# debateLA R3 – 1NC v Strake Jesuit KS

speechdrop - https://speechdrop.net/MMJFLm

## 1

#### Interp – “the” is a definite article that refers to one group. Affs must not specify a subset of appropriation by private entities.

**Rinnert et al 86,** Professor Emeritus at Hiroshima City University, Paper presented at the Japan Association of Language Teachers' International Conference on Language Teaching and Learning (Teaching the English Article System, Nov 1986, Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Descriptive (141) -- Tests/Evaluation Instruments (160)) KD

PRINCIPLE 4 MODIFIERS BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOUN Very often, the uniqueness of the thing being talked about is indicated by adding limiting modifiers to the noun being used to refer to that thing. This is why superlative noun phrases, for example, are always preceded by the. a. the best students in the class... b. the highest mountain in the world... c. the person that I love most... But uniqueness is not always indicated by superlatives; there are many other ways. In effect, **when the meaning of the modifier limits the meaning of the noun so that it can refer to just one thing or things**, then, as usual, **the is used in front of the noun**, e.g the only way to finish this assignment on time... e. the very same day... f. the girl that we met at the party yesterday In many cases, the use of the before a noun qualified by limiting modifiers can be seen as another "shortcut" for the writer. Instead of saying, "There are people. They live in China." the writer can simply say, "The people of China..." The following examples are similar: g. the student in the corner... (There is a student; the student is in the corner.) h. the man who came by... (There is a man; he came by.) i. the idea that you gave us... (There is an idea; you gave it to us.) j. the woman watching us... (There is a woman; she is watching us.) k. the people interested in economy... (There are people; they are interested in economy.) (See Appendix B, sample exercises 13 and 14.) **If a writer is talking about something** in general (i.e. non-unique), the indefinite article is used, no matter how many times it is referred to again. But if it is made **specific with limiting modifiers, then the definite aritcle is used**. For example, when the word curiosity in the following passage is used in a general sense, the indefinite article (0) is used; however, when curiosity is limited to a specific kind by the use of limiting modifiers, the definite article the is used. We all need 0 curiosity. 0 curiosity is important because it can stimulate us to look for new truths and learn new lessons. Unfortunately, much of education stifles 0 curiosity. **For example, the curiosity to know** how things work is often discouraged by adults who grow tired of children's constant questioning. These adults have long ago lost the curiosity they once felt as children. It sometimes takes furhter education to stimulate 0 curiosity again for such people. (See Appendix B, exercises 15-18.)

#### Vote neg—

#### 1] Limits— hundreds of types of appropriation that the aff can pick from and limitless combinations underlimits the topic and destroys neg prep since there’s no unifying DA against mining, space tourism, satellites, space col, and debris -- aff gets infinite prep and sets terms for debate so DAs and PICs are inherently reactive and its absurd to say potential neg abuse justifies the aff being flat-out non-T-- limits outweighs – reciprocal prep burden and allows for nuanced engagement

#### 2] Textuality is an independent voter—it determines which interps your ballot can endorse by providing the only salient focal point for debates

#### DTD on T – the debate shouldn’t have happened if they were abusive

#### Competing Interps on T since its binary and a question of models – Good enough isn’t good—there can be no reasonable interp of what the topic actually means

#### No RVIs on T – 1] Illogical—T is a gateway issue, winning T is meeting a baseline to have the debate to begin with 2] T is reactionary, they shouldn’t win for meeting their preround burden 3] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on theory kills substance education and neg flex—o/w on real world

## 2

#### Greater regulation of private space companies leads to less innovation and entrepreneurship

Lamine et al 21 (Wadid Lamine1 Alistair Anderson2 Sarah Jack3 Alain Fayolle4 1 Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa 2 Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University 3 House of Innovation, Stockholm School of Economics 4 Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship Activities, University of Cagliari ), “New article examines entrepreneurship in the space industry”, Stockholm School of Economics, 2-24-21, <https://www.hhs.se/en/about-us/news/hoi-news/2021/new-article-examines-entrepreneurship-in-the-space-industry/> NT

The space industry is generally perceived as very innovative. Normally, one might expect innovative environments to be conducive to entrepreneurship. **However, the space industry seems to be an exception owing to the highly regulative impact of institutions operating within it.** Generally, institutions influence entrepreneurship and set out the “rules of the game” that shape enterprise or even prevent it. Currently, within academia, there is little research examining how institutions impact on entrepreneurship at an industry level. Studying entrepreneurship in the context of the space industry offers the opportunity to deepen academia’s understanding of industry-specific conditions that form the rules of the game for innovation. New research, conducted in part at the House of Innovation, seeks to understand how **entrepreneurship in the space industry is enabled and constrained by institutions**, and what this implies for the freedom to be entrepreneurial. The research findings suggest that the institutional framework has a profoundly negative effect on start-ups and growth. **Formal institutional factors in the space industry discourage entrepreneurial initiatives and stymie the growth of small firms.** This institutional context favors the established firms that dominate the sector, challenging entrepreneurship. To counteract this negative environment, the researchers recommend that policymakers: (1) strengthen private-public-partnership arrangements; (2) implement policies to attract venture capitalists to transform and reinvigorate the upstream segment; and (3) design specific incubation mechanisms for space start-ups. With these changes in place, the researchers remain confident that the space context could evolve into a wonderful launchpad from which entrepreneurship can take off. **These findings are based on a ten-year study** originating in an extended case study of a smaller entrepreneurial space industry firm. The case study was eventually extended to include other start-up founders and CEOs of existing businesses. Researchers then tapped into the perceptions of business angels and incubator managers and interviewed key influencers in large space companies and space agencies. These case studies and interviews combined yielded an appreciation of how different space industry stakeholders make sense of and inform their organizations’ entrepreneurial role and practices.

#### Space-based solar power (SBSP) stations are key to improving energy efficiency in the green transition to renewables.

Hughes and Soldini 20 (Amanda Jane Hughes is an engineer, qualified teacher and passionate science communicator. She have a BSc in Astrophysics and PhD in Solar Energy Engineering, and currently is a lecturer at the University of Liverpool. Dr. Stefania Soldini, Lecturer in Aerospace Engineering, in the Department of Mechanical, Materials and Aerospace Engineering, University of Liverpool, UK since 2019. ), “Solar power stations in space could be the answer to our energy needs”, The Conversation, 11-19-20, <https://theconversation.com/solar-power-stations-in-space-could-be-the-answer-to-our-energy-needs-150007> NT

It sounds like science fiction: **giant solar power stations floating in space that beam down enormous amounts of energy to Earth.** And for a long time, the concept – first developed by the Russian scientist, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, in the 1920s – was mainly an inspiration for writers. A century later, however, scientists are making huge strides in turning the concept into reality. The European Space Agency has realised the potential of these efforts and is now looking to fund such projects, predicting that **the first industrial resource we will get from space is “beamed power”.** **Climate change is the greatest challenge of our time**, so there’s a lot at stake. From rising global temperatures to shifting weather patterns, the impacts of climate change are already being felt around the globe. Overcoming this challenge will require radical changes to how we generate and consume energy. Renewable energy technologies have developed drastically in recent years, with improved efficiency and lower cost. But one major barrier to their uptake is the fact that they don’t provide a constant supply of energy. Wind and solar farms only produce energy when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining – but we need electricity around the clock, every day. Ultimately, we need a way to store energy on a large scale before we can make the switch to renewable sources. Benefits of space **A possible way around this would be to generate solar energy in space.** There are many advantages to this. **A space-based solar power station could orbit to face the Sun 24 hours a day. The Earth’s atmosphere also absorbs and reflects some of the Sun’s light, so solar cells above the atmosphere will receive more sunlight and produce more energy.** But one of the key challenges to overcome is how to assemble, launch and deploy such large structures. A single solar power station may have to be as much as 10 kilometres squared in area – equivalent to 1,400 football pitches. Using lightweight materials will also be critical, as the biggest expense will be the cost of launching the station into space on a rocket. One proposed solution is to develop a swarm of thousands of smaller satellites that will come together and configure to form a single, large solar generator. In 2017, researchers at the California Institute of Technology outlined designs for a modular power station, consisting of thousands of ultralight solar cell tiles. They also demonstrated a prototype tile weighing just 280 grams per square metre, similar to the weight of card. Recently, developments in manufacturing, such as 3D printing, are also being looked at for this application. At the University of Liverpool, we are exploring new manufacturing techniques for printing ultralight solar cells on to solar sails. **A solar sail is a foldable, lightweight and highly reflective membrane capable of harnessing the effect of the Sun’s radiation pressure to propel a spacecraft forward without fuel.** We are exploring how to embed solar cells on solar sail structures to create large, fuel-free solar power stations. These methods would enable us to construct the power stations in space. Indeed, it could one day be possible to manufacture and deploy units in space from the International Space Station or the future lunar gateway station that will orbit the Moon. Such devices could in fact help provide power on the Moon. The possibilities don’t end there. While we are currently reliant on materials from Earth to build power stations, scientists are also considering using resources from space for manufacturing, such as materials found on the Moon. Another major challenge will be getting the power transmitted back to Earth. The plan is to convert electricity from the solar cells into energy waves and use electromagnetic fields to transfer them down to an antenna on the Earth’s surface. The antenna would then convert the waves back into electricity. Researchers led by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency have already developed designs and demonstrated an orbiter system which should be able to do this. There is still a lot of work to be done in this field, but the aim is that solar power stations in space will become a reality in the coming decades. **Researchers in China have designed a system called Omega, which they aim to have operational by 2050. This system should be capable of supplying 2GW of power into Earth’s grid at peak performance, which is a huge amount.** To produce that much power with solar panels on Earth, you would need more than six million of them. Smaller solar power satellites, like those designed to power lunar rovers, could be operational even sooner. Across the globe, the scientific community is committing time and effort to the development of solar power stations in space. Our hope is that they could one day be a vital tool in our fight against climate change.

#### Private innovation on reusable rockets is key to SBSP

Chi 20 (Joanna Chi, independent writer at Medium), “Space-Based Solar Power: The Future of Renewable Energy”, Medium, 11-22-20, <https://medium.com/swlh/space-based-solar-power-804e301c8af2> NT

Requirements for SBSP To make space-based solar power feasible on a global scale, there are two main technologies that we need. **First, the launch vehicles to get materials into space need to be low-cost and eco-friendly.** Most of the rockets that are currently used to deliver payloads are expendable, and they are extremely expensive and prone to causing pollution. As such, reusable rockets are vital to a sustainable SBSP model**.** Several private companies, including SpaceX, **are in the process of developing cheaper, reusable rockets.** Once we have the means to launch parts into space, the second facet of building satellite solar panels centers around the in-orbit construction of solar satellites. To collect the amount of energy that we need, satellite solar panels will need to be much larger than even the ISS, making them the largest spacecraft ever built. Luckily, satellite solar panels will also be much simpler to build than the ISS, as they would be built from many identical parts. Solar panels on the ISS cover about 2.5 square km — some SBSP satellites would be over twice this size. **In the long term, investments into space infrastructures such as asteroid mining may allow the construction of spacecraft to be completely removed from Earth**, which would require only the energy receiving centers of SBSP to be built on Earth. For now, though, the main technologies needed to build satellite solar panels can be found on Earth, and they are reasonably attainable within the next few decades.

