# 1NC-round 4-greenhill

## 1

#### Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “suspend”

**Reynolds 59** – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13]  The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation – the plan suspends sales conditioned on the target’s behavior

**Standards –**

#### Limits – infinite timelines, delays, and conditions could be placed on the plan – kills predictability and decks a stable nexus of IPR research

#### Ground – suspension allows them to shift out of innovation and econ DA’s by saying they start enforcing patents before the DA happens – magnified by not speccing what the timeframe is which means its on the 1AR to recharacterize, which functionally makes the aff conditional

## 2

#### Big Pharma can’t withstand legalization – large cash reserves solve patent cliffs now, but legalization causes medicinal marijuana to *trade off with most dependable revenue streams* - reducing cannabis undermines results so no turns

Jackson, 2012 Lee, “Will National Legalized Marijuana Help or Hurt Big Pharma, Tobacco and Alcohol?” http://247wallst.com/investing/2012/12/11/will-national-legalized-marijuana-help-or-hurt-big-pharma-tobacco-and-alcohol/

One other big and powerful industry might have something to lose: Big Pharma. It is estimated that the global pharmaceutical market will be worth more than $1 trillion by 2014. Industry giants Merck & Co. (NYSE: MRK), Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ), Pfizer Inc. (NYSE: PFE) and Abbott Laboratories (NYSE: ABT) have warded off patent cliffs for years using their large cash reserves to acquire smaller companies with robust product pipelines. The last thing these companies want see is current product lines that are producing dependable revenue flow to be dented by legal marijuana. The big pharmaceutical firms have a lot of money to spread around, so when it comes to lobbying efforts, very few have this group’s clout. One thing it wants is for marijuana to remain illegal. There are countless maladies where the ingestion of marijuana has been believed to help alleviate or control the symptoms. These include glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, AIDS-related complications, Crohn’s disease, fibromyalgia, chemotherapy complications and others. Big pharma has tried to come up with their own pot pill. There are more than 400 chemicals in marijuana, 80 of which are called “cannabinoids.” Drug companies have tried reducing it to one chemical and results have been poor. Researchers find that when you reduce cannabis to just tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), you lose efficacy and gain side effects. In a book critical of the pharmaceutical industry called “Our Daily Meds,” author Melody Petersen offers a statistic showing more than 100,000 people die each year from prescription drugs. This includes death from abuse and overdose, side effects, misdiagnosis and interaction error. Many physicians may currently be reluctant to prescribe legalized marijuana. A national mandate would provide many physicians with the moral and ethical cover they need to be more aggressive if they feel medical marijuana may help their patients. Then it is very possible that medical marijuana prescriptions will put a dent in many currently prescribed drugs. This is not an outcome that big pharma is likely to tolerate well, unless they get in on the action themselves.

#### Profit margins determine R&D budgets --- that solves emerging existential pandemics

Engelhardt 8 “Innovation and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Critical Reflections on the Virtues of Profit” Hugo Engelhardt – PhD, MD, Professor of Philosophy at Rice, Ebrary

Many are suspicious of, or indeed jealous of, the good fortune of others. Even when profit is gained in the market without fraud and with the consent of all buying and selling goods and services, there is a sense on the part of some that something is wrong if considerable profit is secured. There is even a sense that good fortune in the market, especially if it is very good fortune, is unfair. One might think of such rhetorically disparaging terms as "wind-fall profits". There is also a suspicion of the pursuit of profit because it is often embraced not just because of the material benefits it sought, but because of the hierarchical satisfaction of being more affluent than others. The pursuit of profit in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is tor many in particular morally dubious because it is acquired from those who have the bad fortune to be diseased or disabled. Although the suspicion of profit is not well-founded, this suspicion is a major moral and public-policy challenge. Profit in the market for the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is to be celebrated. This is the case, in that if one is of the view (1) that the presence of additional resources for research and development spurs innovation in the development of pharmaceuticals and medical devices (i.e., if one is of the view that the allure of profit is one of the most effective ways not only to acquire resources but productively to direct human energies in their use), (2) that given the limits of altruism and of the willingness of persons to be taxed, the possibility of profits is necessary to secure such resources, (3) that the allure of profits also tends to enhance the creative use of available resources in the pursuit of pharmaceutical and medical-device innovation, and (4) if one judges it to be the case that such innovation is both necessary to maintain the human species in an ever-changing and always dangerous environment in which new microbial and other threats may at any time emerge to threaten human well-being, if not survival (i.e., that such innovation is necessary to prevent increases in morbidity and mortality risks), as well as (5) in order generally to decrease morbidity and mortality risks in the future, it then follows (6) that one should be concerned regarding any policies that decrease the amount of resources and energies available to encourage such innovation. One should indeed be of the view that the possibilities for profit, all things being equal, should be highest in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries. Yet, there is a suspicion regarding the pursuit of profit in medicine and especially in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries.

#### Pharma profits and innovation are key to solve impending pandemics

Howard, 9-- Paul Howard, senior fellow and director of the Center for Medical Progress at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 4-30-2009, "Big Pharma Can Save Us," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/2009/04/30/drug-vaccine-cure-opinions-contributors-swine-flu.html>

Industrialization–and the globalization of mass markets–means that an enterprising microbe doesn’t have to wait for Spanish conquistadores to decimate virgin populations. Planes, trains and automobiles–byproducts of the Industrial Revolution–are much better, and faster, ways to circulate in the global bloodstream. Turistas in Cancun enjoy their margaritas, but Mayor Bloomberg gets the hangover when they return home with the swine flu. No amount of infrared scanning at airports can stop the bugs that reside in your bloodstream while the virus is pre-symptomatic. The only sure way to nip the bug before it blooms is to blockade global trade and travel. Unless you’re in favor of another Great Depression, that’s a cure that is truly worse than the disease. Luddite fantasies aside, our real hope rests with another by-product of the industrial revolution: the modern corporation and capital markets. Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis and GlaxoSmithKline (and their investors) have a vested interest in helping us decode and treat new plagues. As long as we keep the industry that makes the cures hale and hearty–abjuring price controls, ruinous lawsuits and unnecessary red tape, the policy equivalent of leeches on innovation–pandemics may emerge, but they need not ravage whole nations. Pharmaceutical companies–those much reviled things–now have the tools to map the genomes of new viruses and bacteria in hours and days, pinpointing the genes responsible for illness and death and priming antibiotics and vaccines to target the enemy. We don’t know if swine flu will become a pandemic, but companies are already developing cell-based technologies to grow the viruses that are integral components of vaccines, replacing old and unreliable chicken-egg incubators and allowing manufacturers to ramp up production quickly to meet unexpected need. Companies have also created new generations of vaccines with materials called adjuvants, which both help stimulate the immune system and require less viral material to be injected into the body to guarantee an effective immune response. This loaves-and-fishes approach means that less is more: The same amount of viral material can be spread out into many more effective doses, reducing the need to ration vaccines in the event of a true pandemic. Adding to the modern armamentarium are a growing number of anti-viral drugs like Tamiflu and Relenza that inhibit viral replication, acting both as prophylactics that can reduce the risk of infection and treatments that reduce disease severity–buying time for vaccines to reach the market and quarantine further outbreaks. Two decades ago, vaccines looked like a low-end commodity business better suited for Wal-Mart than big pharmaceutical firms. Today, though, the market for new vaccines has stabilized and even improved thanks to two developments. First, in 1986 Congress created the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which gives vaccine manufacturers substantial protection from personal injury lawyers who are every bit as predatory as the bacteria Yersinia pestis. Also, in 2002, Wyeth‘s Prevnar became the first blockbuster vaccine with over $1 billion in sales, signaling that hi-tech vaccines could fetch a premium price from insurers. Where public buyers dominate the markets (as they do for seasonal influenza vaccines) wise policies have helped too. In 2005, Congress authorized over $7 billion for pandemic preparedness, including funding for private firms to develop cell-based vaccine production technologies in the U.S. More generally, the move reassured companies that policymakers are serious about underwriting the cost of pandemic vaccine research. Other vaccine innovations are just over the horizon: multi-purpose vaccines that can thwart not just this season’s flu but several different variants; improved adjuvants that help make vaccines even safer and more effective; and vaccines that can help the body thwart its own worst enemy, cancer. Swine flu is the story today as governments race to stockpile drugs and companies stand poised to produce a swine-flu vaccine–if the World Health Organization asks them to shift production from seasonal flu vaccines to swine flu. But the real story, as always, isn’t this black swan but the next one we don’t (and can’t) predict. To ensure we’re ready for the next pandemic, companies must trust Uncle Sam to honor his promises at market prices and protect them from the inevitable flood of lawsuits after the demon virus or bacteria has been tamed. It’s ironic that the specter of a swine-flu pandemic coincides with the health-care reform debate in the U.S. President Obama and his party want to win the war against swine flu, cancer and Alzheimer’s–but they also want price controls on the products devised by drug-company scientists. When it comes to R&D, the president and his party seem to love the “R” but hate the prices that make the “D” possible. The Democrats are also financially beholden to the plaintiff’s bar and are eager to unwind protections against rogue lawsuits, another disincentive for companies to invest in the expensive and highly uncertain pursuit of new cures. If big pharma doesn’t get its profits, all the basic science in the world won’t help us fight the next pandemic. And since the U.S. accounts for about 50% of global profits for the industry, when it comes to incentivizing innovation, we are the world. For now, the swine flu will make its random way through our political and social networks, and drug companies–the equivalent of a national immune system–will race to bombard it with drugs and vaccines. But this is the original long war, and staying ahead of our very small but rapidly evolving enemies demands that industry remain profitable, flexible and innovative. If not, we may find ourselves the next democracy devastated by an invisible foe.

