# 1

#### US wins space race now due to private competition – its key to space dominance and militarization is good – the plan nukes the US’s silver bullet against Chinese aggression

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As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector. Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing. Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world. The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below. Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket. The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.) Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter. Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious. Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter. Why not? America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century? More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor. Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government. Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight. Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy. The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us. The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### Space dominance solves hegemony – deterrence strategies, even rudimentary ones, are perceived as weakness and causes aggression

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While space superiority and space dominance share a militarized view of space, there are fundamental differences in their stated end goals. Those who favor space superiority view space as a global commons, accessible to all in peacetime. They take a more defensive and reactive view of space and the actors who seek access to this domain. The space superiority model understands that U.S. dependence on space is vital for the basic functioning of American civilization (banking transactions, cell phone signals, GPS functions, television broadcasts, as well as essential military surveillance and support functions all across satellites in space). Yet, this model also accepts that current budgetary constraints mean that the United States is unlikely to invest significantly more into unwieldy and expensive space systems. A strategy of space superiority accepts the risk arising from reliance on space systems, while deterring attacks on space assets. As actors such as China or Russia become increasingly dependent on space systems themselves, space superiority advocates believe that U.S. willingness to retaliate in kind against any attack on its own space assets is sufficient.7 This is in keeping with the classic deterrence model of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Unfortunately, however, U.S. dependence on space assets for its very survival is so much greater than any other state that such a threat is unrealistic. The reason that states like China or Russia are developing counter-space capabilities is because the cost to them is extremely low, whereas the benefit for them (in the event of war with the United States) is high. For the cost of a ground-based laser or an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile launcher, China could knock out the ability of all U.S. forces in the Pacific to coordinate and adequately defend themselves from a Chinese offensive. What could the United States do to the Chinese in return? The best option for U.S. retaliation in space would be to launch some blinding attacks on the handful of China's space assets. However, this ultimately would not deter China from escalating any future conflict since China's investment in space is so low compared to that of the United States. In addition, since Chinese forces are designed to operate in an environment without those assets, such retaliation grounded on deterrence-based models becomes highly problematic and ineffective. Rather than serving as a stabilizing force in space, then, the defensive and reactive space superiority model would be an inducement for conflict in the strategic high ground of space. Or, rather, the direction of attack would be unidirectional: from U.S. adversaries toward essential U.S. space systems. Thus, while space confers unequivocal advantages to the U.S. forces that depend on space assets for their vital functions, it also provides adversaries with an unprecedented weakness for them to exploit. The fact is that United States, China, or Russia's dependence on space is asymmetrical. Over the long run, a deterrent-based, space superiority model would eventually allow other states not only to gain and maintain access to space, but also effectively to gain strategic parity with the United States in space. Make no mistake, the more that states are able to access space, no matter how nascent or rudimentary their space programs may be, the more they will refine their capabilities and be able to develop space programs for their own strategic ends. While most defense analysts believe that deterrence during the Cold War led to bipolar stability, a deterrence-based model in space would create instability. If a near-peer competitor like China or Russia believed that it had acquired the capacity to achieve parity with the United States, what would stop that state from trying to gain strategic advantage over America in space? A Hegemonic Model The best solution to avoid this situation is a hegemonic model. The only way that the United States can ensure its continued strategic advantage in space is to embrace fully the space dominance model by weaponizing space. While space superiority advocates will denounce this policy as both cost-ineffective and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more in keeping with U.S. traditions and values. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the American response to foreign threat is traditionally to take “the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security.”8 What of the claim that a deterrence-based space superiority model creates stability? The primary claim of deterrence efficacy is that during the Cold War, the more or less equal nuclear balance ensured that neither side had an incentive to launch a disarming first strike. This view was the basis of the mutual assured destruction theory. Since there was no conceivable advantage to either side from these weapons, both sides were forced into a more constructive diplomatic relationship. In all of the time that deterrence was employed, American policymakers assured the public that MAD was better than the alternatives—compellence,9 Rollback,10 and hegemony—because it restrained Soviet aggression. American policymakers assumed that the Soviet strategists in the Kremlin viewed nuclear arms in the same apocalyptic terms that they did. As such, U.S. policymakers were not only content to allow American nuclear dominance to erode, but also to degrade actively those capabilities through strategic arms agreements. In the meantime, until 1986, mainstream Soviet strategists and policymakers were convinced that they could prevail in a nuclear war. They were just biding their time.11 In this light then, deterrence was not built around the concept of enlightened self-interest, but more likely the result of U.S. policymakers’ inability to see through the fog of the Cold War. The Soviets were by definition a revolutionary power. Even after they had renounced the concept of spreading global communist revolution, however, the urge to transform fundamentally the world order to reflect their own image remained a high strategic priority for the USSR. The United States failed to discern this situation until the Reagan Administration. President Ronald Reagan, rather than accept the Cold War deterrence paradigm, planned to bring American technical and strategic dominance to bear in space in order to help defeat the Soviet Union. Reagan also recognized that the demilitarized sanctuary view of space was irrelevant, and he eschewed arms control agreements that sought to counteract the inherent American advantages in space. President Reagan not only embraced a militarized view of space, but in 1983, he also called for the weaponization of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). By the 1980s, the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space for military purposes (primarily in the area of satellites). These space systems formed the backbone of the modern military force that Reagan was assembling to counter the Soviet Union. What is more, Reagan's preferred strategy of Rollback meant that the United States would no longer sacrifice its own strategic advantages on the altar of diplomacy. After all, Reagan did not accept the Soviets as an equal and legitimate global power. He detested communism and viewed its proponents in the USSR as the great villains on the world stage. Furthermore, Reagan was staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. Therefore, he sought to remove the notion of deterrence through MAD and replace it with the concept of hegemony through “Mutual Assured Survival.” These views coalesced into the Reagan Administration's commitment to placing missile defense systems in orbit. It also called for developing new technologies (i.e., directed-energy weapons) to be used in space. The United States would not only remove the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal by creating a working missile defense system in space, but it would also move beyond the Soviet threat by permanently dominating the high ground of space. This position was the basis of SDI.12 In fact, the Reagan Administration's shift in focus was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union as the Soviet leadership then embarked on a tit-for-tat arms buildup that their economy simply could not sustain. 13 Even if deterrence did facilitate a significant reduction in hostility—thereby creating the bipolar stability—no such hope for stability exists in space today. As argued earlier, U.S. reliance on space assets for its most basic functions is far greater than that of other countries. Furthermore, there is no way that the United States can—or should—abandon its use of space as a strategic domain. Thus, a hegemonic model for space dominance is the only hope to create the stability that most planners seek, while at the same time defending the American position in space. Space dominance as a model for stability is nothing new. Indeed, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) asserts that the most stable global systems are those in which one actor dominates the system. In such a system, power is aggregated so greatly into a single, dominant actor that such a hegemonic power acts as a stabilizing force. Due to its relative strength, the hegemonic power can set the agenda and the rules that govern the system. The relative weakness of the other actors in the system is well understood, which then prompts these weak actors to abandon any hope of challenging the hegemonic power's rule. Eventually, they end up accommodating the hegemonic power. The lack of challenge creates peaceful stability.14 The fact that one actor is setting the rules means that the system is simple to operate in, as well. The same logic that buttresses the HST international relations theory arguably undergirds the military strategy of space dominance. If this claim is so, then American hegemony in space is essential for the continued survival of the United States. Whereas there are legitimate arguments to be made regarding the reliance on deterrence-based models for creating stability during the Cold War, the fact is that the world is more multipolar today than it was 25 years ago. Despite what writer Fareed Zakaria has dubbed “the rise of the rest,”15 the United States still retains greater relative power. Therefore, it is inevitable and logical that the United States should expand its hegemonic position in space, in order to secure its place there. Whereas deterrence-based models, such as space superiority, may have worked in a less chaotic international system, no such stability can be achieved today. Many of America's competitors are revanchist states intent on redefining the world order. They are not interested in preserving the American position in space. Also, they are not cowed by a U.S. deterrence strategy in space. Rather, they view such a policy as a concession that the United States is becoming weaker. Space dominance would create greater stability than space superiority. Missile defense systems, tungsten rods, and even directed-energy weapons potentially would all be placed in key orbits around the Earth. This, on top of the existing U.S. space infrastructure, would prove to the world that the United States is committed to preserving its position in space. In a world of rogue states, space-based weapons likely would prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Failing that, the fact that the United States possessed strategic, offensive weapons in orbit—that could be brought down against any hostile actor—undoubtedly, would make even the most intractable foe hesitant. It is arguable that overwhelming U.S. space power would trickle down from the strategic high ground to lower strategic domains. Rather than wasting time demonstrating resolve by “temporarily blinding Chinese satellites,”16 for example, the overwhelming American presence in space presumably would dissuade potential attackers.

