# HWL R6 – 1NC v Westridge TW

## 1

#### The only ethical demand available to modern politics is that of the Slave, the demand for the end of the world itself. The grammar of the 1AC is inadequate and parasitic on Blackness as a sentient object and distances itself from the articulation of the gratuitous violence that positions blackness as the anti-human and the structural antagonism that undergirds political life.

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In the Introduction and the preceding chapter, we have seen how the aporia between Black *being* and political ontology has existed since Arab and European enslavement of Africans, and how the need to craft an ensemble of questions through which to arrive at an unflinching paradigmatic analysis of political ontology is repeatedly thwarted in its attempts to find a language that can express the violence of *slave-making*, a violence that is both structural and performative. Humanist discourse, the discourse whose epistemological machinations provide our conceptual frameworks for thinking political ontology, is diverse and contrary. But for all its diversity and contrariness it is sutured by an **implicit rhetorical consensus that violence accrues to the Human body as a result of transgressions, whether real or imagined, within the Symbolic Order**. That is to say, **Humanist discourse** can only think a subject’s relation to violence as a contingency and not as a matrix that positions the subject. Put another way, Humanism has no theory of the slave because it imagines a subject who has been either alienated in language (Lacan) and/or alienated from his/her cartographic and temporal capacities (Marx). It **cannot imagine an object who has been positioned by gratuitous violence and who has no cartographic and temporal capacities to lose**—a sentient being for whom recognition and incorporation is impossible. In short, political ontology, as imagined through Humanism, can only produce discourse that has as its foundation alienation and exploitation as a grammar of suffering, when what is needed (for the Black, who is always already a slave) is an ensemble of ontological questions that has as its foundation accumulation and fungibility as a grammar of suffering (Hartman).

The violence of the Middle Passage and the slave estate (Spillers), technologies of accumulation and fungibility, recompose and reenact their horrors upon each succeeding generation of Blacks. This violence is both gratuitous, that is, it is not contingent upon transgressions against the hegemony of civil society; and structural, in that it positions Blacks ontologically outside of humanity and civil society. Simultaneously, it renders the ontological status of humanity (life itself) wholly dependent on civil society’s repetition compulsion: the frenzied and fragmented machinations through which civil society reenacts gratuitous violence upon the Black—that civil society might know itself as the domain of humans— generation after generation.

Again, we need a new language of abstraction to explain this horror. The explanatory power of Humanist discourse is bankrupt in the face of the Black. It is inadequate and inessential to, as well as parasitic on, the ensemble of questions which the dead but sentient *thing*, the Black, struggles to articulate in a world of living subjects. My work on film, cultural theory, and political ontology marks my attempt to contribute to this often fragmented and constantly assaulted quest to forge a language of abstraction with explanatory powers emphatic enough to embrace the Black, an accumulated and fungible object, in a human world of exploited and alienated subjects.

The imposition of Humanism’s assumptive logic has encumbered Black film studies to the extent that it is underwritten by the assumptive logic of White or non-Black film studies. This is a problem of Cultural Studies writ large. In this chapter, I want to offer a brief illustration of how we might attempt to break the theoretical impasse between, on the one hand, the assumptive logic of Cultural Studies and, on the other hand, the theoretical aphasia to which Cultural Studies is reduced when it encounters the (non)ontological status of the Black. I will do so not by launching a frontal attack against White film theory, in

particular, or even Cultural Studies broadly speaking, but by interrogating Jacques Lacan— because Lacanian psychoanalysis is one of the twin pillars that shoulders film theory and Cultural Studies.i

My problem with Cultural Studies is that when it theorizes the interface between Blacks and Humans it is hobbled in its attempts to (a) expose power relationships and (b) examine how relations of power influence and shape cultural practice. Cultural Studies insists upon a *grammar of suffering* which assumes that we are all positioned essentially by way of the Symbolic Order, what Lacan calls the wall of language—and as such our potential for stasis or change (our capacity for being oppressed or free) **is overdetermined by our “universal” ability or inability to seize and wield discursive weapons.** This idea corrupts the explanatory power of most socially engaged films and even the most radical line of political action because it produces a cinema and a politics that cannot account for the grammar of suffering of the Black—the Slave. To put it bluntly, the *imaginative labor* (Jared Sexton 2003) of cinema, political action, and Cultural Studies are all afflicted with the same theoretical aphasia. They are speechless in the face of gratuitous violence.

This theoretical aphasia is symptomatic of a debilitated ensemble of questions regarding political ontology. At its heart are two registers of imaginative labor. The first register is that of description, the rhetorical labor aimed at explaining the way relations of power are named, categorized, and explored. The second register can be characterized as prescription, the rhetorical labor predicated on the notion that everyone can be emancipated through some form of discursive, or symbolic, intervention.

