# Space Dominance DA

#### US wins space race now due to private competition – its key to space dominance and militarization is good – the plan nukes the US’s silver bullet against Chinese aggression

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As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector.

Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing.

Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world.

The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below.

Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket.

The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.)

Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter.

Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious.

Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter.

Why not?

America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century?

More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor.

Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government.

Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight.

Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy.

The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us.

The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### And, space dominance key to global peace – nuclear and conventional deterrence is collapsing, which will provoke civilization-ending revisionist aggression from Russia and China

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The United States needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a large-scale conventional war, and we are woefully unprepared.

Eastern and Central Europe is now so weakly defended as to virtually invite invasion. The United States is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So deterrence is dead, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop tankless remnant, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. It’s not enough. Meanwhile, in Asia, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region.

How can we restore the balance, creating a sufficiently powerful conventional force to deter aggression? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the United States must seek to totally outgun them by obtaining a radical technological advantage. This can be done by achieving space supremacy.

To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the 21st century, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls space.

The critical military importance of space has been obscured by the fact that in the period since the United States has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against minor powers that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless.

But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war.

But modern space power involves far more than just reconnaissance satellites. The use of space-based GPS can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based communications provide an unmatched capability of command and control of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will prove decisive.

Not only Europe, but the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to wipe them out with the push of a button. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States possess space capabilities that are so robust as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to comprehensively deny it to others.

*Space superiority* means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a complete monopoly of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made so formidable as to render any conventional attack unthinkable. On the other hand, should we fail to do so, we will remain so vulnerable as to increasingly invite aggression by ever-more-emboldened revanchist powers.

For this reason, both Russia and China have been developing and actively testing antisatellite (ASAT) systems. Up till now, the systems they have been testing have been ground launched, designed to orbit a few times and then collide with and destroy targets below one thousand kilometers altitude. This is sufficient to take out our reconnaissance satellites but not our GPS and communications satellites, which fly at twenty thousand and thirty-six thousand kilometers respectively. However, the means to reach these are straightforward, and, given their critical importance to us, there is every reason to believe that such development is well underway.11

The Obama administration sought to dissuade adversaries from developing ASATs by setting a good example and not working on them ourselves. This approach has failed. As a consequence, many defense policy makers are now advocating that we move aggressively to develop ASATs of our own. While more hardheaded than the previous policy, such an approach remains entirely inadequate to the situation.

The United States armed forces are far more dependent upon space assets than any potential opponent. Were both sides in a conflict able to destroy the space assets of the other, we would be the overwhelming loser by the exchange.

#### Space dominance solves hegemony – deterrence strategies, even rudimentary ones, are perceived as weakness and causes aggression

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While space superiority and space dominance share a militarized view of space, there are fundamental differences in their stated end goals. Those who favor space superiority view space as a global commons, accessible to all in peacetime. They take a more defensive and reactive view of space and the actors who seek access to this domain. The space superiority model understands that U.S. dependence on space is vital for the basic functioning of American civilization (banking transactions, cell phone signals, GPS functions, television broadcasts, as well as essential military surveillance and support functions all across satellites in space). Yet, this model also accepts that current budgetary constraints mean that the United States is unlikely to invest significantly more into unwieldy and expensive space systems.

A strategy of space superiority accepts the risk arising from reliance on space systems, while deterring attacks on space assets. As actors such as China or Russia become increasingly dependent on space systems themselves, space superiority advocates believe that U.S. willingness to retaliate in kind against any attack on its own space assets is sufficient.7 This is in keeping with the classic deterrence model of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Unfortunately, however, U.S. dependence on space assets for its very survival is so much greater than any other state that such a threat is unrealistic. The reason that states like China or Russia are developing counter-space capabilities is because the cost to them is extremely low, whereas the benefit for them (in the event of war with the United States) is high. For the cost of a ground-based laser or an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile launcher, China could knock out the ability of all U.S. forces in the Pacific to coordinate and adequately defend themselves from a Chinese offensive.

What could the United States do to the Chinese in return? The best option for U.S. retaliation in space would be to launch some blinding attacks on the handful of China's space assets. However, this ultimately would not deter China from escalating any future conflict since China's investment in space is so low compared to that of the United States. In addition, since Chinese forces are designed to operate in an environment without those assets, such retaliation grounded on deterrence-based models becomes highly problematic and ineffective.

Rather than serving as a stabilizing force in space, then, the defensive and reactive space superiority model would be an inducement for conflict in the strategic high ground of space. Or, rather, the direction of attack would be unidirectional: from U.S. adversaries toward essential U.S. space systems. Thus, while space confers unequivocal advantages to the U.S. forces that depend on space assets for their vital functions, it also provides adversaries with an unprecedented weakness for them to exploit.

The fact is that United States, China, or Russia's dependence on space is asymmetrical. Over the long run, a deterrent-based, space superiority model would eventually allow other states not only to gain and maintain access to space, but also effectively to gain strategic parity with the United States in space. Make no mistake, the more that states are able to access space, no matter how nascent or rudimentary their space programs may be, the more they will refine their capabilities and be able to develop space programs for their own strategic ends. While most defense analysts believe that deterrence during the Cold War led to bipolar stability, a deterrence-based model in space would create instability. If a near-peer competitor like China or Russia believed that it had acquired the capacity to achieve parity with the United States, what would stop that state from trying to gain strategic advantage over America in space?

