# 1

#### Interpretation – the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of the resolution. This necessitates defending the implementation of a topical plan.

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 4** (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation—The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Vote negative to preserve limits and equitable division of ground – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of

#### that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate. That greenlights a race away from the core topic controversies that

#### allow for robust contestation, which favors the aff by making neg ground inapplicable, susceptible to the perm, and concessionary. Two additional

#### impacts:

#### 1. Accessibility – Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### 2. Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents.

#### 3. Policy making – EXPLAIN. Turns your aff, cuz you need to create your own state, says it in ur last card, without communist policy maker it would never work, we are a pre req to the revolution

#### 3. TVA – EXPLAIN

#### They can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 3. No RVI, illogical shouldn’t win for being fair, and encourages bating theory and winning off the RVI.

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

# 2

#### The affirmative links in several ways. First, governmentality renders human populations measurable through visible means such as aggregate data on disease, pollution and pestilence in order to form affirmative scenarios. Second, the move to Marxism is a link. Marx fundamentally misunderstands power, equating it with materiality, the means of power. This ignores completely the social roots of power and explains why Marxist states have come to be such dismal failures. They assume government is a material asset rather than a dialectical entity. This was Foucault’s project: to deconstruct Marxism. These notions of the state are mechanistic and flawed. Ignore bio-politics. Revives politics of the camp: Colonialism, racism and war.

Means 2021 [Alexander, u Hawaii, Manoa] “Foucault, biopolitics, and the critique of state reason,” **Educational Philosophy and Theory** [www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2021.1871895?scroll=top&needAccess=true/EM](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2021.1871895?scroll=top&needAccess=true/EM)

Foucault’s early formulation of biopolitics was part of a broader attempt in his genealogical studies to think beyond Marxist theories of power and the State. Influencing Foucault at the time were a number of historical factors including longstanding frustration with intellectual orthodoxy in the French academy particularly the dominance of structural Marxism; the need for new political theory in light of the eruptions of 1968; the arrival of former eastern bloc dissidents in France fueling growing disillusionment with the Soviet Union; the defeat of the French Socialist and Communist Parties in 1978; and the emergence neoliberal thought—Thatcher in the United Kingdom, Giscard in France, Schmidt in Germany—that foretold a looming crisis of the left. Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics can be read as emerging from this historical milieu and as part of his unique approach to formulating a post-Marxist theory of political rule. Marx (1977) himself famously never developed a systematic theory of the State. However, through his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right he did provide a window into his perspective. Whereas Hegel viewed the State as the abstract dialectical embodiment of universal reason, Marx argued that the State was rather the concrete embodiment of the particular interests of the ruling class. Extending Marx, Antonio Gramsci (1971) situated the State as a site of struggle over the formation of ideological consent, or hegemony. For Louis Althusser (2005), the State operates to coordinate the social reproduction of the material relations of production through ideological apparatuses such as the school, church, prison, factory, and media. In Foucault’s assessment, these notions of the State were mechanistic, functionalist, determinist, and monolithic because they failed to recognize the multivalent forms of power and knowledge that both animate and exceed the State within a more general economy of political rule. Thus, in his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault analyzed biopolitics as emerging out of and complimenting two other modalities of power, sovereignty and discipline. Whereas sovereignty refers ultimately to a power to take life, and discipline to a form of power directed at training the body, biopolitics concerns the management of a population, which in the 18th century, became possible for the first time through the development of new rationalities and techniques that aimed to measure, quantify, classify, and evaluate the immanent characteristics of a given territory. Through the invention of new statistical tools and metrics such as birth rates, death rates, census tracts, agricultural outputs and inputs, and figures concerning pestilence, disease, deviancy, and pauperism, human populations where rendered into a field of visibility and intervention, which, in turn, meant that populations and subjects came to understand themselves and their actions through these contingent and arbitrary statistical categories, including classification schemas that became associated with 19th and 20th century racial taxonomies, colonialism, genocide, and warfare.

#### Every reform has a bio-political component which mutes its ability to address aggregate concerns. The assumption of aggregation is the problem. Reform efforts are excuses to create a “civilian military assemblage” that increases state power. This thwarts the innovative potential of the affirmative and causes bio-political failure.

