## FW

#### Western Techno-Orientalist discourses present Asians as subhuman and robotic- beings that not only lack moral capabilities but worst of all, threaten Western dominance. Creates internalized oppression and chain Asian bodies to the oppressive capitalist system

**Esaki 20**

Esaki, B. (2020) "Ted Chiang’s Asian American Amusement at Alien Arrival", Religions, 11(2), p. 56. doi: 10.3390/rel11020056. //AL

Namely, from an otherhood lens, Chiang’s stories focus on challenges to the goodness of the universe posed by technology (A versus C). That is, the central conflict is between nonhuman phenomena (the universe and technology), or Others. Others are in nearly every story of Chiang’s, such as a mythical tower, golems, angels, aliens, and so on. By locating the central conflict between Others, Chiang shifts the reader’s concern away from flawed humanity (B), even though there are many shortcomings of character in his stories. This shift in gaze can be important for those who have been othered, and Asian Americans who have been victim to multiple colonial projects may not want to affirm colonial perspectives. The colonial gaze—as John Reider has argued—undergirds much of science fiction, scrutinizes others “to maintain and reproduce the political and economic arrangements that establish the subjects’ respective positions” (Reider 2008, p. 7). Centering on the effects of humans on technology and on the universe thus may focus the reader on humanity’s relationship to Others, and, by extension, the respective position of colonist to discovered and undiscovered (sub)humans. Centering on the effects of Others on Others thereby subverts the colonial gaze, and shifts the central questions of the reader. Another reason to associate Others with technology is that SF frequently reduces Asians and Asian Americans by associating them with technology. Even if Asians are not present in body, there are common plots that mirror the Yellow Peril, with hordes of subhuman aliens or robots threatening humanity. In body, Asians have come to represent a dangerous future, or what is called high-tech Orientalism or techno-Orientalism (Morely and Robins 1995; Chun 2006). As historian Kenneth Hough has demonstrated, an early form of techno-Orientalism emerged during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, where Japanese people were illustrated as “technologically adept, modern, chivalrous, and civilized, yet savage and ultimately an existential threat to the West” (Roh et al. 2015, pp. 31–33). In this depiction, the Japanese had superhuman control of pain and no morality; as Jack London wrote in a 1904 The San Francisco Examiner essay, “Yellow Peril”: “From the West he has borrowed all of material achievement and passed our ethical achievement by … A marvelous imitator truly, but imitating us only in things material. Things spiritual cannot be imitated … and here the Japanese fails” (p. 38). This image continued and was eventually applied to China in the 1990s as it emerged in the high-tech global economy (p. 4). In this sense, science fiction plots that focus on human relationships to Others may reiterate techno-Orientalism, especially the moral vacuity of Asians and Asian Americans. In addition, such narratives may exert a discursive control over Asians and Asian Americans, where Asian American readers can either identify with the reduced Other or the subjectivity and culture of the colonist. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has argued for high-tech Orientalism, this leaves Asian Americans with two oppressive options. For one, they can see themselves as absent or subhuman. Alternatively, they can choose “to be an individual—to exceed one’s culture in order to become incorporated into a global market”; that is, Asian Americans can be an individual yet one without culture and chained to a capitalist system. In other words, the otherness of techno-Orientalism erases subjectivity along with the richness of culture and religion.

#### Techno Orientalism is pervasive yet critically neglected in academia. Counterdialouge is key to reconstruct Asian images in literature

**Roh et al. 15**

DAVID S. ROH, BETSY HUANG and GRETA A. NIU, April 27. 2015, “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media”, <https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/techno-orientalism/9780813570631> //AL

