# 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a democracy in which a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

#### ‘A’ is indefinite – means you have to prove the rez in a vacuum, not a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation)

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec Inida

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision – they justify arbitrarily doing away with words in the rez which decks ground and prep. Voter for jurisdiction since the judge can’t vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### 2] Limits – there are hundreds of democracies, but other metrics means even more – explodes limits since there are tons of affs and combinations with different situations i.e. inherency in France is different from the US – there are no DAs that apply to every aff. Some examples are UK, Japan, US, India, etc.

#### 3] TVA – read your advantage under a whole rez aff. Answers PICs – potential doesn’t justify actual abuse and lack of prep means cheaty word and process PICs.

#### Fairness is a voter and outweighs – debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention while encouraging a race to the bottom.

#### No RVIs – Logic – you don’t win for being fair, outweighs since arguments must be logical

# 2

#### Multiple links. Authorship. Affirmative makes authorship critical. One must assess quality of the source. Moral Panics: Aff creates moral panic over the constant question of democracy and the identity of media professionalism. Regimes of truth: Aff manufactures frames using SQ as guide. Discourses of power underlie journalism. Without properly addressing them, there is no solution. Biopolitics will undermine any solution.

Mitchelson 2012 [Alana, Journalist, October 26] “The journalistic relevance of Foucault’s theory,” **Ink** <https://inkedhistoryofnow.wordpress.com/2012/10/26/the-journalistic-relevance-of-foucaults-theory/EM>

