# debateLA R6 – 1NC v Westwood PM

## 1

#### Interp: The aff must defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities in general is unjust.

#### “Private Entities” is a generic bare plural. Generics cannot be affirmed by particular instances, and bare plurals normally express generic generalization

**Leslie 16–** (Sarah-Jane Leslie, Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, where she is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy. She is known for her work on the cognitive underpinnings of generic generalizations); "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics>. KD

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

* (1) a. Tigers are striped.
* b. Tigers are on the front lawn.
* **(2) a. A tiger is striped.**
* **b. A tiger is on the front lawn.**
* (3) a. The tiger is striped.
* b. The tiger is on the front lawn.

The sentence pairs above are *prima facie* syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. **In the first sentences, however, we are saying something *general*.** **There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.**

The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a *kind*.

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is *upward entailing*, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” *salva veritate*, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, **“tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (**[**1a**](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)**) does not entail that animals are striped,** but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### “private entities” is a generic bare plural that must be read with a generic interpretation - a] Fails the Upward-Entailment Test--- “Private entities” doesn’t entail “all entities” since the topic doesn’t extend to public entities as well.

#### b] Adverb of Quantification Test— “most private entities” produces only a small change in meaning

#### Violation: They only defend [Indian private entities] – here’s a caselist of other private entities.

**The Space Foundation**, **1-26-**21, "Commercial Space Activities," No Publication, https://spacepolicyonline.com/topics/commercial-space-activities/#nasas-commercial-crew-and-commercial-cargo-programs//ak//

U.S. AEROSPACE COMPANIES¶ Hundreds of companies are involved in the aerospace sector, even when looking only at the “space” part of the business and not aircraft. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, but to provide links to some of the companies that are most often referenced in discussions about space policy. The list of entrepreneurial companies is especially subject to change as new companies enter the business or existing ones merge with other companies or fail.¶ The “big three” U.S. aerospace companies are:¶ Boeing¶ Lockheed Martin, and¶ Northrop Grumman (which acquired Orbital ATK as of June 6, 2018)¶ In addition, Boeing and Lockheed Martin co-own¶ United Launch Alliance (launch services)¶ Other major U.S. aerospace companies that manufacture spacecraft, instruments and/or launch vehicles and/or provide launch services including for people include:¶ Aerojet Rocketdyne (rocket engines)¶ Ball Aerospace (spacecraft and instruments)¶ Dynetics, a Leidos Company (space systems)¶ International Launch Services (launch services)¶ L3Harris (Harris and L3 merged in 2019, previously Harris acquired Excelis) (spacecraft instruments)¶ Maxar Technologies (incorporating Space Systems Loral, DigitalGlobe, and Radiant Solutions — earth observation and communications satellites and services)¶ Raytheon (spacecraft instruments, acquired Blue Canyon in 2020)¶ Sierra Nevada (spacecraft and instruments)¶ SpaceX (Space Exploration Technologies) (launch services, crew spacecraft, satellite communications)¶ Major U.S. companies that sell space-related products or services include:¶ Dish Network (satellite television)¶ DirecTV (satellite television)¶ SiriusXM (satellite radio)¶ Iridium (mobile satellite telephone)¶ Globalstar (mobile satellite telephone)¶ Trimble (GPS consumer equipment)¶ Garmin (GPS consumer equipment)¶ Entrepreneurial companies:¶ Astrobotic (robotic lunar landers)¶ Axiom Space (commercial space module, personal spaceflight)¶ Bigelow Aerospace (expandable/inflatable space stations)¶ Blue Canyon (acquired by Raytheon in 2020, spacecraft and components)¶ Blue Origin (suborbital and orbital rockets, rocket engines, personal spaceflight)¶ Deep Space Industries (originally asteroid mining, later deep space propulsion–bought by Bradford Space Group, Jan 2, 2019)¶ Firefly Aerospace (small launch vehicles)¶ GeoOptics (radio occultation weather data)¶ Intuitive Machines (robotic lunar landers)¶ Masten Space Systems (robotic lunar landers)¶ Moon Express (robotic lunar landers)¶ Nanoracks (hardware and services including delivery to ISS of cubesats for deployment)¶ Near Space (stratospheric balloons)¶ OneWeb (communications satellites)¶ Paragon Space Development Corp. (environmental control and life support systems)¶ Planet (formerly PlanetLabs) (earth remote sensing, which bought Terra Bella, which was previously Skybox)¶ Planetary Resources, Inc. (originally asteroid mining, acquired by blockchain company ConsenSys Oct 2018)¶ PlanetIQ (radio-occulation weather data)¶ RedWire (acquired Made in Space June 2020)¶ Rocket Lab USA (smallsat launches)¶ Space Adventures (personal spaceflight)¶ Space Perspective (stratospheric balloons)¶ Spire (radio-occultation weather data)¶ Up Aerospace (suborbital launches)¶ World View Enterprises (stratospheric balloons)¶ MAJOR NON-U.S. AEROSPACE COMPANIES¶ There also are hundreds of non-U.S. companies in the aerospace sector. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, but to provide links to companies that are most often referenced in discussions about space policy.¶ Airbus (formerly EADS — European satellite manufacturing)¶ Arianespace (French, launch services)¶ Eutelsat (European fixed satellite services)¶ Inmarsat (global mobile satellite services, based in the United Kingdom)¶ Intelsat (global fixed satellite service, based in Luxembourg)¶ Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japanese, satellites and in-space platforms, launch services)¶ SES (European fixed satellite services)¶ Surrey Satellite Technologies (SSTL — British, small satellite manufacturing)¶ Telesat (Canadian fixed satellite services)¶ Thales Alenia Space (European satellite manufacturing)¶ Virgin Galactic (personal spaceflight, UK)¶ Virgin Orbit (smallsat launches, UK)

