# 1NC-Round 3-Glenbrooks

## 1

#### Business recovery is strong. Business confidence is high.

Halloran ’9-14 [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we remain encouraged by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are historically healthy and still have pent-up demand. Business confidence has rebounded with strong corporate profits that should support further capital spending and hiring (there are now more job openings than there are unemployed people by a record amount).

We expect to see further improvement in the international backdrop, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus and accelerating rates of vaccination. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, recent evidence confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from financial markets themselves remain positive. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain near record highs while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the lows of earlier this summer when concerns about Delta first emerged.

These factors support our view of a durable economic recovery from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains encouraging.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

The arguments in favor of unions are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is needed to combat job insecurity and economic inequality.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the basic point that the decline of union power is good news, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to stifle the welfare of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest protection for workers lies in a competitive economy that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by slashing the various restrictions that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are maximized by cutting the multitude of regulations and taxes that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less productive ends.

#### Recessions cause global crises – ensuring continued growth is key

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

ca, JD Candidate at Yale University Law School, AB from Harvard University, “To End Forever War, Keep the Dollar Globally Dominant”, The New Republic, 2/3/2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/156417/end-forever-war-keep-dollar-globally-dominant

In early 2016, Obama Treasury Secretary Jack Lew cautioned that the dollar’s dominance as a global currency rested, in part, on the U.S. government’s reluctance to fully weaponize it. If foreign markets and governments “feel that we will deploy sanctions without sufficient justification or for inappropriate reasons,” he warned, “we should not be surprised if they look for ways to avoid doing business in the United States or in U.S. dollars.” Lew’s case stemmed from the more fundamental view that the dollar’s international role is “a source of tremendous strength for our economy, a benefit for U.S. companies and a driver of U.S. global leadership”—in other words, a role worth keeping. This view is emblematic of American financial governance since the Second World War. U.S. economic analysts, especially at the Treasury, have jealously guarded the dollar’s role and the many benefits it offers: the ability to run large deficits at low cost and disproportionate influence over the structure of the global economy, among others. Yet in their recent article in The New Republic, David Adler and Daniel Bessner argue the U.S. should abandon these advantages. In their view, the dollar’s role has encouraged American militarism and should be relinquished to curb such behavior. Dollar hegemony is not without cost, but to renounce it would be a profound mistake. Adler and Bessner’s view neglects the sizable economic benefits the dollar’s role confers on the U.S., as well as its possible use as an antidote to military adventurism. It ignores the enormous good that can be done with deficit spending, much of which has gone to the American military but could instead fund progressive programs. And it elides the inability of the U.S. and its global trading partners to shift away from dollar dominance without creating worldwide financial distress. Adler and Bessner are right that the U.S. has misused its privilege, but Washington should not abandon it; rather, American leaders should seek to transform it. Generations of American policymakers have been right to protect the dollar’s key currency role for economic reasons. Most notably, dollar hegemony affords the U.S. the ability to run large and prolonged budget and balance-of-payments deficits. The dollar represents 62 percent of allocated foreign exchange reserves, is used to invoice and settle roughly half of world trade, and accounts for 42 percent of global payments. Because governments, banks, and businesses worldwide need lots of dollars, the world market always stands ready to absorb new U.S.-dollar-denominated debt without charging higher interest rates. Adler and Bessner correctly point out that the rest of the world considers the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency to be an “exorbitant privilege,” a term coined in the 1960s by then French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard D’Estaing. The ability to spend beyond its means has enabled the U.S. to fund its impressive military might, whether one views that power as the fountainhead of Pax Americana or the source of illegitimate military adventurism. But these economic benefits go beyond just deficits. The demand for dollars also pushes up the dollar’s value against other currencies, enhancing American purchasing power and offering consumers access to imports on the cheap. The dollar’s role also means American firms rarely need to do business in foreign currencies, reducing transaction costs and exchange-rate risks. More broadly, America’s central economic role gives it outsize influence at crucial moments. At the height of the financial crisis that began in 2008, the Federal Reserve was able to inject vital liquidity into the global financial system by selectively offering dollar swap lines to trusted foreign central banks. Dollar hegemony enabled the U.S. to act swiftly, effectively, and on its own terms. In addition, the dollar’s role offers a potent alternative to kinetic military action as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. The dollar’s broad use means access to dollar liquidity—which in turn requires access to the U.S. financial system—is essential for foreign governments and businesses. For foreign banks, especially, being cut off from dollar access is essentially a death sentence. That makes sanctions that do so a powerful tool in the international arena. In 2005, for example, the U.S. used the dollar to strike a devastating blow against North Korea without firing a single shot or even formally enacting sanctions. Using authority provided by Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the Department of the Treasury crippled Banco Delta Asia, a bank accused of facilitating illegal activity by the North Korean government, by merely threatening to cut off its access to the American financial system. Deposit outflows began within days; within weeks the bank was placed under government administration to avoid a full collapse. Pyongyang was hit hard, as other banks ceased their business with it to avoid meeting the same fate. Similarly, though the Trump administration has worked hard to undo it, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran to limit the development of nuclear weapons was made possible, in part, by painful dollar sanctions that brought Iran to the table. Far from being a proximate cause of military conflict, the dollar’s central global role has often been used to contain adversaries without military intervention. Still, skeptics are right to point out that the dollar’s role has indirectly funded American interventionism and that dollar sanctions have been overused, provoking the ire of American allies. But these facts suggest we should use our dollar power to forge a more progressive U.S. order, not abandon the advantage altogether. America’s exorbitant privilege need not fund warships and missiles: The same low-interest borrowing could be used to fund a new universal health care system, expand access to higher education, or pursue any number of large-scale social policy objectives, including financing global public goods that no other country or consortium of countries is prepared to fund, such as climate change mitigation.