#### US hegemony prevents great-power conflicts that escalates to nuclear war – China and Russia are revisionist expansionists

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Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and military exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. 34 More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post– Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history. Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington.35 In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation.36 The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers. Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America? Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profi ted far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fi ctional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38 These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how signifi cantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacifi c, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

# Case

### Framing

#### Materiality controls all of their impacts – racialized, gendered violence, otherization, and war are only bad if pain is bad and pleasure is good – they cant independently justify their impacts without util

#### Their argument for discourse important is that it shapes reality, but this concedes that shaping reality is bare minimum equally important to shaping discourse which means util impacts should be weighed

#### Extinction outweighs under util – infinite future generations outweigh any current suffering and moral uncertainty means even if you are leaning aff you still prioritize extinction to make sure u weren’t wrong

### ROB

#### [1] The ROB is to vote for the better debater – anything else is self-serving and arbitrary. This is key to fairness and clash and preserves substantive education.

#### [2] Don’t allow for any pre-FIAT performative offense – the NC and NR are also instances of Asian performance and identity within the debate space and there’s no pre and post-FIAT distinction either way. If they win that their reading of the 1AC spills up then the act of us reading the CP and DA spills up as well. If we prove that the act of getting private corporations out of space is bad then that means their performative act of rejecting it is unethical and bad so you should vote NEG

#### [3] All our offense falls under their ROB –

#### [A] We “best construct reality in a desirable way through discourse” because we’re discussing why the status quo or the comparative world of the CP are a more desirable reality than the AFF

#### [B] Space policy has no intrinsic quality – it’s porous and open to public pressure, but equipping students to engage is necessary for broader engagement that stops devastating social inequality AND solves the case

Weeks 12 [Adjunct Professor of International Relations Online Program, Webster University (Edythe, “OUTER SPACE DEVELOPMENT: THE SOLUTION FOR GLOBAL INEQUALITY,” *Outer Space Development, International Relations and Space Law: A Method for Elucidating Seeds*, Chapter 7, pg 171-174]

