## Part 1: Politics of Objectivity

#### Most current definitions exclude citizen journalists. They are not protected by nor are the bound by regulations governing the free press. This creates a unique exception.

Papandrea 2007 (Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School) “Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege,” MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW <https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=http://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1168&context=lsfp>/EM

Alexander would defines[s] “journalist” to include “any person who is engaged in gathering news for public presentation or dissemination by the news media.”344 “News” is defined as “information of public interest or concern relating to local, statewide, national or worldwide issues or events,” and “news media” is defined as “newspapers, magazines, television, and radio stations, online news services, or any other regularly published news outlet used for the public dissemination of news.”345 Alexander’s suggestion finds its roots in several state statutes that take a similar approach.346

Some have suggested that bloggers and other citizen journalists simply should be excluded from the benefits of a reporter’s privilege. In an editorial in the L.A. Times, David Shaw argued that “the nation’s estimated 8 million bloggers are not entitled to the same constitutional protection as traditional journalists—essentially newspaper, magazine, radio and television reporters and editors.”322 Shaw argued that bloggers have no journalistic training or experience, and instead “[a]ll they need is computer access and the desire to blog.”323 He complained that unlike mainstream journalists, bloggers do not care about being fair or accurate. Instead, Shaw argued, “[t]hey just want to get their opinions—and their ‘scoops’—out there as fast as they pop into their brains.”324 Shaw’s suggestion that bloggers should not be permitted to invoke the reporter’s privilege has some facial appeal because it allows us to side-step the issue entirely. As explained above, many state statutes explicitly apply only to traditional media entities. Unfortunately, this sort of distinction is clearly outdated.

#### Current conceptions of objectivity have more to do with economic considerations and lawsuits than actual journalistic practice. Really just attempts by professionals to police the boundaries of their craft through positivist notions of scientific rigor.

Borger, van Hoof and Sanders 2016 [Merel, VU University Amsterdam; Anita, VU University Amsterdam; Jose, Radboud University Nijmegen] “Exploring participatory journalistic content: Objectivity and diversity in five examples of participatory journalism,” **Journalism** <file:///C:/Users/eric/Downloads/1464884916675633.pdf/EM>

There is a broad consensus that 20th-century journalism in Western countries has been characterized by a ‘professional model’ (see Schudson and Anderson, 2009) that centred on the idea of a trained professional gathering and disseminating objectively validated information to the public (McNair, 2009: 347). Over the course of the 20th century, this model became increasingly institutionalized through the forming of professional institutions and codes of practice (Schudson and Anderson, 2009), and the development of a professional ideology, consisting of a set of values to which journalists in all media types, genres and formats refer in the context of their daily work (Deuze, 2005: 445). Objectivity has long been considered a core tenet of this professional ideology. Although interpretations of objectivity vary across countries (Deuze, 2005), over time and journalistic subgenres (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013), journalists in elective democracies worldwide consider themselves as committed to providing ‘objective’ information (Deuze, 2005). Objectivity as a core value translates into the idea that, as long as journalists follow depersonalized and rationalized procedures, ‘a true account of reality can be presented’ (Broersma, 2010: 27). Others have demonstrated how the objectivity standard is also a ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman, 1972), rooted in organizational demands to avoid libel suits and meet deadlines (p. 664).

#### Objectivity in journalism is too steeped in scientific positivism. Failed heuristic.

Blagaard 2013 [Bolette, Aalborg University Copenhagen] “Shifting boundaries: Objectivity,citizen journalism andtomorrow’s journalists,” **Journalism** <https://www.academia.edu/7452532/Shifting_boundaries_Objectivity_citizen_journalism_and_tomorrows_journalists_Article/EM>

Professional journalism’s modern heritage means that the rule of ‘Stoic … professional objectivity’ and ‘self-abstraction’ (Peters, 2005) has been promoted in professional jour-nalism and mediated communication (Dahlgren, 1995, 2009; Habermas, 1989). Despiteresistance, backlash, and ongoing academic and professional discussions, objectivity hashad and still has (Muhlmann, 2008; Richards and Rees, 2011; Schudson, 1978; Wien,2005) a strong impact on western journalists’ understanding of the journalistic practiceand function in society. Though the term ‘objectivity’ may have been changed to the less positivist sounding terms ‘impartiality’ or ‘balanced’ reporting through these years of debate, some scholars believe that it is still the legacy of the positivist sciences that sustains journalistic legitimacy (Anderson and Ward, 2007: 46; Muhlmann, 2008: 10; Wien,2005: 13).

