 80% since 1970, and has been damaged by the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accord.

4. Food and Water Security.5bn people today lack adequate access to sanitation, and of the 3bn people projected to be added to the world’s population by 2050, most will be born in countries facing severe food and water shortages.

5. Cross-Border Terrorism. Cross-border terrorism is at an all-time high today, causing nearly 40,000 deaths per year, and creating an urgent need for global co-operation on intelligence and security.

6. Cyber-Crime. Cyber-crime, with over 45m+ incidents annually, is an increasingly critical threat to the global economic and political order.

7. Displacements and Increasing Refugee Flows. Collective action is required to effectively process and integrate refugees and economic migrants around the world, which today total 65m – the highest number in human history.

As pointed out in previous Sign of the Times papers, these issues are interrelated, with the feedback loop between them accelerating the demise of the current US led world order and its governance framework underwritten by multilateral institutions. As the single most powerful nation on earth, America’s current unwillingness or inability to reinvent the rules and institutions that have failed to solve the world’s issues satisfactorily to date creates an opening for other countries to either reform and save or to reinvent these institutions based on a set of new values. China has clearly recognised the importance of the major issues facing the world and shown an interest in leading across a number of them, in particular in the areas of climate change and free trade. However, China’s willingness to lead is neither comprehensive in nature nor universally welcomed, particularly by the established participants of the current global order who fear that increases in China’s influence would come at a cost to their own positions. While unipolar world orders (such as the Pax Britannica in the 19th century or the shorter Pax Americana post the collapse of the Soviet Union) can underpin periods of peace and prosperity, most countries today lean towards preferring one led by a pre-Trump America or a multi-polar order to one dominated by China. However, where ambitious nations form the leadership of a multipolar order, their competitiveness can drive conflict and instability, whereas in a unipolar world, the rivalry is kept in check. Despite the US having built a broader armoury of hard and soft power than China, the two countries seem set up for conflict across a number of issues. So, unless a third country seeks to also enter this fray and create a three-way tug of war, new entrants to the power game will need to think differently about how to participate. It would seem though that given the diversity of global issues today there is space for multiple leaders employing multiple approaches.

In terms of who the new power players might be, while some of the world’s major western countries in theory might partially fill America’s shoes, most will likely be held back by a combination of domestic and geopolitical issues, even if they were able to overcome their fundamental and long-standing lack of willingness to lead. The EU needs more time to recover from its separation from the UK, the UK has been in increasing political and economic turmoil since the Brexit referendum, France is beginning its own domestic political revival and Germany and Japan remain mostly unwilling to be overt leaders for a combination of historic reasons. Having said that, Germany is positioning and being welcomed as a voice of reason by many in favour of salvaging the best of the current liberal world order. However, none of these countries are yet able to provide a credible alternative to China’s bids for leadership or stem its increasing influence and, in the face of American withdrawal, they may have no choice but to welcome another power player.

In the absence of credible alternatives from established economies, there are few with the positioning to play a more central role in world affairs. Among these, India stands out clearly due to its size, growth and most importantly its potential. The country has been an important part of the United States’ ‘Asia Pivot’ strategy, is growing rapidly with an increasingly outward foreign and trade policy, has embarked on an aggressive security and defence programme, has established strong relationships with major Asian countries and is committed to the principles of democracy. In the absence of a renewed American interest in world leadership, which one should certainly not rule out, India alone has the scope and scale to offer credible alternatives to China’s leadership bids across a number of fronts. Moreover, given the imbalance in power that a US withdrawal would leave in the Asia-Pacific region, India will have little choice but to play a more active role in the region and the world if it is to achieve its ambitions. However, while India’s potential to become a more important voice on the international stage is unlikely to be questioned, its actions to date are not yet in line with a country that has global leadership aspirations.

