# Fwk

### 1AC – Comparative Worlds

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that does the better debating under comparative worlds- to clarify, this means the aff must fairly prove the resolution

Nelson, 8 [Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. Rostrum. 2008.]

And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truth claims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as they provide the negative with functionally inﬁnite ground, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the affirmativeto a much smaller range of options:advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of competing world-views rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denied access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way. Such a model of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer their worldview, thereby further enforcing a parallel burden structure. This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate the truth of ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world. They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

1. Reciprocity- prevents infinite tricky NIBs or cheap one-shots to win debates.

2. Real world- ethical judgments are relevant only in terms of how they impact the world.

3. Topic education- forcing them to defend a plan requires research about the topic- only unique impact to topic rotation.

4. Advocacy- forces them to defend an alternative vision of the world.

6. Collapses to competing worlds- truth of the resolution can *only* be determined if it is better than other worlds

7. Non-sequitur- that all statements are either true or false doesn’t require the debate center on the truth value of the rez.

9. It’s not constitutive- theory proves we can redefine the rules and you can always just be a “*schm-udge*” without caring about constitutivism.

### 1AC – Presumption and permissibility

The aff must be a significant departure from the status quo rather than just an idea internal to debate.

If not, vote neg on presumption.

Interpretation: the aff must be a departure from the status quo. If not, you should vote neg on presumption and permissibility.

Our presumption argument is a double bind:

1. Either they are NOT a change from the status quo and therefore not inherent, or

2. they ARE a departure from the status quo, but the aff is TOO SMALL to solve the impacts of the 1AC.

The terminal impact is ballot commodification. The aff will perform the 1AC endlessly.

Berlant 98. Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” *American Literature*, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668

What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are trans- historical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence**.** Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

# 1

#### Xi pursuit of unilateral space domination key to CCP legitimacy

Loftus 19 (1st Lt Peter Loftus, USAF, “Counter and Cooperate: How Space Can Be Used to Advance US–China Cooperation While Curbing Beijing’s Terrestrial Excesses,” AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Vol. 33, No. 1, Spring 2019, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-33_Issue-1/SEA-Loftus.pdf>)

Since People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Jinping XI came to power in 2012, China’s diplomatic disposition has experienced a profound evolution. Jinping XI is promoting his vision of the “Chinese Dream” and national rejuvenation, the goal of which is to reverse the “Century of Humiliation” that China suffered, from the start of the First Opium War in 1839 and lasting until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949. In testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dr. Alison A. Kaufman, a senior Asia policy researcher with the Center for Naval Analyses, explained that this period provides a key foundational story for the CCP. “Today, this narrative has become a key legitimizer for CCP rule, because the CCP is portrayed as the only modern Chinese political party that was able to successfully stand up to foreign aggression.

The dilemma for Beijing is how to ascend without ensnaring itself and the US in Thucydides’s Trap. Previously the PRC abided by former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of Tao Guang Yang Hui, which translates to “lay low and bide one’s time.” The purpose of this strategy was to fight the perception that China is an ascendant threat, incurring preemptive hostilities from outside powers. Today, however, China is much more confident on the world stage. Beijing seeks to promote its vision for the future on the diplomatic front, and space policy plays an important role in this objective. According to James Andrew Lewis, the Center for Strategic & International Studies technology and public policy program director, China’s space endeavors are “. . . especially important to show that it has reclaimed its place among the leading nations of the world. China’s successes in space reinforce its claims to regional dominance by demonstrating that it is the most advanced among Asian nations, with technology and resources that others cannot match.”3 China’s space initiatives play an instrumental role in showing that it has returned to its place as a preeminent regional power. While China’s neighbors question US commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, Beijing’s promulgation of a multidecade plan for developing space capabilities demonstrates its staying power and ambition.

China’s Informational Power

While China’s focus on diplomatic messaging travels outward, the informational element of Chinese space policy is mainly directed inward. To this day, the CCP’s legitimacy is premised upon a Faustian bargain with its citizens. In exchange for economic results, social improvement, and the respect of the world, the political elite expects loyalty and acquiescence from the public. The CCP’s space aspirations play a fundamental role in demonstrating the government’s ambitions for China’s future. They include landing a rover on the far side of the moon by 2018, landing a Mars rover by 2020, probing asteroids by 2022, sending humans to the moon by 2025, bringing Mars samples back by 2028, sending an exploratory mission to Jupiter by 2029, and establishing a lunar research station manned by robots with occasional astronaut visits by 2050.4 Shooting for the stars keeps the Chinese people’s eyes skyward and away from CCP malfeasance. To borrow Karl Marx’s reference to religion, Beijing’s space policy is an opiate for the Chinese masses.

#### China’s “space dream” is key to Xi credibility – plan is a flip flop that undermines legitimacy

Kharpal 21 – senior technology correspondent based in Guangzhou, China at CNBC [Arjun, “China once said it couldn’t put a potato in space. Now it’s eyeing Mars,” 6/30/2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/30/china-space-goals-ccp-100th-anniversary.html]

Fast forward more than six decades and President Xi Jinping, China’s current leader, is seen congratulating three astronauts who were sent to the country’s own space station earlier this month.

