## FW

#### Western Techno-Orientalist discourses present Asians as subhuman and robotic- beings that not only lack moral capabilities but worst of all, threaten Western dominance. Creates internalized oppression and chain Asian bodies to the oppressive capitalist system

**Esaki 20**

Esaki, B. (2020) "Ted Chiang’s Asian American Amusement at Alien Arrival", Religions, 11(2), p. 56. doi: 10.3390/rel11020056. //AL

Namely, from an otherhood lens, Chiang’s stories focus on challenges to the goodness of the universe posed by technology (A versus C). That is, the central conflict is between nonhuman phenomena (the universe and technology), or Others. Others are in nearly every story of Chiang’s, such as a mythical tower, golems, angels, aliens, and so on. By locating the central conflict between Others, Chiang shifts the reader’s concern away from flawed humanity (B), even though there are many shortcomings of character in his stories. This shift in gaze can be important for those who have been othered, and Asian Americans who have been victim to multiple colonial projects may not want to affirm colonial perspectives. The colonial gaze—as John Reider has argued—undergirds much of science fiction, scrutinizes others “to maintain and reproduce the political and economic arrangements that establish the subjects’ respective positions” (Reider 2008, p. 7). Centering on the effects of humans on technology and on the universe thus may focus the reader on humanity’s relationship to Others, and, by extension, the respective position of colonist to discovered and undiscovered (sub)humans. Centering on the effects of Others on Others thereby subverts the colonial gaze, and shifts the central questions of the reader. Another reason to associate Others with technology is that SF frequently reduces Asians and Asian Americans by associating them with technology. Even if Asians are not present in body, there are common plots that mirror the Yellow Peril, with hordes of subhuman aliens or robots threatening humanity. In body, Asians have come to represent a dangerous future, or what is called high-tech Orientalism or techno-Orientalism (Morely and Robins 1995; Chun 2006). As historian Kenneth Hough has demonstrated, an early form of techno-Orientalism emerged during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, where Japanese people were illustrated as “technologically adept, modern, chivalrous, and civilized, yet savage and ultimately an existential threat to the West” (Roh et al. 2015, pp. 31–33). In this depiction, the Japanese had superhuman control of pain and no morality; as Jack London wrote in a 1904 The San Francisco Examiner essay, “Yellow Peril”: “From the West he has borrowed all of material achievement and passed our ethical achievement by … A marvelous imitator truly, but imitating us only in things material. Things spiritual cannot be imitated … and here the Japanese fails” (p. 38). This image continued and was eventually applied to China in the 1990s as it emerged in the high-tech global economy (p. 4). In this sense, science fiction plots that focus on human relationships to Others may reiterate techno-Orientalism, especially the moral vacuity of Asians and Asian Americans. In addition, such narratives may exert a discursive control over Asians and Asian Americans, where Asian American readers can either identify with the reduced Other or the subjectivity and culture of the colonist. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has argued for high-tech Orientalism, this leaves Asian Americans with two oppressive options. For one, they can see themselves as absent or subhuman. Alternatively, they can choose “to be an individual—to exceed one’s culture in order to become incorporated into a global market”; that is, Asian Americans can be an individual yet one without culture and chained to a capitalist system. In other words, the otherness of techno-Orientalism erases subjectivity along with the richness of culture and religion.

#### Techno Orientalism is pervasive yet critically neglected in academia. Counterdialouge is key to reconstruct Asian images in literature

**Roh et al. 15**

DAVID S. ROH, BETSY HUANG and GRETA A. NIU, April 27. 2015, “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media”, <https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/techno-orientalism/9780813570631> //AL

As this collection demonstrates, techno-Orientalism occurs across genres and disciplines—history, art, literature, film, television, video games—but the majority of the criticism coalesces around literature and film, particularly in the genre of speculative fiction (SF). This is unsurprising; techno-Orientalism finds some of its most pervasive expressions in SF because of the genre’s futurist esprit of contemporary existential, racial, and technological anxieties. Nevertheless, we identify a disciplinary narrowness to SF in the extant scholarship that our project attempts to broaden. Even as techno-Orientalism in SF has been documented by several incisive studies in recent decades, critical studies of Orientalism in the long history of SF are scarce. A survey of the essays published in the genre’s flagship journal, Science Fiction Studies, founded in 1973, confirms the critical neglect. A search with the term “Orientalism” in the journal’s archives yielded only nine substantive essays that address Orientalism, four of which are book reviews. A search with the term “techno-Orientalism” yielded, even more negligibly, two review essays. Similar searches in Extrapolations, another major academic venue for SF criticism, yielded equally scant results. And when PMLA, the lingua franca of academic scholarship in literature and languages, published a special issue on science fiction in May 2004, no mention of Orientalism could be found— this despite the fact that SF’s propensity for projecting and amplifying contemporary racial and imperialist attitudes is well documented.7 Indeed, the conceptualization of techno-Orientalism as a recognizable discursive effect of the postindustrial age may have been the clarion call for addressing this gap in the genre. Orientalism in SF during the pre-cyberpunk era may have suffered critical neglect because of the perception that the “yellow peril” has been kept in check by the mechanisms of immigration and exclusion acts that were in place for much of the midcentury. It took the repeal of the immigration acts in 1965, coupled with the entrance of Japanese capital and imports into the U.S. economy in the late seventies, to precipitate a renewed wariness toward all things Asian, onto which the West once again projected agendas of cultural hegemony and technological dominance. Cyberpunk, with its fetishizing gaze upon Japan as a seductive and contradictory space of futuristic innovation and ancient mystique, sharply focused the SF critical and creative lenses upon Asia. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism thus emerged in the mid1990s with the contributions of Morley and Robins, Ueno, and Sato. Critical momentum continued with Takayuki Tatsumi’s 2000 historiography of Japanese SF in Science Fiction Studies (SFS), and a 2002 special issue of SFS on Japanese speculative fiction, guest edited by Takayuki Tatsumi, Christopher Bolton, and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., introduced Japanese SF and cyberpunk visions to the Western audience. Sato’s important and incisive 2004 intersectional analysis of what she describes as “the four different categorical spheres, namely, Western cyborg philosophy, American cyberpunk, Japanese cyberpunk, and Japanese theory of uniqueness known as nihonjinron” (335–336) and Christine Cornea’s chapter “Techno-Orientalism and the Postmodern Subject” in Jacqueline Furby and Karen Randell’s Screen Methods: Comparative Readings in Film Studies (Wallflower Press, 2006) sustained the necessary critical interest in the field. These studies, however, constitute the bulk of the critical history of technoOrientalism. Other studies in recent years, such as Mimi Thi Nguyen and Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu’s Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America (Duke, 2007), Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Lynn Joyrich’s 2009 special issue of Camera Obscura, “Race and/as Technology,” Chun’s New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory Reader (Routledge, 2005), and Lisa Nakamura’s Cybertypes (Routledge, 2002), made significant contributions to critiques of Orientalism in popular culture and mainstream media. Yet, despite technoOrientalism’s growing prevalence in the Western cultural consciousness, and in SF more specifically, it has been generally ignored in academic and popular cultural spheres. A special issue of the literary journal MELUS, titled “Alien/Asians” (2008) and edited by Stephen Hong Sohn, expanded the critical scope of the phenomenon and drew it closer for theoretical scrutiny. Sohn’s introduction persuasively conveys the urgent need for vigilant documentation and analysis of the ever-growing techno-Orientalist vocabulary. The eight essays in the issue examine a range of techno-Orientalist instantiations in SF within U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Indian contexts, from “a cyberpunk-inflected Asian future” to “the cyborg technologies intertwined with Asian American bodies” (Sohn 15). The essays, Sohn writes, “investigate how alternative imaginaries provide fertile terrains to consider the prospects of racial subjectivity and identity” (15). The essayists take a hard look at the work of SF luminaries such as Philip K. Dick, Ursula K. Le Guin, William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and William S. Burroughs, whose work consciously or unconsciously traded in technoOrientalist tropes, as well as the work of Asian American and Asian Canadian writers such as Karen Tei Yamashita, Amitav Ghosh, and Larissa Lai, who mount metafictional critiques of techno-Orientalist tropes in SF. Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, therefore, has two objectives. The first is to continue the work begun by the aforementioned predecessors, to “consider the prospective thesis that cultural production is still invested in parsing out how the yellow peril continues to be a mode to draw from, write against, challenge, negotiate, and problematize” (Sohn 6–7). The volume argues that while Orientalism defines a modern West by producing an oppositional and premodern East, techno-Orientalism symmetrically and yet contradictorily completes this project by creating a collusive, futurized Asia to further affirm the West’s centrality. The second objective is constructive. While we critique the dehumanizing effects of the techno-Orientalist gaze, we also see an opportunity for critical reappropriations in texts that self-referentially engage with Asian images; indeed, as an example, Asian SF writers have already taken to the trope to create the SF cottage industry in which the subject and setting are Eastern. There is of course the danger that Asian and Asian American creators might internalize techno-Orientalist patterns and uncritically replicate the same dehumanizing model. However, thanks to its global and mass appeal, the speculative imagination in television, graphic novels, or science fiction is by no means the purview of single national traditions. Even as techno-Orientalism has become more pervasive, it has also engendered counterdialogue in those same cultural and political spaces.