While the media as an industry encapsulates a particular discourse, one must also consider the many discourses that constitute an individual journalist; Foucault’s concept of the ‘author.’ In addition to this, his theories more broadly indicate that the power structures in a society control all knowledge and social control over that particular group of people. This not only refers to the government and the way politicians may take advantage of time poor journalists to churn out articles tainted by spin, but also to the concentration of media ownership itself which may prevent the exposure of all aspects of the truth. Foucault’s ideas may be considered fundamental for one to develop a richer understanding of journalism as information, knowledge, truth and power are elements so deeply engrained in media reporting. A journalist’s role is to mirror society and report the facts however when considering Foucault’s concept of discourses, it is difficult to discern the whole truth as societies have different versions of the truth through the development of their own discourses over time; in Foucault’s words “each society has its own regime of truth” (Foucault, 2009, pp. 68). Foucault’s notion of historical events influencing that of the future holds especially true when considering the development of technology. Journalists have had to adapt to the changing environment by changing the way in which they communicate news to the masses. Before attempting to fully comprehend the current state of the world, one must first look back as to the reasons for these societal advances in relation to journalism. The internet presented people with an avenue whereby one could communicate and absorb information at a faster rate. Society takes preference to the online media platform for their news consumption over the traditional print form for which society’s demand continues to diminish. Therefore journalists have had to change the product in order to cater for human needs, where the inverted pyramid is far more appropriate to a narrative structured article that does not reveal the most important points in the first paragraph. A noteworthy aspect of Foucault’s societal discourses is that of moral panics. Stories that hold particular traits of a widely known story in the past are more likely to resonate more soundly in a society. The ideas of the previous story will inevitably resurface and cause similar upset in society. This was evident in the case of the recent murder of Jill Meagher. While acknowledging the tragedy of this event, there are many similar deaths that occurred around the same time that did not receive anywhere near as much media coverage. This may be considered a result of the moral panic surrounding the issue of a woman, in particular a young, white woman, fearing walking home alone in her own neighbourhood at night. Likewise, the case of Lindy Chamberlain and the death of her baby Azaria gave rise to the moral panic of the ‘mad mother.’ These ‘moral panics’ almost hold an element of control over people in society, including journalists, as the human mind seems to inadvertently categorise stories in order to make sense of them and give them meaning. Journalism is its own discourse within itself. According to Foucault’s theory, there is a certain perception among members of a society as to what a journalist looks like, how they behave and what kind of a person they are. Notably, these judgments rather superficially revolve around basic stereotypes that do not take individual differences into account. These are the discourses within individual journalists. An example of this may be the ethical choices a journalist makes in their career based on their moral code which is defined by the composition of all the discourses to which they relate. Foucault indicates that “journalism can be viewed as an intersection of many conflicting interests,” meaning that there are many angles to a story and many different, and at times incompatible, interpretations of the facts (Conboy, 2004, pp. 4). It further conveys the way in which power structures of society will shape a story to suits their own ambitious interests at the expense of the truth. Foucault acknowledges that “we must always keep in mind the multiple relationships of journalism with society, with the economy, with politics and also a relatively autonomous cultural practice in its own right with its own traditions” as discourses should be considered in juxtaposition with one another rather than contemplated as single entities (Conboy, 2004, pp. 4). Advertisements REPORT THIS AD In terms of Foucault’s work regarding the ‘death of the author,’ he proposes that the meaning of a ‘work’ is dependent on the person to which the work is associated; the ‘author.’ As reasoned by Foucault, “an author’s name is not simply an element in a discourse; it performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse, assuring a classificatory function” (Foucault, 1984, pp. 107). The attribution of a ‘work’ to an author leads to the subconscious grouping of that writer’s other works and hence, the contrasting of that particular collection of pieces with that of other authors. In this way, the ‘work’ almost becomes characterised solely by the author rather than being defined on its own terms. As summarised by Foucault, the ‘author function’ is the way “the author’s name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and culture” (Foucault, 1984, pp. 107). He touches on the way in which the attribution of a statement to an author is received as merely a ‘demonstrated truth.” He is referring to the way attribution to an authoritative source places a sense of confidence in the minds of readers as personal opinions may be conveyed in a statement even though they may be carefully selected and constructed within an article to convey certain meaning out of context from when the statement was originally delivered. According to Foucault’s notion of ‘discursivity,” the author is also not necessarily only the author of their own work, but suggests that they may also hold some relationship to other authors’ pieces of a similar discourse or genre of writing (Foucault, 1984, pp. 114). The notion of power is deeply embedded within Foucault’s theory of discourse as he proposes that knowledge and truth are vital aspects which contribute to power. The discourse of journalism possesses many characteristics such as the way in which an individual journalist structures an article, the effect of a piece of journalism on the composition of society, and the way members of society prioritise stories. It ultimately defines the way in which people perceive the concept of journalism and its role in society; the notion of a free press, its function as the ‘fourth estate’ and the provision of objective accounts based on evidence and fact. “Journalism can be viewed as an intersection of many conflicting interests” which relates back to the way discourse is inevitably linked to power (Conboy, 2004, pp. 4). This holds particularly true within the discourse of journalism as journalists act to give a voice to the unheard groups in society, giving them a sense of empowerment as they have access to some form of representation. When information and knowledge within societal discourses become widely accepted norms, it is difficult for people to objectively challenge their credibility. In this way, one may argue that discourses place restrictions on an individual’s ability to accurately understand the world around them. Foucault however disagrees with this notion. He argues that discourses present people with the desire to conform to social norms in order to succeed in life and that it is rather institutions of power who blur an individual’s ability to see the truth. For example Rupert Murdoch’s near monopoly over the distribution of information through his concentrated ownership over a large scope of media organisations cause his content to provide a remarkably partisan and unbalanced view of the truth. Foucault acknowledges that power cannot solely be defined by repression or else society would arguably fail to obey the rules set out by our leaders. He therefore argues that bodies of power must offer some benefits to society in addition to enforcing such rules. In this way, some media organisations may argue that they offer stories that are likely to entertain over more serious stories in order to cater for the needs of society. This is a trend that one could argue is undermining to the journalism profession. Foucault’s theories should not be thought of as research of the past that bears no relationship to today’s society. His concepts of discourse, the ‘author’ and that of knowledge and power are still very relevant and may be applied to journalism in order to better understand what the future has to hold for the profession in this digital age. It lays a firm foundation for aspiring journalists as they enter the working world as for one who had not studied social theories such as that of Foucault, they could potentially become lost in the spin provided by political figures which would distract from the real story. It is of uppermost importance that journalist separate ‘power’ from ‘truth.’

#### Objectivity is gatekeeper for Free Press. Upholds the regulatory impulse driving sovereignty. Brings sovereignty into workplace biopolitics. Creates state of exception between professionals who practice scientific rationalism and outsiders who must be regulated and ostracized for their blatant subjectivity.