#### AND Countries are ONLY responsible for private space companies in their state – past international space law proves

Goguichvili et al 21 (Sophie Goguichvili is a Program Associate with the Science Technology and Innovation Program, working on space, cybersecurity, 5G, and artificial intelligence policy. Sophie is particularly interested in the shifting role of technology and how it will influence the future of conventionally resilient democratic nations. Previously, she interned in the Office of the Director, President, and CEO at the Wilson Center, where she researched and drafted memoranda on contemporary topics in international affairs and national security. She received her BA in International Studies from the School of International Service at American University. Sophie is a native speaker of Georgian and has attained full professional proficiency in French. Other listed authors are Alan Linenberger and Amber Gillette.), “The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier?”, Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legal-landscape-space-who-writes-rules-final-frontier> NT

The third foundational U.N. space treaty, “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,” termed the Liability Convention (1972), outlines the liability of Launching States for damage caused by their space objects both on the Earth or in space as well as procedures for the settlement of claims for damages endured. This means that states remain responsible for any space assets launched from their territory, which infers that the same states are liable for any damages should there be an accident. According to the Liability Convention, claims against damage or destruction are brought by a state against a state, irrespective of who caused the incident, whether it was a commercial actor or a State space agency. According to most national legal instruments, an individual or an industry could initiate a lawsuit against another individual or industry, but regarding international space law, the Liability Convention determined that states are ultimately responsible even if an incident is caused by a private actor. The Liability Convention has only been invoked one time, in 1978, when the USSR’s Cosmos 954 satellite accidentally reentered Earth’s atmosphere, scattering around 50 kg of radioactive uranium-235 over northern Canada. Although this area was sparsely populated, several residents were accidentally exposed to radiation before a major recovery campaign succeeded in sweeping a total area of 124,000 square kilometers over the course of almost one year (Karacalıoğlu, 2014).

#### Vote neg—

#### 1] Limits— hundreds of private entities and states that the aff can pick from and limitless combinations underlimits the topic and destroys neg prep since there’s no unifying DA against OneWeb UK aff, Space X US aff, Airbus UK aff, Rocket Lab USA, Origin Space China aff, India, and Russia affs-- aff gets infinite prep and sets terms for debate so DAs and PICs are inherently reactive and its absurd to say potential neg abuse justifies the aff being flat-out non-T-- limits outweighs – reciprocal prep burden and allows for nuanced engagement

#### 2] Textuality is an independent voter—it determines which interps your ballot can endorse by providing the only salient focal point for debates

#### 3] Topic Lit – the literature always talks about private space companies in relation to the states where they’re based – the aff is an arbitrary constraint on the topic not based in the literature – means this turns functional limits because there’s no solvency advocates for exclusively banning single countries or companies from space

#### DTD on T – the debate shouldn’t have happened if they were abusive

#### Competing Interps on T since its binary and a question of models – Good enough isn’t good—there can be no reasonable interp of what the topic actually means

#### No RVIs on T – 1] Illogical—T is a gateway issue, winning T is meeting a baseline to have the debate to begin with 2] T is reactionary, they shouldn’t win for meeting their preround burden 3] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on theory kills substance education and neg flex—o/w on real world

## 2

#### Interpretation: Ownership of and right to use extraterrestrial resources is distinct from ownership of real property

Pershing 19 (Abigail D. Pershing is a Robina Fellow at European Court of Human Rights. Graduate of UChicago in Sociology, Public Policy and Yale Law School.), “Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty’s Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2019, pg. 161, <https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/6733/Pershing.pdf?sequence=2> NT

In contrast to earlier legal theory that denied the possibility of appropriation of any space resources, **scholars now widely accept that extracting space resources from celestial bodies is a “use” permitted by the Outer Space Treaty** and that extracted materials become the property of the entity that performed the extraction.80 Stressing the fact that the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit appropriating resources from outer space, other authors conclude that the use of extracted space resources is permitted, meaning that the new SPACE Act is a plausible interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.81 However, scholars have been careful to cabin the extent to which they accept the legality of appropriation. For instance, although Thomas Gangale and Marilyn Dudley-Rowley acknowledge the legality of private appropriation of extracted space resources, they nonetheless emphasize that **“[o]wnership of and the right to use extraterrestrial resources is distinct from ownership of real property” and that any such claim to real property is illegal.**82 Lawrence Cooper is also careful to point out this distinction: “[t]he [Outer Space] Treaties recognize sovereignty over property placed into space, property produced in space, and resources removed from their place in space, but ban sovereignty claims by states; international law extends this ban to individuals.”83