## ROB

#### Discourse creates a social reality of what we believe to be the outside world

**Holzscheiter ’14** [Anna, “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations” Anna has been Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science since April 2015. During the academic year 2014-2015 she is John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.]

Those not familiar with the term “discourse” often ask: Is everything discourse? Where is the boundary between discourse and the material (touchable and observable) world? Discourse scholars answer this question by stating that **discourse is the space where human beings make sense of the material world, where they attach meaning to the world and where representations of the world become manifest.** **The existence of a material world outside discourse is, thus, not denied**—what is refuted is the assumption that we can relate to this material world without discourse (Holzscheiter 2010). In its essence, **discourse analysis is an engagement with meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality is constructed. Discourse can therefore be defined as, basically, the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, trans- formed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality.** This preliminary and broad understanding of discourse already allows distinguishing discourse from language inasmuch as discourse is an inherently social concept. Rather than simply investigating the use of language in international politics, an explo- ration of **discourse asks for the social and political effects that result from using a particular vocabulary on the one hand and the productive effects of particular constructions of reality on the agency and identity of individuals and groups.** Any singular event of speaking or producing text, thus, is part of a larger social and political process: It is conceived of as “text in social context.”

**Since Discourse shapes the way we interact,**

#### the ROB is to vote for the debater whose discourse best constructs social reality in a desirable way

#### Orientalism functions through educational institutions to build hegemony and consent with Western domination.

**Keskin 2018** (Tugrul, Middle East Studies after September 11 : Neo-Orientalism, American Hegemony and Academia http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/pitt-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5449628)

As early as the 19th century, European **colonial states established a direct link between the state and educational system** in order **to** use the social sciences for their own benefit and further **exploit** and colonialize Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As a result of the economic needs driven by European industrialization, colonial states began to support and finance social science fields such as history and anthropology in order to study colonized regions and design a comprehensive foreign policy vis a vis ethnicities, religions, cultures, traditions, and social structures. We can trace the complicated **relationship between Western colonialism and imperialism** and the Western educational system to the 18th century. Edward Said describes this colonialist knowledge production and criticizes the motivations driving Middle East and Islamic studies in Western academia, especially in the postcolonial period. He understood the **real impetus behind Orientalism** as non-academic, but instead **policy-oriented with the objective of further colonialism and imperialism.** For example, anthropology was established as an academic field not because some people in Europe were really interested in other cultures, but due **to** an interest in **study**ing **other cultures and societies for the purpose of further exploitation**. As a result, most of the early **anthropologists were supported and financed by the French and British state** in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

## Definitions

**Thus I affirm,**

**The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. I reserve the right to clarify in cross ex**

#### Definition of appropriation:

**Ashley and Plesch 02**

Ashley, Kathleen & Plesch, Véronique. (2002). The Cultural Processes of "Appropriation". Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies. 32. 10.1215/10829636-32-1-1.

“[T]he person who represents the world is transformed, through the act of representation, from a subjective being enmeshed in space and time—by which he is, in a sense  possessed—into a transcendent, objective Mind that appropriates reality for itself and, by appropriating it, dominates it. . . . Representation is thus defined as appropriation and is thereby constituted as an apparatus of power.”17 The political and economic issues raised by the practice of the dominant society’s “taking—from a culture that is not [its] own—of intellectual property, cultural expressions or artifacts, history and ways of knowledge” were then taken up within cultural property law.1 This binary model of cultural appropriation, which was dominant during the 1980s, provoked theoretical resistence by the late 1980s from those who argued that it silenced the “other.” In “Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,” Benita Parry noted the deconstructive tendency to produce “a theory assigning absolute power to the hegemonic discourse in constituting and disarticulating the native.” She criticized even the leading postcolonial theorist, Gayatri Spivak, for constructing an account of colonialism in which “the European agent in consolidating the imperialist Sovereign Self, induces the native to collude in its own subject(ed) formation as other and voiceless. Thus while protesting at the obliteration of the native’s subject position in the text of imperialism, Spivak in her project gives no speaking part to the colonized.”