But emancipation through some form of discursive or symbolic intervention is wanting in the face of a subject position that is not a subject position—what Marx calls “a speaking implement” or what Ronald Judy calls “an interdiction against subjectivity.” In other words, the Black has *sentient* capacity but no *relational* capacity. As an accumulated and fungible object, rather than an exploited and alienated subject, the Black is openly vulnerable to the whims of the world; and so is his/her cultural “production.” What does it mean— what are the stakes—when the world can whimsically transpose one’s cultural gestures, the stuff of symbolic intervention, onto another worldly good, a commodity of style? Fanon echoes this question when he writes, “I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects” (*BSWM* 109). Fanon clarifies this assertion and alerts us to the stakes which the optimistic assumptions of Film Studies and Cultural Studies, the counter-hegemonic promise of alternative cinema, and the emancipatory project of coalition politics cannot account for, when he writes: “Ontology— once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black...” (110).

This presents a challenge to film production and to film studies given their cultivation and elaboration by the imaginative labor of Cultural Studies, underwritten by the assumptive logic of Humanism; because if everyone does *not* possess the DNA of culture, that is, (a) time and space transformative capacity, (b) a relational status with other Humans through which one’s time and space transformative capacity is recognized and incorporated, and (c) a relation to violence that is contingent and not gratuitous, then how do we theorize a sentient being who is positioned not by the DNA culture but by the structure of gratuitous violence? How do we think outside of the conceptual framework of subalternity—that is, outside of the explanatory power of Cultural Studies—and think beyond the pale of emancipatory agency by way of symbolic intervention?

I am calling for a different conceptual framework, predicated not on the subject- effect of cultural performance but on the structure of political ontology; one that allows us to substitute *a politics of culture for a culture of politics.* The value in this rests not simply in the way it would help us re-think cinema and performance, but in the way it can help us theorize what is at present only intuitive and anecdotal: the unbridgeable gap between Black being and Human life. To put a finer point on it, such a framework might enhance the explanatory power of theory, art, and politics by destroying and perhaps restructuring, the ethical range of our current ensemble of questions. This has profound implications for non-Black film studies, Black film studies, and African American Studies writ large because they are currently entangled in a multicultural paradigm that takes an interest in an insufficiently critical comparative analysis—that is, a comparative analysis which is in pursuit of a coalition politics (if not in practice then at least as an theorizing metaphor) which, by its very nature, crowds out and forecloses the Slave’s grammar of suffering.

**There is an ontological difference between slavery and settler colonialism – indigenous people may lose their motherland, but have not lost their mother – we must prefigure slavery in order to understand the ways in which antiblackness has dispossessed the Savage – the concept of the law is irredeemable once properly understood for black agency is only ever conceivably legal when it is criminal**

**Sexton 10** (Jared, Associate Professor at UC Irvine in African American Studies People of Color Blindness; published in 1998; p. 14-7)

