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#### The right to strike is a dangerous distraction that prevents the labor movement from challenging systems at the root cause of class inequality and that make it structurally impossible for legal institutions to protect workers. Empirically “right to strike” legislation hamstrings actual strikes via circumventive policies that jail strikers for engaging in theft, violence, etc while allowing for a façade of acceptance and forcing union representation, wages, and economic equality to plummet. The AFF results in scattered, ineffective, and “respectable” strikes and labor disputes re-routed towards legal arbitration while increased legal incorporation results in more tools for the elite to constrain the labor movement -- turns case and kills workers’ movement writ large. Vote NEG for a “direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold”

White 18 (Ahmed White – Nicholaus Rosenbaum Professor of Law @ University of Colorado Law School, “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike”, https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles , 2018, pgs. 1065-1073, EmmieeM)

One of the most important statutes ever enacted, the National Labor Relations Act envisaged the right to strike as the centerpiece of a system of labor law whose central aims included dramatically diminishing the pervasive exploitation and steep inequality that are endemic to modern capitalism. These goals have never been more relevant. But they have proved difficult to realize via the labor law, in large part because an effective right to strike has long been elusive, undermined by courts, Congress, the NLRB, and powerful elements of the business community. Recognizing this, labor scholars have made the restoration of the right to strike a cornerstone of labor law scholarship. Authorities in the field have developed an impressive literature that stresses the importance of strikes and strongly criticizes the arguments that judges, legislators, and others have used to justify their degradation of the right to strike. But this literature has developed without its authors ever answering a fundamental question, which is whether an effective right to strike is a viable aspiration in the first place. This Article takes up this question. It documents the crucial role that strikes have played in building the labor movement, legitimating the labor law itself, and indeed validating the New Deal and, with this, the modern administrative state; and it confirms the integral role that strikes play in contesting the corrosive power capitalism accords employers over the workplace and the spoils of production. But this Article also shows how the strikes that were effective in these crucial ways were not conventional strikes, limited to the simple withholding of labor and the advertisement of workers’ grievances. Instead, they inevitably embraced disorderly, coercive tactics like mass picketing and sit-down strikes to a degree that suggests that tactics such as these are indeed essential if strikes are to be effective. Yet strikes that have featured these tactics have never enjoyed any legitimacy beyond the ranks of labor, radical activists, and academic sympathizers. Their inherent affronts to property and public order place them well beyond the purview of what could ever constitute a viable legal right in liberal society; and they have been treated accordingly by courts, Congress, and other elite authorities. From this vantage, it becomes clear that an effective right to strike is not only an impossible distraction but a dangerous fantasy that prevents labor’s champions from confronting the broader, sobering truths that this country’s legal and political system are, at root, anathema to a truly viable system of labor rights and that labor’s salvation must be sought elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

“They say ‘you got a right to strike but you can’t picket,’ an’ they know a strike won’t work without picket-in’.”1 This is the angry lament of Mac McLeod, a central character in John Steinbeck’s 1936 novel, In Dubious Battle, delivered just after Mac and fellow unionists were enjoined by a carload of heavily-armed police “to keep order.”2 “You can march as long as you don’t block traffic,” said the head cop, “but you are not going to interfere with anybody. Get that?”3

Recently adapted to film in a movie that is notably long on stars but short on distribution,4 the novel is considered one of Steinbeck’s finest.5 It is also perhaps the most powerful depiction of a labor strike in American literature. A bitter reflection on the intense interpersonal conflicts, moral dilemmas, and political impasses that are central to labor struggles, and based on the author’s acquaintances with workers and organizers in the region, the book tells the tragic story of a fruitpickers strike led by radicals in Depression-era California.6 In Dubious Battle broaches a set of crucial issues, which are seldom discussed anymore, concerning the nature of strikes and the acceptable limits of class struggle and workers’ protests in liberal society.7

For much of this country’s post-Civil War history, “hitting the bricks” was a way for workers to try to push back against capitalist employers. Sometimes the strikers succeeded, gaining union recognition and better working conditions. But often enough, their impertinence was repaid with arrests, beatings, and blacklisting; and the strikes ended in failure, sometimes with blood pooled on the streets and soaked into the dirt, as in Steinbeck’s story. Hundreds, possibly thousands lost their lives8 —one can only roughly estimate the numbers, so commonplace and prosaic were these practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, excluding the years 1906 through 1913, for which there are no records, between 1881 and 1935, the year Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (or Wagner Act, in its early form), there were in the neighborhood of 80,000 strikes in America, involving about 30 million workers.9 Despite all the dangers and the likelihood that their efforts would prove futile, workers in these millions downed the tools and picketed, convinced that doing so was not only necessary to their immediate interests but a mandate of their position in class society.

The Wagner Act purported, for the first time in American history, to extend a definite, readily enforceable right to strike to most American workers. Not coincidentally, the years surrounding its enactment featured the most intense wave of labor conflict in the country’s history. When the statute became effective in 1937 (having been widely ignored by employers and blocked by hostile courts), the violence of strikes began to diminish, though not so much their frequency. For much of the period after the Second World War, strikes remained common even as they also became less ambitious in their aims and less militant in their conduct. Beginning about forty years ago, things changed again. Strikes suddenly became rare as well, to the point that workers today basically do not strike at all. From 1947 through 1976, the government documented an average of just over 300 “major work stoppages” (strikes and lockouts involving at least 1000 workers) every year; over the last decade, the annual average was only 14.10 Even the much-ballyhooed mini-strike wave of 2018 appears to be largely an illusion built on a combination of wishful thinking and a convenient misconstruction of a string of well-reported, and sometimes impressive, strikes, as a trend.11 In any event, militancy of the sort that was commonplace when Steinbeck wrote his book, along with the open strife and bloodshed that made the novel a work of undeniable realism, are nearly unheard of today.

The waning of bloody battles may be a good thing. But there is not much to celebrate about the overall demise of strikes—not if you are a worker or care about the working class. For strikes are the most important mode of working class protest, the best way, it seems, for workers to directly challenge capitalist hegemony by their own hand, to alter the terms of exploitation if not to build a new world. As they have declined, so has the strength of the labor movement and, with this, the ability of workers to contest the power that employers wield over their work lives and economic fortunes. And so it is that with the demise of strikes, union representation has plummeted, wages have stagnated, economic inequality skyrocketed, and the everyday caprices and tyrannies of capitalist management have been entwined in the web of demeaning indignities, patronizing indulgences, and suffocating bureaucratic rules that define the contemporary workplace.

