# 1

#### The resolution itself is a link. First, it inserts governmentality by using the term “just government.” This insertion of governmentality is the fetish of policy makers who think aggregate action is predictable and government is stable. Second, it creates a so-called “right” to strike. Rights to strike demand regulatory and policing apparatuses to uphold law and order. Strikes and labor negotiations are bio-political exercises in futility. Because of the diffuse nature of the market and the many interactions that make up exploitation of workers, the outcomes of striking and the imposition of a right to strike only hides the face of the sovereign and makes understanding bio-political relations impossible. Attempts to combine approaches create “disciplinary” pressure undermining bio-political analysis. Means perms fail.

Kennedy 2014 [Duncan, Pf Law Harvard] “The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!” **Harvard Legal Studies Forum** <http://iglp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Duncan-Kennedy-Stakes-of-Law-excerpts.pdf/EM>

Foucault’s understanding of power might have led him to explore economic life, including institutions like the factory and the firm, and the role 354 Legal Studies Forum of law in the outcomes of public conflict. He believed that disciplinary power was a “fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism” (Foucault 1980, 105). In “The Subject and Power” (1989) he proposes a scheme of dimensions for the study of power that treats the economic as strictly parallel to the specialized institutional domains that mainly interested him. Moreover, he presents laws and legal institutions as elements in power situations without sharply distinguishing them from other elements, such as professional knowledge and disciplinary authority (see Foucault 1989, 792). But this passage, the closest (so far as I know) that he got to Hale’s analysis, is truly exceptional in Foucault’s work. He almost never focuses on the exercise of power in a bargaining situation in which the bargainers are cooperators in producing a joint product. Negotiation in the shadow of the law is just not part of his project. Neither are strikes, legislative reform movements, the transformation of the material conditions of working-class life, the vulgar category of distribution of income. When he focuses on the family, it is on the control of infantile sexuality, say, rather than the division of housework through a process that includes recrimination, slacking, and explosive anger, all against the background of legal rules as well as the background of disciplines. Foucault takes, over and over again, the first step across this gap by listing the factory or the workshop as one of the disciplinary institutions11. In Discipline and Punish he takes a second step, explicitly linking the development of disciplinary power/knowledge to the accumulation of capital and the modern transformation of the techniques of production: “[T]he two processes -- the accumulation of the men and the accumulation of capital -- cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital,” and technological change as well (see Foucault 1979, 221, 224-25). The third step should be to incorporate worker activity and resistance into the story of the factory, and the personal/political battle between men and women into the story of domestic production. Foucault repeatedly insists that there is no power without resistance, never a one-way imposition from above (see Foucault 1978, 92-96; 1979, 26-27; 219, 285-92; 1977, 148-52; 1988, 780-81, 190-95). The outcome of these confrontations is both the distribution of income and wealth between classes through bargaining, and the concrete forms of disciplinary power/knowledge in the presence of resistance. The two kinds of outcomes are related; the distributional outcome affects the forms of power/knowledge, and vice-versa. To understand both, we need to bring the law back in. We need to bring it back in as rules and enforcement institutions that condition the struggle, in The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault! 355 the mode of Hale. Foucault doesn’t do this, perhaps because the factory and marriage play compromised roles in his theory; they are unquestionably “like” the other disciplinary institutions, but at the same time operate under a legal/ideological regime that sharply distinguishes them. The objects of discipline in the prison, the mental hospital, the barracks, and the school do not yet have, have never had, or have forfeited “normal” contractual capacity and many other rights as well. Workers and wives are supposed to be “free,” in the sense of enjoying the “universal” rights of the citizen in a liberal state. Foucault might have responded that this is a liberal distinction without a difference, that the appearance of bargaining and negotiation, of limits on mutual coercion in the style of Hale, is an illusion; the reality is discipline. There would have been an analogy to Marx’s account of worker powerlessness in the first volume of Capital. And sometimes this seems to be just what he is doing. The problem is that his critique of legalist mystification of relations of domination applies equally to all disciplinary institutions. He doesn’t take seriously the liberal claim that the factory and the suburban bungalow are different from the mental hospital or the barracks. The disciplines should be regarded as a sort of counter-law. They have the precise role of introducing insuperable asymmetries and excluding reciprocities. First, because discipline creates between individuals a “private” link, which is a relation of constraint entirely different from contractual obligation; the acceptance of a discipline may be underwritten by contract; the way in which it is imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the nonreversible subordination of one group of people by another, the “surplus” power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality of position of the different “partners” in relation to the common regulation, all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the contractual, and make it possible to distort the contractual link systematically from the moment it has as its content a mechanism of discipline. We know, for example, how many real procedures undermine the legal fiction of work contract; workshop discipline is not the least important (Foucault 1979, 222-23).