## Case

### Quad Good

#### Recent resurrection of the Quad alliance is reconstructing the Indo-Pacific to preserve the liberal international order and multilateralism

Jie 19

(Zhang, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute of International Strategy at CASS, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order,” China International Studies, Volume 74, January/February 2019, Snider)

In response to a reversal in the balance of power between China and Japan, soon after returning to office in December 2012, Abe proposed the building of a “Democratic Security Diamond” composed of the United States, Japan, India and Australia. Unfortunately, the Quad was absent of actual utility at that time, as the US-led “Asia-pacific rebalancing” strategy was in full swing and had incorporated Japan and Australia, as US allies, and India, as a US partner. It was not until the beginning of 2017, when the “Asia-pacific rebalancing” strategy was abandoned by the Trump administration, and the regional influence of the US declined while that of China rose, that the Quad began to be “resurrected” in earnest. Marked by two consultative meetings attended by the four countries, the Quad gradually embarked on a path of pragmatic cooperation. The two consultative meetings, attended by director-general level officials from foreign ministries of the US, Japan, Australia and India, were held in November 2017 and June 2018. Convened around the theme of a “free and open Indo-pacific,” the first quadrilateral meeting addressed seven core themes.9 Although separate statements rather than a joint declaration were issued, the four countries reached consensus on the core theme of “common democratic values,” which was regarded as the basis for “cooperation for security and prosperity.”10 The second meeting was relatively low-key. According to the statement issued by Japan at its conclusion, the meeting had at least two priorities, namely, supporting ASEAN centrality in the construction of regional mechanisms, and promoting sustainable economic cooperation in the region.11 This shows that the four countries were trying to use the Quad as the core to gradually expand the scope of their “alliance,” with ASEAN as the key target. Therefore, the priority became dispelling ASEAN’S concerns that the Quad would weaken its own central position. At the same time, the Quad would focus on strengthening economic cooperation, which was further echoed during the Indo-pacific Business Forum at the end of July 2018 by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who announced that the US would adopt a new $113-million plan to support the development of digital economy, energy and infrastructure. The purpose of strengthening economic cooperation is really motivated by security interests. As Pompeo said, “we remain committed to economic engagement in the Indo-pacific because of the national security benefits for the American people and our partners. As President Trump’s National Security Strategy states, ‘Economic security is national security’.”12 So far, the basic objectives and cooperative content of the Quad have gradually become clear, and include: identifying the “Indo-pacific” as the geographical scope for cooperation; focusing on both security and economy, particularly safeguarding the freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-pacific, while trying to strengthen cooperation in regional infrastructure development; and establishing as an ultimate goal a rules-based, free and open regional order.13 First of all, the transition from “Asia-pacific” to “Indo-pacific” is a prominent feature of the Quad in terms of geography, which reflects the geopolitical trend in the disintegration and reconstruction of the regional order.14 In the past few years, the United States, Japan, and Australia have proposed their own versions of Indo-pacific strategies or policies based on their own strategic considerations. Although they may differ in detail, the basic concepts are consistent: emphasizing the importance of the Indo-pacific and supporting the replacement of “Asia-pacific” with “Indo-pacific.” When he announced that the US Pacific Command was officially renamed the Indo-pacific Command, US Defense Secretary James Mattis pointed out the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and its vital importance to global maritime security.15 Moreover, according to the Shangrila Dialogue in 2018, the concept of “Indo-pacific” has gradually been accepted by the international community and is being included in foreign policy agendas of different countries. This trend underlines the importance of the Indian Ocean. With India’s increasing weight in the world economy, and the growing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Indo-Pacific is being integrated into a broad strategic region. It is noteworthy that the “Indian Ocean-pacific” line is precisely the main route of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which, while representing a broad consensus among countries with regard to geopolitical changes, reflects their competition as to the ultimate shape of the Indo-pacific regional order. Second, the Quad focuses primarily on cooperation in the security field and stresses to jointly maintain the openness, freedom and prosperity of the Indo-pacific region, which is the cornerstone for quadrilateral cooperation. For example, in January 2018, the third Raisina Dialogue, organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation, was held in India. Although this was a “Track 1.5” dialogue, top active duty military leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia all attended and made the “China threat” a discussion topic.16 The delegates of the Quad countries believed that China had undermined the prosperity, openness and inclusiveness of the Indo-pacific region, and it was necessary to start from security and strengthen the Quad military cooperation in order to reverse the trend of increasing disparity in the relative strength of regional powers, respond to the rise of China, and force Beijing to change its behavior.17 In practice, the Malabar military exercise was expected to be an “example” of quadrilateral military cooperation. This exercise was initiated by the United States and India in 1992, and joined by Japan in 2007. So far, the US, Japan and India have carried out the exercise together several times. At the beginning of 2018, there were rumors that Australia would join as well, but in the end India did not extend an invitation.