That is to say, in the debate about the colonial policy of assimilation and its discontents, a debate in which Mannoni and Fanon intervene respectively, it is **slavery** and the particular freedom struggle it engenders that mark the critical difference. Slavery: that which reduces ‘colonial peoples to a molten state’ uniquely enabling the metropolitan power ‘to pour them into a new mould’, a process in which ‘the personality of the native is first destroyed through uprooting, enslavement, and the collapse of the social structure’ (Mannoni 1990: 27). For Mannoni, ‘assimilation is only practicable where an individual has been isolated from his group, wrenched from his environment and transplanted else- where’ (Mannoni 1990: 27, emphasis added). Fanon’s historical materialist redaction of Mannoni’s psychology of the colonial relation is to refuse the latter’s projection of the ‘affective disorders’ produced by colonization into a pre-colonial cultural eternity. Not so much, perhaps, because such projection would have the Malagasy desire her own colonizer (like the Inca who Mannoni suggests desires her own conquistador in an earlier historical period), but because the contradictions of colonization might provide an even more problematic recommendation for ‘the introduction of slavery’ (Mannoni 1990: 27). To suffer the loss of political sovereignty, the exploitation of labor, the dispossession of land and resources is deplorable; yet, we might say in this light that to suffer colonization is unenviable unless one is enslaved. One may not be free, but one is at least not enslaved. More simply, we might say of the colonized: **you may lose your motherland, but you will not ‘lose your mother’** (Hartman 2007). The latter condition, the ‘social death’ under which kinship is denied entirely by the force of law, is reserved for the ‘natal alienation’ and ‘genealogical isolation’ characterizing slavery. Here is Orlando Patterson, from his encyclopedic 1982 Slavery and Social Death: I prefer the term ‘natal alienation’ because it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations. It also has the important nuance of a loss of native status, of **deracination**. It was this alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of ‘blood,’ and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him [sic] by the master, that gave the relation of slavery its peculiar value to the master. The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished. And this was true, at least in theory, of all slaves, no matter how elevated. (Patterson 1982: 7–8) True even if elevated by the income and formal education of the mythic American middle class, the celebrity of a Hollywood icon, or the political position of the so-called Leader of the Free World. 4 The alienation and isolation of the slave is not only vertical, canceling ties to past and future generations and rendering thereby the notion of ‘descen- dants of slaves’ as a strict oxymoron. It is also a horizontal prohibition, canceling ties to the slave’s contemporaries as well. Reduced to a tool, the deracination of the slave, as Mannoni and Fanon each note in their turn, is total, more fundamental even than the displacement of the colonized, whose status obtains in **a network of persecuted human relations rather than in a** collection or **dispersal of** a class of **things**. Crucially, this total deracination is strictly correlative to the ‘absolute submission mandated by [slave] law’ discussed rigorously in Saidiya Hartman’s 1997 Scenes of Subjection: the slave estate is the most perfect example of the space of purely formal obedience defining the jurisdictional field of sovereignty (Agamben 2000). Because the forced submission of the slave is absolute, any signs whatsoever of ‘reasoning … intent and rationality’ are recognized ‘solely in the context of criminal liability’. That is, ‘the slave’s will [is] acknowledged only as it [is] prohibited or punished’ (Hartman 1997: 82, emphasis added). A criminal will, a criminal reasoning, a criminal intent, a criminal rationality: with these erstwhile human capacities construed as indices of culpability before the law, even the potentiality of slave resistance is rendered illegitimate and illegible a priori. The disqualification of black resistance by the logic of racial slavery is not unrelated to the longstanding cross-racial phenomenon in which the white bourgeois and proletarian revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic can allegorize themselves as revolts against slavery, while the hemispheric black struggle against actually existing slavery cannot authorize itself literally in those same terms. The latter must code itself as the apotheosis of the French and American revolutions (with their themes of Judeo-Christian deliverance) or, later, the Russian and Chinese revolutions (with their themes of secular messianic trans- formation) or, later still, the broad anti-colonial movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America of the mid-20th century (with their themes of indigenous reclamation and renaissance). 5 **One of the defining features of contemporary political and intellectual culture remains this metaphoric transfer that appropriates black suffering as the template for non-black grievances, while it misrecognizes the singularity of black struggles against racial slavery** and what Loïc Wacquant calls its ‘functional surrogates’ or what Hartman terms its ‘afterlife’. Put differently, ‘the occult presence of racial slavery’ continues to haunt our political imagination: ‘nowhere, but nevertheless everywhere, a dead time which never arrives and does not stop arriving’ (Marriott 2007: xxi). Hartman’s notion of slavery’s afterlife and Wacquant’s theorization of slavery’s functional surrogates are two productive recent attempts to name the interminable terror of slavery, but we are still very much within the crisis of language – of thinking and feeling, seeing and hearing – that slavery provokes. Both scholars challenge the optimistic idea of a residual ‘legacy’ of slavery, precisely because it requires the untenable demarcation of an historic end in Emancipation. The relations of slavery live on, Hartman might say, after the death knell of formal abolition, mutating into ‘the burdened individuality of freedom’.The functions of the chattel system are largely maintained,Wacquant might say, despite the efforts of Reconstruction, preserved in surrogate institutional form under Jim Crow, the ghetto, and the prison. Slavery lives on, it survives, despite the grand attempts on its institutional life forged by the international movements against slavery, segregation and mass imprisonment (Davis 2003). But what if slavery does not die, as it were, because it is immortal, but rather because it is non-mortal, because it has never lived, at least not in the psychic life of power? What if the source of slavery’s longevity is not its resilience in the face of opposition, but the obscurity of its existence? Not the accumulation of its political capital, but the illegibility of its grammar? On this account, for those that bear the mark of slavery – the trace of blackness – to speak is to sound off without foundation, to appear as a ghost on the threshold of the visible world, a spook retaining (only) the negative capacity to absent the presence,ornegatethewilltopresence,ofeveryclaimtohumanbeing,evenperhapsthefugi- tive movement of stolen life explored masterfully by Fred Moten (2008). We might rethink as well the very fruitful notion of ‘fugitive justice’ that shapes the prize-winning 2005 special issue of Representations on ‘Redress’. Co-editors Saidiya Hartman and Stephen Best are posing the right question: ‘How does one compensate for centuries of violence that have as their consequence the impossibility of restoring a prior existence, of giving back what was taken, of repairing what was broken?’ (Hartman and Best 2005: 2) That is to say, they are thinking about ‘the question of slavery in terms of the incomplete nature of abolition’, ‘the contemporary predicament of freedom’ (2005: 5, emphasis added). Yet, the notion subsequently developed of a fugitive life ‘lived in loss’ – spanning the split difference between grievance and grief, remedy and redress, law and justice, hope and resignation – relies nonetheless on an outside, however improbable or impossible, as the space of possibility, of movement, of life. Returning to our schematization of Fanon, we can say that the outside is a concept embedded in **the problématique of colonization and its imaginary topography**, indeed, the fact that it can imagine topographically at all. But, even if the freedom dreams of the black radical imagination do conjure images of place (and to do here does not imply that one can in either sense of the latter word: able or permitted); what both the fact of blackness and the lived experience of the black name for us, in their discrepant registers, is an anti-black world for which **there is no outside**. 6 ‘The language of race developed in the modern period and in the context of the slave trade’ (Hartman 2007: 5). And if that context is our context and that context is the world, then this is the principal insight revealed by the contemporary predicament of freedom: there is no such thing as a fugitive slave. Malcolm X, by another route, was not far from this formulation in his famous ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’ address, delivered 3 April 1964 at the Cory Methodist Church in Cleveland, Ohio. Speaking to the risks of political confrontation with the structures of racial domination, he exhorts: ‘If you go to jail, so what? If you black, you were born in jail. If you black, you were born in jail, in the North as well as the South. Stop talking about the South. Long as you south of the Canadian border, you’re south.’ For blacks in the USA, the political borders of the nation-state mark the walls of a social incarceration, a political ontology of race **uninterrupted by ontic differences of region or legal standing.** Of course, Malcolm X did not restrict his commentary to the USA, even if recent devel- opments in national electoral politics were the focus of this particular address. His evolv- ing analysis accommodated a much larger geographical scale, what he elsewhere designated ‘white world supremacy’. But if there is any weight to his insistence that the Mason-Dixon Line, demarcating the territories of a still unresolved civil war, or even the prison wall, constituting liberal democracy’s internal hard edge, **are incidental to black life** – this from a former prisoner of over six years – should we not extend this reasoning to the ultimate penalty, the absolute master, and stop talking about death as the limit of black life? Not a loss (of life and limb, liberty and property), but a never having had. Not only the figurative ‘nothing to lose but your chains’ of the proletariat, but the literal inability to lose (because unable to own, to accumulate, to have and to hold, to self-possess) at all. Can’t have (even when we got), can’t be (even when we are): a strange freedom in the heart of slavery. ‘The political ontology of race’ is a phrase borrowed from work of political theorist Frank B. Wilderson, III, where it has been elaborated from his 2003 Social Identities article, ‘Gramsci’s Black Marx’, to his 2008 American Book Award-winning memoir, Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid, and his forthcoming Red,White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms. Drawing heavily upon Gordon and Fanon, alongside the early Patterson, the ongoing research of Wacquant on the four ‘peculiar institutions’ that have ‘operated to define, confine, and control African Americans in the history of the United States’ (Wacquant 2002: 41), and an array of noted literary critics and historians (e.g. David Eltis, Lindon Barrett, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald A.T. Judy, David Marriott, Hortense Spillers); Wilderson supplants the paradigm of comparative ethnic and racial studies in two principle ways. First, by moving conceptually from the empirical to the structural, especially insofar as the question of differential racialization – or the compli- cations of racial hierarchy – makes recourse to a comparative sociology, measuring relative rates of infant mortality, poverty, illiteracy, high school graduation, hate crimes, impris- onment, electoral participation, and so on. Second, by reframing racism (pace Fanon) as a social relationship that is grounded in anti-blackness rather than white supremacy. What Wilderson demonstrates at length is that ‘the racialization of the globe’ (Dikötter 2008) or the formation of the ‘world racial system’ (Winant 2002) does not adhere strictly to Du Bois’s thesis on the color line – ‘the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men [sic] in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea’ – in which ‘Negro slavery’ is referred to as but one ‘phase’ of a general problem. Rather, slavery establishes the vestibule of the category of the Human. To be sure, Humans do not live under con- ditions of equality in the modern world. In fact, modernity is, to a large degree, marked by societies structured in dominance: patriarchy and white supremacy, settler colonialism and extra-territorial conquest, imperialist warfare and genocide, class struggle and the international division of labor. Yet, for Wilderson, there is a qualitative difference, an ontological one, between the inferiorization or dehumanization of the masses of people ‘in Asia … in America and the islands of the sea’, including the colonization of their land and resources, the exploitation of their labor and even their extermination in whole or in part, and the singular com- modification of human being pursued under racial slavery, that structure of gratuitous violence in which bodies are rendered as flesh to be accumulated and exchanged. 7 On this score, we should note that ‘the absolute submission mandated by law was not simply that of slave to his or her owner, but the submission of the enslaved before all whites’ (Hartman 1997: 83). The latter group is perhaps better termed all non-blacks (or the unequally arrayed category of non-blackness), because it is racial blackness as a necessary condition for enslavement that matters most, rather than whiteness as a sufficient condition for freedom. The structural position of the Indian slaveholder – or, for that matter, the smattering of free black slaveholders in the USA or the slaveholding mulatto elite in the Caribbean – is a case in point (Blackburn 1997; Koger 2006; Miles and Holland 2006). Freedom from the rule of slave law requires only that one be considered non-black, whether that non-black racial designation be ‘white’ or ‘Indian’ or, in the rare case, ‘Oriental’ – this despite the fact that each of these groups have at one point or another labored in conditions similar to or contiguous with enslaved African-derived groups. In other words, it is not labor relations, but property relations that are constitutive of slavery.