#### The plan’s deployment of rights does not limit sovereign power, but rather reinforces the power of exception which legitimizes abuses in the first place. Turns case into a circular endeavor. No solvency and link. Also proves the perm will fail.

Kohn 2006 (Margaret, assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida-Gainesville, “Bare Life and the Limits of the Law,” *Theory and Event* 9.2 (2006): Project Muse)

6. At this point it should be clear that Agamben would be deeply skeptical of the liberal call for more vigorous enforcement of the rule of law as a means of combating cruelties and excesses carried out under emergency powers. His brief history of the state of exception establishes that the phenomenon is a political reality that has proven remarkably resistant to legal limitations. Critics might point out that this descriptive point, even if true, is no reason to jettison the ideal of the rule of law. For Agamben, however, the link between law and exception is more fundamental; it is intrinsic to politics itself. The sovereign power to declare the state of exception and exclude bare life is the same power that invests individuals as worthy of rights. The two are intrinsically linked. The disturbing implication of his argument is that we cannot preserve the things we value in the Western tradition (citizenship, rights, etc.) without preserving the perverse ones. 7. Agamben presents four theses that summarize the results of his genealogical investigation. (1) The state of exception is a space devoid of law. It is not the logical consequence of the state's right to self-defense, nor is it (qua commissarial or sovereign dictatorship) a straightforward attempt to reestablish the norm by violating the law. (2) The space devoid of law has a "decisive strategic relevance" for the juridical order. (3) Acts committed during the state of exception (or in the space of exception) escape all legal definition. (4) The concept of the force-of-law is one of the many fictions, which function to reassert a relationship between law and exception, nomos and anomie. 8. The core of Agamben's critique of liberal legalism is captured powerfully, albeit indirectly, in a quote from Benjamin's eighth thesis on the philosophy of history. According to Benjamin, (t)he tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of exception' in which we live is the rule. We must attain a concept of history that accords with this fact. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about the real state of exception, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism. (57) 9. Here Benjamin endorses the strategy of more radical resistance rather than stricter adherence to the law. He recognizes that legalism is an anemic strategy in combating the power of fascism. The problem is that conservative forces had been willing to ruthlessly invoke the state of exception in order to further their agenda while the moderate Weimar center-left was paralyzed; frightened of the militant left and unwilling to act decisively against the authoritarian right, partisans of the rule of law passively acquiesced to their own defeat. Furthermore, the rule of law, by incorporating the necessity of its own dissolution in times of crisis, proved itself an unreliable tool in the struggle against violence. 10. From Agamben's perspective, the civil libertarians' call for uniform application of the law simply denies the nature of law itself. He insists, "From the real state of exception in which we live, it is not possible to return to the state of law. . ." (87) Moreover, by masking the logic of sovereignty, such an attempt could actually further obscure the zone of indistinction that allows the state of exception to operate. For Agamben, law serves to legitimize sovereign power. Since sovereign power is fundamentally the power to place people into the category of bare life, the law, in effect, both produces and legitimizes marginality and exclusion.

#### No value to life in a biopolitical framework—everyone is exposed to the possibility of being reduced to bare life in the name of instrumentality

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140]

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the *exceprio* of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### The role of the ballot becomes a negotiation of knowledge, a deciding of axes and boundaries. Evaluate our critique by its ability to reorient political perception and action.

Bleiker 2000 [Roland, coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program @ U of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics]