#### Arms sales are key – they’re the foundation of the Quad – Japan is key and on the brink

Smith 18

(Jeff South Asia research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, 7/30, "The Return of the Asia-Pacific Quad," <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/the-return-the-asia-pacific-quad>, Snider)

Meanwhile, each member of the Quad has expressed concerns about—and refused to endorse—China's pre-eminent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with India taking the early, lonely lead. The Quad has also found common ground on the importance of the rules-based order and the underlying tenets of the U.S. and Japanese visions for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The Return of the QSD Against this backdrop, in November 2017 the four countries reconstituted their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which met again for a second time in April 2018. Not only is the Quad’s logic more compelling now, but its foundations are stronger. In the decade since the last QSD the democracies have been strengthening trust and functional cooperation at a bilateral level and across a trio of complementary, overlapping trilateral strategic dialogues. In 2007 India had virtually no U.S. military hardware to speak of; it now hosts advanced U.S. surveillance and transport aircraft, artillery, attack helicopters and missiles. Soon it may induct U.S. armed drones and potentially even fighter jets. Japan has reinterpreted its constitution to allow for greater defense cooperation with America and other security partners. Australia and India recently began their first bilateral military exercises. A long list of new joint exercises, arms sales, military interoperability agreements, shared vision statements and intelligence sharing arrangements have strengthened the foundations of one of the world’s most robust informal security networks. To be sure, the Quad is not without its challenges. India remains perhaps the most circumspect member, still embittered by Australia's withdrawal from original QSD and concerned another Labor government in Canberra could prompt another readjustment of its China policy. In some cases, the trilateral forums remain the preferred venue for substantive achievements. All four countries, particularly Japan and Australia, are struggling to walk a tightrope between robust security balancing while maximizing opportunities for economic engagement.

#### Collapse of the LIO causes interstate conflict and increases nuclear weapon usage

Kendall-Taylor 19

(Andrea, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline: National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World,” <https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence-1>, Snider)

