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#### The 1AC sees criminal justice as reformable, redeemable, or forgivable, which prevents understanding carcerality as the structuring principle of society. Criminal justice reform gets coopted by liberal feel-good narratives that strengthen the prison regime even if they seem like gains in a vacuum.

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The global U.S. prison regime has no precedent or peer and has become a primary condition of schooling, education, and pedagogy in every possible site. Aside from its sheer accumulation of captive bodies (more than 2.5 million, if one includes children, military captives, undocumented migrants, and the mentally ill/disordered),1 the prison has become central to the (re)production and (re)invention of a robust and historically dynamic white supremacist state: at its farthest institutional reaches, the prison has developed a capacity to organize and disrupt the most taken-for-granted features of everyday social life, including “family,” “community,” “school,” and individual social identities. Students, teachers, and administrators of all kinds have come to conceptualize “freedom,” “safety,” and “peace” as a relatively direct outcome of state-conducted domestic war (wars on crime, drugs, gangs, immigrants, terror, etc.), legitimated police violence, and large-scale, punitive imprisonment. In what follows, I attempt to offer the outlines of a critical analysis and schematic social theory that might be useful to two overlapping, urgent tasks of the radical teacher: 1) to better understand how the prison, along with the relations of power and normalized state violence that the prison inhabits/produces, form the everyday condition of possibility for the teaching act; and 2) to engage a historically situated abolitionist praxis that is, in this moment, primarily pedagogical.

A working conception of the “prison regime” offers a useful tool of critical social analysis as well as a theoretical framework for contextualizing critical, radical, and perhaps abolitionist pedagogies. In subtle distinction from the criminological, social scientific, and common sense understandings of “criminal justice,” “prisons/ jails,” and the “correctional system,” the notion of a prison regime focuses on three interrelated technologies and processes that are dynamically produced at the site of imprisonment: first, the prison regime encompasses the material arrangements of institutional power that create informal (and often nominally illegal) routines and protocols of militarized physiological domination over human beings held captive by the state. This domination privileges a historical anti-black state violence that is particularly traceable to the latter stages of continental racial chattel slavery and its immediate epochal aftermath in “post-emancipation” white supremacy and juridical racial segregation/apartheid—a privileging that is directly reflected in the actual demography of the imprisoned population, composed of a Black majority. The institutional elaborations of this white supremacist and anti-black carceral state create an overarching system of physiological domination that subsumes differently racialized subjects (including whites) into institutional routines (strip searching and regular bodily invasion, legally sanctioned torture, ad hoc assassination, routinized medical neglect) that revise while sustaining the everyday practices of genocidal racial slavery. While there are multiple variations on this regime of physiological dominance—including (Latino/a, Muslim, and Arab) immigrant detention, extra-territorial military prisons, and asylums—it is crucial to recognize that the genealogy of the prison’s systemic violence is anchored in the normalized Black genocide of U.S. and New World nation-building.2

Second, the concept of the prison regime understands the place of state-ordained human capture as a modality of social (dis)organization that produces numerous forms of interpersonal and systemic (race, class, gender, sexual) violence within and beyond the physical sites of imprisonment. Here, the multiple and vast social effects of imprisonment (from affective disruptions of community and extended familial ties to long-term economic/geographic displacement) are understood as fundamental and systemic dimensions of the policing and imprisonment apparatus, rather than secondary or unintended consequences of it.3

Third, the prison regime encompasses the multiple knowledges and meanings that are created around the institutional site and cultural symbol of “the prison,” including those that circulate in popular culture and among the administrative bureaucracies and curriculum of schools.

Given this conception of the prison regime as a far-reaching and invasive arrangement of social power, state violence, and human domination, we might better be able to understand the significance of everyday routines of school-based discipline that imply the possibility of imprisonment as the punitive bureaucratic outcome of misbehavior, truancy, and academic failure. What, then, is the condition of “teaching” in the context of a prison regime that is so relentless in its innovation and intrusiveness?

We might depart from another critical premise: that the prison 4 (jail, detention center, etc.) cannot be conceptualized as a place that is wholly separate or alienated from the normalized intercourses of civil society or “the free world.” Speaking more precisely to the concerns raised by this issue of Radical Teacher, the massive carceral-cultural form of the prison has naturalized a systemic disorientation of the teaching act, so that teaching is no longer separable from the work of policing, juridical discipline, and state-crafted punishment.

Thus, I do not think the crucial question in our historical moment is whether or not our teaching ultimately supports or adequately challenges the material arrangements and cultural significations of the prison regime - just as I believe the central question under the rule of apartheid is not whether a curriculum condones or opposes the spatial arrangements of white supremacy and intensified racist state violence. Rather, the primary question is whether and how the act of teaching can effectively and radically displace the normalized misery, everyday suffering, and mundane state violence that are reproduced and/or passively condoned by both hegemonic and critical/counterhegemonic pedagogies.

I am arguing that our historical conditions urgently dictate that a strategic distinction must be drawn between liberal, social justice, critical, and even "radical" pedagogies that are capable of even remotely justifying, defending, or tolerating a proto-genocidal prison regime that is without precedent or peer, on the one hand, and those attempts at abolitionist pedagogy that - in an urgent embracing of the historical necessity of innovation, improvisation, and radical rearticulation - are attempting to generate new epistemic and intellectual approaches to meaning, knowledge, learning, and practice for the sake of life, liberation, and new social possibilities. I am concerned with addressing a pedagogical tendency that artificially separates the teacher- student relation and "the school" from "the prison."

Such strategic distinctions are useful for delineating the ways that multiple pedagogical epistemes5 (including otherwise critical and radical ones) operate from the a priori notion that prisons and policing serve necessary, peace-and-safety making, and "good" social functions that are somehow separable or recuperable from their historical primacy to socioeconomic/class repression, American apartheid,6 racial slavery,7 indigenous land displacement and cultural genocide,8 and white supremacist colonization.9 In other words, what might happen to the disoriented teaching act if it were re-oriented against the assumptive necessity, integrity, and taken-for-grantedness of prisons, policing, and the normalized state violence they reproduce?

Schooling Regime

The structural symbiosis between schools and the racist policing/prison state is evident in the administrative, public policy, and pedagogical innovations of the War on Drugs, “Zero Tolerance,” “No Child Left Behind,” and the school-based militarizations of the “school to prison (and military) pipeline.”10 Angela Y. Davis has suggested that “when children attend schools that place a greater value on discipline and security than on knowledge and intellectual development, they are attending prep schools for prison.”11 These punitive iterations of an increasingly carceral schooling industrial complex, however, represent a symptomatic reflection of how the racist state—and white supremacist social formation generally—are producing new categories of social identities (and redefining older ones) that can only be “taught” within a direct relationship to the regulatory mechanisms and imminent (state) violence of the prison industrial complex and the U.S. prison regime. (Even while some are relatively privileged by the institutional logics of relative de-criminalization, their bodily mobility and academic progression are contingent on the state’s capacity to separate and “protect” them from the criminalized.)