As this collection demonstrates, techno-Orientalism occurs across genres and disciplines—history, art, literature, film, television, video games—but the majority of the criticism coalesces around literature and film, particularly in the genre of speculative fiction (SF). This is unsurprising; techno-Orientalism finds some of its most pervasive expressions in SF because of the genre’s futurist esprit of contemporary existential, racial, and technological anxieties. Nevertheless, we identify a disciplinary narrowness to SF in the extant scholarship that our project attempts to broaden. Even as techno-Orientalism in SF has been documented by several incisive studies in recent decades, critical studies of Orientalism in the long history of SF are scarce. A survey of the essays published in the genre’s flagship journal, Science Fiction Studies, founded in 1973, confirms the critical neglect. A search with the term “Orientalism” in the journal’s archives yielded only nine substantive essays that address Orientalism, four of which are book reviews. A search with the term “techno-Orientalism” yielded, even more negligibly, two review essays. Similar searches in Extrapolations, another major academic venue for SF criticism, yielded equally scant results. And when PMLA, the lingua franca of academic scholarship in literature and languages, published a special issue on science fiction in May 2004, no mention of Orientalism could be found— this despite the fact that SF’s propensity for projecting and amplifying contemporary racial and imperialist attitudes is well documented.7 Indeed, the conceptualization of techno-Orientalism as a recognizable discursive effect of the postindustrial age may have been the clarion call for addressing this gap in the genre. Orientalism in SF during the pre-cyberpunk era may have suffered critical neglect because of the perception that the “yellow peril” has been kept in check by the mechanisms of immigration and exclusion acts that were in place for much of the midcentury. It took the repeal of the immigration acts in 1965, coupled with the entrance of Japanese capital and imports into the U.S. economy in the late seventies, to precipitate a renewed wariness toward all things Asian, onto which the West once again projected agendas of cultural hegemony and technological dominance. Cyberpunk, with its fetishizing gaze upon Japan as a seductive and contradictory space of futuristic innovation and ancient mystique, sharply focused the SF critical and creative lenses upon Asia. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism thus emerged in the mid1990s with the contributions of Morley and Robins, Ueno, and Sato. Critical momentum continued with Takayuki Tatsumi’s 2000 historiography of Japanese SF in Science Fiction Studies (SFS), and a 2002 special issue of SFS on Japanese speculative fiction, guest edited by Takayuki Tatsumi, Christopher Bolton, and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., introduced Japanese SF and cyberpunk visions to the Western audience. Sato’s important and incisive 2004 intersectional analysis of what she describes as “the four different categorical spheres, namely, Western cyborg philosophy, American cyberpunk, Japanese cyberpunk, and Japanese theory of uniqueness known as nihonjinron” (335–336) and Christine Cornea’s chapter “Techno-Orientalism and the Postmodern Subject” in Jacqueline Furby and Karen Randell’s Screen Methods: Comparative Readings in Film Studies (Wallflower Press, 2006) sustained the necessary critical interest in the field. These studies, however, constitute the bulk of the critical history of technoOrientalism. Other studies in recent years, such as Mimi Thi Nguyen and Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu’s Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America (Duke, 2007), Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Lynn Joyrich’s 2009 special issue of Camera Obscura, “Race and/as Technology,” Chun’s New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory Reader (Routledge, 2005), and Lisa Nakamura’s Cybertypes (Routledge, 2002), made significant contributions to critiques of Orientalism in popular culture and mainstream media. Yet, despite technoOrientalism’s growing prevalence in the Western cultural consciousness, and in SF more specifically, it has been generally ignored in academic and popular cultural spheres. A special issue of the literary journal MELUS, titled “Alien/Asians” (2008) and edited by Stephen Hong Sohn, expanded the critical scope of the phenomenon and drew it closer for theoretical scrutiny. Sohn’s introduction persuasively conveys the urgent need for vigilant documentation and analysis of the ever-growing techno-Orientalist vocabulary. The eight essays in the issue examine a range of techno-Orientalist instantiations in SF within U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Indian contexts, from “a cyberpunk-inflected Asian future” to “the cyborg technologies intertwined with Asian American bodies” (Sohn 15). The essays, Sohn writes, “investigate how alternative imaginaries provide fertile terrains to consider the prospects of racial subjectivity and identity” (15). The essayists take a hard look at the work of SF luminaries such as Philip K. Dick, Ursula K. Le Guin, William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and William S. Burroughs, whose work consciously or unconsciously traded in technoOrientalist tropes, as well as the work of Asian American and Asian Canadian writers such as Karen Tei Yamashita, Amitav Ghosh, and Larissa Lai, who mount metafictional critiques of techno-Orientalist tropes in SF. Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, therefore, has two objectives. The first is to continue the work begun by the aforementioned predecessors, to “consider the prospective thesis that cultural production is still invested in parsing out how the yellow peril continues to be a mode to draw from, write against, challenge, negotiate, and problematize” (Sohn 6–7). The volume argues that while Orientalism defines a modern West by producing an oppositional and premodern East, techno-Orientalism symmetrically and yet contradictorily completes this project by creating a collusive, futurized Asia to further affirm the West’s centrality. The second objective is constructive. While we critique the dehumanizing effects of the techno-Orientalist gaze, we also see an opportunity for critical reappropriations in texts that self-referentially engage with Asian images; indeed, as an example, Asian SF writers have already taken to the trope to create the SF cottage industry in which the subject and setting are Eastern. There is of course the danger that Asian and Asian American creators might internalize techno-Orientalist patterns and uncritically replicate the same dehumanizing model. However, thanks to its global and mass appeal, the speculative imagination in television, graphic novels, or science fiction is by no means the purview of single national traditions. Even as techno-Orientalism has become more pervasive, it has also engendered counterdialogue in those same cultural and political spaces.

## ROB

#### Discourse creates a social reality of what we believe to be the outside world

**Holzscheiter ’14** [Anna, “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations” Anna has been Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science since April 2015. During the academic year 2014-2015 she is John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.]

Those not familiar with the term “discourse” often ask: Is everything discourse? Where is the boundary between discourse and the material (touchable and observable) world? Discourse scholars answer this question by stating that **discourse is the space where human beings make sense of the material world, where they attach meaning to the world and where representations of the world become manifest.** **The existence of a material world outside discourse is, thus, not denied**—what is refuted is the assumption that we can relate to this material world without discourse (Holzscheiter 2010). In its essence, **discourse analysis is an engagement with meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality is constructed. Discourse can therefore be defined as, basically, the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, trans- formed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality.** This preliminary and broad understanding of discourse already allows distinguishing discourse from language inasmuch as discourse is an inherently social concept. Rather than simply investigating the use of language in international politics, an explo- ration of **discourse asks for the social and political effects that result from using a particular vocabulary on the one hand and the productive effects of particular constructions of reality on the agency and identity of individuals and groups.** Any singular event of speaking or producing text, thus, is part of a larger social and political process: It is conceived of as “text in social context.”

