## Value and Criterion

Criterion: preventing extinction

#### **Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory**

Pummer 15

(Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

## Neg burden

Any statement from the negative that proves the aff plan or resolution false is sufficient – one way can be to defend private ownership of space. If public private partnerships disproves the aff, then I should be able to defend public private partnerships. The neg burden is to prove that the aff is false, not to defend a specific resolution – under both truth testing and comparative worlds, the neg is not limited to defending private entities.

## 1

#### **Strong commercial space catalyzes tech innovation – progress at the margins and spinoff tech change global information networks**

Joshua Hampson 2017, Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center, 1-25-2017, “The Future of Space Commercialization”, Niskanen Center, https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf

Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### **Tech innovation solves every existential threat – cumulative extinction events outweigh the aff**

Dylan **Matthews 18**. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.\*

## 2

#### **Counterplan: States should create and adopt a new set of flexible regulations concerning responsible space colonization through the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, focused on issues of governance of space colonies and potential existential risks, including but not limited to revising treaties to allow for private outer space appropriation with taxation paid to the United Nations to be used for redistributive efforts.**

#### **Current government issues to resolve colony governance are insufficient – as is the OST – but new flexible regulations solve**

Kovic 21 Kovic, Marko. PhD Communication and Media Studies, University of Zurich. "Risks of space colonization." Futures 126 (2021): 102638. [Quality Control]

Overall, it seems fair to say that space governance is in shambles today. Creating any kind of meaningful space colonization-related governance in such a policy and policymaking environment is difficult, to say the least. We should not expect governance work on space colonization be initiated by gov-ernmental actors any time soon, so the proverbial ball is, at the time being,probably in the academic court. If we were to draft a space colonization gov-ernance framework that would be effective at mitigating colonization-relatedrisks and maximize the positive future value, what are some factors or aspects that need to be taken into account? First, we should consider a break with the past. Existing space gover-nance based on the Outer Space Treaty has barely seen any progress over the decades, and the Outer Space Treaty does not seem geared towards questions of space colonization risks. Starting with a philosophical clean slate that is divorced from the realities of the 1960-ies is probably the easiest way forward. Second, given the uncertainty of the long-term future, a governance frame-work for space colonization should be conceptualized as provisional and mal-leable. Major principles of safe space colonization might very well be uni-versal, but the empirical realities on the ground might change in the nottoo distant future. This means that, on one hand, our understanding of space colonization-related risks will almost certainly change over time. The practical reality of policymaking on Earth, on the other hand, will probably also undergo significant changes in the future. The current political order on Earth has been, roughly speaking, stable since the Second World War, and it seems plausible to expect the global political order to roughly continue along those lines for several more decades. This means that any governance frame-work that is geared towards today’s workings of global policymaking should daim to achieve tangible results as soon as possible, before the world changesso much that the governance framework and its bodies simply become obso-lete. The philosophical timescale of such a governance project thousands tomillions of years, but the practical timescale for achieving results should be decades.

#### **Those specific reforms are necessary to encourage space colonization and humanitarian economics– but avoids all terrestrial downsides**

Iliopoulos and Esteban 20 Iliopoulos, Nikolaos [University of Tokyo], and Miguel Esteban [Waseda University]. "Sustainable space exploration and its relevance to the privatization of space ventures." Acta Astronautica 167 (2020): 85-92. [Quality Control]

The envisioned legal regime to encourage private firms to undertake the high risk and high cost involved in activities of space exploration would have to explicitly recognize extra-terrestrial property claims of individuals and corporations that meet specified conditions. As such, based on the conclusions made through this paper ,it is considered that with the right negotiation terms, the current treaties can be revised so as to become steppingstones for the advancement of space exploration that could potentially bring forth significant changes to the environment surrounding planet Earth. Finally, one way that such privatization efforts could be seen to benefit of mankind as a whole is that any taxation resulting from it should be paid directly to the United Nations, or that at least some fraction of the profits should fund this organization.