This is the time to discuss equality. Once societies in outer space are established it will be too late. The first wave of outer space development in the last half of the 20th century changed the world. This process included establishing a satellite telecommunications infrastructure in the geostationary orbit along with the globalization of new high-tech products and services. The retirement of the NASA space shuttle program symbolized the start of the second wave of outer space development, which is likely to be propelled by the privatization of space tourism and space mining. This type of space industrialization will undoubtedly result in extreme wealth for a few who know what is happening, while those who have no knowledge will be left behind. Decision makers, scholars, trouble-shooters, and others worry constantly about existing inequality gaps, lack of development, poverty, and economic hardship. This chapter suggests a method for preventative maintenance prior to humankind’s next development project. It argues that education, information, and sharing knowledge can become tools for generating perpetual equality as we embark on our journey to colonize the final frontier. Those historically disenfranchised can gain a fresh advantage through preparation and education to develop an expertise aimed at providing valuable knowledge useful for space endeavors. In addition, in these times of crashing economies, job loss, high unemployment rates, and school system failures, people are searching for ways to create prosperous futures for themselves and their families. Outer space could prove to be a way for many to find their answer. Newly Emerging Trends Relevant for Outer Space Development The passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 demonstrates a willingness by the U.S. to fund a stepped-up phase of space activities. During bad economic times, this Act provides $58,400,000,000 for various space-related programs from 2011 to 2013. In 2010/2011, media reports constantly alerted the general public to be ready for the retirement of the NASA Space Shuttle program. This initiative complemented the New Vision for U.S. Space Exploration Policy (2004), as well as various other laws and policies initiated by the United States and discussed in previous chapters. When read together, it is fair to assume the newly emerging space industries will be related to achieving advanced space transportation systems, private spacecraft development, commercial space habitats, space stations, space settlements, commercial space mining, spacecraft trajectory optimization techniques for landing on near-Earth asteroids, commercial spaceport construction, interplanetary telecommunications, and space exploration missions. The thing for teachers, students, and members of the general public to do in order to prepare to take advantage of these linked opportunities is to imagine how these goals are likely to play out, and what types of goods, services, and skill-sets will be needed. Education as the Solution Outer space development historically has been the purview of skilled professionals in the science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields. The STEM-oriented opportunities for those proficient in physics, astrophysics, space medicine, engineering, calculus, etc., have always been limited to a few select students. But now global society is calling for something, more since the STEM fields have failed to attract diverse people on an equal footing.186 A bridge can be created by using social and behavioral sciences curricula, thereby to attract people from a wider range of backgrounds to learn about outer space development and newly emerging industries. New education paradigms can help ensure equity and enable wider citizen participation throughout the international community. Curricula using the new paradigm can be used to motivate and inspire a new generation of scholars who can play a key role in the process of outer space development. In effect, an educational system that unleashes human creativity and curiosity will empower students with the knowledge and competencies not only for the second wave of outer space development, but also for the global engagement necessary for the 21st century and beyond (Weeks and Tamashiro, 2011). It is never too early to begin cultivating a person’s intellectual and academic talents. Most children are naturally curious. As part of the curriculum, students of all ages can be shown how to do research, how to write a research paper, to compile and present data, perform critical analytical thinking, and to anticipate and develop relevant skill-sets for newly emerging industry trends. Learning these skills will enable more people to develop an expertise aimed at supplying talent that will be in demand as future industries emerge. This can change people’s lives. Students can learn how to anticipate and prepare for future emerging industries while they are at the K-12 level. Students can also learn at young ages how to get recognized by publishers, editors, the mass media, and others. In situations where the resources necessary for teaching science are unavailable, space studies can be introduced through the social and behavioral sciences and the arts. For many years, space studies has remained the exclusive purview of engineers, scientists, and technology experts. However, there is room at the table for social and behavioral sciences students to join in and develop a specialty area of expertise. Key actors within the outer space development community have expressed an interest in advancing space studies to a broader audience. Orchestrating such a process carries with it the power to improve international relations, education, inspiration, dreams, and creativity, and to boost the global economy by creating a myriad of new jobs and degree programs. We can open an additional door to allow a broader range of knowledge into the minds of more people by introducing outer space development studies through the social and behavioral sciences (Hammond and Weeks, 2011). Unlike engineering, an interdisciplinary social and behavioral sciences lens enables us to interpret the meaning behind sets and patterns of human behaviors—this includes the behavior of individuals, institutions, groups, presidents, members of congress, business and other organizations, mass media, international organizations, and lawmakers. Humankind can progress beyond the “STEMs = space studies” model by including, encouraging, involving, and preparing a new breed of social and behavioral sciences geniuses. These would be people who are naturals in international relations, conflict resolution, and peace studies, as well as versed in international law, politics, social psychology, critical analysis, discourse analysis, international communication, artistic architecture, race and ethnic studies, gender studies, religious studies, economics, finance, business and entrepreneurship, history, and political economy, while also being concerned with inequality gaps, oppression, subjugation, revolts, uprisings, revolutions, and various other social and behavioral phenomena. People who understand the issues concerning human beings now have a way of participating in future emerging space industries. The audience of learners scheduled to receive cutting-edge knowledge of fields relevant for outer space development will be expanded by online learning techniques and sharing of information through the open-source technologies of the Internet. Shaping Ideology Imagine teaching students about the newly emerging trends related to outer space development. This would give students permission to envision and carve out their role in designing future space societies. Students from all disciplines can be taught to see what’s coming next by learning to research and interpret economic policies, laws, and international relations. This will enable them to detect newly emerging industries and to anticipate the elements likely to be in demand. Students can then shape their skill-sets and prepare to satisfy these emerging needs. Students can be taught to perform this type of interdisciplinary analysis and to research combined dynamics—government hearings and transcripts, policy statements and speeches, laws, economic initiatives, and international treaties. They can also be taught to combine this type of primary data with theoretical understandings of historical, ideological, institutional, political, economic, psychological, and structural phenomena.