Blagaard 2013 [Bolette, Aalborg University Copenhagen] “Shifting boundaries: Objectivity, citizen journalism andtomorrow’s journalists,” **Journalism** <https://www.academia.edu/7452532/Shifting_boundaries_Objectivity_citizen_journalism_and_tomorrows_journalists_Article/EM>

New journalism, public journalism and citizen journalism may be seen as pockets of resistance to or even backlashes against the dominating journalistic concept, particularlyin American journalism, of objectivity, by attempting to decentre the readers rather than unify them (Muhlmann, 2008). While professional journalism’s history helps connect and construct national societies (Anderson, 1991; Muhlmann, 2008), it seemingly more-over carries an inbuilt contradiction between universal objectivity and national specificity which calls on the profession to veil its bias and national situatedness through discourses of professionalism (Schudson, 1978). Journalistic objectivity is therefore adisputed and fiercely discussed concept, which continues to draw strong opinions fromscholars and practitioners alike. However, recent scholarship has uncovered a more nuanced picture of practiced objectivity. This scholarship suggests that journalistic objectivity should not be confused with scientific objectivity, and that the former in fact is a set of practices(Hampton, 2008; Richards and Rees, 2011; Ward, 2008), a ritual (Tuchman, 1972) or performance (Boudana, 2011). Although within the professional modern practice of journalism it is widely accepted that objectivity is an ideal that cannot be reached, itis equally acknowledged that the history of journalism has provided resistance and alternatives to the discourse of objectivity. Objectivity is then both an occupational norm and an object of ‘struggle within the larger struggle of professional jurisdiction [over definitions and particular forms of expertise]’ (Schudson and Anderson, 2009:96). The occupational values are internalised and define the journalistic episteme(Tumber and Prentoulis, 2003). Moreover, journalists perceive emotions to imply contamination of objectivity (Richards and Rees, 2011: 863). Objectivity is then a‘performance’, which can be ‘evaluated by the degree of truth that characterizes [the journalist’s] report’ (Boudana, 2011: 396). In order to perform adequately and to avoid contamination, journalists adhere to a set of principles and practices that restrict access of emotions, value judgments and political biases to journalistic products.These principles may be termed journalistic objectivity as opposed to scientific objec-tivity and include factuality, fairness, non-bias, independence, non-interpretation, and neutrality and detachment (Ward, 2008: 19). Save factuality, these principles make journalistic objectivity into an ethical concept that relies on the individual professional journalist to maintain the moral standard.

#### No value to life in a biopolitical framework—everyone is exposed to the possibility of being reduced to bare life in the name of instrumentality

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140]

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the *exceprio* of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### The role of the ballot becomes a negotiation of knowledge, a deciding of axes and boundaries. Evaluate our critique by its ability to reorient political perception and action.

Bleiker 2000 [Roland, coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program @ U of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics]

Describing, explaining and prescribing may be less unproblematic processes of evaluation, but only at first sight. **If one abandons** the notion of **Truth,** the idea that an event can be apprehended as part of a natural order, authentically and scientifically, as something that exists independently of the meaning we have given it – if one abandons this separation of object and subject, then **the process of judging a** particular approach to describing and explaining an event **becomes a** **very muddled affair. There** is **no** longer an **objective measuring device that can set the standard to evaluate whether or not a particular insight into an event**, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, **is true or false**. The very nature of a past event becomes indeterminate insofar as its identification is dependent upon ever-changing forms of linguistic expressions that imbue the event with meaning.56 The inability to determine objective meanings is also the reason why various critical international relations scholars stress that there can be no ultimate way of assessing human agency. Roxanne Doty, for instance, believes that the agent–structure debate ‘encounters an aporia, i.e., a self-engendered paradox beyond which it cannot press’. This is to say that the debate is fundamentally undecidable, and that theorists who engage in it ‘can claim no scientific, objective grounds for determining whether the force of agency or that of structure is operative at any single instant’.57 Hollis and Smith pursue a similar line of argument. They emphasise that there are always two stories to tell – neither of which is likely ever to have the last word – an inside story and an outside story, one about agents and another about structures, one epistemological and the other ontological, one about understanding and one about explaining international relations.58 The value of an insight cannot be evaluated in relation to a set of objectively existing criteria. But this does not mean that all insights have the same value. Not every perception is equally perceptive. Not every thought is equally thoughtful. Not every action is equally justifiable. How**,** then, can one judge? **Determining the value** of a particular insight or action **is always a process of negotiating knowledge, of deciding where its rotating axes should be placed and how its outer boundaries should be drawn.** The actual act of **judging can** thus **be made in reference to the very process of negotiating knowledge**. The contribution of the present approach to understanding transversal dissent could, for instance, be evaluated by its ability to demonstrate that a rethinking of the agency problematique has revealed different insights into global politics. The key question then revolves around whether or not a particular international event, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, appears in a new light once it is being scrutinised by an approach that pays attention to factors that had hitherto been ignored. Expressed in other words, knowledge **about agency can be evaluated by its ability to orient and reorient our perceptions of events and the political actions that issue from them**. The lyrical world, once more, offers valuable insight. Rene´ Char: A poet must leave traces of his passage, not proofs. Only traces bring about dreams.