#### Solving warming is not all-or-nothing – every additional fraction of a degree is irreversible and costs millions of lives—prefer IPCC assessments that are the gold standard for warming consensus

David Wallace-Wells 19 [National Fellow at New America. He is deputy editor of New York Magazine, where he also writes frequently about climate and the near future of science and technology, including his widely read and debated 2017 cover story on worst-case scenarios for global warming], *The Uninhabitable Earth: A Story of the Future* (Kindle Edition: Allen Lane, 2019), pg. 8-30, beckert

* Every degree key – each bit 🡪 hundreds of millions of lives
* IPCC🡪best ev b/c conservative estimate + still really big impact
* Now key – not reversible, feedback loops 🡪 speeds up later

There is almost no chance we will avoid that scenario. The Kyoto Protocol achieved, practically, nothing; in the twenty years since, despite all of our climate advocacy and legislation and progress on green energy, we have produced more emissions than in the twenty years before. In 2016, the Paris accords established two degrees as a global goal, and, to read our newspapers, that level of warming remains something like the scariest scenario it is responsible to consider; just a few years later, with no single industrial nation on track to meet its Paris commitments, two degrees looks more like a best-case outcome, at present hard to credit, with an entire bell curve of more horrific possibilities extending beyond it and yet shrouded, delicately, from public view.28 For those telling stories about climate, such horrific possibilities—and the fact that we had squandered our chance of landing anywhere on the better half of that curve—had become somehow unseemly to consider. The reasons are almost too many to count, and so half-formed they might better be called impulses. We chose not to discuss a world warmed beyond two degrees out of decency, perhaps; or simple fear; or fear of fearmongering; or technocratic faith, which is really market faith; or deference to partisan debates or even partisan priorities; or skepticism about the environmental Left of the kind I’d always had; or disinterest in the fates of distant ecosystems like I’d also always had. We felt confusion about the science and its many technical terms and hard-to-parse numbers, or at least an intuition that others would be easily confused about the science and its many technical terms and hard-to-parse numbers. We suffered from slowness apprehending the speed of change, or semi-conspiratorial confidence in the responsibility of global elites and their institutions, or obeisance toward those elites and their institutions, whatever we thought of them. Perhaps we felt unable to really trust scarier projections because we’d only just heard about warming, we thought, and things couldn’t possibly have gotten that much worse just since the first Inconvenient Truth; or because we liked driving our cars and eating our beef and living as we did in every other way and didn’t want to think too hard about that; or because we felt so “postindustrial” we couldn’t believe we were still drawing material breaths from fossil fuel furnaces. Perhaps it was because we were so sociopathically good at collating bad news into a sickening evolving sense of what constituted “normal,” or because we looked outside and things seemed still okay. Because we were bored with writing, or reading, the same story again and again, because climate was so global and therefore nontribal it suggested only the corniest politics, because we didn’t yet appreciate how fully it would ravage our lives, and because, selfishly, we didn’t mind destroying the planet for others living elsewhere on it or those not yet born who would inherit it from us, outraged. Because we had too much faith in the teleological shape of history and the arrow of human progress to countenance the idea that the arc of history would bend toward anything but environmental justice, too. Because when we were being really honest with ourselves we already thought of the world as a zero-sum resource competition and believed that whatever happened we were probably going to continue to be the victors, relatively speaking anyway, advantages of class being what they are and our own luck in the natalist lottery being what it was. Perhaps we were too panicked about our own jobs and industries to fret about the future of jobs and industry; or perhaps we were also really afraid of robots or were too busy looking at our new phones; or perhaps, however easy we found the apocalypse reflex in our culture and the path of panic in our politics, we truly had a good-news bias when it came to the big picture; or, really, who knows why—there are so many aspects to the climate kaleidoscope that transforms our intuitions about environmental devastation into an uncanny complacency that it can be hard to pull the whole picture of climate distortion into focus. But we simply wouldn’t, or couldn’t, or anyway didn’t look squarely in the face ﻿of the science. This is not a book about the science of warming; it is about what warming means to the way we live on this planet. But what does that science say? It is complicated research, because it is built on two layers of uncertainty: what humans will do, mostly in terms of emitting greenhouse gases, and how the climate will respond, both through straightforward heating and a variety of more complicated, and sometimes contradictory, feedback loops. But even shaded by those uncertainty bars it is also very clear research, in fact terrifyingly clear. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offers the gold-standard assessments of the state of the planet and the likely trajectory for climate change—gold-standard, in part, because it is conservative, integrating only new research that passes the threshold of inarguability. A new report is expected in 2022, but the most recent one says that if we take action on emissions soon, instituting immediately all of the commitments made in the Paris accords but nowhere yet actually implemented, we are likely to get about 3.2 degrees of warming, or about three times as much warming as the planet has seen since the beginning of industrialization—bringing the unthinkable collapse of the planet’s ice sheets not just into the realm of the real but into the present.29, 30 That would eventually flood not just Miami and Dhaka but Shanghai and Hong Kong and a hundred other cities around the world.31 The tipping point for that collapse is said to be around two degrees; according to several recent studies, even a rapid cessation of carbon emissions could bring us that amount of warming by the end of the century.32 The assaults of climate change do not end at 2100 just because most modeling, by convention, sunsets at that point. This is why some studying global warming call the hundred years to follow the “century of hell.”33 Climate change is fast, much faster than it seems we have the capacity to recognize and acknowledge; but it is also long, almost longer than we can truly imagine. In reading about warming, you will often come across analogies from the planetary record: the last time the planet was this much warmer, the logic runs, sea levels were here. These conditions are not coincidences. The sea level was there largely because the planet was that much warmer, and the geologic record is the best model we have for understanding the very complicated climate system and gauging just how much damage will come from turning up the temperature by two or four or six degrees. Which is why it is especially concerning that recent research into the deep history of the planet suggests that our current climate models may be underestimating the amount of warming we are due for in 2100 by as much as half.34 In other words, temperatures could rise, ultimately, by as much as double what the IPCC predicts. Hit our Paris emissions targets and we may still get four degrees of warming, meaning a green Sahara and the planet’s tropical forests transformed into fire-dominated savanna.35 The authors of one recent paper suggested the warming could be more dramatic still—slashing our emissions could still bring us to four or five degrees Celsius, a scenario they said would pose severe risks to the habitability of the entire planet. “Hothouse Earth,” they called it.36 Because these numbers are so small, we tend to trivialize the differences between them—one, two, four, five. Human experience and memory offer no good analogy for how we should think of those thresholds, but, as with world wars or recurrences of cancer, you don’t want to see even one. At two degrees, the ice sheets will begin their collapse, 400 million more people will suffer from water scarcity, major cities in the equatorial band of the planet will become unlivable, and even in the northern latitudes heat waves will kill thousands each summer.37, 38 There would be thirty-two times as many extreme heat waves in India, and each would last five times as long, exposing ninety-three times more people.39 This is our best-case scenario. At three degrees, southern Europe would be in permanent drought, and the average drought in Central America would last nineteen months longer and in the Caribbean twenty-one months longer. In northern Africa, the figure is sixty months longer—five years. The areas burned each year by wildfires would double in the Mediterranean and sextuple, or more, in the United States. At four degrees, there would be eight million more cases of dengue fever each year in Latin America alone and close to annual global food crises.41 There could be 9 percent more heat-related deaths.40 Damages from river flooding would grow thirtyfold in Bangladesh, twentyfold in India, and as much as sixtyfold in the United Kingdom. In certain places, six climate-driven natural disasters could strike simultaneously, and, globally, damages could pass $600 trillion—more than twice the wealth as exists in the world today. Conflict and warfare could double. Even if we pull the planet up short of two degrees by 2100, we will be left with an atmosphere that contains 500 parts per million of carbon—perhaps more. The last time that was the case, sixteen million years ago, the planet was not two degrees warmer; it was somewhere between five and eight, giving the planet about 130 feet of sea-level rise, enough to draw a new American coastline as far west as I-95.42 Some of these processes take thousands of years to unfold, but they are also irreversible, and therefore effectively permanent. You might hope to simply reverse climate change; you can’t. It will outrun all of us. This is part of what makes climate change what the theorist Timothy Morton calls a “hyperobject”—a conceptual fact so large and complex that, like the internet, it can never be properly comprehended.43 There are many features of climate change—its size, its scope, its brutality—that, alone, satisfy this definition; together they might elevate it into a higher and more incomprehensible conceptual ﻿category yet. But time is perhaps the most mind-bending feature, the worst outcomes arriving so long from now that we reflexively discount their reality. Yet those outcomes promise to mock us and our own sense of the real in return. The ecological dramas we have unleashed through our land use and by burning fossil fuels—slowly for about a century and very rapidly for only a few decades—will play out over many millennia, in fact over a longer span of time than humans have even been around, performed in part by creatures and in environments we do not yet even know, ushered onto the world stage by the force of warming. And so, in a convenient cognitive bargain, we have chosen to consider climate change only as it will present itself this century. By 2100, the United Nations says, we are due for about 4.5 degrees of warming, following the path we are on today.44 That is, farther from the Paris track than the Paris track is from the two-degree threshold of catastrophe, which it more than doubles. As Naomi Oreskes has noted, there are far too many uncertainties in our models to take their predictions as gospel.45 Just running those models many times, as Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman do in their book Climate Shock, yields an 11 percent chance we overshoot six degrees.46 Recent work by the Nobel laureate William Nordhaus suggests that better-than-anticipated economic growth means better than one-in-three odds that our emissions will exceed the U.47N.’s worst-case “business as usual” scenario. In other words, a temperature rise of five degrees or possibly more. The upper end of the probability curve put forward by the U.N. to estimate the end-of-the-century, business-as-usual scenario—the worst-case outcome of a worst-case emissions path—puts us at eight degrees. At that temperature, humans at the equator and in the tropics would not be able to move around outside without dying.48 In that world, eight degrees warmer, direct heat effects would be the least of it: the oceans would eventually swell two hundred feet higher, flooding what are now two-thirds of the world’s major cities; hardly any land on the planet would be capable of efficiently producing any of the food we now eat; forests would be roiled by rolling storms of fire, and coasts would be punished by more and more intense hurricanes; the suffocating hood of tropical disease would reach northward to enclose parts of what we now call the Arctic; probably about a third of the planet would be made unlivable by direct heat; and what are today literally unprecedented and intolerable droughts and heat waves would be the quotidian condition of whatever human life was able to endure.49, 50, 51, 52 We will, almost certainly, avoid eight degrees of warming; in fact, several recent papers have suggested the climate is actually less sensitive to emissions than we’d thought, and that even the upper bound of a business-as-usual path would bring us to about five degrees, with a likely destination around four.53 But five degrees is nearly as unthinkable as eight, and four degrees not much better: the world in a permanent food deficit, the Alps as arid as the Atlas Mountains.54 Between that scenario and the world we live in now lies only the open question of human response. Some amount of further warming is already baked in, thanks to the protracted processes by which the planet adapts to greenhouse gas. But all of those paths projected from the present—to two degrees, to three, to four, five, or even eight—will be carved overwhelmingly by what we choose to do now. There is nothing stopping us from four degrees other than our own will to change course, which we have yet to display. Because the planet is as big as it is, and as ecologically diverse; because humans have proven themselves an adaptable species, and will likely continue to adapt to outmaneuver a lethal threat; and because the devastating effects of warming will soon become too extreme to ignore, or deny, if they haven’t already; because of all that, it is unlikely that climate change will render the planet truly uninhabitable. But if we do nothing about carbon emissions, if the next thirty years of industrial activity trace the same arc upward as the last thirty years have, whole regions will become unlivable by any standard we have today as soon as the end of this century. ﻿A few years ago, E. O. Wilson proposed a term, “Half-Earth,” to help us think through how we might adapt to the pressures of a changing climate, letting nature run its rehabilitative course on half the planet and sequestering humanity in the remaining, habitable half of the world.55 The fraction may be smaller than that, possibly considerably, and not by choice; the subtitle of his book was Our Planet’s Fight for Life. On longer timescales, the even-bleaker outcome is possible, too—the livable planet darkening as it approaches a human dusk. It would take a spectacular coincidence of bad choices