Nevertheless, in most quarters the decline in strikes has been taken in stride, if noticed at all. For most people, strikes are hardly more than historical relics or quaint curiosities that seldom affect their daily lives or command much of their attention. Ironically, this is probably one reason the very modest labor conflict of the last year has been so overcharacterized. Once a preoccupation of newspaper editorialists, lawyers, and other commentators, a concern of government, and the subject of numerous hearings and reports, abundant litigation, and seemingly endless attempts at legislation, strikes are now rarely of any interest in any of these quarters. Where judges, politicians, and editorialists once worried greatly over how to deal with strikes of the kind that Steinbeck fictionalized, how to protect the economy (not to mention the interests of individual capitalists) from the disruptive effects of labor unrest, and sometimes how to preserve the ability of workers to strike in meaningful ways, their successors stand mute in the context of the near extinction of this form of protest. It has been two decades since Congress, which once grappled with these issues on a regular basis, has seriously confronted the question of strikes.12 Its last engagement with the right to strike attempts, in the early 1990s, to enact modest changes in the law relative to employers’ use of replacement workers during strikes. And even this effort, which collapsed in the mid 1990s, hardly seemed possessed of the kind of urgency that characterized earlier forays on these issues.13

Among the few Americans who well remember what strikes are and why they are important are labor scholars. For them, at least, strikes remain a preoccupation. Prominent students of labor like James Atleson, Julius Getman, Karl Klare, and James Pope—to name the most notable of this group—have expended much effort over the past few decades identifying and critiquing legal doctrines which have undermined the right to strike. Important to them in this regard are doctrines that give employers the prerogative to easily replace striking workers; that allow employers to enjoin and even fire strikers on the ground that they have engaged in coercive “misconduct,” or because they have protested the wrong issue or in the wrong way; that prohibit sympathy strikes and general strikes, and spontaneous “wildcat” strikes; and that funnel labor disputes off of picket lines and into legal proceedings and arbitrations.14

These doctrines have eviscerated a once-vital right to strike, these scholars tell us, subverting a prerogative that earlier in the century was central to improving conditions for workers and lending legitimacy to the very idea that workers have rights to claim in the first place. Indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, a massive and sustained campaign of strikes proved crucial to the formation of the modern labor movement, the political and legal validation of the Wagner Act, and ultimately the survival of the New Deal itself. This was true even as the Wagner Act itself seemed to play a crucial role in conveying to workers, for the first time, an effective right to strike. But the problem as far as the right to strike goes, we are told, is that the statute was later weakened and corrupted by the connivances of judges and Congress, urged on by a business community relentless in its contempt for organized labor, and abetted at times by inept or corrupt union leaders and a weak and politically diffident National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, the entity with primary authority for enforcing the labor law). And so the Wagner Act is said to have had a great potential, only to have been tragically “deradicalized,” as Klare puts it; and workers are said to have “lost” the right to strike, in Pope’s words, with devastating consequences for workers today and ominous portents for generations ahead.15 Critically, these authors argue, an effective right to strike must be restored at the expense of these unjustified impositions.16 Only then will the labor law regain its relevance and the labor movement its ability to improve the lives of workers.

Early on, this attempt to defend an effective right to strike was the object of mean-spirited criticism by more conventional scholars who, in the guise of unmasking its interpretative shortcomings, rejected its radicalism and recoiled at its underlying supposition that law is not only malleable and untethered to its formal, elite iterations, but within the province of workers to reshape around their own interests and visions.17 Despite these efforts, which focused on the work of Klare and Katherine Stone, whose critique of post-war “industrial pluralism” shared a similar reasoning—or maybe, to some extent, anyway, because of them—support for this campaign to restore the right to strike seems like a mandate among scholars and commentators who purport to take seriously the interests of workers.18 And yet for all its appeal, this project nevertheless suffers from a remarkably negligent oversight, one that has nothing to do with morality of its pretense that the law is malleable and that workers can remake it—a proposition that is broadly true and eminently defensible. Instead, it has to do with its practical feasibility. In fact, as this Article argues, a critical reflection on this question suggests that the effort to realize an effective right to strike is actually quite impossible and that attempts to do so, however earnest and thoughtful they may be, represent as dubious a battle as the hopeless walkout dramatized in Steinbeck’s book.

This doleful conclusion rests on a frank understanding of the legal and political realities in which strikes necessarily play out. There are many kinds of strikes, but those that are apt to be successful in challenging employers’ power and interests entail a level of militancy that sets them against well-entrenched notion of property and public order. This was true in the 1930s and 1940s when these values contradicted, at once, strike militancy and whatever radical potential the Wagner Act may have had. Ironically, it is perhaps even truer today, now that workers do in fact enjoy the right to strike, albeit only in more conventional ways. Seen in this light, those doctrines that have undermined the right to strike are not aberrations or jurisprudential failings—not mistakes in any sense, in fact, nor a retreat from some earlier, truer iteration of the labor law. Rather, they represent a settling of the labor law on bedrock precepts of the American life. However illegitimate those precepts may be from a vantage that questions capitalism’s essential legitimacy and takes the rights of workers seriously, they reign supreme, foreclosing an effective right to strike.

All of this, as I argue in this Article, is made plainly evident by a critical review of the history of strikes and striking. To anticipate a bit more of the argument that follows, the strikes most crucial to the building of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s were not built only around peaceful picketing and a withholding of labor. Rather, they were sit-down strikes and strikes built on mass picketing, as well as, to some extent, secondary boycotts. And strikes of this kind were never considered lawful or politically appropriate. Ironically, it was these strikes that legitimated the Wagner Act itself and the New Deal. But they could not legitimate themselves.

Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its potential. To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this way that the history of strikes shows less in the way of de-radicalization than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor protest and labor rights can be in liberal society.

As this all played out, it left in its wake a right to strike, but one whose power consists almost entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are not effective weapons in their own right. Nor are they generally advanced when strikes are broken. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, striking in such a conventional way accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it is simply not coercive enough to be effective. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers.

From this perspective, the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no less, steeped in a misplaced and exaggerated faith in the law and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The campaign to resurrect such a right appears, too, not only as a dead-end and a distraction, but an undertaking that risks blinding those who support viable unionism and the interests of the working class to the more important and fundamental fact that liberalism and the legal system are, in the end, antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights. It is for this reason that the call for an effective right to strike should be set aside in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold.

The argument that follows further elaborates these main contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an opposition to coercion and disorder that, even if sometimes invoked disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic. The final part is a brief conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument.

#### There is no strike wave, just media smoke tricks. Empirics on current strike trends and outcomes of “Right to Strike” legislation go heavily NEG – you cannot legalize revolution and all legislation is merely a ruse to constrain the workers’ movement through the guise of “legal management”

White 18 (Ahmed White – Nicholaus Rosenbaum Professor of Law @ University of Colorado Law School, “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike”, https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles , 2018, pgs. 1124-1131, EmmieeM)

In fact, at this crucial moment it was common for elites of all stripes to claim that they supported the right to strike and yet to assert that it was being abused by unionists who insisted on winning every labor dispute and using coercive and disorderly methods to do so. In 1946, Hebert Hoover, who might well have denied just such a thing fifteen years earlier, inveighed that “Nobody denies that there is a ‘right’ to strike”; but that right, he said, had been abused to the detriment of the public interest.295 Although considerably more liberal than Hoover, Walter Lippmann, the extremely popular political commentator, offered a similar judgement about a railroad strike that same year, concluding “we must henceforth refuse to regard the right to strike as universal and absolute, and as one of the inalienable rights of man.”296 Also writing in 1946, Henry Ford II, whose father had used a small army of thugs and toughs to enforce the open shop at his plants and bitterly fought unionization until 1941, now purported at once to support the right to strike—and to believe that it should be limited.297 “There is no longer any question of the right of organized workers to strike, but that right,” he said, “is being misused.”298

Like Taft-Hartley’s supporters in Congress, figures like Hoover, Lippmann, and Ford did not trouble themselves to confess that such tactics as they so blithely condemned might actually be necessary to counterbalance the power of employers and give life and meaning to a statute that did not take adequate account of this basic reality, let alone that they were essential in establishing the idea that workers enjoyed any enforceable right to strike. But they did not have to, either; for they honestly did not believe that labor should generally prevail. Liberal or conservative, it did not matter; these were capitalists in a capitalist society, contented, consistent with their values, with a right to strike that went little further than a right to withhold one’s labor.