#### Pharma industry solves disease spread.

Sachs 14 — Jeffrey D. Sachs, professor of sustainable development, health policy, and management at Columbia University, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Millennium Development Goals, 8-18-2014 (“Important lessons from Ebola outbreak”, *Business World Online*, http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=important-lessons-from-ebola-outbreak&id=92924)

Ebola is the latest of many recent epidemics, also including AIDS, SARS, H1N1 flu, H7N9 flu, and others. AIDS is the deadliest of these killers, claiming nearly 36 million lives since 1981.

Of course, even larger and more sudden epidemics are possible, such as the 1918 influenza during World War I, which claimed 50-100 million lives (far more than the war itself). And, though the 2003 SARS outbreak was contained, causing fewer than 1,000 deaths, the disease was on the verge of deeply disrupting several East Asian economies including China’s.

There are four crucial facts to understand about Ebola and the other epidemics. First, most emerging infectious diseases are zoonoses, meaning that they start in animal populations, sometimes with a genetic mutation that enables the jump to humans. Ebola may have been transmitted from bats; HIV/AIDS emerged from chimpanzees; SARS most likely came from civets traded in animal markets in southern China; and influenza strains such as H1N1 and H7N9 arose from genetic re-combinations of viruses among wild and farm animals. New zoonotic diseases are inevitable as humanity pushes into new ecosystems (such as formerly remote forest regions); the food industry creates more conditions for genetic recombination; and climate change scrambles natural habitats and species interactions.

Second, once a new infectious disease appears, its spread through airlines, ships, megacities, and trade in animal products is likely to be extremely rapid. These epidemic diseases are new markers of globalization, revealing through their chain of death how vulnerable the world has become from the pervasive movement of people and goods.

Third, the poor are the first to suffer and the worst affected. The rural poor live closest to the infected animals that first transmit the disease. They often hunt and eat bushmeat, leaving them vulnerable to infection. Poor, often illiterate, individuals are generally unaware of how infectious diseases -- especially unfamiliar diseases -- are transmitted, making them much more likely to become infected and to infect others. Moreover, given poor nutrition and lack of access to basic health services, their weakened immune systems are easily overcome by infections that better nourished and treated individuals can survive. And “de-medicalized” conditions -- with few if any professional health workers to ensure an appropriate public-health response to an epidemic (such as isolation of infected individuals, tracing of contacts, surveillance, and so forth) -- make initial outbreaks more severe.

Finally, the required medical responses, including diagnostic tools and effective medications and vaccines, inevitably lag behind the emerging diseases. In any event, such tools must be continually replenished. This requires cutting-edge biotechnology, immunology, and ultimately bioengineering to create large-scale industrial responses (such as millions of doses of vaccines or medicines in the case of large epidemics).

The AIDS crisis, for example, called forth tens of billions of dollars for research and development -- and similarly substantial commitments by the pharmaceutical industry -- to produce lifesaving antiretroviral drugs at global scale. Yet each breakthrough inevitably leads to the pathogen’s mutation, rendering previous treatments less effective. There is no ultimate victory, only a constant arms race between humanity and disease-causing agents.

#### Diseases causes extinction— risk is underestimated, and no burnout

{Ross D. E. MacPhee et al. 13, Ph.D. in Physical Anthropology from University of Alberta, Former chairman of the Department of Mammalogy at the American Museum of Natural History, Professor at Richard Gilder Graduate School, Alex D. Greenwood, Head of the Department of Wildlife Diseases at the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research, Professor of wildlife diseases in the Department of Veterinary Medicine of the Freie Universität Berlin, “ Infectious Disease, Endangerment, and Extinction,” Hindawi Publishing Corporation, http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijeb/2013/571939/, Date Accessed: 4-14-16, NCC Packet Draft }

Infectious disease, especially virulent infectious disease, is commonly regarded as a cause of fluctuation or decline in biological populations. However, it is not generally considered as a primary factor in causing the actual endangerment or extinction of species. We review here the known historical examples in which disease has, or has been assumed to have had, a major deleterious impact on animal species, including extinction, and highlight some recent cases in which disease is the chief suspect in causing the outright endangerment of particular species. We conclude that the role of disease in historical extinctions at the population or species level may have been underestimated. Recent methodological breakthroughs may lead to a better understanding of the past and present roles of infectious disease in influencing population fitness and other parameters.

1. Background

Although lethal epi- or panzootics are obvious risk factors that can lead to population fluctuation or decline in particular circumstances, infectious diseases are seldom considered as potential drivers of extirpation or extinction—that is, of the complete loss of all populations or subunits comprising a given biological species. For example, in conservation biology, infectious disease is usually regarded as having only a marginal or contributory influence on extinction, except perhaps in unusual circumstances (e.g., [1–4]). In their examination of 223 instances of critically endangered species listed by the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) as allegedly threatened by infectious disease, Smith et al. [4] found that in the overwhelming majority of cases there was no conclusive evidence to support infectious disease as a contributing threat. Although this record should improve with increasing awareness of the effects of infectious diseases on wildlife, as this paper illustrates progress has so far been slow.

Both of the authors of this paper are primarily concerned with mammals, which is the group that will receive the bulk of attention here. However, at the pragmatic, data-gathering level, the issues concerned with properly accounting for and evaluating the effects of infectious diseases on natural populations differ little from one phylogenetic grouping to another.

First, narrowing down extinction events or even catastrophic population declines to single causes is almost always problematic. In most real cases, extinction is multicausational, even if one cause can be identified as being predominantly responsible [5]. Habitat fragmentation and climate change are currently regarded as the leading prime movers behind most instances of extreme endangerment, to which other stressors such as pollution, invasive competitors, and so forth, might be of greater or lesser importance in particular circumstances. Disease, however, is rarely mentioned as a possible contributing factor in such contexts (but see [6]).

Another difficulty is lack of knowledge about pathogen diversity and susceptibility in wildlife. In the absence of sufficient means of detection and characterization, it is difficult to assess or to give quantitative expression to the degree to which pathogens might influence population decline or extinction. Thus it has been estimated that only a small fraction of bacterial diversity has been identified at even the most basic systematic level. This problem is exacerbated in the case of viruses, which often evolve rapidly and defy, in any case, classical methodologies for identifying “species” [7]. For example, bat viruses have only recently begun to be described systematically, even though many chiropterans are known vectors of numerous zoonotic diseases and corporately represent the second largest grouping (by species richness) of mammals after rodents [8, 9]. A similar lack of knowledge affects our understanding of parasites and fungi that affect wildlife.

The foregoing difficulties are compounded when one considers that, unless a species is studied extensively during and up to the actual extinction event affecting it, all extinction studies are retrospective. Retrospective investigation of losses in which disease is possibly implicated is often severely hindered by limitations in the number and quality of samples available for study, as well as the inability to satisfy Koch’s postulates—especially if both host and pathogen became extinct simultaneously [10]. Performing isolation, reisolation, and reinfection experiments to directly establish that a particular pathogen was indeed the causative agent behind a given infection is either very difficult or impossible to do retrospectively. Isolation and recreation of the 1918 H1N1 influenza A virus [11], for example, were performed by sequencing from extractions derived from individuals thought to have died of the disease in WWI, not by directly isolating the infectious virus from tissues (as would be required to formally comply with Koch’s postulates). Although most studies will have to be correlative rather than dispositive, one can nevertheless test hypotheses concerning plausible causal agents and examine samples for presence/absence of specific pathogens [12].

Forensically, decay, degradation, and chemical changes in DNA post mortem produce severe methodological challenges to retrieving and accurately determining sequences [13]. In addition, in any retrospective investigation involving “ancient DNA,” pathogen nucleic acids will be less abundant than those of the host, and this dilution effect will make sequence retrieval even more complex [10]. For example, relatively abundant mitochondrial DNA is generally easier to retrieve from fossils or historical samples than lower copy per cell nuclear DNA. Pathogen nucleic acids are generally even lower copy than host DNA sequences in a given extraction. These and other factors reviewed here may help to explain the paucity of conclusive studies of disease-mediated extinction, except in the very few instances in which sampling and methodological roadblocks could be overcome. Nonetheless, in favorable circumstances it should be possible to genetically analyze ancient pathogens with sufficient accuracy to make the endeavor worthwhile, especially because next-generation sequencing methods are beginning to make such endeavors ever more feasible [14–18].

Why should the possible role of infectious disease in endangerment and extinction be regarded as a critical issue in modern conservation? Whether or not disease was ever a major cause of extinction in the fossil record [19], in our times it plays an acknowledged but perhaps underestimated role. Pathogen-driven population declines have been identified in a wide array of invertebrate and vertebrate taxa (cf. [20]), suggesting that the phenomenon is probably universal. Yet without the kinds of monitoring methods now available, some and perhaps most of these declines would have gone undetected, or attributed to other causes. Further, the processes forcing such declines are as diverse as the pathogens themselves and are far from being clearly understood. The apparent increase in zoonotic diseases during the last few decades [21] may be objectively real or merely due to better monitoring, but it seems highly likely that loss or reduction of pristine habitats and the overall impact of invasive species should promote the introduction of opportunistic pathogens into wildlife with increasing frequency.