and bad luck to make that kind of zero earth possible within our lifetime. But the fact that we have brought that nightmare eventuality into play at all is perhaps the overwhelming cultural and historical fact of the modern era—what historians of the future will likely study about us, and what we’d have hoped the generations before ours would have had the foresight to focus on, too. Whatever we do to stop warming, and however aggressively we act to protect ourselves from its ravages, we will have pulled the devastation of human life on Earth into view—close enough that we can see clearly what it would look like and know, with some degree of precision, how it will punish our children and grandchildren. Close enough, in fact, that we are already beginning to feel its effects ourselves, when we do not turn away. ﻿It is almost hard to believe just how much has happened and how quickly. In the late summer of 2017, three major hurricanes arose in the Atlantic at once, proceeding at first along the same route as though they were battalions of an army on the march.56 Hurricane Harvey, when it struck Houston, delivered such epic rainfall it was described in some areas as a “500,000-year event”—meaning that we should expect that amount of rain to hit that area once every five hundred millennia.57 Sophisticated consumers of environmental news have already learned how meaningless climate change has rendered such terms, which were meant to describe storms that had a 1-in-500,000 chance of striking in any given year. But the figures do help in this way: to remind us just how far global warming has already taken us from any natural-disaster benchmark our grandparents would have recognized. To dwell on the more common 500-year figure just for a moment, it would mean a storm that struck once during the entire history of the Roman Empire. Five hundred years ago, there were no English settlements across the Atlantic, so we are talking about a storm that should hit just once as Europeans arrived and established colonies, as colonists fought a revolution and Americans a civil war and two world wars, as their descendants established an empire of cotton on the backs of slaves, freed them, and then brutalized their descendants, industrialized and postindustrialized, triumphed in the Cold War, ushered in the “end of history,” and witnessed, just a decade later, its dramatic return. One storm in all that time, is what the meteorological record has taught us to expect. Just one. Harvey was the third such flood to hit Houston since 2015.58 And the storm struck, in places, with an intensity that was supposed to be a thousand times rarer still. That same season, an Atlantic hurricane hit Ireland, 45 million were flooded from their homes in South Asia, and unprecedented wildfires tilled much of California into ash.59, 60 And then there was the new category of quotidian nightmare, climate change inventing the once-unimaginable category of obscure natural disasters—crises so large they would once have been inscribed in folklore for centuries today passing across our horizons ignored, overlooked, or forgotten. In 2016, a “thousand-year flood” drowned small-town Ellicott City, Maryland, to take but one example almost at random; it was followed, two years later, in the same small town, by another.61 One week that summer of 2018, dozens of places all over the world were hit with record heat waves, from Denver to Burlington to Ottawa; from Glasgow to Shannon to Belfast; from Tbilisi, in Georgia, and Yerevan, in Armenia, to whole swaths of southern Russia.62 The previous month, the daytime temperature of one city in Oman reached above 121 degrees Fahrenheit, and did not drop below 108 all night, and in Quebec, Canada, fifty-four died from the heat.63 That same week, one hundred major wildfires burned in the American West, including one in California that grew 4,000 acres in one day, and another, in Colorado, that produced a volcano-like 300-foot eruption of flames, swallowing an entire subdivision and inventing a new term, “fire tsunami,” along the way.64, 65, 66 On the other side of the planet, biblical rains flooded Japan, where 1.2 million were evacuated from their homes.67 Later that summer, Typhoon Mangkhut forced the evacuation of 2.45 million from mainland China, the same week that Hurricane Florence struck the Carolinas, turning the port city of Wilmington briefly into an island and flooding large parts of the state with hog manure and coal ash.68, 69, 70 Along the way, the winds of Florence produced dozens of tornadoes across the region.71 The previous month, in India, the state of Kerala was hit with its worst floods in almost a hundred years.72 That October, a hurricane in the Pacific wiped Hawaii’s East Island entirely off the map.73 And in November, which has traditionally marked the beginning of the rainy season in California, the state was hit instead with the deadliest fire in its history—the Camp Fire, which scorched several hundred square miles outside of Chico, killing dozens and leaving many more missing in a place called, proverbially, Paradise.74 The devastation was so complete, you could almost forget the Woolsey Fire, closer to Los Angeles, which burned at the same time and forced the sudden evacuation of 170,000. It is tempting to look at these strings of disasters and think, Climate change is here. And one response to seeing things long predicted actually come to pass is to feel that we have settled into a new era, with everything transformed. In fact, that is how California governor Jerry Brown described the state of things in the midst of the state’s wildfire disaster: “a new normal.”75 The truth is actually much scarier. That is, the end of normal; never normal again. We have already exited the state of environmental conditions that allowed the human animal to evolve in the first place, in an unsure and unplanned bet on just what that animal can endure. The climate system that raised us, and raised everything we now know as human culture and civilization, is now, like a parent, dead. And the climate system we have been observing for the last several years, the one that has battered the planet again and again, is not our bleak future in preview. It would be more precise to say that it is a product of our recent climate past, already passing behind us into a dustbin of environmental nostalgia. There is no longer any such thing as a “natural disaster,” but not only will things get worse; technically speaking, they have already gotten worse. Even if, miraculously, humans immediately ceased emitting carbon, we’d still be due for some additional warming from just the stuff we’ve put into the air already. And of course, with global emissions still increasing, we’re very far from zeroing out on carbon, and therefore very far from stalling climate change. The devastation we are now seeing all around us is a beyond-best-case scenario for the future of warming and all the climate disasters it will bring. ﻿What that means is that we have not, at all, arrived at a new equilibrium. It is more like we’ve taken one step out on the plank off a pirate ship. Perhaps because of the exhausting false debate about whether climate change is “real,” too many of us have developed a misleading impression that its effects are binary. But global warming is not “yes” or “no,” nor is it “today’s weather forever” or “doomsday tomorrow.” It is a function that gets worse over time as long as we continue to produce greenhouse gas. And so the experience of life in a climate transformed by human activity is not just a matter of stepping from one stable ecosystem into another, somewhat worse one, no matter how degraded or destructive the transformed climate is. The effects will grow and build as the planet continues to warm: from 1 degree to 1.5 to almost certainly 2 degrees and beyond. The last few years of climate disasters may look like about as much as the planet can take. In fact, we are only just entering our brave new world, one that collapses below us as soon as we set foot on it. Many of these new disasters arrived accompanied by debate about their cause—about how much of what they have done to us comes from what we have done to the planet. For those hoping to better understand precisely how a monstrous hurricane arises out of a placid ocean, these inquiries are worthwhile, but for all practical purposes the debate yields no real meaning or insight. A particular hurricane may owe 40 percent of its force to anthropogenic global warming, the evolving models might suggest, and a particular drought may be half again as bad as it might have been in the seventeenth century. But climate change is not a discrete clue we can find at the scene of a local crime—one hurricane, one heat wave, one famine, one war. Global warming isn’t a perpetrator; it’s a conspiracy. We all live within climate and within all the changes we have produced in it, which enclose us all and everything we do. If hurricanes of a certain force are now five times as likely as in the pre-Columbian Caribbean, it is parsimonious to the point of triviality to argue over whether this one or that one was “climate-caused.” All hurricanes now unfold in the weather systems we have wrecked on their behalf, which is why there are more of them, and why they are stronger. The same is true for wildfires: this one or that one may be “caused” by a cookout or a downed power line, but each is burning faster, bigger, and longer because of global warming, which gives no reprieve to fire season. Climate change isn’t something happening here or there but everywhere, and all at once. And unless we choose to halt it, it will never stop. Over the past few decades, the term “Anthropocene” has climbed out of academic discourse and into the popular imagination—a name given to the geologic era we live in now, and a way to signal that it is a new era, defined on the wall chart of deep history by human intervention. One problem with the term is that it implies a conquest of nature, even echoing the biblical “dominion.” But however sanguine you might be about the proposition that we have already ravaged the natural world, which we surely have, it is another thing entirely to consider the possibility that we have only provoked it, engineering first in ignorance and then in denial a climate system that will now go to war with us for many centuries, perhaps until it destroys us. That is what Wally Broecker, the avuncular oceanographer, means when he calls the planet an “angry beast.”76 You could also go with “war machine.” Each day we arm it more. The assaults will not be discrete—this is another climate delusion. Instead, they will produce a new kind of cascading violence, waterfalls and avalanches of devastation, the planet pummeled again and again, with increasing intensity and in ways that build on each other and undermine our ability to respond, uprooting much of the landscape we have taken for granted, for centuries, as the stable foundation on which we walk, build homes and highways, shepherd our children through schools and into adulthood under the promise of safety—and subverting the promise that the world we have engineered and built for ourselves, out of nature, will also protect us against it, rather than conspiring with disaster against its makers. Consider those California wildfires. In March 2018, Santa Barbara County issued mandatory evacuation orders for those living in Montecito, Goleta, Santa Barbara, Summerland, and Carpinteria—where the previous December’s fires had hit hardest. It was the fourth evacuation order precipitated by a climate event in the county in just three months, but only the first had been for fire.77 The others were for mudslides ushered into possibility by that fire, one of the toniest communities in the most glamorous state of the world’s preeminently powerful country upended by fear that their toy vineyards and hobby stables, their world-class beaches and lavishly funded public schools, would be inundated by rivers of mud, the community as thoroughly ravaged as the sprawling camps of temporary shacks housing Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in the monsoon region of Bangladesh.78 It was. More than a dozen died, including a toddler swept away by mud and carried miles down the mountainslope to the sea; schools closed and highways flooded, foreclosing the routes of emergency vehicles and making the community an inland island, as if behind a blockade, choked off by a mud noose.79 Some climate cascades will unfold at the global level—cascades so large their effects will seem, by the curious legerdemain of environmental change, imperceptible. A warming planet leads to melting Arctic ice, which means less sunlight reflected back to the sun and more absorbed by a planet warming faster still, which means an ocean less able to absorb atmospheric carbon and so a planet warming faster still. A warming planet will also melt Arctic permafrost, which contains 1.8 trillion tons of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in the earth’s atmosphere, and some of which, when it thaws and is released, may evaporate as methane, which is thirty-four times as powerful a greenhouse-gas warming blanket as carbon dioxide when judged on the timescale of a century; when﻿ judged on the timescale of two decades, it is eighty-six times as powerful.80, 81 A hotter planet is, on net, bad for plant life, which means what is called “forest dieback”—the decline and retreat of jungle basins as big as countries and woods that sprawl for so many miles they used to contain whole folklores—which means a dramatic stripping-back of the planet’s natural ability to absorb carbon and turn it into oxygen, which means still hotter temperatures, which means more dieback, and so on. Higher temperatures means more forest fires means fewer trees means less carbon absorption, means more carbon in the atmosphere, means a hotter planet still—and so on. A warmer planet means more water vapor in the atmosphere, and, water vapor being a greenhouse gas, this brings higher temperatures still—and so on. Warmer oceans can absorb less heat, which means more stays in the air, and contain less oxygen, which is doom for phytoplankton—which does for the ocean what plants do on land, eating carbon and producing oxygen—which leaves us with more carbon, which heats the planet further. And so on. These are the systems climate scientists call “feedbacks”; there are more.82 Some work in the other direction, moderating climate change. But many more point toward an acceleration of warming, should we trigger them. And just how these complicated, countervailing systems will interact—what effects will be exaggerated and what undermined by feedbacks—is unknown, which pulls a dark cloud of uncertainty over any effort to plan ahead for the climate future. We know what a best-case outcome for climate change looks like, however unrealistic, because it quite closely resembles the world as we live on it today. But we have not yet begun to contemplate those cascades that may bring us to the infernal range of the bell curve. Other cascades are regional, collapsing on human communities and buckling them where they fall. These can be literal cascades—human-triggered avalanches are on the rise, with 50,000 people killed by avalanches globally between 2004 and 2016.83 In Switzerland, climate change has unleashed a whole new kind, thanks to what are called “rain-on-snow” events, which also caused the overflow of the Oroville Dam in Northern California and the 2013 flood of Alberta, Canada, with damages approaching $5 billion.84 But there are other kinds of cascade, too. Climate-driven water shortages or crop failures push climate refugees into nearby regions already struggling with resource scarcity. Sea-level rise inundates cropland with more and more saltwater flooding, transforming agricultural areas into brackish sponges no longer able to adequately feed those living off them; flooding power plants, knocking