#### Free press key to a free society. Without independent news, democracy collapses.

COOPER 2004 (Director of Research, Consumer Federation of America Center for the Internet & Society, Stanford Law School Associated Fellow, Columbia Institute for Tele-information) 2004 **Media Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Age** Creative Commons <https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/attachments/mediabooke.pdf>/EM

Democratic governance requires a free press not just in the sense of a diversity of expression. It requires the institution of a free press. It requires media with the financial wherewithal and political independence to engage in sustained investigative journalism, to expose the errors and excesses of government and other powerful political and economic actors… Our best hope for democratic governance in this world is far messier than the ideal republic of yeomen. It requires mediating institutions and associations, private and public concentrations of wealth and power, and varied mechanisms to maintain multiple balances of power within government, within civil society, and between government and civil society.120 One of the central benefits of promoting deconcentrated and diverse media markets is to provide a self-checking function on the media. The media needs to be accountable to the public, but that function cannot, as a general matter, be provided by government action in our political system. It can best be provided by the media itself, as long as there is vigorous antagonism between sources of news and information.121

#### Expert professionalism alone is the wrong model for democratic governance. Leads to distorted democracy and destruction of objectivity. Must strive for middle ground.

Schudson 2013 [Michael, Fellow of the American Academy; Professor of Journalism at Columbia University] “Reluctant Stewards: Journalism in a Democratic Society,” **Daedulus** <https://www.amacad.org/publication/reluctant-stewards-journalism-democratic-society/EM>

The question is not whether the press stewards or fails to, but what sort of stewardship and philosophy of stewardship best serve a democratic society – particularly this democratic society, with its resistance to government “intrusion” inherited from the nation’s founders but exacerbated and exaggerated in the post- Reagan era. Let me propose three general principles for stewardship in the media: First, stewardship should be exercised in moderation; it should be a stewardship of loose reins. Second, stewardship should be decentralized and multiform, more a set of practices seeking to enhance a usefully vague sense of democracy than a set of guiding ideals based on a clearly articulated philosophy of the functional location of news in a democratic culture. Third, at rare but critical junctures, journalism cannot and should not give up what has been called “social trustee professionalism” for “expert professionalism,” but it must acknowledge that it is suspended awkwardly between them.20 That is, as necessary as a focused professionalism is most of the time, it is not sufficient all of the time. Vital as professionalism is in guiding news practice ordinarily, it is not an adequate refuge in those moments when journalists face threats to transcendent values of democracy, human rights, public safety, and an accountability to future generations.

#### Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war, that’s existential.

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However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. **Democracy promotion** in particular serves a **key role in safeguarding U.S. interests** and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, **democracies protect private property** in important ways, **invest in public goods**, are more politically stable, make for **more dependable allies**, and empirically **do not go to war with one another**. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting. Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to **investor confidence and growth**. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for **protecting private property** than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a **particularly attractive type of country for investors** — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system **encourage entrepreneurship and small business development**, both of which are **key to a growing and modernizing economy**. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making **countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties**. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard. Democracies also **invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments**. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they **approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare**, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to **increase overall societal productivity** and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall **costs of healthcare are driven down** as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor. Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which **makes countries more politically stable**. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, **increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict**, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and **violent extremism**. This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes **democracies better international partners and** allies **in the long-term**. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. **These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order**; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly. Finally, it has been empirically observed that **democracies do not go to war with one another**. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a **dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war**, competitive elections and a free press make it **easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries**, consolidated democracies tend to be **more wealthy and economically interdependent**, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.

## Part 2: Biopolitics of Objectivity

#### CJ lives in state of exception with respect to professional journalism. They operate in the boundaries between citizen and journalist without the benefits of either.