#### **Definition of private enterprise: Collins Dictionary**

Collins, Definition of ‘private enterprise’, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/private-enterprise#:~:text=uncountable%20noun,government%20or%20an%20official%20organization.

Private enterprise is industry and business that is owned by individuals or stockholders, and not by the government or an official organization

#### Definition of outer space: Meriam Webster

Meriam Webster, Definition of outer space, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space

space immediately outside the earth's atmosphere

## Offense

#### Discourse around the commercialization of space is not neutral, the US frames spending into the private sector as a military effort to prevent Asian countries from destroying US satellites

**Broad 21**

William J. Broad Published Jan. 24, 2021 Updated May 6, 2021How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest Between the U.S. and China. (2021). Retrieved 17 December 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/trump-biden-pentagon-space-missiles-satellite.html

Beijing’s rush for antisatellite arms began 15 years ago. Now, it can threaten the orbital fleets that give the United States military its technological edge. Advanced weapons at China’s military bases can fire warheads that smash satellites and can shoot laser beams that have a potential to blind arrays of delicate sensors. And China’s cyberattacks can, at least in theory, cut off the Pentagon from contact with fleets of satellites that track enemy movements, relay communications among troops and provide information for the precise targeting of smart weapons. Among the most important national security issues now facing President Biden is how to contend with the threat that China poses to the American military in space and, by extension, terrestrial forces that rely on the overhead platforms. The Biden administration has yet to indicate what it plans to do with President Donald J. Trump’s legacy in this area: the Space Force, a new branch of the military that has been criticized as an expensive and ill-advised escalation that could lead to a dangerous new arms race. Mr. Trump presented the initiative as his own, and it now suffers from an association with him and remains the brunt of jokes on television. But its creation was also the culmination of strategic choices by his predecessors, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, to counter an emboldened China that raised bipartisan alarm. “There’s been a dawning realization that our space systems are quite vulnerable,” said Greg Grant, a Pentagon official in the Obama administration who helped devise its response to China. “The Biden administration will see more funding — not less — going into space defense and dealing with these threats.” The protective goal is to create an American presence in orbit so resilient that, no matter how deadly the attacks, it will function well enough for the military to project power halfway around the globe in terrestrial reprisals and counterattacks. That could deter Beijing’s strikes in the first place. The hard question is how to achieve that kind of strong deterrence. Lloyd J. Austin III, a retired four-star Army general who was confirmed last week as Mr. Biden’s secretary of defense, told the Senate that he would keep a “laserlike focus” on sharpening the country’s “competitive edge” against China’s increasingly powerful military. Among other things, he called for new American strides in building “space-based platforms” and repeatedly referred to space as a war-fighting domain. “Space is already an arena of great power competition,” Mr. Austin said, with China “the most significant threat going forward.” Editors’ Picks Could Oreo Cookies Solve New York’s Rat Problem? Quiz: Do You Recognize These Notable People of 2021? A Love Language Spoken With Hands The new administration has shown interest in tapping the innovations of space entrepreneurs as a means of strengthening the military’s hand — what Mr. Austin in his Senate testimony called “partnerships with commercial space entities.” The Obama and Trump administrations both adopted that strategy as a uniquely American way of sharpening the military’s edge. Experts clash on whether the United States is doing too little or too much. Defense hawks had lobbied for decades for the creation of a military Space Corps and called for more spending on weapons. But arms controllers see the Space Force as raising global tensions and giving Beijing an excuse to accelerate its own threatening measures. Some go further and call it a precipitous move that will increase the likelihood of war. In decades past, especially during the “Star Wars” program of the Reagan administration, conflict in space was often portrayed as shootouts in orbit. That has changed. With few exceptions, the weapons are no longer seen as circling the planet but as being deployed from secure bases. So, too, the targets are no longer swarms of nuclear warheads but fleets of satellites, whose recurring, predictable paths while orbiting the Earth make them far easier to destroy. A main question is whether the antisatellite moves and countermoves will lower or raise the risks of miscalculation and war. That debate is just beginning. Beijing’s Surge For years, the Chinese studied — with growing anxiety — the American military, especially its invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The battlefield successes were seen as rooted in space dominance. Planners noted that thousands of satellite-guided bombs and cruise missiles had rained down with devastating precision on Taliban forces and Iraqi defenses. While the Pentagon’s edge in orbital assets was clearly a threat to China, planners argued that it might also represent a liability. “They saw how the U.S. projected power,” said Todd Harrison, a space analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “And they saw that it was largely undefended.” China began its antisatellite tests in 2005. It fired two missiles in two years and then made headlines in 2007 by shattering a derelict weather satellite. There was no explosion. The inert warhead simply smashed into the satellite at blinding speed. The successful test reverberated globally because it was the first such act of destruction since the Cold War. The whirling shards, more than 150,000 in all, threatened satellites as well as the International Space Station. Ground controllers raced to move dozens of spacecraft and astronauts out of harm’s way. The Bush administration initially did little. Then, in a show of force meant to send Beijing a message, in 2008, it fired a sophisticated missile to shoot down one of its own satellites. Beijing conducted about a dozen more tests, including ones in which warheads shot much higher, in theory putting most classes of American spacecraft at risk. China also sought to diversify its antisatellite force. A warhead could take hours to reach a high orbit, potentially giving American forces time for evasive or retaliatory action. Moreover, the speeding debris from a successful attack might endanger Beijing’s own spacecraft. In tests, China began firing weak laser beams at satellites and studying other ways to strike at the speed of light. However, all the techniques were judged as requiring years and perhaps decades of development. Then came the new idea. Every aspect of American space power was controlled from the ground by powerful computers. If penetrated, the brains of Washington’s space fleets might be degraded or destroyed. Such attacks, compared with every other antisatellite move, were also remarkably inexpensive. In 2005, China began to incorporate cyberattacks into its military exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks. Increasingly, its military doctrine called for paralyzing early attacks. In 2008, hackers seized control of a civilian imaging satellite named Terra that orbited low, like the military’s reconnaissance craft. They did so twice — first in June and again in October — roaming control circuits with seeming impunity. Remarkably, in both cases, the hackers achieved all the necessary steps to command the spacecraft but refrained from doing so, apparently to reduce their fingerprints. Space officials were troubled by more than China’s moves and weapons. The modern history of the American military centered on building global alliances. Beijing was rushing ahead as an aggressive loner, and many officers feared that Washington was too hidebound and burdened with the responsibilities of coalition-building and arms-control treaties to react quickly. “The Chinese are starting from scratch,” Paul S. Szymanski, a veteran analyst of space warfare, argued in an Air Force journal. They’re not, he added, “hindered by long space traditions.” Washington’s Response In its second term, the Obama administration made public what it called an “offset strategy” to respond to China and other threats by capitalizing on America’s technological edge. Just as the United States had developed, first, a vast nuclear arsenal and, second, smart weapons, this so-called third offset would seek an advantage by speeding the rise of robotics, high-speed arms and other breakthroughs that could empower the armed forces for decades. Unlike earlier offsets, officials said, the objective was to rely less on federal teams than the tech entrepreneurs who were fast transforming the civilian world. “We must really capture the commercial sector,” Robert O. Work, a deputy secretary of defense, said in a 2015 speech explaining the new initiative. The advances in space were to be defensive: swarms of small, relatively cheap satellites and fleets of recycled launchers that would overwhelm Beijing with countless targets. For Mr. Obama, innovative leaps were to do for American space forces what Steve Jobs did for terrestrial gadgets, running circles around the calcified ministries of authoritarian states. After decades in which adversaries — from stateless terrorists to those with traditional militaries — sought to exploit narrow advantages over the more powerful United States, the Pentagon was now finding an unconventional edge all its own. The Obama administration was already applying the commercial philosophy to NASA, turning the space agency into a major funder of entrepreneurial strides. It was pumping billions of dollars into the development of private rockets and capsules meant to carry astronauts into orbit. The military joined in. The beneficiaries included Elon Musk, the founder of Tesla, and Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon. Their space companies — Mr. Musk’s SpaceX and Mr. Bezos’s Blue Origin — sought to turn rocket launchers from throwaways into recyclables, slashing their cost. Military officials believed that the new system would make it possible to quickly replace satellites in times of war. The third offset also sought to shrink the size of satellites. Over decades, the big ones had grown into behemoths. Some cost $1 billion or more to design, construct, outfit, launch and keep in service. One type unfurled an antenna nearly as large as a football field. But civilians, inspired by the iPhone revolution, were building spacecraft as small as loaves of bread. Military planners saw smaller, cheaper, more numerous craft as making antisatellite targeting vastly more difficult — in some cases impossible — for an adversary.