Since Mao’s comments, China has launched satellites, sent humans to space and is now planning to build a base on Mars, achievements and ambitions Beijing has highlighted as the centennial of the CCP’s founding approaches.

Space is now another battleground between the U.S. and China amid a broader technological rivalry for supremacy, one that could have scientific and military implications on Earth.

“President Xi Jinping has declared that China’s ‘Space Dream’ is to overtake all nations and become the leading space power by 2045,” said Christopher Newman, professor of space law and policy at the U.K.’s Northumbria University. “This all feeds into China’s ambition to be the world’s single science and technology superpower.”

Why space?

In March, China highlighted space as a “frontier technology” it would focus on and research into the “origin and evolution of the universe.”

But there are other implications too.

“It is important for China and the US because it can advance technological development” in areas such as “national security and some socioeconomic development,” according to Sa’id Mosteshar, director of the London Institute of Space Policy and Law, and research fellow Christoph Beischl.

While experts doubt it could spiral into war in space, extra-terrestrial activities can support military operations on Earth.

Space achievements are also about the optics.

Through space exploration to the Moon or to Mars, “China and the U.S. display their technological sophistication to the domestic audience and the world, increasing their domestic and international prestige, domestic legitimacy and international influence,” Mosteshar and Beischl said.

#### Flip flops trigger the disad

Buckley and Myers 19 (Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “As China Trade Talks Stall, Xi Faces a Dilemma: Fold? Or Double Down?,” New York Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/world/asia/xi-jinping-donald-trump.html)

China had been willing to protect intellectual property and open its markets to American business, but the Trump administration wanted the agreement to specify that some of those changes be made in Chinese law. For China, any legislative change or policy reversal could be a very public — and potentially humbling — reminder that it gave ground under pressure.

“That would bring back painful memories of the days of national humiliation in our history,” said Wang Yong, the director of the Center for International Political Economy at Peking University. “China has made too many concessions.”

The blaring nature of the Trump administration’s broadsides has sharpened the dilemma that Mr. Xi faces in the negotiations.

“To have Trump doing it so publicly is obviously very, very difficult for Xi Jinping,” said Susan L. Shirk, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, who worked as a deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for China under President Bill Clinton. “It makes it much more difficult for him to make the compromises needed.”

#### The aff overrides a core PLA priority which breaks the Chinese conditional compliance model – balancing CMR determines internal and external stability.

Kurtis H. Simpson 16, Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada, served as the Head of Delegation abroad for the Canadian government, head of Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence Organization, 12/21/16, “China’s Re-Emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations In Contemporary Era – Analysis,” https://www.eurasiareview.com/21122016-chinas-re-emergence-assessing-civilian-military-relations-in-contemporary-era-analysis/

China’s rising economic, political and military power is the most geopolitically significant development of the post-Cold War period. For some, America’s unipolar moment has passed, and the essential debates now focus on the rate and relativity of US hegemonic decline.1 In tandem with this, the question of can China rise peacefully must be considered?2 All such external preoccupations rest, however, on assumptions of continued economic growth and internal stability.3 The tipping point in both positive and negative scenarios alike in China is civilian-military (civ-mil) relations. This single factor is all determining, under-studied, and currently in a period of profound transition.

To date, the literature on civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is overly reductionist in its scope, simplifying relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to a single entity, built on dubious assumptions (for example, over-emphasizing the reach and control of the Party) and finally, prone to exaggerating some trends, most notably professionalization of the military, at the expense of others, including divided loyalties, the decentralization of power, and the endless political bargaining that now characterizes the relations between Party, military, and bureaucratic stakeholders.

The purpose of this article is threefold. It will first place civ-mil relations in a historical context, mapping fundamental transitional changes between the revolutionary period (1921-1949), the politicized era (1949-1976), and the modernization years (1976-2014). Second, it will highlight evolving trend lines in CCP-PLA relations, identifying emerging tensions. Third, it will provide a cursory assessment of early signals or indications of future friction points.

A critical review of civ-mil relations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes apparent that the military’s political power resources are increasing; a relationship of ‘conditional compliance’ now exists where the Party is required to negotiate with the PLA on key issues (whether it be funding increases, force development, or foreign policy priorities) for its continued support. As a result, the potential for fractures between the Party and PLA are increasingly possible during crises situations.

Prior to beginning with a historic examination of civilian-military relations in China, we need first to root our discussion in a viable theoretical framework, or model, in which to help organize the information/evidence being considered. As expansively covered by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip Saunders, perspectives on Chinese elite politics are relatively few in number, and often period specific.4 Each is not without its limitations, but all have explanatory potential. Of growing relevance, however, is the bureaucratic politics approach, because not only does it easily incorporate the tenets of earlier schools (such as symbiosis, factionalism, and the Party control lens) it, moreover, best captures the PRC’s current political landscape of distributive power. In essence, since the 1978 economic reforms, the CCP’s receding ideological justification for rule, and varied rates of development in China’s 34 provinces, the country has increasingly witnessed ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ where the control of a paramount leader (such as Mao Zedong) is greatly reduced, a growing separation between the economic and political spheres more pronounced, and individual ‘pockets’ of authority—often the result of ‘factions’ within both the Party and the PLA—more evident. The end result of this is increased “bargaining” both between and within government and military apparatuses, a process which requires negotiations, exchanges, and consensus building.5 This type of interaction is strikingly different than that which first typified Party-PLA relations in the early revolutionary period.