## 2

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

#### 1] only it can explain degrees of wrongness- it is worse to kill thousands than to steal a quarter- either ethical theories cannot explain comparative badness, or it collapses

#### 2] risks breaks all non-consequentialist moral theories since all actions have some non-zero chance of causing a rights violation- that prevents evaluation of potential harms- only util solves- it can weigh probability times expected value

#### 3] actor spec-

#### A] gov’ts have to aggregate since all collective actions require trade-offs that benefit some and worsen others- side-constraints freeze action and render ethics inoperable- takes-out and turns calc indicts- consequentialism is hard but not impossible, it’s empirically false since we calculate all the time, and the alt is no action which is worse

#### B] special obligations and equality

Nagel, 79 **--** an American philosopher and University Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus at New York University, where he taught from 1980 to 2016. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics [Thomas Nagel, “Ruthlessness in public life,” *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pgs. 84-85, accessed 12-19-2018, HKR-LWZ]

\*\* public officials are contractually obligated by virtue of their role as public servants to equally prioritize all interests which requires consequentialism- only consequentialism recognizes the inherent equality of individuals- any other moral system arbitrarily prioritizes some over others

There is no comparable right of self-indulgence or favoritism for public officials or institutions vis-å-vis the individuals with whom they deal. Perhaps the most significant action-centered feature of public morality is a special requirement to treat people in the relevant population equally. Public policies and actions have to be much more impartial than private ones, since they usually employ a monopoly of certain kinds of power and since there is no reason in their case to leave room for the personal attachments and inclinations that shape individual lives.6

In respect to outcomes, public morality will differ from private in according them greater weight. This is a consequence of the weakening of certain action-centered constraints and permissions already described, which otherwise would have restrictive effects. The greater latitude about means in turn makes it legitimate to design institutions whose aim is to produce certain desirable results on a large scale, and to define roles in those institutions whose responsibility is mainly to further those results. Within the appropriate limits, public decisions will be justifiably more consequentialist than private ones. They will also have larger consequences to take into account.