regions offline just as electricity may be needed most; and crippling chemical and nuclear plants, which, malfunctioning, breathe out their toxic plumes. The rains that followed the Camp Fire flooded the tent cities hastily assembled for the first disaster’s refugees. In the case of the Santa Barbara mudslides, drought produced a state full of dry brush ripe for a spark; then a year of anomalously monsoonish rain produced only more growth, and wildfires tore through the landscape, leaving a mountainside without much plant life to hold in place the millions of tons of loose earth that make up the towering coastal range where the clouds tend to gather and the rain first falls. Some of those watching from afar wondered, incredulously, how a mudslide could kill so many. The answer is, the same way as hurricanes or tornadoes—by weaponizing the environment, whether “man-made” or “natural.” Wind disasters do not kill by wind, however brutal it gets, but by tugging trees out of earth and transforming them into clubs, making power lines into loose whips and electrified nooses, collapsing homes on cowering residents, and turning cars into tumbling boulders. And they kill slowly, too, by cutting off food delivery and medical supplies, making roads impassable even to first responders, knocking out phone lines and cell towers so that the ill and elderly must suffer, and hope to endure, in silence and without aid. Most of the world is not Santa Barbara, with its Mission-style impasto of infinite-seeming wealth, and in the coming decades many of the most punishing climate horrors will indeed hit those least able to respond and recover. This is what is often called the problem of environmental justice; a sharper, less gauzy phrase would be “climate caste system.” The problem is acute within countries, even wealthy ones, where the poorest are those who live in the marshes, the swamps, the floodplains, the inadequately irrigated places with the most vulnerable infrastructure—altogether an unwitting environmental apartheid. Just in Texas, 500,000 poor Latinos live in shantytowns called “colonias” with no drainage systems to deal with increased flooding.85 The cleavage is even sharper globally, where the poorest countries will suffer more in our hot new world. In fact, with one exception—Australia—countries with lower GDPs will warm the most.86 That is notwithstanding the fact that much of the global south has not, to this point, defiled the atmosphere of the planet all that much. This is one of the many historical ironies of climate change that would better be called cruelties, so merciless is the suffering they will inflict. But disproportionately as it will fall on the world’s least, the devastation of global warming cannot be easily quarantined in the developing world, as much as those in the Northern Hemisphere would probably, and not to our credit, prefer it. Climate disaster is too indiscriminate for that. In fact, the belief that climate could be plausibly governed, or managed, by any institution or human instrument presently at hand is another wide-eyed climate delusion. The planet survived many millennia without anything approaching a world government, in fact endured nearly the entire span of human civilization that way, organized into competitive tribes and fiefdoms and kingdoms and nation-states, and only began to build something resembling a cooperative blueprint, very piecemeal, after brutal world wars—in the ﻿form of the League of Nations and United Nations and European Union and even the market fabric of globalization, whatever its flaws still a vision of cross-national participation, imbued with the neoliberal ethos that life on Earth was a positive-sum game. If you had to invent a threat grand enough, and global enough, to plausibly conjure into being a system of true international cooperation, climate change would be it—the threat everywhere, and overwhelming, and total. And yet now, just as the need for that kind of cooperation is paramount, indeed necessary for anything like the world we know to survive, we are only unbuilding those alliances—recoiling into nationalistic corners and retreating from collective responsibility and from each other. That collapse of trust is a cascade, too. ﻿Just how completely the world below our feet will become unknown to us is not yet clear, and how we register its transformation remains an open question. One legacy of the environmentalist creed that long prized the natural world as an otherworldly retreat is that we see its degradation as a sequestered story, unfolding separately from our own modern lives—so separately that the degradation acquires the comfortable contours of parable, like pages from Aesop, aestheticized even when we know the losses as tragedy. Climate change could soon mean that, in the fall, trees may simply turn brown, and so we will look differently at entire schools of painting, which stretched for generations, devoted to best capturing the oranges and reds we can no longer see ourselves out the windows of our cars as we drive along our highways.87 The coffee plants of Latin America will no longer produce fruit; beach homes will be built on higher and higher stilts and still be drowned.88 In many cases, it is better to use the present tense. In just the last forty years, according to the World Wildlife Fund, more than half of the world’s vertebrate animals have died; in just the last twenty-five, one study of German nature preserves found, the flying insect population declined by three-quarters.89, 90 The delicate dance of flowers and their pollinators has been disrupted, as have the migration patterns of cod, which have fled up the Eastern Seaboard toward the Arctic, evading the communities of fishermen that fed on them for centuries; as have the hibernation patterns of black bears, many of which now stay awake all winter.91, 92, 93 Species individuated over millions of years of evolution but forced together by climate change have begun to mate with one another for the first time, producing a whole new class of hybrid species: the pizzly bear, the coy-wolf.94 The zoos are already natural history museums, the children’s books already out of date. Older fables, too, will be remade: the story of Atlantis, having endured and enchanted for several millennia, will compete with the real-time sagas of the Marshall Islands and Miami Beach, each sinking over time into snorkelers’ paradises; the strange fantasy of Santa and his polar workshop will grow eerier still in an Arctic of ice-free summers; and there is a terrible poignancy in contemplating how desertification of the entire Mediterranean Basin will change our reading of the Odyssey, or how it will discolor the shine of Greek islands for dust from the Sahara to permanently blanket their skies, or how it will recast the meaning of the Pyramids for the Nile to be dramatically drained.95, 96, 97 We will think of the border with Mexico differently, presumably, when the Rio Grande is a line traced through a dry riverbed—the Rio Sand, it’s already been called.98 The imperious West has spent five centuries looking down its nose at the plight of those living within the pale of tropical disease, and one wonders how that will change when mosquitoes carrying malaria and dengue are flying through the streets of Copenhagen and Chicago, too. But we have for so long understood stories about nature as allegories that we seem unable to recognize that the meaning of climate change is not sequestered in parable. It encompasses us; in a very real way it governs us—our crop yields, our pandemics, our migration patterns and civil wars, crime waves and domestic assaults, hurricanes and heat waves and rain bombs and megadroughts, the shape of our economic growth and everything that flows downstream from it, which today means nearly everything. Eight hundred million in South Asia alone, the World Bank says, would see their living conditions sharply diminish by 2050 on the current emissions track, and perhaps a climate slowdown will even reveal the bounty of what Andreas Malm calls fossil capitalism to be an illusion, sustained over just a few centuries by the arithmetic of adding the energy value of burned fossil fuels to what had been, before wood and coal and oil, an eternal Malthusian trap.99, 100 In which case, we would have to retire the intuition that history will inevitably extract material progress from the planet, at least in any reliable or global pattern, and come to terms, somehow, with just how pervasively that intuition ruled even our inner lives, often tyrannically. Adaptation to climate change is often viewed in terms of market trade-offs, but in the coming decades the trade will work in the opposite direction, with relative prosperity a benefit of more aggressive action. Every degree of warming, it’s been estimated, costs a temperate country like the United States about one percentage point of GDP, and according to one recent paper, at 1.5 degrees the world would be $20 trillion richer than at 2 degrees.101, 102 Turn the dial up another degree or two, and the costs balloon—the compound interest of environmental catastrophe. 3.7 degrees of warming would produce $551 trillion in damages, research suggests; total worldwide wealth is today about $280 trillion.103, 104 Our current emissions trajectory takes us over 4 degrees by 2100; multiply that by that 1 percent of GDP and you have almost entirely wiped out the very possibility of economic growth, which has not topped 5 percent globally in over forty years.105 A fringe group of alarmed academics call this prospect “steady-state economics,” but it ultimately suggests a more ﻿complete retreat from economics as an orienting beacon, and from growth as the lingua franca through which modern life launders all of its aspirations.106 “Steady-state” also gives a name to the creeping panic that history may be less progressive, as we’ve come to believe really only over the last several centuries, than cyclical, as we were sure it was for the many millennia before. More than that: in the vision steady-state economics projects of a state-of-nature competitive scramble, everything from politics to trade and war seems brutally zero-sum. For centuries we have looked to nature as a mirror onto which to first project, then observe, ourselves. But what is the moral? There is nothing to learn from global warming, because we do not have the time, or the distance, to contemplate its lessons; we are after all not merely telling the story but living it. That is, trying to; the threat is immense. How immense? One 2018 paper sketches the math in horrifying detail. In the journal Nature Climate Change, a team led by Drew Shindell tried to quantify the suffering that would be avoided if warming was kept to 1.5 degrees, rather than 2 degrees—in other words, how much additional suffering would result from just that additional half-degree of warming. Their answer: 150 million more people would die from air pollution alone in a 2-degree warmer world than in a 1.1075-degree warmer one. Later that year, the IPCC raised the stakes further: in the gap between 1.1085 degrees and 2, it said, hundreds of millions of lives were at stake. Numbers that large can be hard to grasp, but 150 million is the equivalent of twenty-five Holocausts. It is three times the size of the death toll of the Great Leap Forward—the largest nonmilitary death toll humanity has ever produced. It is more than twice the greatest death toll of any kind, World War II. The numbers don’t begin to climb only when we hit 1.5 degrees, of course. As should not surprise you, they are already accumulating, at a rate of at least seven million deaths, from air pollution alone, each year—an annual Holocaust, pursued and prosecuted by what brand of nihilism? This is what is meant when climate change is called an “existential crisis”—a drama we are now haphazardly improvising between two hellish poles, in which our best-case outcome is death and suffering at the scale of twenty-five Holocausts, and the worst-case outcome puts us on the brink of extinction.109 Rhetoric often fails us on climate because the only factually appropriate language is of a kind we’ve been trained, by a buoyant culture of sunny-side-up optimism, to dismiss, categorically, as hyperbole. Here, the facts are hysterical, and the dimensions of the drama that will play out between those poles incomprehensibly large—large enough to enclose not just all of present-day humanity but all of our possible futures, as well. Global warming has improbably compressed into two generations the entire story of human civilization. First, the project of remaking the planet so that it is undeniably ours, a project whose exhaust, the poison of emissions, now casually works its way through millennia of ice so quickly you can see the melt with a naked eye, destroying the environmental conditions that have held stable and steadily governed for literally all of human history. That has been the work of a single generation. The second generation faces a very different task: the project of preserving our collective future, forestalling that devastation and engineering an alternate path. There is simply no analogy to draw on, outside of mythology and theology—and perhaps the Cold War prospect of mutually assured destruction. Few feel like gods in the face of warming, but that the totality of climate change should make us feel so passive—that is another of its delusions. In folklore and comic books and church pews and movie theaters, stories about the fate of the earth often perversely counsel passivity in their audiences, and perhaps it should not surprise us that the threat of climate change is no different. By the end of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear winter had clouded every corner of our pop culture and psychology, a pervasive nightmare that the human experiment might be brought to an end by two jousting sets of proud, rivalrous tacticians, just a few sets of twitchy hands hovering over the planet’s self-destruct buttons. The threat of climate change is more dramatic still, and ultimately more democratic, with responsibility shared by each of us even as we shiver in fear of it; and yet we have processed that threat only in parts, typically not concretely or explicitly, displacing certain anxieties and inventing others, choosing to ignore the bleakest features of our possible future and letting our political fatalism and technological faith blur, as though we’d gone cross-eyed, into a remarkably familiar consumer fantasy: that someone else will fix the problem for us, at no cost. Those more panicked are often hardly less complacent, living instead through climate fatalism as though it were climate optimism. Over the last few years, as the planet’s own environmental rhythms have seemed to grow more fatalistic, skeptics have found themselves arguing not that climate change isn’t happening, since extreme weather has made that undeniable, but that its causes are unclear—suggesting that the changes we are seeing are the result of natural cycles rather than human activities and interventions. It is a very strange argument; if the planet is warming at a terrifying pace and on a horrifying scale, it should transparently concern us more, rather than less, that the warming is beyond our control, possibly even our comprehension. That we know global warming is our doing should be a comfort, not a cause for despair, however incomprehensively large and complicated we find the processes that have brought it into being; that we know we are, ourselves, responsible for all of its punishing effects ﻿should be empowering, and not just perversely. Global warming is, after all, a human invention. And the flip side of our real-time guilt is that we remain in command. No matter how out-of-control the climate system seems—with its roiling typhoons, unprecedented famines and heat waves, refugee crises and climate conflicts—we are all its authors. And still writing.