#### Chinese ASAT attacks are neither feasible technologically or desirable for the country. US fixation on this is simply the construction of the Asian threat

**Sankaran 14**

Jaganath Sankaran Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States (2022) Airuniversity.af.edu. Available at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-08\_Issue-4/SSQ\_2014-4.pdf (Accessed: 5 January, 2022).

In May of 2013, the Pentagon revealed that China had launched a suborbital rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest Sichuan province that reached a high-altitude satellite orbit. According to Pentagon spokesperson Lt Col Monica Matoush, “the launch appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to geo-synchronous earth orbit.”1 An unattributed US defense official said, “It was a ground-based missile that we believe would be their first test of an interceptor that would be designed to go after a satellite that’s actually on orbit.”2 In fact, the anticipation of this launch had sparked reports in the United States that China would be testing an antisatellite (ASAT) missile that might be able to attack US global positioning system (GPS) navigation satellites orbiting at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers (km).3 However, the Chinese claimed the launch carried a science payload (a canister of barium powder) to study Earth’s ionosphere. Reporting on the launch, China’s state-run Xinhua news service announced that “the experiment was designed to investigate energetic particles and magnetic fields in the ionized stratum and near-Earth space. The experiment has reached expected objectives by allowing scientists to obtain first-hand data regarding the space environment at different altitudes.”4 Even though the barium payload release occurred at an altitude of 10,000 km, the Chinese did not clarify how high the missile actually went or what launch vehicle was used.5 The launch reignited the perceived threat of Chinese ASAT missile attacks on US military satellites. The growing US concern about Chinese ASAT capability goes back to 2007 when Beijing shot down one of its own satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). China has also conducted “missile defense” tests viewed as proxies for ASAT missions.6 These Chinese activities are seen by many analysts as a threat to US space capabilities. The persistent refrain has been that the US military exploits space surveillance capabilities better than any other nation, resulting in an asymmetric advantage to its armed forces on a global scale.7 Given this US advantage, analysts posit China will find it prudent to directly attack US satellites—executing a space “pearl harbor” that would cripple US military capabilities for years.8 Without its eyes and ears in space to provide early warning and real-time intelligence, it is argued, the United States would be in a painfully awkward situation should China put direct military pressure on Taiwan.9 However, the argument that US armed forces are critically dependent on satellites and therefore extremely vulnerable to disruption from Chinese ASAT attacks is not rooted in evidence.10 Instead, it rests on untested assumptions—primarily, that China would find attacking US military satellites operationally feasible and desirable.11 This article tests those assumptions by critically examining the challenges involved in executing an ASAT attack versus the limited potential benefits such action would yield for China. It first examines which US military satellites are most vulnerable to Chinese ASAT attack and then, by demonstrating the limited reach of China’s ballistic missiles and inadequate infrastructure capacity for launching multiple rockets, posits that it would be infeasible for China to mount extensive ASAT operations necessary to substantially affect US capabilities. The article next explores the limited benefits China would achieve from an ASAT attack, arguing that even if it manages to execute a very complex and difficult ASAT operation, the benefits do not confer decisive military advantage. Finally, it suggests policy actions—both unilateral US military-technical innovations and bilateral cooperative measures with China—to dissuade China and to demonstrate US resilience against ASAT attacks. The Challenges of Antisatellite Attacks Which US military satellites would China be able to destroy and how easily? The answer to this question gives a clear indicator of Chinese offensive space capabilities. Arraying the range of potential target satellites—US, allied, and private, operating across a spectrum of orbital space—against the capabilities of Chinese missiles and launch infrastructure clearly shows that China possesses very limited means to conduct an extensive ASAT operation against the United States. To make that case, one must first understand the various US military satellites, their operational parameters, and the services they provide. Based on military significance, US satellites can be primarily classed as (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, (2) GPS satellites, and (3) communications satellites. All three operate from different altitudes dictated by the functions they provide (see table 1).12 ISR satellites can be further divided into imagery or signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites. ISR imagery satellites operate in LEOs of around 1,000 km. A plethora of ISR imagery satellites, both government-owned and private, are used by US armed forces to construct a picture of adversary capability. Signals intelligence ISR satellites performing electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) collection operate mostly from geosynchronous orbits (GEO) of 36,000 km and are used to develop data on adversary assets and functional capability, particularly during times of peace. US GPS satellites operate from an altitude of around 20,000 km. They are an important component to the successful execution of any modern US military operation in addition to their extensive commercial applications. They provide deployed forces with precise positioning, navigational, and timing information that facilitates rapid maneuvering and precise targeting. US military communication satellites operate farthest from Earth in GEOs at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km. The US military employs a variety of military and commercial communications satellites for different activities. China’s Missiles Will Not Be Enough The substantial range of orbital altitudes—1,000 km to 36,000 km— across which satellites operate poses a challenge to China’s ability to attack US military satellites. Of the three sets of orbiters discussed above, ISR imagery satellites operating at altitudes less than 1,000 km are most vulnerable to ASAT attack by China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). This was demonstrated by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. On 11 January 2007, China launched a two-stage, solid-fuel, mediumrange Dong Feng (DF)-21 ballistic missile using a mobile transportererector-launcher (TEL) from the Xichang Space Center which slammed into one of its polar-orbiting LEO weather satellites (Feng Yun 1C) orbiting at an altitude of approximately 850 km.13 Caution should be exercised, however, in linearly scaling this Chinese ASAT capability to satellites operating at higher altitudes. The DF-21 ballistic missile used in the 2007 test cannot reach either GPS or communications satellites. In fact, even China’s most powerful solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are unable