## T

#### Interpretation - the aff may not claim offense from anything other than the instrumental implementation of a policy stating that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### “Appropriation” refers to the taking of property for exclusive and permanent use

Gorove 69 [Stephen, Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of Law, Ole Miss] “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 37 Issue 3, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr>, 1969 RE

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.

#### “Is unjust” requires positive action to rectify the injustice

Pomerleau [Wayne, PhD, Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga] “Western Theories of Justice”, IEP, <https://iep.utm.edu/justwest/>, last date cited is 2010, RE

Nozick (a departmental colleague of Rawls at Harvard) was one of the first and remains one of the most famous critics of Rawls’s liberal theory of justice. Both are fundamentally committed to individual liberty. But as a libertarian, Nozick is opposed to compromising individual liberty in order to promote socio-economic equality and advocates a “minimal state” as the only sort that can be socially just. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), especially in its famous chapter on “Distributive Justice,” while praising Rawls’s first book as the most important “work in political and moral philosophy” since that of Mill, Nozick argues for what he calls an “entitlement conception of justice” in terms of three principles of just holdings. First, anyone who justly acquires any holding is rightly entitled to keep and use it. Second, anyone who acquires any holding by means of a just transfer of property is rightly entitled to keep and use it. It is only through some combination of these two approaches that anyone is rightly entitled to any holding. But some people acquire holdings unjustly—e.g., by theft or fraud or force—so that there are illegitimate holdings. So, third, justice can require the rectification of unjust past acquisitions. These three principles of just holdings—“the principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectification of the violations of the first two principles”—constitute the core of Nozick’s libertarian entitlement theory of justice. People should be entitled to use their own property as they see fit, so long as they are entitled to it. On this view, any pattern of distribution, such as Rawls’s difference principle, that would force people to give up any holdings to which they are entitled in order to give it to someone else (i.e., a redistribution of wealth) is unjust. Thus, for Nozick, any state, such as ours or one Rawls would favor, that is “more extensive” than a minimal state and redistributes wealth by taxing those who are relatively well off to benefit the disadvantaged necessarily “violates people’s rights” (State, pp. 149, 183, 230, 150-153, 230-231, 149).

#### US Code defines private entities

US Code 6 U.S. Code § 1501 – Definitions, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/1501#15_A>, 2015 RE

(15)Private entity

(A)In general

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

(B)Inclusion

The term “private entity” includes a State, tribal, or local government performing utility services, such as electric, natural gas, or water services.

(C)Exclusion

The term “private entity” does not include a foreign power as defined in section 1801 of title 50.

#### “Outer space” is defined as:

Vereshchetin 06 [Vladlen, former Member of the ICJ, Chairman of the International Law Commission, and Professor of International Law] “Outer Space,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, <https://spacelaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_spacelaw/EPIL_Outer_Space.pdf>, 2006 RE

A. Definition of the Term ‘Outer Space’

1 The term ‘outer space’, like several other basic notions of space law (‘outer space activity’, ‘space flight’, ‘space object’), although frequently used in space agreements and other space law instruments, has never been defined by them. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the objective difficulty for the States concerned to agree on legal definitions in the context of rapidly developing technology and their apprehension that legally binding definitions might restrict their sphere of operation.

2 The absence of a formal definition of outer space does not mean that no general perception exists as to what is meant by outer space, even if the use of the term in natural sciences and in law may not always be exactly the same. It should be remembered that there is no definitive physical boundary between atmospheric space and extra-atmospheric space, the transition from one to the other being gradual. Although at 100 km the density of the air is but one millionth of what it is at sea level, for natural scientists these two regions of space, in some respects, may be perceived as one single whole. However, with the launching of the first satellite in 1957 the notion of outer space became inextricably linked with the exploration and uses of space by means of man-made spacecraft (→ Spacecraft, Satellites, and Space Objects). The physical and technical factors are directly relevant to the legal regulation of the region of space concerned. The atmospheric space of the earth and most of the activities in this space fall within the ambit of → Air Law. The space beyond the atmosphere is governed by space law. The ‘spatial’ element of each of the two above-mentioned branches of law is reflected in their denominations: the first being known as air (ie atmospheric) law, the second as space law, often referred to as outer space (ie extra-atmospheric) law.