#### Solves better – this ev says critical theory and race studies like studies of technoorientalism can seep into and inform space development, but only if they remain grounded in policy from start, which the aff fails to do with its discursive focus. This alone is enough to negate because we’re the only ones discussing from a policy focused lens.

#### [4] Reps don’t shape reality

Shim 14 [David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen. “Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing.”]

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them.

Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other.

However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

### Top Level

#### [1] The only definition we need to answer is “appropriations” – if we win that “appropriations” isn’t defined as cultural hegemony, but rather the economic use of space resources, then you auto-negate because all of their offense is tied around rhetorical resistance

#### US case law and OST language indicate “appropriation” means resource extraction

Leon 18 [Amanda, JD from UVA] “Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources” Vol. 104:497, Virginia Law Review, https://www.capdale.com/files/24323\_leon\_final\_note.pdf, 2018 RE

Appropriation. The term “appropriation” also remains ambiguous. Webster’s defines the verb “appropriate” as “to take to oneself in exclusion of others; to claim or use as by an exclusive or pre-eminent right; as, let no man appropriate a common benefit.”165 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary describes “appropriate” as an act “[t]o make a thing one’s own; to make a thing the subject of property; to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one’s own proper use or pleasure.”166 Oftentimes, appropriation refers to the setting aside of government funds, the taking of land for public purposes, or a tort of wrongfully taking another’s property as one’s own. The term appropriation is often used not only with respect to real property but also with water. According to U.S. case law, a person completes an appropriation of water by diversion of the water and an application of the water to beneficial use.167 This common use of the term “appropriation” with respect to water illustrates two key points: (1) the term applies to natural resources—e.g., water or minerals—not just real property, and (2) mining space resources and putting them to beneficial use—e.g., selling or manufacturing the mined resources— could reasonably be interpreted as an “appropriation” of outer space. While the ordinary meaning of “appropriation” reasonably includes the taking of natural resources as well as land, whether the drafters and parties to the OST envisioned such a broad meaning of the term remains difficult to determine with any certainty. The prohibition against appropriation “by any other means” supports such a reading, though, by expanding the prohibition to other types not explicitly described.168 As illustrated by this analysis, considerable ambiguity remains after this ordinary-meaning analysis and thus, the question of Treaty obligations and property rights remains unresolved. In order to resolve these ambiguities, an analysis of preparatory materials, historical context, and state practice follows.