to reach an altitude of 20,000 km where GPS satellites operate. These limitations of Chinese missiles are due to fundamental constraints of physics. To illustrate: a Chinese ICBM carrying a 2,000 kilogram (kg) payload with a burn-out velocity of 7.0 km/sec (traveling a ground distance of approximately 11,500 km) when launched straight up with a reduced payload of 500 kg reaches a maximum altitude of only 10,500 km. The same ICBM with a reduced payload of 250 kg reaches an approximate maximum altitude of only 15,000 km. This limitation, as discussed above, implies that China would not be able to execute an ASAT attack against GPS satellites operating at 20,000 km or US military communications and SIGINT satellites operating at 36,000 km using its current missile inventory. To reach these higher orbiting satellites, China would have to build new and more-powerful ICBMs. Even if it manages to develop such an ICBM, China certainly will not be able to produce a large number of them without substantial financial stress. Alternatively, it can use its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles; however, this imposes other difficulties discussed below. China’s Infrastructure Further Limits Antisatellite Operations There are other challenges for China in successfully executing an ASAT attack against US satellites. Any operationally relevant ASAT operation will require the destruction of more than one satellite. In the case of ISR imagery satellites, for example, shooting down one would have very little impact upon net US satellite-enabled surveillance capabilities. In real-world scenarios, a chain of ISR satellites orbiting over a location of interest at various times are used to gain information on an adversary. Take for instance US operations in the 1991 Gulf War. An assortment of US military, allied, and private ISR satellites like Landsat, SPOT, Okean, Resurs-F, Resurs-O, Lacrosse, KH-11, KH-12, White Cloud, RORSAT, EORSAT, Almaz, and others were used.14 In all probability, a US-China engagement in the Taiwan Straits would involve as many or more satellites. It would be exceedingly difficult for China to continue destroying such a number of satellites over a period of time without subjecting its launch infrastructure to counterattack. A similar challenge exists in the case of GPS satellites. The GPS constellation consists of around 30 satellites. To meaningfully dilute GPS signals in a local area such as the Taiwan Straits would require destroying six or more satellites, as discussed in detail below. Even after a loss of six GPS satellites, the signal degradation lasts for only 95 minutes. For China to force US armed forces to operate without GPS over a sustained period of time would require destruction of 10 or more of these satellites—a very difficult task. Similarly, a fleet of nine US military communications spacecraft provided coverage over the Persian Gulf area during the 1991 Gulf War. Allied military satellites like the Skynet (UK), MACSAT, and Telecom/ Syracuse (France) were utilized as well, as were nonmilitary space communication systems (INTELSAT, INMARSAT, EUTELSAT, ARABSAT, and PANAMSAT).15 In any future conflict between the United States and China, dozens of communications satellites could be used, making targeting very complicated. To locate and attack these targets, China would likely have to employ its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles performing complex and time-consuming orbit transfer maneuvers to reach the 36,000 km orbit where communications satellites operate. The time needed to transit from LEO to GEO on a transfer orbit is usually more than five hours. Even direct launches to GEO take several hours. The time delay between launch and actual attack would provide enough time for the United States to relocate its GEO military communications satellites if it suspects an ASAT attack is imminent. Such relocation maneuvers have been done before. For example, to meet growing bandwidth demands during the 1991 Gulf War, the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) reserve West Pacific satellite was relocated from its 180o longitude geostationary parking slot to 65o E to service demands over the Gulf region.16 Even if Chinese space launch vehicles could reach these higher orbits in time to intercept US military communications satellites, executing dozens of such launches in quick succession is close to impossible. China’s infrastructure limits such a venture. The total number of space launches to orbits higher than LEO by China in 2012 was nine; there were also nine in 2011, eight in 2010, two in 2009 (with one failure), and four in 2008. In the last five years the two quickest back-to-back launches to orbits higher than LEO occurred with a gap of 15 days. However, the average time between launches is close to a month and a half.17 This launch record suggests that launching dozens of ASATs almost simultaneously as required to cripple US military operations is almost impossible for China. Additionally, China has to date used only one space launch facility for higher-than-LEO launches, the Xichang Space Launch Center, which has only three launch pads. Achieving a number of simultaneous launches using just this one launch site questions the feasibility of China being able to successfully execute an ASAT attack without becoming subject to counterattack. Unlike the ICBMs which can be quickly fired, liquid-fueled space launch vehicles take time to fuel, and these preparations are very visible. If the United States anticipates and observes the preparation for an ASAT attack, it could destroy the launch vehicles during preparation. Even if China were able to execute such an ASAT operation, would it be willing to weather the collateral consequences? Destroying a US satellite might produce debris fields that invariably affect other satellites. The debris field created by the 2007 ASAT test is now generally seen as the most prolific and severe fragmentation event in five decades of space operations.18 Additionally, any major US military operation would involve satellites from coalition partners, neutral nations, and private companies. Would China shoot at satellites from neutral nations like Japan, India, or European nations leasing out their capabilities to the United States? In the wake of the 2007 ASAT test, China faced sustained international pressure to explain its actions. Not only did the United States issue its own démarche to the Chinese foreign ministry, it successfully convinced the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to issue similar démarches. France and Germany made their independent protests to Chinese actions.19 Attacking a third-party satellite during a US-China conflict might impel these actors to side with the United States—an outcome China would certainly want to avoid. The array of factors discussed in this section raises reasonable doubts about Chinese potential to launch an operationally relevant ASAT mission to degrade US military operations.

#### Asian workers in science and engineering face a cultural double bind, either they adhere to their own cultural values and be shamed for failure to advance in a Western ideal dominated field, or be integrated into the aggressive, unforgiving capitalist mindset

**Varma 02**

ROLI VARMA , Science as Culture, Volume 11, Number 3, 2002 , “HIGH-TECH COOLIES: Asian Immigrants in the US Science and Engineering Workforce”,  Homepages.ucl.ac.uk. Available at: http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucessjb/Varma%202002.pdf (Accessed: 16 December 2021).

