# 1

#### The PLA’s complying with civilian control under the conditional model

Simone Dossi 18, Adjunct Professor of History and Politics of the Far East at the University of Milan and Research Fellow at the Torino World Affairs Institute, April 2018, ““Upholding the Correct Political Direction”. The PLA Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Xi Jinping’s China,” The International Spectator, Vol. 53, No. 3, p. 118-131

A second way of looking at civil-military relations in contemporary China is through the “conditional compliance” model. First proposed by Ellis Joffe and later articulated by James Mulvenon, this model postulates that the PLA remains compliant with CCP directives as it continues to recognise the authority of the party leadership. Unlike in the past, however, compliance is now conditional: if CCP leaders want to be obeyed, they have to recognise the autonomy of the PLA in the areas of its more immediate concern, including defence planning, military modernisation, internal organisation and budget allocation. Two main differences with the objective control model are relevant here. First, according to the conditional compliance model, professionalism has not replaced politicisation, with the PLA remaining still today an army that is both professionalised and politicised. Second, the PLA is not transforming into a national army, but continues to work as the army of the CCP. Accordingly, it remains “more accurate to describe civil-military relations in China as party-military relations”.

#### Aff causes PLA backlash

Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, Former Senior Analyst at the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses, Former Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation”, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 4/9/2014, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation]

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. [FOOTNOTE] [10]It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at best, in any internal debate on policy. [END FOOTNOTE] If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.

#### **Factionalism causes miscalc, civil war, global recessions, and Taiwan war – the link alone turns case**

Norris 17 [William, he teaches graduate-level courses in Chinese domestic politics, East Asian security, and Chinese foreign policy, he is also a nonresident associate with the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges," June 2017, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report\_pdf/Discussion\_Paper\_Norris\_China\_OR.pdf, footnote 23 included]

With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate unintended international repercussions. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have ripple effects abroad. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, raising the risks of strategic miscalculation on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 23. This outcome is only one of several potentially dangerous consequences. Others include a rebellious military, destabilizing foreign policy, outright civil war, renewed military conflict with Taiwan, virulent anti-Americanism, and financial collapse and contagion.

# 2

#### CP Text:

#### The People's republic of China should

#### - ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities except for asteroid mining

#### - de-militarize its civilian, military, and commercial space industry.

#### - dismantle and removing ASAT weapons.

#### - dismantle the People’s Liberation Army.

#### - adopt a policy of No First Use

#### China’s Asteroid Mining efforts are light-years ahead of everyone else – now is key for Asteroid Mining. Successful Mining solves Warming through Green Transition.

Cohen 21 Ariel Cohen 10-26-2021 "China’s Space Mining Industry Is Prepping For Launch – But What About The US?" <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2021/10/26/chinas-space-mining-industry-is-prepping-for-launch--but-what-about-the-us/?sh=6b8bea862ae0> (I am a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Founding Principal of International Market Analysis, a Washington, D.C.-based global risk advisory boutique.)//Elmer

Exploration of space-based natural resources are on the Chinese policy makers’ mind. The question is, what Joe Biden thinks? In April of this year, China’s Shenzen Origin Space Technology Co. Ltd. launched the NEO-1, the first commercial spacecraft dedicated to the mining of space resources – from asteroids to the lunar surface. Falling costs of space launches and spacecraft technology alongside existing infrastructure provides a unique opportunity to explore extraterrestrial resource extraction. Current technologies are equipped to analyze and categorize asteroids within our solar system with a limited degree of certainty. One of the accompanying payloads to the NEO-1 was the Yuanwang-1, or “little hubble” satellite, which searches the stars for possible asteroid mining targets. The NEO-1 launch marks another milestone in private satellite development, adding a new player to space based companies which include Japan’s Astroscale. Private asteroid identification via the Sentinel Space Telescope was supported by NASA until 2015. As private investment in space grows, the end goal is to be capable of harvesting resources to bring to Earth. “Through the development and launch of the spacecraft, Origin Space is able to carry out low-Earth orbit space junk cleanup and prototype technology verification for space resource acquisition, and at the same time demonstrate future asteroid defense related technologies.” In the end, it will come down to progressively lowering the cost of launched unit of weight and booster rocket reliability – before fundamentally new engines may drive the launch costs even further down. The April launch demonstrates that China is already succeeding while the West is spinning its wheels. The much touted Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries (DSI) DSI -1% were supposed to be the vanguard of extra-terrestrial resource acquisition with major backers including Google’s GOOG -1.4% Larry Page. But both have since been acquired, the former by block chain company ConsenSys and the latter by Bradford Space, neither of which are prioritizing asteroid mining. This is too bad, given that that supply chain crunches here on Earth – coupled with the global green energy transition – are spiking demand for strategic minerals that are increasingly hard to come by on our environmentally stressed planet. And here China currently holds a monopoly on rare earth element (REE) extraction and processing to the tune of 90%. REE’s 17 minerals essential for modern computing and manufacturing technologies for everything from solar panels to semi-conductors. Resource-hungry China also has major involvement in global critical mineral supply chains, which include cobalt, tungsten, and lithium. As I’ve written before, the Chinese hold of upstream and downstream markets is staggering. Possessing 30% of the global mined ore, 80% of the global processing facilities, and an ever increasing list of high dollar investments around the world, China boasts over $36 billion invested in mining projects in Africa alone. Beijing’s space program clearly indicates that the Chinese would also like to tighten their grip on space-based resources as well. According to research, it is estimated that a small asteroid roughly 200 meters in length that is rich in platinum could be worth up to $300 million. Merrill Lynch predicts the space industry — including extraterrestrial mining industry – to value $2.7 trillion in the next three decades. REEs are fairly common in the solar system, but to what degree remains unknown. The most sought after are M-type asteroids which are mostly metal and hundreds of cubic meters. While these are not the most common, the 27,115 Near Earth asteroids are bound to contain a few. This – and military applications – are no doubt a driving factor of China’s ever increasing space ambitions.