Solves for the entirety of the aff by creating a new international law

#### **Investing in space exploration solves extinction, the economy, and warming**

Dubner, American journalist & Freakonomics Author, 8

(Steven, Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum, Freakonomics Blog, http://freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-a-freakonomics-quorum/)

Pretend that instead of being responsible for your household budget, which means paying for rent or a mortgage, transportation, some schooling costs, groceries, healthcare, vacation, etc., you are instead responsible for a considerably larger budget that provides a variety of services for about 300 million people including the maintenance of an army, protecting the borders, etc. In other words, pretend you are responsible for the U.S. Federal budget. And now ask yourself how much of that money you want to spend on manned space travel, and why. We gathered up a group of space authorities — G. Scott Hubbard, Joan Vernikos, Kathleen M. Connell, Keith Cowing, and David M. Livingston, and John M. Logsdon — and asked them the following: Is manned space exploration worth the cost? Why or why not? Their responses are below. As I suggested above, take your time. For the impatient among you, here are a few highlights: Logsdon on a not-so-obvious incentive for manned space travel: “Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering.” Vernikos on the R.O.I. of space travel: “Economic, scientific and technological returns of space exploration have far exceeded the investment. … Royalties on NASA patents and licenses currently go directly to the U.S. Treasury, not back to NASA.” Cowing on space expenditures relative to other costs: “Right now, all of America’s human space flight programs cost around $7 billion a year. That’s pennies per person per day. In 2006, according to the USDA, Americans spent more than $154 billion on alcohol. We spend around $10 billion a month in Iraq. And so on.” I hope you enjoy their answers, and learn from them, as much as I did. G. Scott Hubbard, professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Stanford University and former director of the NASA Ames Research Center: The debate about the relative merits of exploring space with humans and robots is as old as the space program itself. Werner Von Braun, a moving force behind the Apollo Program that sent humans to the moon and the architect of the mighty Saturn V rocket, believed passionately in the value of human exploration — especially when it meant beating the hated Soviet Empire. James Van Allen, discoverer of the magnetic fields that bear his name, was equally ardent and vocal about the value of robotic exploration. There are five arguments that are advanced in any discussion about the utility of space exploration and the roles of humans and robots. Those arguments, in roughly ascending order of advocate support, are the following: 1. Space exploration will eventually allow us to establish a human civilization on another world (e.g., Mars) as a hedge against the type of catastrophe that wiped out the dinosaurs. 2. We explore space and create important new technologies to advance our economy. It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit. Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering. 3. Space exploration in an international context offers a peaceful cooperative venue that is a valuable alternative to nation state hostilities. One can look at the International Space Station and marvel that the former Soviet Union and the U.S. are now active partners. International cooperation is also a way to reduce costs. 4. National prestige requires that the U.S. continue to be a leader in space, and that includes human exploration. History tells us that great civilizations dare not abandon exploration. 5. Exploration of space will provide humanity with an answer to the most fundamental questions: Are we alone? Are there other forms of life beside those on Earth? It is these last two arguments that are the most compelling to me. It is challenging to make the case that humans are necessary to the type of scientific exploration that may bring evidence of life on another world. There are strong arguments on both sides. Personally, I think humans will be better at unstructured environment exploration than any existing robot for a very long time. There are those who say that exploration with humans is simply too expensive for the return we receive. However, I cannot imagine any U.S. President announcing that we are abandoning space exploration with humans and leaving it to the Chinese, Russians, Indians, Japanese or any other group. I can imagine the U.S. engaging in much more expansive international cooperation. Humans will be exploring space. The challenge is to be sure that they accomplish meaningful exploration. Joan Vernikos, a member of the Space Studies Board of the National Academy and former director of NASA’s Life Sciences Division: Why explore? Asked why he kept trying to climb Everest, English mountaineer George Mallory reputedly replied, “Because it was there.” Exploration is intrinsic to our nature. It is the contest between man and nature mixed with the primal desire to conquer. It fuels curiosity, inspiration and creativity. The human spirit seeks to discover the unknown, and in the process explore the physical and psychological potential of human endurance. There have always been the few risk-takers who ventured for the rest of us to follow. Because of earlier pioneers, air travel is now commonplace, and space travel for all is just around the corner. Economic and societal benefits are not immediately evident, but they always follow, as does our understanding of human potential to overcome challenges. Fifty years after Sputnik, space remains the next frontier. Without risking human lives, robotic technology such as unmanned missions, probes, observatories, and landers enables space exploration. It lays the groundwork, and does the scouting. But as I heard former astronaut Thomas Jones often say, “only a human can experience what being in space feels like, and only a human can communicate this to others.” It is humans who repair the Hubble telescope. It is humans who service the International Space Station (ISS). Mercury astronauts were the first to photograph Earth from space with hand-held cameras. Earth scientists in orbit on the ISS may view aspects of global change that only a trained eye can see. In addition, studying astronauts in the microgravity of space has been the only means of understanding how gravity affects human development and health here on Earth. It is highly probable that, in this century, humans will