**Since Discourse shapes the way we interact,**

#### the ROB is to vote for the debater whose discourse best constructs social reality in a desirable way

#### Orientalism functions through educational institutions to build hegemony and consent with Western domination.

**Keskin 2018** (Tugrul, Middle East Studies after September 11 : Neo-Orientalism, American Hegemony and Academia http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pitt-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5449628)

As early as the 19th century, European **colonial states established a direct link between the state and educational system** in order **to** use the social sciences for their own benefit and further **exploit** and colonialize Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As a result of the economic needs driven by European industrialization, colonial states began to support and finance social science fields such as history and anthropology in order to study colonized regions and design a comprehensive foreign policy vis a vis ethnicities, religions, cultures, traditions, and social structures. We can trace the complicated **relationship between Western colonialism and imperialism** and the Western educational system to the 18th century. Edward Said describes this colonialist knowledge production and criticizes the motivations driving Middle East and Islamic studies in Western academia, especially in the postcolonial period. He understood the **real impetus behind Orientalism** as non-academic, but instead **policy-oriented with the objective of further colonialism and imperialism.** For example, anthropology was established as an academic field not because some people in Europe were really interested in other cultures, but due **to** an interest in **study**ing **other cultures and societies for the purpose of further exploitation**. As a result, most of the early **anthropologists were supported and financed by the French and British state** in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

## Links

**Speculations of the future and discourse about future utopias do not include Asians**

**Roh et al. 15**

DAVID S. ROH, BETSY HUANG and GRETA A. NIU, April 27. 2015, “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media”, <https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/techno-orientalism/9780813570631> //AL