Party-PLA Relations during the Revolutionary Period (1921-1949)

The CCP (founded in 1921) and the PLA (established in 1927) originally enjoyed a level of intimate interaction or ‘fusion’ typical of the militaries and revolutionaries coalescing in a united front, or common cause, to overthrow an existent political order. This pattern is well documented, and will only be briefly touched upon here.6 In short, where elites regularly circulate between military and non-military posts, a symbiotic relationship forms where ideas, authorities, allegiances and circles of interaction take root, fostering a common commitment and vision towards a desired end state. In the case of China, what is referred to as ‘symbiosis’ started in 1934-35 while the Communists were in retreat during “The Long March” period. As a consequence of this shared experience, close cooperation between military and civilian figures resulted in significant overlap in leadership roles, with key individuals (most notably Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) being dubbed “dual role elites.”7

Up until the declaration of Chinese independence, the military was a major recruiter for the Party and a strict ratio of Party members to non-Party members among combat soldiers was upheld. They were, in a sense, two faces of the same organized elite. For many years, political leaders were also generals or political commissars in military units; the party and the army “…formed throughout their history a single institutional system, with a single elite performing simultaneously the functions of political and military leadership.”8 While in many respects effective and efficient, the merger of the military with the political, particularly absent of institutions, over time opened the door to significant infighting when differences arose, often ending in intensive ideological campaigns (such as the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1961), massive popular mobilizations, and widespread national unrest.

The Politicization of the PLA under Mao Zedong (1949-1976)

Upon assuming power, Chairman Mao Zedong early on turned to the military to champion and enable his ideas and to serve as his last line of defence. While less critical in the honeymoon period of the early-1950s, the PLA was increasingly drawn into the political realm, most notably during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a decade long period of social turmoil and populist furor spawned by the PRC’s senior most leaders. While beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any detail, the research of others chronicles how overtly enmeshed in politics the PLA became during this period, serving as a direct tool of Mao and his inner clique.9

Unable to effectively mobilize radicals and students, in early January 1967, Mao and the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) ordered troops to ‘support the masses of the revolutionary left.’ As the campaign developed and became ever more chaotic over the following months, the army was subsequently directed to restore order, ultimately granting PLA members sweeping latitude to use any means necessary to reaffirm peace.10 In a fluid political situation, PLA members were pitted against the populace, who asserted they were acting as directed by China’s leaders, forced to adjudicate between opposing interests, and autonomously resolve unrest all over the country with no rules of engagement, clear direction, or often even understanding of the context of a given problem as it varied dramatically throughout China depending on the parties involved, the interpretation of the ideological direction being followed, and the local agendas at play.

For more than a decade, the PLA was the only institution in the PRC still functioning. The military was decisive in both policy-making and determining power struggles on many levels.11 While the details remain opaque, in 1970-1971, military commanders were reportedly divided, with some supporting Marshal Lin Biao, Vice-Premier, in a purported counter-revolutionary coup d’état. Throughout the period, other incidents of intra-party conflict drew the military into non-military matters and significantly eroded earlier periods of harmonious symbiosis. With the death of Mao in 1976 and the rehabilitation of Deng, specific actions were undertaken to modernize the military and professionalize it. While successful on many fronts, these transformations have also not been without complications and unanticipated consequences.

A New Focus on Modernization (1976-2012): Defining Trends

Increased Professionalization

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA has become a focal point for reform, improvement, and de-politicization. The armed forces were downsized from 4.5 million to 2.2 today. It is rapidly becoming a more modern force which is increasingly educated, better equipped, more regimented with retirements, selection and recruiting. Doctrinal adjustments are regularly made and announced in biannual Defence White Papers, moving the army along a continuum away from land based notions of “People’s War” to concepts like “Limited War under High Technology Conditions.”12 Highlights of this trajectory include: professional military education; specialization in key knowledge sectors like cyber security; a primacy placed on science and technology; improved training and augmented technical skills; the integration and operation of more sophisticated military kit; improvements to command and control; and a focus upon combined joint operations.13

Since 1997, China’s military budget has increased at double digit rates, with much of these augmentations going to offset higher salaries, better housing, and improved facilities. In 2014, official defence spending was published as US$ 131.57 billion; the second largest in the world, and by some intelligence estimates, only half the actual number.14 Increased professionalism is, however, a two-edged sword. While on one level it removes the military from the daily entanglements of political life, it also promotes a greater sense of autonomy, corporateness, and a sense of responsibility to intervene if vital interests are threatened, coupled with the expertise to do, so should the occasion arise.15

A Reduced Emphasis upon Political Work or Ideological Study

While exceptions to the rule exist (such as the immediate period following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre), military professionalization has generally resulted in less emphasis on political work and political education (relative to the time spent on military duties). The eroding foundations of Communist ideology are particularly of high impact on the military, as this calls directly into question the forces’ raison d’être—the promotion of Communist ideals through revolution and unqualified support of the Party. While Marxist ideology can still be invoked as required justification when needed, it is not treated in the sacrosanct manner it once was and this significantly reduces the ‘connective tissue’ seamlessly joining the Party and the PLA.