Describing, explaining and prescribing may be less unproblematic processes of evaluation, but only at first sight. **If one abandons** the notion of **Truth,** the idea that an event can be apprehended as part of a natural order, authentically and scientifically, as something that exists independently of the meaning we have given it – if one abandons this separation of object and subject, then **the process of judging a** particular approach to describing and explaining an event **becomes a** **very muddled affair. There** is **no** longer an **objective measuring device that can set the standard to evaluate whether or not a particular insight into an event**, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, **is true or false**. The very nature of a past event becomes indeterminate insofar as its identification is dependent upon ever-changing forms of linguistic expressions that imbue the event with meaning.56 The inability to determine objective meanings is also the reason why various critical international relations scholars stress that there can be no ultimate way of assessing human agency. Roxanne Doty, for instance, believes that the agent–structure debate ‘encounters an aporia, i.e., a self-engendered paradox beyond which it cannot press’. This is to say that the debate is fundamentally undecidable, and that theorists who engage in it ‘can claim no scientific, objective grounds for determining whether the force of agency or that of structure is operative at any single instant’.57 Hollis and Smith pursue a similar line of argument. They emphasise that there are always two stories to tell – neither of which is likely ever to have the last word – an inside story and an outside story, one about agents and another about structures, one epistemological and the other ontological, one about understanding and one about explaining international relations.58 The value of an insight cannot be evaluated in relation to a set of objectively existing criteria. But this does not mean that all insights have the same value. Not every perception is equally perceptive. Not every thought is equally thoughtful. Not every action is equally justifiable. How**,** then, can one judge? **Determining the value** of a particular insight or action **is always a process of negotiating knowledge, of deciding where its rotating axes should be placed and how its outer boundaries should be drawn.** The actual act of **judging can** thus **be made in reference to the very process of negotiating knowledge**. The contribution of the present approach to understanding transversal dissent could, for instance, be evaluated by its ability to demonstrate that a rethinking of the agency problematique has revealed different insights into global politics. The key question then revolves around whether or not a particular international event, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, appears in a new light once it is being scrutinised by an approach that pays attention to factors that had hitherto been ignored. Expressed in other words, knowledge **about agency can be evaluated by its ability to orient and reorient our perceptions of events and the political actions that issue from them**. The lyrical world, once more, offers valuable insight. Rene´ Char: A poet must leave traces of his passage, not proofs. Only traces bring about dreams.

#### Alternative is “problematization.” I introduce bio-politics into the discussion and we understand the true diffuse nature of power which makes the statements made by the 1AC very problematic. The affirmative attempt to simplify it into basic terms of the mechanisms of power is inadequate. Problematization is key to activist movements, also challenges the effectiveness of non-reformist reforms

Terwiel, 2020 (Anna, Professor of political theory at Trinity College that focuses on carceral feminism and prison abolition, “Problematization as an Activist Practice” Theory and Event, Vol 23 NO.1 January 2020 68-70

Rather than seek solutions to practical policy questions, problematization aims to disrupt how problems and solutions alike are perceived. Such disruption, Foucault suggests, enables a radical rethinking of an issue and the creative development of new approaches. Problematization is usually understood as a style of philosophy that allows individuals to engage in ethical practices of self-transformation.[12](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f12) Foucault's archaeologies and genealogies, for instance, can both be seen as forms of problematization: they use different methods to "clarify and intensify" the problems of our time and thereby make room for "experimentation on what we take to be the limits of our selves."[13](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f13) However, scholars have not yet pursued Foucault's suggestion that problematization can also be [End Page 67] understood as an activist practice.[14](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f14) Specifically, Foucault described the Prisons Information Group [Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons or GIP], an activist collective he co-founded in the early 1970s, as "an initiative of 'problematization.'"[15](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f15) This article considers Foucault's late work alongside his writings for the GIP to theorize problematization as a collaborative activist practice. Problematization is activist because it seeks to enable social change, and collaborative because theorists are seen as "relays" in problematization rather than its originators. As I describe in greater detail below, the GIP formed in a moment of intense political contestation of the prison and tried to help translate prisoners' grievances, protests, and uprisings into a more generalized and widely shared "active intolerance" of the prison and punishment. Bringing together insights from the GIP's activism and Foucault's philosophical writings, I theorize problematization as a way of responding to protests that seeks to affirm and amplify their disruptive power by unsettling the ways of thinking used to adjudicate them. This interpretation of problematization, I will suggest, has the advantage of more clearly connecting the work of radical thinking with practical efforts at change than Foucault himself was able or willing to. Moreover, it expands the relevance of Foucault's work to prison politics beyond the tendency to use either specific Foucauldian concepts (such as biopower or neoliberalism) or scholarly methods (such as genealogy) to analyze punitive practices.[16](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f16) And in the context of contemporary debates about mass incarceration, a problematization approach can help energize critiques of the prison while resisting their limitation to demands for better prisons.[17](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f17) More generally, this essay proposes to consider Foucauldian problematization alongside other approaches that challenge justification and problem-solving as the primary contributions of political theory. Akin to Judith Butler's critical analysis of the "frames" that justify state violence and reproduce unequal vulnerability to death across the globe, problematization urges theorists to consider how dominant ways of thinking enable some practices and lives while obscuring or eliminating others.[18](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f18) Butler's work further highlights the importance of problematizing the norms of gender, sexuality, and race that enable state violence and the unequal distribution of precariousness. Such problematization takes us beyond Foucault's own analyses of punishment to intersectional feminist analysis,[19](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f19) critical trans politics,[20](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/747095" \l "f20) and other scholarly and activist efforts to "trouble the system we have."