settle on other planets. Our ability to explore and sustain human presence there will not only expand Earth’s access to mineral resources but, should the need arise, provide alternative habitats for humanity’s survival. At what cost? Is there a price to inspiration and creativity? Economic, scientific and technological returns of space exploration have far exceeded the investment. Globally, 43 countries now have their own observing or communication satellites in Earth orbit. Observing Earth has provided G.P.S., meteorological forecasts, predictions and management of hurricanes and other natural disasters, and global monitoring of the environment, as well as surveillance and intelligence. Satellite communications have changed life and business practices with computer operations, cell phones, global banking, and TV. Studying humans living in the microgravity of space has expanded our understanding of osteoporosis and balance disorders, and has led to new treatments. Wealth-generating medical devices and instrumentation such as digital mammography and outpatient breast biopsy procedures and the application of telemedicine to emergency care are but a few of the social and economic benefits of manned exploration that we take for granted. Space exploration is not a drain on the economy; it generates infinitely more than wealth than it spends. Royalties on NASA patents and licenses currently go directly to the U.S. Treasury, not back to NASA. I firmly believe that the Life Sciences Research Program would be self-supporting if permitted to receive the return on its investment. NASA has done so much with so little that it has generally been assumed to have had a huge budget. In fact, the 2007 NASA budget of $16.3 billion is a minute fraction of the $13 trillion total G.D.P. “What’s the hurry?” is a legitimate question. As the late Senator William Proxmire said many years ago, “Mars isn’t going anywhere.” Why should we commit hard-pressed budgets for space exploration when there will always be competing interests? However, as Mercury, Gemini and Apollo did 50 years ago, our future scientific and technological leadership depends on exciting creativity in the younger generations. Nothing does this better than manned space exploration. There is now a national urgency to direct the creative interests of our youth towards careers in science and engineering. We need to keep the flame of manned space exploration alive as China, Russia, India, and other countries forge ahead with substantial investments that challenge U.S. leadership in space. Kathleen M. Connell, a principal of The Connell Whittaker Group, a founding team member of NASA’s Astrobiology Program, and former policy director of the Aerospace States Association: The value of public sector human space exploration is generally perceived as worth the cost when exploration outcomes address one or more national imperatives of the era. For example, in the twentieth century, the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik required a bold technological retort by the U.S. Apollo put boots on the moon, winning the first space race. The resulting foreign policy boost and psychic prestige for the U.S. more that justified the cost for the Cold War generation. Unquestionably, manned exploration of that era also created unintended economic consequences and benefits, such as the spinoff of miniaturization that led to computers and cell phones. Apollo also created new NASA centers in the South, acting as an unanticipated economic development anchor for those regions, both then and now. In the twenty-first century, what would happen if U.S. manned space programs were managed based upon the contemporary demands of the planet and the American taxpayer? NASA could be rewarded to explore, but with terrestrial returns as a priority. Space exploration crews could conduct global warming research on the International Space Station National Laboratory, while other crews from the public or private sector could rapidly assemble solar energy satellites for clean energy provision to Earth. Lunar settlements could be established to develop new energy sources from rare compounds that are in abundance on the moon. Getting to Mars, to develop a terrestrial lifeboat and to better understand the fate of planets, suddenly takes on new meaning and relevance. I have to come the conclusion, after over 20 years in the space industry, that addressing global challenges with space solutions that benefit humanity and American constituents is the key to justifying the cost of manned space exploration. I believe we are about to find out, all over again, if civil manned space capability and policy can adapt and rise to meet new imperatives. Keith Cowing, founder and editor of NASAWatch.com and former NASA space biologist. Right now, all of America’s human space flight programs cost around $7 billion a year. That’s pennies per person per day. In 2006, according to the USDA, Americans spent more than $154 billion on alcohol. We spend around $10 billion a month in Iraq. And so on. Are these things more important than human spaceflight because we spend more money on them? Is space exploration less important? Money alone is not a way to gauge the worthiness of the cost of exploring space. NASA is fond of promoting all of the spinoffs that are generated from its exploits, such as microelectronics. But are we exploring space to explore space, or are we doing all of this to make better consumer electronics? I once heard the late Carl Sagan respond to this question by saying, “you don’t need to go to Mars to cure cancer.” If you learn how to do that as a side benefit, well, that’s great, but there are probably more cost effective ways to get all of these spinoffs without leaving Earth. To be certain, tax dollars spent on space projects result in jobs — a large proportion of which are high paying, high tech positions. But many other government programs do that as well — some more efficiently. Still, for those who would moan that this money could be “better spent back on Earth,” I would simply say that all of this money is spent on Earth — it creates jobs and provides business to companies, just as any other government program does. You have to spend all of NASA’s money “on Earth.” There is no way to spend it in space — at least, not yet. Where am I going with this? Asking if space exploration — with humans or robots or both — is worth the effort is like questioning the value of Columbus’s voyages to the New World in the late 1490s. The promise at the time was obvious to some, but not to others. Is manned space exploration worth the cost? If we Americans do not think so, then why is it that nations such as