#### Alternative is “problematization.” I introduce bio-politics into the discussion and we understand the true diffuse nature of power which makes the statements made by the 1AC very problematic. The affirmative attempt to simplify it into basic terms of the mechanisms of power is inadequate. Problematization is key to activist movements, also challenges the effectiveness of non-reformist reforms

Terwiel, 2020 (Anna, Professor of political theory at Trinity College that focuses on carceral feminism and prison abolition, “Problematization as an Activist Practice” Theory and Event, Vol 23 NO.1 January 2020 68-70

Rather than seek solutions to practical policy questions, problematization aims to disrupt how problems and solutions alike are perceived. Such disruption, Foucault suggests, enables a radical rethinking of an issue and the creative development of new approaches. Problematization is usually understood as a style of philosophy that allows individuals to engage in ethical practices of self-transformation.[12](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f12) Foucault's archaeologies and genealogies, for instance, can both be seen as forms of problematization: they use different methods to "clarify and intensify" the problems of our time and thereby make room for "experimentation on what we take to be the limits of our selves."[13](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f13) However, scholars have not yet pursued Foucault's suggestion that problematization can also be [End Page 67] understood as an activist practice.[14](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f14) Specifically, Foucault described the Prisons Information Group [Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons or GIP], an activist collective he co-founded in the early 1970s, as "an initiative of 'problematization.'"[15](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f15) This article considers Foucault's late work alongside his writings for the GIP to theorize problematization as a collaborative activist practice. Problematization is activist because it seeks to enable social change, and collaborative because theorists are seen as "relays" in problematization rather than its originators. As I describe in greater detail below, the GIP formed in a moment of intense political contestation of the prison and tried to help translate prisoners' grievances, protests, and uprisings into a more generalized and widely shared "active intolerance" of the prison and punishment. Bringing together insights from the GIP's activism and Foucault's philosophical writings, I theorize problematization as a way of responding to protests that seeks to affirm and amplify their disruptive power by unsettling the ways of thinking used to adjudicate them. This interpretation of problematization, I will suggest, has the advantage of more clearly connecting the work of radical thinking with practical efforts at change than Foucault himself was able or willing to. Moreover, it expands the relevance of Foucault's work to prison politics beyond the tendency to use either specific Foucauldian concepts (such as biopower or neoliberalism) or scholarly methods (such as genealogy) to analyze punitive practices.[16](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f16) And in the context of contemporary debates about mass incarceration, a problematization approach can help energize critiques of the prison while resisting their limitation to demands for better prisons.[17](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f17) More generally, this essay proposes to consider Foucauldian problematization alongside other approaches that challenge justification and problem-solving as the primary contributions of political theory. Akin to Judith Butler's critical analysis of the "frames" that justify state violence and reproduce unequal vulnerability to death across the globe, problematization urges theorists to consider how dominant ways of thinking enable some practices and lives while obscuring or eliminating others.[18](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f18) Butler's work further highlights the importance of problematizing the norms of gender, sexuality, and race that enable state violence and the unequal distribution of precariousness. Such problematization takes us beyond Foucault's own analyses of punishment to intersectional feminist analysis,[19](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f19) critical trans politics,[20](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f20) and other scholarly and activist efforts to "trouble the system we have."