Utopias and dystopias are fundamentally speculative; they extrapolate futures built upon the dreams, or nightmares, of the present. One such well known coordinate of the not-so-distant future is Los Angeles of 2019, November to be exact. This is a date and location fanboys might sheepishly recognize as the setting of Blade Runner, Ridley Scott’s 1982 film adaptation of Philip K. Dick’s novella about the dreams of insurrectionary androids visiting as nightmares on the minds and bodies of the human world that made them. Yet rather than dwell on that film’s conspicuous semiotics of casual, pervasive, and even ominous Asian difference (see Lowe, “Imagining Los Angeles”; Nakamura, Cybertypes), this chapter turns instead to an event a century earlier that sought to prevent such a future, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. I argue that from the seeming dystopia of 2019 Los Angeles, we can read a persistent thread of anxieties over labor exploitation and racial heterogeneity, manifested in speculative fiction. I turn then to one of the most influential works of speculative utopian fiction in American literary history: Edward Bellamy’s immensely popular novel Looking Backward 2000–1887, a text from the tumultuous 1880s that looked forward to a better 2000. Much about this text is progressive, in the narrow and broad senses of the term. Its vision of 2000 is one of a classlessness so appealing and plausible that the book momentarily inspired societies to implement the novel’s possibilities. By foregrounding the history and cultural politics of Asian exclusion, this chapter considers the extent to which the future possibilities envisioned in Looking Backward were doomed by a past and a present in which class and gendered racialization are inextricably bound. An important intervention of new left social movements has been to critically grasp the depth and complexity of the relationship of race and class in the building and maintenance of modern American civilization. With these conditions appreciated, we see how utopic and dystopic narratives not only extrapolate possible futures but also interpolate occluded pasts that the future can see more clearly than the present seems to be able to. The “color-blindness” that would be reverse engineered into the Constitution by dissenters with the onset of protected racial segregation after Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 would share with Looking Backward a common historical blindness fueled by misplaced enlightenment ideals of procedural equality that impeded a more equitable and substantive reckoning with past exploitations. Yet it should be remembered that this text dramatized the manifestation of progressive ideas. Looking Backward is the story of Julian West, a man of leisure who, through a convoluted set of circumstances, inadvertently sleeps undisturbed for 113 years in a sealed chamber in a state of cryogenic preservation in Boston. By having West narrate, the novel views the world of 2000 through the fascinated eyes of West in order to make the book’s arguments about the eventual eradication of the social and economic ills that plagued the late nineteenth century. West is repeatedly puzzled at the absence of inequalities, both substantive and procedural. Much of the novel amounts to scenes like the one from Austin Powers: the awoken man from the past is told about how things now are. West’s main interlocutor is Dr. Leete, his eventual father-in-law, who expounds at great length on the many solutions the world of 2000 has devised to the problems of 1887. There is little conventional action in Bellamy’s novel aside from this, not unlike a Platonic dialogue. Between these conversations, West also speaks with and courts Edith Leete, the doctor’s daughter. And so the marriage plot functions to formalize the union of the misguided past to the enlightened future, or in this case, present.Bellamy’s text treads a careful middle path between a communistic subsuming of the liberal individual with a Hobbesian world of individuals waging a war of all against all. His novel offers a renegotiation of the social contract where such things as private kitchens and private vehicles are vestiges of an inefficient past that failed to provide “the best for the most for the least,” to borrow the phrase of Cold Warriors Charles and Ray Eames. Given the a.d. 2000 setting of Looking Backward, the use of the Eames’ phrasing may not even really be anachronistic, as Bellamy’s world could be seen as realizing the Eames’ ideal by 2000. As an ideal, the realization of this condition in Bellamy’s novel means the elimination of fundamental differences about how the world should work and be ordered, which characterizes the terms of the Cold War. The world of 2000 means an arrival at, in other words, the end of history, and one that is the opposite of apocalyptic. The threat of apocalypse under the Cold War, that is, mutually assured destruction (MAD), may prevent wide-scale hot war, but it does not necessarily lead to prosperity. Instead it means indefinitely deferred world war, or apocalypse later. Bellamy presents a way not only of avoiding all-out class war, but of actually achieving “the best for the most for the least” everyone believes in. The late nineteenth century was no stranger to thinly veiled literary tracts that expounded on utopic visions and/or social critique. This was an era that made best sellers out of William Hope Harvey’s Coin’s Financial School and David Ames Wells’s The Dollar of the Fathers and the Dollar of the Sons, and later L. Frank Baum’s The Wonderful Wizard of Oz. What presumably made a book like Looking Backward so compelling to readers in the last decade-plus of the nineteenth century was not its fancifulness but rather its plausibility. The appeal of Looking Backward is its ability to make something as fanciful as “from each according to need and to each according to necessity”—or even desire—a seemingly realizable destiny, albeit 113 years in the making. The world that Bellamy envisions is one in which some of the key features of capitalism have been done away with, including competition, the market, individualism, private property, money, and a state apparatus dedicated to the preservation of the aforementioned. Importantly, the disappearance of these social and economic features happens not through a strong state, but rather through a collective realization that these capitalist elements are detrimental to the conditions of production, rather than necessary for such economic activity (see Beard). The time travel conceit of the novel makes it possible for there to be a glossing over of the means by which utopia was realized and for there instead to be a delightfully bewildered enjoyment of the world absent of the past’s strife. Many of these problems are solved through the introduction of new technologies. Dr. Leete’s favorite metaphorical illustration of this problem solving is the communal umbrellas that unfurl when rain falls on Boston. Rather than there being the comparatively inefficient system involving individuals’ umbrellas and the haphazard awnings we still are cursed with, the steampunkish Boston of 2000 has “a continuous waterproof covering” that shelters the sidewalks of that fair city should there be precipitation. Edith remarks, “The private umbrella is father’s favorite figure to illustrate the old way when everybody lived for himself and his family” (193). From a twenty-four-hour radiolike musical service to massive communal kitchens, the inhabitants of 2000 are protected from “hunger, cold, and nakedness” rather than “France, England, and Germany.” The enemies of these enemies—want and exposure to the elements—have become friends, unifying the nations of the world in a common cause to feed, shelter, and clothe all. It may come as no great surprise that Bellamy’s book does not include Asian American characters, or really any discernible reference to anything Oriental, for better or for worse. The main character of color, West’s nineteenth-century African American manservant Sawyer, necessarily falls away from the novel after the slumber. (Sawyer makes a brief return in the psyche-out at the end of the novel, when West dreams that 2000 was a dream only to wake up to find that 2000 is glorious after all.) For all the book’s visions of truly global transformations, it is actually a rather isolationist text, culturally and practically, even if juridically it espouses borderlessness. It presents an interconnected world, in terms of resources and economic networks, but is more or less a snapshot of the demographics that were presumed to exist in late nineteenth-century America. That is, it does not envision a future formed by waves of immigration that would diversify the ethnic and racial composition of the United States. Logically speaking then, this might imply that Looking Backward is an anti-immigrant text, imply that this ideal future does not require an industrial reserve army from beyond. But that might not be a fair or really accurate assessment. Rather, Looking Backward may be envisioning a world in which mass human movements are unnecessary and people get to stay where they are. And therefore the implicit argument is that people, given the choice, are not inclined to intermix their bodies and gene pools.

### Technology Link

#### Technological discourse isn’t neutral, it’s rooted in a techno-orientalist drive which epitomizes East Asian territories as the locus of modern innovation. The aff’s deployment of targeted discourse in the debate space is emblematic of broader civil discourse against East Asian bodies

Lozano-Mendez 10 (Artur, Undergraduate Student Majoring in East Asian Studies, Published in 2010, “TECHNO-ORIENTALISM IN EAST-ASIAN CONTEXTS: REITERATION, DIVERSIFICATION, ADAPTATION”, pg. 184) RR Jr

Techno-orientalism is an orientalist discourse that the West established hegemonically at a global scale as a power-knowledge structure. It is a discourse in the Foucauldian sense that derives from the orientalist knowledge referring to Japan, and also from the orientalist knowledge built around the “imaginative geography” that is usually labeled “East Asia.” Techno-orientalism recycles and adapts objects, archival lore, and even many of the strategies from both discursive formations on Japan and East Asia. At the same time, its rules of formation allow for novelty and the incorporation of new words to the lexicon inherited from those two preexisting discourses. The discursive relations enacting techno-orientalist discourse allow us to reveal what kind of statements about the discursive objects have become central to that discourse. The knowledge generated through techno-orientalist “discursive practice”8 attempted to explain both the role of Japan, first, and then the role of East Asia in the configuration of global economy after World War II, in a context of technological leap and acceleration of globalization.9 Nevertheless, it is not just a matter of objects and the content of statements about them. Discourse is a practice, and so it implies the entanglement of attitude, medium, support, opportunity, expectations (even cultural horizon), and a range of other factors whose relevance is sorted out by the rules of formation. Techno-orientalist discourse both produces and consists of complex and cohesive “technologies of recognition,”10 which frame the perception of everything “Japanese”—they tell us what is to be reckoned “Japanese” to begin with. Such power-knowledge structure relies on “schema of co-figuration” through “regimes of translation.”11 Techno-orientalism is not a substitute of “traditional” orientalism—rather, it co-exists with it coherently.12 Thus, techno-orientalism incorporates and gives a new spin to prejudices and misjudgments that can be traced as far back as the writings by the first Jesuit missionaries that traveled to the archipelago after St. Francis Xavier arrived to Kagoshima in 1549.