To say that consequentialist reasons will be prominent is not to say what kinds of consequences matter. This is a well-worked field, and I shall avoid discussing the place of equality, liberty, autonomy and individual rights, as well as overall level of happiness, in a consequentialist view of the good. The point to remember is that consequentialist values need not be utilitarian; a consequentialist assessment of social institutions can be strongly egalitarian, in addition to valuing welfare, liberty, and individuality in themselves. Moreover, giving the members of a society the opportunity to lead their own lives free of consequentialist demands is one of the goods to be counted in a consequentialist social reckoning. But I will not try to present a complete system of public values here, for I am concerned with the more abstract claim that consequentialist considerations, together with impartiality, play a special role in the moral assessment and justification of public institutions.

#### 4] existential threats outweigh-

#### A] universalism

Baum and Wilson 14 — (Seth D. Baum and Grant S. Wilson are co-editors for the Global Catastrophe Risk Institute, “The Ethics of Global Catastrophic Risk from Dual-Use Bioengineering “, 1-7-2014, Available Online at https://sethbaum.com/ac/2013\_BioengineeringGCR.pdf, accessed 10-30-2018 | HKR-AT) \*\*bracketed for gendered language

B. Space-Time Universalism In consequentialism, universalism can be defined as the view that any given phenomenon holds the same intrinsic value regardless of when or where it exists.21 For example, universalist anthropocentric utilitarianism would value all human utility equally, regardless of where or when that utility exists. The utility of someone in India or Paraguay would hold the same intrinsic value as the utility of someone in Denmark or Senegal. Likewise the utility of someone alive in 2013 would hold the same intrinsic value as the utility of someone alive in 2014 or 2114 or even year 21114. Strong arguments can be made in favor of universalism. The simplest is to use a ‘God’s eye view’, looking at the world from ‘above’. From this standpoint there is no reason to value anyone any more or less than anyone else. Similar is the ‘veil of ignorance’, in which decisions are made as if the decision-maker doesn’t know which member of society she will end up being.22,23 In this case the decision-maker is forced to be equally fair to everyone since she has an equal chance of being any of these individuals. There is also a material logic to universalism: The same material phenomenon should have the same value in each of its instantiations, because each is materially identical. Finally, one might ask: Why is location in time or space a morally relevant criterion? Why should someone be intrinsically valued any differently just because of where or when she lives? We object to such bias,24,25 and indeed it reminds us of other objectionable biases such as racism and sexism. We therefore conclude in favor of universalism. Universalism is important to GCR because global catastrophes affect so many people – or ecosystems, or whatever global catastrophes are defined to affect. Suppose global catastrophes are defined in the usual anthropocentric fashion. Then global catastrophes affect millions or even billions of people throughout the world. Furthermore, global catastrophes (especially the largest ones) can affect future generations, denying many people the chance to exist. The extreme case of human extinction would kill everyone around the world and prevent everyone in all future generations from existing. A selfish person would care about none of this loss of life, except her own. A global catastrophe would be no more important than her own death. A car accident that kills her would be equally tragic as a nuclear war from which humanity never recovers. On the other hand, a universalist would care deeply about global catastrophes. Indeed, the universalist would not care much about her own death relative to all the others dying in a global catastrophe. As long as other people continue to exist, [their] her values would be realized. A global catastrophe would prevent many other people from continuing to exist, and so [they] she would care deeply about this. An important result is that GCR is considered equivalently for universalist variants of anthropocentric utilitarianism and several non-anthropocentric consequentialisms, including non-anthropocentric utilitarianism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. As long as each ethical view places positive intrinsic value on the continued existence of Earth-life (in contrast to e.g. negative utilitarianism), then these views all reach the same conclusion about GCR, namely that preventing the permanent destruction of human civilization is the key priority for this era. Reaching this conclusion requires looking to the very far future. First, note that life on Earth can continue to exist for about five billion more years, until the Sun becomes too hot and large for Earth life. Second, note that the rest of the galaxy could support life for many orders of magnitude longer,26 if Earth-originating life is able to colonize space. A similar orders of magnitude difference exists across space between Earth and the galaxy. If we are truly universalist – if we truly do assign intrinsic value equally for all locations in space and time – then this includes spaces and times beyond that of this planet. Most of the opportunity for intrinsic value exists beyond Earth, and so space colonization becomes a crucial objective, to spread intrinsic value throughout the galaxy. The importance of space colonization holds regardless of whether intrinsic value is placed on humans or non-humans. But presumably only humans can colonize space, as our species is the only one on the planet with the requisite advanced technology. And so, universalist consequentialism will recommend that humanity eventually colonize space to spread intrinsic value 4 throughout the galaxy. However, space colonization need not be an immediate goal. Humanity still has about five billion years left on Earth to figure space colonization out. Instead, the immediate goal should be to prevent global catastrophe, so that future generations can go on to colonize space.5,8 The importance of eventual space colonization provides some focus on which global catastrophes are most important, namely the global catastrophes that would prevent Earthoriginating civilization from eventually colonizing space. This focus is worth bearing in mind when evaluating specific GCRs. Finally, it should be noted that concern about GCR does not require universalism. As a simple case, imagine weighting everyone equally except yourself, and weighting yourself twice as much as everyone else. In this case GCR is only negligibly less important than under universalism. Another case involves applying a temporal discount rate (e.g. an exponential decay function) such that future times are valued less. In this case GCR can still be quite important, especially if the global catastrophe were to occur relatively soon. Similar logic holds for applying a spatial discount rate such that distant places are valued less. And so even of the case for universalism is not accepted, there still can be much concern for GCR.