#### Warming causes extinction

Klein 14[(Naomi Klein, award-winning journalist, syndicated columnist, former Miliband Fellow at the London School of Economics, member of the board of directors of 350.org), *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate*, pp. 12-14]

In a 2012 report, the World Bank laid out the gamble implied by that target. “As global warming approaches and exceeds 2-degrees Celsius, there is a risk of triggering nonlinear tipping elements. Examples include the disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet leading to more rapid sea-level rise, or large-scale Amazon dieback drastically affecting ecosystems, rivers, agriculture, energy production, and livelihoods. This would further add to 21st-century global warming and impact entire continents.” In other words, once we allow temperatures to climb past a certain point, where the mercury stops is not in our control.¶ But the bigger problem—and the reason Copenhagen caused such great despair—is that because governments did not agree to binding targets, they are free to pretty much ignore their commitments. Which is precisely what is happening. Indeed, emissions are rising so rapidly that unless something radical changes within our economic structure, 2 degrees now looks like a utopian dream. And it’s not just environmentalists who are raising the alarm. The World Bank also warned when it released its report that “we’re on track to a 4-C warmer world [by century’s end] marked by extreme heat waves, declining global food stocks, loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, and life-threatening sea level rise.” And the report cautioned that, “there is also no certainty that adaptation to a 4-C world is possible.” Kevin Anderson, former director (now deputy director) of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, which has quickly established itself as one of the U.K’s premier climate research institutions, is even blunter; he says 4 degrees Celsius warming—7.2 degrees Fahrenheit—is “incompatible with an organized, equitable, and civilized global community.”¶ We don’t know exactly what a 4 degree Celsius world would look like, but even the best-case scenario is likely to be calamitous. Four degrees of warming could raise global sea levels by 1 or possibly even 2 meters by 2100 (and would lock in at least a few additional meters over future centuries). This would drown some island nations such as the Maldives and Tuvalu, and inundate many coastal areas from Ecuador and Brazil to the Netherlands to much of California and the northeastern United States as well as huge swaths of South and Southeast Asia. Major cities likely in jeopardy include Boston, New York, greater Los Angeles, Vancouver, London, Mumbai, Hong Kong, and Shanghai.¶ Meanwhile, brutal heat waves that can kill tens of thousands of people, even in wealthy countries, would become entirely unremarkable summer events on every continent but Antarctica. The heat would also cause staple crops to suffer dramatic yield losses across the globe (it is possible that Indian wheat and U.S. could plummet by as much as 60 percent), this at a time when demand will be surging due to population growth and a growing demand for meat. And since crops will be facing not just heat stress but also extreme events such as wide-ranging droughts, flooding, or pest outbreaks, the losses could easily turn out to be more severe than the models have predicted. When you add ruinous hurricanes, raging wildfires, fisheries collapses, widespread disruptions to water supplies, extinctions, and globe-trotting diseases to the mix, it indeed becomes difficult to imagine that a peaceful, ordered society could be sustained (that is, where such a thing exists in the first place).¶ And keep in mind that these are the optimistic scenarios in which warming is more or less stabilized at 4 degrees Celsius and does not trigger tipping points beyond which runaway warming would occur. Based on the latest modeling, it is becoming safer to assume that 4 degrees could bring about a number of extremely dangerous feedback loops—an Arctic that is regularly ice-free in September, for instance, or, according to one recent study, global vegetation that is too saturated to act as a reliable “sink”, leading to more carbon being emitted rather than stored. Once this happens, any hope of predicting impacts pretty much goes out the window. And this process may be starting sooner than anyone predicted. In May 2014, NASA and the University of California, Irvine scientists revealed that glacier melt in a section of West Antarctica roughly the size of France now “appears unstoppable.” This likely spells down for the entire West Antarctic ice sheet, which according to lead study author Eric Rignot “comes with a sea level rise between three and five metres. Such an event will displace millions of people worldwide.” The disintegration, however, could unfold over centuries and there is still time for emission reductions to slow down the process and prevent the worst. ¶ Much more frightening than any of this is the fact that plenty of mainstream analysts think that on our current emissions trajectory, we are headed for even more than 4 degrees of warming. In 2011, the usually staid International Energy Agency (IEA) issued a report predicting that we are actually on track for 6 degrees Celsius—10.8 degrees Fahrenheit—of warming. And as the IEA’s chief economist put it: “Everybody, even the school children, knows that this will have catastrophic implications for all of us.” (The evidence indicates that 6 degrees of warming is likely to set in motion several major tipping points—not only slower ones such as the aforementioned breakdown of the West Antarctic ice sheet, but possibly more abrupt ones, like massive releases of methane from Arctic permafrost.) The accounting giant PricewaterhouseCoopers as also published a report warning businesses that we are headed for “4-C , or even 6-C” of warming.¶ These various projections are the equivalent of every alarm in your house going off simultaneously. And then every alarm on your street going off as well, one by one by one. They mean, quite simply, that climate change has become an existential crisis for the human species. The only historical precedent for a crisis of this depth and scale was the Cold War fear that we were headed toward nuclear holocaust, which would have made much of the planet uninhabitable. But that was (and remains) a threat; a slim possibility, should geopolitics spiral out of control. The vast majority of nuclear scientists never told us that we were almost certainly going to put our civilization in peril if we kept going about our daily lives as usual, doing exactly what we were already going, which is what climate scientists have been telling us for years. ¶ As the Ohio State University climatologist Lonnie G. Thompson, a world-renowned specialist on glacier melt, explained in 2010, “Climatologists, like other scientists, tend to be a stolid group. We are not given to theatrical rantings about falling skies. Most of us are far more comfortable in our laboratories or gathering data in the field than we are giving interviews to journalists or speaking before Congressional committees. When then are climatologists speaking out about the dangers of global warming? The answer is that virtually all of us are now convinced that global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization.”

# Case

## Private not Key

#### Can’t solve anything – post aff the private sector will literally just sell tech to the public sector so theres no appropriation

#### Chinese space will be dominated by government enterprises — they're far more established making private corporations unprofitable and limits them to a niche role instead of broad capabilities

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"Tapping into China’s Space Program," China Briefing News, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/tapping-into-chinas-space-program/] mk

China’s space program From the launch of China’s space program in the mid-1950s to becoming a complete space power with autonomous access to outer space and to deep-space exploration, China has been very persistent in pursuing a “space dream”, as said by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. Especially in recent years, China’s space industry has produced remarkable achievements. In 2019, China became the first country to send an uncrewed rover to the far side of the Moon. In 2020, China successfully put into orbit its final Beidou satellite in June, sent an unmanned probe to Mars in July, launched an uncrewed mission called Chang’e-5 with the aim of collecting lunar material in November, and successfully landed the Chang’e-5 probe on the moon’s surface in December. In 2021, China accelerated its Tiangong Space Station program, with the successful launch of the Tianhe core module in April, the Tianzhou-2 cargo craft in May, the Shenzhou-12 manned spaceship in June, and another planned Tianzhou-3 mission in September. A more detailed timeline of China’s space station construction can be found below. China's space station program In the long-term, China has set the following goals for its space program: Improve China’s standing in the world of space science Establish a crewed space station Crewed missions to the Moon Establish a crewed lunar base Robotic mission to Mars Exploit Earth-Moon space for industrial development The two state-owned enterprises behind China’s space program China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). CASIC and CASC provide the technology and devices required by the state space and military programs, such as launch vehicles, satellites, manned spaceships, cargo spaceships, deep space explorers, space station, nuclear missiles, conventional ground-to-ground missiles, and air and missile defense equipment. The two state-owned corporations have decades of experience, secured state funding, thousands of personnel, dozens of labs and subsidiaries, and an established suite of high-tech products and services. In the years ahead, the Chinese state-owned space titans will continue to lead the country’s space program, while private commercial space companies are likely to serve as “supplements” to China’s broader space activities. Participation of private commercial players The past decade has witnessed an explosive growth in the number of China’s commercial space companies. By November 2020, China was home to over 160 commercial space companies. More than half of them were founded since 2014 – a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China and the government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation. The private space enterprises boast a range of offerings from satellite manufacturing and rocket launch. FutureAerospace, a state-funded industry think tank, reports that investment in Chinese commercial space firms totaled RMB 3.57 billion (US$550 million) in 2018, and will exceed RMB 30.6 billion (US$4.7 billion) by 2025. The upsurge is fueled by rising demand for launching satellites. In the next decade, China envisions massive constellations of commercial satellites that can offer services ranging from high-speed internet for aircraft to tracking coal shipments. To boost the commercial space industry, China uses government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. However, state-owned commercial space companies like Expace and China Rocket can have easier access to government funding and Chinese financing. Private commercial space companies either receive government support or seek venture capital. A 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies reached US$516 million in 2018, although the amount was far shy of the US$2.2 billion American companies raised. Unlike American companies, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, whose billionaire founders are ready to take on large expensive risks, Chinese companies who are late starters have to consider whether they can be supported by deep-pocked and risk-prone investors. Some private companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have managed to accrue foreign investment, which could make it easier for them to compete on a global scale, in terms of taking on overseas clients, launching from other countries, and attracting international talents. However, to maintain investor confidence will not be easy. At present, none of the new commercial space companies are profitable. These companies’ launch success rates have been erratic. And they have shown no sign of explosive innovation – the current offerings consist almost solely for small, solid-fuel, single-use rockets. Thus, China’s private commercial space sector is not yet positioned to upend the state-dominated or global space ecosystems any time soon, though eventually new entrants may carve out niche areas for themselves in the domestic market.