Thus, understanding the dynamics of disease-mediated species declines may be critical to conservation missions concerned with a wide variety of species and habitats. Recent advances in molecular biology and microbiology have permitted the detection and identification of hosts of novel microorganisms, many of which are pathogenic, and the technology needed to assess threat levels is becoming increasingly available.

2. Disease as an Agent of Extinction: Some Considerations

Although the fossil record clearly establishes that the fate of all species is to eventually die out, it is obvious from the same record that the rate of disappearance of individual species varies significantly [22]. As already noted, inferences about how (as opposed to when) an individual species disappeared must be developed inductively and retrospectively. An important guideline is that apparent causes of extinction that are diachronic (repeatedly affect species across time) are inherently more plausible than ones that are claimed to have occurred only once, or apply to only one taxon. Although this means that explanations about individual extinctions are not strictly testable, they can nevertheless be evaluated in terms of likelihood, which is the approach currently taken by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and several other conservation organizations interested in compiling extinction statistics [23, 24].

It is an accepted tenet in conservation biology that any severe, continuing threat to a species might eventually contribute to its extinction [25]. From this perspective, it is also accepted that diseases presenting with very high levels of mortality—as in the case of a highly transmissible infection that is newly emergent in a population—can cause outright endangerment. But are there conditions under which a disease, probably in combination with other threats, might so imperil a species to cause its complete disappearance? MacPhee and Marx [19] considered this issue from the standpoint of model pathogenic features that a disease-provoking organism might exhibit in forcing the extinction of a given species. These features include:

(1) a reservoir species presenting a stable carrier state for the pathogen,

(2) a high potential for causing infections in susceptible species, affecting critical age groups,

(3) a capacity for hyperlethality, defined here as mortality rates in the range of 50–75%.

Only under the most extreme conditions is it conceivable that a species would suffer extinction in a single epizootic event. Much more likely would be repeated outbreaks over a period of years gradually reducing the fitness level of the species, with final disappearance potentially caused by stochastic events (such as causally unassociated climate change). One way in which this condition might be achieved would be through a stable carrier (i.e., a species other than the target, living in similar circumstances in the same environment, and in which the infection is inapparent or at least sublethal). A well-studied example is the transfer of simian acquired immunodeficiency virus from one species of macaque to another [26]. Although this instance occurred under captive conditions, repeated outbreaks of distemper in lions and African wild dogs have long been thought to be due to transfer from domestic dogs (although the mechanism is debated; see [27]). Obviously, for a disease to have a very severe impact, it would be necessary for the pathogen to occur in highly lethal, aggressive strains that strongly impact the target species before attenuated strains arise and become common.

High potential for causing infections in a susceptible species is usually associated with the ability to successfully enter the organism through a major portal, such as the respiratory tract, where it can be lodged and transmitted easily (e.g., via aerosol). To achieve hyperlethality and produce serious mortality, all age groups within a species would probably have to be susceptible, not just the very young or very old (or the immunocompromised), with death the usual outcome. In large-bodied mammals, a fundamental consideration is that any process that deleteriously affects young individuals will have a pronounced effect on survivorship because of the lengthy intervals in birth spacing [19].

Lethality in the range of 50–75% is obviously extremely high and thus extremely unusual, although historically seen in Ebola infections in humans and in experimental transmission studies from pigs to macaques [28]. High percentages may have also been achieved in rinderpest outbreaks among East African bovids in the early 20th century [29], although quantitative data on this are largely lacking. An important issue here, however, is whether pathogens causing this level of lethality could maintain themselves in nature long enough to seriously imperil a species. Speculatively, a possible outcome with hyperlethal infections producing a rapid, fatal outcome is that affected populations would be reduced to small numbers of widely dispersed and/or relatively or completely immune individuals. Under these circumstances, the epizootic would necessarily abate as it ran out of new hosts, leading to the conclusion that exceptionally lethal diseases cannot be indefinitely maintained in a population or species under normal circumstances. However, if reservoirs exist from which the pathogen could repeatedly emerge, in principle epizootics might resurge year after year until population sizes were reduced below viable levels (~50–500 individuals). At this point stochastic effects might intervene and lead to complete loss of the species. Among possible examples of this “perfect storm” of circumstances and consequences is the loss of Christmas Island rats, detailed elsewhere in this paper. Among birds, the severe impact of avian malaria on Hawaiian honeycreepers is also pertinent and discussed later in this paper. Although a number of honeycreeper species survive at high elevations, above the limit at which introduced Culex mosquitos can survive, there are multiple adventitious threats, such as deforestation and competition from invasive species, which add to their endangerment picture [30].

## 3

#### Ambiguous standards result in confusion that deters hemp investment now

Fulmer 2 [Melinda Fulmer, award-winning financial writer and media strategist, Vice President of Public Relations for City National Bank, former Times Staff Writer, 1/16/02, Hemp Imports Run Afoul of DEA Rule, LA Times, <http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/16/business/fi-hemp16>]

Kenex contends the rule is discriminatory to Canadian producers, who provide the bulk of hemp products to the U.S. because Americans are banned from growing the plant.¶ "Our company has invested a significant amount of money in Canada and the U.S. to develop these markets for the past three years, and it has been one stumbling block after another," said Jean Laprise, Kenex president. "They're squashing an emerging industry."¶ The Kenex case adds more heat to a debate over the provision of NAFTA that allows private investors to sue governments for taking actions that restrict trade. Since NAFTA was enacted, 15 such cases have been filed.¶ Critics argue the provision gives companies too much power and undermines the ability of governments to protect their citizens.¶ But Laprise says it's necessary to protect companies' rights when the law is discriminatory.¶ DEA officials refuse to comment on the issue because of the pending litigation. But DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson put forward the agency's position recently when he said that "many Americans do not know that hemp and marijuana are both parts of the same plant and that hemp cannot be produced without producing marijuana."¶ The DEA says consumers have until Feb. 6 to dispose of these items or be subject to penalty.¶ Although hemp and marijuana come from the plant species, cannabis, the variety grown for industrial hemp contains much lower amounts of THC, a point the DEA acknowledges. The burning issue for the DEA is: When can cannabis legally be sold as hemp, and when is it still a drug? Hemp oil and seeds can't make people high, but they do contain minuscule amounts of THC, much as poppy seeds contain trace amounts of opium.¶ "The leaves and flowers on industrial hemp, when you smoke them, it gives you a headache," said John Roulac, president of Nutiva in Sebastopol, Calif., which makes snack bars and chips out of hemp. "If you smoke more, you just get a bigger headache."¶ If there weren't a cloud hanging over the industry from this regulation, manufacturers say, it would grow exponentially over the next several years as demand for functional foods grows.¶ However, confusion over the new rule, and high-profile seizures of hemp-containing products such as birdseed, should keep many companies from using the controversial ingredient, Roulac said.¶ Many, however, say they plan to continue to sell their products.¶ Food companies that use hemp ingredients hope that the industry and government can come up with guidelines that will allow the industry to grow as it was expected to before the rule was published.¶ Without them, they say, the DEA's ambiguous standards will make that difficult.

#### Hemp biofuels help achieve energy independence which lowers global oil prices

Keller 13 [Nicole Keller, “NOTE: THE LEGALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL HEMP AND WHAT IT COULD MEAN FOR INDIANA'S BIOFUEL INDUSTRY,” Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 23 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 555, Lexis]