The Growing Bifurcation of Elites

China’s transition into a developed country with a relatively modern military force has demanded a move away from “dual role elites” to streams of distinct and separate senior officials who no longer share similar backgrounds, work experiences, or career paths. Promoted according to functional area expertise, few common bonds (including formal educational experience, common technical knowledge, shared management history, and common political connections) join military professionals, Party leaders, and senior civil servants, as was once the case with their revolutionary predecessors. The implications of this are important. Common frames of reference do not currently exist, and the potential for miscommunication is high. Civilian leaders do not regularly interact with their military counterparts, and a general ignorance of military tactics, training, and procedures continues, which is not systematized through effective briefing channels.16 In short, the growing bifurcation of elites impedes relationships built on trust as the distance between the military sphere and the political sphere lengthens. In particular, varying perspectives on national security issues are increasingly evident.

Divided State-Party-Citizenry Loyalties

In China, theoretically, the Communist Party, state apparatus, and military are all distinct entities with formal authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities. In practice, the Party dominates all according to varying degrees through its membership, appointment routines, and sanctions. This too, however, is evolving. As China modernizes, power is becoming more decentralized, and the legitimacy of the Party (or lack thereof) is linked almost solely to the country’s economic performance. In fundamental respects, China’s legislature (or National People’s Congress) and its Standing Committee are now more appropriately serving an oversight function of the military. Directly linked to this is the NPC’s role in approving the military’s annual budget allocation. Once a ‘rubber-stamp’ process, this is less and less the case.

The emergence of a stronger state structure with ties to the military is fostering a duality of legally and administratively distinct centres (one state, one party) with which the PLA must successfully interact, each often sharing overlaps in membership, but at times competing and conflicting agendas.17 In short, where the Party provides guidance and direction, the state administers and implements policy on a day-to-day basis. The constitutional ambiguity of the military’s allegiance to the Party and the state potentially fosters conflictual loyalties, and challenges the asserted shorthand understanding that the Party and PLA are indivisible and the same. Moreover, the Army’s de facto loyalty to China’s citizenry is historically founded (hence the name “the People’s Liberation Army”), and when tested on 4 June 1989 [Tiananmen Square uprising in Beijing], manifested itself in command and control issues (troops in some cases would not fire of protestors). Long-standing damage to a relationship previously viewed by both sides as inviolable continues to this day, and many assert that even if ordered, such violent suppression would not happen again in light of this precedent and the fallout from it.18

Internal Factionalism within the PLA

Paralleling divided loyalties between Chinese Party, military and government bodies, one must also recognize that within each, factions exist, based upon generational, personal, professional, geographic, or institutional allegiances.19 These minor fault lines are most pronounced during crises, and they continue independent of professionalization.20 As was demonstrated by the civil-military dynamics of the Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators, both divisions and allegiances of interests emerged with respect to how to contain this situation and factional interests largely determined which troops would carry out the orders, who commanded them, what civilian Party leaders supported the actions, and who would be sanctioned following the mêlée. A consequence of factionalism within the PLA is that the Party’s control mechanisms (particularly because rule of law and constitutional restraints on the military are weak) needs to be robust to control not only a single military chain of command but (particularly during crises) perhaps more than one. This is not likely the case. A review of the evidence indicates the military’s influence, on the whole, is increasing, and the Party’s control decreasing.

On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission or CMC (the highest military oversight body in the PRC) is chaired by a civilian, President Xi Jinping. Moreover, the PLAs representation on formal political decision making bodies (such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the NPC) has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence. For example, the two Vice-Chairman of the CMC are now military generals, as are the remaining other eight members. Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say. Personal interactions and informal meetings with senior party elites provide venues to sway decisions. They do, also, hold important places on leading small groups dedicated to issues like Taiwan and other security questions, such as the South China Seas.21

In a similar vein, other methods of Party influence, as exercised through political commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection commissions are no longer empowered to enforce the ideological dictates of a paramount leader. In the face of diffuse reporting chains, competing allegiances, and often effective socialization by the military units they are supposed to be watching over, most do not provide the Party guardian and guidance function once so pervasive.

While perhaps overstated, Paltiel’s observation that “…China’s energies over the past century and half have given the military a prominent and even dominant role in the state, preempting civilian control and inhibiting the exercise of constitutional authority” is likely now truer than ever before in history.22 While still loyal to the party as an institution, the PLA is not unconditionally subservient to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if (at the highest levels) a decision is made to do so.

Assessing the Implications of the Civilian-Military Trend Lines in China

The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late1960s. The promotion of professionalism, a reduced role for ideological indoctrination, an increasing bifurcation of civil-military elites, and growing state powers (complete with divided loyalties and continued factionalism) has complicated the political landscape informing how the CCP interacts with the PLA. If, as postulated, we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this. A review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this.