#### B] extinction o/ws under any framework- moral uncertainty and future gens

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### C] prereq to their offense- it forecloses all future value and causes massive structural violence

## Case

### Underview

#### Overview- err neg on all 1ar theory-

#### 1] 2nr has to split between substance and over-cover theory b/c of the 7/6, 2 speech aff advantage and they get 2ar collapse and persuasiveness advantage and no 3nr to check

#### 2] Responses to the counter-interp will inevitably be new- implications-

#### A] Evaluate the theory debate after the 2nr- means you have to draw a strict line between 1ar and 2ar args- if they didn’t do the weighing, it’s their fault since it should’ve been in the 1ar

#### B] If intervention happens on theory, intervene to reduce theory and just vote on substance

#### 3] Reasonability- good is good enough- they create a race to the top of blippy theory debate which crowds out substance and internal link turns their education offense- potential abuse isn’t a voter- that’s infinitely regressive

### Framework

#### Disregard presumption and permissibility- there’s always credence in favor of a proposition or against it. It doesn’t require absolute certainty under util- just best calculation of expected utility and debate solves since we can debate about the best outcomes using evidence and predictions.

#### Korsgaard is wrong – constructivism assumes no intrinsic value and collapses to intuitions – takes out procedural realism and their epistemology claims

FitzPatrick, 5 -- Gideon Webster Burbank Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy @ University of Rochester [FitzPatrick, William J. “The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity.” Ethics, vol. 115, no. 4, 2005, pp. 651–691. JSTOR, JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/430750](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/430750).]