**Ryan, 2016** (Barry, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University, “Becoming Motenegrin: biopower, police reform and human rights.” The International Journal of Human Rights 21 March 2016) 3-5

Adopted for hospitals, schools and factories, the Panopticon became a more generalised schematic of governance that gradually ‘spread throughout the social body’ to strengthen society, ‘increase production, develop the economy and raise the level of public morality’. 19 The major contribution Foucault made through these studies was to show how techniques of military discipline liberalised and infiltrated civilian institutions and later became embedded throughout society. This rationality of governance, which he termed biopolitics, The came to constitute a mode of political power exercised through modern Western societies, producing through law, custom, force and ethics to produce calculable, rational, governable liberal subjects.20 The schematic of Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault argued, ought to be understood as a metaphor for the profound epistemological shift in the exercise of sovereign power that occurred with the rise of liberal values in the nineteenth century. As Foucault outlines, the liberal state differed from its predecessor in terms of its methods to secure space. The problem of sovereignty, he wrote, is ‘no longer of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good from the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement … but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out’. 21 Early radical liberalism conferred on this emergent modern subject rights that were irreducible to an economic model premised on the productive power of societal and individual freedom.22 Sovereignty had become a managerial rather than a patrimonial exercise of power under the cameralists of the eighteenth century, who saw the state as a machine and the ruler as the foreman for whom rule emanated from committees, bureaux, inspectors, statisticians and by other experts.23 As mercantilism gave way to free trade the break with the authoritarian decisionism of the Leviathan sovereign ruler who ruled down on a passive society was no longer appropriate to a framework of governance that required self-governing, responsible, disciplined, and above all, rational rights bearing subjects. In Foucault’s lecture series, On the Birth of Biopolitics, 24 he argues that two conceptions of freedom arose from this epistemological break in sovereign rationality: a revolutionary juridical definition of freedom where the individual was deemed to be in possession of certain freedoms; and a utilitarian definition of freedom which asserted a limit on the practices of public authorities over the civil society. These two accounts of freedom, Foucault insists, had heterogeneous histories. Nonetheless it was the latter formation which persisted to mark out modern freedom, so that governmental utility is used to gauge the juridical limitation of public authorities. ‘Since the beginning of the nineteenth century we have been living in an age in which the problem of utility increasingly encompasses all the traditional problems of law’. 25 The important implication arises that sovereignty is not so much a question of legitimacy, but of effect, of success. Contemporary sovereignty therefore serves to administer life as a sort of economic asset amidst the turbulence and uncertainty generated by the market based economy. In other words, an awareness of biopolitics allows us to contest the idealism of a linear rule of law dividing wrong from right. Instead it outlines a complex assemblage of pragmatic discretionary powers; a non-linear radically contingent array of interventions and orders that are continuously shifting in a grey zone where wrong and right is subject to the interpretative capacity of administrative, technical and security experts.26 It is in such conditions of liquid modernity27 that the rule of law contends with, supports and is utilised by what Walter Benjamin termed the rule of police. 28 Nikolas Rose has pointed out that the rationality of governing through the norm of freedom required a thorough knowledge of the population of the sort that only a policing agency could collate and process.29 Consequently, police power, understood as the activity of data gathering and sharing, includes not only the police officer, but, for example, the social worker, the psychiatrist and the probation officer. Thus an assemblage of police relationships can be found, as Foucault recounts, at the birth of modern police in the eighteenth century.30 Importantly, the rise of police power coincides with, indeed participates in, the discovery of ‘population’ as an object of statistical survey. Based on the assumption that by knowing the essence of things one can improve them so as to maximise their potential for economic and political utility, liberalism requires knowledge for ceaseless reforming. 4 B. J. Ryan Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 17:34 04 June 2016 Biopower is constituted by the capacity to improve minds and bodies by tinkering with the institutions and agencies that regulate human behaviour.31 Dillon reminds us that a liberal life cannot be guaranteed without a security apparatus which regulates life around a terrain of values, demarcated as being the essence of a (good) human.32 More importantly it must gather this knowledge, from a distance, without disturbing the flow of people and things that maintain the health of the economy. As Bell describes it; ‘biopolitical governance emphasizes indirect forms of rule through state agencies that govern “at a distance” through various regulatory protocols’. 33 Law enforcement is consequently less concerned with upholding timeless, fundamental ideals, than it is with the pragmatics of configuring a network of relationships to more effectively know and manage the life processes of its population. Brodeur has referred to this in terms of a policing web34 – a civilian-military assemblage that processes what has been described as the ‘production of freedom’. 35 As Evans forcefully argues, ‘biopolitical regimes of security governance have always revolved around threats to existence’. 36 If needs be, such a regime ought to withdraw these freedoms until such time as the environment is once again safe. The imperative to secure these rights, which form the existential undercurrent of a liberal market economy, demands a highly integrated, dynamic, networked police apparatus formed around knowledge, planning, surveillance and, of course, intervention.