There are, at first, categories of social subjects that are apprehended and naturalized by the school-as-state—gifted and talented, undocumented, gang affiliated, exceptional, at-risk, average—who are then, by ontological necessity, hierarchically separated through the protocols of pseudo-standardized intelligence quotient, socioeconomic class, race, gender, citizenship, sexuality, neighborhood geography, etc. This seemingly compulsory, school-sited reproduction of the deadly circuits of privilege and alienation is anything but new, and has always been central to the routines of the U.S. schooling regime, particularly in its colonialist and post-emancipationist articulations.12 The idea of the U.S. prison apparatus as a regime, in this context, brings attention to how prisons are not places outside and apart from our everyday lives, but instead shape and deform our identities, communities, and modes of social interaction.

I have written elsewhere that the prison regime is an apparatus of power/violence that cannot be reduced to a minor “institution” of the state, but has in fact become an apparatus that possesses and constitutes the state, often as if autonomous of its authority.13 Here, I am interested in how this regime overlaps with and mutually nourishes the multiple “schooling regimes” that make up the U.S. educational system. The U.S. prison, in other words, has become a model and prototype for power relations more generally, in which 1) institutional authority is intertwined with the policing and surveillance capacities (legitimated violence) of the state, 2) the broadly cultural and peculiarly juridical racial/gender criminalization of particular social subjects becomes a primary framework for organizing institutional access, and 3) the practice of systemic bodily immobilization (incarceration) permeates the normal routines of the “free world.” To trace the movements of the prison’s modeling of power relations to the site of the school is to understand that policing/surveillance, criminalization, and immobilization are as much schooling practices as they are imprisonment practices. The teacher is generally being asked to train the foot soldiers, middle managers, administrators, workers, intellectuals, and potential captives of the school/prison confluence, whether the classroom is populated by criminalized Black and Brown youth or white Ph.D. candidates. Two thoughts are worth considering: the teaching act is constituted by the technologies of the prison regime, and the school is inseparable from the prison industrial complex.

The “prison industrial complex,” in contrast to the prison regime, names the emergence over the last three decades of multiple symbiotic institutional relationships that dynamically link private business (such as architectural firms, construction companies, and uniform manufacturers) and government/state apparatuses (including police, corrections, and elected officials) in projects of multiply-scaled human immobilization and imprisonment. The national abolitionist organization Critical Resistance elaborates that the prison industrial complex is a “system situated at the intersection of governmental and private interests that uses prisons as a solution to social, political, and economic problems.”14 In fact, as many abolitionist scholars have noted, the rise of the prison industrial complex is in part a direct outcome of the liberal-progressive “prison reform” successes of the 1970s. The political convergence between liberals, progressives, and “law and order” conservatives/reactionaries, located within the accelerating political and geographical displacements of globalization,15 generated a host of material transformations and institutional shifts that facilitated— in fact, necessitated—the large-scale reorganization of the prison into a host of new and/or qualitatively intensified structural relationships with numerous political and economic apparatuses, including public policy and legislative bodies, electoral and lobbying apparatuses, the medical and architectural/construction industries, and various other hegemonic institutional forms. Concretely, the reform of the prison required its own expansion and bureaucratic multiplication: for example, the reform of prison overcrowding came to involve an astronomical growth in new prison construction (rather than decarceration and release), the reformist outrage against preventable deaths and severe physiological suffering from (communicable, congenital, and mental) illnesses yielded the piecemeal incorporation of medical facilities and staff into prison protocols (as opposed to addressing the fact that massive incarceration inherently creates and circulates sickness), and reformist recognition of carceral state violence against emotionally disordered, mentally ill, and disabled captives led to the creation of new prisons and pharmaceutical regimens for the “criminally insane,” and so on. Following the historical trajectory of Angela Y. Davis’ concise and accurate assessment that “during the (American) revolutionary period, the penitentiary was generally viewed as a progressive reform, linked to the larger campaign for the rights of citizens,”16 it is crucial to recognize that the prison industrial complex is one of the most significant “reformist” achievements in U.S. history and is not simply the perverse social project of self-identified reactionaries and conservatives. Its roots and sustenance are fundamentally located in the American liberal-progressive impulse toward reforming institutionalized state violence rather than abolishing it.

The absolute banality of the prison regime’s presence in the administrative protocols, curricula, and educational routines of the school is almost omnipresent: aside from the most obvious appearances of the racist policing state on campuses everywhere, it is generally the fundamental epistemological (hence pedagogical) assumption of the school that 1) social order (peace) requires a normalized, culturally legitimated proliferation of state violence (policing, juridical punishment, war); 2) the survival of civil society (schools, citizenship, and individual “freedom”) depends on the capacity of the state to isolate or extinguish the criminal/dangerous; and 3) the U.S. nationbuilding project is endemically decent or (at least) democratic in spirit, and its apparent corruptions, contradictions, and systemic brutalities (including and especially the racial, gender, and class-based violence of the prison industrial complex) are ultimately reformable, redeemable, or (if all else fails) forgivable.

#### The right to strike is a dangerous distraction that prevents the labor movement from challenging systems at the root cause of class inequality and that make it structurally impossible for legal institutions to protect workers. Empirically “right to strike” legislation hamstrings actual strikes via circumventive policies that jail strikers for engaging in theft, violence, etc while allowing for a façade of acceptance and forcing union representation, wages, and economic equality to plummet. The AFF results in scattered, ineffective, and “respectable” strikes and labor disputes re-routed towards legal arbitration while increased legal incorporation results in more tools for the elite to constrain the labor movement -- turns case and kills workers’ movement writ large. Vote NEG for a “direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold”

White 18 (Ahmed White – Nicholaus Rosenbaum Professor of Law @ University of Colorado Law School, “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike”, https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles , 2018, pgs. 1065-1073, EmmieeM)

One of the most important statutes ever enacted, the National Labor Relations Act envisaged the right to strike as the centerpiece of a system of labor law whose central aims included dramatically diminishing the pervasive exploitation and steep inequality that are endemic to modern capitalism. These goals have never been more relevant. But they have proved difficult to realize via the labor law, in large part because an effective right to strike has long been elusive, undermined by courts, Congress, the NLRB, and powerful elements of the business community. Recognizing this, labor scholars have made the restoration of the right to strike a cornerstone of labor law scholarship. Authorities in the field have developed an impressive literature that stresses the importance of strikes and strongly criticizes the arguments that judges, legislators, and others have used to justify their degradation of the right to strike. But this literature has developed without its authors ever answering a fundamental question, which is whether an effective right to strike is a viable aspiration in the first place. This Article takes up this question. It documents the crucial role that strikes have played in building the labor movement, legitimating the labor law itself, and indeed validating the New Deal and, with this, the modern administrative state; and it confirms the integral role that strikes play in contesting the corrosive power capitalism accords employers over the workplace and the spoils of production. But this Article also shows how the strikes that were effective in these crucial ways were not conventional strikes, limited to the simple withholding of labor and the advertisement of workers’ grievances. Instead, they inevitably embraced disorderly, coercive tactics like mass picketing and sit-down strikes to a degree that suggests that tactics such as these are indeed essential if strikes are to be effective. Yet strikes that have featured these tactics have never enjoyed any legitimacy beyond the ranks of labor, radical activists, and academic sympathizers. Their inherent affronts to property and public order place them well beyond the purview of what could ever constitute a viable legal right in liberal society; and they have been treated accordingly by courts, Congress, and other elite authorities. From this vantage, it becomes clear that an effective right to strike is not only an impossible distraction but a dangerous fantasy that prevents labor’s champions from confronting the broader, sobering truths that this country’s legal and political system are, at root, anathema to a truly viable system of labor rights and that labor’s salvation must be sought elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