Cultural differences between Western and Asian countries have been identified in terms of modern and traditional values. Several scholars have identified many work-related dimensions on which Western and Asian cultures differ. Most frequently cited characteristics within Western cultures are: universalism; individualism; inner-directed orientation; time as sequence; achieved status; and equality. In contrast, characteristics within Asian cultures are: particularism; collectivism; outer-directed orientation; time as synchronization; ascribed status; and hierarchy (Hofstede, 1984; Dumont, 1986; Bedi, 1991; Redding and Baldwin, 1991; Stewart and Bennett, 1991; Simons et al., 1993; Trompenaars, 1994; Alder, 1997). Generally, scholars use this ‘two worlds’ theme to describe various disparate and contradictory aspects of new immigrants in the US. For instance, Americans are viewed as desiring individual mobility to fulfil l the ‘American Dream’ of individual accomplishments. They assume personal responsibility, pay attention to the enhancement of each individual’s rights, and focus on general rules. Asian immigrants, on the other hand, are viewed as relying more on the priorities of a group or an organization than concern for themselves. For Asian immigrants, friendships with colleagues, managers, and others take precedence over their own interests. Similarly, the dominant ideology of American culture emphasizes equality. Hierarchy emerges as the result of competition in which everyone starts from the same position and enjoys the same rules. In contrast, the dominant ideology of Asian societies emphasizes hierarchy, which is ascribed and fixed. Social ordering is not through horizontal bonds but through vertical allegiances to people holding a higher rank on the basis of age, gender, status, wealth, or power. Accordingly, Asian immigrants tend to observe the cultural tradition of deference to people above them. They tend to work under one another’s shadow. Such cultural values of Asian immigrants are viewed as a liability in the US organization of S&E. Being brought up to be modest, honour wisdom, work hard, and let the work speak for itself, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers do not boast of their achievements. Their low-key, self-effacing, and team approach work against them in American S&E organizations which reward aggressive, assertive, and outspoken individuals. Even when Asian immigrant scientists and engineers acknowledge their unfair treatments, they still avoid conflict with those in a higher position. They remain patient and hope that one day their time will come. By not taking an active part in the organizational dynamic, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers do not use the American system to work in their favour. Nonetheless, such cultural explanations tend to reinforce popular stereotypes. With a great variety of histories, customs, languages, and religions, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers themselves are not a homogeneous group. Yet the same cultural categories are attributed to all those from Asia. Likewise, national cultures tend to manifest contradictions. For instance, many Asian immigrant scientists and engineers are Westernized because science in many parts of Asia is a sign of modernity. Most of them are trained in American graduate schools, and thus do not differ significantly from Americans in routine S&E activities. Although Asian immigrants see cultural differences between Eastern and Western cultures, they do not like to be called minority. Instead, they consider themselves to be the equivalent of their white counterparts (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995, p. 103). Most importantly, if Asian immigrants succeed in S&E due to cultural emphasis on education and hard work, they are symbolically placed against Afro-Americans and other minorities. Likewise, if Asian immigrants fail to advance in S&E, they themselves are to blame and should change their cultural values from collectivism to individualism. In other words, Asian immigrant scientists and engineers should not make any demands for institutional assistance. Proponents of cultural differences ignore institutional policies that create obstacles for Asian immigrants in the S&E workforce, and thus serve the status quo

## **Advocacy**

#### Techno-orientalist discourse is perpetuated every day, only a confrontation with pedagogical practices centered on modernization theory can break down stereotypes surrounding East Asian functionality. The aff confronts the ideas that justify private appropriation of space, thus supporting the resolution

Lozano-Mendez 10 (Artur, Undergraduate Student Majoring in East Asian Studies, Published in 2010, “TECHNO-ORIENTALISM IN EAST-ASIAN CONTEXTS: REITERATION, DIVERSIFICATION, ADAPTATION”, pg. 184-186) RR Jr

Early in the history of exchange with Europeans, Japan was presented as the most conspicuous instance of il mondo alla riversa, “the world upside down”. After many decades of globalization, that topos from the Renaissance clings on to the Western imagination. The following words were written by the Jesuit Alessandro Valignano, who visited the East Indies from 1574 to 1606: “They also have other rites and customs so different from all the other nations that it would seem that they deliberately studied how to differ from everybody (…) because honestly it can be said that Japan is a world upside down compared to the ways of the world in Europe; as it is so different and contrary, that there is almost no issue where they adjust to us.”14 Such all-encompassing othering perceptions spread quickly and rooted deeply. Even today, after many decades of globalization, Japan is presented sometimes as the radical other versus Euro-American cultural horizon. Following the logics of schema of co-figuration, the identity of the West had been supported by antonymous couplings such as civilized–uncivilized, modern–pre-modern, etc. According to Morley and Robins, the idea of the West draws legitimacy from the unequivocal and exclusive correspondence that bound together the words “West–Modernity–Progress”. Thus, techno-orientalism started to take shape when such discursive exclusivity was unmistakably refuted, when the other “refused” to render themselves as the docile signified to a preset signifier. As Morley and Robins write: “Those anxieties must be seen in the context of an increasing sense of insecurity about European and American modernity. Modernity has always been that ‘mysterious and magical word that puts a barrier between the European [and American] ego and the rest of the world’.16 If it was the West that created modernity, it was also modernity that created the imaginary space and identity described as ‘Western’. (...) however, the very dynamism of modernity also worked to undermine its Western foundations. The modernization project was cumulative, future-orientated, based upon the logic of technological progression and progress. Its various elements were also designed to be exported and to transcend their European origins and exclusiveness. Modernization and modernity, with their claims to universalism, could be transposed to other host cultures. In Japan this project found a fertile environment. The technological and futurological imagination has now come to be centered here; the abstract and universalizing force of modernization has passed from Europe to America to Japan.” An instrumental factor in the successful expansion and acceptance of techno-orientalist tenets lay in their early adoption by self-orientalist discourse in Japan. Self-orientalism takes the images supplied by Western orientalism and changes their polarization from negative to positive. The mutual feedback benefits power structures both internationally and within Japan, where the nihonjinron—a trend of publications analyzing the “particularism” of Japanese people—already promotes conformity to specific models of citizenship.18 Thus, discourse informally induces people to adopt certain lifestyles and values. Those perceived cultural traits are turned into cultural assets, and merchandised as such. What the techno-orientalist deformative lens perceives as robotic, gregarious and self-emasculated way of life is presented as a considerate, balanced and reliable behavior. Paradoxically, the culture, tourism and entertainment industries from Japan have been exporting products that undergo symbolic negotiation in Western markets 20 and, all too often, become techno-orientalist avatars. The result of such symbolic negotiation comes naturally since the mainboard of technologies of recognition is already printed with techno-orientalism and the “binary structuring schemata that are constantly utilized by the geopolitics of the modernization theory.”