Foucault depicts the work of diagnosing and defamiliarizing our ways of thinking—problematization—as a crucial part of collective efforts to change practices (such as punishment) and institutions (such as the prison). Intellectuals, he suggests, should work alongside "very different people such as magistrates, penal law theorists, penitentiary practitioners, lawyers, social workers, and persons who have experienced prison" in a shared "endeavor of reflection and thought."29 While these categories are by no means mutually exclusive—just think of the work of (formerly) incarcerated intellectuals such as George Jackson, Angela Davis, and Assata Shakur—I will focus, in this essay, on how theorists on the outside can contribute to prison activism.30 Yet problematization is not typically seen as a collaborative activist practice. Rather, scholars tend to interpret it more narrowly as a form of philosophy that can inspire ethical self-transformation. In the most in-depth analysis to date, Colin Koopman, for instance, depicts problematization as a type of genealogy that, by tracing the emergence of our ways of thinking, provides the materials needed "to constitute ourselves otherwise" or "rework[…] ourselves."31 The philosopher's diagnostic work, Koopman argues, should be "followed up by self-transformative responses," i.e. by "experimentation on what we take to be the limits of our selves."32 Foucault indeed often mentions the transformative effects of philosophy on the self, and his last published works analyze ethical practices through which individuals shape their subjectivity, such as dieting and regulating one's sexual appetites.33 But as I have begun to show, there are grounds for a more political reading of problematization also, which Koopman does not pursue. My aim is not to draw a sharp line between ethics and politics, or between individual and collective change, but to ask: What are the political and theoretical costs of restricting our understanding of problematization to individual ethics? What possible responses to mass incarceration open up when we approach problematization as a collaborative activist practice instead? One risk of restricting problematization to individual ethics is that we inadvertently reinforce the belief that problematization is inappropriate [End Page 70] for politics, understood as a domain that demands practical solutions to policy issues.

# Case

#### First, don’t allow AC offense weighing:

#### Your aff analysis starts from the wrong point, that’s an epistemological indict, all your offense just feeds back into bio politics.

#### Reject their method:

#### Even if the state can be good in some instances, the links isolate reasons why the aff’s use of the state specifically is bad. Prefer the links on specificity

#### Working within the state is always a solvency deficit to the perm – this allows the state to control what it wants us to understand and learn and means we’ll never learn how to resist and create radical change

#### The role of the ballot precludes your standard for a few reasons.

#### It question our role in debate, the consequences of the plan don’t matter if our orientation in debate is flawed.

#### Is fait is illusory, giving the aff a ballot does nothing outside of the round, the ROB function to alter our perception of thing like political engagement, we need to stop creating mindless drones of the state from debate.

#### Claim about fairness don’t matter a) they don’t spill up b) debate is innately an unfair playing field c) voting on fairness is just the sovereign exercising control over what is fair and what is not, link back into our critique.

#### My role of the ballot is a question of ontology and epistemology – your framework presupposes both epistemology and ontology in the process of making its claims about life. If I win that even ONE of those presuppositions is bad, that’s enough to consider the ROB first.

## FW:

#### AT: Extinction ow – vtl ow

#### The traditional debate impulse to rely on body counts for impact calc is an example of our impact---it relies on the continual imagination of external threats to the social order and teaches students to be constantly searching for the best way to describe those threats, instead of examining the structural conditions that enable violence. This enables a system of governance that elides the endless war present in incarceration, global policing, and more by insisting on narrow chains of causality and the most catastrophic impacts possible

Kevin **McDonald 13**, Professor and Director of the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing at Victoria University, *Our Violent World: Terrorism in Society*, 2013, pp. 1-4