McGuckin 2015 [Stuart, BA Journalism, Murdoch U.; currently Research Officer. Department of the Premier and Cabinet of WA, Australia] “The Rise of Citizen Journalism: Its impact on professional journalism’s traditional ideal of objectivity,” **Thesis Online** <https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/29490/1/whole.pdf/EM>

Whilst transparency does not completely overhaul the ideal of objectivity it can be considered a shift in the established standards that has resulted in journalism becoming more accountable. Professional journalism’s pursuit of accountability comes in part as a result of the rise of citizen journalism; it has brought with it information that previously may not have made it past the gatekeepers and into the 57 public sphere. Given individual professional journalists will find it very difficult to report on, and be aware of, all the information and perspectives existing in the networked public sphere, their reporting is prone to being construed as unbalanced or biased. As professional journalists explain and justify the positions taken by their reporting they lift the curtain on their processes and reveal they too are slaves to their own positioning in the world—they too are not absolutely objective. During the research for this thesis it became evident that the notion of ‘citizen journalism’ is much easier to discuss than notions regarding ‘citizen journalists’. Whilst still problematic, the term ‘citizen journalism’ can at least be applied with some permanence to certain contributions to discussions held in the public sphere, whereas applying the citizen journalist moniker to an individual is reliant on reference to such a contribution. The problem is exacerbated by the negative connotations often associated with the term. Individuals are reluctant to be considered as citizen journalists because they are seen as inferior to professional journalists and even “dangerous” because of their lack of experience and training.

#### This chills independent journalism. Creates an incentive for a surveillance society and allows authorized monopolies to restrict freedom of expression and subjectivity. Spreads inequality and structural violence. CJ offers an alternative to the surveillance society, sousveillance, which acknowledges biopolitical realities as well as the news.

Wahl-Jorgenson et al. 2017 [Media Studies researcher, Cardiff U] “Journalism, citizenship and surveillance,” **Digital Journalism** <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21670811.2016.1266134/EM>

Our everyday life and the forms of engagement and participation it entails increasingly take place through digital media (Hintz, Dencik, and Wahl-Jorgensen 2016; Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2007). The digital era has therefore profoundly transformed our political subjectivity (Isin and Ruppert 2015). Here, we draw on the idea of digital citizenship to help make sense of the ways in which rights claims and agency of citizens have changed in the digital era. As Isin and Ruppert (2015) have observed, “our digital lives are configured, regulated, and organized by dispersed arrangements of numerous people and things such as corporations and states but also software and devices as well as people such as programmers and regulators” (4). Along those lines, subjects have been atomised and fragmented in the digital era (Hintz, Dencik, and Wahl-Jorgensen 2016; Papacharissi 2010). They can no longer be understood simply as the citizens of well-defined and manageable nation states, and have become more choice and difficult to control. At the same time, surveillance of citizens in a datafied society enables forms of classification that facilitate control and order (Foucault 1975). This, in turn, raises issues of political accountability, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the rights and forms of agency afforded to digital citizens. These issues are further complicated by the fact that practices of surveillance often lack transparency and therefore do not allow for informed consent or resistance.Along those lines, the various forms of surveillance raise critical questions for citizens. Though they are often refracted through debates over privacy (see Mols’ article in this issue) and related concerns about anonymity and confidentiality, they raise broader questions of justice and inequality. So, for example, scholars have begun to raise questions about how different groups and individuals—distinguished by factors including race, ethnicity, income and religion—may be differentially targeted and affected by big data surveillance in what might be considered a system of “social sorting” (e.g. Turow 2012). However, the digital era also provides new ways for citizens to resist and contest surveillance through their own monitoring and data collection. Bottom-up “sousveillance” (Bakir 2010; Mann, Nolan, and Wellman 2003) can be used to document malpractice and confront authorities. Citizens also organise resistance through political action, including movements such as the “Stop Watching Us” and “The Day We Fight Back” campaigns which have opened up new spaces for discussion of the consequences of surveillance (see Wa¨schel’s article in this issue). More than anything, emerging work on digital citizenship demonstrates that we have some way to go in developing both the conceptual and practical tools to help us understand the implications of surveillance in the digital era. Here, journalism plays a key role. Was the journalists reporting on the topic are personally highly critical. What is clear is that the complexities of surveillance in the digital era, and how to contest and resist it, are insufficiently understood and communicated by journalists. As Thorsen’s article in this issue shows, coverage of encryption technologies remains scant. Despite some increase in attention after the Snowden revelations, there is a lack of depth in such coverage, “with most mentions of encryption vague and non-descript”. Similarly, Bradshaw’s research, based on interviews with UK regional newspaper journalists, demonstrated that these journalists displayed “few signs of adapting source protection and information security practices to reflect new legal and technological threats”, and had “widespread ignorance of what their employers are doing to protect networked systems of production”. Journalists themselves experience surveillance in various forms. A recent Pew Research Center report, Investigative Journalists and Digital Security (Holcomb, Mitchell, and Purcell 2015), shows that investigative journalists are increasingly aware of practices of surveillance, with around two-thirds of US investigative journalists believing the government has collected information about their activities, and nearly half changing the ways they store sensitive information. Such awareness is, however, not universal. Bradshaw’s article highlights that “regional newspapers have not adapted their practices to respond to new legal and technological developments, and journalists have little awareness of what employers are doing to protect production systems”. As the articles by Bradshaw, and Wahl-Jorgensen, Bennett and Cable in this special issue document, targeted surveillance of journalists may have a chilling effect on journalistic practice, as journalists shy away from covering sensitive stories and including critical voices for fear of surveillance and associated sanctions. Source protection is a critical concern within this landscape, since “the current situation will prevent all but the most determined from speaking to journalists. In effect, the threat of mass surveillance may all but eliminate confidential sources” (Lashmar 2016, 19). News organisations do, however, take a critical approach to the surveillance of journalists, as highlighted in Johnson’s article. Johnson analyses US newspaper editorial positions on the tracking of activities of Fox News’ chief Washington correspondent, James Rosen, contrasting those with positions on the Snowden revelations.