#### Asian workers in science and engineering face a cultural double bind, either they adhere to their own cultural values and be shamed for failure to advance in a Western ideal dominated field, or be integrated into the aggressive, unforgiving capitalist mindset

**Varma 02**

ROLI VARMA , Science as Culture, Volume 11, Number 3, 2002 , “HIGH-TECH COOLIES: Asian Immigrants in the US Science and Engineering Workforce”,  Homepages.ucl.ac.uk. Available at: http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucessjb/Varma%202002.pdf (Accessed: 16 December 2021).

Cultural differences between Western and Asian countries have been identified in terms of modern and traditional values. Several scholars have identified many work-related dimensions on which Western and Asian cultures differ. Most frequently cited characteristics within Western cultures are: universalism; individualism; inner-directed orientation; time as sequence; achieved status; and equality. In contrast, characteristics within Asian cultures are: particularism; collectivism; outer-directed orientation; time as synchronization; ascribed status; and hierarchy (Hofstede, 1984; Dumont, 1986; Bedi, 1991; Redding and Baldwin, 1991; Stewart and Bennett, 1991; Simons et al., 1993; Trompenaars, 1994; Alder, 1997). Generally, scholars use this ‘two worlds’ theme to describe various disparate and contradictory aspects of new immigrants in the US. For instance, Americans are viewed as desiring individual mobility to fulfil l the ‘American Dream’ of individual accomplishments. They assume personal responsibility, pay attention to the enhancement of each individual’s rights, and focus on general rules. Asian immigrants, on the other hand, are viewed as relying more on the priorities of a group or an organization than concern for themselves. For Asian immigrants, friendships with colleagues, managers, and others take precedence over their own interests. Similarly, the dominant ideology of American culture emphasizes equality. Hierarchy emerges as the result of competition in which everyone starts from the same position and enjoys the same rules. In contrast, the dominant ideology of Asian societies emphasizes hierarchy, which is ascribed and fixed. Social ordering is not through horizontal bonds but through vertical allegiances to people holding a higher rank on the basis of age, gender, status, wealth, or power. Accordingly, Asian immigrants tend to observe the cultural tradition of deference to people above them. They tend to work under one another’s shadow. Such cultural values of Asian immigrants are viewed as a liability in the US organization of S&E. Being brought up to be modest, honour wisdom, work hard, and let the work speak for itself, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers do not boast of their achievements. Their low-key, self-effacing, and team approach work against them in American S&E organizations which reward aggressive, assertive, and outspoken individuals. Even when Asian immigrant scientists and engineers acknowledge their unfair treatments, they still avoid conflict with those in a higher position. They remain patient and hope that one day their time will come. By not taking an active part in the organizational dynamic, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers do not use the American system to work in their favour. Nonetheless, such cultural explanations tend to reinforce popular stereotypes. With a great variety of histories, customs, languages, and religions, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers themselves are not a homogeneous group. Yet the same cultural categories are attributed to all those from Asia. Likewise, national cultures tend to manifest contradictions. For instance, many Asian immigrant scientists and engineers are Westernized because science in many parts of Asia is a sign of modernity. Most of them are trained in American graduate schools, and thus do not differ significantly from Americans in routine S&E activities. Although Asian immigrants see cultural differences between Eastern and Western cultures, they do not like to be called minority. Instead, they consider themselves to be the equivalent of their white counterparts (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995, p. 103). Most importantly, if Asian immigrants succeed in S&E due to cultural emphasis on education and hard work, they are symbolically placed against Afro-Americans and other minorities. Likewise, if Asian immigrants fail to advance in S&E, they themselves are to blame and should change their cultural values from collectivism to individualism. In other words, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers should not make any demands for institutional assistance. Proponents of cultural differences ignore institutional policies that create obstacles for Asian immigrants in the S&E workforce, and thus serve the status quo

#### ALT-Techno-orientalist discourse is perpetuated every day, only a confrontation with pedagogical practices centered on modernization theory can break down stereotypes surrounding East Asian functionality.