## Impacts

#### The dehumanization of Orientalism is a form of racialized and gendered violence – it justifies military action and makes the Other dispensable.

**Nayak ’06** (Meghana; Professor of Political Science at Pace University; March 2006; International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8:1; “Orientalism and ‘saving’ US state identity after 9/11; <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616740500415458>, accessed 7/14/16)

The third element has to do with the nexus of power and knowledge. US state identity making requires a particular social production of knowledge. ‘Knowing’ the Other is integral to protecting and securing what one ‘knows’ to be true about the Self (i.e. **the Self is good, normal, enlightened, progressive and right and the Other is backwards, barbaric, primitive and dangerous**). Indeed, the proliferation of books about ‘understanding Islam’, what is ‘behind/beneath the veil’ and ‘the Arab mind’ since 9/11 attests to the need to know, thus predict, ‘them’ as well as to justify occupation (Patai 2002; Lewis 2003; Warraq 2003; Manji 2004). Relatively speaking, Christian fundamentalism, as it underscores Bush’s rhetoric and replacement of human rights terminology with references to ‘Providence’, human dignity and biblical scripture (Mertus 2003), needs little to no explanation or interrogation for mainstream America. In effect, the only way to guarantee the persistence and prevalence of this hypermasculinist, religiously and morally superior Self, arising out of the ashes of 9/11, is to rely firmly on US-specific orientalism. While Said underscores his thesis with references to racism and racialization, he fails to examine the intersectionality of race and gender in upholding orientalism. Further, he claims that orientalism has been an ‘exclusively male province’ (1979: 207), ignoring both historical and contemporary collusions between feminism and orientalism and between women and colonial projects. As such, while I rely on Said’s formulation of orientalism as an ideology with material and discursive effects, I argue that to fully understand both orientalism and its crucial role in US state identity making, one must extrapolate Said’s argument to recognize how orientalism only works because of the violent remaking, disciplining and construction of race and gender. Thus, I argue that the US state project could not work without gendered and racialized violence. These violent acts are not singular, pathologized events but are systematic oppressive acts that are integral to complex productions and significations of gender and race. Processes of gendering and racialization involve the solidification of categories of people, and their eligibility as political agents, based on sexuality, sex/gender, race, ethnicity, religion, geography, etc. Gendered and racialized violence secures, disciplines and maintains the boundaries of public and private, community, nation and state. Systematic and programmatic violence functions through the registers of gender and race, thus dictating what ‘men’, ‘women’ and racialized categories such as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Arab/Muslim’ or ‘oriental’ are supposed to be and do. To emphasize an earlier point, the gendered and racialized violence of orientalist US state identity making is nothing new or remarkable; however, since the US government and mainstream citizenry fervently believe that US state identity making is more crucial and urgent now than ever before, it is accordingly the task of this article to trace and resist the violence, in the forms of infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification, engendered by the desperate attempts to save the Self. The ‘feminist’ framework advanced here, then, brings together several themes on masculinity, orientalism, religion, race, gender, nation, state and violence in order to better understand and possibly resist particular forms of identity making. I rely upon feminisms that are cognizant of the historic collusion of orientalism and feminisms as well as of the contradictory practices of feminisms that at once promise emancipation from and transformation of oppressive structures/systems yet also problematically ‘make’ race, gender, community and territory and benefit from power relations (McClintock 1995). In fact, the very concept of the Other has not only enabled many ‘western’, upper class, hegemonic self-described feminist actors to exercise agency while leaving undisturbed the very systems that allow oppression, but has also been central to the development of feminisms (Mohanty 1991). Thus, in order for feminism to have resistance potential, it must acknowledge its own participation in orientalism and its self-referential activism during colonialism, conflicts and the War on Terror. As this article progresses, I grapple first with tracing the violence of orientalism, in the form of infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification, before concluding with thoughts on the type of theoretical shifts and political gestures that feminist responses must include. Infantilization is the representation of certain political actors/communities as vulnerable, helpless and backward children. As such, their lives depend on being saved from the vagaries and horrors of their cultures and religions by rational, enlightened, civilized and strong political actors. US policymakers’ documented reasons for late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century imperial expansion hinged on the need to save these ‘emotional, irrational, irresponsible, unbusinesslike, unstable, childlike’ people (Rosenberg 1991: 31–5). They were bolstered in this mission by the strongly gendered overtones of Social Darwinism, the perceived duty to teach Others how to live in a political society and the desire to ‘prove’ US power and strength through the assertion of American men’s military might, sexual prowess and ability to protect Other women from ‘their’ men (Hoganson 2000). As such, one can recognize infantilization in discourses and acts that appear to raise awareness about gender violence but that actually locate oppression squarely on Other cultures, rather than on local and international power relations, globalized capitalism or US foreign policy. As such, infantilization includes the following elements: descriptions of gender violence are racialized, to underscore that patriarchal violence does not exist in the West and that the only reason a woman may die in a nonwestern country is because of a monolithically oppressive, static Culture (Narayan 1997); promotion of a militaristic solution to end gender violence; and use of the ‘progress’ of Other women in achieving or exercising rights, such as voting, to justify US strategic actions. Thus, **infantilization is a form of racialized and gendered violence** because it violently denies agency based on race and gender and strongly justifies military action. As the USA attempts to ‘represent’ the voices of those who cannot speak, **it ironically erases these voices**, which in effect makes Other women dispensable. After all, if the West can represent, give voice to and talk about the experiences of Other women, what need is there for real women? Women’s voices are instead systematically forgotten, erased or taken out of context to prove the horrors of their cultures. These women cannot possibly tell their own stories, emphasize poverty or community over western liberal conceptions of freedom in terms of choice of clothing and the opportunity to vote, or revolutionize their societies without the help of the enlightened West. Critiques of particular misogynistic interpretations and politicizations of Islam find no place in the US ‘us versus them’ rhetoric to express such views without inadvertently ‘demonstrating’ Islamic oppression or ‘betraying’ men in their communities. Women elsewhere cannot be full agents, recalling my earlier point that orientalism cannot accept the agency of certain Others. Further, **the ‘help’ comes in the form of militarism**, which is the problematic search for the perfect ‘Other’, the easily differentiated and hence racialized enemy and the promotion of hypermasculinity. Infantilization thus solidifies masculinist battles to prove who is manly enough to protect one’s land, to decide on a political system and to ‘protect’ women, all of which get played out on women’s bodies in the form of abduction, rape