These countries, which have been able to distinguish between hemp and marijuana, are able to take advantage of an enormous renewable resource that boosts their economies and lessens their country's impact on the global environment. Hemp "can be used to produce more than 25,000 products, ranging from dynamite to cellophane." 35 This statement was made in 1938 when Popular Mechanics released an article toting the wonders of industrial hemp, claiming it was the new billion dollar crop. The article "further state[d] that increased hemp production 'will displace imports of raw material and manufactured products' and call[ed] hemp the 'standard fiber of the world.'" 36 That was in 1938. With today's advanced technologies, it is highly likely that the number of uses exceeds 25,000 products. 37 In fact, some sources claim that over 50,000 products can be made from this single plant. 38 Among the 50,000 products are "textiles, paper, paints, clothing, plastics, cosmetics, foodstuffs, insulation, animal feed," 39 biodegradable industrial products such as fiberglass, replacement for wood products, biofuel, and detergents. 40 For a majority of these products, the fibrous stalk of the hemp plant is used. However, the seeds are also an excellent source of oil, varnishes, body care products, detergents, and biofuel. In other words, the entire hemp plant has a use; nothing goes to [\*559] waste. Many countries now have active industries utilizing industrial hemp to their benefit. For example, China has large hemp paper and textile industries. 41 In 2009 Zhang Jianchun, Director General of China's Hemp Research Centre in Beijing, said, Expanded production of hemp . . . offers enormous benefits for China. First, it would provide a major new source of fibre for the textile industry, reduce dependency on cotton and, in the process, free large areas of cotton-growing land for food production. In addition, hemp cultivation would generate extra income for millions of small-scale farmers in some of the country's poorest rural areas. 42 Three years later, "[China] is the largest exporter of hemp paper and [hemp] textiles." 43 It seems that, at least in China, Popular Mechanics' tout that hemp would become the "standard fiber of the world" 44 is quickly becoming a reality as the Chinese increasingly replace fibers such as cotton with industrial hemp. 45 Additionally, another large producer of hemp products is Canada, which supplies the world with a variety of hemp food products. 46 Canada's hemp food industry is growing, and Canadian farmers are benefiting from the US government's refusal to legalize the crop. 47 Among the products derivable from the industrial hemp plant, and the product most relevant to this Note, is hemp as a biofuel. In a time of high gas prices, political instability, and increasing concerns over the environmental effects of fossil fuel consumption, it is natural to seek an alternative. Globally, the use of biofuels as an alternative to petroleum products is gaining momentum. 48 The United States alone consumed approximately 11.7 million gallons of ethanol in 2011 49 and over 549 [\*560] million gallons of biodiesel in the first 9 months of 2011. 50 In Canada, hemp biofuel research is underway to produce cellulosic ethanol. 51 Cellulosic ethanol is ethanol produced from the non-food parts of feedstock and is a more efficient source of energy. 52 Currently, the majority of feedstock for biofuels comes from corn, soybeans, or wheat. 53 However, in addition to being an inefficient source of fuel, the diversion of these commodities for fuel production is at the expense of the world food supply. 54 The United States has recognized the issue and has "announced a $ 510 million initiative meant to spur development of a new US bio-fuel industry that utilizes non-food crops[.]" 55 The initiative is meant to examine sources such as algae or wood chips; 56 however, there is a more efficient source: industrial hemp. "When compared to other plant species of active interest in biofuel production, Hemp derives 100% more cellulose than species under active investigation." 57 Furthermore, "[h]emp is Earth's number one biomass resource; it is capable of producing 10 tons per acre in four months." 58 Hemp biomass fuel products require a minimal amount of specialization and processing and **"[t**]he hydrocarbons in hemp can be processed into a wide range of biomass energy sources, from fuel pellets to liquid fuels and gas."59 These facts alone make industrial hemp the ideal source for both ethanol and biodiesel production. Yet, industrial hemp, in addition to its fibrous plant matter, also produces seeds wherein lies a rich source of hemp [\*561] oil, and this oil can also be used for fuel. 60 Industrial hemp's fuel capabilities and desirability is further enhanced by the fact that "[i]ndustrial hemp can be grown in most climates and on marginal soils. It requires little or no herbicide and no pesticide[.]" 61 The hemp plant is also known to improve soil conditions for rotationalcrops, 62 and it is a clean-burning fuel, contributing no greenhouse gases. 63 Yet, industrial hemp is not seriously considered as a feedstock input, 64 largely because industrial hemp is illegal to grow in the United States.

#### Drop in oil prices collapses the Russian economy – overwhelms resiliency

**Zotin 13** [Aleksander, Columnist – Kommersant, “AN ECONOMIC CRISIS MAY BE LOOMING FOR RUSSIA”, Kommersant, 8/30/13, http://www.worldcrunch.com/business-finance/an-economic-crisis-may-be-looming-for-russia/russia-economy-ruble-boris-yeltsin-global-crisis/c2s13220/]

MOSCOW — On Aug. 17, 1998, the Russian government announced a default on short-term obligations and a currency devaluation. The financial system was practically destroyed. Ten years later, in 2008, there was another crisis, this time a global one, that hit all the world’s economies, including Russia’s. There were both similarities and differences between the two crises — each resulted from internal and external shocks. But we haven’t learned our lessons from them, and there are reasons to be worried that a new economic catastrophe is on the horizon. Although it’s been five years since the last global crisis, it wouldn’t be accurate to say that the world economy is truly healthy. An exterior shock similar to the one that caused the economic collapses in 2008 and 1998 is still possible. In 2008, the epicenter of the crisis was the United States, but today the biggest threat comes from China — and from the fact that the entire developed world still balances on the edge of recession. If, in addition to that, there is a major shock from China, such as a slowdown in growth to just 3%, the world will be faced with another economic meltdown. A slowdown in demand for metals, for example, is already a menacing hint that this could happen. Ominous signs Nobody knows whether, or when, the global economy will suffer another body blow, but what is clear is that while Russia was relatively well-prepared for the 2008 crisis, we don’t have the same safety cushion today. Instead of a surplus, we have a deficit, and the non-oil and gas deficit is **exceptionally high**, with experts predicting that said deficit will be 10.7% of GDP this year. In 2007, the country adopted new rules about how income from oil and gas could be spent, and it was meant to be used increasingly for government savings. But the crisis wrecked that plan, as the government tried to spend its way out of its economic problems. Russia not only failed to save its income from the oil and gas industries during the crisis years, but it also **emptied** its **reserve fund**. The non-oil and gas deficit rose to 13.5% of GDP. The crisis of 2008-2009 passed, but Russia still didn’t heed the World Bank’s recommendation to keep the non-oil and gas deficit below 4% of GDP. The gold reserves are also less important now than they were in 2008, and the private sector’s international debt level is much higher. We are also **more vulnerable** now to **external shocks** than we were in 2008 because of domestic factors. We have witnessed economic stagnation this year even with high oil prices. There are also serious weaknesses in the Russian financial system. There has been a boom in credit and debt, which caused a quick rise in family incomes that has now become the expected norm. Consumer debt has now reached 15% of GDP. That’s low compared to other developed countries, but the advantages of having a low level of indebtedness are negated by the high cost of debt service and the fact that most of the debt is borrowed over very short terms. In fact, Russians spend 11% of their income paying down debt, more than even the United States, where citizens pay on average 10.5% of their income for debt service, researchers say. This is the case even though household debt is 78% of GDP in the United States, much higher than Russia’s 15%. If there is a **sharp drop** in prices for natural resources, a new crisis will be **unavoidable**. And there were not be many choices: either devalue the ruble or cut government spending.

#### Nuke war

Dr. Benjamin Ståhl 15, CEO of the Blue Institute, PhD in Business Studies and Economics from Uppsala University, MA in International Relations from the University of Kent, and Johan Wiktorin, Founder and CEO of the Intelligence Company Brqthrough, Licensed Master of Competitive Intelligence and Former Member of the Swedish Armed Forces, “What’s At Stake?: A Geopolitical Perspective on the Swedish Economic Exposure in Northeast Europe”, Swedish Growth Barometer, 7/1/2015, https://blueinst.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/whats-at-stake\_geopolitical-perspective.pdf