## 3

#### Recent moves by NASA put Asteroid Mining solely in the hands of the private sector.

**Glester 18**, Andrew. [Andrew Glester is the host of the Physics World podcast and the Cosmic Shed podcast, which explores the way science and storytelling collide. He is also the co-ordinator of the Space Universities Network] “The Asteroid Trillionaires.” *PhysicsWorld*, 11 June 2018, <https://physicsworld.com/a/the-asteroid-trillionaires/>. [GHS-AA]

“I’ll make a prediction right now. The first trillionaire will be made in space.” So said Texas senator Ted Cruz, shortly after a bill was signed to increase NASA’s budget for 2018. To untrained ears, his claim would have sounded extraordinary. It might even have stretched credulity for those familiar with the challenges of space. But on closer inspection, Cruz was not being that revolutionary. Peter Diamandis – founder of the X Prize competition to encourage tech developments – made the same prediction back in 2008 and expanded on the theme in his 2015 book Bold. As for how those trillionaires will make their riches from space, both he and Neil DeGrasse Tyson – the US astrophysicist and TV host – reckon it will be done by mining asteroids. Progress is already under way. The first asteroid company, Planetary Resources, was founded in 2012 by Diamandis, Chris Lewicki and others in Washington. Within a year the US company Deep Space Industries was set up by Rick Tumlinson, Stephen Cover and a host of others. A handful more firms have since been established, and while some are admittedly are less serious than others, the race to the riches of space is on. Despite the existence of such firms and Cruz’s declaration, however, Donald Trump’s 2018 NASA budget cancelled the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM), which planned to bring an asteroid into an orbit around Earth where it could be studied and mined a lot more easily than one in the asteroid belt. A NASA spokesperson told me the ARM team is ensuring that the key knowledge from the mission so far is not lost, but NASA pulling out has left the asteroid-mining community without a valuable learning tool and places asteroid mining firmly in the realm of the private space sector. Nevertheless, the investment bank Goldman Sachs has reassured its clients about the financial benefits of investing in asteroid-mining companies. “The psychological barrier to mining asteroids is high, the actual financial and technological barriers are far lower,” it said in a report published last year. A Caltech study put the cost of an asteroid-mining mission at $2.6bn – perhaps not surprisingly the same estimated cost of NASA’s erstwhile ARM. It might sound a lot, but a rare-earth-metal mine has comparable set-up costs of up to $1bn and a football-field-sized asteroid could contain as much as $50bn of platinum.

#### Asteroid mining is key to solving water crises

Tillman 19 (Nola Taylor Tillman is a Freelance Science Writer at Redd Infinity. Graduate of Agnes Scott College.), “Tons of Water in Asteroids Could Fuel Satellites, Space Exploration”, Space, 9-29-19, <https://www.space.com/water-rich-asteroids-space-exploration-fuel.html> NT

When it comes to mining space for water, the best target may not be the moon: Entrepreneurs' richest options are likely to be asteroids that are larger and closer to Earth. **A recent study suggested that roughly 1,000 water-rich, or hydrated, asteroids near our planet are easier to reach than the lunar surface is.** While most of these space rocks are only a few feet in size, more than 25 of them should be large enough to each provide significant water. Altogether, the water locked in these asteroids should be enough to fill somewhere around 320,000 Olympics-size swimming pools — significantly more than the amount of water locked up at the lunar poles, the new research suggested. **Because asteroids are small, they have less gravity than Earth or the moon do, which makes them easier destinations to land on and lift off from**. If engineers can figure out how to mine water from these space rocks, they could produce a source of ready fuel in space that would allow spacecraft designers to build refuelable models for the next generation of satellites. Asteroid mining could also fuel human exploration, saving the expense of launching fuel from Earth. In both cases, would-be space-rock miners will need to figure out how to free the water trapped in hydrated minerals on these asteroids. "Most of the hydrated material in the near-Earth population is contained in the largest few hydrated objects," Andrew Rivkin, an asteroid researcher at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Research Laboratory in Maryland, told Space.com. Rivkin is the lead author on the paper, which estimated that near Earth asteroids could contain more easily accessible water than the lunar poles. "A sure thing" According to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, more than 5,200 of the objects launched into space are still in orbit today. While some continue to function, the bulk of them buzz uselessly over our heads every day. They carry fuel on board, and when they run out, they are either lowered into destructive orbits or left to become space junk, useless debris with the potential to cause enormous problems for working satellites. Refueling satellites in space could change that model, replacing it with long-lived, productive orbiters. "It's easier to bring fuel from asteroids to geosynchronous orbit than from the surface of the Earth," Rivkin said. "If such a supply line could be established, it could make asteroid mining very profitable." Hunting for space water from the surface of the Earth is challenging because the planet's atmosphere blocks the wavelength of light where water can be observed. The asteroid warming as it draws closer to the sun can also complicate measurements. Instead, Rivkin and his colleagues turned to a class of space rocks called Ch asteroids. Although these asteroids don't directly exhibit a watery fingerprint, they carry the telltale signal of oxidized iron seen only on asteroids with signatures of water-rich minerals, which means the authors felt confident assuming that all Ch asteroids carry this rocky water. Based on meteorite falls, a previous study estimated that Ch asteroids could make up nearly 10% of the near-Earth objects (NEOs). With this information, the researchers determined that there are between 26 and 80 such objects that are hydrated and larger than 0.62 miles (1 km) across. Right now, only three NEOs have been classified as Ch asteroids, although others have been spotted in the asteroid belt. Most NEOs are discovered and observed at wavelengths too short to reveal the iron band that marks the class. Carbon-rich asteroids, which include Ch asteroids and other flavors, are also darker than the more common stony asteroids, making them more challenging to observe. Although **Ch asteroids definitely contain water-rich minerals**, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they will always be the best bet for space mining. It comes down to risk. Would an asteroid-mining company rather visit a smaller asteroid that definitely has a moderate amount of water, or a larger one that could yield a larger payday but could also come up dry? "Whether getting sure things with no false positives, like the Ch asteroids, is more important or if a greater range of possibilities is acceptable with the understanding that some asteroids will be duds is something the miners will have to decide," Rivkin said.