3 The legal regimes governing → airspace and outer space are fundamentally different. Thus, logically and jurisprudentially it is necessary to know where air space ends and outer space begins. In theory, there must be no ‘outer’ boundary of application of space law, since outer space itself is limitless, but in practice space law, keeping pace with the development of space technology, does not purport to regulate space activity beyond the solar system (see Art. 1 Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3]). At the same time, ‘celestial bodies’ of the solar system, other than the earth, but comprising the Moon, are included in the legal notion of outer space (→ Moon and Celestial Bodies). This follows from the title and text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies ([signed 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967] 610 UNTS 205) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

#### Violation: <insert>

#### Topical version of the aff: [insert]. Disads to the TVA just prove there is neg ground and that it’s a contestable stasis

**Vote Neg – The resolution is the only common stasis point that anchors negative preparation. Allowing any aff deviation from the resolution is a moral hazard which justifies an infinite number of unpredictable arguments with thin ties to the resolution. Because debate is a competitive game, their interpretation incentivizes affirmatives to run further towards fringes and revert to truisms which are exceedingly difficult to negate—this asymmetry is compounded by their monopoly on preparation**

#### That outweighs – The competitive incentive from debate creates pressures for research and focused clash which generates important skills and makes debate a training ground for future work. The impact is movements -- activism is not automatic, but requires learning to defend a proposal against rigorous negation to develop skills for strategy, organizing, problem-solving, using resources, and creating coalitions---their impact turns aren’t unique because the government will inevitably try to capture public worry, the only question is creating alternative incentives for people to organize.

Lakey 13. (George Lakey co-founded Earth Quaker Action Group which just won its five-year campaign to force a major U.S. bank to give up financing mountaintop removal coal mining. Along with college teaching he has led 1,500 workshops on five continents and led activist projects on local, national, and international levels. Among many other books and articles, he is author of “Strategizing for a Living Revolution” in David Solnit’s book Globalize Liberation. 8 skills of a well-trained activist. June 11, 2013. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/8-skills-of-a-well-trained-activist/>)

Why more training now? The history of training is a history of playing catch-up. Very few movements seem to realize that the pace of change can accelerate so rapidly that it outstrips the movement’s ability to use its opportunities fully. In Istanbul a small group of environmentalists sit down to save a park, and suddenly there are protests in over 60 Turkish cities; the agenda expands, from green space to governance to capitalism; doors open everywhere. It would be a good moment to have tens of thousands of skilled organizers ready to seize the day, supporting smart direct action and building prefigurative institutions. But excitement alone may slacken; as with the Occupy movement, spontaneous creativity has its limits. With the right skills, movements can sustain themselves for years against punishing, murderous resistance. The mass direct action phase of the civil rights movement pushed on effectively for a decade after 1955. Mass excitement doesn’t need to fizzle in a year. A movement thrives by solving the problems it faces. Anti-authoritarians don’t want to count on a movement’s top leaders to be the problem-solvers, but instead to develop shared leadership by fostering problem-solving smarts at the grassroots. There’s nothing automatic about grassroots problem-solving. How well people strategize, organize, invent creative tactics, reach effectively to allies, use the full resources of the group and persevere at times of discouragement — all that can be enhanced by training. Nothing is more predictable than that there will be increased turbulence in the United States and many other societies. Activists cause some of the turbulence by rising up; other turbulence results from things like climate change, the 1 percent’s austerity programs and other forces outside activists’ immediate control. Increased turbulence scares a lot of people. It’s only natural that people will look around for reassurance. The ruling class will offer one kind of reassurance. The big question is: What reassurance will the movement offer? When students in Paris in May 1968 launched a campaign that quickly moved into nationwide turbulence, with 11 million workers striking and occupying, there was a momentary chance for the middle class to side with the students and workers instead of siding with the 1 percent. The movement, though, didn’t understand enough about the basic human need for security and failed to use its opportunity. That was a strategic error, but to choose a different path the movement would have required participants with more skills. Training would have been necessary. We can learn from this, inventory the skills needed and train ourselves accordingly. What is training ready to do for us? Here are a few of the key benefits that we should expect to gain from one another through training: 1. Increase the creativity of direct action strategy and tactics. The Yes Men and the Center for Story-Based Strategy lead workshops in which activist groups break out of the lockstep of “marches-and-rallies.” We need to have a broad array of tactics at our disposal, and we have to be ready to invent new ones when necessary. 2. Prepare participants psychologically for the struggle. The Pinochet regime in Chile depended, as dictatorships usually do, on fear to maintain its control. In the 1980s a group committed to nonviolent struggle encouraged people to face their fears directly in a three-step process: small group training sessions in living rooms, followed by “hit-and-run” nonviolent actions, followed by debriefing sessions. By teaching people to control their fear, trainers were building a movement to overthrow the dictator. 3. Develop group morale and solidarity for more effective action. In 1991 members of ACT UP — a militant group protesting U.S. AIDS policy — were beaten up by Philadelphia police during a demonstration. The police were found guilty of using unnecessary force and the city paid damages, but ACT UP members realized they could reduce the chance of future brutality by working in a more united and nonviolent way. Before their next major action they invited a trainer to conduct a workshop where they clarified the strategic question of nonviolence and then role-played possible scenarios. The result: a high-spirited, unified and effective action. 4. Deepen participants’ understanding of the issues. The War Resisters League’s Handbook for Nonviolent Action is an example of the approach that takes even a civil disobedience training as an opportunity to assist participants to take a next step regarding racism, sexism and the like. When we understand how seemingly separate struggles are connected, it helps us create a broader, stronger, more interconnected movement. 5. Build skills for applying nonviolent action in situations of threat and turbulence. In Haiti a hit squad abducted a young man just outside the house where a trained peace team was staying; the team immediately intervened and, although surrounded by twice their number of guards with weapons, succeeded in saving the man from being hung. Through training, we can learn how to react to emergencies like this in disciplined, effective ways. 6. Build alliances across movement lines. In Seattle in the 1980s, a workshop drew striking workers from the Greyhound bus company and members of ACT UP. The workshop reduced the prejudice each group had about the other, and it led some participants to support each other’s struggle. Trainings are a valuable opportunity to bring people from different walks of life together and help them work toward their common goals. 7. Create activist organizations that don’t burn people out. The Action Mill, Spirit in Action, and the Stone House all offer workshops to help activists to stay active in the long run. I’ve seen a lot of accumulated skill lost to movements over the years because people didn’t have the support or endurance to stay in the fight. 8. Increase democracy within the movement. In the 1970s the Movement for a New Society developed a pool of training tools and designs that it shared with the grassroots movement against nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement went up against some of the largest corporations in America and won. The movement delayed construction, which raised costs, and planted so many seeds of doubt in the public mind about safety that the eventual meltdown of the Three Mile Island plant brought millions of people to the movement’s point of view. The industry’s goal of building 1,000 nuclear plants evaporated. Significantly, the campaign succeeded without needing to create a national structure around a charismatic leader. Activists learned the skills of shared leadership and democratic decision-making through workshops, practice and feedback. In my book Facilitating Group Learning, I share many lessons that have evolved from Freire’s day to ours. I hope that readers of this column will add to the list of training providers in the comments, since I’ve only named some. My intention is to remind us that this could be the right moment, before the next wave of turbulence has all of us in crisis-mode again, to increase training capacity for grassroots skill-building. We’ll be very glad we did.