Scenario 1: Disintegration If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate and the regime continue to distance themselves from the West, the centre may not be capable to maintain legitimacy and keep the periphery together. Already, some regions and counties are highly indebted. In other parts, ethnic Russians are a minority. Regions in eastern Russia, rich in raw materials, may look to China for funding. It is, however, probable that Beijing will not want to undermine the stability in Russia. Closer to the region in focus in this report, Kaliningrad is an area that could distance itself from the Kremlin. Economic problems and security concerns form a background that could lead to a political uprising. A “Kaliningrad-Maidan” development is at the heart of this scenario. Triggers could also come from outside Kaliningrad, in or in the immediate surrounding of the Russian Federation, or from other factors such as severe pollution. The other countries in the region would in all probability remain cool in this situation, considering the county’s military importance for the Russian government. However, a mutiny like the ones in Kroonstad in June 1917, March 1921 or on the frigate Storozjevoj in November 1975 cannot be excluded. Economic and political tensions in Europe could weaken the EU and worsen the development at the same time. A Greek withdrawal from the EU, triggered by its exit from the Eurozone, could set such a movement in motion. A Podemos-led government in Spain could undermine confidence for the single market, at a time when Europe also faces the consequences of a highly unstable North Africa, with a large flow of migrants. Attempts by Russia to influence certain members in the EU, such as Hungary and Cyprus, could sow further discord in the EU. At the most severe levels of disintegration, France could adopt policies effectively blocking EU and NATO response in a time of increased tensions. Britain may opt out of the union altogether, or be forced out if their demands for special status is rejected by the other member states. In all varieties of disintegration, uncertainty concerning the control over the nuclear arsenals will increase. The US will become involved both diplomatically and financially in order to bring clarity and establish control over the arsenals. Should Russia, in that situation, ask for military support for this, it is highly probable that the US would acquiesce: such operations in other parts of the world were the object of joint US-Russian exercises just a few years ago. Scenario 2: Ultra-nationalism If Russian domestic and international policy continues to become more radicalised, it might take ever more drastic forms. As the economy deteriorates, wages fall and shortages become common, a focus on nostalgic nationalism, using belligerent rhetoric and demonstrations of military power, could be used to deflect growing discontentment. A logical target would be to “protect” zones which are perceived as Russian, e.g. where there are Russian ethnic minorities or even just Russian-speaking areas. Such rhetoric was and is used in the Ukraine. The coming years will tell what the Russian ambitions are in the Ukraine. Offensives to secure and expand their supply lines, and weakening those of the Ukraine, are probable, and more ambitious plans, such as the opening of new directions in Kharkiv or Odessa, are possible. As a distraction, conflicts in Moldavia can be fuelled. If the West, primarily the US, UK and Poland, support Ukraine with military means, the risk increases for further escalation of the conflict. Remaining passive, on the other hand, runs the risk that Russia perceives that it could act against other targets. A second country that could be the target of Russian nationalism is Belarus. Judging by president Putin’s justification of the annexation of Crimea, Belarus would similarly be a legitimate candidate for “re-inclusion” in Russia. There are indications that the regime in Belarus are worried about such a development and acting to thwart it. In late 2014, Lukashenko appointed a new government, and has increased the emphasis on “Belorussian”. The fragmented (and thoroughly infiltrated) opposition has declared that it will not field candidates in elections this autumn, since they deem the threat of president Putin to be greater than of Lukashenko himself. Belarus has also passed laws permitting prosecution of non-regular armed troops, as a consequence of the Russian method employed in the annexation of Crimea. In the economic sphere, Russia has complained that Belarus is profiting from sanctions against Russia. Any attempts from Russia to enter Belarus’ with military means would probably not be met by any effective resistance from the Belorussian security apparatus. The opportunities for Russia are in some ways more favourable here than in Ukraine, due to the close cooperation between the countries’ armies and intelligence services. Passive resistance cannot be ruled out but would not mean much in a short-term. However, tensions with other former Soviet Union republics, with the EU and with NATO would surely increase. Polish and Lithuanian forces would probably mobilize to counteract spillover effects. EU policy would be substantially revised. Belorussian citizens would attempt to flee, primarily to neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The Russian government would also threaten the Baltic states, in order to undermine their economies and try to influence policy in these countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be in a precarious situation. While they need to strengthen their civil and military defence, they must retain credibility with their allies and not be perceived as to exaggerate the Russian threat. The higher the tensions, the more sensitive the world is to psychological influence. Russia would, in this scenario, also fan nationalism in other parts of Europe through political and financial support. West Balkan is particularly vulnerable, as the EU and the US have invested considerable political capital in the region with only mixed success. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia have stagnated in their political and economic development with high levels of unemployment, political polarisation and even the establishing of Islamic fundamentalist cells: a fertile ground for nationalist movements. Finally, Russian ultra-nationalism would also be directed inwards, with an escalated persecution of the domestic political opposition, independent media, and nationalisation of foreign assets. This will be combined with attacks on minority groups, especially on Jews. This scenario could happen separately or as a precursor to the final, and most dangerous, scenario. Scenario 3: Test of strength In this scenario, Russia would attempt to break NATO through challenging of one or more of the Baltic states. The objective would be to demonstrate to alliance members that NATO’s response is too late and too weak. A precondition for success is a distraction through a crisis by an intermediator, which would tie down especially American attention and resources. The distraction could come in many forms, e.g. by partnering with North Korea, fanning war in the Middle East, or even hidden support for terrorists. If the current polarisation in US domestic politics continues, any reaction will be obstructed and delayed. An especially vulnerable window of opportunity is in the period between the presidential elections in November 2016 and the installation of the new president in January 2017, which could create a legitimacy problem for the American political system when it comes to the possibilities of directly confronting Russia quickly. An attack on any Baltic state would directly affect Swedish territory and air space. In the worst-case scenario, it will happen immediately before open conflict with NATO. The Baltic states each offer different opportunities for Russia, but they all have in common that they lack any strategic depth, which means that an open invasion would be accomplished in a few days, unless support from other alliance members is forthcoming. Estonia, which is the most powerful of the three, both economically and military, poses as a potential threat to the trade over St Petersburg. To control the maritime traffic through the Gulf of Finland is an important motive for Russia to influence Estonian politics. The population of Estonia, with 25 percent ethnic Russians, could be used to legimize action and as grounds for destabilisation, especially around the border town Narva where more than 90% of the population is ethnic Russian. Latvia is the most vulnerable of the three states. The economy is weaker; the Russian minority is about the same as in Estonia; and Russian organised crime has a strong hold. Especially the eastern parts of the country are vulnerable to Russian influence. Lithuania only have about six percent ethnic Russians and a stronger military tradition. On the other hand, Lithuania offers access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s attempts to decrease their dependence on energy from Russia has annoyed the Russian regime, as is evident in the harassments by the Russian navy of the cabling operation which will connect the Lithuanian grid to Sweden. There are also some tensions surrounding the Polish minorities in the country which Russia could exploit. How fast Sweden will become involved depends on the extent of open, armed actions against one or all of the Baltic States. If a confrontation occurs with non-regular or paramilitary means, maintaining dominance over Swedish territory and territorial waters will be in focus. The same will be the case for Finland, but Finnish action could be influenced by Russian fabrication of tensions in Karelia, that Helsinki could be blamed for. NATO would try to respond in a controlled manner, i.e. prioritizing transports by air and sea. This would mean greatly increased traffic in and over the Baltic Sea. Tensions will rise drastically, with increased risks of miscalculations on both sides. Sweden and Finland are expected to act together with the rest of the EU and the US. If no direct military threat emerges against Sweden, then Sweden cannot count on any enforcements from the rest of the world apart from mutual information exchange. The instance that the citizens in the Baltic states perceive a risk of a Russian incursion, the probability is high that a flow of refugees will commence. From Lithuania, the biggest flow will be to Poland while Latvian will flee to Sweden, mainly Gotland. Refugees from Estonia can be expected to flee towards Finland or Sweden depending on where in the country they live and where they have relations or connections. In the worst-case scenario, Swedish and Finnish territory will become an arena for hostilities. As Russian readiness exercises have shown, airborne and marine infantry could rapidly and with surprise occupy parts of Gotland and Åland. A possible option is also to mine the Danish Straits in connection with this. By supplies of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, Russian forces can temporarily extend their air and coastal defence in the Baltic Sea, protecting an incursion by land into the Baltic states. NATO would be faced with a fait accompli. The invasion does not need to happen in all three states nor include the entire territory of a country. The only thing that is needed is a demonstration of NATO’s inability to defend alliance members. This would establish a new security order. Depending on the level of conflict that Russia would be willing to risk, air and navy bases in Sweden and Finland could be struck with missiles from the ground, air and sea. It is, however, likely that the governments would be issued an ultimatum to remain neutral, with only a few hours to comply. Public announcement of the ultimatum would put immense pressure on the political system and weaken resistance. Such diplomatic tactics could be reinforced by forced cyber attacks on the electricity and telecommunication networks. During the coldest months of the year, the vulnerability would be the highest. At the same time, Sweden would be expected to support their Western partners’ need for transports into the theatre of action. If Russia would close the Danish Straits, any military support to the Baltic states would need to move over Swedish territory; such as air support Norwegian air bases or aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea. There would also be demands to clear of mines in Oresund, and possibly for allowing equipment and troop transports to harbours on the east coast for further transport across the Baltic Sea. The Swedish to such demands would have consequences for generations to come. If Gotland would not be occupied by Russian forces, NATO would demand to set up bases on the island. The smallest indication of acquiescing to such demands would have the Russians racing to the island. Furthermore, Russia would coordinate activities in the far north, with submarines of all kinds and possibly even direct action in northern Finland and even in northern Sweden, in order to expand Russian air defence. Faced with the risk of direct confrontations between Russian and American forces, Russia could mount land-based as well as amphibian operations in the north of Norway and on Svalbard, to improve the defence of Murmansk. Following a similar strategy, occupying parts of Bornholm would make it more difficult for NATO to support their members. This is probably not necessary, but it is a possible option. In most people’s minds, there is a sharp line between the Baltic states’ eastern borders and Russia, the crossing of which is unconceivable. By first gaining the control over Gotland and Åland, the Russian General Army Staff could circumvent a mental Maginot line, in the same way as Germany attacked France through Benelux in May 1940. Russian success in this scenario hinges on speed and the ability to contain the conflict. The first message to Washington will entail the understanding that this is not a direct conflict between the US. For Russia, the uncertainty is therefore how US interests are perceived from an American perspective. For the US, it is not just the credibility of NATO that is at stake but also the unity of the EU. This has global connotations since allies (and enemies) in the Middle East and Asia will also form assumptions regarding the willingness and ability of the US to act in order to protect their allies. The risk is obviously that Russia miscalculates and underestimates the difference between, for instance, the departing presidential administration perceptions of US security interests on the one hand with the wider US security establishment’s perception of these on the other. During the whole process, the threat of nuclear strikes would hover over all decision makers, which increases the degree of uncertainty. Nuclear tests in the period before a test of strength cannot be ruled out, especially since Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence could lose credibility over time. Direct threats of using the nuclear weapons is, however, completely excluded in this scenario.

## Case

#### Turn – The plan’s terrible. Increased weed innovation and reduced weed prices don’t shut down cartels, but make them transform to worse markets – meth, coke, sex trafficking, and heroin

Ioan Grillo 15, 2-9-2015, [Based in Mexico City, Ioan Grillo was GlobalPost senior correspondent covering Mexico and Latin America. "As US marijuana legalization spreads, Mexican 'mota' takes a dive," World from PRX, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-02-09/us-marijuana-legalization-spreads-mexican-mota-takes-dive]//anop