#### Violation: Appropriation doesn’t include resource extraction

Wrench 19 (John Wrench is an attorney at the Institute for Justice. John grew up outside of Ithaca, New York, and received his law degree from the Case Western Reserve University School of Law in 2019. During law school, he served as editor in chief of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law and was a member of the Federalist Society. John interned in his law school’s First Amendment Litigation Clinic and was a judicial extern to the Honorable Paul E. Davison in the Southern District of New York. John graduated from Pace University in 2015 with a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and Religious Studies.), “Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining”, Case Western Reserve of International Law, Vol 51, Issue 1, Article 11, pg. 25-26, <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2546&context=jil> NT

The non-appropriation doctrine restricts parties from making sovereign claims over underlying land—the same restriction embedded in each of previous section’s legal regimes. **Without violating the nonappropriation principle, those regimes grant parties the right to extract resources from land they do not own, transfer that right, and limit wasteful use.** Each system similarly vests an entity with the authority to regulate and enforce those rules. With some tailoring, those rules could graft onto the uniqueness of outer space resource extraction.

1AC evidence proves they defend private space actors doing things like mining as appropriation- from 1AC Nanda –" -- **role of the IAF in safeguarding the space economy**, among other reasons. With the **increasing private sector activities in space, such as the launching of commercial satellites, the introduction of ‘space tourism’, asteroid mining of minerals, and a range of other fascinating stuff, these space assets of the country need protection from the enemy forces.”**

#### Standards –

#### 1] Limits – the aff explodes limits because now they can ban actions that aren’t appropriation and just extraction – their interp justifies affs about space resource mining, space-based nuclear power, resource conflict, satellites, and cooperative space exploration like the ISS. At best, their aff is extremely unpredictable because of non-T advantage areas, and at worst, it’s extra-T because the aff defends banning appropriation but also mining, allowing them to solve DAs about space innovation and tech by circumventing links and solving internal link chains. Unpredictable limits controls the internal link to every other standard – the neg can’t predict and prep for every non-T aff about actions that aren’t appropriation – there are no universal neg generics that apply – this abuse o/w on magnitude since that explodes the number of 7-minute case negs the neg needs to have even game against this aff.

#### 2] Prefer our interpretation – hold the line in the 1AR and force them to find a comparative counter-interp like ours that clearly demarcates what is topical and what’s not. Ours o/w on precision and solves predictability.

#### DTD on T – the debate shouldn’t have happened if they were abusive

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## 3

#### India’s private sector is key to their space programme.

**Rajagopalan 20**, Rajeswari. [Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues.] “India’s Space Programme: A Role for the Private Sector, Finally?” *Observer Research Foundation*, 24 May 2020, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-space-programme-a-role-for-the-private-sector-finally-66661/>. [GHS-AA]

India’s finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced last week that India’s private sector will play a key role in augmenting India’s space programme, and that the government intends to share the facilities of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) with the private sector. This announcement was part of the Narendra Modi government’s call for new and bold reforms in an effort to promote its ‘self-reliant India’ mission. It is the fourth segment of the Rs 20 lakh crore Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan special economic stimulus. Sitharaman’s announcement entails a role for the private sector, possibly with the goal of greater investments in technology development and acquisition, capacity-building and space exploration, including planetary exploration. The minister, while announcing these reforms, appeared to understand that the private sector can help augment India’s space capability. While praising the work done by ISRO, she also pointed out that the private sector is also doing a lot of work in developing space technology. She also acknowledged that the existing regulations prevent private entities from using or even testing their products. Therefore, to level the playing field, the government “will make a provision for the private sector to benefit from the assets which are available to ISRO and for India (in general) to benefit from.” The minister also said the new reforms would allow the private sector to play an active role in “satellites, launches and space-based services”. But as always, implementation is key. Properly executing these reforms will require enabling policies and appropriate regulatory frameworks. That the new reforms will allow private sector players to use ISRO facilities is a big deal. This indeed must be music to the ears of commercial players who have been seeking to get a fair share of the pie in terms of manufacturing of satellites and propellant technologies, among other areas. It should not be too difficult for India’s private space sector because there is a sizeable talent pool available outside ISRO. More importantly, the entry of the private sector, as in the telecom sector, can bring several advantages in terms of cost and access. Following the announcement, ISRO tweeted that it will follow the government’s guidelines to allow the private sector to undertake space activities in the country. Though this did not seem particularly welcoming of the government’s initiative, ISRO’s support is critical to making it a success. ISRO has in the last few years been opening up to the Indian private space sector in a gradual manner – mostly as a matter of compulsion because ISRO simply does not have the in-house capacity to address India’s growing requirements. Today, the Indian space programme is not just about civilian applications for remote-sensing, meteorology and communication, as in the early decades. India’s space sector and its requirements have grown enormously in the last decade to include television and broadband services, space science and exploration, space-based navigation and, of course, defence and security applications. Among others, Ambassador Rakesh Sood has articulated the need for legislation to facilitate ISRO’s partnership with industries and entrepreneurs. Narayan Prasad and Prateep Basu, two prominent faces in the Indian space start-up segment, have argued that despite ISRO’s successes, “India’s space competitiveness has suffered from the absence of a globally reputed, private space industry.” The private sector, especially the NewSpace industry and start-ups, have an advantage in terms of low-cost operations, which itself should be a big incentive for the government to make it an active stakeholder. A certain amount of democratisation of space technology with the participation of the private sector can ensure costs are kept low. And expanding the number of stakeholders will also ensure more transparency and better accountability and regulatory practices. This has been missing in India’s space sector. The same agency has undertaken promotion, commercialisation and regulatory functions – which is not healthy.