#### China's distinct environment guarantee’s private failure, contracts favor the public sector and independently private companies are funded by the govt which guarantees circumvention

Waidelich 21 [Brian Waidelich, Brian Waidelich is a Research Analyst with the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at CNA, 3-13-2021, "China’s commercial space sector shoots for the stars," East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/13/chinas-commercial-space-sector-shoots-for-the-stars/] mk

Despite the hype surrounding Chinese space startups, the prospects for a Chinese SpaceX are not so optimistic. China’s space startups are hardly commercial, compared to countries like the United States where commercial space ventures are meaningfully supported by private capital. Some of China’s commercial space companies are directly state-owned, such as Expace and China Rocket. Other nominally private companies have received substantial investment from provincial and local governments. The lack of private capital at risk diminishes these companies’ motivation to innovate or lower costs. ‘Private’ Chinese space startups also find themselves facing two massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that dominate both the domestic industry and Chinese financing. The state-owned Expace received over one billion RMB (US$154 million) in series A financing, while nominally private Chinese companies like iSpace received around 100 million RMB (US$15 million). This apparent favouritism aligns with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s stated objective of making SOEs ‘stronger, better, and bigger’. Legislative gaps create further uncertainties for the activities of China’s commercial space companies. China still has no comprehensive space law, despite incorporating the need for one in the National People’s Congress’s legislation plan in 2013. New regulations on commercial launches in 2019 were a step forward, but many ambiguities remain. It is still unclear, for example, whether companies can build their own launch sites, or if they must use one of the four military-controlled sites. The launch record of China’s commercial space companies has also been rocky. Two of the three ‘private’ companies to conduct orbital launches — OneSpace and LandSpace — have failed in their sole attempts. Several other companies have fared better, but all three of their most recent launches — two by Expace in July and September 2020, and one by iSpace in February 2021 — ended in failure. These challenges suggest that China’s commercial space industry cannot yet rival its US and European counterparts. Chinese commercial launch companies have shown no signs of explosive innovation; indeed, their current offerings consist almost solely of small, solid-fuel, single-use rockets. Nor have these companies offered prices to challenge global leaders — Expace has announced launches of its Kuaizhou rockets at US$10,000/kg of payload, which will be eventually lowered to US$5000/kg, but this doesn’t even come close to SpaceX’s advertised prices — about US$2720/kg for the Falcon 9, and US$1410/kg for the Falcon Heavy. In the years ahead, breakthroughs in Chinese space technologies will almost certainly come from traditional state-owned contractors, not nominally private firms. CASC and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation have decades of experience, secure state funding, thousands of personnel, dozens of labs and subsidiaries, and an established suite of high-tech products and services. These contractors’ best products and services will be primarily offered to Chinese military and government organisations, rather than private or international clients. The addition of ‘private’ commercial space companies provides China’s traditional contractors with some token competition, and eventually new entrants may carve out niche areas for themselves in the domestic market. But Chinese commercial space firms will not lead China’s space program — indeed, these companies describe themselves as ‘supplements’ to China’s broader space activities. They are not positioned to disrupt the domestic or global space ecosystems with low-cost, innovative offerings any time soon.

### 1NC – Weapons Thump Instability

#### Tons of other stuff thumps information asymmetry

Wolverton 19 [Mark Wolverton is a science journalist, author, and 2016-17 Knight-MIT Science Journalism Fellow. He writes for various national and international publications including WIRED, Nature, Undark, Scientific American, and Air & Space Smithsonian. He has also worked with the NASA Ames History Project, Argonne National Laboratory, the Franklin Institute, and the NASA ISS Science Office. 7/9. "The Race for Space Weapons Speeds Up." https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/the-race-for-space-weapons-speeds-up]

Both antiballistic missiles and co-orbiting antisatellite weapons use kinetic attacks that apply physical force to disable or destroy a satellite. They are far from the only options in the counter-space arsenal.

Nonkinetic approaches were studied intensively since the early 1960’s and then revived during President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s. They seek to disable or destroy vital components or sensors with lasers, particle beams, or high-powered microwaves, either from space or ground stations. Such methods are difficult, expensive, and require great amounts of power, but the United States and other nations have tested them.

A more subtle—and perhaps more deniable—nonkinetic approach might involve electronic warfare. This might range from such time-honored techniques as jamming or spoofing an adversary’s satellite communications to cyberwarfare that targets computer systems that control satellites or process their data.

## Asia War

#### Card says china needs space to “control the region” doesn’t equal china would start a war with spac weapons

### ECS/Senkaku

#### No American draw in – our commitment is clear and Beijing will avoid escalation

Choong 6/4/20 [William Choong, Senior Fellow @ISEAS . Fmr. Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow @IISS\_org, Senior Writer at The Straits Times. "China and Japan’s island dispute." https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-and-japan-island-dispute]

A vital question now is whether Washington would send in the cavalry if a war of words were to escalate into actual war. American leaders have consistently clarified that the islands fall under the auspices of the US-Japan mutual security treaty. That said, the security guarantee will only be invoked if there are Chinese actions at the high-end of the spectrum – say, a deployment of military forces to invade the islands. But as Chinese behaviour since 2012 has shown, Beijing will not stop salami-slicing below the threshold of open conflict, challenging Japan’s occupation of the islands by sending aircraft and vessels near the islands.