Foucault depicts the work of diagnosing and defamiliarizing our ways of thinking—problematization—as a crucial part of collective efforts to change practices (such as punishment) and institutions (such as the prison). Intellectuals, he suggests, should work alongside "very different people such as magistrates, penal law theorists, penitentiary practitioners, lawyers, social workers, and persons who have experienced prison" in a shared "endeavor of reflection and thought."29 While these categories are by no means mutually exclusive—just think of the work of (formerly) incarcerated intellectuals such as George Jackson, Angela Davis, and Assata Shakur—I will focus, in this essay, on how theorists on the outside can contribute to prison activism.30 Yet problematization is not typically seen as a collaborative activist practice. Rather, scholars tend to interpret it more narrowly as a form of philosophy that can inspire ethical self-transformation. In the most in-depth analysis to date, Colin Koopman, for instance, depicts problematization as a type of genealogy that, by tracing the emergence of our ways of thinking, provides the materials needed "to constitute ourselves otherwise" or "rework[…] ourselves."31 The philosopher's diagnostic work, Koopman argues, should be "followed up by self-transformative responses," i.e. by "experimentation on what we take to be the limits of our selves."32 Foucault indeed often mentions the transformative effects of philosophy on the self, and his last published works analyze ethical practices through which individuals shape their subjectivity, such as dieting and regulating one's sexual appetites.33 But as I have begun to show, there are grounds for a more political reading of problematization also, which Koopman does not pursue. My aim is not to draw a sharp line between ethics and politics, or between individual and collective change, but to ask: What are the political and theoretical costs of restricting our understanding of problematization to individual ethics? What possible responses to mass incarceration open up when we approach problematization as a collaborative activist practice instead? One risk of restricting problematization to individual ethics is that we inadvertently reinforce the belief that problematization is inappropriate [End Page 70] for politics, understood as a domain that demands practical solutions to policy issues

# Case

## UV

## Jazz

#### First, don’t allow AC offense weighing:

#### Your aff analysis starts from the wrong point, that’s an epistemological indict, all your offense just feeds back into bio politics.

#### Reject their method:

#### Even if the state can be good in some instances, the links isolate reasons why the aff’s use of the state specifically is bad. Prefer the links on specificity

#### The granting of right implies the ability for the sovereign to grant right, which means they can take them away. Means the aff can just be circumvented or altered.

#### Working within the state is always a solvency deficit to the perm – this allows the state to control what it wants us to understand and learn and means we’ll never learn how to resist and create radical change

#### The role of the ballot precludes your standard for a few reasons.

#### It question our role in debate, the consequences of the plan don’t matter if our orientation in debate is flawed.

#### Is fait is illusory, giving the aff a ballot does nothing outside of the round, the ROB function to alter our perception of thing like political engagement, we need to stop creating mindless drones of the state from debate.

#### Claim about fairness don’t matter a) they don’t spill up b) debate is innately an unfair playing field c) voting on fairness is just the sovereign exercising control over what is fair and what is not, link back into our critique.

#### My role of the ballot is a question of ontology and epistemology – your framework presupposes both epistemology and ontology in the process of making its claims about life. If I win that even ONE of those presuppositions is bad, that’s enough to consider the ROB first.

#### 5. Can’t test the truth claim of the 1ac without tackling the knowledge the 1ac draws upon, that knowledge being flawed implicated ever other part of case means you vote on the ROB.

#### Fw:

#### No extinction first if VTL exists.

#### On moen – even if VTL matters more, you don’t have capacity to maximize pleasure under biopolitical fw: means the K is a pre req to their fw.

#### Adv

#### Turn---democracy promotion emboldens autocrats---they’ll be self-contained as long as they see us as non-interventionist.