China and India — nations with far greater social welfare issues to address with their limited budgets — are speeding up their space exploration programs? What is it about human space exploration that they see? Could it be what we once saw, and have now forgotten? As such, my response is another question: for the U.S. in the twenty-first century, is not sending humans into space worth the cost? David M. Livingston, host of The Space Show, a talk radio show focusing on increasing space commerce and developing space tourism: I hear this question a lot. So a few years ago, I decided to see what really happened to a public dollar spent on a good space program, compared to spending it on an entitlement program or a revenue generating infrastructure program. I used the school breakfast program for the test entitlement program. I chose Hoover Dam for the revenue generating infrastructure program. The space program I chose was the manned program to the moon consisting of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Let me briefly summarize what I discovered. All programs, if properly managed, can produce benefits in excess to the original invested dollar. There is no guarantee that a program will be properly managed, and this includes a space program. “Properly managed” implies many things, but I don’t think space is any more or less likely to be well managed than anything else the government does. A mismanaged space program wastes money, talent, and time, just like any other faulty program. As for what happened to the dollar invested in the respective programs, the school breakfast program was successful, in that it increased the number of kids who received breakfast. However, when funding for this program or this type of program stops, as soon as the last of the funds goes through the pipeline, the program is over. It has no life past government funding. I was unable to find an inspirational or motivational quality for the program leading to downstream business, economic, or science advancements. One could make the case that kids who benefited from the program went on through school to accomplish great things, and I don’t doubt that — I simply could not document it in my research. The Hoover Dam was very interesting. This project paid off its bond cost early, was a major contributor to the U.S. victory in World War II, and has been a huge economic factor for development in the Western part of the country. However, the Hoover Dam requires overhead and maintenance investment on a continual basis. It needs repairs, updates, modernization, and security, and it employs a labor force. Were we to stop investing in the Hoover Dam, over time it would lose its effectiveness and cease to be the value to our nation that it is now. Its value to us depends on our willingness to maintain, protect, and update it as necessary. The Hoover Dam and Lake Mead have given birth to thousands of private businesses, economic growth for the region, and much more. However, as with the entitlement program above, I could not find an inspirational or motivational aspect to the Hoover Dam. What I discovered about our manned lunar program was different. When I did this study, it was 34 years after the last dime had been spent on Apollo, the last of the manned moon programs. Thirty-four years later, when I asked guests on The Space Show, students, and people in space-related fields what inspired or motivated them to start a space business or pursue their science education, over 80 percent said they were inspired and motivated because of our having gone to the moon. Businesses were started and are now meeting payrolls, paying taxes, and sustaining economic growth because the founder was inspired by the early days of the manned space program, often decades after the program ended! This type of inspiration and motivation seems unique to the manned space program and, of late, to some of our robotic space missions. I found the same to be true when I asked the same question to Space Show guests from outside the U.S. John M. Logsdon, director of the Space Policy Institute and acting director of the Center for International Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs: The high costs of sending humans into orbit and beyond are measured in dollars, rubles, or yuan. The benefits of human spaceflight are not so easily calculated, since they include both tangible and intangible payoffs. So answering the question, “Do the benefits outweigh the costs?” is not straightforward. If the payoffs are limited to scientific discovery, the position taken by many critics of human spaceflight is “no.” With both current and, especially, future robotic capabilities, the added value of human presence to missions aimed primarily at new understanding of the moon, Mars, near-Earth asteroids, and other celestial destinations most likely does not justify the added costs and risks involved. However, Steve Squyres, the principal investigator for the Mars Exploration Rovers, has frequently said that he wished that spirit and opportunity were working in partnership with humans on the surface of Mars; that combination, he argues, would greatly increase the scientific payoffs of the mission. To me, the primary justifications for sending people into space require that they travel beyond low Earth orbit. For the next few decades, the major payoffs from humans traveling to the moon and Mars are intangible, and linked to both national pride and national power. Space exploration remains an effort that can be led by only a few countries, and I believe that it should be part of what the United States does in its desire to be seen by both its citizens and the global public as a leader, one to be admired for its continued willingness to invest in pushing the frontiers of human activity. In the longer run, I believe that human exploration is needed to answer two questions. One is: “Are there activities in other places in the solar system of such economic value that they justify high costs in performing them?” The other is: “Can humans living away from Earth obtain at least a major portion of what they need to survive from local resources?” If the answer to both questions is “yes,” then I believe that eventually some number of people in the future will establish permanent settlements away from Earth, in the extreme case to ensure that the human species will survive a planetary catastrophe, but also because people migrate for both economic opportunities and new experiences. That is a big jump from today’s argument regarding the costs and benefits of human spaceflight, but I believe such a long range perspective is the best way to justify a new start in human space exploration.