#### Predictability and precision - Only our evidence goes through the 5 components of legal analysis for a holistic understanding of what appropriation means in context, which is most predictable

#### [2] Vote NEG on presumption – them removing private enterprise from outer space doesn’t resolve their discursive offense. Hold them to the text of the resolution – anything else allows for endless 1AR restarts and shiftiness that makes it impossible to be NEG. This also means that their “advocacy” doesn’t get to become their plan in future speeches because that forces us to debate two different AFFs in one. They read a plan text – if they wanted to have a K AFF with an advocacy, they should have just read the advocacy

#### [3]Presume NEG – none of their offense explains what it is about private companies specifically that is uniquely techno-Orientalist. State-based space projects like those by NASA would still logically be bound by the same hegemonic impulses and would still utilize Asian workers in science fields which means the aff cant solve at best and is totally nonunique at worst

### AT Offense

#### [1] Western space threats of China aren’t construed – their own Broad evidence gives a laundry list of tangible national security threats. Harker reads yellow

**1AC Broad 21**

William J. Broad Published Jan. 24, 2021 Updated May 6, 2021How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest Between the U.S. and China. (2021). Retrieved 17 December 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/trump-biden-pentagon-space-missiles-satellite.html

Beijing’s rush for antisatellite arms began 15 years ago. Now, it can threaten the orbital fleets that give the United States military its technological edge. Advanced weapons at China’s military bases can fire warheads that smash satellites and can shoot laser beams that have a potential to blind arrays of delicate sensors. And China’s cyberattacks can, at least in theory, cut off the Pentagon from contact with fleets of satellites that track enemy movements, relay communications among troops and provide information for the precise targeting of smart weapons. Among the most important national security issues now facing President Biden is how to contend with the threat that China poses to the American military in space and, by extension, terrestrial forces that rely on the overhead platforms. The Biden administration has yet to indicate what it plans to do with President Donald J. Trump’s legacy in this area: the Space Force, a new branch of the military that has been criticized as an expensive and ill-advised escalation that could lead to a dangerous new arms race. Mr. Trump presented the initiative as his own, and it now suffers from an association with him and remains the brunt of jokes on television. But its creation was also the culmination of strategic choices by his predecessors, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, to counter an emboldened China that raised bipartisan alarm. “There’s been a dawning realization that our space systems are quite vulnerable,” said Greg Grant, a Pentagon official in the Obama administration who helped devise its response to China. “The Biden administration will see more funding — not less — going into space defense and dealing with these threats.” The protective goal is to create an American presence in orbit so resilient that, no matter how deadly the attacks, it will function well enough for the military to project power halfway around the globe in terrestrial reprisals and counterattacks. That could deter Beijing’s strikes in the first place. The hard question is how to achieve that kind of strong deterrence. Lloyd J. Austin III, a retired four-star Army general who was confirmed last week as Mr. Biden’s secretary of defense, told the Senate that he would keep a “laserlike focus” on sharpening the country’s “competitive edge” against China’s increasingly powerful military. Among other things, he called for new American strides in building “space-based platforms” and repeatedly referred to space as a war-fighting domain. “Space is already an arena of great power competition,” Mr. Austin said, with China “the most significant threat going forward.” Editors’ Picks Could Oreo Cookies Solve New York’s Rat Problem? Quiz: Do You Recognize These Notable People of 2021? A Love Language Spoken With Hands The new administration has shown interest in tapping the innovations of space entrepreneurs as a means of strengthening the military’s hand — what Mr. Austin in his Senate testimony called “partnerships with commercial space entities.” The Obama and Trump administrations both adopted that strategy as a uniquely American way of sharpening the military’s edge. Experts clash on whether the United States is doing too little or too much. Defense hawks had lobbied for decades for the creation of a military Space Corps and called for more spending on weapons. But arms controllers see the Space Force as raising global tensions and giving Beijing an excuse to accelerate its own threatening measures. Some go further and call it a precipitous move that will increase the likelihood of war. In decades past, especially during the “Star Wars” program of the Reagan administration, conflict in space was often portrayed as shootouts in orbit. That has changed. With few exceptions, the weapons are no longer seen as circling the planet but as being deployed from secure bases. So, too, the targets are no longer swarms of nuclear warheads but fleets of satellites, whose recurring, predictable paths while orbiting the Earth make them far easier to destroy. A main question is whether the antisatellite moves and countermoves will lower or raise the risks of miscalculation and war. That debate is just beginning. Beijing’s Surge For years, the Chinese studied — with growing anxiety — the American military, especially its invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The battlefield successes