#### We allow for better revolutionary praxis.

Sexton 10 [2010, Jared Sexton is Director of African American Studies at UC Irvine, “The Curtain of the Sky,” http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0896920509347136 pg 159-161]

One embodiment of the "Savage" is able to transform space and time into place and cartography. Rudy Yellow Lodge—virile, masculine, conserving, and conservative—is, at the very least, the locus of a nameable loss. Here, the "Savage" is no more an antagonist to the Settler than the Palestinian is to the Jew or than the Iraqi is to the American. In short, Rudy Yellow Lodge embodies the position of the postcolonial subaltern. The ethics of this postcolonial stance are predicated on a coherent semiotics of loss, for example, territorial integrity, political self-determination, economic independence, and religious freedom. This loss, whether spatial (as in land) or temporal (as in language or kinship structure), stages a drama between two Human communities. In addition, this drama is not an antagonism because the shared grammar of suffering of "Savage" and Settler cannot also be shared with the Slave. And if the "Savage" and Settler imaginaries find agreement at moments when their grammars of loss threaten to diverge, this is because the agreement is sutured by their common anxiety toward a body in bits and pieces, the threat of incoherence that sentient objects (Slaves) pose to subjects—that is, by their common Negrophobia.¶ Skins also struggles with the genocide modality of "Savage" ontology in the same way as many Native American metacommentaries on "Savage" ontology. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a language—cinematic or otherwise—able to dramatize five hundred years of genocide. The majority of "Savage" cinema, political discourse, and ontological meta-commentary contains, rather than explains, genocide. It does so by attempting to account for genocide through the modality of sovereignty.¶ I am not suggesting that there is no relation between the Native Americans' sovereign loss of land and the loss of 85 to 99 percent of the Native population—that (loss of) sovereignty and genocide are unrelated grammars of suffering. Rather I am attempting to make two points. First, the film's subordination of genocide to sovereignty enables the dream of a cultural alliance between the "Savage" and the Settler (however tenuous and fraught with contradictions the ontologists claim that dream is), while it simultaneously crowds out the dream of a political alliance between the "Savage" and the Slave. Second, the subordination of genocide to sovereignty lends coherence and rationality to the modality of genocide which, if it were to be contemplated on its own terms, would be otherwise incomprehensible. Though such gestures may have intermediate therapeutic value—in the way that speech provides the grounding wires for trauma in psychoanalysis—they stunt the explanatory power and political force of the "Savage" position as an antagonism. Put more crudely, wallowing in the incomprehension of genocide could, ultimately, not only be productive for Native American studies and the political demand embedded in films like Skins, but could also raise the stakes of Native American revolutionary theory and practice. ¶ Work remains to be done on the plenitude of White (and Latino and Asian) subjectivity from behind the lens of Red genocide, work to be done through a Red gaze on immigration. One question that such work might attend to is how the banality of Settler ontology (family, sexuality, spirituality, civic practice) is structured by, and indebted to, the gratuitousness of "Savage" genocide. This question is large and important enough to fill a wing of any decent library. The Red ontologists would be asking, How does our absence from civil society elaborate your (White, Latino, and Asian) presence? If this could be asked without the therapeutic recourse to the scaffolding of sovereignty, a singular kind of rage could be catalyzed—Red rage: a rage which could not be contained through analogy to postcolonial anger. ¶ Before exploring these tensions in Skins, we must embark on a substantial schematization of sovereignty itself: what it means in "Savage" ontological metacommentaries and how its grammar of suffering underwrites key aspects of Native American political and celluloid texts. This requires us to suspend, for one chapter, our consideration ofSkins's ideological tensions in order to stage a conversation between the most prolific and revered Native American ontologists.

#### The K outweighs and turns the case – the forms of violence foregrounded by the 1AC are contingent aberrations that spur subjective vertigo for the Human because unlike blackness, they’re not ontologically condemned to the condition of objective vertigo, a life constituted by disorientation.