#### In effect, a culture of impunity develops around independent journalists. They cannot rely on the state for protection because they are not primarily citizens anymore, they are journalists. To the professional journalist, they are not journalists. They live in a space of exception. Oppressed by the state but rejected by their peers. This hollows out the meaning of life for journalists. Constrains biopolitical nature of identity. Thus the RoB is to resist spaces of exception.

Pukallus and Harrison 2021 [Researchers, U Sheffield] “The politics of impunity: a study of journalists’ experiential accounts of impunity in Bulgaria, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Mexico and Pakistan,” **Journalism**, 22 (2). pp. 303-319. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884918778248/EM

We therefore propose a new approach, which we call the ‘Politics of Impunity’. It is based on the findings of an exploratory study consisting of a set of semi-structured interviews with editors and senior journalists in five countries. It examined how impunity is defined and experienced by journalists and revealed that impunity deprives journalists of their private autonomy and exiles them into spaces of exception. The former has been well understood (see Cooke, 1999 and Young, 2017) and following Locke and Habermas (1996) we define private autonomy as a legally protected sphere within which ‘individuals are free to pursue their interests and happiness as they see fit (…)5 and modern law must secure the recognition of private autonomy that is, it must guarantee the exercise of, to use Locke’s phrase, the ‘inalienable rights’ of those subject to it.6 The latter, spaces of exception, is derived from Schmitt’s (2005) and Agamben’s (2005) use of the phrase ‘States of Exception’, and in general terms, refers to the suspension of the legal order and political procedures by the state due to exceptional circumstances. We use ‘Spaces of Exception’ to refer to a sphere of activity in which the norms of legal procedure and politically underwritten forms of personal security are suspended with impunity. It does not refer to geo-political territory (as in Gregory, 2004) rather it is a form of existential and affective space. Spaces of exception occur when those who are in a position of political power and decide to no longer legally protect legal and political spaces of individual freedoms and to no longer guarantee the safe exercise of individual rights for certain groups of people then they exclude them from the political community they belong to. They strip them of their equal citizenship and effectively force them to inhabit a ‘space of exception’ where the law no longer applies and political and civil membership is forfeited. Following Gregory (2004: cf.62/63), a space of exception is in effect a space where journalists (in this case country nationals) are still objects of sovereign (state) power, but where they are excluded from being its subjects.7 Using these two key-concepts combined with the concept of self-censorship we define the ‘Politics of Impunity’ as a policy of governance whereby impunity is used as a political tool by the state and state-sponsored actors to achieve journalistic self-censorship. This is done through the deliberate deprivation of private autonomy brought about by the enforced exile of journalists into a ‘space of exception’. Ultimately, the ‘Politics of Impunity’ undermines journalism as a civil institution.8