#### No value to life in a biopolitical framework—everyone is exposed to the possibility of being reduced to bare life in the name of instrumentality

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140]

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the *exceprio* of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### The role of the ballot becomes a negotiation of knowledge, a deciding of axes and boundaries. Evaluate our critique by its ability to reorient political perception and action.

Bleiker 2000 [Roland, coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program @ U of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics]

Describing, explaining and prescribing may be less unproblematic processes of evaluation, but only at first sight. **If one abandons** the notion of **Truth,** the idea that an event can be apprehended as part of a natural order, authentically and scientifically, as something that exists independently of the meaning we have given it – if one abandons this separation of object and subject, then **the process of judging a** particular approach to describing and explaining an event **becomes a** **very muddled affair. There** is **no** longer an **objective measuring device that can set the standard to evaluate whether or not a particular insight into an event**, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, **is true or false**. The very nature of a past event becomes indeterminate insofar as its identification is dependent upon ever-changing forms of linguistic expressions that imbue the event with meaning.56 The inability to determine objective meanings is also the reason why various critical international relations scholars stress that there can be no ultimate way of assessing human agency. Roxanne Doty, for instance, believes that the agent–structure debate ‘encounters an aporia, i.e., a self-engendered paradox beyond which it cannot press’. This is to say that the debate is fundamentally undecidable, and that theorists who engage in it ‘can claim no scientific, objective grounds for determining whether the force of agency or that of structure is operative at any single instant’.57 Hollis and Smith pursue a similar line of argument. They emphasise that there are always two stories to tell – neither of which is likely ever to have the last word – an inside story and an outside story, one about agents and another about structures, one epistemological and the other ontological, one about understanding and one about explaining international relations.58 The value of an insight cannot be evaluated in relation to a set of objectively existing criteria. But this does not mean that all insights have the same value. Not every perception is equally perceptive. Not every thought is equally thoughtful. Not every action is equally justifiable. How**,** then, can one judge? **Determining the value** of a particular insight or action **is always a process of negotiating knowledge, of deciding where its rotating axes should be placed and how its outer boundaries should be drawn.** The actual act of **judging can** thus **be made in reference to the very process of negotiating knowledge**. The contribution of the present approach to understanding transversal dissent could, for instance, be evaluated by its ability to demonstrate that a rethinking of the agency problematique has revealed different insights into global politics. The key question then revolves around whether or not a particular international event, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, appears in a new light once it is being scrutinised by an approach that pays attention to factors that had hitherto been ignored. Expressed in other words, knowledge **about agency can be evaluated by its ability to orient and reorient our perceptions of events and the political actions that issue from them**. The lyrical world, once more, offers valuable insight. Rene´ Char: A poet must leave traces of his passage, not proofs. Only traces bring about dreams.

#### Alternative is “problematization.” I introduce bio-politics into the discussion and we understand the true diffuse nature of power which makes the statements made by the 1AC very problematic. The affirmative attempt to simplify it into basic terms of the mechanisms of power is inadequate. Problematization is key to activist movements, also challenges the effectiveness of non-reformist reforms

Terwiel, 2020 (Anna, Professor of political theory at Trinity College that focuses on carceral feminism and prison abolition, “Problematization as an Activist Practice” Theory and Event, Vol 23 NO.1 January 2020 68-70