#### Water Wars cause Indo-Pak War which goes Nuclear

Klare 20 — Five College professor emeritus of peace and world security studies, and director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies (PAWSS), holds a B.A. and M.A. from Columbia University and a Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute. (Michael; Published: 2020; "Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict in South Asia"; Journal of Strategic Security 13, No. 4, Pages 109-122; https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1826 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/8)//CYang

Interstate conflict over water might occur, the ICA indicated, when several states rely on a shared river system for much of their water supply and one or more of the riparian states sought to maximize the river’s flow for their own benefit at the expense of other states in the basin, amplifying any scarcities already present there. “We judge that as water shortages become more acute beyond the next ten years, water in shared basins will increasingly be used as leverage,” the ICA stated. An upstream state enjoying superior control over a river’s flow might exploit its advantage, say, to extract advantage in international negotiations or to attract international aid for infrastructure projects. As the ICA further noted, “…we assess that states will also use their inherent ability to construct and support major water projects to obtain regional influence or preserve their water interests.”16

The utilization of a state’s superior position in a shared river system to extract political or economic advantage can prove especially destabilizing, the ICA suggested, when weaker states in the system (typically the downstream countries) are especially vulnerable to water scarcity because of long-standing social, economic, and political conditions. Without identifying any particular states by name, the study suggested that this could occur when downstream states suffer from endemic corruption, poor water management practices, and systemic favoritism when it comes to the allocation of scarce water supplies. In such cases, any reduction in the flow of water by an upstream country could easily combine with internal factors in a downstream country to provoke widespread unrest and conflict. “Water shortages, and government failures to manage them, are likely to lead to social disruptions, pressure on national and local leaders, and potentially political instability,” the report noted.17

Although most discussion of the climate and water security nexus has continued to emphasize the risk of internal conflict arising from warming-related water scarcities, some analysts have pursued the line of inquiry introduced by the 2012 ICA, focusing on interstate tensions arising within shared river basins. This was a prominent theme, for example, of a 2013 study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) on behalf of the IC. Entitled Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, the 2013 NRC report sought to better identify the links between global warming, pre-existing social vulnerabilities, and the likelihood of conflict. While it echoed earlier studies by the CNA and NIC in identifying internal factors like poverty, ethnic discord, and governmental ineptitude as likely pre-conditions for climate-related conflict, it also examined dangers arising from dependence on shared river systems, especially in cases where cooperation among the riparian powers in managing the system is limited and global warming is expected to reduce future water flows.18

For the NRC, the river systems of greatest concern in this respect were those that originate in the Himalayan Mountains and depend, for a significant share of the annual flow, on meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers. These glaciers are an important source of meltwater for many of Asia’s major rivers, including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and

Mekong Rivers. These rivers originate in China but travel through India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—countries with a combined population of over 3.4 billion people, or approximately 44 percent of the world’s total population.19 A large share of the population in these countries depends on agriculture for its livelihood, so ensuring access to adequate supplies of water is a prime local and national priority. During the monsoon season, heavy rains provide these rivers with abundant water, but during dry seasons they are dependent on glacial meltwater—and, with the rise in global temperatures, the Himalayan glaciers are melting, jeopardizing future water availability in these river basins. Given a history of ethnic and social discord within many of these countries and long-standing tensions among them, analysts fear that such shortages could aggravate both internal and external tensions and ignite interstate as well as intrastate conflict.20

As was the case of previous IC-initiated studies, the authors of the 2013 NRC report were reluctant to identify specific countries in their findings, referring again to “countries of security concern” or other such euphemisms. However, they did select one of these countries in particular: Pakistan. They chose that country for special analysis, the report indicated, because “Pakistan presents a clear example of a country where social dynamics and susceptibility to harm from climate events combine to create a potentially unstable situation.”21 Pakistan was said to suffer from multiple risk factors: Its economy is largely dependent on agriculture; much of the water used for irrigation purposes comes from just one source, the Indus River; control over the allocation of irrigation waters is often exercised by privileged elites, leaving millions of Pakistanis vulnerable to water shortages; and much of the water flowing into the Indus comes from China or from tributaries originating in India, leaving Pakistan in an unfavorable (downstream) position in the system. These conditions have led, in the past, to internal squabbles over water rights and to tensions with India over control of the Indus; now, with the likelihood of diminished meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers, the risk of water scarcity triggering violent conflict of one sort or another becomes that much greater.22

Pakistan, the Indus, and U.S. Security

There is no doubt that Pakistan is considered by U.S. security analysts as a “state important to U.S. national security interests,” the term used by the Defense Intelligence Agency to describe countries of concern in the 2012 ICA on water. Not only is Pakistan a critical—if not always wholehearted—partner in the global war on terror, but it also possesses a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons whose security is a matter of enormous concern to American leaders.23 Should those munitions wind up with rogue elements of the Pakistani military (some of whose members are believed to maintain clandestine links to radical Islamic organizations), or even worse, should Pakistan descend into civil war and the weapons fall into untrustworthy or hostile hands, the safety of India and other US allies—as well as of American forces deployed in the region—would be at grave risk.24 Ensuring Pakistan’s stability therefore, has long been a major U.S. security objective, prompting regular deliveries of American arms and other military aid. Yet, despite billions of dollars in American aid, Pakistan remains vulnerable to social and ethnic internal strife.25

As noted, farming is the principal economic activity in Pakistan, and ensuring access to water is an overarching public and government concern. This means, above all, managing the use of the Indus—the country’s main source of water for irrigation and its major source of power for electricity generation. Pakistan’s rising population and growing cities, with their rings of factories, are placing an immense strain on the Indus, leading to competition between farmers, industrialists, and urban consumers. With water and power shortages becoming an increasingly frequent aspect of daily life, public protests—sometimes turning violent—have erupted across the country. In one particularly intense bout of rioting, following a prolonged power outage in June 2012, protestors burned trains, blocked roads, looted shops, and damaged banks and gas stations.26

However bad things might be in Pakistan today, climate change is likely to make conditions far worse in the years ahead. Prolonged droughts, climate scientists believe, will occur with increasing regularity, posing a severe threat to the nation’s agricultural sector and further reducing the supply of hydroelectric power. At the same time, warming is expected to increase the intensity of monsoon downpours, resulting in massive flooding (as occurred in 2010) and the loss of valuable topsoil, further adding to Pakistan’s woes. As the Himalayan glaciers melt, moreover, water flow through the Indus will diminish.27 With the competition for land and water resources bound to increase and with Pakistan already divided along ethnic and religious lines, widespread civil strife will become ever more likely, possibly jeopardizing the survival of the state.

It is impossible to predict exactly how the United States might respond to a systemic breakdown of state governance in Pakistan. One thing is clear, however: At the earliest sign that the country’s nuclear weapons are at risk of falling into the hands of hostile parties, the American military would respond with decisive force. In fact, research conducted by the nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has revealed that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and specialized Army units have been training for such contingencies for some time and have deployed all the necessary gear to the region. In the event of a coup or crisis, the NTI revealed, “U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so they can secure known or suspected nuclear-storage sites.” Recognizing that any such actions by American forces could trigger widespread resistance by the Pakistani army and/or various jihadist groups, the U.S. Central Command, which has authority over all American forces in the region, has developed plans for backing up JSOC personnel with full-scale military support.28

Another scenario that has some analysts worried is the possibility that a time of sharply reduced water flow through the Indus will coincide with efforts by India to exploit its advantageous position as the upper riparian on three key tributaries of the Indus—the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej—to divert water for its own use, thereby depriving downstream Pakistan of vital supplies and provoking a war between these two countries. India was granted control over the three tributaries under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, and various Indian leaders have threatened at times to dam the rivers or otherwise reduce their flow into Pakistan as a reprisal for Pakistani attacks on Indian bases in the disputed territory of Kashmir (through which the tributaries flow); this, in turn, has provoked counter-threats from Pakistani leaders.29 What analysts fear most, in such a situation, is that India, possessing superior conventional forces, would overpower Pakistan’s equivalent armies, leading Pakistan’s leaders to order the use of nuclear weapons against India, igniting a regional nuclear war. Such a conflict, scientists have calculated, would result in 50 to 125 million fatalities, and produce a dust cloud covering much of the Earth, decimating global agriculture—an outcome with enormous implications for American national security.30

## 4

#### India’s private sector is key to their space programme.

**Rajagopalan 20**, Rajeswari. [Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues.] “India’s Space Programme: A Role for the Private Sector, Finally?” *Observer Research Foundation*, 24 May 2020, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-space-programme-a-role-for-the-private-sector-finally-66661/>. [GHS-AA]

India’s finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced last week that India’s private sector will play a key role in augmenting India’s space programme, and that the government intends to share the facilities of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) with the private sector. This announcement was part of the Narendra Modi government’s call for new and bold reforms in an effort to promote its ‘self-reliant India’ mission. It is the fourth segment of the Rs 20 lakh crore Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan special economic stimulus. Sitharaman’s announcement entails a role for the private sector, possibly with the goal of greater investments in technology development and acquisition, capacity-building and space exploration, including planetary exploration. The minister, while announcing these reforms, appeared to understand that the private sector can help augment India’s space capability. While praising the work done by ISRO, she also pointed out that the private sector is also doing a lot of work in developing space technology. She also acknowledged that the existing regulations prevent private entities from using or even testing their products. Therefore, to level the playing field, the government “will make a provision for the private sector to benefit from the assets which are available to ISRO and for India (in general) to benefit from.” The minister also said the new reforms would allow the private sector to play an active role in “satellites, launches and space-based services”. But as always, implementation is key. Properly executing these reforms will require enabling policies and appropriate regulatory frameworks. That the new reforms will allow private sector players to use ISRO facilities is a big deal. This indeed must be music to the ears of commercial players who have been seeking to get a fair share of the pie in terms of manufacturing of satellites and propellant technologies, among other areas. It should not be too difficult for India’s private space sector because there is a sizeable talent pool available outside ISRO. More importantly, the entry of the private sector, as in the telecom sector, can bring several advantages in terms of cost and access. Following the announcement, ISRO tweeted that it will follow the government’s guidelines to allow the private sector to undertake space activities in the country. Though this did not seem particularly welcoming of the government’s initiative, ISRO’s support is critical to making it a success. ISRO has in the last few years been opening up to the Indian private space sector in a gradual manner – mostly as a matter of compulsion because ISRO simply does not have the in-house capacity to address India’s growing requirements. Today, the Indian space programme is not just about civilian applications for remote-sensing, meteorology and communication, as in the early decades. India’s space sector and its requirements have grown enormously in the last decade to include television and broadband services, space science and exploration, space-based navigation and, of course, defence and security applications. Among others, Ambassador Rakesh Sood has articulated the need for legislation to facilitate ISRO’s partnership with industries and entrepreneurs. Narayan Prasad and Prateep Basu, two prominent faces in the Indian space start-up segment, have argued that despite ISRO’s successes, “India’s space competitiveness has suffered from the absence of a globally reputed, private space industry.” The private sector, especially the NewSpace industry and start-ups, have an advantage in terms of low-cost operations, which itself should be a big incentive for the government to make it an active stakeholder. A certain amount of democratisation of space technology with the participation of the private sector can ensure costs are kept low. And expanding the number of stakeholders will also ensure more transparency and better accountability and regulatory practices. This has been missing in India’s space sector. The same agency has undertaken promotion, commercialisation and regulatory functions – which is not healthy.