Risse and Babayan 15. Thomas, chair for “transnational relations, foreign- and security policy” at the Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Science at Freie Universität Berlin, and Nellie, fellow at the Transatlantic Academy and associate fellow at the Freie Universität Berlin. 4/28/15. “How (il)liberal states promote democracy and autocracy.” *Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/28/how-illiberal-states-promote-democracy-and-autocracy/?utm_term=.87c785209b1a>. //RG

A special issue of the journal Democratization challenges the conventional wisdom. As to the “good guys,” democratic powers such as the U.S. or the E.U. usually prefer stability over human rights and democracy. If democratic movements threaten stability in a region, neither the U.S. nor the E.U. supports them. As to illiberal powers, they are generally not that different from their democratic counterparts. They also prefer stability over turmoil. Neither Russia nor China nor Saudi Arabia explicitly promote autocracy. Instead, they seek to suppress democratic movements in their periphery the minute these groups threaten their security interests or are perceived to endanger their regime survival. This is what Putin, the Saudi king and the Chinese Communist Party leadership have in common. The special issue starts from the following observations: There is still an ongoing mobilization for democratization on a global scale – from Tunisia to Ukraine and Burma. This is not going away, and both democratic and autocratic regimes have to reckon with it. However, to the extent that Western powers do promote human rights and democracy, they are often faced with illiberal challengers. If we want to understand the outcomes of democracy promotion, we need to simultaneously look at Western efforts (or lack of it) at democracy promotion, autocratic challengers, which see their regimes threatened by democracy promotion, and, most importantly, the balance of forces on the ground. The special issue examines in detail the challenges by three illiberal regional powers — China, Russia and Saudi Arabia — to Western (U.S. and E.U.) efforts at democracy promotion (most of the articles are publicly available without subscription either temporarily or permanently). The various contributions specifically analyze their actions in Ethiopia and Angola in the case of China, Georgia and Ukraine in the case of Russia, and Tunisia in the case of Saudi Arabia. We advance four interrelated arguments: First, illiberal regional powers are only likely to respond to Western efforts in third countries if they perceive democracy promotion as a challenge to their geostrategic interests in the region or to the survival of their regime. Ukraine is a case in point. Furthermore, non-democratic regional powers are unlikely to intentionally promote autocracy even though the strengthening of autocracies might be the consequence of their behavior. In some cases, illiberal regimes even promote democracy if it suits their geostrategic interests.

#### US and global democracy resilient

Stavridis 18 (Admiral Stavridis, was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is an Operating Executive at The Carlyle Group, “Democracy Isn't Perfect, But It Will Still Prevail,” 7-12, <http://time.com/5336615/democracy-will-prevail/>)