MEXICO CITY — As President Barack Obama trumpets that the United States economy is back on track, industry groups are shouting over who’s growing faster. The accounting sector boasted 2014 growth of 11 percent; computer systems of 14 percent; and real estate of a whopping 23 percent, says financial information group Sageworks. However, one industry may have beaten those hands down: legal marijuana. 2/4 According to a new report by The ArcView Group, a cannabis industry investment and research firm based in California, legal marijuana sales rocketed 74 percent in 2014 to a new high of $2.7 billion. And with more states legalizing weed — Alaska, Oregon and Washington, DC, voted to join the legal stoners in November — it predicts this growth pace could continue for several more years straight. However, winners in some places often mean losers in others. And the losers appear to be south of the Rio Grande: Mexican marijuana growers, who’ve provided the lion’s share of cannabis for American smokers for decades. In 2014, the US Border Patrol saw a plunge in seizures of pot heading northward. Its agents nabbed 1.9 million pounds of ganja, a 24 percent reduction compared with the 2.5 million seized in 2011 — before Colorado and Washington State first voted to legalize recreational marijuana. Capturing less drugs doesn’t necessarily mean less drugs are coming over. Agents could be working less or focusing more on other problems. Yet one sign they are as vigilant as ever is that they made increased seizures of some other drugs, especially crystal meth, which was busted in record quantities. More from GlobalPost: Here’s a meth cook who’s helping boost Mexico’s drug traffic to the US Mexican security forces have also noted a dive in marijuana production. In the most recent figures released in September, the Mexican government said that it had seized 971 metric tons (1,070 US tons) of cannabis inside Mexico in 2013, the lowest amount since 2000. “It looks like the US market for illegal Mexican marijuana will keep shrinking.” “In the long run, it looks like the US market for illegal Mexican marijuana will keep shrinking,” says Alejandro Hope, a drug expert in Mexico. “The logic of the legal marijuana market is that it will force prices down. This would take out the big profits from the illegal market. A good way to make some money could be to short the prices of marijuana.” As well as price problems, Mexican producers also have to compete with quality. The legal US suppliers focus on high-grade weed, selling brands with glamorous names like “Skunk Red Hair,” “Sky Dog” and “Super Haze” in the S section of the shelves, to “Hypno,” “Hindu Kush” and “Himalayan Gold” if you look under H. They are often labeled with their exact amount of THC, the ingredient that gets you intoxicated. They are also graded for their mix of indica, the strain that makes users stoned in a more knockout way, and sativa, which hits people in a more psychedelic way. 3/4 On the other hand, Mexican marijuana, known here as “mota,” is a mass-produced lowergrade crop, grown mostly outdoors in the mountains. It doesn’t have a fancy brand name, or tell you how spaced out or sleepy you will feel; it will just get you wasted. Hitting the cartels Drug smugglers, some wearing life vests, carry loads of marijuana, according to US federal agents, as seen from a helicopter flown by the US Office of Air and Marine in September near Rio Grande City, Texas. When advocates campaigned to legalize weed in Colorado and Washington states in 2012, they argued it was better to take the cash away from Mexican cartels and put it into taxes. Former President Vicente Fox also made this case after leaving office when he visited a university in Boulder, Colo., in 2011. “The drug consumer in the US yields billions of dollars, money that goes back to Mexico to bribe police and money that buys guns,” Fox said. “So when you question yourselves [sic] about what is going on in Mexico, it depends very much on what happens in this nation.” If Mexican marijuana is now sinking, it could indeed be reducing cartels’ budgets to commit mass murder. Mexico’s total homicides have gone down during the time that some US states legalized grass. Killings reached a peak in 2011 of 22,852, and then dropped to 15,649 last year, according to the Mexican government’s numbers. However, other aspects could have played a role, too. Among them are the capture or killing of some of the most brutal drug lords, including Heriberto “The Executioner” Lazcano, the head of the Zetas cartel whom Mexican marines gunned down in 2012. Mexican gangs also have a range of other businesses. Not only do they traffic crystal meth, heroin and cocaine, they have also diversified into crimes from sex trafficking to illegal iron mining. More from GlobalPost: How Mexico’s cartel crackdown smashed its iron industry Mexican meth and heroin appear to have gone up as marijuana has dropped — at least, if narcotics seizures are the gauge. Last year, the US seized a record 34,840 pounds of methamphetamine at the Mexican border. Still, longtime experts in illegal markets say there may not be any correlation between the hikes in some drugs and dives in others. “There are lots of variables at play here, complicated factors of both demand and supply that create the markets in these drugs,” says Sanho Tree, director of the Drug Policy Project at Washington’s Institute of Policy Studies. 4/4 “One reason for the rise in heroin use is that many doctors have over-prescribed opiate drugs to patients,” he adds, referring to legal pain treatments. “The patients have got hooked and have later turned to the illegal heroin.” But there’s another factor that could seriously affect marijuana market trends: Mexico could itself legalize it. In 2009, the country decriminalized the possession of small amounts of drugs, including marijuana. And citizens here as elsewhere were amazed when Uruguay became the first entire country to legalize weed in 2013. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has spoken against legalization but says he’s open to debate. Former President Fox is an advocate and even said he would like to team up with an American entrepreneur to import it to the United States. If Mexico did legalize the plant, its cheaper labor costs could give it an edge over US producers. And while some consumers could want the higher-grade California strains, others could still choose the cheapest price. “Cannabis is not unlike wine,” Tree says. “I can buy a $200 bottle of wine, if that is what I am after. But many people will prefer the cheaper, mass-market product. And if all the prohibition factors are taken out, then marijuana is really just an herb that can be produced very cheaply.” Want a seat at the table? Every morning, the editorial team at public radio’s international news show The World meets to plan what they'll cover that day. Want to see what's on deck? Sign up for our daily newsletter TOP OF THE WORLD and get the big stories we’re tracking delivered to your inbox every weekday morning.

#### Laundry list of alt causes – other more potent drugs, still importing cannabis even though it’s legalized which turns case, and controlling and killing public officials which independently causes Mexican instability.

CFR ’21 [The Council on Foreign Relations, founded in 1921, is a United States nonprofit think tank specializing in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs, “Mexico’s Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels”, 02-26-2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels]//pranav

Mexican drug trafficking groups—sometimes referred to as transnational criminal organizations—dominate the import and distribution of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine in the United States. Mexican suppliers are responsible for most heroin and methamphetamine production, while cocaine is largely produced in Colombia and then transported to the United States by Mexican criminal organizations. Mexico, along with China, is also a leading source of fentanyl, a synthetic opioid many times more potent than heroin. The amount of fentanyl seized by Mexican authorities nearly quintupled between 2019 and 2020. At the same time, the cartels smuggle vast quantities of marijuana into the United States, even though some U.S. jurisdictions have legalized it. Mexico’s drug cartels are in a constant state of flux. Over the decades, they have grown, splintered, forged new alliances, and battled one another for territory. The cartels that pose the most significant drug trafficking threats [PDF] to the United States, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), are: Sinaloa Cartel. Formerly led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, Sinaloa is one of Mexico’s oldest and most influential drug trafficking groups. With strongholds in the northwest and along Mexico’s Pacific coast, it has a larger international footprint than any of its Mexican rivals. In 2017, Mexican authorities extradited Guzman to the United States, where he is serving a life sentence for multiple drug-related charges. Jalisco New Generation Cartel. Also known as CJNG, Jalisco splintered from Sinaloa in 2010 and is among Mexico’s swiftest-growing cartels, with operations in more than two-thirds of Mexico’s states. According to the DEA, the “rapid expansion of its drug trafficking activities is characterized by the organization’s willingness to engage in violent confrontations” with authorities and other cartels. U.S. officials link the cartel to more than one-third of the drugs in the United States. Juarez Cartel. A long-standing rival of Sinaloa, Juarez has its stronghold in the north-central state of Chihuahua, across the border from New Mexico and Texas. Gulf Cartel. Its base of power is in the northeast, especially the state of Tamaulipas. In the past decade, Gulf has splintered into various factions, diluting its strength as it battles for territory with Los Zetas. Los Zetas. Originally a paramilitary enforcement arm for the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas was singled out by the DEA in 2007 as the country’s most “technologically advanced, sophisticated, and violent” group of its kind. It splintered from Gulf in 2010 and held sway over swaths of eastern, central, and southern Mexico. However, it has lost power in recent years and fractured into rival wings. Beltran-Leyva Organization. The group formed when the Beltran-Leyva brothers split from Sinaloa in 2008. Since then, all four brothers have been arrested or killed, but their loyalists operate throughout Mexico. The organization’s splinter groups have become more autonomous and powerful, maintaining ties to Jalisco, Juarez, and Los Zetas. Experts point to both domestic and international forces. In Mexico, the cartels use a portion of their vast profits to pay off judges, police, and politicians. They also coerce officials into cooperating; assassinations of public servants are relatively common. The cartels flourished during the decades that Mexico was ruled by a single party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Within this centralized political structure, drug trafficking groups cultivated a wide network of corrupt officials through which they were able to gain distribution rights, market access, and protection. The PRI’s unbroken reign finally ended in 2000 with the election of President Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN). With new politicians in power, cartels ramped up violence against the government in an effort to reestablish their hold [PDF] on the state. At the international level, Mexican cartels began to take on a much larger role in the late 1980s, after U.S. government agencies broke up Caribbean networks used by Colombian cartels to smuggle cocaine. Mexican gangs eventually shifted from being couriers for Colombian criminal organizations to being wholesalers. The U.S. government, despite waging a “war on drugs” and conducting other counternarcotics efforts abroad, has made little progress in reducing the demand for illegal drugs. In 2016, Americans spent almost $150 billion on cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine, 50 percent more than in 2010. Meanwhile, growing use of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, has contributed to a public health crisis.

#### Thailand legalizes marijuana now & revoked foreign patents on it, but the aff changes that by giving access to the drug to traffickers which the government hates.