These two consequences are first, the loss of private autonomy and second, ‘exile’ into a space of exception. It is these two consequences that represent the most significant and pernicious impacts upon journalists and their daily attempts to undertake independent journalism. The loss of private autonomy for journalists means that individual, legal and constitutional rights to freedom of expression are no longer protected or guaranteed by political power. This loss occurs when these rights are suspended with impunity either directly by the state or indirectly when the state endorses the violent actions of state-sponsored actors. The impact of such a loss of autonomy is significant as journalists find themselves no longer protected as journalist – because often such protective laws don’t exist or aren’t upheld – and no longer protected as citizens because they are journalists. As such, the loss of the private autonomy for journalists is equal to being stripped of citizenship protected by the Constitution or other forms of fundamental laws. This loss is occasioned by the creation of spaces of exception into which journalists are exiled. In other words, journalists find themselves in a space in which the legal protection of their rights is absent, where they are ‘marked outcast through the operation of sovereign power’ and where they lose their legal identity as citizens and correspondingly struggle to retain a semblance of their identity as journalists. By committing the ‘crime’ of undertaking independent journalism a journalist puts him/herself outside the law and becomes ‘ipso facto an outlaw, a hostis [enemy], a rebel or an enemy of the homeland’ and by consequence, that journalist is ‘put outside the law [vogelfrei] and becomes automatically the object of an arbitrary execution’ (Schmitt, 2014: 152). The journalist is simultaneously within and beyond the legal order. It is these political-legal consequences of impunity that lie at the root of what journalists often express as the feeling that their life ‘isn’t worth anything’, ‘that their lives don’t matter’, ‘that there is no solution’ (see above). What is felt is the consequence of an essentially political and legal decision with regard to the withdrawal of political protection combined with the loss of effective citizenship. These political-legal spaces of exception have become the global norm for journalists who work under the circumstances of the use of impunity.

The feeling of helplessness described above was further exacerbated the lack of journalistic solidarity. Fellow journalists are perceived as not interested in what happens to their colleagues, they don’t report these attacks and thereby don’t provide a feeling of belonging to a community or a feeling of being supported. Ultimately the lack of journalistic solidarity and journalism associations mean that opportunities for common civil resilience or resistance to impunity are non-existent. Bulgarian journalists said that a ‘journalistic community’ in the form of journalism associations that could provide an alternative form of collective protection did not exist. In India, there is equally a lack of journalistic solidarity. This lack combined with a lack of public awareness about attacks on journalists (see below) ensures that crimes against journalists don’t get reported allowing for impunity to continue.

Independent journalism has the ideal role of holding those in power to account and to inform the public about issues of public concern; issues that are commonly referred to as being in the public interest. This, in turn, enables the civil sphere to be autonomous and to some extent independent of the non-civil spheres (including the political sphere i.e. the state and government). It also enables free debate and democratic citizenship.

#### No value to life in a biopolitical framework—everyone is exposed to the possibility of being reduced to bare life in the name of instrumentality.

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140]

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the *exceprio* of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### Therefore I stand resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

## Part 3: Pragmatic of Objectivity

#### Objectivity must be modified to stress transparency as defining characteristic. “Pragmatic Objectivity” is a superior middle way to objective analysis.

McGuckin 2015 [Stuart, BA Journalism, Murdoch U.; currently Research Officer. Department of the Premier and Cabinet of WA, Australia] “The Rise of Citizen Journalism: Its impact on professional journalism’s traditional ideal of objectivity,” **Thesis Online** <https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/29490/1/whole.pdf/EM>

An increasingly sceptical audience has the potential to become distracted looking for things to be critical about and may miss the information being communicated. By being transparent—acknowledging their own fallibility, position, and process— journalists may be able to more effectively communicate information. Despite this, it is important to recognise the familiar aversion to opinion, in favour of good reporting based on independence, that exist in both this notion of transparency and the standards Ward (2006, 19) proposed journalists follow in an effort to be objective. This suggests the notion of journalistic objectivity might simply need to be adjusted rather than completely thrown out.