To be sure, these were not the views of ordinary people. But the public’s perspective did not seem to vary all that much from those of elites. Although overall approval of union membership as measured in Gallup surveys slipped noticeably after 1937, it remained quite high— well above fifty percent right through the 1940s.299 Nevertheless, Gallup surveys taken in June 1937, after the big wave of sit-strikes had waned noticeably, but while mass picketing and overall levels of labor militancy remained high, revealed that fifty-seven percent supported the proposition that the militia should “be called out whenever strike trouble threatens.”300

As with the sit-down strikes, too, the status of mass picketing and other forms of strike militancy can also be gauged by the way these tactics were defended. During the hearings on Taft-Hartley, only a few labor leaders stood against the torrent of criticism of these practices by businessmen, conservative unionists, and congressmen and senators, and tried to parry the move to prohibit the strikes. With only a couple of exceptions, most of them consistently qualified their defense of these tactics by downplaying their coercive qualities—again the very thing that made them so effective in the first place—while also describing them as expedients, presumably temporary, that were justified by the unreasonable stances of some employers.301

While the political motivations and implications of this campaign against these forms of strike militancy might be as dubious as the attacks on the sit-down strikes, their value in expressing dominant political judgments concerning these tactics is not. Repeatedly, it was taken for granted that workers could not be allowed to excessively coerce their fellow workers, that they should be obliged to adhere to their contractual obligations, that they did not own the streets or the workplace, and that whatever the right to strike was, it was surely, as Brandeis had insisted, not an absolute right. Of course, all of this was controversial for many unionists. But unionists were almost the only ones to really push back against these measures. Even President Harry Truman’s dramatic veto of Taft-Hartley is widely regarded as a political move taken with the expectation that Congress would override the veto anyway.302 It is also notable that despite dedicating itself to this aim, the labor movement has never come close to repealing the Taft Hartley Act, or even securing the enactment of favorable amendments to any of its provisions.

And then there is the replacement worker doctrine where, if anything, the change in the law even more clearly reflected the depth and power of liberal norms. For the rule established in Mackay Radio came out of the blue. It was set forth in a case which required no such question to be resolved, in a manner that drew no support from the text of the Wagner Act, and on the basis of legislative history that was ambiguous at best. Worse, as Getman points out, the rule is in direct conflict with the very statutory principle of barring discrimination on the basis of a worker’s assertion of the basic labor rights laid out in § 7 that it was, itself, supposedly derived from.303

As an exercise in statutory construction and administration, Mackay Radio makes no sense; but as a defense of property rights it makes all the sense in the world. One way to see this is to consider what would have happened had the Court decided the matter in a fundamentally different way. If employers were barred from replacing economic strikers, it seems likely that strikes would have proliferated to an extraordinary extent, as workers could at least plausibly have expected to be able to strike under a broad array of circumstances and yet be restored to their jobs no matter the outcome. But precisely because such a doctrine would have given workers so much power, Congress would almost certainly have stepped in with its own rule, codifying employers’ right to permanently replace striking workers and bringing this to an end. Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a much more liberal alternative to the Mackay Radio rule surviving for very long—a point that also draws support from labor’s failure to repeal the rule in Congress in the early 1990s.304

A simple exercise in counterfactual speculation bears similar fruit in regard to other, more basic, limitations on the right to strike, including those imposed relative to sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and secondary boycotts. Shrill and self-interested though it was, all the testimony from employers and their allies during the hearings on TaftHartley or Landrum-Griffin about the perils posed by these tactics, was fundamentally correct. For were workers able to make unfettered use of sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and general strikes and sympathy walkouts, they could have very much challenged the sovereignty of capitalists in and about the workplace, and with this the bedrock institutions and norms of liberal society. As Jim Pope puts it, Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion in Fansteel established the maxim that “the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights.”305 This is unquestionably true. But equally unquestionable is that neither this court nor any other important arbiter of legal rights in this country was ever prepared to endorse the contrary view that property rights might be sufficiently subordinate to labor rights as to justify the kinds of tactics by which workers could routinely defeat powerful employers on the fields of industrial conflict

Significantly, there is no reason to believe that any of this has changed or is poised to change today. Quite the contrary: In a culture and political system more immersed than ever in the veneration of order and control, mediated by criminal law and police work, by the celebration of property rights, and by a readiness to punish violence, it is all but unthinkable that the courts or the NLRB would deign to give legal sanction to workers to engage in any sustained way in the kinds of tactics that might make going on strike a worthwhile thing to do.

CONCLUSION

One of the outstanding ironies in a story rich with many is that the very things which made the prospect of an effective right to strike seem for a time so viable—the unlawful, illiberal, and altogether intolerable coerciveness of sit-down strike and mass picketing, especially—are also what made this concept impossible to ever realize. As we have seen, effective strikes could build the labor movement, validate the Wagner Act, secure the New Deal, and in many ways change America. But they could not make themselves legitimate.

So it is that workers have found themselves with a right to strike that equals little more than a right to quit work—and maybe lose their jobs or their houses and savings in the balance. They have a right to strike, as Steinbeck’s character, Mac, complained, but they “can’t picket”—at least, not in a way that is really apt to change anything. And so they do not strike—in fact, under these circumstances they usually should not strike.

The proof of this is readily evident, not only in the dramatic decrease in strikes since the 1970s, but in the sad regularity with which even the most vibrant strikes have ended in defeat for workers. Phelps Dodge (1983), Greyhound (1983 and 1990), Hormel (1985-1986), Caterpillar (1992, 1993, and 1994-1995), Detroit Daily News/Daily Free Press (1995-1997)—these are but the most notable of a litany of vibrant strikes since the 1970s that ended in failure.306 They are, in fact, the definitive labor struggles of this period, overshadowing a much smaller number of comparable disputes, like the strikes at United Parcel Service in 1997 and Verizon in 2016 that—often shaped by uniquely favorable labor dynamics—ended in something resembling victory for the union.307 Each of these big and unsuccessful strikes was motived by very modest, in fact anti-concessionary, goals and well-supported by workers and the larger public alike. And each featured mass picketing and other attempts at militancy. But these tactics were met with injunctions, civil suits, mass arrests, and criminal prosecutions, which ended the protests and left the employers free to exert their vast advantages in material wealth and political power, end the disputes on their terms, and leave thousands of strikers unemployed.308

It is true that the last year or so has witnessed what many people have declared to be a miniature strike wave, that has been widely celebrated by unionists and their allies as a welcome departure from past trends and portent, many hope, of a sustained resurgence of labor activism.309 Headlined by statewide teachers strikes in West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Arizona, all in the first part of 2018, the strikes commanded a great deal of media coverage, at least compared to what labor disputes usually receive nowadays.310 However, closer inspection suggests that this wave is mainly an artifact of wishful thinking exacerbated by the novelty for many people nowadays of seeing these strikes reported in the media. For in fact, the number of strikes over the last couple of years has remained close to the level that has prevailed for several decades now.311

Perhaps more significant in putting these strikes in proper context is a reflection on their character. None have been organizing strikes. All of these strikes have been over contracts and working conditions, with many driven by workers’ opposition to concessions and ended with less than spectacular gains by the strikers.312 Moreover, the strikes which comprise this supposed wave have been disproportionately mounted by government workers—teachers, mainly—who are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. For this reason, several of the strikes have been unlawful, as state law typically denies such workers the right to strike anyway. But at the same time—and this may be the most crucial point—none of these strikes has unfolded in an especially militant way, at least by historical standards. There have been no big sit-down strikes, no threatening episodes of mass picketing, no routing of “scabs,” no destruction of property. Which is all to say that the kinds of strikes that built the labor movement eighty or more years ago remain thoroughly in check.