#### India’s Space program is key to primacy and winning the space race against China.

**Hickert 17**, Cameron. [Cameron Hickert is a former Research Assistant at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focused on China’s artificial intelligence initiatives, U.S.-China relations, and security issues in East Asia. Prior to joining the Belfer Center, Cameron studied as a member of the inaugural class of Schwarzman Scholars. Previously, he was a researcher at the Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum and interned for the U.S. State Department in Vienna, where he provided on-site support at the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He holds a B.S. in physics and a B.A. in international studies from the University of Denver.] “Space Rivals: Power and Strategy in the China-India Space Race.” *Schwarzman Scholars*, 14 Aug. 2017, <https://www.schwarzmanscholars.org/events-and-news/space-rivals-power-strategy-china-india-space-race/>. [GHS-AA]

The regional rivalry between India and China has long simmered, and the next frontier increasingly appears to be space. Although officials on both sides of the border have denied the existence of a space race between the two nations, this claim is increasingly dubious. Recent events present the first counter: in response to China’s 2007 anti-satellite test, the ISRO formed the Integrated Space Cell to manage its future military space assets, and pledged to develop ground-based anti-satellite weapons. Days after China announced it would send a human into orbit in 2003, then- Prime Minister of India Atal Vajpayee publicly urged his nation’s scientists to land a man on the moon. It is also in this intensified climate that India’s space budget has increased by double-digit percentages. Economic rationale provides another reason to believe a competition is afoot. China has offered its global satellite-navigation services to countries participating in its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure plan; India, which has been skeptical about OBOR, is developing a satellite system which could compete with the Chinese offerings. And as a greater number of private companies seek entry into space-related operations, the two nations will be vying against each other to attract the same paying customers. Both sides increasingly are adopting rhetoric tied to a space race. Wu Yanhua, vice administrator of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), in the first half of 2016 stated his organization aimed “to rank among the world’s top three (alongside the U.S. and Russia) by around 2030”. Evident within this statement is a competition in which India falls short of China’s achievements. More explicitly, the Global Times – a nationalist and populist outlet for the Communist Party of China (CCP) – in February described a successful Indian satellite launch with the title, “India’s satellite launch ramps up space race.” The article then describes Sino-Indian competition in both military and commercial spheres. India, meanwhile, has been heralding space achievements in such a manner that the subcontinent’s press, believing the Indian mission to Mars was meant to show China it was a worthy rival, reacted with forthright nationalism in the event’s wake. The government’s decision to use the Mars orbiter as the new design for the 2,000 rupee note lends further support to patriotic conceptions of a space competition between the Asian neighbors. Whether or not either nation’s top leadership declares a space race, the tit-for-tat timing of space-related developments, economic competition, and the rhetoric present at other levels of government and society indicate a race is indeed occurring. From a fundamental ‘hard power’ perspective, the appeal of outer space is clear. Satellites are crucial to modern day capabilities in the realm referred to as ‘C4ISR’ – command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. And while there are currently international prohibitions on the deployment of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons do not yet have these limits, although there is a precedent against deploying them to space. Indeed, the theories of deterrence that have long applied to terrestrial combat are now inextricably linked in a complex web with space, nuclear weapons, and conventional weapons. The value of crossover technologies is another important reality for China and India. Experts estimate that upwards of 90% of technologies developed during a space program have applications elsewhere. These cross-applications of the research and development fueling the space race is a means by which nations can improve domestic quality of life, produce technologies more suited to compete in a global environment, sharpen military capabilities, and improve domestic innovation.

#### India primacy key to US efforts to counter China Rise

**Heijmans**, Philip, **and** Iain **Marlow 21**. [Philip Heijmans is a journalist based in Prague. Iain Marlow is a former Asia-Pacific correspondent for The Globe and Mail. Based in Vancouver, he was responsible for covering Canada’s business ties with the booming economies of Asia, as well as important economic and political developments in the region. Iain has reported from across China, India, Southeast Asia, West Africa and the United States. He joined the Globe in early 2010 as the telecom reporter for Report on Business and in late 2011 began focusing on BlackBerry and its global rivals. In 2012, Iain’s work in Report on Business Magazine was nominated for three National Magazine Awards. His reporting on BlackBerry from Nigeria won a Best in Business award from the Society of American Business Editors and Writers in International Features, and in 2013 he was part of a team of Globe reporters that won a National Newspaper Award in Business. Before joining The Globe, Iain studied journalism and human rights at Carleton University and earned an MSc in International Politics (Distinction) from London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, where he studied on a Chevening Scholarship. He also founded TorontoReview.ca, an international-affairs website, and spent half of 2013 working for Journalists for Human Rights – a Canadian media development organization – in Ghana, where he also did media training for the United Nations Development Programme.] “India to Emerge as Key Military Partner in US’ Plan to Counter China’s Rise.” *Business Standard*, 13 Jan. 2021, <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-to-emerge-as-key-military-partner-in-us-plan-to-counter-china-s-rise-121011300370_1.html>. [GHS-AA]