#### Debate doesn’t have any effect on the political and the individual arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, even if they spur immediate reflection, those insights aren’t integrated into deep-stored memory—this means you can vote negative on presumption. Encouraging focused, nuanced research and clash is the only chance to change attitudes long term—which means they can’t solve their impact turns but our model can.

#### Filter their impacts through predictable testability ---debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered---a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

## Case

#### Privatization is necessary for space colonization – disruptions kill that potential

Thiessen ‘20 – writes a twice-weekly column for The Post on foreign and domestic policy. He is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and the former chief speechwriter for President George W. Bush. (Marc A., "SpaceX’s success is one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism," Washington Post, 6-1-2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/01/spacexs-success-is-one-small-step-man-one-giant-leap-capitalism/, Accessed 1-6-2021, )

It was one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism. Only three countries have ever launched human beings into orbit. This past weekend, SpaceX became the first private company ever to do so, when it sent its Crew Dragon capsule into space aboard its Falcon 9 rocket and docked with the International Space Station. This was accomplished by a company Elon Musk started in 2002 in a California strip mall warehouse with just a dozen employees and a mariachi band. At a time when our nation is debating the merits of socialism, SpaceX has given us an incredible testament to the power of American free enterprise. While the left is advocating unprecedented government intervention in almost every sector of the U.S. economy, from health care to energy, today Americans are celebrating the successful privatization of space travel. If you want to see the difference between what government and private enterprise can do, consider: It took a private company to give us the first space vehicle with touch-screen controls instead of antiquated knobs and buttons. It took a private company to give us a capsule that can fly entirely autonomously from launch to landing — including docking — without any participation by its human crew. It also took a private company to invent a reusable rocket that can not only take off but land as well. When the Apollo 11 crew reached the moon on July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong declared “the Eagle has landed.” On Saturday, SpaceX was able to declare that the Falcon had landed when its rocket settled down on a barge in the Atlantic Ocean — ready to be used again. That last development will save the taxpayers incredible amounts of money. The cost to NASA for launching a man into space on the space shuttle orbiter was $170 million per seat, compared with just $60 million to $67 million on the Dragon capsule. The cost for the space shuttle to send a kilogram of cargo into to space was $54,500; with the Falcon rocket, the cost is just $2,720 — a decrease of 95 percent. And while the space shuttle cost $27.4 billion to develop, the Crew Dragon was designed and built for just $1.7 billion — making it the lowest-cost spacecraft developed in six decades. SpaceX did it in six years — far faster than the time it took to develop the space shuttle. The private sector does it better, cheaper, faster and more efficiently than government. Why? Competition. Today, SpaceX has to compete with a constellation of private companies — including legacy aerospace firms such as Orbital ATK and United Launch Alliance and innovative start-ups such as Blue Origin (which is designing a Mars lander and whose owner, Jeff Bezos, also owns The Post) and Virgin Orbit (which is developing rockets than can launch satellites into space from the underside of a 747, avoiding the kinds of weather that delayed the Dragon launch). In the race to put the first privately launched man into orbit, upstart SpaceX had to beat aerospace behemoth Boeing and its Starliner capsule to the punch. It did so — for more than $1 billion less than its competitor. That spirit of competition and innovation will revolutionize space travel in the years ahead. Indeed, Musk has his sights set far beyond Earth orbit. Already, SpaceX is working on a much larger version of the Falcon 9 reusable rocket called Super Heavy that will carry a deep-space capsule named Starship capable of carrying up to 100 people to the moon and eventually to Mars. Musk’s goal — the reason he founded SpaceX — is to colonize Mars and make humanity a multiplanetary species. He has set a goal of founding a million-person city on Mars by 2050 complete with iron foundries and pizza joints. Can it be done? Who knows. But this much is certain: Private-sector innovation is opening the door to a new era of space exploration. Wouldn’t it be ironic if, just as capitalism is allowing us to explore the farthest reaches of our solar system, Americans decided to embrace socialism back here on Earth?

#### Happens by 2050s---solves every impact BUT degrowth disrupts progress

Drake '16 – a science journalist and contributing writer at National Geographic. She earned an A.B. in biology, psychology, and dance at Cornell University, worked in a clinical genetics lab at The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, then returned to Cornell for her Ph.D. in genetics and development. (Bynadia, "Elon Musk: A Million Humans Could Live on Mars By the 2060s," Science, 9-27-2016, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/elon-musk-spacex-exploring-mars-planets-space-science, Accessed 6-10-2021, )