Lozano-Mendez 10 (Artur, Undergraduate Student Majoring in East Asian Studies, Published in 2010, “TECHNO-ORIENTALISM IN EAST-ASIAN CONTEXTS: REITERATION, DIVERSIFICATION, ADAPTATION”, pg. 184-186) RR Jr

Early in the history of exchange with Europeans, Japan was presented as the most conspicuous instance of il mondo alla riversa, “the world upside down”. After many decades of globalization, that topos from the Renaissance clings on to the Western imagination. The following words were written by the Jesuit Alessandro Valignano, who visited the East Indies from 1574 to 1606: “They also have other rites and customs so different from all the other nations that it would seem that they deliberately studied how to differ from everybody (…) because honestly it can be said that Japan is a world upside down compared to the ways of the world in Europe; as it is so different and contrary, that there is almost no issue where they adjust to us.”14 Such all-encompassing othering perceptions spread quickly and rooted deeply. Even today, after many decades of globalization, Japan is presented sometimes as the radical other versus Euro-American cultural horizon. Following the logics of schema of co-figuration, the identity of the West had been supported by antonymous couplings such as civilized–uncivilized, modern–pre-modern, etc. According to Morley and Robins, the idea of the West draws legitimacy from the unequivocal and exclusive correspondence that bound together the words “West–Modernity–Progress”. Thus, techno-orientalism started to take shape when such discursive exclusivity was unmistakably refuted, when the other “refused” to render themselves as the docile signified to a preset signifier. As Morley and Robins write: “Those anxieties must be seen in the context of an increasing sense of insecurity about European and American modernity. Modernity has always been that ‘mysterious and magical word that puts a barrier between the European [and American] ego and the rest of the world’.16 If it was the West that created modernity, it was also modernity that created the imaginary space and identity described as ‘Western’. (...) however, the very dynamism of modernity also worked to undermine its Western foundations. The modernization project was cumulative, future-orientated, based upon the logic of technological progression and progress. Its various elements were also designed to be exported and to transcend their European origins and exclusiveness. Modernization and modernity, with their claims to universalism, could be transposed to other host cultures. In Japan this project found a fertile environment. The technological and futurological imagination has now come to be centered here; the abstract and universalizing force of modernization has passed from Europe to America to Japan.” An instrumental factor in the successful expansion and acceptance of techno-orientalist tenets lay in their early adoption by self-orientalist discourse in Japan. Self-orientalism takes the images supplied by Western orientalism and changes their polarization from negative to positive. The mutual feedback benefits power structures both internationally and within Japan, where the nihonjinron—a trend of publications analyzing the “particularism” of Japanese people—already promotes conformity to specific models of citizenship.18 Thus, discourse informally induces people to adopt certain lifestyles and values. Those perceived cultural traits are turned into cultural assets, and merchandised as such. What the techno-orientalist deformative lens perceives as robotic, gregarious and self-emasculated way of life is presented as a considerate, balanced and reliable behavior. Paradoxically, the culture, tourism and entertainment industries from Japan have been exporting products that undergo symbolic negotiation in Western markets 20 and, all too often, become techno-orientalist avatars. The result of such symbolic negotiation comes naturally since the mainboard of technologies of recognition is already printed with techno-orientalism and the “binary structuring schemata that are constantly utilized by the geopolitics of the modernization theory.”

## Impacts

#### The dehumanization of Orientalism is a form of racialized and gendered violence – it justifies military action and makes the Other dispensable.

**Nayak ’06** (Meghana; Professor of Political Science at Pace University; March 2006; International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8:1; “Orientalism and ‘saving’ US state identity after 9/11; <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616740500415458>, accessed 7/14/16)