“They say ‘you got a right to strike but you can’t picket,’ an’ they know a strike won’t work without picket-in’.”1 This is the angry lament of Mac McLeod, a central character in John Steinbeck’s 1936 novel, In Dubious Battle, delivered just after Mac and fellow unionists were enjoined by a carload of heavily-armed police “to keep order.”2 “You can march as long as you don’t block traffic,” said the head cop, “but you are not going to interfere with anybody. Get that?”3

Recently adapted to film in a movie that is notably long on stars but short on distribution,4 the novel is considered one of Steinbeck’s finest.5 It is also perhaps the most powerful depiction of a labor strike in American literature. A bitter reflection on the intense interpersonal conflicts, moral dilemmas, and political impasses that are central to labor struggles, and based on the author’s acquaintances with workers and organizers in the region, the book tells the tragic story of a fruitpickers strike led by radicals in Depression-era California.6 In Dubious Battle broaches a set of crucial issues, which are seldom discussed anymore, concerning the nature of strikes and the acceptable limits of class struggle and workers’ protests in liberal society.7

For much of this country’s post-Civil War history, “hitting the bricks” was a way for workers to try to push back against capitalist employers. Sometimes the strikers succeeded, gaining union recognition and better working conditions. But often enough, their impertinence was repaid with arrests, beatings, and blacklisting; and the strikes ended in failure, sometimes with blood pooled on the streets and soaked into the dirt, as in Steinbeck’s story. Hundreds, possibly thousands lost their lives8 —one can only roughly estimate the numbers, so commonplace and prosaic were these practices in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, excluding the years 1906 through 1913, for which there are no records, between 1881 and 1935, the year Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (or Wagner Act, in its early form), there were in the neighborhood of 80,000 strikes in America, involving about 30 million workers.9 Despite all the dangers and the likelihood that their efforts would prove futile, workers in these millions downed the tools and picketed, convinced that doing so was not only necessary to their immediate interests but a mandate of their position in class society.

The Wagner Act purported, for the first time in American history, to extend a definite, readily enforceable right to strike to most American workers. Not coincidentally, the years surrounding its enactment featured the most intense wave of labor conflict in the country’s history. When the statute became effective in 1937 (having been widely ignored by employers and blocked by hostile courts), the violence of strikes began to diminish, though not so much their frequency. For much of the period after the Second World War, strikes remained common even as they also became less ambitious in their aims and less militant in their conduct. Beginning about forty years ago, things changed again. Strikes suddenly became rare as well, to the point that workers today basically do not strike at all. From 1947 through 1976, the government documented an average of just over 300 “major work stoppages” (strikes and lockouts involving at least 1000 workers) every year; over the last decade, the annual average was only 14.10 Even the much-ballyhooed mini-strike wave of 2018 appears to be largely an illusion built on a combination of wishful thinking and a convenient misconstruction of a string of well-reported, and sometimes impressive, strikes, as a trend.11 In any event, militancy of the sort that was commonplace when Steinbeck wrote his book, along with the open strife and bloodshed that made the novel a work of undeniable realism, are nearly unheard of today.

The waning of bloody battles may be a good thing. But there is not much to celebrate about the overall demise of strikes—not if you are a worker or care about the working class. For strikes are the most important mode of working class protest, the best way, it seems, for workers to directly challenge capitalist hegemony by their own hand, to alter the terms of exploitation if not to build a new world. As they have declined, so has the strength of the labor movement and, with this, the ability of workers to contest the power that employers wield over their work lives and economic fortunes. And so it is that with the demise of strikes, union representation has plummeted, wages have stagnated, economic inequality skyrocketed, and the everyday caprices and tyrannies of capitalist management have been entwined in the web of demeaning indignities, patronizing indulgences, and suffocating bureaucratic rules that define the contemporary workplace.

Nevertheless, in most quarters the decline in strikes has been taken in stride, if noticed at all. For most people, strikes are hardly more than historical relics or quaint curiosities that seldom affect their daily lives or command much of their attention. Ironically, this is probably one reason the very modest labor conflict of the last year has been so overcharacterized. Once a preoccupation of newspaper editorialists, lawyers, and other commentators, a concern of government, and the subject of numerous hearings and reports, abundant litigation, and seemingly endless attempts at legislation, strikes are now rarely of any interest in any of these quarters. Where judges, politicians, and editorialists once worried greatly over how to deal with strikes of the kind that Steinbeck fictionalized, how to protect the economy (not to mention the interests of individual capitalists) from the disruptive effects of labor unrest, and sometimes how to preserve the ability of workers to strike in meaningful ways, their successors stand mute in the context of the near extinction of this form of protest. It has been two decades since Congress, which once grappled with these issues on a regular basis, has seriously confronted the question of strikes.12 Its last engagement with the right to strike attempts, in the early 1990s, to enact modest changes in the law relative to employers’ use of replacement workers during strikes. And even this effort, which collapsed in the mid 1990s, hardly seemed possessed of the kind of urgency that characterized earlier forays on these issues.13

Among the few Americans who well remember what strikes are and why they are important are labor scholars. For them, at least, strikes remain a preoccupation. Prominent students of labor like James Atleson, Julius Getman, Karl Klare, and James Pope—to name the most notable of this group—have expended much effort over the past few decades identifying and critiquing legal doctrines which have undermined the right to strike. Important to them in this regard are doctrines that give employers the prerogative to easily replace striking workers; that allow employers to enjoin and even fire strikers on the ground that they have engaged in coercive “misconduct,” or because they have protested the wrong issue or in the wrong way; that prohibit sympathy strikes and general strikes, and spontaneous “wildcat” strikes; and that funnel labor disputes off of picket lines and into legal proceedings and arbitrations.14

These doctrines have eviscerated a once-vital right to strike, these scholars tell us, subverting a prerogative that earlier in the century was central to improving conditions for workers and lending legitimacy to the very idea that workers have rights to claim in the first place. Indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, a massive and sustained campaign of strikes proved crucial to the formation of the modern labor movement, the political and legal validation of the Wagner Act, and ultimately the survival of the New Deal itself. This was true even as the Wagner Act itself seemed to play a crucial role in conveying to workers, for the first time, an effective right to strike. But the problem as far as the right to strike goes, we are told, is that the statute was later weakened and corrupted by the connivances of judges and Congress, urged on by a business community relentless in its contempt for organized labor, and abetted at times by inept or corrupt union leaders and a weak and politically diffident National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, the entity with primary authority for enforcing the labor law). And so the Wagner Act is said to have had a great potential, only to have been tragically “deradicalized,” as Klare puts it; and workers are said to have “lost” the right to strike, in Pope’s words, with devastating consequences for workers today and ominous portents for generations ahead.15 Critically, these authors argue, an effective right to strike must be restored at the expense of these unjustified impositions.16 Only then will the labor law regain its relevance and the labor movement its ability to improve the lives of workers.