But countervailing forces are at work as well. The realities of Russia’s nuclear arms and China’s rising economic clout, and the fact that neither country has ever had a sustained period of democratic rule, make it easy to forget that the world’s dominant military and economic forces remain in the hands of committed democracies. And around the world, many often overlooked nations have been demonstrating that even imperfect democracies can prevail over this century’s new challenges. Take India, where over 550 million people voted in the last election — a monumental number. Its democracy is hardly unblemished. Critics say Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is eroding liberal institutions, and India ranks 138 out of 180 countries in press freedom, according to Reporters Without Borders. But in all of my contacts with senior Indian officials, including members of the military who might be expected to favor top-down order, I have always found an unwavering commitment to democracy. It has assured India decades of stability and growth in the face of terrorist attacks, economic strife and massive population shifts. Democracy might hardly seem the most efficient response to a half-century’s disorder in Colombia. And yet despite a virulent insurgency since the mid-1960s, power continues to transfer peacefully in that nation. President Alvaro Uribe gave up the presidency at the end of his constitutionally limited second term in 2010, despite high popularity and calls for him to amend the constitution to stay on. His successor, Juan Manuel Santos, negotiated a comprehensive but controversial peace agreement with the communist-inspired guerrillas known as FARC, for their formal name’s acronym in Spanish. This year, as Santos’ second term came to an end, the nation began a heated debate over the peace deal. Democracy provided the answer: an election on June 17 put a stark choice before the people. Iván Duque, a business-friendly pragmatist who pledged to impose harsher terms on the former rebels, defeated Gustavo Petro, who supported the peace agreement. A nation whose upheaval might easily have led to authoritarianism has again and again chosen free debate and open elections. So it is as well in Brazil, a superpower-size nation of 200 million that, despite considerable political turmoil, has not turned back toward autocracy. Mexico has just elected Andrés Manuel López Obrador as its President — perhaps not the first choice of the U.S., given his left-leaning agenda, but another example of democracy at work as the third-largest nation in the Americas swings from right to left following free elections. Technological developments may yet prove a net positive for democracy. I have visited the tiny former Soviet state of Armenia many times, and gotten to know the former President and Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Until recently, he appeared to be an unbeatable authoritarian figure. But weeks of protests, powered by the Internet, caused him to resign in April, and propelled a new leader, Nikol Pashinyan, into power. In Tunisia, the Internet-fueled Arab Spring has persisted. The democratically elected government that replaced the 23-year dictatorship of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has remained in power through recurring free and fair elections. Yes, there are worrying trends in the government’s responses to media criticism and protests. But the fact that democratic institutions have held up for seven years is cause for optimism. Tunisia’s experience reflects another often overlooked asset democracy brings around the world: its flexibility. The U.S. too often failed to recognize this during and after the Cold War, sometimes siding with dictators rather than accepting that not all democracies look alike. Part of Tunisia’s success has come from adapting its electoral system to its own culture, through a constitution that gives Islam a role in the public sphere. Enduring democratic structures in Chile, Indonesia, South Korea and elsewhere differ significantly from the secular Western model. Another boon for democracy is the growing role of women in governance. Powerful female champions of democracy and civil rights have emerged around the world, from Michelle Bachelet of Chile to Jacinda Ardern of New Zealand and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, the first elected female head of state in Africa. Female representation has increased in national parliaments, from 15% in 2002 to 19.8% in 2012, the most recent year available. The rise to power of those representing 50% of the world’s population can only be good for the legitimacy and durability of democracy. Moreover, countries with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to engage in internal or external conflict, according to the World Bank. Women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution often helps ensure success; agreements that include women and civil-society groups are 64% less likely to fail than those that do not, according to a U.N.-sponsored study. Perhaps most important, democracy remains strong in its traditional redoubts. Most of the world’s most developed countries are still highly committed democracies, including Japan, Canada, France, Australia and Germany. That’s no accident. China’s rise may seem like economic validation of authoritarianism, but it has come by liberalizing a backward agrarianism to mimic established democracies, and by stealing their intellectual property. And imitation has its limits. Few in Europe and Asia have forgotten that free-market economies were democracy’s greatest weapon in the 20th century, and the entrepreneurs and investors that drive those free markets won’t soon embrace authoritarian control. That goes double for the U.S. Political life here has problems: money in politics, gerrymandering, rising partisanship and a President who calls the media an “enemy of the people” while musing about how “great” it must be for Chinese President Xi Jinping to amass absolute power. Finding a voice to counter that antidemocratic rhetoric is proving surprisingly hard, so far. But does anyone seriously think we are headed toward authoritarian control of our politics or single-party rule? Speaking as someone who was interviewed for possible positions by both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, I don’t think so. The media remain strong and determined to tell the truth, and the courts remain rigorously independent. The Mueller investigation is clanking at the President like a Panzer tank, and whatever it reveals, the nation will deal with it through laws and politics. Accountability remains a core driver in the national debate. We paint democracy as a utopia, but it is not. It has been called, as Churchill noted, the worst form of government except for all the others — subject to abuse and manipulation and often sclerotic. We must forgive its failings, and work to improve them, as long as its core institutions further civil rights, guarantee rule of law and are subject to the will of the people. There will be losses in all of these nations, as well as our own, corruption, misbehavior, pressure on the courts and media. Challenges will only grow as change in this century continues at a blistering pace. But for every example of democracy fading out or finding itself under attack, there are counterexamples of democracy and democratic activists moving forward and finding solutions. Under this U.S. Administration, there is little leadership on global human rights or democratic norms. But other leaders, from Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron of Europe to Shinzo Abe of Japan to Justin Trudeau of Canada, have been outspoken in defense of democratic values. Change is happening in smaller nations as well. And democracy will prevail not because of individual leaders but because it is better than authoritarianism at meeting the challenges of governing. Human nature abhors a boss, and politically, democracy serves as a safety valve. Look to America, even in its current rage. We cannot imagine our own nation without the ability to switch from George W. Bush, a Republican fighting unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to Barack Obama. Or, for that matter, to move from Obama to President Trump. Those shifts may look like stark division on the surface. But they also represent democracy’s ability to allow dissenting, frustrated views an outlet. Dictators may impose order, but mounting unrest as often as not turns them out, frequently with disastrous results. Some of the worst massacres in modern history have followed the ouster of strongmen. Sometimes democracy will not resolve complex events, or most effectively use technology, or respond speedily. But it peacefully holds accountable leaders who don’t fulfill their promises or better our lives, and rewards those who do. That has proved more valuable in the long run than more immediate urges. Two hundred years ago, there was a mere handful of pseudo democracies in the world. At the turn of the 20th century, a couple of dozen democracies existed. Today, despite the continuation of Chinese and Russian authoritarian regimes, there are well over a hundred. Hundreds of millions have transitioned from fully authoritarian monarchies (throughout Europe, Central Asia and parts of East Asia) and pure dictatorships (Latin America, the Balkans, the Levant and parts of Africa). History has run from male-dominated tribes in the Paleolithic era through dictatorial city-states to early modern monarchies and today’s democracies. We can all hope that the battle to defend democracy will be less costly in the 21st century than in the previous one. We can enhance our chances of winning by empowering women, boosting programs that fight economic inequality and teaching our children the critical thinking skills they need to separate truth from lies. Democracy’s defenders can work to be clear what our cause is, why it matters and what is at stake. Sometimes people say to me that America is in a “war of ideas.” Not quite. We remain in a marketplace of ideas. That is what has made us most adaptable to new threats and resilient in the face of challenges. It is also why we must articulate our vision of the values that, while we execute them imperfectly, are right and true.