A Hegemonic Model

The best solution to avoid this situation is a hegemonic model. The only way that the United States can ensure its continued strategic advantage in space is to embrace fully the space dominance model by weaponizing space. While space superiority advocates will denounce this policy as both cost-ineffective and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more in keeping with U.S. traditions and values. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis asserts, the American response to foreign threat is traditionally to take “the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security.”8

What of the claim that a deterrence-based space superiority model creates stability? The primary claim of deterrence efficacy is that during the Cold War, the more or less equal nuclear balance ensured that neither side had an incentive to launch a disarming first strike. This view was the basis of the mutual assured destruction theory. Since there was no conceivable advantage to either side from these weapons, both sides were forced into a more constructive diplomatic relationship. In all of the time that deterrence was employed, American policymakers assured the public that MAD was better than the alternatives—compellence,9 Rollback,10 and hegemony—because it restrained Soviet aggression.

American policymakers assumed that the Soviet strategists in the Kremlin viewed nuclear arms in the same apocalyptic terms that they did. As such, U.S. policymakers were not only content to allow American nuclear dominance to erode, but also to degrade actively those capabilities through strategic arms agreements. In the meantime, until 1986, mainstream Soviet strategists and policymakers were convinced that they could prevail in a nuclear war. They were just biding their time.11

In this light then, deterrence was not built around the concept of enlightened self-interest, but more likely the result of U.S. policymakers’ inability to see through the fog of the Cold War. The Soviets were by definition a revolutionary power. Even after they had renounced the concept of spreading global communist revolution, however, the urge to transform fundamentally the world order to reflect their own image remained a high strategic priority for the USSR. The United States failed to discern this situation until the Reagan Administration.

President Ronald Reagan, rather than accept the Cold War deterrence paradigm, planned to bring American technical and strategic dominance to bear in space in order to help defeat the Soviet Union. Reagan also recognized that the demilitarized sanctuary view of space was irrelevant, and he eschewed arms control agreements that sought to counteract the inherent American advantages in space. President Reagan not only embraced a militarized view of space, but in 1983, he also called for the weaponization of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

By the 1980s, the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space for military purposes (primarily in the area of satellites). These space systems formed the backbone of the modern military force that Reagan was assembling to counter the Soviet Union. What is more, Reagan's preferred strategy of Rollback meant that the United States would no longer sacrifice its own strategic advantages on the altar of diplomacy. After all, Reagan did not accept the Soviets as an equal and legitimate global power. He detested communism and viewed its proponents in the USSR as the great villains on the world stage. Furthermore, Reagan was staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. Therefore, he sought to remove the notion of deterrence through MAD and replace it with the concept of hegemony through “Mutual Assured Survival.”

These views coalesced into the Reagan Administration's commitment to placing missile defense systems in orbit. It also called for developing new technologies (i.e., directed-energy weapons) to be used in space. The United States would not only remove the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal by creating a working missile defense system in space, but it would also move beyond the Soviet threat by permanently dominating the high ground of space. This position was the basis of SDI.12 In fact, the Reagan Administration's shift in focus was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union as the Soviet leadership then embarked on a tit-for-tat arms buildup that their economy simply could not sustain. 13

Even if deterrence did facilitate a significant reduction in hostility—thereby creating the bipolar stability—no such hope for stability exists in space today. As argued earlier, U.S. reliance on space assets for its most basic functions is far greater than that of other countries. Furthermore, there is no way that the United States can—or should—abandon its use of space as a strategic domain. Thus, a hegemonic model for space dominance is the only hope to create the stability that most planners seek, while at the same time defending the American position in space.

Space dominance as a model for stability is nothing new. Indeed, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) asserts that the most stable global systems are those in which one actor dominates the system. In such a system, power is aggregated so greatly into a single, dominant actor that such a hegemonic power acts as a stabilizing force. Due to its relative strength, the hegemonic power can set the agenda and the rules that govern the system. The relative weakness of the other actors in the system is well understood, which then prompts these weak actors to abandon any hope of challenging the hegemonic power's rule. Eventually, they end up accommodating the hegemonic power. The lack of challenge creates peaceful stability.14 The fact that one actor is setting the rules means that the system is simple to operate in, as well.

The same logic that buttresses the HST international relations theory arguably undergirds the military strategy of space dominance. If this claim is so, then American hegemony in space is essential for the continued survival of the United States. Whereas there are legitimate arguments to be made regarding the reliance on deterrence-based models for creating stability during the Cold War, the fact is that the world is more multipolar today than it was 25 years ago. Despite what writer Fareed Zakaria has dubbed “the rise of the rest,”15 the United States still retains greater relative power. Therefore, it is inevitable and logical that the United States should expand its hegemonic position in space, in order to secure its place there.

Whereas deterrence-based models, such as space superiority, may have worked in a less chaotic international system, no such stability can be achieved today. Many of America's competitors are revanchist states intent on redefining the world order. They are not interested in preserving the American position in space. Also, they are not cowed by a U.S. deterrence strategy in space. Rather, they view such a policy as a concession that the United States is becoming weaker.