There is little hope within the prevailing political and juridical order that things could ever be any different. Perhaps the right to strike could be made effective if it were fundamentally reconfigured in illiberal, corporatist terms. The right could conceivably be reconfigured such that the government might intervene more aggressively and make the workers protests effective—for example, stepping in to decide by adjudication, mediation, or arbitration which side should win a strike. Elements of this approach, which was vigorously opposed by IWW and AFL unionists alike in the early twentieth century, can be found internationally, in industry-specific statutes like the Railway Labor Act, and in labor statutes that apply to government workers, although most often when the law goes down this path it all but dispenses with the right to strike anyway, treating it as a redundancy, a tool without a purpose. As Senator Wagner himself perceived, alignment between the excessive reliance on the authority of the state to manage labor relations and the denigration of the right to strike was both dysfunctional and dangerous. As he put it back in the summer of 1937, defending the recently-passed statute that bore his name and the right that he placed at the center of it, [t]he outlawry of the right to strike is a natural concomitant of authoritarian governments. It occurs only when a government is willing to assume definitive responsibility for prescribing every element in the industrial relationship—the length of the day, the size of the wage, the terms and conditions of work.313

Clearly no such regime will be instituted in any event, not least because, as interest in such schemes in the twentieth century makes clear, support for this kind of corporatist intervention in labor disputes has itself been an elite reaction against strike militancy that currently does not exist. Where does this leave workers and unions, possessed of a right they cannot afford to surrender but cannot rely on as a means of advancing their interests and standing in society? Are they bound like Steinbeck’s strikers to meet defeat, albeit in a more peaceful way? Maybe. In one of his many commentaries on the sit-down strikes as they raged across the country in the spring of 1937, Walter Lippmann took time to analyze one of the speeches in which James Landis had argued that the tactic might well become a new right, in the same way that the right to strike in general had been created through its persistent assertion in the face of opposition and incredulity. No revolutionary, Lippmann nonetheless understood what Landis apparently did not: that the right Landis spoke of was revolutionary in its conception, and therefore not just an impracticality but a contradiction. “Never in the history of the law has rebellion been made lawful. Only the rights demanded by the rebels have been legalized,” said Lippman.314

As the labor scholars who call for the restoration of an effective right to strike have all understood, the tactics that made such strikes possible were tolerated only so long as there was not a functional system of labor rights in place, one that could stand alone in courts and hearing rooms. Once this was the case—once the rebel unionists’ aims, or at least those imputed to them, were realized—the sit-down strikes were predictably banned, and then so were mass picketing, secondary boycotts, and so forth. Thus it is that in cases like Fansteel and the debates on Taft-Hartley, sit-down strikers, mass picketers, and the like were presented as enemies of the labor law. Even more recent attacks on the right to strike, such as complaints in the 1980s about union violence going uncensored and the modest moves by the NLRB to rein in this, too, have been inevitably justified not in terms of overthrowing the system of labor rights but managing it, reconciling its virtues with the normative and juridical mandates of liberal society. And so it is that the right to strike—the right to an effective strike—has been sacrificed not in the name of capitalist hegemony but on liberalism’s altar of labor peace. Unfortunately, so far as the interests of workers go, these are the same thing.

## AT Underview

purdy —> [1] prefer specificity. we have specific reasons that are backed by empirics and historical analysis. white traces a century worth of striking and strike legislation and has found that this directly breeds passivity and decreases union power, leads to ineffective strikes and shifts public opinion against strikes.

[2] the alt is material we just think their material action is a bad one

3] we agree that at one point we will have to grapple with legal institutions but not by pleasing to legalize strikes but instead to get up and say “hey uv been mistreating us and u need to change the law and stop oppressing us”

delgado —> [1] even if reform can make revolution more likely, our k indicates that theyre not reform, theyre just backsliding. they have to win that theyre effective reform. the card is referring to something that actually results in something materially good

[2] cross apply specifity

## Case

#### “Right to strike” is a term of art that only covers the act of legalizing the ability to withhold your labor – unconditional right to strike means that prisoners cannot be punished for not working, but it doesn’t make it legal for them to commit other crimes as part of their strike efforts – prefer official definitions over their vague no link hand waving in the 1AR

ILO 98 (pg. 12, “ILO PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE” http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed\_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms\_087987.pdf, EmmieeM)

Definition of the right to strike and various types of strike action

The principles of the ILO’s supervisory bodies contain no definition of strike action which would permit definitive conclusions to be drawn regarding the legitimacy of the different ways in which the right to strike may be exercised. However, some types of strike action (including occupation of the workplace, go-slow or work-to rule strikes), which are not merely typical work stoppages, have been accepted by the Committee on Freedom of Association, provided that they are conducted in a peaceful manner (ibid., para. 496). The Committee of Experts has stated that:

When the right to strike is guaranteed by national legislation, a question that frequently arises is whether the action undertaken by workers constitutes a strike under the law. Any work stoppage, however brief and limited, may generally be considered as a strike. This is more difficult to determine when there is no work stoppage as such but a slowdown in work (go-slow strike) or when work rules are applied to the letter (work-to-rule); these forms of strike action are often just as paralysing as a total stoppage. Noting that national law and practice vary widely in this respect, the Committee is of the opinion that restrictions as to the forms of strike action can only be justified if the action ceases to be peaceful.

#### Not enough prisoners will join – many like their jobs – and prison system cannot financially afford to better conditions so strikes go nowhere

Schwartzapfel 14 (Beth Schwartzapfel – Journalist writing for The Prospect, “The Great American Chain Gang: Why can't we embrace the idea that prisoners have labor rights?”, https://prospect.org/justice/great-american-chain-gang/, 28 May 2014, EmmieeM)

Despite the conditions and the pay, most inmates want to work. A job gives them a safe place to be for hours each day, provides a break from the monotony of prison life, and-in most states-puts a few dollars and cents in their commissary account. "I was happy to work," Hazen says. "It made me feel like I wasn't so much in prison. It gave me a minute by myself to get away from the craziness, time to think and reflect and figure out what I wanted to do with my life." What the job didn't provide was a wage sufficient to support her son and accumulate some savings for post-prison life, or job training that would help her pursue the goals she established in that dish room: to study psychology and one day open a domestic-violence shelter. After six months of work, Hazen left prison the way most people do: with a criminal record, no meaningful job experience beyond what she went in with, and not even enough savings to buy a suit for a job interview ($43).

Study after study has found what common sense would suggest: Prisoners who gain professional skills while locked up, and those who earn a decent wage for their work, are far less likely to end up back behind bars. But if prisons in America, with the world's highest incarceration rate, had to pay minimum wage-let alone the prevailing wage-they couldn't keep operating. If inmates like Hazen weren't washing dishes in Massachusetts prisons, the state's corrections department would spend an average of $9.22 to hire someone else to do it (the mean hourly wage for a dishwasher, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics). That's 30 to 45 times what inmates make for performing the same service. As a result, prisons-and taxpayers-use prisoners to save hundreds of millions of dollars each year on labor costs, according to the GAO.