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Subjective vertigo is vertigo of the event. But the sensation that one is not simply spinning in an otherwise stable environment, that one’s environment is perpetually unhinged stems from a relationship to violence that cannot be analogized. This is called **objective vertigo**, a life **constituted by disorientation rather than a life interrupted by disorientation**. This is structural as opposed to performative violence. Black subjectivity is a crossroads where vertigoes meet, the intersection of performative and structural violence. Elsewhere I have argued that the Black is a sentient being though not a Human being. The Black’s and the Human’s disparate relationship to violence is at the heart of this failure of incorporation and analogy. The Human suffers contingent violence, violence that kicks in when s/he resists (or is perceived to resist) the disciplinary discourse of capital and/or Oedipus. But Black peoples’ subsumption by violence is a paradigmatic necessity, not just a performative contingency. To be constituted by *and* disciplined by violence, to be gripped simultaneously by subjective and objective vertigo, is indicative of a political ontology which is radically different from the political ontology of a sentient being who is constituted by discourse and disciplined by violence when s/he breaks with the ruling discursive codes.6 When we begin to assess revolutionary armed struggle in this comparative context, we find that **Human revolutionaries** (workers, women, gays and lesbians, post-colonial subjects) **suffer subjective vertigo when they meet the state’s disciplinary violence with the revolutionary violence of the subaltern; but they are spared objective vertigo**. This is because the most disorienting aspects of their lives are induced by the struggles that arise from intra-Human conflicts over competing conceptual frameworks and disputed cognitive maps, such as the American Indian Movement’s demand for the return of Turtle Island vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain territorial integrity, or the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional’s (FALN) demand for Puerto Rican independence vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory. But for the Black, as for the slave, there are no cognitive maps, no conceptual frameworks of suffering and dispossession which are analogic with the myriad maps and frameworks which explain the dispossession of Human subalterns. The structural, or paradigmatic, violence that subsumes Black insurgents’ cognitive maps and conceptual frameworks, subsumes my scholarly efforts as well. As a Black scholar, I am tasked with making sense of this violence without being overwhelmed and disoriented by it. In other words, the writing must somehow be indexical of that which exceeds narration, while being ever mindful of the incomprehension the writing would foster, the failure, that is, of interpretation were the indices to actually escape the narrative. The stakes of this dilemma are almost as high for the Black scholar facing his/her reader as they are for the Black insurgent facing the police and the courts. For the scholarly act of embracing members of the Black Liberation Army as beings worthy of empathic critique is terrifying. One’s writing proceeds with fits and starts which have little to do with the problems of building the thesis or finding the methodology to make the case. As I write, I am more aware of the rage and anger of my reader-ideal (an angry mob as readers) than I am of my own interventions and strategies for assembling my argument. Vertigo seizes me with a rash of condemnations that emanate from within me and swirl around me. I am speaking to me but not *through* me, yet there seems to be no other way to speak. I am speaking through the voice and gaze of a mob of, let’s just say it, White Americans; and my efforts to marshal a mob of Black people, to conjure the Black Liberation Army smack of compensatory gestures. It is not that the BLA doesn’t come to my aid, that they don’t push back, but neither I nor my insurgent allies can make the case that we are worthy of our suffering and justified in our actions and not terrorists and apologists for terror who should be locked away forever. How can we be worthy of our suffering without being worthy of ourselves? I press on, even though the vertigo that seizes me is so overwhelming that its precise nature— subjective, stemming from within me, or objective, catalyzed by my context, the raging throng—cannot be determined. I have no reference points apart from the mob that gives no quarter. If I write “freedom fighter,” from within my ear they scream “terrorist”! If I say “prisoner of war,” they chant “cop killer”! Their denunciations are sustained only by assertion, but they ring truer than my painstaking exegesis. No firewall protects me from them; no liberated psychic zone offers me sanctuary. I want to stop and turn myself in.

**The alternative is an unflinching paradigmatic analysis that poses the question of whether civil society is ethical or not**

**Wilderson 10** (Frank B. III, “Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pg. ix-x) \*\*we reject author’s use of ableist language

STRANGE AS it might seem, this book project began in South Africa. During the last years of apartheid I worked for revolutionary change in both an underground and above-ground capacity, for the Charterist Movement in general and the ANC in particular. During this period, I began to see how **essential an unflinching paradigmatic analysis is to a movement dedicated to the complete overthrow of an existing order. The neoliberal compromises that the radical elements of the Chartist Movement made with the moderate elements were due, in large part, to our inability or unwillingness to hold the moderates' feet to the fire of a political agenda predicated on an unflinching paradigmatic analysis. Instead, we allowed our energies and points of attention to be displaced by and onto pragmatic considerations. Simply put, we abdicated the power to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all.** Elsewhere, I have written about this unfortunate turn of events (Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid), so I'll not rehearse the details here. Suffice it to say, this book germinated in the many political and academic discussions and debates that I was fortunate enough to be a part of at a historic moment and in a place where the word revolution was spoken in earnest, free of qualifiers and irony. For their past and ongoing ideas and interventions, I extend solidarity and appreciation to comrades Amanda Alexander, Franco Barchiesi, Teresa Barnes, Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, Nigel Gibson, Steven Greenberg, Allan Horowitz, Bushy Kelebonye (deceased), Tefu Kelebonye, Ulrike Kistner, Kamogelo Lekubu, Andile Mngxitama, Prishani Naidoo, John Shai, and S'bu Zulu.

#### The 1AC and any perm forecloses the possibility of radical questioning about the ethicality of civil society by structurally adjusting the black body through the “political action” that ceases to be “inclusive” – the aff’s starting point places the black body upon a psychologically traumatic, dielectric state of abandonment that forecloses black liberation – if we win that their scholarship produces this structural violence that is an independent reason to vote negative