Space dominance would create greater stability than space superiority. Missile defense systems, tungsten rods, and even directed-energy weapons potentially would all be placed in key orbits around the Earth. This, on top of the existing U.S. space infrastructure, would prove to the world that the United States is committed to preserving its position in space. In a world of rogue states, space-based weapons likely would prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Failing that, the fact that the United States possessed strategic, offensive weapons in orbit—that could be brought down against any hostile actor—undoubtedly, would make even the most intractable foe hesitant.

It is arguable that overwhelming U.S. space power would trickle down from the strategic high ground to lower strategic domains. Rather than wasting time demonstrating resolve by “temporarily blinding Chinese satellites,”16 for example, the overwhelming American presence in space presumably would dissuade potential attackers.

#### US hegemony prevents great-power conflicts that escalates to nuclear war

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Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and military exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. 34 More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post– Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington.35 In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation.36 The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profi ted far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fi ctional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how signifi cantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacifi c, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

# case

#### The role of the judge is to vote for the better debater. Anything else is arbitrary.

#### Extinction outweighs the K – A. magnitude – the preclusion of life future generations makes extinction the upmost moral evil and means we have infinite magnitude B. reversibility – you can only die once and extinction precludes the possibility for material progress or decolonization at any point in the future

#### Alt fails—violence can only be remedied on a material plane.

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ACADEMIC INJUSTICE DISCOURSE Just law can coexist with unjust practice and both are parts of “empirical law” or what Bendey called “the process of government.” Empirical law is constantly changing and some theorists are optimistic that verbal discourse has the ability to make written law more just, even though the same unjust practices recur or new ones emerge. These theorists, some of whom are or may aspire to become public intellectuals, hope that someday public political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will have the power to interrupt a cycle of just written law accompanied by continued unjust practice. That is, the “right” discourse perennially holds the promise of changing the beliefs, values, and goals of everyone in the public auditorium, so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws.11 This search for “magic words” is futile for academics who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose. Our verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it anyway. But even when multitudes are inspired and emotionally stirred by great orators, action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests. After the 1960s, academics began a robust practice of liberatory discourse about injustice that seems to grow more impassioned and intense each year. The quest for demographic diversity among students and faculty in higher education has weathered judicial defeat of explicit affirmative action policies, but only partly for the sake of justice. There are pragmatic prizes if the academy can justify itself by producing a racially integrated leadership and managerial class for business, politics, and the military. Top leaders throughout society realize that they need such racial diversity for broad consumption, voter support, and boots on the ground, and the expression of that need is evident in amicus curiae briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court as it has been torturously dismantling affirmative action, piece by piece, since Bakke in 1978.12 Academic political discourse has been deeper than polemics and debate, exactly because of its disciplined intellectual origins in different fields of study (i.e., discipline imposed by distinct “disciplines”). But it has been swimming upstream against a more rarefied and older academic tradition, particularly among many philosophers and their gate keepers outside of the profession. Even Hannah Arendt (see chapter 2) spoke approvingly of the life of the mind as cut off from real political activity that occurred in the realm of “opinion.” In her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif, Arendt addressed the phenomenon of college-stu-dent protestors, noting that they had brought social change through optimistic belief in their ability to make a better world, while at the same time discovering joy in civic participation. Arendt credited such protests with the success of the civil rights movement and progress toward ending the Vietnam War.13 As discussed in chapter 4, it is doubtful that Arendt was correct that student protests caused the success of the civil rights movement. A historical analysis of the end to the Vietnam War is beyond the present scope, but what we already know about empirical Bentleyan analyses would warrant skepticism about Arendt’s causal thesis there as well. In the same interview, Arendt warned that demonstrations by student activists could be self-defeating in democratic Euro-American contexts, because in attacking their universities, they were attacking the very entities that made their protests possible, American universities, especially large state schools that were the sites of the protests Arendt had in mind, have perforce developed very different financial structures since 1970. These schools have become increasingly dependent on private corporate and philanthropic funding, with state government funds now a much reduced part of their budget. While this structural change is not generally viewed as an incursion on academic freedom, it has been coincident with a very flat era of student protest and activism. Still, Arendt's notion of the "life of the mind” remains useful if we consider that the progressive/change-seeking output of professional academics since 1970 has been professionally accepted in the institutions that employ its participants. Also, much of today’s liberatory academic discourse can be viewed as the legacy of earlier student protest, furthering a tradition that may have been founded when some of the 1960s student radicals became professors. This indicates that the connection between academic radicals and the hands that feed them is not as simple as Arendt thought. In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of real academic freedom and its real ineffectiveness. Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks, with requisite scholarly apparatuses and without translation into more simple views of the world; there is often also a lack of translation from one discipline to another or between subdisciplines in the same field. The audience is other academics and students. Neither specialization nor the limited and partly captive audience should be viewed as problematic because that is the nature of academic work, given broad social divisions of labor. But there is a problem with the delusional nature of so much of this work. The delusion consists of a naive view of the power of academic speech to directly change reality. The rhetorical mode of address used by academics writing cultural criticism, political philosophy, social philosophy, or what is now called social-political philosophy (which combines the other subfield approaches), often proceeds as though its authors are making grand entries in a planetary cabala, where words have the immediate power to become their intended referents. Those who do not write and speak cabalistically may subscribe to the Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory that can be traced from Plato to John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. Subscription to that theory is immediately self-flattering, but it lacks reliable empirical support.16 Although, after the US civil rights movement, there has been an uncanny coincidence of race-blind formal racial equality with the hegemony in political philosophy of Rawls’s requirement that those who plan fundamental social institutions do so in ignorance of their own societal environments. As we saw in chapter 1, Rawls was quite explicit about this: I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.17 Both race-blind racial equality and Rawlsian ideals are compatible with race-based real inequality. There are, of course, counter-examples, such as Katherine MacKinnon’s work on sexual harassment in the workplace as expressed in current law and institutional policy.18 Nevertheless even very good academic political discourse about justice and injustice cannot be relied upon to attract implementation or application in real life. This may be because there has not been sufficient time for the development of training programs for a new profession of “bridgers,” who could translate good ideas in the academy for those who govern and make policy. An internal problem for such translators would be to decide where to anchor their bridges in fields—every humanistic field—where experts disagree. However, the current tradition of progressive academic writing and speech is less than half a century old and if and when such translators emerge, they will develop their own professional criteria for choosing among contending experts. Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that expressing and airing views in day-to-day practices or special “national conversations” also have immediate practical results. It is not evident how there could be such results, when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that lacks rules for evidence or valid argument. As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. The only reliable result of participation in such unbinding referenda is that those who participate are able to express themselves and get attention that may benefit them in the marketplace of their related endeavors. Public expression also serves to, represent and create collective atmospheres of belief, attitude, and opinion. These atmospheres are implicitly known by a majority of people in the culture, even though such knowledge is difficult to validate. Ambiguities cannot be resolved by recourse to public opinion polls, because understanding the results of those polls requires creative interpretive skills that draw on what is already known about relevant atmospheres. For example, suppose that more blacks than whites believe that white privilege is real and that O.J. Simpson was innocent, or that more whites than blacks believe that white American police officers are not, in general, racially biased. Are the views of whites evidence of racial bias or racial oblivion? Are the views of blacks evidence of racial preference or paranoia? Moreover, such polls almost always have a large racial overlap of opinion: If 29 percent of blacks compared to 71 percent of whites believe X, then 71 percent of blacks and 29 percent of whites do not believe X. Does this mean that the percentages of each group that does not contribute to the discrepancy in belief recorded in the polls are in some degree of agreement? Experiments in social psychology could be designed to answer such questions and others like them, but it is important to decide beforehand why the data is important and what it does and does not indicate. For instance, testing the claim that white privilege is a reality of contemporary life requires some prior definition of what is meant by “white privilege,” which can range from injustice to social courtesies. In a widely discussed 2013 experiment conducted in Queensland, Australia, economists Redzo Mujcic and Paul Frijters found that the majority of free bus rides, based on conductor generosity, were dispensed to whites, with blacks least likely to receive this courtesy, compared to all other racial groups among commuters. Journalist Britni Danielle, writing for a general audience on Yahoo News, touted this study as evidence that “white privilege is real,” without distinguishing between an amenity such as a free bus ride and recognition of one’s rights by not being subject to arbitrary stops and frisks by police officers.19 Conservatives reading Mujcic and Frijter’s study might say that the bus driver may have been acting rationally based on past experience with unruly black passengers. From a progressive perspective, more specifics would need to be introduced to defend the claim that this study revealed white privilege, such as controls for the apparent social class and gender of passengers, as well as the preexisting racial climate among bus commuters in Queensland, as well as the broader racial atmosphere throughout Australia in 2013. The 2015 Academy Awards What is racial atmosphere and climate? A US example that is also global could help clarify these vague ideas, provided that it is understood beforehand that in this context, as in most public references to "race," ‘racial” means “pertaining to racism.” From beginning to end, the 2015 Academy Awards ceremony hit racist notes that slid by unchecked, because it was an occasion of celebration. Neil Patrick Harris, the host, began with what might have been a critical remark about the lack of racial diversity among audience members and award winners: “Tonight we honor Hollywood’s best and whitest, sorry, bright est.” For those who were uncomfortable with the lack of robust racial diversity among audience members and award winners, his remark might have validated their unease. But those who would have been uncomfortable with more racial diversity may have been heard “best and whitest” as support for their social values. (The discourse of white privilege as a critique of contemporary anti-nonwhite racism is, as indicated, that kind of double-edged sword.) Midway through the ceremony, Patricia Arquette called for people of color and members of the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender (LBGT) community to support legislation for equal pay for women and to commit themselves to supporting women, thereby overlooking the women who were either or both people of color and members of the LGВТ community. This kind of oversight may perhaps be excused by Arquette’s ignorance of what academics have been for decades analyzing as “intersectionality.” But