Early on, this attempt to defend an effective right to strike was the object of mean-spirited criticism by more conventional scholars who, in the guise of unmasking its interpretative shortcomings, rejected its radicalism and recoiled at its underlying supposition that law is not only malleable and untethered to its formal, elite iterations, but within the province of workers to reshape around their own interests and visions.17 Despite these efforts, which focused on the work of Klare and Katherine Stone, whose critique of post-war “industrial pluralism” shared a similar reasoning—or maybe, to some extent, anyway, because of them—support for this campaign to restore the right to strike seems like a mandate among scholars and commentators who purport to take seriously the interests of workers.18 And yet for all its appeal, this project nevertheless suffers from a remarkably negligent oversight, one that has nothing to do with morality of its pretense that the law is malleable and that workers can remake it—a proposition that is broadly true and eminently defensible. Instead, it has to do with its practical feasibility. In fact, as this Article argues, a critical reflection on this question suggests that the effort to realize an effective right to strike is actually quite impossible and that attempts to do so, however earnest and thoughtful they may be, represent as dubious a battle as the hopeless walkout dramatized in Steinbeck’s book.

This doleful conclusion rests on a frank understanding of the legal and political realities in which strikes necessarily play out. There are many kinds of strikes, but those that are apt to be successful in challenging employers’ power and interests entail a level of militancy that sets them against well-entrenched notion of property and public order. This was true in the 1930s and 1940s when these values contradicted, at once, strike militancy and whatever radical potential the Wagner Act may have had. Ironically, it is perhaps even truer today, now that workers do in fact enjoy the right to strike, albeit only in more conventional ways. Seen in this light, those doctrines that have undermined the right to strike are not aberrations or jurisprudential failings—not mistakes in any sense, in fact, nor a retreat from some earlier, truer iteration of the labor law. Rather, they represent a settling of the labor law on bedrock precepts of the American life. However illegitimate those precepts may be from a vantage that questions capitalism’s essential legitimacy and takes the rights of workers seriously, they reign supreme, foreclosing an effective right to strike.

All of this, as I argue in this Article, is made plainly evident by a critical review of the history of strikes and striking. To anticipate a bit more of the argument that follows, the strikes most crucial to the building of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s were not built only around peaceful picketing and a withholding of labor. Rather, they were sit-down strikes and strikes built on mass picketing, as well as, to some extent, secondary boycotts. And strikes of this kind were never considered lawful or politically appropriate. Ironically, it was these strikes that legitimated the Wagner Act itself and the New Deal. But they could not legitimate themselves.

Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its potential. To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this way that the history of strikes shows less in the way of de-radicalization than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor protest and labor rights can be in liberal society.

As this all played out, it left in its wake a right to strike, but one whose power consists almost entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are not effective weapons in their own right. Nor are they generally advanced when strikes are broken. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, striking in such a conventional way accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it is simply not coercive enough to be effective. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers.

From this perspective, the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no less, steeped in a misplaced and exaggerated faith in the law and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The campaign to resurrect such a right appears, too, not only as a dead-end and a distraction, but an undertaking that risks blinding those who support viable unionism and the interests of the working class to the more important and fundamental fact that liberalism and the legal system are, in the end, antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights. It is for this reason that the call for an effective right to strike should be set aside in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold.

The argument that follows further elaborates these main contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an opposition to coercion and disorder that, even if sometimes invoked disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic. The final part is a brief conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument.

#### There is no strike wave, just media smoke tricks. Empirics on current strike trends and outcomes of “Right to Strike” legislation go heavily NEG – you cannot legalize revolution and all legislation is merely a ruse to constrain the workers’ movement through the guise of “legal management”

White 18 (Ahmed White – Nicholaus Rosenbaum Professor of Law @ University of Colorado Law School, “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike”, https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles , 2018, pgs. 1124-1131, EmmieeM)

In fact, at this crucial moment it was common for elites of all stripes to claim that they supported the right to strike and yet to assert that it was being abused by unionists who insisted on winning every labor dispute and using coercive and disorderly methods to do so. In 1946, Hebert Hoover, who might well have denied just such a thing fifteen years earlier, inveighed that “Nobody denies that there is a ‘right’ to strike”; but that right, he said, had been abused to the detriment of the public interest.295 Although considerably more liberal than Hoover, Walter Lippmann, the extremely popular political commentator, offered a similar judgement about a railroad strike that same year, concluding “we must henceforth refuse to regard the right to strike as universal and absolute, and as one of the inalienable rights of man.”296 Also writing in 1946, Henry Ford II, whose father had used a small army of thugs and toughs to enforce the open shop at his plants and bitterly fought unionization until 1941, now purported at once to support the right to strike—and to believe that it should be limited.297 “There is no longer any question of the right of organized workers to strike, but that right,” he said, “is being misused.”298

Like Taft-Hartley’s supporters in Congress, figures like Hoover, Lippmann, and Ford did not trouble themselves to confess that such tactics as they so blithely condemned might actually be necessary to counterbalance the power of employers and give life and meaning to a statute that did not take adequate account of this basic reality, let alone that they were essential in establishing the idea that workers enjoyed any enforceable right to strike. But they did not have to, either; for they honestly did not believe that labor should generally prevail. Liberal or conservative, it did not matter; these were capitalists in a capitalist society, contented, consistent with their values, with a right to strike that went little further than a right to withhold one’s labor.

To be sure, these were not the views of ordinary people. But the public’s perspective did not seem to vary all that much from those of elites. Although overall approval of union membership as measured in Gallup surveys slipped noticeably after 1937, it remained quite high— well above fifty percent right through the 1940s.299 Nevertheless, Gallup surveys taken in June 1937, after the big wave of sit-strikes had waned noticeably, but while mass picketing and overall levels of labor militancy remained high, revealed that fifty-seven percent supported the proposition that the militia should “be called out whenever strike trouble threatens.”300

As with the sit-down strikes, too, the status of mass picketing and other forms of strike militancy can also be gauged by the way these tactics were defended. During the hearings on Taft-Hartley, only a few labor leaders stood against the torrent of criticism of these practices by businessmen, conservative unionists, and congressmen and senators, and tried to parry the move to prohibit the strikes. With only a couple of exceptions, most of them consistently qualified their defense of these tactics by downplaying their coercive qualities—again the very thing that made them so effective in the first place—while also describing them as expedients, presumably temporary, that were justified by the unreasonable stances of some employers.301

While the political motivations and implications of this campaign against these forms of strike militancy might be as dubious as the attacks on the sit-down strikes, their value in expressing dominant political judgments concerning these tactics is not. Repeatedly, it was taken for granted that workers could not be allowed to excessively coerce their fellow workers, that they should be obliged to adhere to their contractual obligations, that they did not own the streets or the workplace, and that whatever the right to strike was, it was surely, as Brandeis had insisted, not an absolute right. Of course, all of this was controversial for many unionists. But unionists were almost the only ones to really push back against these measures. Even President Harry Truman’s dramatic veto of Taft-Hartley is widely regarded as a political move taken with the expectation that Congress would override the veto anyway.302 It is also notable that despite dedicating itself to this aim, the labor movement has never come close to repealing the Taft Hartley Act, or even securing the enactment of favorable amendments to any of its provisions.