In perhaps the most eagerly anticipated aerospace announcement of the year, SpaceX founder Elon Musk has revealed his grand plan for establishing a human settlement on Mars. In short, Musk thinks it’s possible to begin shuttling thousands of people between Earth and our smaller, redder neighbor sometime within the next decade or so. And not too long after that—perhaps 40 or a hundred years later, Mars could be home to a self-sustaining colony of a million people. “This is not about everyone moving to Mars, this is about becoming multiplanetary,” he said on September 27 at the International Astronautical Congress in Guadalajara, Mexico. “This is really about minimizing existential risk and having a tremendous sense of adventure.” Musk’s timeline sounds ambitious, and that's something he readily acknowledges. “I think the technical outline of the plan is about right. He also didn’t pretend that it was going to be easy and that they were going to do it in ten years,” says Bobby Braun, NASA’s former chief technologist who’s now at Georgia Tech University. “I mean, who’s to say what’s possible in a hundred years?” And for those wondering whether we should go at all, the reason for Musk making Mars an imperative is simple. “The future of humanity is fundamentally going to bifurcate along one of two directions: Either we’re going to become a multiplanet species and a spacefaring civilization, or we’re going be stuck on one planet until some eventual extinction event,” Musk told Ron Howard during an interview for National Geographic Channel’s MARS, a global event series that premieres worldwide on November 14. “For me to be excited and inspired about the future, it’s got to be the first option. It’s got to be: We’re going to be a spacefaring civilization.” Mars Fleet Though he admitted his exact timeline is fuzzy, Musk thinks it’s possible humans could begin flying to Mars by the mid-2020s. And he thinks the plan for getting there will go something like this: It starts with a really big rocket, something at least 200 feet tall when fully assembled. In a simulation of what SpaceX calls its Interplanetary Transport System, a spacecraft loaded with astronauts will launch on top of a 39-foot-wide booster that produces a whopping 28 million pounds of thrust. Using 42 Raptor engines, the booster will accelerate the assemblage to 5,374 miles an hour. Overall, the whole thing is 3.5 times more powerful than NASA’s Saturn V, the biggest rocket built to date, which carried the Apollo missions to the moon. Perhaps not coincidentally, the SpaceX rocket would launch from the same pad, 39A, at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The rocket would deliver the crew capsule to orbit around Earth, then the booster would steer itself toward a soft landing back at the launch pad, a feat that SpaceX rocket boosters have been doing for almost a year now. Next, the booster would pick up a fuel tanker and carry that into orbit, where it would fuel the spaceship for its journey to Mars. Once en route, that spaceship would deploy solar panels to harvest energy from the sun and conserve valuable propellant for what promises to be an exciting landing on the Red Planet. As Musk envisions it, fleets of these crew-carrying capsules will remain in Earth orbit until a favorable planetary alignment brings the two planets close together—something that happens every 26 months. “We’d ultimately have upward of a thousand or more spaceships waiting in orbit. And so the Mars colonial fleet would depart en masse,” Musk says. The key to his plan is reusing the various spaceships as much as possible. “I just don’t think there’s any way to have a self-sustaining Mars base without reusability. I think this is really fundamental,” Musk says. “If wooden sailing ships in the old days were not reusable, I don’t think the United States would exist.” Musk anticipates being able to use each rocket booster a thousand times, each tanker a hundred times, and each spaceship 12 times. At the beginning, he imagines that maybe a hundred humans would be hitching a ride on each ship, with that number gradually increasing to more than 200. By his calculations, then, putting a million people on Mars could take anywhere from 40 to a hundred years after the first ship launches. And, no, it would not necessarily be a one-way trip: “I think it’s very important to give people the option of returning,” Musk says. Colonizing Mars After landing a few cargo-carrying spacecraft without people on Mars, starting with the Red Dragon capsule in 2018, Musk says the human phase of colonization could begin. For sure, landing a heavy craft on a planet with a thin atmosphere will be difficult. It