#### Japan would back down over Senkaku – that means no war AND it solves entanglement by deterring American involvement

Newsham 8/12/20 [Grant Newsham, a retired US Marine Corps officer and former US diplomat, currently is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and the Center for Security Policy. "Why Japan may cede the Senkakus to China." https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/why-japan-may-cede-the-senkakus-to-china/]

Many Western observers have long assumed that if backed into a corner Japan would fight – despite its reticence about things military. The prospect of losing territory to the Chinese is presumably such a corner. And despite their shortcomings, the Self Defense Forces – particularly the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) with its highly professional surface, submarine and anti-submarine forces – have the capability to bloody an opponent’s nose. But maybe the assumption is wrong. It could be that in Japan – or, better said, in those parts of its ruling political and business classes that make such decisions – there is no intention of “going kinetic” to defend the Senkakus. If the Chinese presence becomes overwhelming, Tokyo may simply cede the area to the PRC. It would complain of course, but would it shoot? Or would it reckon that the cost of military confrontation with China would far exceed the value of “some rocks”? Far-fetched? Maybe not. A recently retired JSDF officer, unprompted, recently confided his belief that, even if the Senkaku Islands are invaded by China, the “Japanese government will not choose war.” He expained: “I’m very sorry but Japanese statesmen think these affairs” – in this case he was referring both to the Senkakus and the South Korean-controlled Takeshima Islands – “are not military matters but political matters.” I take his point. The Japanese would sort of resist but my own guess is that, if the only way to remove the Chinese were to shoot, Japan wouldn’t do it. This assumes the Chinese don’t start shooting first. If China just comes in and parks itself and even lands some people on the Senkakus and says, “wuddyugonnadoaboutit?,” the government of Japan just might do nothing much. Recall that the Barack Obama administration allowed the PRC to take de facto control of the South China Sea without putting up a fight – or much of an argument. And back then the US military still had the advantage over the People’s Liberation Army. There are of course Japanese – including factions in the ruling LDP and most members of the JSDF – who think Japan should defend all of the territories it claims. But there were also Americans who thought Obama should forcefully defend US partners and interests in East Asia in the 2010s. If letting go is what Japan’s leaders are thinking of doing, they can’t exactly publicly declare it. For one thing, Japan’s public might be outraged – if public opinion polls, overwhelmingly negative toward China, are anything to go by. But the citizenry doesn’t always matter much in Japan and the government can always simply say, after the fact, “Shoganai” – it couldn’t be helped. One suspects that Japan Inc might be in the “Senkakus aren’t worth a war” camp.

The Abe administration recently allotted US$2 billion to help Japanese companies move operations out of China. However, a Japanese friend whom I trust told me the other day that Keidanren – Japan’s powerful business federation – is soon to issue a call for deeper economic ties with China, while citing the PRC’s post-Corona V-shaped recovery. Toyota, Japan’s leading company, is planning to go all-in on electric vehicle production in China. There is a precedent for Japanese business interests shaping defense policy. In 2012 anti-Japanese riots broke out in China – over the Senkakus – and targeted a Japanese supermarket chain’s stores in the PRC. Around the same time, a prominent official close to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda convinced the leader to cancel an upcoming amphibious exercise near Okinawa that I was directly involved with after the Chinese complained. The official’s family owned the stores being targeted in China. No doubt this isn’t unique to Japan. Wall Street and the American business community have pressured successive US administrations to accommodate the PRC for decades. In fairness, Japan is not ignoring defense. But it almost seems to be going through the motions – hoping China is somehow frightened off or loses interest. Defense spending doesn’t increase much. Recruitment is lackluster. The services can’t easily operate together. Japan’s home-built stealth fighter is scheduled for operations in 2035. And the government still can’t figure out missile defense – or offense. Closer to the Senkakus, the GSDF is fortifying several of Japan’s southern islands and is in the process of installing anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft systems. The MSDF and Japan Coast Guard diligently patrol near the Senkakus, and the Japan Air Self Defense Force intercepts intruding PLA jets intruding into Japanese airspace. However, these activities are disjointed and reactive rather than part of a coherent defense scheme. And Japanese forces are increasingly outmatched numbers-wise by Chinese ships and aircraft. Nor is Senkaku defense a fully joint US-Japan effort, even though the need has been obvious for years. If Japan does give up the Senkakus it may avoid an immediate problem, from Tokyo’s perspective – but that won’t be the end of Chinese demands. And where would this leave the Americans? US forces have operated on the assumption that each side will do its part to defend Japan’s territorial integrity. Cede the Senkakus and it raises doubts about Japanese reliability and commitment, as well as complicating US and Japanese military operations in the East China Sea and beyond.

### Sino-India

#### Wont escalate or go nuclear

* Deterrence stable
* Huge Chinese economic investment in the region
* Chinese threat perceptions are low, and India would never start it
* Both countries have well-established NFU’s
* Terrain makes conventional war impossible
* Five decades of threats haven’t escalated
* Accidental escalation is impossible – diplomacy and weapons stationed far from the border

Dalton et. al 20 [Toby, co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order. “After the Border Clash, Will China-India Competition Go Nuclear?” https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/29/after-border-clash-will-china-india-competition-go-nuclear-pub-83072]