"If our criminal-justice system had to pay a fair wage for labor that inmates provide, it would collapse," says Alex Friedmann, managing editor of Prison Legal News, an independent magazine that promotes inmates' rights. "We could not afford to run our justice system without exploiting inmates."

#### Worker strikes empirically fail in prisons and there’s a laundry list of tactics non-employers use within the system to prevent effectiveness without technically violating the right to strike – prisons don’t even have strike task forces because they don’t criminalize the actual striking

Washington 18 (Robin Washington – former interim commentary editor for The Marshall Project interviewing a prison warden, The Marshall Project, “A Former Warden’s View on Prison Strikes”, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/22/a-former-warden-s-view-on-prison-strikes, 22 August 2018, EmmieeM)

This week, a prison strike has been called for inmates at 17 facilities nationwide in response to an April riot at South Carolina’s Lee Correctional Institution, where seven inmates were killed while prison staff failed to immediately respond.

Among 10 demands stated by the [Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee](https://incarceratedworkers.org/campaigns/prison-strike-2018), one of several groups endorsing the strike, are improvements in prison conditions, prevailing wages for incarcerated workers, voting rights for all confined citizens and an end to the racial overcharging, over-sentencing and parole denials to people of color. The strike is planned to continue until Sept. 9, the 47th anniversary of [the Attica prison uprising](https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/292-attica-correctional-facility).

For a view into the nature of prison strikes and how authorities respond to them, The Marshall Project spoke with Cameron Lindsay, a retired warden of three federal facilities: the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California, the U.S. Penitentiary in Canaan, Pennsylvania, and the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, N.Y. Lindsay also ran privatized institutions in Philipsburg and Glen Mills, Pennsylvania, and has taught at several colleges. He now serves as a consultant and an expert witness in corrections cases. He spoke with Interim Commentary Editor Robin Washington. The views expressed are his own, and this interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Q: Have you experienced any strikes, hunger strikes, work strikes or other organized prisoner actions?

A: I’ve seen pretty much all of that over the course of 29 years. The most widespread strike that I ever saw that comes close to what I’m hearing about this week was in federal prisons in October of 1995. It was mostly African American inmates. They were protesting the vast disparity of sentencing laws between powder cocaine and crack cocaine.

It was the first and only time in history that (the federal prison system) announced a nationwide lockdown. The lockdown of a facility is something to be taken very, very seriously. It’s complicated and fraught with all kinds of problems. It’s not a decision to be made lightly.

I can promise you if these inmates do engage in some kind of systematic strikes that wardens will lock down the facilities.

Q: What have you experienced specifically?

In 1995, I worked at the Federal Correctional Institution, McKean, in Bradford, Pennsylvania. It started as a work strike. The first inmate called to duty is at 4 a.m. What we experienced on Oct. 24, 1995, was the inmate crew refused to go to work. There were some that wanted to but they didn’t because they feared retaliation. I have had others on a less severe scale. We had a very brief food strike at the (U.S. Penitentiary) in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. It was small and isolated.

There are food strikes, work strikes, then all-out disturbances and/or riots, depending on the severity. You might have food service inmates who are upset about wages or the way they are being treated by staff. A work strike is the most common way — inappropriate, I might add — that inmates will demonstrate in an attempt to get the attention of the staff. Typically when it happens, the warden will lock down the facility until they have a chance to gauge what really is going on. They’ll gather intelligence, talk to informants, listen to telephone calls, until they can figure out what is going on out there. They may even reach out to certain inmate leaders. Usually, the next thing they do is remove the quote-unquote “agitators” from the general population and put them in isolation. Then they interview every single inmate so that nobody feels singled out.

Q: Does a strike ever work? From the inmate point of view?

In the short term, no. They don’t work because the ringleaders tend to get locked up, and after they are isolated they’re transferred to other facilities.

In the long term, they may be able to effect some change because they do get some media and political attention. In 1987 in Oakdale, Louisiana, and Atlanta, there were simultaneous riots. There was a specific cadre of Cuban inmates from the Mariel boatlift. Our government decided to repatriate them to Cuba. They did not want to go, so they raised hell in their facility. In the long term, their actions did lead to some changes.

Q: The cocaine sentencing disparities protested in the 1995 strike also were eventually changed.

There you go.

Q: Do prisons have a strike task force of some kind, with COs appointed to investigate?

That’s a tough answer. People talk about the “criminal justice system,” but it’s not one system, it’s a whole bunch of systems. There are local corrections, state corrections and federal corrections. There’s very rarely a coordinated effort on a widespread basis for a type of strike.

In the federal Bureau of Prisons, they are really good about gathering and cultivating intelligence. The staffers should be able to predict when one of these happens. Conversely, if you have a correctional facility that is not well operated and they don’t know that something is going to go down, when it does, they’re not going to know how to react.

#### 2018 strike wave was largest ever in prison history – proves right to strike exists and strikes don’t solve

Lopez 18 (German Lopez – writing for Vox and has written for numerous other publications, “America’s Prisoners Are Going On Strike In At Least 17 States”, https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/17664048/national-prison-strike-2018, 22 August 2018, EmmieeM)

America’s prisoners are going on strike.

The demonstrations are planned to take place from August 21 to September 9, which marks the anniversary of the bloody uprising at the Attica Correctional Facility in New York. During this time, inmates across the US plan to refuse to work and, in some cases, refuse to eat to draw attention to poor prison conditions and what many view as exploitative labor practices in American correctional facilities.

“Prisoners want to be valued as contributors to our society,” Amani Sawari, a spokesperson for the protests, told me. “Every single field and industry is affected on some level by prisons, from our license plates to the fast food that we eat to the stores that we shop at. So we really need to recognize how we are supporting the prison industrial complex through the dollars that we spend.”

Prison labor issues recently received attention in California, where inmates have been voluntarily recruited to fight the state’s record wildfires — for the paltry pay of just $1 an hour plus $2 per day. But the practice of using prison inmates for cheap or free labor is fairly widespread in the US, due to an exemption in the 13th Amendment, which abolished chattel slavery but allows involuntary servitude as part of a punishment for a crime.

For Sawari and the inmates participating in the protests, the sometimes forced labor and poor pay is effectively “modern slavery.” That, along with poor prison conditions that inmates blame for a deadly South Carolina prison riot earlier this year, have led to protests.

For prisons, though, fixing the problems raised by the demonstrations will require money — something that cash-strapped state governments may not be willing to put up. That raises real questions about whether the inmates’ demands can or will be heard.

The demonstrations come two years after what was then the largest prison strike in US history, with protests breaking out in at least 12 states in 2016. The new demonstrations could end up even larger than those previous protests.

Protests are planned in at least 17 states

There’s no hard estimate for how many inmates and prisons are taking part in the protests, as organizers continue to recruit more and more inmates and word of mouth spreads. But demonstrations are expected across at least 17 states.

The inmates will take part in work strikes, hunger strikes, and sit-ins. They are also calling for boycotts against agencies and companies that benefit from prisons and prison labor.