#### India’s Space program is key to primacy and winning the space race against China.

**Hickert 17**, Cameron. [Cameron Hickert is a former Research Assistant at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focused on China’s artificial intelligence initiatives, U.S.-China relations, and security issues in East Asia. Prior to joining the Belfer Center, Cameron studied as a member of the inaugural class of Schwarzman Scholars. Previously, he was a researcher at the Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum and interned for the U.S. State Department in Vienna, where he provided on-site support at the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He holds a B.S. in physics and a B.A. in international studies from the University of Denver.] “Space Rivals: Power and Strategy in the China-India Space Race.” *Schwarzman Scholars*, 14 Aug. 2017, <https://www.schwarzmanscholars.org/events-and-news/space-rivals-power-strategy-china-india-space-race/>. [GHS-AA]

The regional rivalry between India and China has long simmered, and the next frontier increasingly appears to be space. Although officials on both sides of the border have denied the existence of a space race between the two nations, this claim is increasingly dubious. Recent events present the first counter: in response to China’s 2007 anti-satellite test, the ISRO formed the Integrated Space Cell to manage its future military space assets, and pledged to develop ground-based anti-satellite weapons. Days after China announced it would send a human into orbit in 2003, then- Prime Minister of India Atal Vajpayee publicly urged his nation’s scientists to land a man on the moon. It is also in this intensified climate that India’s space budget has increased by double-digit percentages. Economic rationale provides another reason to believe a competition is afoot. China has offered its global satellite-navigation services to countries participating in its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure plan; India, which has been skeptical about OBOR, is developing a satellite system which could compete with the Chinese offerings. And as a greater number of private companies seek entry into space-related operations, the two nations will be vying against each other to attract the same paying customers. Both sides increasingly are adopting rhetoric tied to a space race. Wu Yanhua, vice administrator of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), in the first half of 2016 stated his organization aimed “to rank among the world’s top three (alongside the U.S. and Russia) by around 2030”. Evident within this statement is a competition in which India falls short of China’s achievements. More explicitly, the Global Times – a nationalist and populist outlet for the Communist Party of China (CCP) – in February described a successful Indian satellite launch with the title, “India’s satellite launch ramps up space race.” The article then describes Sino-Indian competition in both military and commercial spheres. India, meanwhile, has been heralding space achievements in such a manner that the subcontinent’s press, believing the Indian mission to Mars was meant to show China it was a worthy rival, reacted with forthright nationalism in the event’s wake. The government’s decision to use the Mars orbiter as the new design for the 2,000 rupee note lends further support to patriotic conceptions of a space competition between the Asian neighbors. Whether or not either nation’s top leadership declares a space race, the tit-for-tat timing of space-related developments, economic competition, and the rhetoric present at other levels of government and society indicate a race is indeed occurring. From a fundamental ‘hard power’ perspective, the appeal of outer space is clear. Satellites are crucial to modern day capabilities in the realm referred to as ‘C4ISR’ – command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. And while there are currently international prohibitions on the deployment of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons do not yet have these limits, although there is a precedent against deploying them to space. Indeed, the theories of deterrence that have long applied to terrestrial combat are now inextricably linked in a complex web with space, nuclear weapons, and conventional weapons. The value of crossover technologies is another important reality for China and India. Experts estimate that upwards of 90% of technologies developed during a space program have applications elsewhere. These cross-applications of the research and development fueling the space race is a means by which nations can improve domestic quality of life, produce technologies more suited to compete in a global environment, sharpen military capabilities, and improve domestic innovation.

#### India Primacy key to US efforts to counter China Rise

**Heijmans**, Philip, **and** Iain **Marlow 21**. [Philip Heijmans is a journalist based in Prague. Iain Marlow is a former Asia-Pacific correspondent for The Globe and Mail. Based in Vancouver, he was responsible for covering Canada’s business ties with the booming economies of Asia, as well as important economic and political developments in the region. Iain has reported from across China, India, Southeast Asia, West Africa and the United States. He joined the Globe in early 2010 as the telecom reporter for Report on Business and in late 2011 began focusing on BlackBerry and its global rivals. In 2012, Iain’s work in Report on Business Magazine was nominated for three National Magazine Awards. His reporting on BlackBerry from Nigeria won a Best in Business award from the Society of American Business Editors and Writers in International Features, and in 2013 he was part of a team of Globe reporters that won a National Newspaper Award in Business. Before joining The Globe, Iain studied journalism and human rights at Carleton University and earned an MSc in International Politics (Distinction) from London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, where he studied on a Chevening Scholarship. He also founded TorontoReview.ca, an international-affairs website, and spent half of 2013 working for Journalists for Human Rights – a Canadian media development organization – in Ghana, where he also did media training for the United Nations Development Programme.] “India to Emerge as Key Military Partner in US’ Plan to Counter China’s Rise.” *Business Standard*, 13 Jan. 2021, <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-to-emerge-as-key-military-partner-in-us-plan-to-counter-china-s-rise-121011300370_1.html>. [GHS-AA]

The Trump administration declassified its strategy to ensure continued dominance over China, which focuses on accelerating India’s rise as a counterweight to Beijing and the ability to defend Taiwan against an attack. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien on Tuesday announced the publication of the document, titled “United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific.” Approved by President Donald Trump in February 2018, it provided the “overarching strategic guidance” for U.S. actions the past three years and was released to show the U.S. commitment to “keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open long into the future,” O’Brien said in a statement. “Beijing is increasingly pressuring Indo-Pacific nations to subordinate their freedom and sovereignty to a ‘common destiny’ envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party,” O’Brien said in an expanded statement. “The U.S. approach is different. We seek to ensure that our allies and partners – all who share the values and aspirations of a free and open Indo-Pacific -- can preserve and protect their sovereignty.” The document lays out a vision for the region in which North Korea no longer poses a threat, India is predominant in South Asia and the U.S. works with partners around the world to resist Chinese activities to undermine sovereignty through coercion. It assumed that China will take “increasingly assertive” steps to compel unification with Taiwan and warns that its dominance of cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence will “pose profound challenges to free societies.” While the timing of the release just a week before President-elect Joe Biden takes office raises questions about the motive, the Trump administration’s actions to counter China in Asia have largely enjoyed bipartisan support. Incoming Biden officials have talked about the need to work more with allies and partners against China, which also forms a key part of the strategy -- particularly in strengthening security ties with Australia, Japan and India. Rory Medcalf, a professor and head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, said that the document shows U.S. policy in Asia was driven by efforts to “bolster allies and counter China.” But he noted that the strategy was so ambitious that “failure was almost assured” on issues such as disarming North Korea, sustaining “primacy” in the region and finding international consensus against harmful Chinese economic practices. “The declassified framework will have enduring value as the beginning of a whole-of-government blueprint for handling strategic rivalry with China,” Medcalf wrote in a post for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute research group. “If the U.S. is serious about that long-term contest, it will not be able to choose between getting its house in order domestically and projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. It will need to do both at once.”

#### China leadership causes prolif --- empirics prove transition wars.

Joshi 15, fellow at the Takshashila Institution, focusing on Indian strategic affairs and foreign policy towards Afghanistan (Rohan Joshi, 2/15/15, “China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation”, The Diplomat. [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation](http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/)) KD

**China’s appetite for prolif**eration **remained undiminished** **even after it acceded to the NPT**. In 1995, it allegedly sold Pakistan 5,000 ring magnets needed for high-speed gas centrifuges, while a U.S. intelligence report in 1997 held that “China was the single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass destruction” in the world. China’s civil nuclear trade commitments with Pakistan have gained considerable momentum since Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998. The China-Pakistan Power Plant Corporation’s Chashma-1 and Chashma-2 power reactors, which were under item-specific IAEA safeguards, were held not to be in violation of NSG guidelines as they were pre-existing commitments and thus “grandfathered” in at the time of China’s induction into the NSG in 2004. However, China then entered into agreements in 2009 for the construction of two new 340 MW power plants (Chashma-3 and Chashma-4). There have since been reports of undertakings for the construction of additional plants in Chashma and Karachi. Some in Pakistan have argued that these commitments date back to a 1986 agreement with China on cooperation in construction and operation of nuclear reactors for an initial period of 30 years, and thus not in violation of NSG guidelines. This spurious argument, if accepted, implies that China can continue to commit to any number of additional nuclear projects in Pakistan without any repercussions. It is another matter that the actual text of the so-called 1986 agreement remains unreleased and shrouded in mystery, thereby preventing the international community from validating Chinese and Pakistani representations. China has demonstrated remarkable consistency over four decades in acting in ways that undermine with impunity the global non-proliferation regime

. Its nuclear deals with Pakistan – both military and civilian – were conceived and executed in secrecy. The recent news articles now confirm that China remains committed to a long-term nuclear relationship with Pakistan under its own terms. This is a pattern of behavior that is **unlikely to change without the application of sustained international pressure to bring China into compliance with the commitments it has undertaken.**

## Case

### AT Debris

#### 1] No space war---attribution technology solves

Omar Lamrani 16, studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine, 5/17/16, “Avoiding a War in Space”, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/avoiding-war-space

If the United States wants to preserve its primacy in the face of increasing threats to its strength in space, Washington will need to invest in strategies to deter attacks on its orbital assets. The first step in strengthening space deterrence is to ensure proper attribution: The United States cannot hold its enemies accountable for attacks if it does not know who initiated them. But the vastness of space, along with the difficulty of obtaining physical evidence from attacked satellites, can make responsibility hard to prove.¶ To that end, the United States is investing in a second-generation surveillance system, known as Space Fence, to track satellites and orbital debris. Slated to begin operating in 2018, Space Fence uses ground-based radars that give it 10 times the detection capability of its predecessor, the Air Force Space Surveillance System.¶ In addition, the United States has been working with a classified satellite defense technology called the Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness system, which reportedly will be able to pinpoint the source of a laser fired at a satellite.¶ Redundancy and shielding can also deter limited attacks against satellites. The innate redundancy of large satellite constellations could make attacking them too risky; such an assault would fail to significantly impair US space control while still inviting retaliation.¶ Meanwhile, more widespread use of resistant antenna designs, filters, surge arresters and fiber-optic components, which are less vulnerable to attack, is already being explored to further shield satellites from jamming, dazzling and blinding.

#### 2] Attribution. The U.S. knows the difference between intentional indirect attacks and accidental collisions---no nation would try.

Jan Kallberg 12, PhD, is a Swedish-American lawyer, political scientist, and opinion writer. He received his doctorate in public affairs and MA in political science from the University of Texas at Dallas and holds a law degree from Stockholm University. His research interests include national security issues such as strategic deterrence and the Internet battlefield. SPRING 2012, “Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air University Press, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 124-136, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26270793

Kinetic Attacks. Essentially, an adversary can choose between two types of noncyber antisatellite attacks: direct kinetic and indirect kinetic. While a direct kinetic antisatellite missile attack on a US satellite is possible, it would provide direct attribution to the attacker, thus leading to repercussions. The thruster and the heat from the missile would be identified and attributed to the country or vessel that launched the attack. A direct kinetic attack might be inviting, but the political price is high. Even though it would be inviting to attack satellites, an adversary would not be able to attack without leaving a trace of tangible evidence. Using an ASAT missile is a grave act of war and can only reasonably be used if the perpetrator anticipates and accepts a wartime response.

For a potential adversary, it can be far more advantageous to increase the amount of debris that clutters specific orbits, thus epitomizing the indirect attack. Increasing debris can be accomplished through actively adding debris to specific well-targeted orbits, systematic designer accidents, or collisions in space.

During the eighteenth century and until the Second World War, artillery units had a special round to be used if enemy infantry came uncomfortably close to the battery position—the case shot. The battery aimed toward the closing infantry and fired the case shots, which dispersed thousands of steel balls that created massive losses in the infantry ranks. Whether those steel balls hit an arm, a leg, the torso, or a hand did not matter; the infantry assault against the battery position lost momentum and ended. By applying the case shot idea to space, we can see an unsophisticated way to radically increase debris by using space boosters to reach lower Earth orbit (LEO) and then using kinetic energy to disperse hundreds of thousands of steel balls into a segment of space. Any obsolete or crude missile—exemplified by the Iranian Shahab or the North Korean Taepodong—could act as a space booster to take the payload to space. A salvo of 20 such crude space boosters delivering a significant amount of prefragmented shrapnel or steel balls could radically increase the amount of hypervelocity debris.