Rather than seek solutions to practical policy questions, problematization aims to disrupt how problems and solutions alike are perceived. Such disruption, Foucault suggests, enables a radical rethinking of an issue and the creative development of new approaches. Problematization is usually understood as a style of philosophy that allows individuals to engage in ethical practices of self-transformation.[12](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f12) Foucault's archaeologies and genealogies, for instance, can both be seen as forms of problematization: they use different methods to "clarify and intensify" the problems of our time and thereby make room for "experimentation on what we take to be the limits of our selves."[13](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f13) However, scholars have not yet pursued Foucault's suggestion that problematization can also be [End Page 67] understood as an activist practice.[14](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f14) Specifically, Foucault described the Prisons Information Group [Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons or GIP], an activist collective he co-founded in the early 1970s, as "an initiative of 'problematization.'"[15](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f15) This article considers Foucault's late work alongside his writings for the GIP to theorize problematization as a collaborative activist practice. Problematization is activist because it seeks to enable social change, and collaborative because theorists are seen as "relays" in problematization rather than its originators. As I describe in greater detail below, the GIP formed in a moment of intense political contestation of the prison and tried to help translate prisoners' grievances, protests, and uprisings into a more generalized and widely shared "active intolerance" of the prison and punishment. Bringing together insights from the GIP's activism and Foucault's philosophical writings, I theorize problematization as a way of responding to protests that seeks to affirm and amplify their disruptive power by unsettling the ways of thinking used to adjudicate them. This interpretation of problematization, I will suggest, has the advantage of more clearly connecting the work of radical thinking with practical efforts at change than Foucault himself was able or willing to. Moreover, it expands the relevance of Foucault's work to prison politics beyond the tendency to use either specific Foucauldian concepts (such as biopower or neoliberalism) or scholarly methods (such as genealogy) to analyze punitive practices.[16](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f16) And in the context of contemporary debates about mass incarceration, a problematization approach can help energize critiques of the prison while resisting their limitation to demands for better prisons.[17](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f17) More generally, this essay proposes to consider Foucauldian problematization alongside other approaches that challenge justification and problem-solving as the primary contributions of political theory. Akin to Judith Butler's critical analysis of the "frames" that justify state violence and reproduce unequal vulnerability to death across the globe, problematization urges theorists to consider how dominant ways of thinking enable some practices and lives while obscuring or eliminating others.[18](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f18) Butler's work further highlights the importance of problematizing the norms of gender, sexuality, and race that enable state violence and the unequal distribution of precariousness. Such problematization takes us beyond Foucault's own analyses of punishment to intersectional feminist analysis,[19](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f19) critical trans politics,[20](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f20) and other scholarly and activist efforts to "trouble the system we have."

Foucault depicts the work of diagnosing and defamiliarizing our ways of thinking—problematization—as a crucial part of collective efforts to change practices (such as punishment) and institutions (such as the prison). Intellectuals, he suggests, should work alongside "very different people such as magistrates, penal law theorists, penitentiary practitioners, lawyers, social workers, and persons who have experienced prison" in a shared "endeavor of reflection and thought."29 While these categories are by no means mutually exclusive—just think of the work of (formerly) incarcerated intellectuals such as George Jackson, Angela Davis, and Assata Shakur—I will focus, in this essay, on how theorists on the outside can contribute to prison activism.30 Yet problematization is not typically seen as a collaborative activist practice. Rather, scholars tend to interpret it more narrowly as a form of philosophy that can inspire ethical self-transformation. In the most in-depth analysis to date, Colin Koopman, for instance, depicts problematization as a type of genealogy that, by tracing the emergence of our ways of thinking, provides the materials needed "to constitute ourselves otherwise" or "rework[…] ourselves."31 The philosopher's diagnostic work, Koopman argues, should be "followed up by self-transformative responses," i.e. by "experimentation on what we take to be the limits of our selves."32 Foucault indeed often mentions the transformative effects of philosophy on the self, and his last published works analyze ethical practices through which individuals shape their subjectivity, such as dieting and regulating one's sexual appetites.33 But as I have begun to show, there are grounds for a more political reading of problematization also, which Koopman does not pursue. My aim is not to draw a sharp line between ethics and politics, or between individual and collective change, but to ask: What are the political and theoretical costs of restricting our understanding of problematization to individual ethics? What possible responses to mass incarceration open up when we approach problematization as a collaborative activist practice instead? One risk of restricting problematization to individual ethics is that we inadvertently reinforce the belief that problematization is inappropriate [End Page 70] for politics, understood as a domain that demands practical solutions to policy issues

# Case

#### First, don’t allow AC offense weighing:

#### Your aff analysis starts from the wrong point, that’s an epistemological indict, all your offense just feeds back into bio politics.