#### Prisons circumvent by instead punishing prisoners for rioting, causing property damage, or inciting violence – also issue false reports to prevent enforcement of right to strike laws. Laundry list of solvency take-outs - lock-downs, cut communication lines, transferring of prisoners, bribing, labelling organizers as gang leaders to put them into solitary confinement, etc break up strikes without criminalizing the act of striking itself

Nam-Sonenstein 18 (Brian Sam-Sonenstein – Publishing Editor at ShadowProof and columnist at Prison Protest, “Florida Officials Deny Operation Proof is Ongoing, Even as They Retaliate Against Protestors”, https://shadowproof.com/2018/01/25/operation-push-update/, 25 January 2018, EmmieeM)

Kevin “Rashid” Johnson, an activist and intellectual incarcerated at Florida State Prison, was charged with “inciting or attempting to incite a riot” five days before a nonviolent prison labor strike and boycott known as Operation PUSH.

A disciplinary report filed on January 10 states Warden Barry Reddish sent an article Johnson wrote about Operation PUSH and a “series of other articles” on the action to an administrative lieutenant. The article made “numerous allegations of mistreatment of inmates at Florida state prison and proclaims Florida to be the worst prison system of the four various states [where] he’s been incarcerated.”

It does not specify which passages specifically incited a riot and at no point does Johnson’s article include a call to action.

In an “emergency note” Johnson sent to his lawyers on January 19, he alleged Florida Department of Correction (FDC) officials tortured him.

“Am being literally tortured in retaliation for article on prison strike and conditions \*by the warden\*,” Johnson wrote. “No heat. Cell like \*outside\*, temp in 30s. Toilet doesn’t work. Window to outside doesn’t close and cold air blowing in cell.”

“Its daytime and so cold can barely write,” he wrote.

His supporters fear for his life and are asking members of the public to call Florida State Prison and demand they move him to a safer cell immediately.

“Nowhere is anyone told to do anything,” Johnson wrote in response to the riot charge. “It is only a piece of journalism, which is constitutionally protected exercise of speech and press. Also FDC prisoners have no internet access, so how is something published online inciting prisoners?”

Johnson’s article runs through the demands and motivations behind Operation PUSH. He describes slave labor conditions, violence and abuse, and a lack of medical care in the Florida system, connecting these conditions to the establishment of the state’s first penitentiary just three years after slavery was abolished for all with the ratification of the 13th Amendment (excluding those convicted of felonies).

He uses his own experiences over the last six months in the Florida prison system as context for Operation PUSH and compares it to three other states where he has been incarcerated.

“I can personally attest that conditions here are among the worst I’ve seen,” Johnson writes.

The department has a record of corruption and deception, Johnson notes, pointing to the 2012 murder of Darren Rainey by corrections officers.

Rainey was a mentally ill prisoner who burned to death because officers locked him in a shower rigged to reach 160 degrees Fahrenheit—40 degrees above the state limit—and then covered it up. His death led to further revelations about death, corruption, and abuse across the Florida prison system.

Data released this year shows the number of prisoner deaths in Florida rose 20 percent to 428 deaths in 2017, even as the number of prisoners declined. By comparison, more incarcerated people died in Florida prisons last year than have been executed in all of the United States since 2007.

Johnson called the riot charge “retaliation, plain and simple, for publicizing abusive conditions.”

On January 15, when Operation PUSH was to begin (and also the day after Johnson’s disciplinary report), FDC canceled visitation at three facilities : Blackwater Correctional Institution, Everglades Correctional Institution and the Reception and Medical Center (RMC).

When the day arrived, RMC went on lockdown and sources indicate staffing levels were tripled at that facility. Around 50 protesters gathered outside to show solidarity with striking prisoners. Similar demonstrations took place around the state and in other parts of the country. News of Operation PUSH and its demands spread across U.S. and international media, including several mainstream outlets, like Newsweek and the Guardian.

The following day, as abolitionist scholar and activist Angela Davis announced her support of Operation PUSH at a speech in Florida, outside organizers for the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC) reported they lost communication with their sources on the inside. (IWOC is a chapter organization under the Industrial Workers of the World that seeks to unionize incarcerated people and serves as a liaison for their political organizing.)

“The only logical answer is repression tactics,” IWOC organizers declared. Lockdowns and shakedowns had likely interrupted lines of communication. At least two organizers were thrown in solitary confinement “without reason,” and dozens more were isolated in the days before the strike began.

Meanwhile, a large protest assembled outside FDC headquarters in Tallahassee. Protesters took over the lobby for several hours, demanding a meeting with department head Julie Jones to present the demands and call for an end to the retaliation.

Around 3:00 PM, police officers attempted to break up the protest. One activist with the anti-racist organization The Dream Defenders was arrested and charged with property damage/criminal mischief of $1000 or more, resisting an officer, and trespassing. She was bonded out of jail later that night. Several others were injured in the scuffle as police tried to eject protesters from the building.

FDC made some of its first statements about Operation PUSH the next day, acknowledging the arrest and alleging “protesters became increasingly disruptive and breached the doors into a secure area of the building.”

“In attempt to enter the secure area, protesters battered FDC staff,” they claimed. FDC also said there was “no interruption to daily operations” and denied any prisoner resistance took place.

Meanwhile, Supporting Prisoners And Real Change (SPARC), which is a platform for Florida prisoners and families in Florida, reported “key organizers” were placed in solitary confinement and faced investigation for “no reason given.”

IWOC reported the Avon Park facility deactivated prison phones on the second day of the protest, “denying these political prisoners their right to inform their loved ones that they are safe.” They said “dozens” of suspected organizers were now in isolation.

Solidarity actions continued around the country. On January 19, members of Workers World held a teach-in on prison abolition and documentary film screening in Georgia. There were banner drops in Omaha, Nebraska, earlier that morning.

SPARC released a list of over 150 organizations, who expressed solidarity with Operation PUSH on January 20.

On January 22, outside activists flooded FDC phone lines with a call-in action demanding the department recognize prisoner demands. In response, the department released another statement denying any protest was happening and said normal operations continued in all prisons across the state.

“Despite recent reports, prisons and institutions across the state have had no interruption to daily operations. There were no inmate work stoppages or strikes,” the statement read.

Publicly, FDC insists there is no Operation PUSH inside its facilities. Yet incarcerated people have reported “active participation or repression of some sort” in at least sixteen state prisons.

SPARC argues this is part of FDC’s strategy of severing communication to “create the perception of inactivity and break the spirits of those participating in the strike.” Incarcerated organizers have expressed the importance of solidarity and communication with those on the outside, both for morale and for protection, for many years.

FDC threatened organizers with “harsher retaliation” if they corresponded or in some cases merely received literature from advocacy groups like IWOC and Fight Toxic Prisons.

Lockdowns, disconnected phone lines, and mass searches interrupted lines of communication, and incarcerated people suspected of organizing resistance were split up and transferred to other facilities.

Multiple incarcerated people reported being given a choice: work with the FDC against Operation PUSH and receive a transfer to a so-called “sweeter” work camp. Otherwise, face solitary confinement for corresponding with organizers on the outside.

Prison officials used gang designations to stifle the nonviolent protest, labeling suspected organizers as members of a Security Threat Group (STG). This classification level subjects prisoners to further isolation, surveillance, harassment, and loss of rights and privileges.

In an interview with the website It’s Going Down, IWOC organizer Karen Smith said suspects were investigated and charged for using contraband phones. Investigators in some cases went so far as to decide certain social media posts were tied to particular individuals even if they didn’t have a phone.

Smith called the repression “harsh and complete.” The FDC is watching social media pages and keeping close tabs on people who receive literature from outside groups, she said.

FDC’s reaction to Operation PUSH is somewhat of a departure from how the state handled prisoner resistance in recent years.