Twenty-first-century autocrats are not the same as their Cold War predecessors. In the face of what looked like their inevitable extinction in the 1990s and early 2000s, dictators have changed their strategies. Today’s authoritarian regimes have become more resilient and a more formidable challenge to democracy. Research shows that today’s authoritarian regimes last longer than their predecessors. From 1946 to 1989, the typical autocracy lasted 14 years. This number has nearly doubled since the end of the Cold War to an average of 20 years. As authoritarian regimes become savvier and more durable, global democracy is likely to suffer.5 Autocracies are evolving in a number of important ways. They have learned to mimic elements of democracy, for example by regularly holding elections, allowing multiple political parties to exist, and providing space for legislatures to function. They seek to portray themselves as upholders of the rule of law, and then weaponize the system to weaken the opposition. And they have adapted to manage the threats initially posed by social media. Authoritarian regimes have co-opted these technologies to deepen their grip internally, curb basic human rights, spread illiberal practices beyond their borders, and undermine public trust in open societies. New advances in facial recognition and artificial intelligence will only intensify and accelerate these maleficent practices. Not only have the tactics of today’s autocrats evolved, but so too has their form. Since the end of the Cold War, highly personalized autocracies—those regimes where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual—are on the rise. As my colleagues Erica Frantz, Joseph Wright and I have shown, personalist dictatorships—or those regimes where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual—have increased notably since the end of the Cold War. In 1988, personalist regimes comprised 23 percent of all dictatorships. Today, 40 percent of all autocracies are ruled by strongmen.6 The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts.9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot afford. Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression. Although Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions. Politics in China show many of these same trends. Xi’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea has occurred alongside the rising personalization of the political system. Xi has amassed substantial personal power since coming to office in 2012 and continues to roll back the norms of the post-Mao collective leadership system. If Xi further consolidates control and limits accountability—particularly over military and foreign policy bodies—research suggests that he, too, could feel free to further escalate his aggressive rhetoric and actions in the South China Sea. Not only do personalist dictatorships pursue aggressive foreign policies—they are also often difficult and unpredictable partners. Research underscores that, thanks to limited constraints on decisionmaking, personalist leaders generally have the latitude to change their minds on a whim, producing volatile and erratic policies.10 Moreover, personalist leaders—think Putin, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro—are among those autocrats who are most suspicious of U.S. intentions and who see the creation of an external enemy as an effective means of boosting public support. Anti-U.S. rhetoric, therefore, is most pronounced in personalist settings. Finally, personalist regimes are the most corrupt and the least likely to democratize. Strongman autocracies, more so than any other type of government, depend on the distribution of financial incentives to maintain power.11 As such, these leaders are the most likely to squander foreign aid and sideline competent individuals, hollowing out those institutions that could plausibly constrain their power. Their departure from power often entails instability and violence. And they leave conditions that are highly inhospitable for a transition to democracy. Put differently, when leaders like Turkish President Erdoğan roll back democracy and consolidate personal power, the effects of their actions persist long after they exit office. 3

### India rise advantage

#### US-India relations key to counter terrorism—specifically ISIS

ET 18

(Economic Times, 3-1-2018, "Future very bright for US-India counter-terrorism cooperation: Trump administration," <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/future-very-bright-for-us-india-counter-terrorism-cooperation-trump-administration/articleshow/63120542.cms?from=mdr>, JKS)\*\*citing US counterterrorism coordinator, Nathan Sales

Describing India as an "incredibly valuable and close counter-terrorism partner" of the US, the Trump administration today said the future is "very bright" for bilateral co-operation in this arena. US Counterterrorism Coordinator, Nathan Sales credited the meetings between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump early in the latter's tenure as the reason behind a "powerful" partnership between the two nations. "India is an incredibly important, incredibly valuable and incredibly close counterterrorism partner of the US," Sales told reporters during a teleconference at the conclusion of the conference on Law Enforcement Efforts to Defeat ISIS. "The president (Trump) and the prime minister (Narendra Modi) held a very, very productive series of meetings earlier in the administration, and in response to that set of meetings, the US government and the Indian government have forged ahead to create a really powerful partnership," he said. Sales said the Trump administration has announced in the US a number of designations related to terrorist threats that India faces. In 2016, the US entered into an arrangement with India to share information about known and suspected terrorists. "I think the future is very bright for US-India counterterrorism corporation," Sales said. Sales said South Asia is one of the areas of the world where ISIS has an increasingly robust presence. "Bangladesh is a good example of this. The Holey Artisan Bakery attack in July of 2016 in Dhaka killed 22 people," he said. The US is also tracking in South Asia the ISIS Khorasan affiliates of ISIS becoming increasingly ambitious and increasingly active, he said. "We are working with our partners in the region to develop a shared understanding of the threat that these organisations pose to us in the US and pose to local governments. We are also working with those partners to develop a set of responses," said Sales. Those responses include things like information-sharing, exchanging data about known and suspected terrorists, improving border security efforts to spot terrorists as they travel from conflict zone to conflict zone. "I am confident that by bringing together partner nations who have a common understanding of the threat we face that we'll be able to address this," he said.