#### No climate impact – exaggerated and inevitable

Curry 17 [Judith President of Climate Forecast Applications Network (CFAN), previously Professor and Chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 1/29/17, “The ‘threat’ of climate change,” https://judithcurry.com/2017/01/29/the-threat-of-climate-change/]

I think that use of these words mislead the public debate on climate change — any damages from human caused climate change are not imminent, we cannot quantify the risk owing to deep uncertainties, and any conceivable policy for reducing CO2 emissions will have little impact on the hypothesized damages in the 21st century. ‘Threats’ or ‘reasons for concern’? I do not question that the possibility of adverse impacts from human caused climate change should be under consideration. However, the human caused impacts of climate change have been overhyped from the beginning — the 1992 UNFCCC treaty on avoiding dangerous human interference on the climate. This implied warming was dangerous before any work had actually been done on this. Some much needed clarification is presented in a recent article published in Nature: IPCC reasons for concern regarding climate change risks. This article provides a good overview of the current IPCC framework for considering dangerous impacts. A summary of the main concerns: The reasons for concern (RFCs) reported in AR5 are: Risks to unique and threatened systems (indicated by RFC1) Risks associated with extreme weather events (RFC2) Risks associated with the distribution of impacts (RFC3) Risks associated with global aggregate impacts (RFC4) Risks associated with large-scale singular events (RFC5) The eight overarching key risks are: Risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods in low-lying coastal zones and small island developing states and other small islands due to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea-level rise. Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods for large urban populations due to inland flooding in some regions. Systemic risks due to extreme weather events leading to breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services such as electricity, water supply, and health and emergency services. Risk of mortality and morbidity during periods of extreme heat, particularly for vulnerable urban populations and those working outdoors in urban or rural areas. Risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems linked to warming, drought, flooding, and precipitation variability and extremes, particularly for poorer populations in urban and rural settings. Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to insufficient access to drinking and irrigation water and reduced agricultural productivity, particularly for farmers and pastoralists with minimal capital in semi-arid regions. Risk of loss of marine and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for coastal livelihoods, especially for fishing communities in the tropics and the Arctic. Risk of loss of terrestrial and inland water ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for livelihoods.” I think that qualitatively, these are the the appropriate risks to consider. Where I don’t find this analysis particularly convincing is their links of ‘undetectable’, ‘moderate’, ‘high’, ‘very high’ to specific levels of temperature increase. The confounding societal effects on all of these risks are overwhelming, IMO, and very likely to be of greater concern than actual temperature increase. Apart from (vii) and (viii) related to ecosystems, these risks relate to vulnerability of social systems. These vulnerabilities have put societies at risk for extreme weather events throughout recorded history — adding a ‘delta’ to risk from climate change does not change the fundamental underlying societal vulnerabilities to extreme weather events. The key point IMO is one that I made in a previous post Is climate change a ‘ruin’ problem? The short answer is ‘no’ — even under the most alarming projections, human caused climate change is not an existential threat on the timescale of the 21st century.