and forced impregnation and on men’s bodies as sexual violence and humiliation (Enloe 1993, 1998, 2000). After 9/11, the US government, the media and ‘experts’ collaborated to signify the oppression of Arab/Muslim women as the categorical proof of Islamic terror, and women accordingly became a central point of the war on terror. Despite US involvement in the regimes of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the USA suddenly turned the long-term persecution of women in Afghanistan and Iraq into a spectacle for public consumption and justification for military intervention. Images of Afghani women throwing off their burqas and Iraqi women marching and shouting political slogans alleviated some of the public concern about the validity of the military operations. In the State of the Union address in January 2002, Bush (2002) declared, ‘[t]he last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes ... Today women are free’, later emphasizing ‘[a]s a result of securing ourselves and ridding [sic] the Taliban out of Afghanistan, the Afghan people had elections this weekend. And the first voter was a 19- year-old woman. Think about that. Freedom is on the march’ (‘The Third Bush–Kerry Presidential Debate’ 2004). Regarding the war campaign in Iraq, the Bush administration employed graphic descriptions of Saddam Hussein’s ‘rape rooms’ and has consistently framed women’s political participation as the sign of progress. While many contest the reasons for and events in these two theaters of war, few doubt the inherently beneficial goal of ‘freeing’ women from the religious and cultural oppression of Islam, regardless of the US governmental role in creating some of the conditions for such oppression or of the particular political and historical specificities of the oppression. As discussed above, racialized and gendered violence is crucial in US attempts to promote hypermasculinity and religious ethics in the project to save the Self. The USA can save itself and its identity by protecting its power. The power to save is clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy (2002: prologue): Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence ... we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom. In order to prove and solidify this strength and power, the US state must ‘save’ violated women and emasculated men who cannot seem to defend their countries from terrorism or build democracies. If one counters infantilization, one effectively doubts the US ability to save others and thus threatens the very strength the USA proclaims it (still) has. The paternalist mission, wherein only a real man can save suffering women under the shadow of the gun, is crucial for alleviating the anxiety that the USA has experienced since 9/11. Because states feminize boundaries, the invasion of such translates into imagery of an impotent, emasculated man unable to protect his possessions from being violated and destroyed. Bush (2004d) demonstrates the militaristic solution to this masculinist anxiety: ‘And we have seen Americans in uniform storming mountain strongholds, and charging through sandstorms and liberating millions, with acts of valor that would make the men of Normandy proud.’ Further, infantilization serves Bush’s (2003b) perception that salvation is divine, as he notes: ‘[t]he liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity’. Bush’s Christian-based salvation, despite its bloody history throughout colonizing missions, somehow poses little danger in comparison to the Islamic threat. Infantilization ‘works’ for the USA because it allows the redemption of the emasculated citizen and state that could not fight off 9/11. In her research on female slaves on the plantations in the south of the USA, Deborah Gray White (1985) describes two prevailing understandings of the women: the Jezebel archetype, the hedonistic, lascivious and morally corrupt woman who raises men to be rapists and women to be temptresses; and the Mammy archetype, the maternal, submissive, non-thinking woman. Both demonization and dehumanization are apparent in the diabolic Jezebel who deserves violence and the dispensable Mammy whose violent experiences really do not matter, as only certain ‘worthy’ bodies can truly experience suffering. In other words, Jezebels and Mammies are ineligible for inclusion in civilization. As the discussion of infantilization demonstrates, the politically expedient redemption and salvation of Other women reaffirms that their bodies are dispensable. One can recognize demonization and dehumanization by tracing competing discourses of disgust and apathy in the US attempts to save the Self. In particular, **these violent practices classify people as collateral damage** (not mattering at all), conditionally worthy (mattering only if they meet particular conditions such as expressing US patriotism), or dangerous (mattering in so far as they need to be identified in order to be targeted or eliminated). The event of 9/11 requires, as it harshly exposed the underlying anxiety always present in the US Self, that ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ and various constructed categories of Others, be turned into something to be feared and hated, notquite-humans whose suffering must have been brought onto themselves, and thus is not really important. At the same time that infantilization constructs Other women as objects to be saved, demonization and dehumanization ensure that ‘their’ men and cultures are hated and despised. Depending on the type of state identity it wants to assert, the US state decides when to hate, save or ignore Other men and women. These contradictions, of saving yet hating the Other, sympathizing with yet neglecting the realities of the Other, proudly touting the freedom of Other women yet violating these very women by repressing political beliefs and expressions or through sexual and physical brutalization, are indicative of orientalist logic. Thus, the attempts to save the Self can result in infantilization, demonization or dehumanization simultaneously or alternatively. To demonstrate the absolute degeneracy of the ‘Orient’ depends on describing the condition of the most ‘vulnerable’: women. However, the ‘West’ must be able to retain positional superiority, in terms of deciding what happens in the ‘Orient’, thus the Other cannot be allowed to fully cross the line from ‘them’ to ‘us’, explaining the underlying contempt for ‘them’. **Demonization and dehumanization are forms of gendered and racialized violence** because these practices, like infantilization, erase agency based on gender and race. To invoke hatred and/or extreme apathy toward communities is to emphasize that they do not matter, and consequently, promotes **the targeted violence and killings of Others** and reduces the loss of human life to collateral damage. In effect, demonization and dehumanization are critical to the US hegemonic project, as the assertion of the US Self is as much about disciplining the Others at home as it is about objectifying Others ‘elsewhere’. The hypermasculinity required for the US state project results in and requires demonization and dehumanization, particularly of the Arab/ Muslim male, since 9/11. The limited horror expressed in the USA at the hypocrisy of the peaceful, secular, democratic USA inflicting sexualized violence and atrocities on those coded as the enemy in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, shows the interrelationship of masculinity and patriotism enacted by both US male and female members of the military. Because the Arab/ Muslim male is so hateful and subhuman, the torture of potentially innocent people is acceptable in order to protect US strength and power. Any concern with scenes and stories from Cuba and Iraq deals with the ‘humiliation’ the men must have suffered as members of honor-based Arab society. This discomfort with the consequences of masculinist militarism marks the pain not as human horror but as a function of (superficial knowledge about) the Other society’s expectations of heterosexual men. Underlying the ambivalent responses is the assumption that the worst thing that can happen to a man, ‘here’ or ‘there’, is to be ‘treated like a woman’, i.e. raped and made powerless. Those invested in US state identity can comfort themselves by thinking of the torturers as ‘sick’ individuals rather than as agents of systemized hatred, racialization and misogyny.