was tough enough to gently lower NASA’s Curiosity rover to the surface, and at 2,000 pounds, that payload weighed just a fraction of Musk’s proposed vessels. For now, Musk plans to continue developing supersonic retrorockets that can gradually and gently lower a much heavier spacecraft to the Martian surface, using his reusable Falcon 9 boosters as a model. And that’s not all these spacecraft will need: Hurtling through the Martian atmosphere at supersonic speeds will test even the most heat-tolerant materials on Earth, so it’s no small task to design a spacecraft that can withstand a heated entry and propulsive landing—and then be refueled and sent back to Earth so it can start over again. The first journeys would primarily serve the purpose of delivering supplies and establishing a propellant depot on the Martian surface, a fuel reservoir that could be tapped into for return trips to Earth. After that depot is set up and cargo delivered to the surface, the fun can (sort of) begin. Early human settlers will need to be good at digging beneath the surface and dredging up buried ice, which will supply precious water and be used to make the cryo-methane propellant that will power the whole enterprise. As such, the earliest interplanetary spaceships would probably stay on Mars, and they would be carrying mostly cargo, fuel, and a small crew: “builders and fixers” who are “the hearty explorer type,” Musk said to Howard. “Are you prepared to die? If that’s OK, then you’re a candidate for going.” While there will undoubtedly be intense competition and lots of fanfare over the first few seats on a Mars-bound mission, Musk worries that too much emphasis will be placed on those early bootprints. “In the sort of grander historical context, what really matters is being able to send a large number of people, like tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people, and ultimately millions of tons of cargo,” he says.

#### That solve *every impact*

Bates 17 (Jordan, Executive Editor at HighExistence LLC, "In Order to Ensure Our Survival, We Must Become a Multi-Planetary Species", Futurism, 5-8-17, https://futurism.com/in-order-to-ensure-human-survival-we-must-become-a-multi-planetary-species/, DOA: 7-28-2017) //Snowball

We possess thousands of nuclear warheads capable of occasioning an existential catastrophe, and we are at the liberty of a fairly fragile global ecosystem with limited resources. Beyond that, our being confined to this single planet means that a single asteroid collision or some other unforeseen cataclysmic event could wipe out our entire species and potentially all intelligent life on Earth. There are numerous other theorized existential risks (e.g. risks arising from advances in artificial intelligence, biotech, nanotech, etc.) as well. In his pioneering 2002 paper, Dr. Nick Bostrom defined “existential risk” as follows: “Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come.” If it sounds far-fetched to consider earthly extinction scenarios, it shouldn’t. Many intelligent people are discussing this topic, and many are even devoting their lives to attempting to avert crisis situations that could decimate earthly intelligent life. The Future of Life Institute, Future of Humanity Institute, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, and Centre for the Study of Existential Risk are a few prominent organizations specifically dedicated to this cause. According to Muller and Bostrom (2014), a sample of the top 100 most-cited authors on artificial intelligence ascribed a 10% chance of existential catastrophe when and if AI reaches human-level intelligence. In 2008, a group of experts at the Global Catastrophic Risk Conference at Oxford estimated a 19% chance of human extinction before 2100. If you’re curious to know more about existential risk, Bostrom’s landmark 2002 paper is the place to start. You may also want to follow this list I compiled on Twitter of the best sources of information related to existential risk. HOW TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF OUR EVOLUTIONARY BRANCH The various existential risks that threaten to decimate humanity and the entire earthly biosphere in the coming decades and centuries have, as I said, compelled a multitude of very smart people to consider how best to avoid the potential catastrophes we’ve identified and how best to identify potential catastrophes that we have yet to notice. Other smart folks have begun asking a similar question: If a catastrophe does occur, how can we at least ensure that our evolutionary branch will persist? One popular answer, in certain circles, is that we must become a multi-planetary species as soon as possible.

#### Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Pummer 15

(Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### The future is a contingent phenomenon but foreclosing any hope destroys the possibility of survival---you should prioritize material adjustments in living conditions because they produce the conditions for more radical politics down the line

**Ruti 17** (Mari, Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies at the University of Toronto, “The Ethiscs of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects,” Page 127-129)

It seems to me that the humanist subject can die in a variety of different ways. Edelman’s account of queer antisociality drains the subject of creativity, meaning, relationality, and agency, allowing it to be overtaken by the mindless pulsation of the death drive. But there are those of us who would like to reconfigure the posthumanist subject in less dejected terms, who, instead of dismissing notions like creativity, meaning, relationality, agency, and inner restoration, would like to figure out what these concepts might mean in the posthumanist context. This is not a matter of returning to a time before poststructuralism but rather of working toward a place beyond it; it is not a matter of discarding the critical tools that we have gained from poststructuralism but rather of putting these tools to less doctrinaire use; and it is not a matter of holding on to an outdated vision of the masterful and self-transparent subject but rather of building a better understanding of what it means to live in the world as an embodied creature who can never fully master or understand the parameters of its own being.

It is not insignificant that those of us advancing this softer version of posthumanist theory tend to possess a strong commitment to matters of social survival, justice, and responsibility. Among other things, this commitment explains why we are not averse to the possibility that hopefulness may at times be more radical than the cynicism of neo-Lacanian austerity. I  would propose that it is in these more limber genres of posthumanist theory that the innovative (rather than merely defensive) spirit of poststructuralism lives on in a reinvigorated form. I would also argue—and this point should not be taken as a criticism of Edelman, whose stylistic acrobatics I count among the merits of No Future—that insofar as these new forms of posthumanist theory reject faithfulness to torpid forms of overworked rhetoric, they exemplify what is most revolutionary about queer theory, namely, its resistance to obsolete kinship structures of all kinds. For me at least, there is nothing as strange as queer theory that remains intractably devoted to the most sacrosanct pieties of poststructuralism.

Let us assume from the outset that the subject is alienated, fragmented, and non-self-identical, that its every attempt at self-mastery is undermined by unconscious currents of desire, and that its sociality is always to some extent disrupted by the antisocial energies of the real. Let us also assume that nonreproductive pleasure is valuable, that eros in its unshackled form is rebellious, and that we want to defeat heteronormative, patriarchal, and racist structures of social organization. What we are then left with is the dicey question of how the queer subject—or any subject for that matter—is to proceed with its life. After all, the fact that the subject is socially constituted rather than essential, that it only manages to attain a culturally intelligible identity at the price of lack, and that it is internally torn by antagonistic forces that pull it in contradictory directions does not mean that it is released from the task of fashioning a livable life for itself; if anything, it means that this task is all the more demanding, sometimes even perhaps calling for the type of negotiation with hegemonic power that Butler advocates.

The main fissure I see in contemporary queer theory resides between those who recognize the necessity of such existential negotiation—affect theorists such as Berlant being the most obvious example—and those who persist in the notion that any concession to the idea that there are lives to be lived in the “real” world leads to soft-hearted and naïve forms of theorizing. Even though I believe that Butler negotiates too willingly, I find Edelman’s extreme version of queer antisociality even more problematic, which is why I have sought to offer an alternative reading of Lacanian negativity. I have sought to show that, far from foreclosing the future in the manner that Edelman proposes, Lacanian negativity holds open the future as a space of ever-renewed possibility. This insight in turn allows me to conceptualize the contours of (queer) subjectivity along less nihilistic lines. After all, barring some life-erasing catastrophe, there will always be a future in the future, even (hopefully for some time) for Professor Edelman. The question that remains—the only question worth asking—is what this future should (or could) entail.