And then there is the replacement worker doctrine where, if anything, the change in the law even more clearly reflected the depth and power of liberal norms. For the rule established in Mackay Radio came out of the blue. It was set forth in a case which required no such question to be resolved, in a manner that drew no support from the text of the Wagner Act, and on the basis of legislative history that was ambiguous at best. Worse, as Getman points out, the rule is in direct conflict with the very statutory principle of barring discrimination on the basis of a worker’s assertion of the basic labor rights laid out in § 7 that it was, itself, supposedly derived from.303

As an exercise in statutory construction and administration, Mackay Radio makes no sense; but as a defense of property rights it makes all the sense in the world. One way to see this is to consider what would have happened had the Court decided the matter in a fundamentally different way. If employers were barred from replacing economic strikers, it seems likely that strikes would have proliferated to an extraordinary extent, as workers could at least plausibly have expected to be able to strike under a broad array of circumstances and yet be restored to their jobs no matter the outcome. But precisely because such a doctrine would have given workers so much power, Congress would almost certainly have stepped in with its own rule, codifying employers’ right to permanently replace striking workers and bringing this to an end. Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a much more liberal alternative to the Mackay Radio rule surviving for very long—a point that also draws support from labor’s failure to repeal the rule in Congress in the early 1990s.304

A simple exercise in counterfactual speculation bears similar fruit in regard to other, more basic, limitations on the right to strike, including those imposed relative to sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and secondary boycotts. Shrill and self-interested though it was, all the testimony from employers and their allies during the hearings on TaftHartley or Landrum-Griffin about the perils posed by these tactics, was fundamentally correct. For were workers able to make unfettered use of sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and general strikes and sympathy walkouts, they could have very much challenged the sovereignty of capitalists in and about the workplace, and with this the bedrock institutions and norms of liberal society. As Jim Pope puts it, Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion in Fansteel established the maxim that “the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights.”305 This is unquestionably true. But equally unquestionable is that neither this court nor any other important arbiter of legal rights in this country was ever prepared to endorse the contrary view that property rights might be sufficiently subordinate to labor rights as to justify the kinds of tactics by which workers could routinely defeat powerful employers on the fields of industrial conflict

Significantly, there is no reason to believe that any of this has changed or is poised to change today. Quite the contrary: In a culture and political system more immersed than ever in the veneration of order and control, mediated by criminal law and police work, by the celebration of property rights, and by a readiness to punish violence, it is all but unthinkable that the courts or the NLRB would deign to give legal sanction to workers to engage in any sustained way in the kinds of tactics that might make going on strike a worthwhile thing to do.

CONCLUSION

One of the outstanding ironies in a story rich with many is that the very things which made the prospect of an effective right to strike seem for a time so viable—the unlawful, illiberal, and altogether intolerable coerciveness of sit-down strike and mass picketing, especially—are also what made this concept impossible to ever realize. As we have seen, effective strikes could build the labor movement, validate the Wagner Act, secure the New Deal, and in many ways change America. But they could not make themselves legitimate.

So it is that workers have found themselves with a right to strike that equals little more than a right to quit work—and maybe lose their jobs or their houses and savings in the balance. They have a right to strike, as Steinbeck’s character, Mac, complained, but they “can’t picket”—at least, not in a way that is really apt to change anything. And so they do not strike—in fact, under these circumstances they usually should not strike.

The proof of this is readily evident, not only in the dramatic decrease in strikes since the 1970s, but in the sad regularity with which even the most vibrant strikes have ended in defeat for workers. Phelps Dodge (1983), Greyhound (1983 and 1990), Hormel (1985-1986), Caterpillar (1992, 1993, and 1994-1995), Detroit Daily News/Daily Free Press (1995-1997)—these are but the most notable of a litany of vibrant strikes since the 1970s that ended in failure.306 They are, in fact, the definitive labor struggles of this period, overshadowing a much smaller number of comparable disputes, like the strikes at United Parcel Service in 1997 and Verizon in 2016 that—often shaped by uniquely favorable labor dynamics—ended in something resembling victory for the union.307 Each of these big and unsuccessful strikes was motived by very modest, in fact anti-concessionary, goals and well-supported by workers and the larger public alike. And each featured mass picketing and other attempts at militancy. But these tactics were met with injunctions, civil suits, mass arrests, and criminal prosecutions, which ended the protests and left the employers free to exert their vast advantages in material wealth and political power, end the disputes on their terms, and leave thousands of strikers unemployed.308

It is true that the last year or so has witnessed what many people have declared to be a miniature strike wave, that has been widely celebrated by unionists and their allies as a welcome departure from past trends and portent, many hope, of a sustained resurgence of labor activism.309 Headlined by statewide teachers strikes in West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Arizona, all in the first part of 2018, the strikes commanded a great deal of media coverage, at least compared to what labor disputes usually receive nowadays.310 However, closer inspection suggests that this wave is mainly an artifact of wishful thinking exacerbated by the novelty for many people nowadays of seeing these strikes reported in the media. For in fact, the number of strikes over the last couple of years has remained close to the level that has prevailed for several decades now.311

Perhaps more significant in putting these strikes in proper context is a reflection on their character. None have been organizing strikes. All of these strikes have been over contracts and working conditions, with many driven by workers’ opposition to concessions and ended with less than spectacular gains by the strikers.312 Moreover, the strikes which comprise this supposed wave have been disproportionately mounted by government workers—teachers, mainly—who are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. For this reason, several of the strikes have been unlawful, as state law typically denies such workers the right to strike anyway. But at the same time—and this may be the most crucial point—none of these strikes has unfolded in an especially militant way, at least by historical standards. There have been no big sit-down strikes, no threatening episodes of mass picketing, no routing of “scabs,” no destruction of property. Which is all to say that the kinds of strikes that built the labor movement eighty or more years ago remain thoroughly in check.