The third element has to do with the nexus of power and knowledge. US state identity making requires a particular social production of knowledge. ‘Knowing’ the Other is integral to protecting and securing what one ‘knows’ to be true about the Self (i.e. **the Self is good, normal, enlightened, progressive and right and the Other is backwards, barbaric, primitive and dangerous**). Indeed, the proliferation of books about ‘understanding Islam’, what is ‘behind/beneath the veil’ and ‘the Arab mind’ since 9/11 attests to the need to know, thus predict, ‘them’ as well as to justify occupation (Patai 2002; Lewis 2003; Warraq 2003; Manji 2004). Relatively speaking, Christian fundamentalism, as it underscores Bush’s rhetoric and replacement of human rights terminology with references to ‘Providence’, human dignity and biblical scripture (Mertus 2003), needs little to no explanation or interrogation for mainstream America. In effect, the only way to guarantee the persistence and prevalence of this hypermasculinist, religiously and morally superior Self, arising out of the ashes of 9/11, is to rely firmly on US-specific orientalism. While Said underscores his thesis with references to racism and racialization, he fails to examine the intersectionality of race and gender in upholding orientalism. Further, he claims that orientalism has been an ‘exclusively male province’ (1979: 207), ignoring both historical and contemporary collusions between feminism and orientalism and between women and colonial projects. As such, while I rely on Said’s formulation of orientalism as an ideology with material and discursive effects, I argue that to fully understand both orientalism and its crucial role in US state identity making, one must extrapolate Said’s argument to recognize how orientalism only works because of the violent remaking, disciplining and construction of race and gender. Thus, I argue that the US state project could not work without gendered and racialized violence. These violent acts are not singular, pathologized events but are systematic oppressive acts that are integral to complex productions and significations of gender and race. Processes of gendering and racialization involve the solidification of categories of people, and their eligibility as political agents, based on sexuality, sex/gender, race, ethnicity, religion, geography, etc. Gendered and racialized violence secures, disciplines and maintains the boundaries of public and private, community, nation and state. Systematic and programmatic violence functions through the registers of gender and race, thus dictating what ‘men’, ‘women’ and racialized categories such as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Arab/Muslim’ or ‘oriental’ are supposed to be and do. To emphasize an earlier point, the gendered and racialized violence of orientalist US state identity making is nothing new or remarkable; however, since the US government and mainstream citizenry fervently believe that US state identity making is more crucial and urgent now than ever before, it is accordingly the task of this article to trace and resist the violence, in the forms of infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification, engendered by the desperate attempts to save the Self. The ‘feminist’ framework advanced here, then, brings together several themes on masculinity, orientalism, religion, race, gender, nation, state and violence in order to better understand and possibly resist particular forms of identity making. I rely upon feminisms that are cognizant of the historic collusion of orientalism and feminisms as well as of the contradictory practices of feminisms that at once promise emancipation from and transformation of oppressive structures/systems yet also problematically ‘make’ race, gender, community and territory and benefit from power relations (McClintock 1995). In fact, the very concept of the Other has not only enabled many ‘western’, upper class, hegemonic self-described feminist actors to exercise agency while leaving undisturbed the very systems that allow oppression, but has also been central to the development of feminisms (Mohanty 1991). Thus, in order for feminism to have resistance potential, it must acknowledge its own participation in orientalism and its self-referential activism during colonialism, conflicts and the War on Terror. As this article progresses, I grapple first with tracing the violence of orientalism, in the form of infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification, before concluding with thoughts on the type of theoretical shifts and political gestures that feminist responses must include. Infantilization is the representation of certain political actors/communities as vulnerable, helpless and backward children. As such, their lives depend on being saved from the vagaries and horrors of their cultures and religions by rational, enlightened, civilized and strong political actors. US policymakers’ documented reasons for late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century imperial expansion hinged on the need to save these ‘emotional, irrational, irresponsible, unbusinesslike, unstable, childlike’ people (Rosenberg 1991: 31–5). They were bolstered in this mission by the strongly gendered overtones of Social Darwinism, the perceived duty to teach Others how to live in a political society and the desire to ‘prove’ US power and strength through the assertion of American men’s military might, sexual prowess and ability to protect Other women from ‘their’ men (Hoganson 2000). As such, one can recognize infantilization in discourses and acts that appear to raise awareness about gender violence but that actually locate oppression squarely on Other cultures, rather than on local and international power relations, globalized capitalism or US foreign policy. As such, infantilization includes the following elements: descriptions of gender violence are racialized, to underscore that patriarchal violence does not exist in the West and that the only reason a woman may die in a nonwestern country is because of a monolithically oppressive, static Culture (Narayan 1997); promotion of a militaristic solution to end gender violence; and use of the ‘progress’ of Other women in achieving or exercising rights, such as voting, to justify US strategic actions. Thus, **infantilization is a form of racialized and gendered violence** because it violently denies agency based on race and gender and strongly justifies military action. As the USA attempts to ‘represent’ the voices of those who cannot speak, **it ironically erases these voices**, which in effect makes Other women dispensable. After all, if the West can represent, give voice to and talk about the experiences of Other women, what need is there for real women? Women’s voices are instead systematically forgotten, erased or taken out of context to prove the horrors of their cultures. These women cannot possibly tell their own stories, emphasize poverty or community over western liberal conceptions of freedom in terms of choice of clothing and the opportunity to vote, or revolutionize their societies without the help of the enlightened West. Critiques of particular misogynistic interpretations and politicizations of Islam find no place in the US ‘us versus them’ rhetoric to express such views without inadvertently ‘demonstrating’ Islamic oppression or ‘betraying’ men in their communities. Women elsewhere cannot be full agents, recalling my earlier point that orientalism cannot accept the agency of certain Others. Further, **the ‘help’ comes in the form of militarism**, which is the problematic search for the perfect ‘Other’, the easily differentiated and hence racialized enemy and the promotion of hypermasculinity. Infantilization thus solidifies masculinist battles to prove who is manly enough to protect one’s land, to decide on a political system and to ‘protect’ women, all of which get played out on women’s bodies in the form of abduction, rape and forced impregnation and on men’s bodies as sexual violence and humiliation (Enloe 1993, 1998, 2000). After 9/11, the US government, the media and ‘experts’ collaborated to signify the oppression of Arab/Muslim women as the