#### ISIS is the most likely bioterror scenario

Budowsky 14

Brent, LL.M. degree in international financial law from the London School of Economics, former aide to former Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and Bill Alexander, then chief deputy majority whip of the House, “ISIS poses nuclear 9/11 threat”, 8/22/2014, http://www.opednews.com/articles/ISIS-poses-nuclear-9-11-th-by-Brent-Budowsky-ISI\_Military\_Nuclear\_insanity\_Threat-To-World-Peace-140822-911.html

After the latest grotesque atrocity by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the beheading of an American journalist, American and European policymakers must clearly understand the near certainty that unless it is defeated and destroyed, ISIS will launch a major terror attack on American or European soil. Analysts estimate that ISIS has amassed a cash hoard of between $400 million and $2 billion. It is highly probable that ISIS will attempt to use some of this money to obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other weapons of mass death on the international ~~black~~ illicit market or from corrupt officials in nations such as Russia, China, Pakistan or North Korea to use in attacks against New York, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Brussels or other nations it considers infidel enemies. This danger is magnified by the fact that ISIS has recruited nationals of the United States and Europe, who possess American and European passports and are physically indistinguishable from local populations in America and Europe. It is extraordinary that the mass murdering butchery of ISIS is so demented than even al Qaeda is offended. It is alarming that the CIA, which launched intelligence operations even against the United States Senate, and the NSA, which launched massive and unprecedented eavesdropping operations, and intelligence services of leading European nations were blind to the magnitude of the ISIS threat until the most barbaric terrorists in modern history had taken over almost a third of Iraq and are on the brink of creating a terrorist super-state that dwarfs al Qaeda's efforts prior to 9/11. I vehemently opposed the misguided Iraq War from the moment it was proposed by former President George W. Bush and have never been a neoconservative, warmonger or super-hawk. But aggressive action against ISIS is urgently needed. ISIS has stated its intention to attack the United States and Europe to advance its evil, messianic and genocidal ideology and ambitions. ISIS has the money to purchase the most deadly weapons in the world, and has recruited American and European traitors with above-average capability to execute an attack. The odds that ISIS can obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other forms of mass destruction weapons are impossible to ascertain but in a world of vast illegal arms trafficking, with so many corrupt officials in nations possessing arsenals of destruction, the danger is real. The fact that WMD scares prior to the Iraq War ranged from mistaken to deceitful does not mean that the WMD danger does not exist today. It does. I applaud the recent actions taken by President Obama. Obama's airstrikes saved tens of thousands of Yazidis from genocide, took back the Mosul Dam from ISIS and saved countless Iraqis, Kurds and Syrians from slaughter. The airstrikes inflicted material damage to ISIS. The diplomacy of Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry contributed mightily to the replacement of a disastrous Iraqi government by a government can unite Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. The Obama-Kerry initiatives will lead to the creation of a stable Afghan government and avoid the collapse that was possible after the recent controversial Afghan elections. These are real successes. In the current political climate, Obama seems to get credit for nothing, but he deserves great credit for some important successes in recent weeks. And yet the danger of ISIS pulling off a nuclear, chemical, biological or other mass death 9/11-style attack in a major American or European city is real. Even with dirty or primitive WMD weapons, the casualty totals could be catastrophic. ISIS must be defeated and destroyed. This will not be achieved with "boots on the ground" proxies from Iraqi or Kurd forces alone, though Kurdish forces should immediately receive strong military assistance. America should not initiate another massive Iraq ground war. What is needed is a multinational special ops strike force made up of 10,000 troops from NATO nations and possibly Arab League nations.