The probability for collision in space between a functional satellite and debris is a numbers game. Reduced to a simplified example, if the presence of 5,000 debris pieces at a specific altitude generates a risk of one satellite hit every 10 years—not taking into account additional debris generated from the impact—an additional 100,000 debris pieces would increase that risk drastically. To illustrate the principle, 20 space boosters can lift 30 metric tons of payload to LEO—roughly 400,000 steel balls—that would be spread at hypervelocity into the satellite orbits. The attack is kinetic but indirect, as the target satellites are not individually targeted but are instead approached by a swarm of hypervelocity debris that impacts the target satellites either by penetration or by destroying antennas, solar panels, or other equipment. This impact would initially generate more debris, although orbital decay would counterbalance some of it by moving it to a lower altitude; eventually it would disappear from space.

Either a direct or indirect kinetic attack would be an act of war and provide the necessary attribution to give the United States casus belli approved by at least a part of the international community. First, both the direct and indirect kinetic attack would be attributable to the nation that launched the attack, and observations from space-borne monitoring satellites would be accurate enough to give the United States a solid case. Second, creating unprecedented amounts of space debris would not only be hazardous to US satellites but also to those of other major powers. If rogue nation X launches an indirect kinetic attack, it would affect Russia’s, Europe’s, China’s, India’s, Pakistan’s, and other nations’ satellites. Depending on the dispersement of these debris objects, damage could be limited to small areas of space, but it would still be a space territory not used solely by the United States. Rogue nation X traditionally has avoided United Nations–supported repercussions from the international community when US interests have been damaged. Russia and/or China, in particular, are likely to veto any punitive actions proposed by the United States in the UN Security Council.20 In this scenario, rogue nation X cannot afford to lose that support by damaging Russian or Chinese space assets as collateral damage from its attack on US satellites. Chinese space assets are quite limited compared to Russian or US inventories; therefore, an indirect kinetic attack against US assets could result in severe damage to Chinese interests, as the Chinese lack space resilience. Neither direct nor indirect kinetic attacks are suitable or viable options for a rogue nation that intends to harm US satellites.

#### 3] No risk of conflict from satellite attacks.

Sandra **Erwin 18**, Staff Writer at Space News, 30 years of experience reporting about defense and space, citing Brian Weeden, Director of Program Planning at the Scure World Foundation and Michael Hoversten, chief of space, cyber, international, and operations law at Air Force Space Command headquarters a 1/2/2018, “Sorry sci-fi fans, real wars in space not the stuff of Hollywood”, Space News, https://spacenews.com/sorry-sci-fi-fans-real-wars-in-space-not-the-stuff-of-hollywood/

WASHINGTON — The public’s idea of a war in space is almost **entirely** a product of Hollywood fantasy: Interstellar empires battling to conquer the cosmos, spaceships going head to head in pitched dogfights

The reality of how nations will fight in space is much duller and blander. And some of the key players in these conflicts will be hackers and lawyers.

Savvy space warriors like Russia’s military already are giving us a taste of the future. They are jamming GPS navigation signals, electronically disrupting satellite communications links and sensors in space. Not quite Star Wars.

This form of electronic warfare in space is serious enough, however, that the U.S. military is now moving to defend its satellites and other space assets. There is in fact a real conversation under way about war in space, albeit one of cyber and electromagnetic attacks, not spaceships shooting at each other.

“There are legal and **practical** **limits** on armed conflict in space,” said Brian Weeden, director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C.

“Most people experience space through Hollywood movies, TV shows and science-fiction books,” he said during an online discussion last month hosted by the American Bar Association. In almost all cases the depictions of warfare and combat in space are fictional. “They take extreme liberties and show outright ignorance of the laws of physics, orbital mechanics, conservation of energy and other things in order to make stories more dramatic and exciting.”

Weeden mentioned “The Expanse” as a rare case of a TV show that depicts space warfare pretty close to accurately, but he insisted that the gap between fiction and reality with regard to space war is stark.

Space indeed has turned into an important battlefront, and for good reasons. It is critical to nearly all aspects of national security and military power, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, precision timing and navigation, attack warning and targeting of potential threats. The issue for the United States is to figure out how to thwart attacks within the boundaries of current treaties and legal frameworks, Weeden said. “Counterspace is now part of conventional warfare because space itself is part of conventional warfare.”

Non‐kinetic attacks like jamming and interference are occurring more often. They are cheaper and easier to pull off than full-on kinetic destruction of satellites that would require a high-power laser or a ballistic missile.

As the Pentagon maps out strategies and tactics to defend its satellites, military lawyers are actively investigating how international law applies to outer space.

“Any operation in outer space must comply with the same law that is applicable to other domains, like sea, air and ground warfare,” said Michael Hoversten, chief of space, cyber, international, and operations law at Air Force Space Command headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.

As with other uses of military force, actions in space are restricted by international rules. If U.S. satellites were attacked, there is no ambiguity, he said. “The right to use force in self defense applies.”

International law concerns

The preeminent statute of international space law is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but some of the language is becoming harder to interpret in today’s environment, Hoversten said. “The treaty states that the Moon and other celestial bodies must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes” but it does not specifically say that outer space is exclusively a haven for peaceful purposes. The phrase “peaceful purposes” has been interpreted as “no military use” and also as “nonaggressive military use consistent with international law and the UN charter.”

The reality is that many countries use space for military purposes, he said. And most are reluctant to sign on to new treaties that might restrict their ability to exploit space in national security or economic activities.

The majority view is that military use is permissible, provided that it’s nonaggressive and consistent with international law and UN charter, Hoversten said. There is no consensus, however, about the meaning of “militarization” and “weaponization” of space, and different states use these terms differently. Outer space has been militarized for decades, but that is not the same as weaponization. “There is a common misconception that weapons of all kinds are illegal in outer space. That is not the case.” The only specific prohibition is against so-called weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological.

Electronic arms like lasers or jammers, or even conventional kinetic weapons can lawfully be placed in orbit, he said. Some countries, notably China and Russia, for the past decade have championed efforts to prohibit all kinds of space weapons. The United States has opposed bans primarily because of difficulties in defining what a weapon is, Hoversten explained. Theoretically any satellite that is capable of maneuvering can be used as a weapon. U.S. officials also have argued that an arms control treaty for space weapons would be unverifiable.

Also a topic of debate is how the U.S. military would justify the use of countermeasures. So far it remains a fuzzy issue, said Maj. Ross Brown, chief of space, international and operations law at 14th Air Force headquarters at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

“Below an armed attack, the most applicable response is a countermeasure,” he said. But the devil is in the details. “Countermeasures must be proportional. Must not be forceful. They must be constrained. Must be reversible,” Brown said. “It’s a ‘mushy’ requirement.”

Another concern is that the response must be “proportionate to the injury being suffered,” he said. “That is difficult to measure.” Disruptions to satellite links can cause material damage but also “strategic harm” if the military is cut off from access to information.

As the Pentagon and others sound alarms about cyber threats to space, the reality is that very little is known about the frequency of attacks or even the scope of the danger.

“Public data on cyber attacks on any satellites, military or commercial, is extremely scarce,” said Weeden. “Militaries, governments, space agencies, companies are pretty reluctant to talk publicly about cyber attacks, whether successful or unsuccessful.”

There have been widely publicized incidents like the jamming of an HBO satellite signal in 1986 by a hacker dubbed “Captain Midnight.” On the government side, Congress has openly chided NASA for cyber attacks against its aging command-and-control infrastructure. But there are very few details.

“We have satellites and ground control infrastructure that are, easily, one to three decades old,” Weeden said. “I don’t think it’s a stretch to really wonder just how hardened they may be against sophisticated cyber attacks. But we don’t have any good data on that.”

Satellite providers that are under contract to the Defense Department are required to report breaches. Otherwise, commercial companies would not want vulnerabilities or weakness known that can hurt their business and might invite additional attacks.

Commercial communications providers are now investing billions of dollars in cybersecurity technologies as they seek to attract government and military customers. They are putting up high-throughput satellites with smaller beams that are more resilient against jamming. And they are shielding satellite uplinks and downlinks with Pentagon-approved encryption.

Hoversten said a number of space agencies and governments are coming together to draft a new rulebook on military uses of outer space. “A comprehensive manual is a few years down the road.”

#### 4] Space miscalc unlikely---hotlines and info sharing agreements avoids accidents

Chen Lan 16, an independent analyst and founder of the 'Go Taikonauts!', “Chinese Space Quarterly Report”, January 2016, http://www.go-taikonauts.com/images/newsletters\_PDF/GoTaikonauts18.pdf

During the IAC 2015, China re-iterated the wish for international participation and cooperation in its space station project including extending the station by modules provided by international partners. Twitter messages posted by a European journalist from the Congress, that is still to be confirmed, however, showed a different view from ESA. ESA’s new Director General JohannDietrich Wörner said he had told China that the world does not need two space stations and will likely persuade China to drop its space station in favour of joining the ISS. On the other side, during the traditional “Heads of Space Agencies Panel” in IAC 2015, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden expressed his belief that the current exclusion of China from the ISS will not last forever. Though Sino-U.S. cooperation on human spaceflight is still uncertain, a positive move between the two countries has been made, that is the establishment of a space hotline. Western media reported in November that the hotline has been setup between Washington and Beijing to allow easy sharing of technical information about their space operations, hopefully **avoiding any misunderstandings or accidents.** Russia’s space agency Roscosmos on 17 December signed a cooperation agreement with the China National Space Administration (CNSA). The document was signed at the 20th regular meeting of Russian and Chinese Heads of Government, during Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s three-day visit to Beijing. The two sides agreed to promote the use of “GLONASS” and “Beidou” and their augmentations in their own countries and around the world, expanding the market of navigation services provided by these systems. The two space agencies signed another agreement on the same day on cooperation in the field of space electronics. It was reported earlier that the two countries were discussing a barter deal that Russia will import Chinese space electronic components and will export rocket engines, presumably the RD-180, to China. However, an official statement about the agreement did not mention the engine. Also on the same day, Russian state-owned nanotechnology company RUSNANO and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) signed a strategic partnership agreement. CNSA also signed an agreement with the Netherlands on 26 October, and a memorandum of understanding with the UAE (United Arab Emirates) on 15 December, on exploration and peaceful use of outer space. A year after India signed its first space cooperation agreement with China, scientists from ISRO and the Chinese space agency have decided on six major areas of interest, including the hosting of payloads on each other’s satellites and inter-planetary missions. The other areas of interest are Earth observation, disaster management, space science and navigation, as the Times of India reported on 5 October. The Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation announced on 30 December that the sixth CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) satellite, CBERS-4A, is scheduled to be launched into space in December 2018. The Planetary Science Institute signed a cooperation agreement with the Qian Xuesen Laboratory of Space Technology (Qian Xuesen Lab), CAST, on 15 December to advance their mutual interests in facilitating the open-ended expansion of the exploration of the solar system and to use the knowledge thus gained in supporting the expansion of human activity beyond the Earth. Both institutions also wish to advance their common interest in communicating to the public the knowledge and benefits gained through robotic and human exploration of the solar system