Reuters ’19 [Reuters, “Thailand to revoke foreign patent requests on marijuana”, 01-28-2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-cannabis/thailand-to-revoke-foreign-patent-requests-on-marijuana-idUSKCN1PM1FU]//pranav

BANGKOK (Reuters) - Thailand on Monday effectively revoked all foreign patent requests for the use of marijuana, after fears foreign firms would dominate a market thrown open last month when the government approved the drug for medical use and research. The junta-appointed parliament in Thailand, a country which until the 1930s had a tradition of using marijuana to relieve pain and fatigue, voted to amend the Narcotic Act of 1979 in December in what it described as “a New Year’s gift to the Thai people”. While countries from Colombia to Canada have legalized marijuana for medical or even recreational use, the drug remains illegal and taboo across much of Southeast Asia. But in Thailand, the main controversy with the legalization involved patent requests by two foreign firms, British giant GW Pharmaceuticals and Japan’s Otsuka Pharmaceutical, filed before the change to the law. Thai civil society groups and researchers feared domination by foreign firms could make it harder for Thai patients to get access to medicines and for Thai researchers to get marijuana extracts. The military government issued a special executive order on Monday enabling the Department of Intellectual Property to revoke all pending patents that involve cannabis, or remove marijuana from those patents, within 90 days. “The pending patent requests are illegal,” Somchai Sawangkarn, a member of parliament responsible for amending the Narcotic Act told Reuters. “This NCPO order is beneficial for Thai people across the country because it prevents a monopolistic contract,” he said referring to the junta by its official name, the National Council for Peace and Order. Reuters did not have contact details for spokesmen for either of the two foreign firms and the companies did not immediately respond to emailed requests for comment. Companies with a request pending can appeal to the Department of Intellectual Property, the government said in an order, published on an official website. Marijuana remains illegal and taboo across much of Southeast Asia, and traffickers can be subject to the death penalty in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The new legislation on marijuana has yet to come into effect. All Thai laws must receive royal approval.

Zero impact uniqueness – Latin America instability caused by drug cartels has been happening for decades, no warrant why its uniquely worse now or can be solved by only weed

No internal link between Grinberg and Soumaya – just because cartels can buy off police doesn’t mean China or Russia will cause instability – they’ve conflated instability caused by cartels and instability caused by foreign powers gaining influence in Latin America, no nuke war.

Lauria is majorly powertagged, marijuana can’t solve all of water scarcity – it only creates efficient uses of water, but that doesn’t get us MORE water since other crops are still inefficient.

Link turn – legalizing marijuana and creating more strains leads to MORE water use since more people will grow it, even if its efficient, it still takes more.

No internal link to biod – a) naturally occurring cannabis b) non-uq bc decrease now

#### squo solves OR the plan can’t.

Sandra Weiss 20, staff writer, 4-4-2020, "How the coronavirus lockdown is hitting Mexico's drug cartels," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-coronavirus-lockdown-is-hitting-mexicos-drug-cartels/a-53001784

Drug production hit by lack of chemicals The lockdown has also dried up the supply of imported Chinese chemicals needed to produce synthetic drugs. Prior to the virus outbreak, for example, China's Hubei province was a major exporters of fentanyl, an opioid. But now, Mexico's big Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) drug cartels are lacking the raw materials to produce drugs, as insightcrime.org reports. According to Mexican weekly Riodoce, Sinaloa boss Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada has therefore hiked the market price for synthetic drugs. It reports that the price for 1 pound (just under half a kilogram) of methamphetamine, a stimulant widely known as crystal meth, has now shot up from 2,500 pesos (€95/$102) to 15,000 pesos. Getting illegal substances into the United States has become much more difficult, too. "Five days ago was the last time we brought something across the border. Just three kilos," said a smuggler from Mexicali, speaking to blogdelnarco, a platform covering Mexican organized crime. "We have arrangements with border police and our smugglers know which borders posts to use. But now, many crossing have surprisingly been shut. That makes our business much more risky." Fewer flights, more checks As many commercial flights have been canceled and air traffic has declined across Latin America, it has now become easier for authorities to spot planes carrying illegal drugs. Several days ago, for example, a light aircraft from Colombia carrying drugs was detected when it crash-landed in Honduras. The plane had been registered as an ambulance aircraft. The repercussions of the coronavirus lockdown are making it increasingly difficult for Mexican drug cartels to operate, reports insightcrime.org. But the platform also says that "large organizations like CJNG, who operate in many illegal business sectors and regions, are finding it easier to adapt to these challenges and to withstand the recession." Even though coronavirus-related news is dominating the headlines, this of course doesn't mean there have been fewer violent incidents in Mexico lately. On Tuesday, a hit squad mowed down a Veracruz journalist. And since Mexico introduced its first safety measures to curb the virus outbreak on March 23, 646 people have been murdered, according to official statistics. Last year, an average 95 individuals per day died a violent death in Mexico. There has also been a rise in looting in recent weeks. And turf wars have broken out once more in Guerrero and Michoacan state between different drug cartels. Javier Oliva, a professor of political science at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, expects tensions between cartels to grow amid the coronavirus lockdown, and also predicts a spike in street crime and burglaries.

#### No spillover – Latin American stability has been improving for years.

Velasco 17 [Andrés Velasco, ormer presidential candidate and finance minister of Chile, is Professor of Professional Practice in International Development at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, 7-15-2017, "Consolidating Latin America’s Gains," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/consolidating-latin-america-gains-by-andres-velasco-2017-07]

SANTIAGO – At the time of last year’s failed coup in Turkey, I emailed a Turkish friend expressing concern. His answer left me thinking. After a somber review of events in his country, he concluded: “You are very lucky to be in Latin America, even though it may not seem that way sometimes.” We Latin Americans are complainers. We shudder to think that other people’s lot could be worse than ours. But if a Latin American views today’s world objectively, it’s easy to understand why many would consider us fortunate. Terrorism is on the rise in Europe, just as Colombia’s civil war, the region’s last, is ending. Argentines, Brazilians, and Chileans of my generation grew up with heavily armed soldiers patrolling airports, train stations, and other public places. Today we see the same in Brussels, Paris, and London, not here. Compared to US President Donald Trump, some of Latin America’s populist politicians seem almost competent and well informed. But this is not the first time Latin Americans can feel this way. As Carlos Díaz-Alejandro, the great Cuban-American economic historian, put it: “Reviewing the 1930s and 1940s, most Latin Americans could feel lucky, at least relative to the rest of humanity. The Spanish and the Chinese Civil Wars, World War II, the depth of depression in the United States, Stalinist purges, the political dependence of Asia and Africa, and the pains of decolonization in India and elsewhere could be viewed by Brazilians and Mexicans as remote events that could not happen here any more.” The sharpest contrast was political. “In contrast with the ideological, religious, and ethnic frenzies of Europe, India, and even North America,” Díaz-Alejandro continues, “most Latin Americans viewed themselves then as tolerant, a view largely correct at least in relative terms, and demonstrated by the many refugees who found a haven in the region.” The year 1948 saw the outbreak of “la violencia” in Colombia; today we witness the murderous persecution of President Nicolás Maduro’s political opponents in Venezuela. Political repression was common in Central America back then, and remains common in Cuba today. But they are the exceptions that confirm the rule. Just as “the 1930s and 1940s witnessed little political bloodletting in Latin America,” in Díaz-Alejandro’s words, the same is largely true today. Our democracies remain imperfect, but the region’s increasing political stability is undeniable. We have had our share of wild-eyed populists recently. But with the exception of Venezuela, where authoritarian chavistas remain in power despite massive opposition, populism is on the wane. In Ecuador, former president Rafael Correa managed to get his handpicked successor elected, but low oil prices and dollar shortages make a turn toward policy moderation quite likely. In Argentina, President Mauricio Macri, who ousted the Peronist-populist Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, remains popular despite an inevitable economic adjustment and slow growth. The 1930s and 1940s were a time of great social and political change in the region. Migration from abroad and from the countryside to the city gave rise to a new urban middle class employed mostly in government-related jobs. The political clout of traditional land-owning elites declined, and powerful new working-class-based parties began to emerge. Today, a new middle class – employed mostly in private firms – is on the rise. In many countries, consumption has been booming, even as economic growth slows. Shopping malls crop up in newly built suburbs, and Facebook has made it to the smallest Andean village. Economic inequality remains high, but income disparities in Latin America have been narrowing for nearly two decades, just as they widened in the United States and Europe.

### Cartels Good

#### Legalization causes cartels to compete over new revenue streams

Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies, “Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America,” September ‘11