## 3

#### **Counter advocacy: Private entities supporting and following an optional protocol to the OST banning space weaponization is just.**

#### **That resolves space weaponization – verification, political resistance, and legal complexity aren’t issues**

Meyer 21 Meyer, Paul. Paul Meyer is Adjunct Professor of International Studies and Fellow in International Security at Simon Fraser University. "Could an optional protocol be the way to stop the weaponization of outer space?" International Journal, 3 June 2021, p. 00207020211020521, doi:10.1177/00207020211020521. [Quality Control]

Time for an alternative diplomatic solution: An optional protocol

Since the Sino–Russian PPWT proposal is not going anywhere at present, buried as it is at the Conference on Disarmament, and no one is picking up the dropped International Code of Conduct proposal or the Canadian ideas on security ‘pledges’, the time may be ripe for a totally different approach to provide legal reinforcement to the declaration against the weaponization of outer space.

In this context, a simpler vehicle could be employed to give legal expression to the non-weaponization goal, namely, an optional protocol to the Outer Space Treaty. An optional protocol is a legal instrument that supplements an existing international treaty. As the word ‘optional’ indicates, the protocol does not automatically bind the states parties of the original treaty but must be separately agreed to by the states concerned. Optional protocols have been widely used in international human rights law; for example, the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict (2000) supplements the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child by stipulating that no one younger than 18 should be recruited into the military and potentially take part in hostilities. Optional protocols have also featured in the arms control and disarmament realm, for example, the five protocols of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

One of the advantages of this approach is that it provides a supplementary agreement to the widely supported Outer Space Treaty (currently 110 states parties) that is aligned with its pacific orientation and extends its existing weapons prohibition. The adoption of an optional protocol to the Outer Space Treaty would not entail ‘opening up’ the treaty itself, which could prompt undesirable amendments to the treaty. Rather, the negotiating process for an optional protocol could be undertaken using existing UN machinery, either through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or, if consensus agreement was not possible in that body, via a UN General Assembly mandated process, or even by means of an ad hoc diplomatic conference. If kept simple, an optional protocol that extended the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on weapons of mass destruction to all forms of weaponry should not be overly complicated to draft.

An objection to this approach could stem from the question of defining a ‘space weapon’, a concern that has been raised in the past, with respect to the PPWT for instance. At one level, any object in space capable of manoeuvre could theoretically be employed as a weapon against another object. This sort of objection tends to be cited, however, by those not interested in new restraints on military space activity. If there is sufficient interest in negotiating cooperative measures, there could be two ways of responding to such a definitional challenge: (i) offer up a definition or (ii) do not attempt to define the term. If the latter option seems odd, it is relevant to consider the approach taken by such central arms control and disarmament agreements as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the NPT is directed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitating their elimination, one will search in vain for a definition of a ‘nuclear weapon’ in the NPT. Similarly, although the CTBT codifies a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosive testing, it does not define the term ‘nuclear explosion’. The negotiators of these agreements decided it was best not to seek specific definitions of these key terms, yet their absence has not detracted from the wide support and high standing both of these treaties enjoy.

Alternatively, a suitable definition of ‘weapon’ could be developed that would be adequate in the eyes of most negotiators. The PPWT already offers one which reads in part: ‘any outer space object or component thereof which has been produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space …’12 Such a definition could probably be improved upon, but it would seem to offer a reasonable basis for negotiation.