Among the most significant Of these changes are transformations in forms Of social and political violence, the kinds Of violence recently described by the philosopher Charles Taylor as 'categorial', directed towards people whom the protagonists do not personally know (2011). Often such violence is contrasted to the violence that takes place within personal relationships, but as we will see as this book develops, this distinction is not as clear as it once may have been. The chapters that follow attempt to explore a con- text that has become increasingly evident, as violence that once appeared to be 'contained' by key dimensions of modern society is now much more fluid, increasingly part of the flows making up a global world (Urry 2005). But such violence is not a 'thing' or an object. It is a form of agency, an embodied relationship and human experience. As such, it is a critical lens through which to explore wider transformations of social life. On the Other hand, to separate violence from such transformations profoundly limits our capacity to understand, and respond to, one of the most urgent questions shaping the twenty-first century. ¶ The Surveillance Society ¶ Most of us are aware of changing forms or potentials of violence through the growth of security and surveillance (Crelinsten 2009). Some developments are obvious, such as airport security. Others are less so, such as passport tracking systems, internment camps, control orders and detention without trial, or erosion of the distinction between immigration policy and security policy (Connolly 2005: 54). Some receive extensive debate in the press and social media, while Other developments are less discussed. Over recent years, for example, states as different as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States have been engaged in the construction Of thousands Of kilometres Of walls along national bor- ders, a development that the political scientist Wendy Brown calls 'walling', something she contends is driven by 'waning sovereignty' (2010). Global military expenditure, which had declined in the years following the end of the Cold War in 1989, expanded rapidly over the first decade of the new century, increasing by some 49 per cent to reach US$1.53 tril- lion in 2009 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011). New types of public surveillance involve pervasive but ambiguous categories Of 'pre-crime' as public policy seeks to identify groups and individuals 'at risk' of committing criminal acts (Zedner 2007). The changing role of the criminal justice system has become evident in the relentless increase in the number of people imprisoned in the world, a figure that reached some 10.65 million in 2009 (Walmsley 2010). ¶ Political theorists in particular have been aware of the ways these transformations 'resonate', mutually amplifying each other (Connolly 2005: 54). Brian Massumi (2007) argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a new type of governance in complex societies, one shaped by a shift from a model Of prevention, which operates in an 'objectively knowable world', to a model of pre-emption, which involves the attempt to wield power in a world based on uncertainty. Brad Evans (2010) points to the rise of 'consequentialist ethics' involved in this development, where forms of moral judgement framed in terms of 'right' and 'wrong' are becoming redefined as calculations to determine whether a situation is to be judged better or worse as a result of a course of action. These are not minor trans- formations. The OECD argues that 'security' has become a major area Of economic activity, a driver Of modern economies (OECD 2004), while the sociologist David Lyon traces the contours of a surveillance society increasingly based on digital technologies (Lyon 2004). The political philosopher William Connolly argues that this new social and political model involves an increasing mobilization of the population against 'unspecified enemies'

#### AT: brands - read the card it is all about optimization of current systems, kills thing outside dominate struc of knowledge, democracy is link

#### AT: leek – bad frame = bad policy

## Adv:

#### No impact --- weapons are dealerted and escalation checks stop conflict

Ghoshal 16 [Research Associate at the Delhi Policy Group (Debalina, “India’s Recessed Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, 39:1, 159-170]

The theory behind India’s nuclear missile program is ‘induction without deployment.’ 15 As Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, another nuclear expert, writes, the Indian military is clear that induction is meant for peacetime, while deployment is a wartime activity.16 A recessed deterrent posture, hence, puts a lesser burden on its command and control and enables New Delhi to clarify for the world the difference between its induction program and a deployment program (should New Delhi wish to deploy the weapons). Nuclear deterrence usually comes just from the mere possession of such weapons. Therefore, the need to keep these nuclear weapons in a ready deterrent posture does not make sense, but instead adds to insecurity and instability. In fact, Lt. General B.M. Kapur has argued that “if range, target, yield, and mobility of nuclear weapons are made known to the enemy, that is the beginning of deterrence. Openness is itself deterrence.” 17 For instance, even though the Agni-V missile is neither deployed nor mated with nuclear warheads, the fact that New Delhi declares that the missile is capable of reaching targets in China—and that they are survivable against an enemy’s first-strike—could itself strengthen deterrence. Therefore, t here is no need for India to keep nuclear weapons in ready deterrent posture to strengthen deterrence. Recessed deterrence thus enables India to adopt a strategy that is an amalgamation of both openness and ambiguity. India declared a state of possessing nuclear weapons, which is an openness that enabled New Delhi to strengthen its deterrent capability. However, the unassembled and semi-assembled states of its nuclear weapons and missile systems open the window of ambiguity regarding India’s nuclear weapons command and control issues (especially in the case of seabased deterrence) as well as its survivability and ability to launch a counterstrike, thereby further strengthening deterrence. Moreover, India has always projected itself as a firm supporter of nuclear disarmament. India has been the only state to call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. While adopting a no-first-use policy is considered to be another vital step toward nuclear disarmament, nofirst-use is best ensured when states decide to not to keep their arsenal in a ready deterrent posture. How Can Recessed Deterrence Help? A posture of recessed deterrence offers a variety of benefits: Allows for rational thinking: When warheads are not mated with their delivery systems, it gives a state more time to act rationally during times of crisis. This has even more relevance when a state has a first-use policy. However, India, with a no-first-use policy, also gains from a recessed deterrence posture. In addition to the reasons given above, the belief that India’s warheads are not mated with their delivery systems could give Pakistan reason not to clandestinely mate their own nuclear warheads with their delivery systems. As former Defense Minister George Fernandes points out, if Pakistan strikes initially, the effects could be cataclysmic: “we [India] may [lose] a part of our population.” And after India’s retaliatory strikes on Pakistan, “Pakistan may [be] completely wiped out.” 18 This irrationality and catastrophe to an extent has been prevented not just because of New Delhi’s no-first-use policy, but also because of its posture of keeping the nuclear weapons de-mated and de-alerted. This provides a certain trust to Pakistan that New Delhi’s nuclear weapons are not meant for warfighting. Similarly, China has always been keen on avoiding nuclear “adventurism,” and a de-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons posture coupled with no-first-use provides China the room to do so. With both New Delhi and Beijing adopting a nofirst-use policy (though the policy is conditional), their de-mated and de-alerted nuclear weapons posture could leave less scope for an irrational launch by either state, thereby keeping the nuclear threshold high. Prevent an all out nuclear war: Choosing not to mate delivery systems with nuclear warheads could prevent an all out nuclear war. This posture is conducive for both Pakistan and India since both states could feasibly engage in limited conflict