**Wilderson ‘10** (Frank B Wilderson III- Professor at UC irvine- Red, White and Black- p.  **8-10)**

I have little interest in assailing political conservatives. Nor is my ar- gument wedded to the disciplinary needs of political science, or even sociology, where injury must be established, first, as White supremacist event, from which one then embarks on a demonstration of intent, or racism; and, if one is lucky, or foolish, enough, a solution is proposed. If the position of the Black is, as I argue, a paradigmatic impossibility in the Western Hemisphere, indeed, in the world, in other words, if a Black is the very antithesis of a Human subject, as imagined by Marxism and psy- choanalysis, then his or her paradigmatic exile is not simply a function of repressive practices on the part of institutions (as political science and sociology would have it). This banishment from the Human fold is to be found most profoundly in the emancipatory meditations of Black people's staunchest "allies," and in some of the most "radical" films. Here—not in restrictive policy, unjust legislation, police brutality, or conservative scholarship—is where the Settler/Master's sinews are most resilient. The polemic animating this research stems from (1) my reading of Native and Black American meta-commentaries on Indian and Black subject positions written over the past twenty-three years and ( 2 ) a sense of how much that work appears out of joint with intellectual protocols and political ethics which underwrite political praxis and socially engaged popular cinema in this epoch of multiculturalism and globalization. The sense of abandonment I experience when I read the meta-commentaries on Red positionality (by theorists such as Leslie Silko, Ward Churchill, Taiaiake Alfred, Vine Deloria Jr., and Haunani-Kay Trask) and the meta-commentaries on Black positionality (by theorists such as David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe) against the deluge of multicultural positivity is overwhelming. One suddenly realizes that, though the semantic field on which subjec- tivity is imagined has expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and globalization theory, Blackness and an unflinching articulation of Redness are more unimaginable and illegible within this expanded semantic field than they were during the height of the F B I ' S repressive Counterintelligence Program ( C O I N T E L P R O ) . On the seman- tic field on which the new protocols are possible, Indigenism can indeed lO become partially legible through a programmatics of structural adjust- ment (as fits our globalized era). In other words, for the Indians' subject position to be legible, their positive registers of lost or threatened cultural identity must be foregrounded, when in point of fact the antagonistic register of dispossession that Indians "possess" is a position in relation to a socius structured by genocide. As Churchill points out, everyone from Armenians to Jews have been subjected to genocide, but the Indigenous position is one for which genocide is a constitutive element, not merely an historical event, without which Indians would not, paradoxically, "exist." 9 Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims suc- cessfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today's Blacks in the United States as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrat- ing how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the state has come to pass. In other words, the election of a Black president aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of H I V infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived expe- rience of Black life. But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on "solid" ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to "facts," the "historical record," and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political sci- ence, history, and public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the "solid" plank of "work" is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of "claims against the state"—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put an- other way, No slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a position against which Hu- manity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal in- tegrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of re- lationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

#### Thus, the ROB is to vote for the debater who best methodologically challenges anti-blackness.

## 2

#### Reading Andrea Smith should lose them this debate. They clearly haven’t been keeping up with contemporary discussions within the Native academic community. Smith is 100% a pretendian who has been ousted as a white woman playing Cherokee. Reading her work has consequences—it reifies dispossession, and trades off with valuing the work of other indigenous feminists.

-we are reading a letter from 12 native feminists, including people like Jodi Byrd and Joanne Barker

ICT 15

(7-7-2015, "Open Letter From Indigenous Women Scholars Regarding Discussions of Andrea Smith," IndianCountryToday, <https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/open-letter-from-indigenous-women-scholars-regarding-discussions-of-andrea-smith-5jTCIy_mHUCCE26kGsH49g/>, JKS)