Verification could also be raised as a problem for the envisaged optional protocol as it was for the PPWT. Current verification capabilities, however, appear adequate to provide confidence that violations of the optional protocol could be detected. Both in the state realm and in the private sector, important progress has been made recently in the capabilities of monitoring technologies for space activity. These could be drawn on to verify compliance with a ban on weapon placement in outer space. It is noteworthy that a recent accusation by one leading power about a space object launched by a rival power and its subsequent suspicious action clearly relied on information derived from ‘national technical means’ available to the accusing party.13 Barriers to accepting a verification regime for space arms control thus are more likely political than technical.

A further objection to the proposed optional protocol, as was raised against the PPWT, was that it fails to cover ground-to-space weapons, in particular terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). Two approaches to this issue are possible: (i) ignore this category of weapon and focus only on weapons placed in space, or (ii) extend the ban on space weapons to cover ground-to-space systems as well. The former option could be embraced as representing an important step towards codifying the non-weaponization of space norm and one that would be easier to negotiate than one attempting to cover ground-to-space systems.

## On Case

#### **! turn – Space weaponization good**

#### **US wins space race now due to private competition – its key to space dominance and militarization is good – the plan nukes the US’s silver bullet against Chinese aggression**

Weichert 21 – former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft & National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics [Brandon, “The Future of Space Exploration Depends on the Private Sector,” 7/5/2021, https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/07/the-future-of-space-exploration-depends-on-the-private-sector/#slide-1]

As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector.

Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing.

Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world.

The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below.

Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket.

The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.)

Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter.

Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious.

Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter.

Why not?

America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century?

More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor.

Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government.

Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight.

Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy.

The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us.

The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### **And, space dominance key to global peace – nuclear and conventional deterrence is collapsing, which will provoke civilization-ending revisionist aggression from Russia and China**

Dr. Robert Zubrin 19, Masters in Aeronautics and Astronautics and Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington, President of Pioneer Energy, Founder and President of the Mars Society, Senior Fellow with the Center for Security Policy, The Case for Space: How the Revolution in Spaceflight Opens Up a Future of Limitless Possibility, p. Google Books

The United States needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a large-scale conventional war, and we are woefully unprepared.

Eastern and Central Europe is now so weakly defended as to virtually invite invasion. The United States is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So deterrence is dead, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop tankless remnant, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. It’s not enough. Meanwhile, in Asia, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region.

How can we restore the balance, creating a sufficiently powerful conventional force to deter aggression? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the United States must seek to totally outgun them by obtaining a radical technological advantage. This can be done by achieving space supremacy.

To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the 21st century, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls space.

The critical military importance of space has been obscured by the fact that in the period since the United States has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against minor powers that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless.

But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war.

But modern space power involves far more than just reconnaissance satellites. The use of space-based GPS can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based communications provide an unmatched capability of command and control of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will prove decisive.

Not only Europe, but the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to wipe them out with the push of a button. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States possess space capabilities that are so robust as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to comprehensively deny it to others.

*Space superiority* means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a complete monopoly of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made so formidable as to render any conventional attack unthinkable. On the other hand, should we fail to do so, we will remain so vulnerable as to increasingly invite aggression by ever-more-emboldened revanchist powers.

For this reason, both Russia and China have been developing and actively testing antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Up till now, the systems they have been testing have been ground launched, designed to orbit a few times and then collide with and destroy targets below one thousand kilometers altitude. This is sufficient to take out our reconnaissance satellites but not our GPS and communications satellites, which fly at twenty thousand and thirty-six thousand kilometers respectively. However, the means to reach these are straightforward, and, given their critical importance to us, there is every reason to believe that such development is well underway.11

The Obama administration sought to dissuade adversaries from developing ASATs by setting a good example and not working on them ourselves. This approach has failed. As a consequence, many defense policy makers are now advocating that we move aggressively to develop ASATs of our own. While more hardheaded than the previous policy, such an approach remains entirely inadequate to the situation.

The United States armed forces are far more dependent upon space assets than any potential opponent. Were both sides in a conflict able to destroy the space assets of the other, we would be the overwhelming loser by the exchange.

#### **Space dominance solves hegemony – deterrence strategies, even rudimentary ones, are perceived as weakness and causes aggression**

Weichert 17 (Brandon J. Weichert. Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staff member who holds a Master of Arts in Statecraft & National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. He is the founder of The Weichert Report: An Online Journal of Geopolitics, “The High Ground: The Case for U.S. Space Dominance,” Orbis, Vol 61, Issue 2, 2017, pp 227 – 237, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438717300108>)

While space superiority and space dominance share a militarized view of space, there are fundamental differences in their stated end goals. Those who favor space superiority view space as a global commons, accessible to all in peacetime. They take a more defensive and reactive view of space and the actors who seek access to this domain. The space superiority model understands that U.S. dependence on space is vital for the basic functioning of American civilization (banking transactions, cell phone signals, GPS functions, television broadcasts, as well as essential military surveillance and support functions all across satellites in space). Yet, this model also accepts that current budgetary constraints mean that the United States is unlikely to invest significantly more into unwieldy and expensive space systems.