categorical proof of Islamic terror, and women accordingly became a central point of the war on terror. Despite US involvement in the regimes of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the USA suddenly turned the long-term persecution of women in Afghanistan and Iraq into a spectacle for public consumption and justification for military intervention. Images of Afghani women throwing off their burqas and Iraqi women marching and shouting political slogans alleviated some of the public concern about the validity of the military operations. In the State of the Union address in January 2002, Bush (2002) declared, ‘[t]he last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes ... Today women are free’, later emphasizing ‘[a]s a result of securing ourselves and ridding [sic] the Taliban out of Afghanistan, the Afghan people had elections this weekend. And the first voter was a 19- year-old woman. Think about that. Freedom is on the march’ (‘The Third Bush–Kerry Presidential Debate’ 2004). Regarding the war campaign in Iraq, the Bush administration employed graphic descriptions of Saddam Hussein’s ‘rape rooms’ and has consistently framed women’s political participation as the sign of progress. While many contest the reasons for and events in these two theaters of war, few doubt the inherently beneficial goal of ‘freeing’ women from the religious and cultural oppression of Islam, regardless of the US governmental role in creating some of the conditions for such oppression or of the particular political and historical specificities of the oppression. As discussed above, racialized and gendered violence is crucial in US attempts to promote hypermasculinity and religious ethics in the project to save the Self. The USA can save itself and its identity by protecting its power. The power to save is clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy (2002: prologue): Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence ... we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom. In order to prove and solidify this strength and power, the US state must ‘save’ violated women and emasculated men who cannot seem to defend their countries from terrorism or build democracies. If one counters infantilization, one effectively doubts the US ability to save others and thus threatens the very strength the USA proclaims it (still) has. The paternalist mission, wherein only a real man can save suffering women under the shadow of the gun, is crucial for alleviating the anxiety that the USA has experienced since 9/11. Because states feminize boundaries, the invasion of such translates into imagery of an impotent, emasculated man unable to protect his possessions from being violated and destroyed. Bush (2004d) demonstrates the militaristic solution to this masculinist anxiety: ‘And we have seen Americans in uniform storming mountain strongholds, and charging through sandstorms and liberating millions, with acts of valor that would make the men of Normandy proud.’ Further, infantilization serves Bush’s (2003b) perception that salvation is divine, as he notes: ‘[t]he liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity’. Bush’s Christian-based salvation, despite its bloody history throughout colonizing missions, somehow poses little danger in comparison to the Islamic threat. Infantilization ‘works’ for the USA because it allows the redemption of the emasculated citizen and state that could not fight off 9/11. In her research on female slaves on the plantations in the south of the USA, Deborah Gray White (1985) describes two prevailing understandings of the women: the Jezebel archetype, the hedonistic, lascivious and morally corrupt woman who raises men to be rapists and women to be temptresses; and the Mammy archetype, the maternal, submissive, non-thinking woman. Both demonization and dehumanization are apparent in the diabolic Jezebel who deserves violence and the dispensable Mammy whose violent experiences really do not matter, as only certain ‘worthy’ bodies can truly experience suffering. In other words, Jezebels and Mammies are ineligible for inclusion in civilization. As the discussion of infantilization demonstrates, the politically expedient redemption and salvation of Other women reaffirms that their bodies are dispensable. One can recognize demonization and dehumanization by tracing competing discourses of disgust and apathy in the US attempts to save the Self. In particular, **these violent practices classify people as collateral damage** (not mattering at all), conditionally worthy (mattering only if they meet particular conditions such as expressing US patriotism), or dangerous (mattering in so far as they need to be identified in order to be targeted or eliminated). The event of 9/11 requires, as it harshly exposed the underlying anxiety always present in the US Self, that ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ and various constructed categories of Others, be turned into something to be feared and hated, notquite-humans whose suffering must have been brought onto themselves, and thus is not really important. At the same time that infantilization constructs Other women as objects to be saved, demonization and dehumanization ensure that ‘their’ men and cultures are hated and despised. Depending on the type of state identity it wants to assert, the US state decides when to hate, save or ignore Other men and women. These contradictions, of saving yet hating the Other, sympathizing with yet neglecting the realities of the Other, proudly touting the freedom of Other women yet violating these very women by repressing political beliefs and expressions or through sexual and physical brutalization, are indicative of orientalist logic. Thus, the attempts to save the Self can result in infantilization, demonization or dehumanization simultaneously or alternatively. To demonstrate the absolute degeneracy of the ‘Orient’ depends on describing the condition of the most ‘vulnerable’: women. However, the ‘West’ must be able to retain positional superiority, in terms of deciding what happens in the ‘Orient’, thus the Other cannot be allowed to fully cross the line from ‘them’ to ‘us’, explaining the underlying contempt for ‘them’. **Demonization and dehumanization are forms of gendered and racialized violence** because these practices, like infantilization, erase agency based on gender and race. To invoke hatred and/or extreme apathy toward communities is to emphasize that they do not matter, and consequently, promotes **the targeted violence and killings of Others** and reduces the loss of human life to collateral damage. In effect, demonization and dehumanization are critical to the US hegemonic project, as the assertion of the US Self is as much about disciplining the Others at home as it is about objectifying Others ‘elsewhere’. The hypermasculinity required for the US state project results in and requires demonization and dehumanization, particularly of the Arab/ Muslim male, since 9/11. The limited horror expressed in the USA at the hypocrisy of the peaceful, secular, democratic USA inflicting sexualized violence and atrocities on those coded as the enemy in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, shows the interrelationship of masculinity and patriotism enacted by both US male and female members of the military. Because the Arab/ Muslim male is so hateful and subhuman, the torture of potentially innocent people is acceptable in order to protect US strength and power. Any concern with scenes and stories from Cuba and Iraq deals with the ‘humiliation’ the men must have suffered as members of honor-based Arab society. This discomfort with the consequences of masculinist militarism marks the pain not as human horror but as a function of (superficial knowledge about) the Other society’s expectations of heterosexual men. Underlying the ambivalent responses is the assumption that the worst thing that can happen to a man, ‘here’ or ‘there’, is to be ‘treated like a woman’, i.e. raped and made powerless. Those invested in US state identity can comfort themselves by thinking of the torturers as ‘sick’ individuals rather than as agents of systemized hatred, racialization and misogyny.