‘Pragmatic objectivity’ is an adjustment of journalism’s traditional approach to objectivity as suggested by Ward (2006, 261-316). Within this approach, the standards concerning non-interpretation, and neutrality and detachment are emphasised less. Parallels may be drawn between the idea of objectivity as performance and pragmatic objectivity given the way it is described by Ward: Pragmatic objectivity is the evaluation of the means and results of inquiry. Current beliefs, theories, and methodological norms are the tentative results of past inquiry, providing a platform for further inquiries. (264) With this understanding of objectivity, a journalist may move towards the truth, but they recognise, and acknowledge, it is never the full truth. Adopting ‘pragmatic objectivity’ would see journalism considered an on-going process towards truth, as it would not be expected the truth could be found in one story; rather it is pieced together by looking at several stories over time. News is then taken as exactly that— an event or something new—and not a matter of fact.

#### Must revise objectivity to a performativae rather than a positivist scientific method. Provides win for everyone. CJ are objective. Need to incorporate their perspective.

Darbo and Skjerdal 2019 [Katherine, graduate of NLA University College and teaches Media and Communication at Sam Eyde High School; Terje, Associate Professor in Journalism at NLA University College in Kristiansand] “Blurred boundaries: Citizens journalists versus conventional journalists in Hong Kong,” **Global Media and China** <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2059436419834633/EM>

A number of the journalists express allegiance to objectivity as a norm in their reporting practice, while others contend that objective journalism is unreachable and therefore not a goal. Interestingly, the differentiation between those who highlight objectivity and those who don’t, does not coincide with the division between citizen journalists and conventional journalists, but goes across the two groups. A journalist from one of the mainstream outlets, for example, dismisses the value of objectivity because “it is only an American idea,” while one of the citizen journalists claims to be neutral and objective. What the 12 respondents more or less seems to have in common, however, is a reporting strategy where they maintain fairness and balance by including both sides in the story and keeping their own sympathies at distance. This is a known strategy for how to deal with objectivity in professional practice, by which journalistic objectivity is not treated as scientific objectivity, but rather seen as a performance ideal (Blaagaard, 2013).

#### Plan initiates a new biopolitics of journalistic identity that ends the state of exception, empowers social change that will ensure human survival in the long term. Resists the growing surveillance society.

Neme Forum 2021 “Monitorial Citizen: the ordinary witness,” **Cyprus Conference Summary** <https://www.neme.org/projects/state-machines/monitorial-citizen/EM>

Selecting in the new planetary humanity those characteristics that allow for its survival, removing the thin diaphragm that separates bad mediated advertising from the perfect exteriority that communicates only itself – this is the political task of our generation. (Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community,* University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p63) Agamben’s statement implies a sense of urgency, a call to humanity to form a completely new engagement with politics, a shared uniting form of representation, the perfect exteriority. This may be seen as an unachievable ideal, even for informed citizens, especially in context to the current condition[s] of uncertain notions of citizenship, disuniting nationalisms, refugees and internal displacement caused by incessant wars, migration caused by climate change and bots generating fake news. Corporate and government media’s insistence on defending a collapsing political, economic and social system has created reverberations of disillusionment and mistrust leading to a decline in conventional forms of political involvement. Nonetheless, we are witnessing an alternative form of participatory democracy and a higher level of engagement on the web by citizen bloggers, described by Michael Schudson as “monitorial citizens.” (Michael Schudson, *Good Citizens and Bad History: Today’s Political Ideals in Historical Perspective,* Communication Review 1, no. 4, 2000). This ubiquitous presence of citizen journalism is in itself not without issues. Stuart Allan addresses these concerns and conceptualises social media outreach from ordinary citizens as “citizen witnessing.” (Stuart Allan, *Citizen Witnessing: Revisioning Journalism in Times of Crisis,* Polity Press, 2013) It is from both these scholars we take the title for this conference. The importance of social media activism was already well established by bloggers in Tunisia and Algeria then spreading to other countries in the MENA region with the case of several bloggers in Egypt receiving substantial international exposure due to their effective use of media activism. This outreach via the so called egalitarianism of cyberspace is not without problems. Apart from the obvious political crackdown of arrest and temporarily removing internet access, citizen blogging is more often established through ‘weak links’ without secure tools and platforms such as self-data privacy management. Jonathan A Obar questions what type of interface in this increasingly technocratic world would allow very large groups of monitorial citizens to raise issues for debate to the point where change is possible. Obar addresses Walter Lippmann’s (1927) concern on whether citizens can be self-governing in a participatory democracy, “What I term the fallacy of data privacy self-management, or the mis-conception that digital citizens can be self- governing in a digital universe defined by Big Data, is perpetuated by governments the world over, refusing to move beyond flawed notice and choice policy.” (Jonathan *A Obar, Big Data and The Phantom Public: Walter Lippmann and the fallacy of data privacy self-management,* 2015 , p2 Retrieved from SAGE Open Access). Of course, most users do not read the fine print of the convoluted terms of service and privacy policies and thus inertly sanctioning Big Data’s monopoly of personal data and this is another area of concern regarding the issue of transparency. The growing demand for political and corporate clarity is a manifold topic of discussion on social media. The speed with which data-processing is conducted provides the citizen blogger with almost instant access to information but it also ensures that crucial issues may become evanescent. The acuity with which we address these issues requires serious attention in order to secure increased citizen participation, to expand and reinforce the demand for greater individual security, privacy and transparency of governance. Accomplishing these would provide tangible credibility for technology’s claim of democratising the world.