A strategy of space superiority accepts the risk arising from reliance on space systems, while deterring attacks on space assets. As actors such as China or Russia become increasingly dependent on space systems themselves, space superiority advocates believe that U.S. willingness to retaliate in kind against any attack on its own space assets is sufficient.7 This is in keeping with the classic deterrence model of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Unfortunately, however, U.S. dependence on space assets for its very survival is so much greater than any other state that such a threat is unrealistic. The reason that states like China or Russia are developing counter-space capabilities is because the cost to them is extremely low, whereas the benefit for them (in the event of war with the United States) is high. For the cost of a ground-based laser or an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile launcher, China could knock out the ability of all U.S. forces in the Pacific to coordinate and adequately defend themselves from a Chinese offensive.

What could the United States do to the Chinese in return? The best option for U.S. retaliation in space would be to launch some blinding attacks on the handful of China's space assets. However, this ultimately would not deter China from escalating any future conflict since China's investment in space is so low compared to that of the United States. In addition, since Chinese forces are designed to operate in an environment without those assets, such retaliation grounded on deterrence-based models becomes highly problematic and ineffective.

Rather than serving as a stabilizing force in space, then, the defensive and reactive space superiority model would be an inducement for conflict in the strategic high ground of space. Or, rather, the direction of attack would be unidirectional: from U.S. adversaries toward essential U.S. space systems. Thus, while space confers unequivocal advantages to the U.S. forces that depend on space assets for their vital functions, it also provides adversaries with an unprecedented weakness for them to exploit.

The fact is that United States, China, or Russia's dependence on space is asymmetrical. Over the long run, a deterrent-based, space superiority model would eventually allow other states not only to gain and maintain access to space, but also effectively to gain strategic parity with the United States in space. Make no mistake, the more that states are able to access space, no matter how nascent or rudimentary their space programs may be, the more they will refine their capabilities and be able to develop space programs for their own strategic ends. While most defense analysts believe that deterrence during the Cold War led to bipolar stability, a deterrence-based model in space would create instability. If a near-peer competitor like China or Russia believed that it had acquired the capacity to achieve parity with the United States, what would stop that state from trying to gain strategic advantage over America in space?

A Hegemonic Model

The best solution to avoid this situation is a hegemonic model. The only way that the United States can ensure its continued strategic advantage in space is to embrace fully the space dominance model by weaponizing space. While space superiority advocates will denounce this policy as both cost-ineffective and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more in keeping with U.S. traditions and values. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the American response to foreign threat is traditionally to take “the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security.”8

What of the claim that a deterrence-based space superiority model creates stability? The primary claim of deterrence efficacy is that during the Cold War, the more or less equal nuclear balance ensured that neither side had an incentive to launch a disarming first strike. This view was the basis of the mutual assured destruction theory. Since there was no conceivable advantage to either side from these weapons, both sides were forced into a more constructive diplomatic relationship. In all of the time that deterrence was employed, American policymakers assured the public that MAD was better than the alternatives—compellence,9 Rollback,10 and hegemony—because it restrained Soviet aggression.

American policymakers assumed that the Soviet strategists in the Kremlin viewed nuclear arms in the same apocalyptic terms that they did. As such, U.S. policymakers were not only content to allow American nuclear dominance to erode, but also to degrade actively those capabilities through strategic arms agreements. In the meantime, until 1986, mainstream Soviet strategists and policymakers were convinced that they could prevail in a nuclear war. They were just biding their time.11

In this light then, deterrence was not built around the concept of enlightened self-interest, but more likely the result of U.S. policymakers’ inability to see through the fog of the Cold War. The Soviets were by definition a revolutionary power. Even after they had renounced the concept of spreading global communist revolution, however, the urge to transform fundamentally the world order to reflect their own image remained a high strategic priority for the USSR. The United States failed to discern this situation until the Reagan Administration.