Jiang Zemin (1989-2004)

Formally anointed and legitimized by Deng in 1989, Jiang assumed leadership without military credentials and few allies, viewed by many as a ‘caretaker’ Party Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. Despite his limitations, Jiang was well versed in the vicissitudes of palace politics. Informed by a high political acumen, he immediately promoted an image as an involved Commander-in-Chief, personally visiting all seven military regions, a sign of commitment not made by either the likes of Mao or Deng. Symbolic gestures like this were bolstered by his providing incentives to the PLA, such as: consistent raises in the defence budget; funds for military modernization; as well as equipment, logistics, and augmented R&D.23

Referred to as the ‘silk-wrapped needle,’ Jiang marshalled Party resources to not only reward, but to punish.24 His institutional authority over appointments enabled him to manipulate factions, dismiss those who opposed him, enforce new rigid retirement standards, and promote loyalists. A delicate equilibrium was established during the early-1990s until his semi-retirement in 2004,25 where Jiang guaranteed military priorities such as supporting ‘mechanization’ and an ‘information-based military’ (promoting the concept of RMA with Chinese characteristics) in exchange for the PLA backing of his legacy contributions to Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong thought with the enshrinement of his “Three Represents” doctrine.

Hu Jintao (2002-2012)

Like Jiang, Hu Jintao’s succession was the product of negotiation, compromise, and concessions. While neither opposed by the PLA, nor supported by the military ‘brass,’ Hu was a known commodity, having served as Vice-President (1998) and CMC Vice-Chairman since 1999. He was deemed acceptable until proven otherwise. In the shadow of Jiang (who retained the position of CMC Chair until 2004), Hu did not exert the same kind of influence in, nor engender the same kind of deference from, China’s military, but equally proved capable of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the army which ensured its interests, and in so doing, legitimized his leadership position.

Ceding much of the military planning and operational decisions to the PLA directly, Hu played to his strengths and focused upon national security issues (such as the successful resolution of SARs in China), which bolstered his credibility as a populist leader among the masses, indirectly increasing his power within both the military and the Party. Additionally, he focused upon foreign military security affairs (most notably, North Korea-US negotiations), which enabled him to link his personal political agenda with the military’s latest ambitions.

In according the military a distinct place in China’s national development plan, supporting China’s rise, and ensuring its vital interests, Hu recognized the military’s evolving requirement to ‘go global’ and its worldwide interests in non-combat operations, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as well as stakes in the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace as interest frontiers with no geographic boundaries.26 Under the slogan of ‘China’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century’ and his acquiescence to the PLA’s stated requirements ‘to win local wars under modern conditions’ by funding new technology acquisition, Hu received the army’s formal recognition for his contributions to military thought based upon “scientific development” which informed a “strategic guiding theory,” resulting in a new operational orientation for China’s military. Emulating his predecessor, Hu won ‘conditional compliance’ from the PLA by successfully bartering military needs and wants for the army’s support and endorsement of his political tenure. This was not done outside of self-interest. Hu, as did Jiang, skillfully coopted, fired, and promoted select Generals to serve his greater ends, and he did this through varied means. Ultimately, however, it was done in a manner acceptable to the military.

Xi Jinping (2012-Present)

Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, while replicating the ‘horse-trading’ of Jiang and Hu, marks a fundamental departure in leadership style. Often described as a transformative leader, Xi is openly critical of his predecessors and rails against earlier periods where reform stalled and corruption grew.27 An advocate of ‘top-level design,’ incrementalism is being supplanted by a massive attempt to centralize all aspects of the CCP’s power, which includes a major restructuring of the economy, government, administration, and military.

Nicknamed “the gun and the knife” as a slight for his attempts to simultaneously control the army, police, spies, and the ‘graft busters,’ Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA over the past 25 years. For example, only two years into his mandate, he fostered a Cult of Personality, “the Spirit of Xi Jinping” which was officially elevated to the same standing as that of Mao and Deng, by comparison, foundational figures in Chinese history. His open attacks of political ‘enemies’ (most notably Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and former security czar) breeds fear among almost every senior official, all of whom are vulnerable on some point. Equally true, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign is inciting comrades to turn on comrades, not unlike a massive game of prisoner’s dilemma.

Nowhere is the pressure for reform greater than in the PLA. Xi advocates administering the army with strictness and austerity, promoting frugality and obedience. At his direction, “mass-line educational campaigns” designed to “rectify work style” through criticism and self-criticism are being implemented.28 Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Select military regions (those opposite Taiwan and adjacent to the South China Seas) and commanders from those regions are witnessing favoritism and promotion at the expense of others. Moreover, a new “CMC Chairmanship Responsibility System” has been instituted, which directly calls into question the support of some of Xi’s senior-most generals.