Sean Penn’s remark at the grand finale awarding for Best Picture to Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, the Mexican director of Birdman, was simply, explicitly, racist: "Who gave this son of a bitch a green card?” Inarritu later brushed off the insult by saying he found it "hilarious,” because “Sean and I have that kind of brutal relationship. I think it was very funny.”20 Inarritu attempt at a “save” for Penn does not address the impact of Penn’s insult on other Mexicans and Mexican Americans, including those without green cards who struggle to remain employed in the face of anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination. (That such a moment of maximum recognition was brought so low by a racist crack is not unusual in US culture, where the nastiest forms of racist insult are often let loose on people of color who have succeeded.) As a spectacle watched by almost thirty-four million, the 2015 Oscars, despite ratings lower than recent years, was a global public event.21 Symbolically, it has no peer for the display of beauty, talent, and artistic creativity. Its subtext inevitably has implications about current American race relations, which influence their future. The racial implications of the Oscars replays in millions of minds at countless other public celebrations and entertainment venues, as well as in private interactions (for a year at least). Such spectacles are forms of public discourse and what they represent or fail to represent about US racial demographics and the attitude of the dominant white group creates or augments a specific racial climate that in 2015 is part of a more general racial atmosphere of ambiguity and indeterminacy. At the 2015 Academy Awards, for many critical observers, the issue or subject pertaining to race (insofar as it is understood that subjects of race are subjects of racism), was recognition.22 The beauty, talent, and artistic creativity of people of color was not fully recognized. Some people of color did get awards and some audience members were people of color, so recognition, along with diversity, was not completely absent. But there appeared to be insufficient racial diversity for audience and award winners to be considered racially integrated. And that appearance was symbolic. However, the symbolic meaning is ambiguous: Were there people of color who were deserving of awards but did not get them because they were people of color? Is race a factor in who I becomes a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences? In the future, will the racial makeup of award winners become more or less representative of their proportions in the motion picture industry? If the proportion of people of color in the motion picture industry is not proportional to their presence in the population at large, why is that? The answers to these questions are undetermined in the symbolic spectacle of the 2015 Academy Awards. The observer does not know if recognition of the achievements of people of color in the movie industry will improve, stay the same, or get worse, and she does not know how to find out. The racial (i.e., in regards to racism) climate of the Academy Awards is cloudy, subject to many different interpretations, some of them conflicting. It is an epistemologically unstable racial climate, because people of color do not know what the weather is in that climate, as a basis for prediction, and neither do they know how to find out. The shared judgment throughout the American atmosphere of race in the early twenty-first century is that racism is morally bad. This judgment is a general principle that leaves the nature of racism undefined throughout the atmosphere and most of the climates and subclimates of race. The overriding shared judgment is a bitter and ineffective refuge for nonwhites, because it does not protect them from either First Amendment-protected racist expressions or actions that turn out to be indirectly racist. Energetic self-aware racist whites can try to evade the judgment that they are racist through coded language for racial difference, and the use of intermediate activities and traits as subjects of direct action. That is, something other than race, which nonetheless does a good job of picking out members of a specific racial group, can be used instead of the race of that group to maintain prejudice and legitimize discrimination. The term “racial climate” has a history of meaning “micro-aggressions” based on race, small cuts, insults, and slights that can have a cumulative effect of individual harm.24 In using the term “racial atmosphere,” reference may be made to other issues of harm to people of color, such as ignorance of black history and contemporary racism or discrimination in career advancement.25 The implication of these meanings is that the micro-aggressions add up to what is perceived as a general predisposition of white people to treat people of color in unjust ways. But, at this time, ideas of racial atmosphere and climate also work as metaphors for what is unknown about race relations and attitudes; they capture the vagueness and unpredictability of racial prejudice and discrimination that occur in a society where nonwhites remain disadvantaged, even though there is formal equality. This “vague weather” aspect of atmosphere and climate is an epistemological condition of indecision that may or may not constitute a lasting crisis, although some syndromes of political injustice should be viewed as crises. A crisis is a period of indecision and uncertainty that requires a resolution before life can go on. Will blacks and other people of color achieve more equality with whites, or is the United States—and with it the world, because US racism is exported with business practices, tour-ism, and entertainment products—on the brink of a new era of explicitlу direct oppression of people of color? Are most white Americans, whose race-neutral economic and social activities have racist effects on nonwhites, genuinely ignorant of how the system in which they operate works, or are they secretly but knowingly hearts-and-minds not clear that this indeterminate aspect of present racial atmosphere and climates must be resolved now. We do not know if life can go on if it is not resolved or what it means for life to go on, or not. We do not even know if the putative crisis can be resolved at this time, because there is as yet no systematic and sustained, impassioned, liberatory dis- course for our condition of ambiguity, a time with a black president and police killing with impunity of unarmed black youth, a time of voting rights for everyone but new restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect African Americans.26 Except for what academics write and say and how important they think their discourse is (among themselves), American discourse of racial liberation is at a standstill. And insofar as academic discourse is uttered and received in a closed system, with a semicaptive audience and no reliable means for it to affect the real world, that standstill remains at the disposal of history, where history is understood to be the unpredictable result of contingent events. However, if academic oppositional political discourse can be related to a longer historical trend, a more coherent and optimistic picture might emerge. Cornel West's ideas about the American black prophetic tradition appears to be a relation to such a trend.