There is little hope within the prevailing political and juridical order that things could ever be any different. Perhaps the right to strike could be made effective if it were fundamentally reconfigured in illiberal, corporatist terms. The right could conceivably be reconfigured such that the government might intervene more aggressively and make the workers protests effective—for example, stepping in to decide by adjudication, mediation, or arbitration which side should win a strike. Elements of this approach, which was vigorously opposed by IWW and AFL unionists alike in the early twentieth century, can be found internationally, in industry-specific statutes like the Railway Labor Act, and in labor statutes that apply to government workers, although most often when the law goes down this path it all but dispenses with the right to strike anyway, treating it as a redundancy, a tool without a purpose. As Senator Wagner himself perceived, alignment between the excessive reliance on the authority of the state to manage labor relations and the denigration of the right to strike was both dysfunctional and dangerous. As he put it back in the summer of 1937, defending the recently-passed statute that bore his name and the right that he placed at the center of it, [t]he outlawry of the right to strike is a natural concomitant of authoritarian governments. It occurs only when a government is willing to assume definitive responsibility for prescribing every element in the industrial relationship—the length of the day, the size of the wage, the terms and conditions of work.313

Clearly no such regime will be instituted in any event, not least because, as interest in such schemes in the twentieth century makes clear, support for this kind of corporatist intervention in labor disputes has itself been an elite reaction against strike militancy that currently does not exist. Where does this leave workers and unions, possessed of a right they cannot afford to surrender but cannot rely on as a means of advancing their interests and standing in society? Are they bound like Steinbeck’s strikers to meet defeat, albeit in a more peaceful way? Maybe. In one of his many commentaries on the sit-down strikes as they raged across the country in the spring of 1937, Walter Lippmann took time to analyze one of the speeches in which James Landis had argued that the tactic might well become a new right, in the same way that the right to strike in general had been created through its persistent assertion in the face of opposition and incredulity. No revolutionary, Lippmann nonetheless understood what Landis apparently did not: that the right Landis spoke of was revolutionary in its conception, and therefore not just an impracticality but a contradiction. “Never in the history of the law has rebellion been made lawful. Only the rights demanded by the rebels have been legalized,” said Lippman.314

As the labor scholars who call for the restoration of an effective right to strike have all understood, the tactics that made such strikes possible were tolerated only so long as there was not a functional system of labor rights in place, one that could stand alone in courts and hearing rooms. Once this was the case—once the rebel unionists’ aims, or at least those imputed to them, were realized—the sit-down strikes were predictably banned, and then so were mass picketing, secondary boycotts, and so forth. Thus it is that in cases like Fansteel and the debates on Taft-Hartley, sit-down strikers, mass picketers, and the like were presented as enemies of the labor law. Even more recent attacks on the right to strike, such as complaints in the 1980s about union violence going uncensored and the modest moves by the NLRB to rein in this, too, have been inevitably justified not in terms of overthrowing the system of labor rights but managing it, reconciling its virtues with the normative and juridical mandates of liberal society. And so it is that the right to strike—the right to an effective strike—has been sacrificed not in the name of capitalist hegemony but on liberalism’s altar of labor peace. Unfortunately, so far as the interests of workers go, these are the same thing.

## Case

#### Prisoners already have the right to strike – history proves.

German Lopez, Senior Correspondent and Cohost of The Weeds, 2018 - [“America’s prisoners are going on strike in at least 17 states”, https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/17664048/national-prison-strike-2018]//bread

America’s prisoners are going on strike. The demonstrations are [planned](https://incarceratedworkers.org/campaigns/prison-strike-2018) to take place from August 21 to September 9, which marks the anniversary of the [bloody uprising at the Attica Correctional Facility in New York](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/books/review/blood-in-the-water-attica-heather-ann-thompson.html). During this time, inmates across the US plan to refuse to work and, in some cases, refuse to eat to draw attention to poor prison conditions and what many view as exploitative labor practices in American correctional facilities. “Prisoners want to be valued as contributors to our society,” Amani Sawari, a spokesperson for the protests, told me. “Every single field and industry is affected on some level by prisons, from our license plates to the fast food that we eat to the stores that we shop at. So we really need to recognize how we are supporting the prison industrial complex through the dollars that we spend.” Prison labor issues recently received attention in California, where inmates have been voluntarily recruited to [fight the state’s record wildfires](https://www.vox.com/2018/8/9/17670494/california-prison-labor-mendocino-carr-ferguson-wildfires) — for the paltry pay of just $1 an hour plus $2 per day. But the practice of using prison inmates for cheap or free labor is fairly widespread in the US, due to an exemption in the 13th Amendment, which abolished chattel slavery but allows involuntary servitude as part of a punishment for a crime. For Sawari and the inmates participating in the protests, the sometimes forced labor and poor pay is effectively “modern slavery.” That, along with poor prison conditions that inmates blame for a deadly South Carolina prison riot earlier this year, have led to protests. For prisons, though, fixing the problems raised by the demonstrations will require money — something that cash-strapped state governments may not be willing to put up. That raises real questions about whether the inmates’ demands can or will be heard. The demonstrations come two years after [what was then the largest prison strike in US history](https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/10/19/13306178/prison-strike-protests-attica), with protests breaking out in at least 12 states in 2016. The new demonstrations could end up even larger than those previous protests. Protests are planned in at least 17 states There’s no hard estimate for how many inmates and prisons are taking part in the protests, as organizers continue to recruit more and more inmates and word of mouth spreads. But demonstrations are expected across at least 17 states. The inmates will take part in work strikes, hunger strikes, and sit-ins. They are also calling for boycotts against agencies and companies that benefit from prisons and prison labor. “The main leverage that an inmate has is their own body,” Sawari said. “If they choose not to go to work and just sit in in the main area or the eating area, and all the prisoners choose to sit there and not go to the kitchen for lunchtime or dinnertime, if they choose not to clean or do the yardwork, this is the leverage that they have. Prisons cannot run without prisoners’ work.” While 2016’s protests were largely planned for just September 9 (then the 45th anniversary of the Attica uprising), they ended up taking part over weeks or months as prison officials tried to tamp down the demonstrations and mitigate the effects of the protests. This year, the protests are spread out over three weeks to make it more difficult for prison officials to crack down. The inmates have outlined 10 national demands. They include “immediate improvements to the conditions of prisons” and “an immediate end to prison slavery.” They also target federal laws that boosted [mass incarceration](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/30/15591700/mass-incarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in) and have made it harder for inmates to sue officials for potential rights violations. And they call for an end to racial disparities in the criminal justice system and an increase to rehabilitation programs in prisons. The demands are on top of specific local and regional asks that prisoners are making. For example, Sawari said, in South Carolina they’re also focused on getting prisoners the [right to vote](https://www.vox.com/2016/4/22/11487912/virginia-voting-felons-prison) — and, of course, improving conditions in the state that helped inspire this year’s protests. The strikes are in part a response to South Carolina’s recent prison riots One reason for this year’s demonstrations is the [prison riot at Lee Correctional Institution](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/16/17243598/south-carolina-prison-riot-violence) in April, which was described as a “mass casualty” event by state officials. “After that violent incident happened, South Carolina prisoners and the jailhouse lawyers group out of Lee County came out with the strike demands and really wanted to do something to draw attention to the dehumanizing environment of prisons in general,” Sawari said. In total, seven inmates were killed and at least 17 were seriously injured, according to the [Associated Press](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/state-police-respond-ongoing-situation-sc-prison-085315357.html). An inmate told the AP that bodies were “literally stacked on top of each other,” claiming that prison guards did little to stop the **violence between inmates**. Most of the fatal injuries appeared to be a result of stabbing or slashing, although some inmates may have been beaten to death. No prison guards were hurt. The riot was the worst in a US prison in a quarter-century, according to the [AP](http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/state-police-respond-ongoing-situation-sc-prison-54494693). Based on reports following the riot, it seems some of the major causes, besides personal and potentially gang-related disputes, were poor prison conditions and understaffing — which meant there weren’t enough guards to stop the fighting.