#### Utopianism is valuable for pursuing equity---wholesale rejections of progress are theoretically useless because they don’t translate into empirical quality of life improvements, but in the process they abandon the most vulnerable populations

**Ruti 17** (Mari, Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies at the University of Toronto, “The Ethiscs of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects,” Page 88-91)

For his part, Edelman, in criticizing Muñoz’s commitment to utopianism, accuses Muñoz of the kind of liberal inclusionism that fails to recognize the insistence with which the antisocial pulse of the death drive undermines all social organization (or, in Lacanian terms, the insistence with which the real disrupts the fantasmatic coherence of the symbolic). More specifically, Edelman accuses Muñoz (and Dean) of “putting the puppet of humanism through its passion play once again” by promoting “the redemptive hope of producing brave new social collectivities” (2006, 821). Essentially, Edelman believes that Muñoz and Dean fall prey to the humanist conviction that meaning, progress, and rational understanding are able to transcend the foundational antagonisms of social life— antagonisms that Lacan captured through his notion of the real as an internal limit to symbolic closure.

Let me put some of my cards on the table right away: I think that this critique misses its mark quite drastically in the sense that, whatever faith Muñoz and Dean might have in new social collectivities, they do not, as Edelman implies, support liberal humanism’s dreams of redemption through greater inclusion; they do not believe that simply allowing previously marginalized subjects to enter the existing system would miraculously conjure away the system’s problems. Quite the contrary, both are deeply critical of the homonormative quest for social respectability that characterizes much of liberal gay and lesbian politics. In Cruising Utopia (2009), Muñoz in fact explicitly condemns homonormative gays and lesbians who allow themselves to be seduced by the material and symbolic rewards of neoliberal capitalism. One could of course point out that Edelman could not have known in 2006 what Muñoz was going to say in a book that was published three years later. But this does not change the fact that Edelman’s accusation rings false for the simple reason that it is aimed at two progressive critics who are so well versed in the basics of posthumanist theory that they in many ways take the demise of the humanist self for granted.

I cannot think of a single critic within queer theory who naïvely endorses the sovereign subject of liberal humanism. If anything—as I have already noted and will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter—the field, like the rest of American progressive theory, seems to be caught up in a compulsive cycle of needing to repeatedly expunge this subject even when very little of it remains. Furthermore, the idea that utopian thinking is by definition liberal, that there is no room for utopianism within posthumanist paradigms, is an indication of the extent to which certain strands of posthumanist theory have solidified into lifeless patterns that no longer serve a critical function; in such instances, the monotonous repetition of poststructuralist dogmas—in Edelman’s case, “hopefulness bad, negativity good” (which, notably, has the same starkly binaristic structure as Butler’s “autonomy bad, relationality good”)—serves to bar alternative perspectives that might revitalize contemporary theory by allowing us to think beyond bad–good archetypes. In this sense, Muñoz’s statement regarding Edelman’s “well-worn war chest of poststructuralist pieties” (2009, 10) is right on target, as is his rebuke of the “various romances of negativity” that have, within queer theory, become so predictable as to be “resoundingly anticritical” (12).

If Edelman’s accusations against Muñoz are relatively easy to dismiss, the reverse is not the case, for Muñoz’s indicts Edelman for perpetuating a clandestine—and therefore all the more insidious—form of white gay male identity politics: a politics that flees from the (supposedly) contaminating impact that a consideration of gender, racial, economic, and global inequalities might have on queer theory and that refuses to recognize that the white gay male subject is just as “identitarian” as any other subject. Muñoz asserts that the only reason Edelman is able to dodge the specter of identity politics is that, in Edelman’s work, white masculinity falsely configures—as it has always done—the “universal,” “neutral” subject position that (seemingly) resides beyond identitarian concern. More generally speaking, Muñoz believes that antisocial queer theories “reproduce a crypto-universal white gay subject that is weirdly atemporal” (2009, 94).

Hiram Perez makes an analogous point when he criticizes not only the ways in which whiteness, in the work of many white gay men, “makes itself transparent” (2005, 187) but also the ways in which poststructuralist rhetoric is used to level charges of essentialism against anyone who dares to call attention to this problem. Along the same lines, Halberstam rails against the “invisible identity politics of white gay men,” adding that when “white men (gay or straight) pursue the interests of white men (gay or straight), there’s a heap of trouble for everyone else” (2006, 231). Muñoz adds a final blow when he concludes that “imagining a queer subject who is abstracted from the sensuous intersectionalities that mark our experience  .  .  . is a ticket whose price most cannot afford” (2009, 96).

The battle lines are thus clearly drawn between those—(some) white gay men—for whom sexuality is the sole axis of theoretical investigation and those for whom sexuality is just one among many such axes. Muñoz does not pull his punches, notoriously calling—in the course of the PMLA exchange—the antisocial thesis “the gay white man’s last stand” (2006, 825). In Cruising Utopia, he in turn argues that Edelman “anticipates and bristles against his future critics with a precognitive paranoia” by predicting that some identitarian critics might contest his polemic by arguing that it is “determined by his middle-class white male positionality” (2009, 95). Muñoz’s candid assessment of Edelman’s efforts to inoculate himself against this critique is that it “does not do the job” (95).