Tong Zhao and Toby Dalton: China sees the United States as its primary nuclear rival—the only country that could pose an existential threat. To Chinese strategists, India lacks the will and the military might to pick a fight with Beijing. China has been modernizing its nuclear forces mainly to deter a U.S. nuclear attack. Beijing’s improving arsenal is more than large enough to deter a nuclear attack from India, whose nuclear arsenal is dwarfed by China’s, much less the United States’. Since they don’t see India as a threat, few Chinese analysts focus on the China-India nuclear relationship. Beijing believes that New Delhi developed nuclear weapons in pursuit of deterrence and international prestige, not as a way to threaten China. Chinese leaders are confident that their country’s rising power will discourage India from fighting China and are therefore quite optimistic about the future of the bilateral relationship. To them, a nuclear conflict with India has seemed almost unimaginable. Granted, some in India have claimed that China’s nuclear weapons forced India to develop nuclear bombs in the first place. China’s arsenal, they further argue, justifies India in seeking to improve its nuclear weapons and build more of them. But Chinese experts dismiss these claims as political excuses. Rukmani Gupta: Despite China’s formidable military strength and U.S. security rivalry, the Indian military has not backed down along the countries’ contested border. As the latest standoff enters its fifth month, Chinese scholars may want to reevaluate their sanguine assessment that the disparities between the countries’ militaries will keep conflict at bay. Neither country has openly threatened the other with the use of nuclear weapons, but their nuclear status is an unspoken factor. In keeping with their no-first-use (NFU) policies, neither country has openly threatened the other with the use of nuclear weapons, but their nuclear status is an unspoken factor in the dispute. China has repeatedly dropped hints about its superior military assets, both conventional and nuclear, as it did when Chinese media reported on Chinese H-6 bombers deployed to a “plateau region” for training exercises. Clearly, Chinese military planners seem to have considered the nuclear dimension of its security calculus in the event of a military conflict or border dispute with India. Heading off nuclear escalation is another incentive for both countries to avoid conflict effectively. COULD A FUTURE CHINA-INDIA MILITARY CONFRONTATION INVOLVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? Zhao and Dalton: As their NFU policies demonstrate, both India and China have traditionally reserved nuclear weapons only for deterring a hostile nuclear attack. So even if their dispute over the border worsens, the risk of a Sino-Indian nuclear conflict is still very low, especially compared with other potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. That said, the risk of nuclear use is growing for several reasons. India has noticed that China is increasingly willing to leverage its growing economic and military power to advance its national interests, especially over disputed territory. The nationalist government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi presumably feels growing pressure from populists to push back, despite the potential short-term economic consequences. Both countries are ruled by avowed strongmen who whip up nationalism as a source of popularity and legitimacy. The “fighting spirit” that Chinese President Xi Jinping has touted exposes senior Chinese officials and rank-and-file border guards alike to domestic criticism if they appear weak by making compromises with their Indian counterparts. Modi is similarly known for cultivating a macho image and has publicly alluded to nuclear weapons during previous military crises with Pakistan. Chinese experts tend to dismiss the risk that a conventional border conflict with India could spark nuclear escalation because the tough, mountainous terrain makes large-scale troop maneuvers impossible. If there was a clash, they expect that the potential casualties and damage would be limited enough to avoid triggering nuclear threats. Yet these risks may be growing. After both sides suffered casualties in the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, both countries ramped up their military presence close to the border. Both sides now boast better transportation infrastructure and modern weaponry, so a severe, high-intensity conventional war can no longer be ruled out. Both countries also have dual-use (conventional or nuclear) weapon systems that could factor into a border conflict—weapons that could inadvertently fuel a deadly overreaction. Gupta: The Indian military is battle-tested and is experienced in mountain combat. Infrastructure development under way in India’s border regions will improve transport and logistics links, allowing for a year-round military presence in contested areas. Even though the military confrontation at the border will continue, the risk of nuclear escalation likely hasn’t budged much. The India-China relationship encompasses more than just military affairs. Neither side wants conflict to spill beyond isolated military standoffs. Although Modi and Xi have used nationalist rhetoric in bolstering their legitimacy, the countries’ declared NFU positions remain unchanged, and they remain similarly committed to reserving nuclear weapons for deterrence. After all, the border dispute has not escalated to large-scale conflict in over five decades— clearly, both sides are abundantly cautious about using offensive weapons. The purpose of such contained military confrontation is finite, bound by perceptions of limited territorial claims. Large-scale conventional war beyond the border regions remains highly unlikely. The chances that one side may inadvertently target the other’s weapon systems—a possible path to nuclear escalation—remain very low too. Neither country has embraced tactical nuclear weapons. In the interest of limiting conflict and in keeping with their NFUs, it is extremely unlikely that either country would deploy