were seen as rooted in space dominance. Planners noted that thousands of satellite-guided bombs and cruise missiles had rained down with devastating precision on Taliban forces and Iraqi defenses. While the Pentagon’s edge in orbital assets was clearly a threat to China, planners argued that it might also represent a liability. “They saw how the U.S. projected power,” said Todd Harrison, a space analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “And they saw that it was largely undefended.” China began its antisatellite tests in 2005. It fired two missiles in two years and then made headlines in 2007 by shattering a derelict weather satellite. There was no explosion. The inert warhead simply smashed into the satellite at blinding speed. The successful test reverberated globally because it was the first such act of destruction since the Cold War. The whirling shards, more than 150,000 in all, threatened satellites as well as the International Space Station. Ground controllers raced to move dozens of spacecraft and astronauts out of harm’s way. The Bush administration initially did little. Then, in a show of force meant to send Beijing a message, in 2008, it fired a sophisticated missile to shoot down one of its own satellites. Beijing conducted about a dozen more tests, including ones in which warheads shot much higher, in theory putting most classes of American spacecraft at risk. China also sought to diversify its antisatellite force. A warhead could take hours to reach a high orbit, potentially giving American forces time for evasive or retaliatory action. Moreover, the speeding debris from a successful attack might endanger Beijing’s own spacecraft. In tests, China began firing weak laser beams at satellites and studying other ways to strike at the speed of light. However, all the techniques were judged as requiring years and perhaps decades of development. Then came the new idea. Every aspect of American space power was controlled from the ground by powerful computers. If penetrated, the brains of Washington’s space fleets might be degraded or destroyed. Such attacks, compared with every other antisatellite move, were also remarkably inexpensive. In 2005, China began to incorporate cyberattacks into its military exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks. Increasingly, its military doctrine called for paralyzing early attacks. In 2008, hackers seized control of a civilian imaging satellite named Terra that orbited low, like the military’s reconnaissance craft. They did so twice — first in June and again in October — roaming control circuits with seeming impunity. Remarkably, in both cases, the hackers achieved all the necessary steps to command the spacecraft but refrained from doing so, apparently to reduce their fingerprints. Space officials were troubled by more than China’s moves and weapons. The modern history of the American military centered on building global alliances. Beijing was rushing ahead as an aggressive loner, and many officers feared that Washington was too hidebound and burdened with the responsibilities of coalition-building and arms-control treaties to react quickly. “The Chinese are starting from scratch,” Paul S. Szymanski, a veteran analyst of space warfare, argued in an Air Force journal. They’re not, he added, “hindered by long space traditions.” Washington’s Response In its second term, the Obama administration made public what it called an “offset strategy” to respond to China and other threats by capitalizing on America’s technological edge. Just as the United States had developed, first, a vast nuclear arsenal and, second, smart weapons, this so-called third offset would seek an advantage by speeding the rise of robotics, high-speed arms and other breakthroughs that could empower the armed forces for decades. Unlike earlier offsets, officials said, the objective was to rely less on federal teams than the tech entrepreneurs who were fast transforming the civilian world. “We must really capture the commercial sector,” Robert O. Work, a deputy secretary of defense, said in a 2015 speech explaining the new initiative. The advances in space were to be defensive: swarms of small, relatively cheap satellites and fleets of recycled launchers that would overwhelm Beijing with countless targets. For Mr. Obama, innovative leaps were to do for American space forces what Steve Jobs did for terrestrial gadgets, running circles around the calcified ministries of authoritarian states. After decades in which adversaries — from stateless terrorists to those with traditional militaries — sought to exploit narrow advantages over the more powerful United States, the Pentagon was now finding an unconventional edge all its own. The Obama administration was already applying the commercial philosophy to NASA, turning the space agency into a major funder of entrepreneurial strides. It was pumping billions of dollars into the development of private rockets and capsules meant to carry astronauts into orbit. The military joined in. The beneficiaries included Elon Musk, the founder of Tesla, and Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon. Their space companies — Mr. Musk’s SpaceX and Mr. Bezos’s Blue Origin — sought to turn rocket launchers from throwaways into recyclables, slashing their cost. Military officials believed that the new system would make it possible to quickly replace satellites in times of war. The third offset also sought to shrink the size of satellites. Over decades, the big ones had grown into behemoths. Some cost $1 billion or more to design, construct, outfit, launch and keep in service. One type unfurled an antenna nearly as large as a football field. But civilians, inspired by the iPhone revolution, were building spacecraft as small as loaves of bread. Military planners saw smaller, cheaper, more numerous craft as making antisatellite targeting vastly more difficult — in some cases impossible — for an adversary.