#### Global democracy resilient now. No SQ collapse.

Muggah and Pinker 18 (Robert, Co-founder, Igarape Institute and SecDev Group, and Steven, Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology, Harvard University, “Democracy isn't in as much trouble as you might think,” 6-3-18, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/is-liberal-democracy-in-retreat)

Though some countries (and cities) are faring worse than others, the world is becoming safer and more prosperous overall – hard as that may be to believe. This is especially true of democratic countries, which stand out for their higher rates of economic growth and higher levels of wellbeing. Democracies also tend to have fewer wars and genocides, virtually no famines, and happier, healthier, better-educated citizens. The good news is that a sizeable majority of the world’s population now lives in a democracy. Yet in some of them – not least the United States – the rise of populist, nativist political parties and leaders with authoritarian tendencies has created an unmistakable sense of pessimism, leading many to fear for the future of democracy. Are people right to be worried? Democratic sea change Many people forget that liberal democracy is a relatively new idea. Most of its core precepts – the separation of powers, human rights, civil liberties, freedom of speech and assembly, pluralistic media, and free, fair, and competitive elections – did not genuinely take hold until the twentieth century. Until a few hundred years ago, most societies had swung between anarchy and various forms of tyranny. Governments before the modern era brought about only marginal improvements in the lives of their subjects, whom they often kept in check through brutal repression. Ruthless despotism endured in most places, because the alternative – a Hobbesian state of anarchy – was even worse. The emergence of democracy was far from inevitable. In fact, the spread of democratic governments after the eighteenth century was a rather stop-start affair. According to the late Harvard University political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, it came in three waves. The first began in the nineteenth century, led by the US, which had developed a system of constitutional democracy that was widely admired for its checks on executive, legislative, and judicial power and privilege. Throughout the nineteenth century, Western European countries, in particular, emulated the US model. By 1922, there were some 29 democracies in existence around the world, though that number would fall to 12 by 1942. The second wave, according to Huntington, came after the Allied victory in World War II, and crested in 1962, when there were 36 democracies around the world. Again, the wave would ebb somewhat. By 1975, the number had fallen to 30, owing to communist takeovers and pushback from authoritarian regimes in Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The third wave was more of a tsunami. Military and fascist governments fell left, right, and center throughout the 1970s and 1980s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of democracies worldwide effectively tripled. By the start of US President Barack Obama’s administration in 2009, there were 87 democracies worldwide. Marching backwards? Looking back, the immediate post-Cold War period seems like a Golden Age of democratic consolidation. But it was also a time when the staggering pace of change fueled new concerns about the genuine health of many newly democratic governments. Today, confidence in the forward march of democracy is dimming. Scholars speak grimly of how democracies are suffering from “undertow,” “rollback,” “recession,” and even “depression.” Others worry that democracies are hollowing themselves out and becoming “partial,” “low-intensity,” “empty,” and “illiberal.” In these cases, elections still take place, but civil liberties and checks on power are flouted. Moreover, the failure of the 2003-2005 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were highly demoralizing, as was the failure of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. Even more recently, authoritarian governance in new democracies such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, and in old democracies such as the US, have set off alarm bells. And an unrelenting flood of negative headlines in other democracies has reinforced the sense that illiberalism and nationalist populism are resurgent. Watchdog groups such as Freedom House are convinced that the world has become increasingly less free. A spate of new books has added to the creeping sense of doom. In How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt of Harvard University argue that democracies usually end not with a bang, but with a whimper, as demagogues like President Donald Trump in the US gradually undermine checks and balances. Likewise, in The People vs. Democracy, Harvard’s Yascha Mounk warns that liberal democracy is giving way to “undemocratic liberalism” and “illiberal democracy.” The former protects basic rights but delegates real power to unelected technocratic bodies like the European Commission. The latter features democratically elected leaders who ignore minority rights. More generally, Mounk and others fear that young people, including in the West, are turning away from democracy. What the data show And yet there is reason to doubt that democracy is in retreat around the world. For starters, there is no clear evidence of a dramatic decline in support for democracy across most countries, including in the US. This does not mean that today’s uptick in the number of autocracies should be ignored; but it does suggest that the elegies for democracy may be premature. Polls that show declining global support for democracy should also be interpreted with some skepticism. After all, it is hard to discern people’s appetite for democracy in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, where respondents must be careful about publicly declaring such positions. In fact, research from the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity Project suggests that the great third wave of democratization, far from receding, may eventually give way to a fourth