#### Must protect “acts of journalism” to support CJ and end the state of exception.

Posetti 2017 (**Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age** UNESCO Printing. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002480/248054E.pdf>/EM

In this digital and security-driven context, it becomes important to extend legal source confidentiality protection to all acts of journalism, not just to issues of identification after the publication of content based on confidential communications, but also to related prior digital reporting processes and journalistic communications with sources. Additionally, it is important to debate which journalistic actors qualify for source protection in the digital era – and where there is a need to answer questions like ‘Who can claim entitlement to source confidentiality protection laws?’

In the view of USA journalist Josh Stearns: “we need to look at the acts of journalism rather than defining a particular type of person…defining an act is safer and more consistent with how media is created and consumed today, and (it) provides a stronger basis for protection.”

#### Protections end state of exception and prevent self-censorship.

Darbo and Skjerdal 2019 [Katherine, graduate of NLA University College and teaches Media and Communication at Sam Eyde High School; Terje, Associate Professor in Journalism at NLA University College in Kristiansand] “Blurred boundaries: Citizens journalists versus conventional journalists in Hong Kong,” **Global Media and China** <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2059436419834633/EM>

When asked to define press freedom, journalists on both sides emphasize the liberty to publish what they want without restrictions. However, whereas the citizen journalists are more focused on the right to free expression without facing pressure, the conventional journalists also emphasize freedom from financial considerations and the right to access information. This statement demonstrates how journalists from the mainstream media are somewhat more institutionally oriented in their description of journalistic practice, seeing themselves as part of a professional community with structurally defined rights and responsibilities. Censorship mechanisms, including self-censorship, appear to be more prevalent among the conventional journalists than for the citizen journalists. The conventional journalists are conscious that they are part of a media organization which has certain expectations concerning their stance vis-à-vis the central government. At the same time, they describe a situation where they, as reporters, are more liberal in their performance than the editorial line of the publication prescribes. For example, an informant from Ming Pao, which is considered a pro-establishment newspaper (Cook, 2013), explains that his editors are “pro-Beijing and mild in criticizing the government, but the stories we run are still very critical of the government.” Similarly, there is a tendency among the journalists to claim that self-censorship is a bigger problem in the other publications than in their own. A journalist explains that a newspaper she used to work for had a blacklist of persons who were not to be mentioned in their articles, but her current organization does not have such restrictions. Implicitly, the journalists highlight professional demarcations as a key to tackling unsolicited practices like self-censorship. This is in line with previous research on self-censorship practices in the Hong Kong media, which argues that professional ideals and a political self-perception independent from the publication’s own are important factors to resist self-censorship (Lee & Chan, 2008).

## UV

Aff gets 1AR theory

#### 1) I get 1ar theory because otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive which outwieghs everything because that makes it impossible for the aff to win.

#### 2) Paradigm Issues: Drop the debater a) to deter future abuse, b) if I prove abuse it means substance has already been skewed. No RVIs, a) debaters don’t win for just being fair or educational, b) it would encourage good theory debaters to be abusive so they can bait theory and win off an RVI

3) 1AR theory is the highest layer of the round – they get thirteen minutes on theory vs our seven minutes – they’ll say we can read 1ac theory but we can’t preempt every possible abuse story. Reject nc paradigm issues regarding 1ar theory bc it deters checking abuse.