When protesters changed their tactics for Operation PUSH to focus on a nonviolent economic protest, the FDC changed theirs, too, engaging in what SPARC called “low-intensity, psychological warfare rather than blunt force.” Given the authoritarian nature of prison systems, which are afforded total obscurity and practically unlimited control over prisoner movement and communication, the FDC is well positioned to adapt its forms of repression.

“It should come as no surprise that the [FDC] can’t be trusted to report strikes occurring in Florida state prisons, just as they have been lying, or to borrow from a PUSH prisoner, ‘using wordplay,’ around the rip-off of their canteen prices,” SPARC wrote. “They have been working for weeks to eliminate the chance of the strike’s success. Claiming that it never existed is another tactic for trying to stop it. Never trust the oppressors to adequately report the facts.”

SPARC found that building outside support in advance, which prisoners felt was necessary to boost morale and participation in Operation PUSH, “provided ample notification and time for the [FDC] to bribe, threaten, and gather scab labor.”

## [2] CP

#### CP Text: The National Labor Relations Board should, after soliciting notice and comment, should recognize by rule an unconditional right to strike for incarcerated workers in the United States.

#### Solves and competes - Notice and comment rulemaking solves the case and spills over to set a precedent that the courts will uphold

Zeisler 14 [Royce Zeisler, J.D. Candidate 2014, Columbia Law School; B.S., B.A. 2012, University of British Columbia, "CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND THE FTC: HOW AND WHY THE FTC SHOULD USE CHEVRON TO IMPROVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT", Columbia Business Law Review, 2014, HeinOnline]

An instructive use of this style of regulation occurred in 1991 with the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") promulgation of 29 C.F.R. § 103.30. There, the NLRB promulgated its first rule seeking to cease the costly, frequent, and ineffective litigation aimed at determining collective bargaining units in hospitals.1 3 1 Specifically, the regulation created the legal presumption that, absent "extraordinary circumstances," there were only eight possible collective bargaining units in acute care hospitals. 132 In limiting the presumed form of bargaining units, the NLRB specifically intended to overrule conflicting precedent and create a legal presumption for courts to employ. After promulgation, this rule was challenged and a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the regulation partly based on Chevron deference. 33 Notably, this regulation did not turn litigation into a simple application of predetermined values (as the rules in Vermont Yankee did). 3'4 It simply set the presumption for generalist courts to deploy in deciding the existence of bargaining units.

#### Key to democracy and court acquiescence---notice and comment engages participants and creates deference.

Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller 13. Harry First, New York University School of Law. Spencer Weber Waller, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. “Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit”. Fordham Law Review, Volume 81 Issue 5 Article 13. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4890&context=flr

Redressing antitrust’s democracy deficit on the procedural side can be done with the tools of administrative law. Administrative law is the body of law that controls the procedures of governmental decision making.151 It allows interested persons to participate in decisions that affect their interests. Normally, it requires appropriate notice, the right to be heard, fair procedures, protection of fundamental rights, and judicial review of the resulting decision. These basic features are present in the administrative laws of most foreign legal systems and are part of a growing international consensus.152 The tradeoff is that the decisions of administrative agencies that properly follow these strictures normally are granted a degree of deference as to the interpretation of the laws they enforce.153 Frequently, but not inevitably, private parties also have the right to proceed with actions for damages against private parties who violate their regulatory obligations and even against the government itself when it acts unlawfully, either substantively or procedurally. These tools of administrative law are available to make antitrust enforcement decisions more transparent and more responsive to the interests that the antitrust laws were meant to serve, thereby promoting both better decision making and greater democratic legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

Free markets and free people cannot be assured by the efforts of technocrats. Ultimately, both come about through the workings of democratic institutions, respectful of the legislature’s goals and constrained from engaging in arbitrary action. Antitrust has moved too far from democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in service to a laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement. We need to move the needle back. Doing so will strengthen the institutions of antitrust, the market economy, and the democratic branches of government themselves.

#### US democratic retreat causes terrorism, great power war, famine, and poverty.

Garry Kasparov 17. Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, founded the Renew Democracy Initiative. “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership”. Feb 16 2017. U.S. Senate. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617\_Kasparov\_%20Testimony.pdf

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you

## [3] Politics

#### Build Back Better passes now

Tasolides et al 11-5 [Justin Tasolides, Breanne Deppisch and Spectrum News Staff] “House passes $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill: 'A monumental step forward as a nation'” Spectrum News, [https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/coastal/news/2021/11/05/biden-social-climate-bill-congress 11-5-21](https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/coastal/news/2021/11/05/biden-social-climate-bill-congress%2011-5-21) RE

Progressives agreed to pass the smaller bill Friday night, while moderates pledged to back the larger $1.85 trillion Build Back Better bill later this month, provided official estimates of the cost via the Congressional Budget Office are in line with expectations.

"We commit to voting for the Build Back Better Act, in its current form other than technical changes, as expeditiously as we receive fiscal information from the Congressional Budget Office – but in no event later than the week of November 15th," the group of five moderates wrote.

Asked Saturday about the future of his Build Back Better legislation, Biden told reporters, "Let me be clear: We will pass this in the House. And we will pass it in the Senate."

Biden declined to say whether moderate Democrats had given him any assurances that they plan to approve the spending package, saying only, "I'm not going to answer that question … but I feel confident we will have enough votes."

The infrastructure bill, which passed the Senate in August with significant bipartisan support, includes $550 billion in new spending, focusing on “hard” infrastructure projects, like roads, bridges, airports, clean water and expanding broadband internet access.

The bipartisan bill will be funded largely by repurposing other money, including unused COVID-19 relief funds, as well as other revenue streams and spending cuts. An analysis from the Congressional Budget Office projected that it could add $256 billion to projected deficits over the next decade.

The House also voted late, along party lines (221-213) on a rule to end debate on the 10 year, allowing for a vote on President Biden's $1.85 trillion Build Back Better act the week of Nov. 15. The bill would boost health and family programs and devote $550 billion to climate initiatives, the largest legislative investment to combat the climate crisis in history.

"I’m also proud that a rule was voted on that will allow for passage of my Build Back Better Act in the House of Representatives the week of November 15th," Biden wrote in his statement.

"The Build Back Better Act will be a once-in-a-generation investment in our people," he continued. "It will lower bills for healthcare, child care, elder care, prescription drugs, and preschool. And middle-class families get a tax cut."

"This bill is also fiscally responsible, fully paid for, and doesn’t raise the deficit. It does so by making sure the wealthiest Americans and biggest corporations begin to pay their fair share and doesn’t raise taxes a single cent on anyone making less than $400,000 per year."

"Generations from now, people will look back and know this is when America won the economic competition for the 21st Century," Biden said.

#### Manchin’s broadly opposed to strike activity – plan causes a fight

Furman & Winant 10/17/21 [Jonah Furman is a labor movement organizer and writer for Labor Notes based in Maryland. Gabriel Winant is an assistant professor of history at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Next Shift: The Fall of Industry and the Rise of Health Care in Rust Belt America.” "The John Deere Strike Shows the Tight Labor Market Is Ready to Pop." https://theintercept.com/2021/10/17/john-deere-strike-labor-market/]

In terms of strike activity, the current private sector wave picks up where the teachers left off, after an interlude of relative inaction during the height of the pandemic. In 2020, moreover, teachers formed the first major group of workers to refuse to accept whatever terms the employer dictated for reopening the workplace. It is difficult to imagine teachers speaking out against returning to work in unsafe conditions as much as they did without the national wave of militant teachers’ strikes in the two preceding years. This resistance has now spread across the economy, in both organized and individual forms.