A ‘hardliner’ by nature, Xi recognizes that he must earn the support of the PLA. New military priorities he supports include: accelerating modernization; Joint Command and C4ISR; training; talent management, as well as equipment and force modernization. That said, his goal of achieving the Chinese dream of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is exceptionally ambitious. It will require endless commitments to competing interests in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. Should the PLA come to believe they are not first in line for government largess, support for Xi could erode very quickly.29

Conclusion and Outlook

Projections of China’s purported rise to global Superpower status, or its possible implosion due to political infighting, an economic downturn, or large-scale civil unrest resulting from any number of possible reasons (ranging from the rural-urban divide or massive health issues) makes for rich debate. What is certain is that regardless of outcome, China’s civil-military relations will be a determining factor in how events unfold. This subject matter is profoundly understudied by Western scholars, particularly since the relationship between the Party and the PLA has been witnessing a fundamental transformation since the late-1960s.

Civilian-military relations in the PRC have morphed from a symbiotic nature during the revolutionary period (1921-1949), to a political nature after the founding of China in 1949, to a situation best described as ‘conditional compliance’ in the modernization era (1976-2014), where PLA support was secured through funding increases, political bartering, and guarantees to prioritize military development goals on an a priori basis with other competing domestic interests. Conditional compliance is an outcome of evolving civ-mil trends, which include the PLA’s professionalization and its growing sense of autonomy, reduced political study and indoctrination among Officers and enlisted men alike, the growing bifurcation of military and civilian elites, a sense of divided loyalties between the military, state, Party, and populace, as well as factionalism and weakened Party levers of control.

Irrespective of these trends, under the leadership reigns of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (stretching from 1989-2012) an equilibrium was established where both the Party and PLA secured mutually beneficial results useful enough to keep the arrangement functioning. The succession of hardline Xi Jinping in 2012 is, however, increasingly calling this delicate balance into question.

Xi’s massive ongoing recentralization of power goals, his ‘Cult of Personality’ as China’s paramount leader, rather than acting as ‘first among peers,’ his prosecution of all possible political threats, and his zealous commitment to Communist ideology over all else, fundamentally risks alienating now entrenched alternative centres of power or ‘fragmentary authoritarianism,’ which has been a product of China’s modernization. If this proves true, there is a very realistic case for the PLA to redefine or terminate its backing of the Communist Party and opt for a new type of power sharing arrangement.

While impossible to predict, key indicators capable of fomenting such a dramatic change in China include the following: (a) President Xi pushing his personal agenda for China and self-aggrandizement to a point where it fundamentally challenges other entrenched interests; (b) a political-military crisis (such as with Japan and the East China Seas, Taiwan, or interests in the South China Seas) which involve external nations—particularly the US—and divide civilian/military interests on how to respond; or (c) a social crisis where mass mobilization takes place and civ-mil factions disagree on either how address the situation, or on who makes the decision when and where to act.

Each of the dire scenarios listed is a real possibility and all would be determined by the nature of civ-mil relations in China. Increased scholarly attention, critical thinking, and improved surveillance of early warning signals portending such possibilities must become a priority for Western intelligence analysts, militaries, and strategic planners.

#### Factionalism causes miscalc, civil war, global recessions, and Taiwan war – the link alone turns case

Norris 17 [William, he teaches graduate-level courses in Chinese domestic politics, East Asian security, and Chinese foreign policy, he is also a nonresident associate with the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges," June 2017, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report\_pdf/Discussion\_Paper\_Norris\_China\_OR.pdf, footnote 23 included]

With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate unintended international repercussions. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have ripple effects abroad. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, raising the risks of strategic miscalculation on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23

23. This outcome is only one of several potentially dangerous consequences. Others include a rebellious military, destabilizing foreign policy, outright civil war, renewed military conflict with Taiwan, virulent anti-Americanism, and financial collapse and contagion.

# 2

#### US wins space race now due to private competition – its key to space dominance and militarization is good – the plan nukes the US’s silver bullet against Chinese aggression

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As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector.

Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing.

Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world.

The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below.

Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket.

The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.)

Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter.

Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious.

Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter.

Why not?

America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century?

More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor.

Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government.

Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight.

Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy.

The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us.

The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### And, space dominance key to global peace – nuclear and conventional deterrence is collapsing, which will provoke civilization-ending revisionist aggression from Russia and China

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The United States needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a large-scale conventional war, and we are woefully unprepared.

Eastern and Central Europe is now so weakly defended as to virtually invite invasion. The United States is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So deterrence is dead, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop tankless remnant, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. It’s not enough. Meanwhile, in Asia, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region.

How can we restore the balance, creating a sufficiently powerful conventional force to deter aggression? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the United States must seek to totally outgun them by obtaining a radical technological advantage. This can be done by achieving space supremacy.

To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the 21st century, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls space.

The critical military importance of space has been obscured by the fact that in the period since the United States has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against minor powers that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless.

But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war.

But modern space power involves far more than just reconnaissance satellites. The use of space-based GPS can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based communications provide an unmatched capability of command and control of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will prove decisive.

Not only Europe, but the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to wipe them out with the push of a button. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States possess space capabilities that are so robust as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to comprehensively deny it to others.

*Space superiority* means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a complete monopoly of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made so formidable as to render any conventional attack unthinkable. On the other hand, should we fail to do so, we will remain so vulnerable as to increasingly invite aggression by ever-more-emboldened revanchist powers.