#### Reject their method:

#### Even if the state can be good in some instances, the links isolate reasons why the aff’s use of the state specifically is bad. Prefer the links on specificity

#### Working within the state is always a solvency deficit to the perm – this allows the state to control what it wants us to understand and learn and means we’ll never learn how to resist and create radical change

#### The role of the ballot precludes yours.

#### We win under your ROB we create better revolution

#### No reason why specific individuals spill up

#### The aff fails without the alt.

#### LBL

#### They don’t have spill up:

#### No reason debate is key, other places to establish conditions. Your library go find the conditions

#### Determining what a future communist world looks like does nothing to create that world, without an articulation of what/when and how the revolution occurs, you don’t vote aff.

#### No reason why ballot are needed to determine a communist future, we can do this in the round and then vote neg.

#### Endorsing a aff in the process of figuring out what it is (ie still determine what the communist future looks like) does nothing except lock in possible bad ideas, let them figure out what the communist future looks like then you can vote for them

#### Bio-politics solves the problems with Marxism. If you sequence K as starting point, you end up with a superior version of the aff, one that acknowledges the realities of power. Also a DA to the perm: Sequencing.

Means 2021 [Alexander, u Hawaii, Manoa] “Foucault, biopolitics, and the critique of state reason,” **Educational Philosophy and Theory** [www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2021.1871895?scroll=top&needAccess=true/EM](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2021.1871895?scroll=top&needAccess=true/EM)

Foucault’s innovation in thinking biopolitics in this way is that it revealed the extent to which power became exercised not only through specific technologies of knowledge, but also, decisively, through practices of security underwriting a distinct political economy: enabling and allowing certain types of circulation to occur within a territory by respecting the quasi-natural basis of the economy through State inaction. Put differently, rather than operating solely, or even primarily through coercion and/or regulation, biopolitics constituted the basis of liberalism as an art of governmentality that recognized freedom itself as a crucial terrain of rule. In contrast to framing liberalism as an ideology, or set of beliefs, Foucault situates it in Kantian terms as a critique of State reason: a political rationality predicated on limiting the State so as to secure and enhance the quasi-natural/autonomous characteristics of economy and society. By locating freedom as a component of State reason within liberal governmentality, Foucault complicates Marxist theories of power and the State. Moreover, the insight that freedom is immanent to power also forces deeper engagement with the dynamics of alienation within the Marxist tradition. Rather than a distorted condition that denies an essential aspect of species-being as articulated in Marx’s humanist formulation of alienation in the 1844 Manuscripts, Foucault draws our attention to how humanity as species is itself a historical invention layered with exclusions. This is one of the reasons Foucault claimed that ‘actually-existing’ 20th century communism failed, because it never achieved a fully realized mode of governmentality that recognized freedom as a biopolitical category rather than an essential element of alienated-being waiting to be emancipated either through socialist revolution and/or the eventual withering away the State. This is empowering to the extent that it maintains alternative forms of biopolitics and governmentality are possible.

#### The utopia imaging stuff.

#### The reality is not utopian, means the state still have capacity to place people in bare life in reality

#### K impact before the aff, solve for VLT before cap.

#### Their reason for the state is inevitable is because it is good not that it occurs void it being good, the only claim is that a sate might form after a period of crisis, but 1 is there is no warrant for why this is true anywhere in the card, second is empirically no – there were pre ag groups of people without formal states

#### Cross apply the state bad stuff on the K

#### Their analysis only implicates out to their might be some physical violence, VTL comes first

#### The alt is not necessary stateless, it just reconceptualizes what the state is (ie material to an apparatus)

#### Failure to account for the ontological and epistemological aspects of modern biopolitics ensures serial policy failure – governance repeatedly produces the same problems that it then seeks to solve. Means the aff and future project will fail.

Dillon & Reid 2000 [Michael & Julian, Prof of Politics & Prof of International Relations, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency,” Alternatives: Social Transformation & Humane Governance 25.1]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ [34](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=5c6ed1cd-918f-452a-a061-c91626aee543%40sessionmgr113&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib34)] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ [35](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=5c6ed1cd-918f-452a-a061-c91626aee543%40sessionmgr113&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib35)] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ [36](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=5c6ed1cd-918f-452a-a061-c91626aee543%40sessionmgr113&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib36)] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.