strategic nuclear weapons to border regions, especially since their respective nuclear missiles have sufficient range to be stationed far from the border. None of the Chinese bases believed to host nuclear-capable missiles that can target India are near the Line of Actual Control where the border conflict is simmering. The prospect of accidental nuclear escalation remains quite remote. WHAT SECURITY CONCERNS DO CHINA AND INDIA HAVE IN SOUTH ASIA? Zhao and Dalton: Chinese analysts are confident that both countries’ civilian leaders would be able to defuse any risk of conflict escalation long before nuclear weapons could come into play. What’s more, Chinese experts remain optimistic that nuclear weapons in general play a stabilizing role by making both parties more likely to act carefully in future military confrontations. As its relationship with India turns more competitive, China’s own leverage to defuse future crises between India and Pakistan also may be ebbing. By contrast, Chinese analysts are far more worried about nuclear weapons being used in a conflict between India and Pakistan. From Beijing’s perspective, India continues to widen the gap with Pakistan in overall military capabilities, giving Islamabad a greater incentive to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to avoid defeat in a future military conflict. Pakistan’s new tactical nuclear weapons and India’s existing short-range nuclear systems and increasingly powerful precision strike conventional weapons could make both sides worry that their nuclear forces are vulnerable, compounding in a crisis the time-sensitive pressures of being tempted to use such weapons before they were destroyed. This dynamic exacerbates Chinese concerns that a nuclear war is more likely to break out between India and Pakistan. Beijing recognizes how U.S. administrations have helped smooth over previous military crises on the Indian subcontinent. But it notes that Washington seems less willing and able to continue playing this mediating role. Detecting a power vacuum and worrying about a volatile security dynamic between India and Pakistan, some Chinese experts have called on the Chinese government to step up efforts to maintain regional stability. However, they have offered very few concrete suggestions in public analysis about how this could be done. And as its relationship with India turns more competitive, China’s own leverage to defuse future crises between India and Pakistan also may be ebbing. Gupta: In the wake of the border standoff, China has sought to convince other countries that Indian infrastructure development is the root cause of the border tensions and that India has violated some common understanding of the Line of Actual Control. Yet Beijing’s professed concerns about India’s infrastructure building ignore that India is responding to large-scale infrastructure projects China itself has undertaken in the border regions abutting India. Beijing’s insinuations about India’s supposed bad faith on the LAC disregard India’s consistent rejection of the unilateral LAC proposed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959. This blatant misrepresentation of the diplomatic record is of concern to India. China has also repeatedly stated that it does not recognize the Indian Union Territory of Ladakh, even though the creation of this new administrative division had no impact on India’s external borders as articulated in official maps. China’s sudden expansion of territorial claims in Bhutan and commentary on what India views as domestic governance matters can be considered a change in tactics. Beijing seems more eager to build diplomatic pressure on India and exploit negative assessments of Indian actions in Jammu and Kashmir than to resolve its differences bilaterally with New Delhi. The Chinese position that nuclear weapons play a “stabilizing role” in managing the security relationship with India seems to run contrary to Beijing’s assertion that India’s nuclear weapons play no role in its bilateral relationship with China. It seems hypocritical for Beijing to suggest that the gap in military capabilities between India and China mitigates the possibility of conflict between the two, while a similar gap in military capabilities between India and Pakistan only increases the risk of nuclear escalation. New Delhi sees Beijing’s position as a convenient explanation for China’s deepening defense relationship with Pakistan, which seems destabilizing for South Asia from India’s vantage point. To Indian analysts, Beijing hardly seems like a neutral third party. China’s large-scale investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor involves a disputed region that India and Pakistan are contesting. While Beijing claims to be neutrally waiting for India and Pakistan to resolve their territorial dispute, China’s unspoken interests show it has already taken sides. India sees China’s hand in recent moves that suggest Pakistan may seek to grant Gilgit-Baltistan the status of a province. The establishment of a special economic zone within the economic corridor has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi either. Concerns over China’s economic engagement with India’s neighbors also linger. India fears that China will leverage their economic dependence for political gain at the expense of Indian interests. New Delhi sees the bans China levied on commodity imports from Australia soon after the Australian government called for enquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and offered safe haven to Hong Kong residents as a harbinger of how Beijing may further leverage its interests in the region. All things considered, India is unlikely to welcome Chinese attempts to fill a perceived power vacuum in South Asia. WHAT DO CHINA AND INDIA THINK OF EACH OTHER’S CURRENT MILITARY TECHNOLOGY? Zhao and Dalton: Chinese experts generally do not believe that India’s development of more advanced military technologies—especially counterspace capabilities and cyber weapons—poses any near-term threat to China. But they do have concerns about Indian military technologies that may lower the threshold of nuclear use. For instance, some Chinese strategists worry that prospective Indian battlefield nuclear missiles—which would primarily counter Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons—could also be deployed against China. If that happens, the firewall between conventional and nuclear wars may be eroded, given that such nuclear weapons are more likely to be introduced in a high-stake conventional conflict than are long-range strategic nuclear systems. In most cases, Chinese experts are very confident in China’s ability to maintain a comfortable, decade-long edge over India in nuclear and strategic military technologies. Chinese analysts typically do not even try to hide their skepticism about India’s defense industry and military readiness. Chinese analysts typically do not even try to hide their skepticism about India’s defense industry and military readiness. That said, they are much more sensitive to Indian efforts to acquire advanced military technologies from, and establish partnerships with, other major powers—especially the United States. The concern is not necessarily about how such foreign acquisitions may help India catch up technologically. Rather, China worries that defense technology cooperation may lead to tighter security relations between India and the United States and other countries hostile to China. If New Delhi is lured toward Washington’s geopolitical orbit through defense cooperation, the overall balance of power in China’s immediate neighborhood would tilt considerably against Beijing. Gupta: China aims to modernize its forces into a world-class military by 2050, and the United States is its primary competitor. India keeps close watch on the military technological progress Beijing has made, since this could impact their border dispute. Chinese activities in the South China Sea have been an instructive example. For example, the expansion of Chinese operational space as a result of its growing military prowess has enabled China to change the status quo in disputed waters of the South China Sea. The artificial islands China has constructed and built up can function as forward deployment bases, and the sporadic stationing of Chinese military platforms to the Spratly Islands signals their readiness to host military units. Beijing has harnessed the implicit threat to use force through military drills and military deployments to deter confrontation in the South China Sea. When other countries have declined to challenge these actions, China has been able to use military asymmetry to consolidate its military and civilian presence in the region. Consequently, other countries have seen their normal fishing activities disrupted and their civilian energy exploration hindered. The first lesson that India has belatedly learned is that creeping Chinese advances in disputed regions must be challenged immediately. Given the disparity in military power, India will do well to set the terms of engagement early on rather than conform its response to Chinese actions. The second lesson for India is that China’s technological development and civil-military fusion equip it to engage in hybrid warfare or gray-zone conflicts, tactics Beijing can use to gain advantage even in a limited conflict. India engages in defense partnerships as per the requirements of its armed forces. Although India’s defense trade with the United States is growing, its relationship with Russia remains important, and its defense relationships are not limited to countries that China deems hostile. Resurgent concerns over China’s military ambitions across the Indo-Pacific can be attributed to China’s disregard for the sensitivities of smaller countries. Beijing’s brazenness has led its neighbors to seek external balancers, the reemergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States being one example. Australian inclusion in the naval exercise known as Malabar between India, Japan, and the United States marks an important turning point. The Quad members no longer strain to avoid ruffling Chinese feathers, as they did before. Greater military interoperability, maritime security cooperation, and military information sharing between India and the United States can also be attributed to increasing tensions with China. In the event of a conflict with China, these closer ties may influence U.S. diplomatic positions and facilitate information sharing for effective tactical operations or transfers of military hardware. COULD CHINESE AND INDIAN INVESTMENTS IN ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES SPIRAL INTO A STRATEGIC ARMS RACE? Zhao and Dalton: Chinese analysts dismiss the impact of India’s development of advanced strategic technologies on China’s security—although they are watching the technical details closely. Though Indian missiles, missile defense technologies, and anti-satellite weapons have progressed markedly, Chinese experts claim that Beijing still has at least a ten-year lead and that China’s state-centric defense industry will continue to outpace its Indian peer. But this widely felt optimism also points to a problem that few Chinese analysts appear to acknowledge. Beijing’s dismissal of New Delhi’s security efforts does nothing to assuage India’s concerns about China’s growing nuclear and nonnuclear military capabilities. The border clashes will make such Indian concerns As India focuses more on China than Pakistan, a greater imbalance on the subcontinent will emerge. Pakistan does not have the resources to keep pace with India’s investment in better weaponry (despite long-standing Chinese assistance), so it may have to resort to more asymmetric military postures and tactics such as increasing the role of tactical nuclear weapons in its war strategies. Such spillover pressures may fuel a more dangerous Indo-Pakistani arms race and make bilateral tensions more precarious. A strategically unstable South Asia is not in China’s interests, not least because it would threaten its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative investments, especially in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Beijing could also feel more pressure to redress an accelerating imbalance between India and Pakistan by helping Islamabad boost its military capabilities, but doing so could undermine China’s commitment to nonproliferation and harm its international image. Gupta: Neither country seeks parity with its nuclear adversary, so a strategic arms race is unlikely. As India improves its second-strike capabilities, greater stability in South Asia may ensue. Whether addressing Pakistan’s threat perceptions is the primary focus of China’s policies in South Asia or a handy pretext cannot be reliably ascertained. Yet Chinese scholars do not seem to put much stock in the idea that the China-Pakistan relationship contributes to regional instability. India is not party to the Belt and Road and has protested the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in particular. China’s continued investments in contested territories may encourage it to offer greater security assistance or assurances. China’s paramilitary forces man border posts along the China-Tajikistan-Afghanistan border to check the spread of Islamic extremism into Xinjiang. China has also employed security contractors to safeguard investments in Africa. So it isn’t inconceivable that China may employ security personnel beyond its borders in South Asia.