#### Extinction

Myhrvold 13

[Nathan, PhD in Theoretical and Mathematical Physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as Chief Strategist and Chief Technology Officer of Microsoft Corporation, July, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," http://www.lawfarebl...d-7-3-2013.pdf]

A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowlyâ€”say, only after weeks or monthsâ€”and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV. It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When Iâ€™ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human raceâ€” or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agentsâ€”lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiensâ€”will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a German university, where he earned a masterâ€™s degree in urban planningâ€”not a field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. A future set of terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems likely that sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will overcome our best defenses and do something truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that could kill millions or even billions of people. Indeed, next 20 years seems to be a virtual certainty. The repercussions of their use are hard to estimate. One approach is to look at how the scale of destruction they may cause compares with that of other calamities that the human race has faced.

### Debris Scenerio

#### They don’t solve debris – their card is not making the same claim – even if china militizaring it doesn’t mean India is going to do anything. There are going to be alt causes in space that cause that.

### AT: Indo-China war

#### Even if tensions erupt, diplomacy checks escalation.

**Ho 18** – Selina Ho, International Affairs Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, expert in Chinese policy. [One Year After They Almost Went to War, Can China and India Get Along? 4-27-2018, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/one-year-after-they-almost-went-war-can-china-and-india-get-along]

The China-India confrontation at Doklam in the summer of 2017 marked the culmination of rising tensions between the two nations over the past two years. China’s blocking of India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, a non-proliferation organization; the refusal to name the leader of a Pakistan-based group as a terrorist in the United Nations; and the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes the controversial China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have all contributed to the deterioration in their relations. Nevertheless, both sides managed to defuse the standoff through **diplomatic means**, the most significant of which is the informal May 2018 Wuhan summit between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, which was hailed as a “reset” for their relations. However, the summit yielded few substantive measures for improving relations. Even the agreement to cooperate in joint economic projects in Afghanistan faces significant implementation challenges. While military tensions, border skirmishes, and mutual suspicions and distrust will persist, they are **unlikely to erupt into** **a violent** **conflict** in the near term; as Wuthnow notes, Doklam II is not imminent. This is because Chinese and Indian leaders will focus on **stabilizing** and **routinizing their** **relationship** with **high-level** **visits**, **economic and strategic** **dialogues**, and **regular** **exchanges** between Chinese and Indian military commanders along the disputed border, and by desecuritizing their water dispute. With China keen to reassure the world of its peaceful intentions, it is unlikely to soon engage in **outright** **belligerence**.

### Indo-Pak

#### SO many things have increased tensions – this isn’t going to be the thing to push it passed the bring – their evidence is just about tensions rising.

#### India Pakistan doesn’t escalate – it would violate no first use and deterennce laws that still exist in the aff world. This Bano 20 evidence does not say NFU wouldn’t work – the warrants in the card are totally different.

#### No Indo-Pak war impact- deterrence and history.

Ganguly, PhD, ‘19

(Sumit, PoliSci/IR@IllinoisUniveristyUrbanaChampaign, ProfPoliSci@IndianUniversity, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear>, March 5) BW

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan’s original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation. Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military’s men and materiel. The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations. Other nuclear states have also clashed without resorting to nuclear weapons. In 1969, China, then an incipient nuclear weapons state, and the Soviet Union, a full-fledged nuclear power, came to blows over islands in the Ussuri River, which runs along the border between the two countries. Several hundred Chinese and Soviet soldiers died in the confrontation. Making matters worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong had a tendency to run risks and dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons, reportedly telling Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that even if half of mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would survive and imperialism would have been razed to the ground. Yet despite Mao’s views, the crisis ended without going nuclear, thanks in part to the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who took the first step by travelling to Beijing for talks. There’s reason to believe that the current situation is similar. Pakistan’s overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan’s policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military. Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the “nuclear revolution,” the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India’s nuclear capabilities. The decision by India and Pakistan to allow their jets to cross the border represents a major break with the past. Yet so far both countries have taken only limited action. Their principal aim, it appears, is what the political scientist Murray Edelman once referred to as “dramaturgy”—theatrical gestures designed to please domestic audiences. Now that both sides have gone through the motions, neither is likely to escalate any further. Peering into the nuclear abyss concentrates the mind remarkably.