The stakes of Muñoz’s accusation are high, revolving around the question of who can afford to relinquish all hope of a better future in the way that Edelman’s rendering of queer negativity—with includes the derisive critique of the child as a sentimental emblem of reproductive futurity that I mentioned in chapter 1—calls for. Muñoz suggests that only those who “have” a future in the first place have the luxury of flirting with the idea of rejecting it; conversely, those whose futures are concretely (empirically) threatened are unlikely to advocate the annihilation of these futures. More specifically, Muñoz contends that it would be disastrous to “hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity,” arguing that the fact that this version of futurity is currently winning “is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place: a ‘not-yet’ where queer youths of color actually get to grow up” (2009, 95–96). In this manner, Muñoz alerts us to the fact that while Edelman elevates the child to an icon of reproductive futurity, “the future” has never been the province of all children; that is, though Muñoz agrees with the broad outlines of Edelman’s critique of reproductive futurity, he reminds us that this critique does not apply to the vast majority of the world’s children, that “racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (95).

#### There is zero empirical basis for psychoanalysis – their authors either grossly misrepresent empirical data or hubristically extrapolate single events into broad theories

Paris 17 [Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]

In an era in which psychiatry is dominated by neuroscience-based models, psychological constructs tend to be neglected and may be taken seriously only when they have neural correlates.37 Some psychoanalysts have sought to link their model with neurobiological research and to claim that newer methods of studying the brain can validate their theories.5,6

Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, is the founder of “neuropsychoanalysis.” This new field, with its own society and its own journal, proposes to use neuroimaging to confirm analytic theories. Its key idea is that subjective experience and the unconscious mind can be observed through neuroimaging.5 It is known that brain processes can be seen on brain imaging even before they have entered consciousness.38 However, claims that neuroimaging validate Freud’s model of the unconscious can be based only on “cherry-picking” the literature. The observed correspondences are superficial and hardly support the complex edifice of psychoanalytic theory.

Solms39 has also suggested that Freud’s ideas about dreams are consistent with neuroscience research based on rapid eye movement (REM) activity. This attempt to rescue a century-old theory met with opposition from dream researchers who consider Freud’s clinical speculations to be incompatible with empirical data.40,41

The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42 Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models, without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.

However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.

Another attempt to reconcile psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.

Psychoanalysis and the Humanities

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.

This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism.

One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power.

Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history.

#### Inherency - OST implicitly banned private appropriation

Pershing 19 [Abigail, JD Candidate at Yale, BA from UChicago] "Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty's Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 44 No. 1, 2019, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1697&context=yjil> RE

Technological limitations at the time of the Treaty’s drafting are also relevant when considering the likely original scope attributed to the nonappropriation principle. Private individuals and corporations were not mentioned in the Treaty, likely not because they were purposefully excluded, but rather because the drafters at the time had no reason to imagine a need to extend the application of the Treaty to such parties.33 The Treaty was drafted under the assumption that States would be the only actors in space.34 Indeed, given the technological capabilities at the time, launching a human being into space required the full support of an entire nation—it would have been very near impossible for a private company to marshal the necessary resources to accomplish something similar on its own.

This interpretation is supported in the Treaty’s travaux préparatoires. In a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space dated June 16, 1966, Arthur Goldberg, the Permanent Representative of the United States, summarized the key points for inclusion in the eventual Outer Space Treaty. Specifically, he included as point two in his letter that “[c]elestial bodies should not be subject to any claim of sovereignty.”35 Later in the letter, when proposing draft language for the treaty itself, Goldberg incorporated this key point into a proposed treaty provision that read: “Celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States . . . .”36 The very broad “any claim of sovereignty” point was satisfied, in Goldberg’s view, by referring to States in the language of the Treaty. Had he thought that entities other than States might become involved with the exploration and use of outer space, the draft language he proposed likely would have been broader to conform to the underlying key point he described as foundational to the Treaty. Other elements of the Outer Space Treaty’s negotiating history also point to an implicit prohibition of private appropriation.37

Individual States’ reactions to the non-appropriation principle are particularly relevant. For instance, on August 4, 1966, the head of the Belgium delegation stated that his country “had taken note of the interpretation of the term ‘non-appropriation’ advanced by several delegations—apparently without contradiction—as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law.” 38 The French delegate voiced a similar opinion, mentioning that “there was reason to be satisfied that [the] basic principle [was] affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space . . . .”39