The Trump administration declassified its strategy to ensure continued dominance over China, which focuses on accelerating India’s rise as a counterweight to Beijing and the ability to defend Taiwan against an attack. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien on Tuesday announced the publication of the document, titled “United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific.” Approved by President Donald Trump in February 2018, it provided the “overarching strategic guidance” for U.S. actions the past three years and was released to show the U.S. commitment to “keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open long into the future,” O’Brien said in a statement. “Beijing is increasingly pressuring Indo-Pacific nations to subordinate their freedom and sovereignty to a ‘common destiny’ envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party,” O’Brien said in an expanded statement. “The U.S. approach is different. We seek to ensure that our allies and partners – all who share the values and aspirations of a free and open Indo-Pacific -- can preserve and protect their sovereignty.” The document lays out a vision for the region in which North Korea no longer poses a threat, India is predominant in South Asia and the U.S. works with partners around the world to resist Chinese activities to undermine sovereignty through coercion. It assumed that China will take “increasingly assertive” steps to compel unification with Taiwan and warns that its dominance of cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence will “pose profound challenges to free societies.” While the timing of the release just a week before President-elect Joe Biden takes office raises questions about the motive, the Trump administration’s actions to counter China in Asia have largely enjoyed bipartisan support. Incoming Biden officials have talked about the need to work more with allies and partners against China, which also forms a key part of the strategy -- particularly in strengthening security ties with Australia, Japan and India. Rory Medcalf, a professor and head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, said that the document shows U.S. policy in Asia was driven by efforts to “bolster allies and counter China.” But he noted that the strategy was so ambitious that “failure was almost assured” on issues such as disarming North Korea, sustaining “primacy” in the region and finding international consensus against harmful Chinese economic practices. “The declassified framework will have enduring value as the beginning of a whole-of-government blueprint for handling strategic rivalry with China,” Medcalf wrote in a post for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute research group. “If the U.S. is serious about that long-term contest, it will not be able to choose between getting its house in order domestically and projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. It will need to do both at once.”

#### China leadership causes prolif --- empirics prove transition wars.

Joshi 15, fellow at the Takshashila Institution, focusing on Indian strategic affairs and foreign policy towards Afghanistan (Rohan Joshi, 2/15/15, “China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation”, The Diplomat. [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation](http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/)) KD

**China’s appetite for prolif**eration **remained undiminished** **even after it acceded to the NPT**. In 1995, it allegedly sold Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets needed for high-speed gas centrifuges, while a U.S. intelligence report in 1997 held that “China was the single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass destruction” in the world. China’s civil nuclear trade commitments with Pakistan have gained considerable momentum since Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998. The China-Pakistan Power Plant Corporation’s Chashma-1 and Chashma-2 power reactors, which were under item-specific IAEA safeguards, were held not to be in violation of NSG guidelines as they were pre-existing commitments and thus “grandfathered” in at the time of China’s induction into the NSG in 2004. However, China then entered into agreements in 2009 for the construction of two new 340 MW power plants (Chashma-3 and Chashma-4). There have since been reports of undertakings for the construction of additional plants in Chashma and Karachi. Some in Pakistan have argued that these commitments date back to a 1986 agreement with China on cooperation in construction and operation of nuclear reactors for an initial period of 30 years, and thus not in violation of NSG guidelines. This spurious argument, if accepted, implies that China can continue to commit to any number of additional nuclear projects in Pakistan without any repercussions. It is another matter that the actual text of the so-called 1986 agreement remains unreleased and shrouded in mystery, thereby preventing the international community from validating Chinese and Pakistani representations. China has demonstrated remarkable consistency over four decades in acting in ways that undermine with impunity the global non-proliferation regime. Its nuclear deals with Pakistan – both military and civilian – were conceived and executed in secrecy. The recent news articles now confirm that China remains committed to a long-term nuclear relationship with Pakistan under its own terms. This is a pattern of behavior that is **unlikely to change without the application of sustained international pressure to bring China into compliance with the commitments it has undertaken**.

#### US-China war causes extinction.

**Sharman 17** [Citing professor of Chinese studies and director of King's College London's Lau China Institute & Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick], Jon. “War between China and America ‘Could End Life as We Know It on Earth.’” *The Independent*, 5 Feb. 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-china-war-be-end-of-life-earth-nuclear-weapons-apocalypse-steve-bannon-donald-trump-white-house-a7561821.html.