### AT Taiwan War

#### PLA doesn’t have the capability to invade Taiwan – internal Chinese documents prove.

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Roaring out of the sky, an F-16V fighter jet lands smoothly to rearm and refuel on an unremarkable freeway in rural Taiwan, surrounded by rice paddies. ¶ In different circumstances, this could be alarming sight. Taiwan's fighter pilots are trained to land on freeways between sorties in case all of the island's airports have been occupied or destroyed by an invasion. ¶ Luckily, this was a training exercise. ¶ There's only really one enemy that Taiwan's armed forces are preparing to resist -- China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). And as China's reputation as an economic and military superpower has grown in recent years, so too has that threat of invasion, according to security experts. ¶ Taiwan has been self-governed since separating from China at the end of a brutal civil war in 1949, but Beijing has never given up hope of reuniting with what it considers a renegade province. ¶ At a regional security conference in June, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said: "If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs for national unity." In some shops in mainland China, you can buy postcards and T-shirts emblazoned with patriotic emblems promoting the retaking of Taiwan. ¶ But for seven decades, China has resisted attacking Taiwan partly for political reasons, including the prospect of a US intervention and the potential heavy human toll. But the practical realities of a full-blown invasion are also daunting for the PLA, according to experts. ¶ Ferrying hundreds of thousands of troops across the narrow Taiwan Strait to a handful of reliable landing beaches, in the face of fierce resistance, is a harrowing prospect. Troops would then have a long slog over Taiwan's western mudflats and mountains to reach the capital, Taipei. ¶ Not only that, but China would face an opponent who has been preparing for war for almost 70 years. ¶ At mass anti-invasion drills in May, Taiwan military spokesman Maj. Gen. Chen Chung-Chi said the island knew it had to always be "combat-ready." ¶ "Of course, we don't want war, but only by gaining our own strength can we defend ourselves," he said. "If China wants to take any action against us, it has to consider paying a painful price." ¶ Difficult and bloody ¶ It could be easy to assume that any invasion of Taiwan by Beijing would be brief and devastating for Taipei: a David and Goliath fight between a tiny island and the mainland's military might, population and wealth. ¶ With nearly 1.4 billion people, the People's Republic of China has the largest population in the world. Taiwan has fewer than 24 million people -- a similar number to Australia. China has the fifth largest territory in the world, while Taiwan is the size of Denmark or the US state of Maryland. And Beijing runs an economy that is second only to the United States, while Taiwan's doesn't rank in the world's top 20. ¶ But perhaps most pertinently, China has been building and modernizing its military at an unprecedented rate, while Taiwan relies on moderate US arms sales. ¶ In sheer size, the PLA simply dwarfs Taiwan's military. ¶ China has an estimated 1 million troops, almost 6,000 tanks, 1,500 fighter jets and 33 navy destroyers, according to the latest US Defense Department report. Taiwan's ground force troops barely number 150,000 and are backed by 800 tanks and about 350 fighter aircraft, the report found, while its navy fields only four destroyer-class ships. ¶ Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the PLA has rapidly modernized, buoyed by rises in military spending and crackdowns on corruption in the army's leadership. ¶ "China's leaders hope that possessing these military capabilities will deter pro-independence moves by Taiwan or, should deterrence fail, will permit a range of tailored military options against Taiwan and potential third-party military intervention," according to a 2019 US Defense Intelligence Agency report on China's military. ¶ Yet while China hawks in the media might beat the drum of invasion, an internal China military study, seen by CNN, revealed that the PLA considers an invasion of Taiwan to be extremely difficult. ¶ "Taiwan has a professional military, with a strong core of American-trained experts," said Ian Easton, author of "The Chinese Invasion Threat" and research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, as well as "highly defensible" terrain. ¶ In his book he described an invasion by China as "the most difficult and bloody mission facing the Chinese military.

" ¶ The plan to take Taiwan ¶ China's Taiwan invasion plan, known internally as the "Joint Island Attack Campaign," would begin with a mass, coordinated bombing of Taiwan's vital infrastructure -- ports and airfields -- to cripple the island's military ahead of an amphibious invasion, according to both Easton and Sidharth Kaushal, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies. ¶ At the same time, the Chinese air force would fly over the Taiwan Strait and try to dominate the island's air space. Once the PLA was satisfied it had suitably disabled Taiwan's air and naval forces, Kaushal said soldiers would begin to invade on the west coast of the island. ¶ The island's rocky, mountainous east coast is considered too inhospitable and far from mainland China. ¶ The amphibious invasion needed to put troops on Taiwan, however, could be the biggest hurdle facing the PLA. ¶ In its 2019 report to Congress, the US Department of Defense said China -- which has one of the largest navies in Asia -- had at its command 37 amphibious transport docks and 22 smaller landing ships, as well as any civilian vessels Beijing could enlist. ¶ That might be enough to occupy smaller islands, such as those in the South China Sea, but an amphibious assault on Taiwan would likely require a bigger arsenal -- and there is "no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force," the report said. ¶ That makes it vital for Beijing to neutralize Taiwan's navy and air force in the early stages of an attack, Kaushal said. ¶ "The Taiwanese air force would have to sink around 40% of the amphibious landing forces of the PLA in order to render this sort of mission infeasible," he said. ¶ Essentially, that's only about 10 to 15 ships, he added. ¶ If they did make it across the strait, the PLA would still need to find a decent landing spot for its ships. ¶ China's military would be looking for a landing site both close to the mainland, and a strategic city, such as Taipei, with nearby port and airport facilities. ¶ That leaves just 14 potential beaches, Easton said -- and it's not only the PLA that knows it. Taiwanese engineers have spent decades digging tunnels and bunkers in potential landing zones along the coast. ¶ Furthermore, the backbone of Taiwan's defense is a fleet of vessels capable of launching anti-ship cruise missiles, on top of an array of ground-based missiles, and substantial mines and artillery on the coastline. ¶ "Taiwan's entire national defense strategy, including its war plans, are specifically targeted at defeating a PLA invasion," Easton said. ¶ Chinese troops could be dropped in from the air, but a lack of paratroopers in the PLA makes it unlikely. ¶ If the PLA held a position on Taiwan, and could reinforce with troops from the mainland to face off about 150,000 Taiwan troops, as well as more than 2.5 million reservists, it would have to push through the island's western mud flats and mountains, with only narrow roads to assist them, towards Taipei. ¶ Finally, the mobilization of amphibious landing vessels, ballistic missile launchers, fighters and bombers, as well as hundreds of thousands of troops, would give Taiwan plenty of advance warning of any attack, Kaushal said. ¶ "It's extremely unlikely that the invasion could come as a bolt from the blue," Kaushal added. ¶ There is, of course, one final deterrent to any PLA invasion of Taiwan. ¶ It isn't clear whether or not such an attack by China would spark an intervention by the United States on Taipei's behalf. ¶ Washington has been a longtime ally of the island, selling weapons to the Taiwan government and providing implicit military protection from Beijing. ¶ Easton said that, at present, the US would likely intervene in Taiwan's favor, both to protect investment by US companies on the island and reassure American allies in the region, who are also facing down a resurgent PLA in the East and South China seas. ¶ Collin Koh Swee Lean, research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies' Maritime Security Program in Singapore, said there would also be "immense political consequences" from taking over Taiwan, in the event of a successful China invasion. ¶ "It will likely mean that China will be seen as the bad guy in the neighborhood, who uses force," he said. "It will alienate some regional partners and the good will which China has been trying to build over the years will evaporate. And it will set China on a collision course with the US." ¶ But Taipei isn't taking anything for granted. ¶ On the sidelines of the massive Han Guang drills, Taiwan's Maj. Gen. Chen pointed out the hundreds of spectators who had come out to watch and support the island's military. ¶ "These exercises let people know the national army of the Republic of China is ready," he said. ¶ Taiwan is taking no chances.