Often, criminal groups function as security providers (suboptimal as they are), regulating and punishing theft, robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their rules and punishments for transgressions. The removal of the criminal gangs often results **in a rise of** street **crime** that can become a critical nuisance to the community and **discredit** the presence of the State and its law enforcement. That has in fact been the case in both Medellín in the post-Don Berna order as well as in the pacified favelas of Rio.14 Especially in areas where police have been trained as light counterinsurgency forces (in Latin America, unlike South Asia, this is more often a problem in rural areas rather than in urban spaces) they may be undertrained, under-resourced, and not focused on addressing street crime. Even community-policing forces may have little capacity to undertake criminal investigations that lead to meaningful prosecution, yet police units specialized in criminal investigations may continue to be too far away and have limited access to a pacified urban space to conduct investigations that reduce street crime. Providing training to community police forces for tackling at least some street crime and streamlining and facilitating the presence of specialized criminal investigation units, such as homicide squads and prosecutors, are of critical importance for improving public safety for the community and for anchoring State presence in the pacified areas. Under some circumstances, law enforcement actions against the governing criminal entity may give rise to **intense turf warfare** among other criminal groups over the spoils of the criminal market. After Don Berna was extradited to the United States, for example, many criminal gangs in and around Medellín, including two large ones led by Sebastian and Valenciano, began fighting each other over smuggling routes, local drug distribution, prostitution enterprises, and protection rackets. The turf war triggered **extensive violence**, including homicide rates in over 100per 100,000 in the late 2000s and on par with those before the FARC was defeated in the city, and Don Berna established his “narco-peace”.15 Similarly in Mexico, law enforcement actions against established DTOs triggered **intense violence** among splinter groups and new gangs, such as in the Mexican state of Michoacán where interdiction operations against La Familia Michoacana have given rise to Los Templarios. That criminal gang has since been battling with Los Zetas, another of Mexican DTOs originating as splinter group, over control of criminal markets in the state. Such turf wars can compromise **the physical and economic security of local communities** far more than even the previous criminal order. In some circumstances, an urban area to which State presence has been extended may even suffer a **peace deficit.** Along with or instead of the hoped-for peace dividend of legal businesses moving into the urban space and providing legal jobs and income, the new areas may be attractive as a source of new land to be taken over by nefarious land developers. Such demands for land in the newly “pacified” urban areas may generate new **forced land displacement**, instead of benevolent gentrification. In rural spaces, the cause of such new illegal displacement may be the presence of profitable resources, such as gold, coal, and others, or the agricultural potential of the land, such as for African oil palm plantations. In urban spaces, housing development and real estate speculation may well drive such illegal displacement. Competition over State resources inserted to “pacified” areas, such as for socio-economic development, may generate new temptations of illegal behavior. Militias or new criminal groups seeking to set up new protection rackets and usurp the inserted State resources may well emerge. Many urban spaces in Colombia suffer from such old-new criminality today, as they have historically. Local community forces, even while effective at keeping the old criminals out, may not have the capacity to prevent such nefarious activities **cloaked as legal development**. At the same time, criminal units specializing in white-collar organized crime and asset expropriation are often located in the city center of a State capital far away from the “pacified” slums and may be paying little attention to such phenomena in the newly-liberated spaces. Moreover, since such land takeover and asset expropriation may well be linked to legal and politically-powerful developers, municipal authorities may lack the motivation to pay close attention to such criminal developments in the “pacified” urban areas. Yet without diligent and concerted law enforcement actions against such new crime, the benefits of the complex and costly State interventions in the marginalized urban areas may be altogether lost. Instead of addressing the **causes** of illegal economies and violent organized crime by strengthening effective and accountable State presence, the State intervention may ultimately only alter the manifestation **of illegality and displace existing problems** to other areas. Not only criminality and criminal gangs, but also the marginalized residents of the urban shantytowns themselves may merely be forced out **to other slums**.

#### breakup of cartels causes massive violence – empirics

Dotinga 14 (Randy, "Tijuana Violence Ticks Up, But Don’t Blame Cartels," Voice of San Diego, April 18, voiceofsandiego.org/2014/04/18/tijuana-violence-ticks-up-but-dont-blame-cartels/)

Why did violence suddenly explode in 2008, a year after Mexico saw a record-low homicide rate?¶ The Sinaloa Cartel and its former partners suddenly began to fight against each other. We’re not sure why the feud broke out between those organizations, but it led to a no-holds-barred attempt to take over major zones of control in different parts of Mexico, especially along the border.¶ As a result, we saw an explosion of violence in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and (the Mexican state of) Nuevo Leon from 2008-2010.¶ But in 2011, things had begun to shift. There were 418 homicides in Tijuana that year, and people were already talking about how good things were.¶ Of course, 10-15 years ago, no one would have found close to 500 homicides to be an acceptable level.¶ How has violence in Tijuana evolved from the worst days of the drug-war period?¶ It’s a different kind of violence now.¶ You don’t see bodies hanging from bridges, decapitated heads, running gun battles in the streets of Tijuana.¶ Instead, there’s more localized, street-corner violence among local criminals fighting over turf, nothing like what we saw in 2008 and 2009.¶ What does the current level of violence mean for residents of Tijuana who aren’t criminals?¶ I don’t think the change in the level of violence — 160 additional homicides — has the same direct effect on daily lives as the 2008 violence, which was really terrifying for people in Tijuana.¶ For ordinary citizens, for schoolkids, for housewives, for businesspeople, this does not mean a major change in their day-to-day lifestyle. If you’re driving your kids to school every day, this year is no different than last year.¶ In 2008, you were much more likely to be directly confronted with a sign of this violence.¶ You were driving under those bridges and seeing those guys hanging from them. I had Mexican students who’d go shopping at Costco and see someone run out with an automatic weapon in front of their car.¶ I don’t think what we saw last year entered the radar screen of ordinary people.¶ What calmed the drug wars?¶ Part of the reason we’re seeing things calm down is that competition has largely eroded. The Sinaloa Cartel largely won. You have one big organization that calls the shots, and nobody really challenges them.¶ The cartel is still very strong even after the arrest of leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman. It’s still the largest and most powerful organization, and his business partners who are at large still have effective control of the organization’s drug operations.¶ When there’s no competition in the black market, it’s a terrible thing if you’re trying to stop the flow of drugs. But it’s a great thing if you want peace.¶

**Revenue losses cause intra-cartel struggles for control – increases violence**

Viridiana **Rios**, Department of Government, Harvard University, “Why did Mexico become so violent? A self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement,” 9 August **‘12**, Trends in Organized Crime

With almost 41,648 drug-related homicides in the country in the last 4 and 1/2 years, Mexico has changed nearly beyond recognition. Some cities, particularly those located close to the U.S. border, have experienced spikes in violence that transformed them into war zones, in a very literal sense. Mexico’s recent changes are particularly puzzling given that the country has long been a large supplier of drugs into the US and had always filled this role in a non-violent manner. The purpose of this article has been to explain the reasons behind these changes in drug-related homicides. Using the case of La Familia, a drug-trafficking organization operating mainly in the states of Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Guerrero, this study shows that Mexico’s trafficking industry went from a **stable**, **peaceful equilibrium into a self-reinforcing violent equilibrium because of** increases in **illegal**-drug **market competitions** and in law enforcement operations. Drug-related violence can be explained as the outcome of two variables: (1) homicides caused by traffickers confronting each other to compete for territories (“competition”), and (2) enforcement operations conducted by authorities to capture drug traffickers (“enforcement”). Violence resulted when illegal markets became more competitive as a result of changes in Mexico’s drug-trafficking industry. Lacking a central enforcement agency to deal with these changes, violence erupted. Violence also increased when enforcement operations against traffickers were conducted by the authorities. As the quantitative model showed, for each instance of competition or enforcement measured, the number of drug-related targeted executions increased by 0.979. Enforcement operations have had a further damaging effect which has locked Mexico into **a self-reinforcing violent equilibrium.** When traffickers are killed or captured by the government, the **internal structure** of criminal organizations **destabilize**, which provides **further incentives** for other organizations to try to take control over the territory of the weakened one. Furthermore, the process of replacing leadership within a trafficking organization is inherently complex, which means that in most cases, the capture of the leader leads to internal battles within the drug trafficking organizations. This study shows that the reasons why Mexico has become violent can be understood by looking at La Familia areas of operation. The interaction of competition and enforcement is what has brought the country into the vicious cycle of violence that we call the drug war. Mexican authorities have followed a strategy of increased enforcement assuming that the only way to get out of this self-reinforcing violent equilibrium is by remaining within it for a longer time. Following this logic, in the long-term, law enforcement operations will weaken drug trafficking organizations enough to drive them out of business, at which point violence will stop. **Some recent evidence**, particularly from Michoacán and Chihuahua, **seems to show** that by late 2011 **increases in drug-related violence have stopped. Is this the beginning of the end of the cycle of violence? Only time will tell.10**

#### Legalization is the only scenario for violence to spread – the aff can only lead to net more violence

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Violent, brutal, and ruthless, Mexican DTOs will work to maintain their black-market profits at the expense of American citizens’ safety. Every week, there are news articles cataloguing the murders, kidnappings, robberies, and other thuggish brutality employed by Mexican drug gangs along the border. It is nonsensical to argue that these gangs will simply give up producing marijuana when it is legalized; indeed, their profits might soar, depending on the actual tax in California and the economics of the interstate trade. While such profits might not be possible if marijuana was legalized at the national level and these gangs were undercut by mass production, that is unlikely ever to happen. Nor does anyone really believe that the gangs will subject themselves to state and local regulation, including taxation. And since the California ballot does nothing to eliminate the black market for marijuana—quite the opposite, in fact—legalizing marijuana will only incentivize Mexican DTOs to grow more marijuana to feed the demand and exploit the black market. Furthermore, should California legalize marijuana, other entrepreneurs will inevitably attempt to enter the marketplace and game the system. In doing so, they will compete with Mexican DTOs and other criminal organizations. Inevitably, violence will follow, and unlike now, that violence will not be confined to the border as large-scale growers seek to protect their turf—turf that will necessarily include anywhere they grow, harvest, process, or sell marijuana. While this may sound far-fetched, Californians in Alameda County are already experiencing the reality of cartel-run marijuana farms on sometimes stolen land,[54] protected by “guys [who] are pretty heavily armed and willing to protect their merchandise.”[55] It is not uncommon for drugs with large illegal markets to be controlled by cartels despite attempts to roll them into the normal medical control scheme. For instance, cocaine has a medical purpose and can be prescribed by doctors as Erythroxylum coca, yet its true production and distribution are controlled by drug cartels and organized crime.[56] As competition from growers and dispensaries authorized by the RCTCA cuts further into the Mexican DTOs’ business, Californians will face a real possibility of bloodshed on their own soil as the cartels’ profit-protection measures turn from defensive to offensive. Thus, marijuana legalization will increase crime, drug use, and social dislocation across the state of California—the exact opposite of what pro-legalization advocates promise.

#### The aff just gives domestic companies a window – that doesn’t mean they will catch up to foreign monopolies

#### Monopolies can still manipulate even without patents