While the prospect remains relatively remote, experts have told The Independent they believe such a conflict would be catastrophic, throwing the entire globe into turmoil and potentially ending "life as we know it on Earth". The United States would likely win because sending China's untested forces against the might of America's military would be like pitching farmers against Achilles and his warriors, said one, but even a conventional military victory would be a strategic disaster. It would set off a global economic crisis and create a potential power vacuum inside defeated China "the like of which we can't imagine". Mr Bannon said war would erupt in the South China Sea in "five to 10 years". He said: "They’re taking their sandbars and making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those. They come here to the United States in front of our face—and you understand how important face is—and say it’s an ancient territorial sea." The US and China have been engaged in a back-and-forth dispute over military build-up and territorial claims in the region for some years. In December the US said it would base its deadliest fighter jets in Australia, and days later China seized an unmanned US Navy drone. It followed a diplomatic spat around then-President-elect Trump's congratulatory phone call with Taiwan's Prime Minister Tsai Ing-wen, which broke with decades of US policy. Mr Trump has been forthright about China's influence, blaming it for the loss of American jobs. The war of words recently heated up when a Chinese military official was quoted as saying talk of war with the US under Mr Trump "are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality". Trevor McCrisken, associate professor of politics and international studies at the University of Warwick, said that if war broke out "we would be looking, I would imagine, at World War Three". He said: "I really do think that would be the end of life as we know it on Earth. "From a global strategic risk level I would say the last thing you want is war between the United States and any of the major powers because of the risks of escalation, obviously the potential for nuclear weapons to be used. The likelihood of nuclear exchange between the two principals involved is high." But, he added, the "overwhelming view of most policy-makers in Washington since at least the late 1970s" favours a form of "cooperative, if competitive" relationship with China. Dr Peter Roberts, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, said: "America would take military losses. They would lose thousands and thousands [of personnel]. But China would be utterly defeated. If America goes to war, it wages war in its totality. They would go to this with unparalleled violence and energy." The US has an "overall competitive edge" partly due to technological superiority, Dr Roberts said, but also because the four branches of its military—Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force—are trained to work closely together. "It's demonstrated how it can use all those arms to deliver military victory," he said. In contrast, China's services operate "individually" and also have less, and less recent, combat experience compared to their American counterparts. "There's a huge difference between someone who's been in combat before, and someone who hasn't," Dr Roberts said, comparing the potential confrontation to one between Greek hero Achilles and farmers recruited from the fields. Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese studies and director of King's College London's Lau China Institute, said: "US naval superiority is massive. And if we are talking just military, then for sure, a conflict right beside China would hurt China more than the US. "It would, of course, totally upend supply routes, however, and probably cause a global recession. So it would, no matter who won in terms of military outcomes, be lose-lose and cut against the logic of self interest of both the US and China." Professor Brown added: "We have to expect this war of words to simply get worse. The best outcome is that the two sides ultimately compromise—China acts more responsibly, and stops its adventurism, and the US concedes it more space. The worst outcome would be a misunderstanding that would lead to real conflict."

## Case

#### India-China conflict won’t escalate - border clashes during COVID prove neither wants war

Choudhury 20 (Saheli Roy Choudhury is a reporter for CNBC.com. She reports on technology news in Asia Pacific, with a focus on artificial intelligence, 5G and cybersecurity. She also covers India and writes on market moves in the region.), “Wider armed conflict between India and China unlikely after ‘violent’ border clash”, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/india-china-border-standoff-analysts-say-war-is-unlikely.html> NT

“**The fact that the 15 June incident, despite the fatalities, did not boil over into a larger conflict is one positive signal that higher-ups on both sides are not interested in sparking any kind of war**,” Broderick said. She explained that India and China are likely to return to de-escalation, but that the process will take “significantly longer,” with a higher risk of another flare-up as both governments have to tackle hardened domestic attitudes against the other side and resist calls for retaliation. “If talks at the military and foreign ministry level are flailing, a conversation between (President) Xi Jinping and (Prime Minister) Narendra Modi is likely to prevent a major fallout,” Broderick said. **China-India relations to ‘change considerably’ with border dispute**, says expert Still, analysts expect that there remains a risk of future border clashes turning into larger armed clashes, particularly if thousands of soldiers continue to face each other along the disputed border area. Domestic challenges **Both countries face a number of domestic challenges that are likely to preoccupy New Delhi and Beijing — including the economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic.** China is experiencing a resurgence of infections in Beijing, where more than 100 new cases were reported in recent days. Authorities have reimposed restrictions to stop the virus from spreading. The world’s second-largest economy is also managing a deteriorating relationship with the United States. The risk of miscalculation aside, we believe there is little appetite to beat the war drum. India for its part is one of the most-affected countries in the world, with more than 340,000 reported cases, despite imposing a strict national lockdown between late-March and the end of May. “The risk of miscalculation aside, we believe there is little appetite to beat the war drum,” Miha Hribernik, head of Asia for risk insight at Verisk Maplecroft, wrote in a note. “Nevertheless, neither Modi nor Xi can afford to completely back down in what is an exceedingly complex and long-standing sovereignty dispute,” Hribernik said. “**We accordingly expect tensions along the disputed border areas to continue to simmer during the rest of the year, with neither side willing to pull back completely, but with little enthusiasm for further escalation.**”

#### No Sino-India conflict—conventional and nuclear deterrence check

Richards 2015 – Marine Engineer Officer who has served in the Royal Australian Navy for 26 Years (Commodore Katherine, February, China-India: An analysis of the Himalayan territorial dispute, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf>)