#### [2] The card about how Chinese ASATs aren’t feasible is postdated by their own card about how China is definitely using ASATs, which is especially relevant because what is feasible for China will change rapidly as the country’s economy grows, their space policy changes, and antisatellite technology evolves

#### [3] This answers their third card about Asian workers giving up their values – that card is about people seeking the “American Dream” and society writ large, the Broad recut shows that Chinese space policy values are equally incredibly hegemonic and militaristic, which lines up exactly how they portray the US

#### [4] No solvency and TURN - the US will try to defend hegemony inevitably – anything that tries to weaken it causes war

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and Internatio nal Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

#### [5]China is an offensive realist power – the only result of increased power consolidation is instability and aggression

Two important things about our study

* we modeled conflict initiation, not involvement, so they can’t say US pressure is an alt cause
* most models don’t control for current power and power-growth – we distinguished the two and modeled both separately

Jung & Lee 17 [Kihyun Lee Postdoctoral Scholar at Gladstone Institutes, Korea Institute for National Unification. Sung Chul Jung, Myongji University, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy. "The Offensive Realists Are Not Wrong: China’s Growth and Aggression, 1976–2001." <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/pafo.12088>]

Offensive realists are right: China’s growth has destabilized regional stability in the post-Mao period. Our statistical analysis of China’s initiation of military conflict shows that its economic power has had significant and positive effects. In addition, China was more aggressive toward its territorial dispute opponents, although the United States’ Asian allies were no more likely to be military targets than other Asian states. In short, China’s greater power made the country more assertive, rather than cooperative, toward Asian states and major powers. This leads us to expect that China will maintain its current uncompromising and firm position in the South and East China Seas if its economic rise continues. Also, China’s growth will accelerate its resolute protection of core interests in strategic and economic matters.

Two objections are possible to the argument presented here regarding China’s growth and aggression. First, some may argue that a stronger China was dragged into more conflicts with foreign actors. China’s rise to become a major power might not have changed its goals and strategies as much as it increased the emergence of conflict-laden issues. As it is now connected more deeply and extensively with foreign actors, China will face more international issues, and some conflict will be unavoidable. However, as explained earlier, this study’s dependent variable was not conflict involvement but conflict initiation. Of course, there have been some historical cases of over-balancing, as seen in European countries before World War I. But this study shows that China has become more prone to conflict initiation as it has gained greater economic capability.

### Advocacy

#### Cx proved they don’t do any deconstruction – discussion of the ways the us gov uses private enterprise does not deconstruct technoorientalism because the issue with the us gove using private enterprise for technoorientalism isn the private enterprise part it’s the technoorientalism part

And if starting a discussion is all that matters they don’t need the ballot bc they’ve already started the discussion