#### Prison strikes rarely achieves significant reforms, no matter how big or long the strike is – be doubtful how the aff is any different

Christie Thompson is a staff writer. Her work has been published by outlets including The New York Times, The Washington Post, NPR, ProPublica, and The Atlantic, 9/1/2016 – [“Do Prison Strikes Work?”, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/21/do-prison-strikes-work]//bread

On Sept. 9, prisoners across the country stopped showing up for their work assignments to protest [what they call](https://iwoc.noblogs.org/post/2016/04/01/announcement-of-nationally-coordinated-prisoner-workstoppage-for-sept-9-2016/) slave-like conditions for incarcerated workers. Inmates make pennies an hour keeping the prison running — such as cleaning and cooking — or providing [cheap manufacturing for private businesses](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/07/what-do-prisoners-make-victorias-secret). Inmates involved in the protest are calling for higher wages, better working conditions and less severe punishment while on the job. The work stoppage was organized by inmates in multiple states and labor activists with the Industrial Workers of the World to coincide with the [45th anniversary of the Attica riot](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/09/revisiting-the-ghosts-of-attica?ref=hp-3-111#.yAfs2yVfq), which was preceded by a strike in the prison’s metal shop. Prisoners and labor organizers on the outside hoped it would be the largest prison strike in history. It’s hard to quantify exactly how many prisoners in how many states have participated, as prison officials and organizers give conflicting accounts of its scope. Activists claim inmates in [at least 11 states](https://theintercept.com/2016/09/16/the-largest-prison-strike-in-u-s-history-enters-its-second-week/) are taking part. This strike is the latest in a long history of prisoners trying to use what little leverage they have — whether work stoppages or hunger strikes — to demand change from administrators. Some have been more successful than others. Here’s a look at five other prison strikes and what came of them: Post-WWII Labor Strikes University of Michigan professor Heather Ann Thompson’s [history of labor movements in prison](http://labor.dukejournals.org/content/8/3/15) details how a series of work stoppages and sit-down protests took off in prisons across the U.S. in 1947. In little over a decade, hundreds of prisoners in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Ohio, and Georgia stopped working to protest long hours, trifling pay, and grueling work environments. Prisoners in Georgia and Louisiana went even further and slit their heel tendons so they could not be forced to work. While the work stoppages did not lead to immediate changes, they inspired another era of prison protest in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, which included the Attica work stoppage and eventual riot. Those movements achieved slight pay raises and improved safety precautions in some states and led to the **creation of prisoner-led unions.** 2010 Georgia Labor Strike In 2010, state prisoners across Georgia launched what many then called the largest prison work strike in U.S. history — though official numbers are difficult to confirm. At the protest’s height, organizers said thousands of inmates participated across at least six state prisons. Georgia inmates were paid nothing for their work, as dictated by state law, and [were asking](https://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/12/13/georgia-prisoners-strike-for-better-conditions/) for better conditions and more access to programming. Not only were Georgia inmates not showing up to their job assignments — they refused to leave their cells at all until their demands were met. The strike lasted six days, and garnered coverage in news outlets like [The New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/us/12prison.html?_r=0). It ended when prisoners decided to leave their cells to [go to the law library](http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/prisoners-protest-over-for-now/nQnxt/) and try to sue for improvements instead. (It’s unclear what became of those efforts). Prisoners in Georgia are still not paid for their labor. 2011-2013 Pelican Bay Hunger Strike [In 2011](http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/113/3/579.abstract), 400 prisoners in California’s supermax prison started refusing their meals. Their numbers grew to 7,000 as they were joined by prisoners all over the state. The inmates had a [list of five demands](https://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/education/the-prisoners-demands-2/), including limits on solitary confinement and changes to how the prison determines gang membership. Their fast ended after three weeks when prison officials agreed to reconsider some of their solitary confinement policies. Inmates returned to hunger-striking later in 2011 and again in 2013 saying the changes were too small and too slow.

But the protests did have a significant impact. After the initial strike, the chair of the California Assembly’s Public Safety Committee held a hearing on conditions at Pelican Bay. In 2012, the nonprofit Center for Constitutional Rights [filed a class-action lawsuit](https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/ashker-v-brown) against the state over its use of prolonged isolation. Todd Ashker, [one of the strike’s organizers](http://nymag.com/news/features/solitary-secure-housing-units-2014-2/), was the lead plaintiff. The suit was settled in September 2015, addressing many of the strikers’ concerns about how people end up in solitary and how long they remain there. 2013 Guantanamo Hunger Strike Detainees at the U.S. military prison in Cuba [began hunger-striking in March 2013](http://media.miamiherald.com/static/media/projects/gitmo_chart/) to fight against their indefinite detention and alleged mistreatment. At the strike’s peak in July that year, 106 men were refusing to eat and 45 were being force-fed through nasal tubes. The strike — for its duration, size, and the graphic nature of force-feeding — outraged the public and policymakers and [increased pressure](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/opinion/president-obama-and-the-hunger-strike-at-guantanamo.html?_r=0) on President Obama to fulfill his promise of closing the controversial prison. Since the strike, Obama has lowered the number of men held at Guantanamo [from over 2,000 to 61](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article97896012.html), but has yet to close the prison entirely. 2015-2016 Immigration Detention Center Hunger Strikes Since 2015, hunger strikes have begun at various immigration detention centers — prison-like facilities where immigrants are held while their deportation case is decided — throughout the U.S. [Roughly 200 detainees](http://www.cbs5az.com/story/29312788/200-detainees-stage-hunger-strike-at-eloy-detention-center) at Eloy Detention Center in Arizona stopped eating in June 2015, in part to pressure an investigation into [recent deaths at the facility](http://www.cbs5az.com/story/29312788/200-detainees-stage-hunger-strike-at-eloy-detention-center). [That fall](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/11/why-are-hundreds-detained-immigrants-going-hunger-strike), immigrants in detention in California, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas also stopped eating to object to their indefinite detention and poor conditions. More recently, 22 mothers being held with their children in a family detention center in Pennsylvania went on a [hunger strike this August](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mothers-immigrant-detention-hunger-strike_us_57b3698be4b04ff883990132). Their strike accompanied a series of [handwritten letters](http://grassrootsleadership.org/blog/2015/10/breaking-least-27-women-hunger-strike-hutto-detention-center-hutto27) they sent to immigration officials asking to be released from indefinite detention. The strike has continued off-and-on since then, with even their [children threatening to refuse to attend classes](http://www.democracynow.org/2016/9/8/headlines/children_held_at_berks_threaten_school_strike_amid_parents_hunger_strike) in solidarity with their mothers. It’s too soon to tell what the impact of their protests might be.