However, Fravel counters this view and states that China has been ‘less belligerent than leading¶ theories of international relations might have predicted for a state with its characteristics’,¶ further noting that:¶ For scholars of offensive realism, China has rarely exploited its military superiority either to¶ bargain hard territory that it claims or to seize it through force. China has likewise not become¶ increasingly aggressive in managing its territorial disputes as its relative military and economic¶ power has grown since 1990.199¶ Moreover, Jonathan Holslag surmises that the overall strategy of both nations is to maintain the¶ balance of power in the border area and that this balance is ‘nourished’ by small-scale incursions¶ and the build-up of military infrastructure.200 He further argues that both sides are not looking¶ for military supremacy along the border, although ‘they are seeking … to develop the capability to¶ react flexibly on a wide range of challenges’.201 For China, such challenges include combating¶ Tibetan separatism, while for India, Pakistan continues to be a constant source of irritation.¶ On balance, ‘an all-out conflict, although possible, appears improbable because it could spiral into¶ nuclear war and would upset the prevailing harmonious development model adopted by both¶ sides’.202 Hence a combination of conventional and nuclear deterrence serves to keep hostilities¶ in check. Furthermore, as China and India are both ‘vulnerable to potential acts of hostility’, a¶ ‘multi-level soft deterrence’ is now a feature of the relationship.203 In the border dispute, China’s¶ key vulnerability is Tibet and India’s is Pakistan, which makes the potential cost of conflict¶ extremely high for both nations.¶ Thus India’s and China’s military modernisations have created a ‘stronger security¶ interdependence’, suggesting the current security dilemma ‘will not bring peace, but it will lead¶ to a precarious form of stability as the costs of war rise significantly on both sides of the¶ Himalayas’.204 In effect, the military power of both nations will assist in perpetuating the¶ stalemate, wherein the dispute will continue to fester, albeit within bounds.¶ In many ways, the Sino-Indian border dispute highlights the limitations of military power. Yet¶ today, China and India are also bound by ‘the challenge of piloting a third of the world’s¶ population into the global economy’.205 So what does this great economic endeavor mean for¶ their relationship and, more specifically, for the prospects of resolution of the dispute? The next¶ part of this paper examines the role of economic forces and whether or not these forces could aid¶ in breaking the deadlock.

#### Indo-Pak war doesn’t cause extinction – previous studies are flawed

Reisner et al 18 Reisner, J., D’Angelo, G., Koo, E., Even, W., Hecht, M., Hunke, E., … Cooley, J. (2018). Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 123(5), 2752–2772. doi:10.1002/2017jd027331