Considered in itself, this version of the argument seems more promising. Whether it truly fares better, however, will depend on whether it has really been shown that, in the course of solving the practical problem in the first two premises, one would necessarily be treating oneself as if one were the unconditionally valuable, value-conferring source of the value of one’s ends (3a and 4a). To answer this question, we need first to clarify the required notion of treating something as if it had a certain property by acting in a certain way. The general idea seems to be this: in acting in a certain way, one treats X as if it were F insofar as the action is predicated on one’s taking it to be the case that p, and p could in fact be the case only if X were F. So insofar as any action of mine is predicated on my taking it to be the case that my end is good, and my end could be good only if I were an unconditionally valuable source of its value, I am—simply by so acting—treating myself as if I were an unconditionally valuable source of the value of my end. The burden of the argument would thus be to show that it is indeed the case that S: My ends could be good only if I were the unconditionally val- uable source of their value. Only if this is so can it be said that in pursuing ends I judge to be good I am treating myself as if I were the unconditionally valuable, value- conferring source of the value of my ends. Now S is a value-theoretic claim about the true dependency of the value of ends on agents. Ironically, this sounds like just the sort of metaphysical construal of value conferral that Korsgaard herself renounced in favor of claims simply about how we allegedly must see and value things and ourselves.50 The latter, of course, was the focus of the first interpretation of the argument, which failed. We are thus back to what looks like a crucial metaphysical claim about how things truly stand with respect to the source of value. Setting this tension to one side, we may notice that, in relying on S, the positive constructivist argument depends entirely on the success of sweeping negative arguments against realism. For if even a very mod- est form of realism were true, S would be false. If, for example, severe animal suffering is intrinsically bad—bad in a way that is not derived from facts about the conditions of my exercise of agency—then my end of stopping a forest fire could be good quite apart from any value conferral on my part. Unless we have been given independent reason to reject such claims, we have no reason to accept S. It is not obvious that Korsgaard’s general attack on realism (Sec. II) will help here, since that was focused on the problem of normative force rather than on the present question whether ends can be good in a relevantly nonderivative way, violating S. And in any case, one of my aims is precisely to deflate her critique of realism. If that is successful, then, it will not only answer her objections to realism but will also undermine support for the positive constructivist argument as presently construed, insofar as that argument depends on the prior rejection of realism. Apart from relying on an independent rejection of realism, Kors- gaard’s support for S seems to come down to a simple intuition: if I didn’t matter, then it couldn’t matter whether my ends were realized or frustrated; if it matters that my ends be realized, then that implies that I am an important being.51 This reasonable intuition, however, has force only in connection with ends having to do with my own welfare and fulfillment. My end of taking piano lessons in order to develop musically, for example, would indeed not matter if I were worthless and my welfare counted for nothing. But there is no similar intuitive pull to say anything parallel about any number of other ends I might pursue, as in the forest fire example. And even with respect to ends that do pertain to the agent’s own welfare, all that is compelling is that the agent-neutral importance of the ends’ being realized is conditional on the importance of the agent or of the agent’s welfare. Nothing follows about the agent’s being the value-conferring source of the choice wor- thiness of the ends themselves in the sense that what makes these ends worth pursuing is explained by the agent’s desires, inclinations, or choices together with the fact that the agent is unconditionally valuable and endorses those desires or makes those choices.52

#### A priori ethics doesn’t exclude util—the first principle of maximizing wellbeing is just as a priori as the categorical imperative—evaluation does require experience, but so does Kant—that an action fulfills a promise is just as empirical as whether it produces pleasure—also we solve reason 1st since it just proves our arguments have to be logical

#### This directly answers all their reason to trigger permissability or presumption out of the 1ac – don’t let them go for it.

#### Agent-dependent theories cannot apply to social institutions—there are circumstances in which we must rank options that do not implicate individual choices—institutions are only judged on their ability to bring about good states of affairs across a broad set of domains including to agents that change the identity of the institution—that collapses to consequentialism

#### Bad action problem

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This line of thought is subject to a well-known objection, which is that it makes a mystery of irrational action. Irrational action is action in violation of the principles of practical reason. But if these principles are constitutive of action, then nothing that is an action can be in violation of them. So, if the principles of practical reason are constitutive of action, then irrational action is impossible. But irrational action is clearly possible. So the principles of practical reason cannot be constitutive of action.

#### Shmagency objection—agents can be non-agents that lack what is constitutive of agency but otherwise be as similar—any skeptic can say “so what” and deny constitutivism

#### Ideal world objection—maxims have disastrous consequences when faced with irrational actors in the real world—once noncompliance takes hold, Kant’s formula lacks guiding force—e.g. never use violence unless some others have in which case kill others can be willed in an ideal world, but in the real world would justify incredible violence

### Advantage

#### Teachers are replacable – climate change is a known problem – there is much bigger problems to the climate then teachers so alt causes defintely solve this advantage.

#### Their evidence just says climate education is good – teachers would just have to tell them about it

#### They read u/q going to the wrong way – its inevitable if current teachers are getting bad.

#### Their evidence doesn’t even say that teachers leaving education is the problem it just says education is key. They don’t solve anything.

### Offense

#### Extinction outweighs – they cannot have the right to strike if they go through a global war that kills them.