For this reason, both Russia and China have been developing and actively testing antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Up till now, the systems they have been testing have been ground launched, designed to orbit a few times and then collide with and destroy targets below one thousand kilometers altitude. This is sufficient to take out our reconnaissance satellites but not our GPS and communications satellites, which fly at twenty thousand and thirty-six thousand kilometers respectively. However, the means to reach these are straightforward, and, given their critical importance to us, there is every reason to believe that such development is well underway.11

The Obama administration sought to dissuade adversaries from developing ASATs by setting a good example and not working on them ourselves. This approach has failed. As a consequence, many defense policy makers are now advocating that we move aggressively to develop ASATs of our own. While more hardheaded than the previous policy, such an approach remains entirely inadequate to the situation.

The United States armed forces are far more dependent upon space assets than any potential opponent. Were both sides in a conflict able to destroy the space assets of the other, we would be the overwhelming loser by the exchange.

#### Space dominance solves hegemony – deterrence strategies, even rudimentary ones, are perceived as weakness and causes aggression

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While space superiority and space dominance share a militarized view of space, there are fundamental differences in their stated end goals. Those who favor space superiority view space as a global commons, accessible to all in peacetime. They take a more defensive and reactive view of space and the actors who seek access to this domain. The space superiority model understands that U.S. dependence on space is vital for the basic functioning of American civilization (banking transactions, cell phone signals, GPS functions, television broadcasts, as well as essential military surveillance and support functions all across satellites in space). Yet, this model also accepts that current budgetary constraints mean that the United States is unlikely to invest significantly more into unwieldy and expensive space systems.

A strategy of space superiority accepts the risk arising from reliance on space systems, while deterring attacks on space assets. As actors such as China or Russia become increasingly dependent on space systems themselves, space superiority advocates believe that U.S. willingness to retaliate in kind against any attack on its own space assets is sufficient.7 This is in keeping with the classic deterrence model of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Unfortunately, however, U.S. dependence on space assets for its very survival is so much greater than any other state that such a threat is unrealistic. The reason that states like China or Russia are developing counter-space capabilities is because the cost to them is extremely low, whereas the benefit for them (in the event of war with the United States) is high. For the cost of a ground-based laser or an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile launcher, China could knock out the ability of all U.S. forces in the Pacific to coordinate and adequately defend themselves from a Chinese offensive.

What could the United States do to the Chinese in return? The best option for U.S. retaliation in space would be to launch some blinding attacks on the handful of China's space assets. However, this ultimately would not deter China from escalating any future conflict since China's investment in space is so low compared to that of the United States. In addition, since Chinese forces are designed to operate in an environment without those assets, such retaliation grounded on deterrence-based models becomes highly problematic and ineffective.

Rather than serving as a stabilizing force in space, then, the defensive and reactive space superiority model would be an inducement for conflict in the strategic high ground of space. Or, rather, the direction of attack would be unidirectional: from U.S. adversaries toward essential U.S. space systems. Thus, while space confers unequivocal advantages to the U.S. forces that depend on space assets for their vital functions, it also provides adversaries with an unprecedented weakness for them to exploit.

The fact is that United States, China, or Russia's dependence on space is asymmetrical

. Over the long run, a deterrent-based, space superiority model would eventually allow other states not only to gain and maintain access to space, but also effectively to gain strategic parity with the United States in space. Make no mistake, the more that states are able to access space, no matter how nascent or rudimentary their space programs may be, the more they will refine their capabilities and be able to develop space programs for their own strategic ends. While most defense analysts believe that deterrence during the Cold War led to bipolar stability, a deterrence-based model in space would create instability. If a near-peer competitor like China or Russia believed that it had acquired the capacity to achieve parity with the United States, what would stop that state from trying to gain strategic advantage over America in space?

A Hegemonic Model

The best solution to avoid this situation is a hegemonic model. The only way that the United States can ensure its continued strategic advantage in space is to embrace fully the space dominance model by weaponizing space. While space superiority advocates will denounce this policy as both cost-ineffective and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more in keeping with U.S. traditions and values. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the American response to foreign threat is traditionally to take “the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security.”8

What of the claim that a deterrence-based space superiority model creates stability? The primary claim of deterrence efficacy is that during the Cold War, the more or less equal nuclear balance ensured that neither side had an incentive to launch a disarming first strike. This view was the basis of the mutual assured destruction theory. Since there was no conceivable advantage to either side from these weapons, both sides were forced into a more constructive diplomatic relationship. In all of the time that deterrence was employed, American policymakers assured the public that MAD was better than the alternatives—compellence,9 Rollback,10 and hegemony—because it restrained Soviet aggression.

American policymakers assumed that the Soviet strategists in the Kremlin viewed nuclear arms in the same apocalyptic terms that they did. As such, U.S. policymakers were not only content to allow American nuclear dominance to erode, but also to degrade actively those capabilities through strategic arms agreements. In the meantime, until 1986, mainstream Soviet strategists and policymakers were convinced that they could prevail in a nuclear war. They were just biding their time.11

In this light then, deterrence was not built around the concept of enlightened self-interest, but more likely the result of U.S. policymakers’ inability to see through the fog of the Cold War. The Soviets were by definition a revolutionary power. Even after they had renounced the concept of spreading global communist revolution, however, the urge to transform fundamentally the world order to reflect their own image remained a high strategic priority for the USSR. The United States failed to discern this situation until the Reagan Administration.