## Hegemony

#### Global war /=/ nuclear escalation – it does rely on winning the first scenario

#### Overstretch makes prolif, econ decline, terror, failed states, war with Russia and China – try or die

Walt 19 [STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and the author of The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. Foreign Affairs. May/June. “The End of Hubris And the New Age of American Restraint.” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris> My OCR sometimes turns E’s into C’s, I think I got them all, but please let me know if I missed one]

At bottom, liberal hegemony is a highly revisionist strategy. Instead of working to maintain favorable balances of power in a few areas of vital interest, the United States sought to transform regimes all over the world and recruit new members into the economic and security institutions it dominated. The results were dismal: failed wars, financial crises, staggering inequality, frayed alliances, and emboldened adversaries. HEGEMONIC HUBRIS When Clinton took office in 1993, the United States was on favorable terms with the world’s other major powers, including China and Russia. Democracy was spreading, Iraq was being disarmed, and Iran had no nuclear enrichment capacity. The Oslo Accords seemed to herald an end to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and Washington seemed well positioned to guide that process. The European Union was adding new members and moving toward a common currency, and the U.S. economy was performing well. Americans saw terrorism as a minor problem, and the U.S. military seemed unstoppable. The wind was at the country’s back. Life was good. But those circumstances fueled a dangerous overconfidence among American elites. Convinced that the United States was “the indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously put it in 1998, they believed they had the right, the responsibility, and the wisdom to shape political arrange ments in every corner of the world. That vision turned out to be a hubris-tic fantasy. Repeated attempts to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians all failed, and the two-state solution sought by three U.S. presidents is no longer a viable option. Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, and Washington responded by launching a global war on terrorism, including invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Those campaigns were costly failures and shattered the U.S. military’s aura of invincibility. Much of the Middle East is now embroiled in conflict, and violent extremists operate from Africa to Central Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, India, Pakistan, and North Korea tested and deployed nuclear weapons, and Iran become a latent nuclear weapons state. The collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2008 exposed widespread corruption in the country’s financial institutions and triggered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression—a calamity from which the global economy has yet to fully recover. In 2014, Russia seized Crimea, and it has interfered in a number of other countries since then and its relations with the West are now worse than at any time since the Cold War. Chinas power and ambitions have expanded, and cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has deepened. The eurozone crisis, the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the eu, and energetic populist movements have raised doubts about the eu’s future. Democracy is in retreat worldwide; according to Freedom House, 2018 was the 13th consecutive year in which global freedom declined. Illiberal leaders govern in Hungary and Poland, and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democ-racy Index has downgraded the United States from a “full” to a "flawed” democracy. The United States was not solely responsible for all these adverse developments, but it played a major role in most of them. And the taproot of many of these failures was Washington's embrace of liberal hegemony. For starters, that strategy expanded U.S. security obligations without providing new resources with which to meet them. The policy of “dual containment,” aimed at Iran and Iraq, forced the United States to keep thousands of troops on the Arabian Peninsula, an additional burden that also helped convince Osama bin Laden to strike at the U.S. homeland. Nato expansion committed Washington to defend weak and vulnerable new members,

even as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom let their military forces atrophy. Equally important, U.S. efforts to promote democracy, the open-ended expansion of NATO, and the extension of the alliances mission far beyond its original parameters poisoned relations with Russia. And fear of U.S. led regime change encouraged several states to pursue a nuclear deterrent—in the case of North Korea, successfully. When the United States did manage to topple a foreign foe, as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the results were not thriving new democracies but costly occupations, failed states, and hundreds of thousands of dead civilians. It was delusional for U.S. leaders to expect otherwise: creating a functional democracy is a difficult process under the best of circumstances, but trying to do it in fractured societies one barely under stands is a fool’s errand. Finally, globalization did not deliver as promised. Opening up markets to trade and investment brought great benefits to lower and middle classes in China, India, and other parts of the developing world. It also further magnified the already staggering wealth of the worlds richest one percent. But lower- and middle-class incomes in the United States and Europe remained flat, jobs in some sectors there fled abroad, and the global financial system became much more fragile.

#### China rise is peaceful

* China seeks limited predation not outright competition
* Strategy and policy moves show coop over conflict
* Care most about stability

Shifrinson 19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University. Should the United States Fear China’s Rise? Winter 2019. www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf]

In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly addressing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.”51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.”52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [... China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.”53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a still-potent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

#### Empirical data goes negative. Compilation of historical analyses proves heg increases war by 400%.

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At the same time, the first two-and-a-half decades of our unipolar system have [has] been **anything but peaceful** in what concerns U.S, involvement in interstate conflict. U.S. forces have been employed in **four interstate wars** – Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2oo3-2011) – in addition to many smaller interventions including Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan.5 As a result, the United States has been at war for **fifteen of the twenty-five years** since the end of the Cold War, In fact, the first two-and-a-half decades of unipolarity — representing around 1o percent of U.S. history account for more than 30 percent of the nation's total wartime.6 For critics of U.S. interventionism, "the central question [of contemporary international politics] is how to contain and moderate the use of military force by the United States."8 Table 5 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: from 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; from 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and unipolarity since 1990.9 Table 6 then presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is **by far the most conflict prone** of all systems according to two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great-power years were spent at war versus 16 percent in bipolarity. In unipolarity, in contrast, a remarkable 64 percent of great-power years have been until now spent at war – **by far the highest percentage** in all systems. Furthermore, during multipolarity and bipolarity the probability that war involving a great power would, break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 16.o percent – or around **four times higher**. It might be argued that the higher number of years that great powers spent at war under unipolarity are merely the result of the long, grinding, and unforeseen occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq by U.S. forces.11 But even if these two wars had gone according to U.S. plans – if the Afghanistan War had ended in the spring of 2002 and the Iraq War in the summer of 2003 – unipolarity would still be particularly **prone to great-power involvement** in war. Even if the United States had not occupied either Afghanistan or Iraq, it would still have spent 16.0 percent of the post-Cold War years at war, which is about the same as the respective percentages for bipolar and multipolar systems. In other words, even if the United States had refrained from any military occupations, the frequency of its use of military force in major operations would still give us **no reason to believe** that unipolarity is any more peaceful than any other past configuration of the international system. As things turned out in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the last two-and-a-half decades saw a sharp increase in both the incidence of conflict and the percentage of great-power years spent at war. This is a particularly puzzling finding given that the current unipole – the United States – is a democracy in a world populated by more democracies than at any time in the past. In light of arguments about how democracies are better able to solve disputes peacefully, choose to engage only in those wars they can win, and tend to fight shorter wars, the United States should have spent fewer years at war than previous nondemocratic great powers.12 As we can see, post-Cold War history can be used in support of both the widespread claim that the overall level of conflict has declined and of the claim that the United States has experienced an **unprecedented level of involvement** in interstate war. Reality seems to be chafing against the view that unipolarity produces no incentives for confilict; at least in what concerns the unipole's involvement in interstate wars, the past two-and-a-half decades seem to point in **the opposite direction**.