#### There’s a passivity DA- Voting aff doesn’t return land—it just makes you feel good and progressive and makes you think you’ve done something good for Natives, when nothing actually changes and we all will still occupy Native land—this means voting aff is worse because it makes you feel like good settlers, which TURNS their settler innocence arguments

#### The United States has been the cause of anti-imperialism globally – the four waves of empire dismantlement are intrinsically US driven

Deudney & Ikenberry 15 (Daniel Deudney, Johns Hopkins University G. John Ikenberry, Princeton University “America’s Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System”, August 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf) \*\*two charts from the article

In contemporary debates, this argument undercuts, modifies, and qualifies characterizations held by so many of the United States as essentially imperial, and the American order as an empire. In our rendering, the United State is not the last Western empire, but the first anti-imperial and post-imperial great power in the global system. Our argument is thus focused on the consequences of American foreign policy for the evolution of the international system, and we do not in this confined treatment offer an explanation for the origins of U.S. foreign policy. In short, we offer an argument about impacts rather than the sources of America’s antiimperial and pro-Westphalian role. Against the backdrop of this evolution of the international system and the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, it becomes possible to see more clearly the many ways in which the United States played important anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and pro-Westphalian roles. 16 The Pattern of American Anti-Imperial, Anti-Colonial, and Pro-Westphalian Impacts In each of the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, the United States had an impact. The United States was the first “new nation” to emerge from a rebellion against European imperial rule during the first wave of modern empire. The United States also supported the independence of other European settler colonies throughout the Americas and, with the Monroe Doctrine, helped sustain their independence against European efforts to recolonize parts of the Americas. In the second wave of late 19th century empire-building, the United States, despite its great relative power, did not establish an empire of its own of any significance or duration. And during the latter part of the 20th century, the United States pushed European decolonization, thus facilitating the breakup of second wave empires. In the great world wars in the 20th century, the United States played an important role in thwarting a third wave of imperial projects of Germany, Japan, and Italy. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States played decisive roles, both ideological and military, in thwarting the fourth wave of empire building, the expansion of the communist

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great power, the Soviet Union, as well as communist coups and revolutions in many weak and small independent states. The United States also played a variety of important roles in building and strengthening Westphalian institutions, moderating inter-state anarchy, and facilitating the ability of states to survive as independent members of international society. From its inception, the United States was precocious in its support for the law of nations, the institutions of the society of states, particularly the laws of war and neutrality, and public international law, as a means of restraining war and aggression. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States, first regionally and then globally, inspired and helped legitimate anti-colonial and anti-imperial independence movements and national liberation struggles among peoples struggling against empires all over the world. In the 20th century, the United States led the efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of non-aggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the 20th century, the American-led liberal international order institutionalized free trade and multilateral cooperation, thus providing the infrastructure for a global economic system, thus enabling smaller and weaker states to sustain their sovereign. Also in the second half of the 20th century, the American system of military alliances contributed to the dampening

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of violent conflicts among allied states, particularly in Europe and East Asia, thus protecting the Westphalian system from the return of violent conflict and empire-building. Taken together, these varied American activities in the world clearly provide strong preliminary evidence for our claim that the United States has significantly contributed to the dismantlement of empires, the thwarting of further empire-building, and to the universalization, institutionalization, and stabilization of the Westphalian state-system.

#### The alternative is Chinese rise---weak American responses embolden aggression.

Choi 18—Ji Young Choi, associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University (“Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84, Available through ProQuest)