## [2] CP

#### CP Text: The United States ought to ban incarcerated labor that involves unsafe working conditions, sub-minimum wages, and risks inmates going into debt – Harker reads some examples in blue

1AC Elsen Lauren-Brooke Eisen [director of the Brennan Center’s Justice Program where she leads the organization’s work to end mass incarceration], 20 - ("Covid-19 Highlights the Need for Prison Labor Reform," Brennan Center for Justice, 4-17-2020, accessed 11-4-2021, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/covid-19-highlights-need-prison-labor-reform)//ML

For decades, prisoners in American correctional facilities have worked for no wages or mere pennies an hour. As the United States attempts to reduce transmission of Covid-19, more than a dozen states are now relying on this captive labor force to manufacture personal protective equipment badly needed by healthcare workers and other frontline responders.¶ [Prisoners in Missouri](https://wgem.com/2020/03/31/missouri-governor-provides-updates-on-covid-19-response/) are currently earning between $0.30 and $0.71 an hour to produce hand sanitizer, toilet paper, and protective gowns that will be distributed across the state. In Louisiana, prisoners are [making hand sanitizer](https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/coronavirus/article_98081a40-74ea-11ea-b367-2774f5090b74.html) for about $0.40 an hour. And in Arkansas, where incarcerated workers are [producing](https://www.eldoradonews.com/news/2020/apr/02/state-prisoners-manufacturing-masks/) cloth masks for prisoners, correctional officers, and other government workers, their labor is entirely uncompensated.¶ This unprecedented health emergency is re-exposing how our country’s long-held practice of paying nothing or next-to-nothing for incarcerated labor, with no labor protections, is akin to modern-day slavery.¶ Prisoners are not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the federal law establishing minimum wage and overtime pay eligibility for both private sector and government workers. In 1993, a federal appeals court [held](https://casetext.com/case/harker-v-state-use-industries) that it is up to Congress, not the courts, to decide whether the FLSA applies to incarcerated workers.¶ Courts have also [ruled](https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/) that the National Labor Relations Act, which guarantees the right of private sector employees to collective bargaining, does not apply in prisoners.¶ Even worse, prisoners are excluded from the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration protections that require employers to provide a safe working environment. This dehumanizing lack of protection for prison workers has long subjected them to conditions that have [endangered their physical safety](https://theintercept.com/2016/12/28/california-blames-incarcerated-workers-for-unsafe-conditions-and-amputations/).¶ Amid a health threat that [worsens in crowded environments](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/09/coronavirus-hits-workers-inmates-jails-prisons-threatened/2968807001/), many prisoners are working without any mandated protections. Congress must amend the language of federal employment protections to explicitly extend to work behind bars.¶ Forced labor in prisons has its roots in the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, when Southern planters faced the need to pay the labor force that had long worked for free under brutal conditions to produce the economic capital of the South.¶ Though the 13th Amendment abolished “involuntary servitude,” it excused forcible labor as punishment for those convicted of crimes. As a result, Southern states codified punitive laws, known as the Black Codes, to arbitrarily criminalize the activity of their former slaves. Loitering and congregating after dark, among other innocuous activities, suddenly became criminal. Arrest and convictions bound these alleged criminals to terms of incarceration, often sentenced to unpaid labor for wealthy plantation owners.¶ In the following decades, Southern states — desperate for cheap labor and revenue — widely began leasing prisoners to local planters and Northern industrialists who took responsibility for their housing and feeding, a practice known as convict leasing.¶ Under this system, the captive labor market worked long hours in unsafe conditions, often treated as [poorly](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/books/10masl.html) as they had been as slaves. Records [approximate](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=35zwA6yMbAgC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Robert+Zieger,+%E2%80%9CFor+Jobs+and+Freedom:+Race+and+Labor+in+America+Since+1965.%E2%80%9D+&ots=EBzrbvCklq&sig=YkRKzrWlFAqE7YG00vNHgFBAPJ8#v=onepage&q=Robert%20Zieger%2C%20%E2%80%9CFor%20Jobs%20and%20Freedom%3A%20Race%20and%20Labor%20in%20America%20Since%201965.%E2%80%9D&f=false) that on an average day between 1885 and 1920, 10,000 to 20,000 prisoners — the overwhelming majority of them Black Americans — continued to toil under these insufferable circumstances.¶ In the 1930s, a [series of laws](http://www.ncpathinktank.org/pub/st206?pg=3) prohibited state prisons from using prison labor, but the federal government continued to rely on this workforce to meet the demands of the rapidly changing markets of mid-century. By 1979, Congress passed [legislation](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/203483.pdf) allowing state corrections officials to collaborate with private industries to produce prison-made goods, birthing the modern era of prison labor. ¶ Today, [approximately 55 percent](https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csfcf05.pdf) of the American prison population works while serving their sentences. Prison jobs are broadly divided into two categories: prison support work — such as food preparation, laundry services, and maintenance work — and “correctional industries” jobs, in which prisoners might make license plates, sew military uniforms, or staff a call center. It is prisoners in correctional industries who are currently being deployed to help meet the nation’s need for protective gear.¶ While so many behind bars are manufacturing items the country desperately needs to combat our current health crisis, their low wages and lack of labor protections — among myriad other factors — mean they are not accorded the same benefits or recognition as other workers.¶ What’s more, the measly cents per hour that is typical compensation across often-dangerous prison jobs is not nearly enough to cover the court fees and fines, restitution, child support, and room and board expenses that most state departments of corrections deduct from prisoners’ earnings. When there is anything left, it is barely enough to pay for commissary goods such as food, hygienic products, and toiletries, let alone marked-up email services that prisoners rely on to stay in touch with their loved ones. Despite working for years, many prisoners are left with thousands of dollars in ~~crippling~~ debt by the time they complete their sentences.¶ In 2018, prisoners in dozens of facilities across the country went on strike and issued a [list of demands](https://incarceratedworkers.org/campaigns/prison-strike-2018), which included “an immediate end to prison slavery” and that prisoners be “paid the prevailing wage in their state or territory for their labor.”¶ This time of national emergency requires that everyone do their part to slow the spread of coronavirus. The significant shortage of face masks, protective gowns, and hand sanitizer that is putting the lives of our frontline workers in jeopardy necessitates bold and swift action. But if the states and [federal](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-06/federal-inmates-to-make-cloth-virus-masks-for-prisoners-guards) government are going to rely on correctional labor to manufacture this equipment, they need to improve the wages and labor protections of our incarcerated workers. To fail to do so is not far off from the devaluation and brutalization of slave labor that was ostensibly abandoned a century and a half ago.

#### This solves 100% of the AFF – they say that abusive jobs are bad, we get rid of them – that’s their own evidence

#### They will say that prisoners still need to make money, but

#### [1] That is just another link to the legalism K – the idea that prisoners should strike and put their wellbeing on the line for months and months just to earn $0.05 more an hour in marginally better conditions is somehow worthy employment that should be seen as a net positive for them to engage in only seeks to legitimize incredibly abusive prison labor practices that are slightly better than what we have now

#### [2] Militant strikes are the only ones that empirically have a chance of working – that’s White from the CLS K. Our alternative also incorporates violent and disruptive outside praxis that the AFF would still render illegal – slave rebellions, outside blockades of roads leading to jails, breaking of sewing machines inmates have to use to make masks, mass picketing outside the homes of police officers, de-arresting to pre-emptively strike individuals about to be forced into jail and parted from their labor, etc are all illegal even with a right to strike, but embracing strikes as purposely illegal and disruptive acts without trying to be palatable or included within liberal law is key to empowerment