TODAY, WORKERS’ ECONOMIC resistance — whether through organized strikes or in the refusal of dangerous, underpaid, and unappealing jobs — is shaping the political agenda. Many of the policies in the Democrats’ $3.5 trillion budget proposal would pursue the same ends as workers’ actions but in the realm of social policy. Proposed subsidies for home health care and child care, the child tax credit, Medicaid expansion, and investments in housing and green energy would all indirectly support workers’ power. Either by increasing demand for labor further or by alleviating some of the grotesque social pressures that have forced employees to accept whatever terms employers offered them, the federal government would strengthen workers’ bargaining position. When Sen. Joe Manchin, D-W.Va., warns against becoming an “entitlement society,” what he is opposing is the shift in labor market power that such policy measures help secure.

#### Passage allows an unprecedented investment in combatting climate change

Morton 10/28 [Joseph Morton, "Democrats tout climate spending in reconciliation", 10/28/21, https://www.rollcall.com/2021/10/28/framework-includes-clean-energy-tax-credits-omits-methane-fee/]

“At the same time, substantial investments in electric vehicle charging stations and clean heavy-duty vehicles, like school buses, will serve the dual purpose of slashing our carbon emissions while helping American manufacturing stay globally competitive,” Pallone said. Rep. Cindy Axne, D-Iowa, had pushed for funding to support biofuels infrastructure, complaining it was left out of the bipartisan infrastructure bill even as that measure delivered significant funding for electric vehicles. The latest reconciliation package text includes $1 billion over 10 years in funding for the Agriculture Department to provide grants for expanding biofuel pump infrastructure, upgrade existing infrastructure and increase usage of higher blends of ethanol and biodiesel. “Not only does the Build Back Better Act represent the largest investment in clean energy and combating climate change ever — it also confirms that my colleagues have listened to my central argument in our clean energy discussions: biofuels can and should be a part of our fight against climate change,” Axne said in a statement. The White House framework released earlier in the day envisions that $320 billion would be delivered in the form of clean energy tax credits to accelerate the transition from coal and gas-fired power plants to renewable energy sources such as wind turbines and solar panels. That includes incentives for both utilities and residents and support for additional transmission and storage capacity — areas where bottlenecks have hampered the development of renewable energy sources. The framework includes incentives intended to cut the cost for Americans to put rooftop solar panels on their homes and make it easier to purchase electric vehicles. New EV tax credits would lower the cost of a vehicle by $12,500 for a middle-class family, according to the White House. The framework calls for $105 billion for climate resiliency and addressing legacy pollution in communities. For example, a new Clean Energy and Sustainability Accelerator that would invest in climate-related projects around the country would allocate 40 percent of those benefits to disadvantaged communities — part of a pledge the Biden administration has made to deliver climate spending to communities traditionally on the front lines of environmental damage. It also would fund grants to support environmental justice in disadvantaged communities and create a new Civilian Climate Corps with more than 300,000 members working on conservation projects that could help mitigate climate change. The framework includes $110 billion in spending and incentives to boost domestic supply chains supporting solar power and batteries. It also would fund grants, loans and tax credits aimed at moving steel, cement and aluminum industries toward decarbonization. There’s also $20 billion for the government to purchase new technologies such as long-duration storage, small modular reactors and clean construction materials. While the size of the package falls short of initial proposals, some Capitol Hill Democrats declined to say they were disappointed with the climate portion. Sen. Christopher S. Murphy, D-Conn., said he didn’t want to undersell the framework, as it would represent the most significant spending on climate policy since he joined Congress. The fact that climate makes up about one-third of the overall spending shows how much the issue has been elevated within the Democratic Party, he said, and negotiations over bolstering it aren’t finished. “I think there's a number of things that we can still find consensus on that might not be in this agreement. So climate is something you’ve got to work on every single day,” Murphy said. “If we're not passing climate change legislation every year, then we're not doing our job. So this is just one admittedly very big piece of the overall policy puzzle.”

#### It causes extinction.

Dunlop 17. (Ian Dunlop chaired the Australian Coal Association in 1987-88, chaired the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading from 1998-2000 and was CEO of the Australian Institute of Company Directors from 1997-2001. He has a particular interest in the interaction of corporate governance, corporate responsibility and sustainability. An engineer by qualification, he holds an MA (Mechanical Sciences) degree from the University of Cambridge, he is a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, and the Energy Institute (UK), and a Member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME (USA). He also chairs the Australian National Wildlife Collection Foundation. David Spratt is a Research Director for Breakthrough and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action (Scribe 2008). His recent reports include Recount: It’s time to “Do the math” again; Climate Reality Check and Antarctic Tipping Points for a Multi-metre Sea-level Rise. A Failure of Imagination on Climate Risks. July 26, 2017. www.resilience.org/stories/2017-07-26/a-failure-of-imagination-on-climate-risks/)

Climate change is an existential risk that could abruptly end human civilisation because of a catastrophic “failure of imagination” by global leaders to understand and act on the science and evidence before them. At the London School of Economics in 2008, Queen Elizabeth questioned: “Why did no one foresee the timing, extent and severity of the Global Financial Crisis?” The British Academy answered a year later: “A psychology of denial gripped the financial and corporate world… [it was] the failure of the collective imagination of many bright people… to understand the risks to the system as a whole”. A “failure of imagination” has also been identified as one of the reasons for the breakdown in US intelligence around the 9/11 attacks in 2001. A similar failure is occurring with climate change today. The problem is widespread at the senior levels of government and global corporations. A 2016 report, Thinking the unthinkable, based on interviews with top leaders around the world, found that: “A proliferation of ‘unthinkable’ events… has revealed a new fragility at the highest levels of corporate and public service leaderships. Their ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected, non-normative events is… perilously inadequate at critical moments… Remarkably, there remains a deep reluctance, or what might be called ‘executive myopia’, to see and contemplate even the possibility that ‘unthinkables’ might happen, let alone how to handle them. Such failures are manifested in two ways in climate policy. At the political, bureaucratic and business level in underplaying the high-end risks and in failing to recognise that the existential risk of climate change is totally different from other risk categories. And at the research level in underestimating the rate of climate change impact and costs, along with an under-emphasis on, and poor communication of, those high-end risks. Existential risk An existential risk is an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. For example, a big meteor impact, large-scale nuclear war, or sea levels 70 metres higher than today. Existential risks are not amenable to the reactive (learn from failure) approach of conventional risk management, and we cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, or social attitudes developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Because the consequences are so severe — perhaps the end of human global civilisation as we know it — researchers say that “even for an honest, truth-seeking, and well-intentioned investigator it is difficult to think and act rationally in regard to… existential risks”. Yet the evidence is clear that climate change already poses an existential risk to global economic and societal stability and to human civilisation that requires an emergency response. Temperature rises that are now in prospect could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%. But this conversation is taboo, and the few who speak out are admonished as being overly alarmist. Prof. Kevin Anderson considers that “a 4°C future [relative to pre-industrial levels] is incompatible with an organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable”. He says: “If you have got a population of nine billion by 2050 and you hit 4°C, 5°C or 6°C, you might have half a billion people surviving”. Asked at a 2011 conference in Melbourne about the difference between a 2°C world and a 4°C world, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber replied in two words: “Human civilisation”.