I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, historical and theoretical lessons reveal that a rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former's economic and other major capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter's leadership and the international rules it created. This means that the rise of China could produce intense hegemonic competition and even a global hegemonic war. The preventive motivation by an old declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with other variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly emerging yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system leader, as in the case of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A historical lesson is that "incomplete catch-ups are inherently conflict-prone" (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that even though it falls short of surpassing the system leader, the rise of a new great power can produce significant instability in the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the United States and China are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the possibility that one of these regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war in which the two superpowers are entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied sixteen historical cases in which a rising power confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not unavoidable, but escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia 2009; Wang and Zhu 2015), who emphasize the transformation of China's domestic politics and the pragmatism of Beijing's diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China relations. Yet my reading of the situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between this optimistic view and what has really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist state, but in what follows I will suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at least in the Asia Pacific and could develop into a revisionist power in the future.¶ Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization since the start of pro-market reforms in the late 1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in international security issues for several decades. It followed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine: "hide one's capabilities, bide one's time, and seek the right opportunity." Since 2003, China's motto has been "Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development," and Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of China would not threaten any other countries. Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in international security affairs. In particular, China has been adamant about territorial issues in the East and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a severe threat by other nations in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased naval activities on a large scale in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, Beijing announced that just like Tibet and Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical changes as well. In 2010, China's foreign minister publicly stated, "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also used the words "struggle and achieve results," emphasizing the importance of China's territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167). Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in the South China Sea to seek "de facto control over the resource-rich waters and islets" claimed as well by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times 2015). As of now, China's strategy is to delay a direct military conflict with the United States as long as possible and use its economic and political prowess to pressure smaller neighbors to give up their territorial claims (Doran 2012). These new developments and rhetorical signals reflect significant changes in China's foreign policies and signify that China's peaceful rise seems to be over.¶ A rising great power's consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as one of the significant signs of the rising power's dissatisfaction with the existing order and its willingness to do battle if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), "arms buildups and arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage." Werner and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger's military expenditures are increasing faster than those of a system leader, parity can be very dangerous to the international political order. China's GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet. China's military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the United States. In addition to its air force, China's strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers (Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military, particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015).¶ Sea power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained cogently in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new hegemonic power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective control of main international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly emerging power, as well as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy's rapid growth requires external expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products. Therefore, naval power becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities. Second, securing major sea-lanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the supply of energy, raw materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a hegemonic war or any other major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable why China is so stubborn over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history tells us that many rising powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all the global hegemons including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers.¶ Another important aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing international economic order and take actions that could potentially change this order. The Chinese economy has overall benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its allies and China does not have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in Washington, DC, and the United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along with other emerging economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing system of the IMF, but reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have been delayed by the opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took the initiative to create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is premature to say that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, this new development can be read as a starting point for significant changes in global economic and financial governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II (Subacchi 2015).¶ China's historical legacies reinforce the view that China has a willingness to become a global hegemon. From the Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century to the start of the first Opium War in 1839, China enjoyed its undisputed hegemonic position in East Asia. "Sino-centrism" that is related to this historical reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all China's neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese foreign minister's recent public statement that I quoted previously: "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese people's ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its economic standing at least in most Chinese people's mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by "the Century of Humiliation," a period between the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China's economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this bitter experience of subjugation and shame and recover its traditional position and old glory (Choi 2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an ultimate objective of China. Rather, its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition (Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow 2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are needed.¶ Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets. It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or nature and goals or ideologies of a rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their territories and influence in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan's goal was to create the Japanese empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World War II era. Twentiethcentury history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values and cultures (for instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold War) can pose significant challenges to democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies, states organized similarly to the dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they tend to be status quo states. Another historical lesson is that economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony. Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor 2011). A relatively peaceful relationship or transition is possible when economic interdependence is supported by a solid democratic alliance between a rising great power and an existing or declining one.¶ Some scholars such as Ikenberry (2008) emphasize nuclear deterrence and the high costs of a nuclear war. Power transition theorists agree that the high costs of a nuclear war can constrain a war among great powers but do not view them as "a perfect deterrent" to war (Kugler and Zagare 1990; Tammen et al. 2000). The idea of nuclear deterrence is based upon the assumption of the rationality of actors (states): as long as the costs of a (nuclear) war are higher than its benefits, an actor (state) will not initiate the war. However, even some rationalists admit that certain actors (such as exceedingly ambitious risk-taking states) do not behave rationally and engage in unexpected military actions or pursue military overexpansion beyond its capacity (Glaser 2010). The state's behaviors are driven by its values, perceptions, and political ambitions as well as its rational calculations of costs and benefits. Especially, national pride, historical memories, and territorial disputes can make states behave emotionally. The possibility of a war between a democratic nation and a nondemocratic regime increases because they do not share the same values and beliefs and, therefore, the level of mistrust between them tends to be very high. China and the United States have enhanced their cooperation to address various global issues like global warming, international terrorism, energy issues, and global economic stability. But these issues are not strong enough to bring them together to overcome their mistrust that stems from their different values, beliefs, and perceptions (Friedberg 2011). What is more important is whether they can set mutually agreeable international rules on traditional security issues including territorial disputes.

#### Even if the US is bad, China is worse – critiques of American foreign policy show blatant disregard for Chinese imperial aggression and colonial violence

Thayer and Han ’19 (Bradley A. Thayer Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas San Antonio and is the coauthor of How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism and the Balance of Power in International Politics. Lianchao Han is vice president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, Dr. Han was one of the founders of the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars. He worked in the U.S. Senate for twelve years, as legislative counsel and policy director for three senators, 6/12/19(Bradley and Lianchao, “The ‘Xi Doctrine’: Proclaiming and Rationalizing China’s Aggression”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/%E2%80%98xi-doctrine%E2%80%99-proclaiming-and-rationalizing-china%E2%80%99s-aggression-62402)//GA)