#### No extinction

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As already noted, the IPCC scenarios themselves are wildly alarmist, not only on the basic science but also on the underlying economic assumptions, which in turn drive the alarmist impacts. The result cannot withstand critical analysis. Economists Ian Castles and David Henderson, for example, show the extent to which the analysis is driven by the desire to reach predetermined outcomes.50 Other economists have similarly wondered what purpose was served by pursuing such unrealistic scenarios. It is hard to credit the defense put forward by Mike Hulme, one of the creators of the scenarios, that the IPCC is not engaged in forecasting the future but in creating “plausible” story lines of what might happen under various scenarios.51 Each scare scenario is based on linear projections without any reference to technological developments or adaptation. If, on a similar linear basis, our Victorian ancestors in the UK, worried about rapid urbanization and population growth in London, had made similar projections, they would have pointed to the looming crisis arising from reliance on horse-drawn carriages and omnibuses; they would have concluded that by the middle of the 20th century, London would be knee-deep in horse manure, and all of the southern counties would be required to grow the oats and hay to feed and bed the required number of horses. Technology progressed and London adapted. Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of more than a century? The work on physical impacts is equally over the top. All the scenarios assume only negative impacts, ignore the reality of adaptation, and attribute any and all things bad to global warming. Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter in reducing atmospheric heat loss to outer space.52 It would have greater impact in increasing minimum temperatures than in increasing maximum temperatures. Secondary studies, however, generally ignore this facet of the hypothesis. The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health due, for example, to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents. As already noted there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-related threats or malnutrition. The claim about heat-related deaths gained a boost during the summer of 2003 because of the tragedy of some 15,000 alleged heat-related deaths in France as elderly people stayed behind in city apartments without air conditioning while their children enjoyed the heat at the sea shore during the August vacation. Epidemiological studies of so-called "excess" deaths resulting from heat waves are abused to get the desired results. Similar studies of the impact of cold spells show that they are far more lethal than heat waves and that it is much easier to adapt to heat than to cold.53 More fundamentally, this, like most of the alarmist literature, ignores the basics of the AGW hypothesis: the world will not see an exponential increase in summer, daytime heat (and thus more heat waves), but a decrease in night-time and winter cooling, particularly at higher latitudes and altitudes. Based on the AGW hypothesis, Canada, China, Korea, Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina will see warmer winters and warmer nights. There are clear benefits to such a development, even if there may also be problems, but the AGW industry tends to ignore the positive aspects of their alarmist scenarios. The feared spread of malaria, a much repeated claim, is largely unrelated to climate. Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW. Similarly, the building of the Rideau Canal in Ottawa in the 1820s was severely hampered by outbreaks of malaria due to the proximity of mosquito-infested wetlands in the area. Malaria remains widespread in tropical countries today in part because of the UN’s lengthy embargo on the use of DDT, the legacy of an earlier alarmist disaster. Temperature is but one factor, and a minor one at that, in the multiple factors that affect the rise or decline in the presence of disease-spreading mosquitoes. Wealthier western countries have pursued public health strategies that have reduced the incidence of the dis- ease in their countries. Entomologist Paul Reiter, widely recognized as the leading specialist on malaria vectors and a contributor to some of the early work of the IPCC, was aghast to learn how his careful and systematic analysis of the potential impacts had been twisted in ways that he could not endorse. In a recent paper, he concludes: “Simplistic reasoning on the future prevalence of malaria is ill-founded; malaria is not limited by climate in most temperate regions, nor in the tropics, and in nearly all cases, ’new' malaria at high altitudes is well below the maximum altitudinal limits for transmission. Future changes in climate may alter the prevalence and incidence of the disease, but obsessive emphasis on ’global warming' as a dominant parameter is indefensible; the principal determinants are linked to ecological and societal change, politics and economics.”54 Catastrophic species loss similarly has little foundation in past experience.55 Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct, its impact would be slow, providing significant scope and opportunity for adaptation, including by ﬂora and fauna. One of the more irresponsible claims was made by a group of UK modelers who fed wildly improbable scenarios and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss by the end of the century. There are literally thousands of websites devoted to spreading alarm about species loss and biodiversity. Global warming is but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity. The claims, fortunately, are largely hype, based on computer models and the estimate by Harvard naturalist Edward O. Wilson that 27,000 to 100,000 species are lost annually - a figure he advanced purely hypothetically but which has become one of the most persistent of environmental urban myths. The fact is that scientists have no idea of the extent of the world's ﬂora and fauna, with estimates ranging from five million to 100 million species, and that there are no reliable data about the rate of loss. By some estimates, 95 per cent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons, most before humans became major players in altering their environment. A much more credible estimate of recent species loss comes from a surprising source, the UN Environmental Program. It reports that known species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years in the last three decades of the 20th century, with some 20 reported extinctions despite increasing pressure on the biosphere from growing human population and industrialization.57 The alarmist community has also introduced the scientifically unknown concept of "locally extinct,” often meaning little more than that a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances, e.g., birds or butterflies becoming more numerous north of their range and disappearing at its extreme southern extent. Idso et al. conclude: “Many species have shown the ability to adapt rapidly to changes in climate. Claims that global warming threatens large numbers of species with extinction typically rest on a false definition of extinction (the loss of a particular population rather than en- tire species) and speculation rather than real-world evidence. The world’s species have proven very resilient, having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?“