President Ronald Reagan, rather than accept the Cold War deterrence paradigm, planned to bring American technical and strategic dominance to bear in space in order to help defeat the Soviet Union. Reagan also recognized that the demilitarized sanctuary view of space was irrelevant, and he eschewed arms control agreements that sought to counteract the inherent American advantages in space. President Reagan not only embraced a militarized view of space, but in 1983, he also called for the weaponization of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

By the 1980s, the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space for military purposes (primarily in the area of satellites). These space systems formed the backbone of the modern military force that Reagan was assembling to counter the Soviet Union. What is more, Reagan's preferred strategy of Rollback meant that the United States would no longer sacrifice its own strategic advantages on the altar of diplomacy. After all, Reagan did not accept the Soviets as an equal and legitimate global power. He detested communism and viewed its proponents in the USSR as the great villains on the world stage. Furthermore, Reagan was staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. Therefore, he sought to remove the notion of deterrence through MAD and replace it with the concept of hegemony through “Mutual Assured Survival.”

These views coalesced into the Reagan Administration's commitment to placing missile defense systems in orbit. It also called for developing new technologies (i.e., directed-energy weapons) to be used in space. The United States would not only remove the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal by creating a working missile defense system in space, but it would also move beyond the Soviet threat by permanently dominating the high ground of space. This position was the basis of SDI.12 In fact, the Reagan Administration's shift in focus was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union as the Soviet leadership then embarked on a tit-for-tat arms buildup that their economy simply could not sustain. 13

Even if deterrence did facilitate a significant reduction in hostility—thereby creating the bipolar stability—no such hope for stability exists in space today. As argued earlier, U.S. reliance on space assets for its most basic functions is far greater than that of other countries. Furthermore, there is no way that the United States can—or should—abandon its use of space as a strategic domain. Thus, a hegemonic model for space dominance is the only hope to create the stability that most planners seek, while at the same time defending the American position in space.

Space dominance as a model for stability is nothing new. Indeed, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) asserts that the most stable global systems are those in which one actor dominates the system. In such a system, power is aggregated so greatly into a single, dominant actor that such a hegemonic power acts as a stabilizing force. Due to its relative strength, the hegemonic power can set the agenda and the rules that govern the system. The relative weakness of the other actors in the system is well understood, which then prompts these weak actors to abandon any hope of challenging the hegemonic power's rule. Eventually, they end up accommodating the hegemonic power. The lack of challenge creates peaceful stability.14 The fact that one actor is setting the rules means that the system is simple to operate in, as well.

The same logic that buttresses the HST international relations theory arguably undergirds the military strategy of space dominance. If this claim is so, then American hegemony in space is essential for the continued survival of the United States. Whereas there are legitimate arguments to be made regarding the reliance on deterrence-based models for creating stability during the Cold War, the fact is that the world is more multipolar today than it was 25 years ago. Despite what writer Fareed Zakaria has dubbed “the rise of the rest,”15 the United States still retains greater relative power. Therefore, it is inevitable and logical that the United States should expand its hegemonic position in space, in order to secure its place there.

Whereas deterrence-based models, such as space superiority, may have worked in a less chaotic international system, no such stability can be achieved today. Many of America's competitors are revanchist states intent on redefining the world order. They are not interested in preserving the American position in space. Also, they are not cowed by a U.S. deterrence strategy in space. Rather, they view such a policy as a concession that the United States is becoming weaker.

Space dominance would create greater stability than space superiority. Missile defense systems, tungsten rods, and even directed-energy weapons potentially would all be placed in key orbits around the Earth. This, on top of the existing U.S. space infrastructure, would prove to the world that the United States is committed to preserving its position in space. In a world of rogue states, space-based weapons likely would prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Failing that, the fact that the United States possessed strategic, offensive weapons in orbit—that could be brought down against any hostile actor—undoubtedly, would make even the most intractable foe hesitant.

It is arguable that overwhelming U.S. space power would trickle down from the strategic high ground to lower strategic domains. Rather than wasting time demonstrating resolve by “temporarily blinding Chinese satellites,”16 for example, the overwhelming American presence in space presumably would dissuade potential attackers.

#### **US hegemony prevents great-power conflicts that escalates to nuclear war**

Brands and Edel 19 (Hal Brands and Charles Edel. Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Charles Edel is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served on the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, “Rediscovering Tragedy. In The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order; Chapter 6: The Darkening Horizon,” Yale University Press, pp 128-131 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbnm3r9.11>)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and military exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. 34 More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post– Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington.35 In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation.36 The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profi ted far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fi ctional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how signifi cantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacifi c, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

OST was signed in 1967, no arms race now, so aff impacts won’t happen