Using the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this month, Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe, delivered a sharp message to the United States, which may be termed the “Xi Doctrine” on China’s use of force, after Chinese premier Xi Jinping. Wei declaring both China’s resolve to aggress to advance its interests and a rationalization for the use of force. Wei’s de facto threat of war should not be lost in his nuances, deliberate ambiguity, or in translation. His remarks were so bellicose that the world has noticed, as was certainly intended by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Empirical evidence of China’s aggression is increasingly common, from its attempt to dominate the South China Sea, the neo-imperialist effort to gain control of states through the Belt and Road Initiative, to its technological imperialism to control 5G and artificial intelligence technologies. What is rather less frequent are statements from high-level Chinese officials proclaiming the country’s intent to be aggressive and offering an attempted legitimizing principle justifying that aggression. While much of the content of Wei’s remarks were in keeping with the gossamer pronouncements on China’s peaceful intentions, as well as a paean to Xi Jinping’s leadership, they still conveyed that China is ready and willing to resort to war if the United States stands in its way of global expansion; and they made clear that China must go to war, or even a nuclear war, to occupy Taiwan. Specifically, there are four elements that comprise the Xi Doctrine and are indications of China’s signaling its willingness to use force. The first component is a new and alarming proclamation of the undisguised threats to use force or wage an unlimited war. China is becoming bolder as its military power grows. This is evidenced in Wei’s muscular remarks on the People’s Republic of China’s approach against Taiwan, his explicit statement that China does not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and his effort to deter the United States and its allies from intervention should an attack occur. Wei forcefully stated: “If anyone dares to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but must go to war, and must fight for the reunification of the motherland at all costs.” “At all cost” means that China will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons or launching another Pearl Harbor to take over Taiwan. This is a clear warning of an invasion. Second, the Xi Doctrine legitimizes territorial expansion. Through his remarks, Wei sought to convince the rest of the world that China’s seizure of most of the South China Sea is an accomplished fact that cannot be overturned. He made bogus accusations, which included blaming the United States for “raking in profits by stirring up troubles” in the region. He insisted that only ASEAN and China must resolve the issue. He claimed that China’s militarization on South China Sea islands and reefs were an act of self-defense. Should this be allowed to stand, then the Xi Doctrine will set a perilous precedent of successful territorial expansion, which will further entice China and jeopardize the peace of the region. Third, the doctrine targets the United States as a cause of the world’s major problems and envisions a powerful China evicting the United States from the region. Wei obliquely identified the United States as the cause wars, conflicts, and unrest, and sought to convey that the United States will abandon the states of the South China Sea (SCS) when it is confronted by Chinese power, a typical divide and conquer strategy used by the CCP regime. The Xi Doctrine’s fourth element is the mendacity regarding China’s historical use of force and current actions. While the distortions of history were numerous, there were three major lies that should be alarming for the states of the region and the global community. First, Wei said that China had never invaded another country, which is a claim so transparently false it can only be a measure of the contempt he held for the audience. China has a long history of aggression, including against the Tibetans and Vietnamese, and perhaps soon against the Taiwanese. Second, Wei argued that hegemony does not conform to China’s values when, in fact, China proudly was Asia’s hegemon for most of the last two thousand years. Lastly, he claimed that the situation in the SCS is moving toward stability—from China’s perspective this stability is caused by its successful seizure of territory. In fact, the SCS is far less stable as a result of China’s actions. Efforts to counter this grab are denounced by Wei as destabilizing, which is a bit like a thief accusing you of a crime for wanting your property returned. Wei’s belligerent rhetoric is an indication that the CCP regime faces deep external and internal crises. Externally, the Trump administration has shocked the CCP with the three major steps it has taken. First, it has shifted the focus of the U.S. national-security strategy and now identifies China explicitly as its primary rival—abandoning the far more muted policies of previous administrations. Second, Trump has acted on this peer competitive threat by advancing tangible measures, such as arms sales to allies and the ban of Huawei. Third, the administration has made credible commitments to assure partners and allies to counter China’s aggression and bullying. These have unbalanced the CCP regime, and its natural reaction is to bully its way out. Additionally, the CCP regime has perceived that the world today has begun to consider the negative implications of China’s rise, and the United States is determined to prevent what heretofore had been considered China’s unstoppable rise. From the perspective of CCP, conflict is increasingly seen as inevitable and perhaps even imminent. Wei’s bellicosity should be seen in this light, and the PLA is tasked with fighting and winning the war. Internally, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign that selectively targets his political rivalries, and his abandoning the established rules such as term limited of presidency, have introduced deep cleavages into the unity of the regime unity. China’s economic slowdown, made worse by the U.S. trade war, is a fundamental challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. Xi’s repression and suppression of the Chinese people, particularly human-rights defenders, Christians, Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other minorities, have miscarried. Drawing from the pages of unfortunate history, in a classic social-imperialist move, the regime wants to direct these internal tensions outward. At the same time, the nationalistic fervor advanced by the CCP’s propaganda and by the rapid military modernization have made many young militant officers in the PLA overconfident. This is infrequently noticed in the West. They can hardly wait to fight an ultimate war to defeat the arch-enemy. This plainly dangerous mentality echoes the Japanese military’s beliefs before Pearl Harbor. The bellicosity evinced in Wei’s speech is serious and is not bluster intended to deter. The United States cannot meet China’s threat with half-measures, which are likely to further encourage China’s aggressive behavior. The United States must respond to China’s belligerence with greater strength, adamantine determination, and more vigorous diplomatic and military measures. With the Xi Doctrine, China has proclaimed and rationalized its aggression. A Trump Doctrine forged in response has to reveal to all global audiences, most importantly the CCP leadership, the recklessness of the Xi Doctrine and the supreme folly of aggression.

# Framework

#### A] Governments have to aggregate since all collective actions require trade-offs that benefit some and worsen others- side-constraints freeze action and render ethics inoperable- takes-out and turns calc indicts- consequentialism is hard but not impossible, it’s empirically false since we calculate all the time, and the alt is no action which is worse

#### B] Only consequentialism treats agents equally since it values their well-being the same- public officials have special obligations by virtue of their role to benefit its people in an equal manner

#### [C] Existential threats deserve serious consideration in your ethical calculus- moral uncertainty and future gens

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good,

from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)