Fires initiated by warhead detonations can induce mass fires into the local urban environment, producing aerosols and soot particles. While we chose a US city to burn down, we were conservative in terms of producing a quantity of soot at the high end of the range of what might occur in an actual scenario (no rubble) and believe this still to be the case for a city in India or Pakistan. The fire simulation produced a vertical profile of the carbon concentration from the Earth’s surface through the troposphere and into the stratosphere. This profile was input into the same global Earth system model (CESM) used by Mills et al. (2014), at a single point in time. CESM’s global transport and atmospheric chemistry mechanisms complete the chemical transport and evolution for the globe. To quantitatively account for natural and forced variability in the climate system, we created two ensembles, one for the natural, unforced system and a second ensemble using a range of realistic vertical profiles for the BC aerosol forcing, consistent with our detailed fire simulation. The control ensemble was generated using small atmospheric temperature perturbations (Kay et al., 2015). Notably, the overall spread of anomalies in both ensembles is very similar. These ensembles were then used to create “super ensembles” using a © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. statistical emulator, which allows a robust statistical comparison of our simulated results with and without the carbon forcing. Our primary result is the decreased impact on global climate indices, such as global average surface temperature and precipitation, relative to standard scenarios considered in previous work (e.g., Robock et al., 2007a; Stenke et al., 2013; Mills et al., 2014; Pausata et al., 2016). With our finding of substantially less BC aerosol being lofted to stratospheric heights (e.g., over a factor of four less than in most of the scenarios considered by previous studies), these globally averaged anomalies drop to statistically insignificant levels after the first several years (Figures 14 and 16). Our results are generally comparable to those predicted by other studies that considered exchange scenarios in which only about 1 Tg of soot is emitted in the upper troposphere (Robock et al., 2007a; Mills et al., 2008; Stenke et al., 2013). There are more subtle suggestions of regional effects, notably in the extent of the region over which sea surface temperature differences between ensembles remain significant in the final years of simulation (Figure 17). Further work is required to adequately analyze these and other potential regional effects. Historical analysis of several large volcanic eruptions and a recent large fire also supports this result. For example, Timmreck et al. (2010) claim that nonlinear aerosol effects of the Toba Tuff eruption 74,000 years ago helped limit significant global cooling impacts to a two-year time period and that any cooling beyond this time period could be due to other effects. It should be noted that this eruption was estimated to have produced 106 Tg of ash and comparable amounts of other gases, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), while the estimated amount of soot produced by a regional exchange is on the order of 10 Tg, or 5 orders of magnitude smaller than the ash (not including gases) produced by the Toba eruption. Noting that a nuclear exchange is not identical to volcanic events, it has been asserted that BC particles produced by fires should have a greater impact on absorbing solar radiation than even has the significantly larger amounts of ash and various gases produced by large eruptions (e.g., Robock and Toon 2010). Likewise, recent work in analyzing BC emissions from large fires suggests that in such fires, similar to large volcanic eruptions, coating of soot particles with other particles in convective eddies tends to increase their size and hence increase their subsequent rainout (China et al., 2013) before they can reach the stratosphere. In fact, the recent study of Pausata et al. (2016) found that growth of BC aerosol via coagulation with organic carbon significantly reduce the particles’ lifetime in the atmosphere. One source of error in our study is the linkage between HIGRAD-FIRETEC and CESM. In particular, regional climate simulations are needed to fill in the rather large, disparate spatial scales between the two modeling systems and to understand how small-scale, synoptic weather conditions influence the movement of BC particles into the stratosphere. For instance, regional climate simulations should be better able to address the role of turbulent mixing and cloud rainout in dispersing the BC plumes from the various cities over the IndiaPakistan region and hence provide a more realistic source to CESM. Another issue that could be addressed by regional climate simulations is the potential impact of the exchange on the Indian monsoon, e.g. whether the reduction in surface heating is sufficient to either delay or prevent its formation. 5 Conclusions There have recently been new simulations of a limited nuclear exchange in the India-Pakistan region using modern climate models (e.g., Stenke et al., 2013; Mills et al., 2014), that suggest devastating impacts on climate over a decadal time scale, although somewhat less extreme consequences have also been suggested (Pausata et al., 2016). Our team has taken a careful © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. look at some of the assumptions that were used in those studies, using an end-to-end modeling sequence. Our series of simulations started with a nuclear weapon explosion followed by a simulation of the fireball and cloud rise. The key improvement in this study is our simulation of fire spread and soot transport in the environment that results from fires initiated by the fireball. Due to the heat of the fire and of the BC particles that are produced, some of the particles are lofted into the stratosphere. However, our comprehensive urban fire simulations indicate that the bulk of the carbon mass remains in the troposphere, where it is quickly removed from the atmosphere. In most previous work, e.g., that of Stenke et al. (2013) and Mills et al. (2014), all of the soot produced by the urban fires is directly injected near the top of the troposphere, and therefore much of it rises into the stratosphere, where it shades and cools the Earth. In contrast, if we use a realistic vertical profile for the BC aerosols as input to the climate model, the long-term global impacts on climate are much less severe than predicted by previous studies. This was true even with conservative, worst-case assumptions regarding BC production. To assess the significance of differences between a limited nuclear exchange scenario and the control climate, we created an ensemble of forced (BC-loaded) simulations using a range of realistic vertical emission profiles, all consistent with our detailed fire simulation. A similar ensemble generated using small atmospheric temperature perturbations allows a robust statistical comparison of our simulated results with and without the carbon forcing. This analysis demonstrates that while modest, statistically significant differences occur during the first few years, longer-term impacts are unlikely, regional in scope and limited in scale. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect. We also completed a thorough nuclear weapon simulation, determining that it was not necessary for this study, and that the impact on climate of the fireball and cloud rise is negligible. There are other, worse effects than those on climate, however, such as nuclear fallout in the region. Such consequences will be the focus of our future work using both xRage and HIGRAD. Likewise, we will conduct a more comprehensive investigation of regional effects, such as potential consequences for the Asian monsoon during the first few years after the nuclear exchange, in follow-on work. Additionally, although this study examines a possible exchange between India and Pakistan via the injection of soot over this region, our modeling system could be used to examine potential impacts of other regional exchange scenarios.

#### No Indo-Pak war – history proves de-escalation

Ganguly 3/5/19 [Sumit Ganguly is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. Why the India-Pakistan Crisis Isn’t Likely to Turn Nuclear. March 5, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear]

Worried analysts now fear that, since India and Pakistan have breached the informal norm against using air power across the border, they will be unable to prevent further escalation. Hawkish publics in both countries are calling for retaliation. Can the politicians exercise restraint?

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan’s original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation.

Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military’s men and materiel. The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations.

Other nuclear states have also clashed without resorting to nuclear weapons. In 1969, China, then an incipient nuclear weapons state, and the Soviet Union, a full-fledged nuclear power, came to blows over islands in the Ussuri River, which runs along the border between the two countries. Several hundred Chinese and Soviet soldiers died in the confrontation. Making matters worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong had a tendency to run risks and dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons, reportedly telling Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that even if half of mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would survive and imperialism would have been razed to the ground. Yet despite Mao’s views, the crisis ended without going nuclear, thanks in part to the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who took the first step by travelling to Beijing for talks.

There’s reason to believe that the current situation is similar. Pakistan’s overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan’s policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military.

Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the “nuclear revolution,” the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India’s nuclear capabilities.

The decision by India and Pakistan to allow their jets to cross the border represents a major break with the past. Yet so far both countries have taken only limited action. Their principal aim, it appears, is what the political scientist Murray Edelman once referred to as “dramaturgy”—theatrical gestures designed to please domestic audiences. Now that both sides have gone through the motions, neither is likely to escalate any further. Peering into the nuclear abyss concentrates the mind remarkably.