#### No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Indian citizenship is built on oppression of the Muslim outsider. Attempting to “save lives” ends up creating a permanent state of exception that exacerbates violence and causes more war and genocide.

Hossein 2020 [Adil, Muslim Journalist] “THE BIOPOLITICS OF PANDEMIC CITIZENSHIP,” **DISCOVER SOCIETY** <https://archive.discoversociety.org/2020/05/11/the-biopolitics-of-pandemic-citizenship/EM>

Overall, in this process, Indian citizenship continues to be defined through its Muslim population, who since the time India became independent from colonial rule, had been increasingly held as the ‘other’ to be marginalized and excluded (Kapur 2007). This process of exclusion and marginalization of Indian Muslims that found legal backing in CAA and NRC, has reached an unprecedented level with the recent Covid19 pandemic. By studying the government response and rise of anti-Muslim hatred around the virus, I argue in this piece that we can see the operation of certain biopolitics of pandemic citizenship in India.

## Solvency

#### Turn: Regulatory Violence. Aff upholds regulatory approaches to objectivity. Framing inside regulatory apparatuses re-creates killing machine. Combining objectivity with subjectivity fails. 1AC optimism misplaced.

Humphreys 2006 [Stephen, Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge] “Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception,” **European Journal of International Law** <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/17/3/677/2756274/EM>

And just as structural linguists once feared that the physical world risks becoming inaccessible per se, trapped outside a self-referential and abstract ‘prisonhouse of language’,33 so too law can shape and limit the politically possible, rendering a world without sovereign ascendancy unthinkable or unattainable. Fundamentally, Agamben worries that attempts like Schmitt’s, both past and contemporary, to legislate for anomie – that is, to encompass the non-legal within the law – amount to a denial of the existence of an extralegal reality: the existing ‘juridical order’ becomes total. The thesis is stated most clearly in the last paragraph of the book: To show law in its nonrelation to life and life in its nonrelation to law means to open a space between them for human action, which once claimed for itself the name of ‘politics’. Politics has suffered a lasting eclipse because it has been contaminated by law, seeing itself, at best, as constituent power (that is, violence that makes law), when it is not reduced to merely the power to negotiate with the law.34 As a final figure of illustration, Agamben follows the Roman relation of auctoritas (first of the Senate in ratifying the will of the people, later of the emperor) to the potestas of the magistrate. Auctoritas, which is ‘the power to suspend or reactivate the law, but is not formally in force as law’ is located in the figure of authority, and is an attribute not of law but of life itself, deriving originally from the people of the republic, later from the person of the emperor.35 It exists in a binary relationship ‘at once of exclusion and supplementation’ to potestas, the magistrate’s power to execute the law.36 Through Augustus’ auctoritas, he ‘legitimates and guarantees the whole of Roman political life’.37 Bringing the parallel forward to contemporary experience, Agamben writes: As long as the two elements [i.e. auctoritas and potestas or life and law] remain correlated yet conceptually, temporally and subjectively distinct . . . their dialectic . . . can nevertheless function in some way. But when they tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in which they are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine.38