President Ronald Reagan, rather than accept the Cold War deterrence paradigm, planned to bring American technical and strategic dominance to bear in space in order to help defeat the Soviet Union. Reagan also recognized that the demilitarized sanctuary view of space was irrelevant, and he eschewed arms control agreements that sought to counteract the inherent American advantages in space. President Reagan not only embraced a militarized view of space, but in 1983, he also called for the weaponization of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

By the 1980s, the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space for military purposes (primarily in the area of satellites). These space systems formed the backbone of the modern military force that Reagan was assembling to counter the Soviet Union. What is more, Reagan's preferred strategy of Rollback meant that the United States would no longer sacrifice its own strategic advantages on the altar of diplomacy. After all, Reagan did not accept the Soviets as an equal and legitimate global power. He detested communism and viewed its proponents in the USSR as the great villains on the world stage. Furthermore, Reagan was staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. Therefore, he sought to remove the notion of deterrence through MAD and replace it with the concept of hegemony through “Mutual Assured Survival.”

These views coalesced into the Reagan Administration's commitment to placing missile defense systems in orbit. It also called for developing new technologies (i.e., directed-energy weapons) to be used in space. The United States would not only remove the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal by creating a working missile defense system in space, but it would also move beyond the Soviet threat by permanently dominating the high ground of space. This position was the basis of SDI.12 In fact, the Reagan Administration's shift in focus was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union as the Soviet leadership then embarked on a tit-for-tat arms buildup that their economy simply could not sustain. 13

Even if deterrence did facilitate a significant reduction in hostility—thereby creating the bipolar stability—no such hope for stability exists in space today. As argued earlier, U.S. reliance on space assets for its most basic functions is far greater than that of other countries. Furthermore, there is no way that the United States can—or should—abandon its use of space as a strategic domain. Thus, a hegemonic model for space dominance is the only hope to create the stability that most planners seek, while at the same time defending the American position in space.

Space dominance as a model for stability is nothing new. Indeed, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) asserts that the most stable global systems are those in which one actor dominates the system. In such a system, power is aggregated so greatly into a single, dominant actor that such a hegemonic power acts as a stabilizing force. Due to its relative strength, the hegemonic power can set the agenda and the rules that govern the system. The relative weakness of the other actors in the system is well understood, which then prompts these weak actors to abandon any hope of challenging the hegemonic power's rule. Eventually, they end up accommodating the hegemonic power. The lack of challenge creates peaceful stability.14 The fact that one actor is setting the rules means that the system is simple to operate in, as well.

The same logic that buttresses the HST international relations theory arguably undergirds the military strategy of space dominance. If this claim is so, then American hegemony in space is essential for the continued survival of the United States. Whereas there are legitimate arguments to be made regarding the reliance on deterrence-based models for creating stability during the Cold War, the fact is that the world is more multipolar today than it was 25 years ago. Despite what writer Fareed Zakaria has dubbed “the rise of the rest,”15 the United States still retains greater relative power. Therefore, it is inevitable and logical that the United States should expand its hegemonic position in space, in order to secure its place there.

Whereas deterrence-based models, such as space superiority, may have worked in a less chaotic international system, no such stability can be achieved today. Many of America's competitors are revanchist states intent on redefining the world order. They are not interested in preserving the American position in space. Also, they are not cowed by a U.S. deterrence strategy in space. Rather, they view such a policy as a concession that the United States is becoming weaker.

Space dominance would create greater stability than space superiority. Missile defense systems, tungsten rods, and even directed-energy weapons potentially would all be placed in key orbits around the Earth. This, on top of the existing U.S. space infrastructure, would prove to the world that the United States is committed to preserving its position in space. In a world of rogue states, space-based weapons likely would prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Failing that, the fact that the United States possessed strategic, offensive weapons in orbit—that could be brought down against any hostile actor—undoubtedly, would make even the most intractable foe hesitant.

It is arguable that overwhelming U.S. space power would trickle down from the strategic high ground to lower strategic domains. Rather than wasting time demonstrating resolve by “temporarily blinding Chinese satellites,”16 for example, the overwhelming American presence in space presumably would dissuade potential attackers.

#### US hegemony prevents great-power conflicts that escalates to nuclear war

Brands and Edel 19 (Hal Brands and Charles Edel. Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Charles Edel is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served on the U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, “Rediscovering Tragedy. In The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order; Chapter 6: The Darkening Horizon,” Yale University Press, pp 128-131 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbnm3r9.11>)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and military exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. 34 More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post– Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over’

the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington.35 In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation.36 The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profi ted far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fi ctional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how signifi cantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacifi c, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

# Case

### Russia

#### 1) This adv doesn’t do anything for the aff – the res isn’t about deep space exploration it’s about private appropriation of space. Those two aren’t synonymous so idk what this adv is trying to accomplish. There’s no link that articulates why private appropriation is key to deep space exploration.