Open Letter From Indigenous Women Scholars Regarding Discussions of Andrea Smith

We write to respond to widespread public discussion of well-known scholar-activist Andrea Smith’s history of contradictory claims to Cherokee identity through both enrollment and lineal descent. While concerns about her claims have been known and discussed within various indigenous women’s circles for years, many people are hearing details about them for the first time. The news has provoked a variety of responses from those committed to antiracist, antisexist, and anticolonial analyses and actions, including shock, incredulity, fear, anger, denial, and great sadness. Thus, differing and sometimes conflicting assumptions about the meanings and intentions of this discussion are circulating on social media. A prominent fear is that the discussion is motivated by a desire to undermine, police or ostracize an individual; another is that the work people find important in developing their understandings of colonization and sexual violence might now have to be jettisoned. We hope to reframe this discussion and to collectively clarify what we believe to be core issues at stake. We are indigenous women scholars from a number of different indigenous nations, communities, academic disciplines, and geographies who are committed to working for gender, sexual, and racial justice in the context of decolonization. We write with the intention to open up discussion. We hope to elicit productive dialogues about deeply fraught and painful issues, and to suggest paths forward for continued and complex analysis of the roles identity plays in the work we do. We do not claim to represent all indigenous women in Native American and Indigenous Studies (NAIS) or a monolithic indigenous feminism. There is diverse work within NAIS and Native/Indigenous gender, sexuality, and feminist studies, and also diverse perspectives within Native/Indigenous academic and activist communities about feminism. We respect that diversity. Additionally, we want to acknowledge the kinds of professional vulnerabilities that NAIS scholars are subject to, especially intergenerationally, through the politics of race, gender, and sexuality. Therefore, we did not invite untenured or adjunct faculty to sign this statement. We call first and foremost for accountability to the communities in which we claim membership. This is not a call for the punitive or the exclusionary. This case evokes people’s fears and vulnerabilities about very real histories of disenfranchisement, expulsion, discrimination, and normative policing in Indian Country and beyond. Thus it bears repeating: our concerns about Andrea Smith do not emerge from statist forms of enrollment or non-enrollment, federal recognition or lack thereof. They are not about blood quantum or other biologically essentialist notions of identity. Nor are they about cultural purity or authenticity, or imposing standards of identification that those who would work for or with indigenous communities must meet. Rather, our concerns are about the profound need for transparency and responsibility in light of the traumatic histories of colonization, slavery, and genocide that shape the present. Andrea Smith has a decades-long history of self-contradictory stories of identity and affiliation testified to by numerous scholars and activists, including her admission to four separate parties that she has no claim to Cherokee ancestry at all. She purportedly promised to no longer identify as Cherokee, and yet in her subsequent appearances and publications she continues to assert herself as a non-specific “Native woman” or a “woman of color” scholar to antiracist activist communities in ways that we believe have destructive intellectual and political consequences. Presenting herself as generically indigenous, and allowing others to represent her as Cherokee, Andrea Smith allows herself to stand in as the representative of collectivities to which she has demonstrated no accountability, and undermines the integrity and vibrancy of Cherokee cultural and political survival. Her lack of clarity and consistency in her self-presentation adds to the vulnerability of the communities and constituents she purports to represent, including students and activists she mentors and who cite and engage her work. This concerns us as indigenous women committed to opening spaces for scholars and activists with whom we work and who come after us. Asking for accountability to our communities and collectivities is not limited to Andrea Smith. Asking for transparency, self-reflexivity, and honesty about our complex histories and scholarly investments is motivated by the desire to strengthen ethical indigenous scholarship by both indigenous and non-indigenous scholars. This is one of the core guiding values of indigenous feminisms, and we believe that the long history of indigenous feminisms cannot and should not be reduced to Smith’s work as representative or originary, even as we recognize that her work on sexual violence and colonialism has had a profound impact on a wide range of constituencies. Though some express fear that the power of indigenous feminist critique might be undermined by raising these concerns, such fear is a reflection of the urgent need for scholars in and beyond indigenous studies to extend their reading and citational practices to include the length and breadth of indigenous women’s writings and activism over the years. Indigenous women have always been at the forefront of their communities in naming and combatting colonization, genocide, and gendered violence. Looking at the US and Canada alone, work by Paula Gunn Allen, Kim Anderson, Beth Brant, Chrystos, Sarah Deer, Ella Deloria, Jennifer Denetdale, Mishuana Goeman, Joy Harjo, Sarah Hunt, E. Pauline Johnson, Winona LaDuke, Emma LaRoque, Lee Maracle, Bea Medicine, Dian Millon, Deborah Miranda, Dory Nason, Melissa K. Nelson, Jessica Bissett-Perea, Kimberly Robertson, Luana Ross, Priscilla Settee, Audra Simpson, Leanne Simpson, Lina Sunseri, Elle-Maija Tailfeathers, and Melanie Yazzie to name only some, demonstrates the vitality and richness of indigenous women’s voices that speak against the racial, gendered, and sexualized violences of colonialism. Given the intellectual and emotional labor that Andrea Smith’s silence and lack of accountability has required us all—supporter or critic—to undertake, we would like to also ask for reflection and care in the stories generated to make sense of her contradictions and her silences. The history of Cherokee removal and dispossession is deeply woven into the same southeastern landscapes shaped by slavery and anti-black racism, and the Cherokee Nation’s disenfranchisement of the Freedmen must continue to be ethically addressed and challenged. So too must efforts to expunge the rolls of entire families in indigenous nations across this continent. At the same time, we recognize that histories of “playing Indian” have gone hand in hand with dispossession of land in Indian Territory during allotment. Playing Indian is enabled by and supports the dominant narrative that indigenous peoples are vanishing or already vanished. The material consequences of that narrative includes ongoing claims by the state, by science, and by non-indigenous individuals to indigenous lands, sacred sites, remains, and both individual and group representations of us. Our concerns are grounded in these histories, and we challenge both individual and structural forms of indigenous erasure. Smith’s self-acknowledged false claims and lack of clarity on her own identity perpetuate deeply ingrained notions of race—black, white, and Indian—that run counter to indigenous modes of kinship, family, and community connection. When she and others continue to produce her as Cherokee, indigenous, and/or as a woman of color by default, they reinforce a history in which settlers have sought to appropriate every aspect of indigenous life and absolve themselves of their own complicity with continued dispossession of both indigenous territory and existence. The stories we tell have consequences, and the harm that some stories produce goes beyond their individual context. One of the devastating consequences of Smith having served as the often singular representative of indigeneity in a variety of academic and activist social justice contexts is damage to strategic alliance building, especially between indigenous and non-indigenous women of color. Accountability to communities, kinship networks and multiple histories is part of the difficult work scholars of indigenous and critical race studies must be willing to undertake to ensure that our work combats rather than reinforces or leaves untouched the intricate dynamics of heteropatriarchal racist colonialism.

#### Smith’s time of ‘playing Indian’ is identical to the histories of white people playing Indian and actively recreates the erasure of indigenous sovereignty

Sarah Viren 2021 [Sarah viren is a contributing writer for the *New York Times Magazine* and an assistant professor at Arizona State University, where I head up the Nonfiction Writing and Publishing Graduate Certificate. “The Native Scholar Who Wasn’t,” NYT 5/25/2021 ghs-rodz]

Although the United States has a long history of white people “playing Indian,” as the scholar Philip J. Deloria calls it in his book of the same name, the 1990s saw the beginning of what would eventually be significant pushback by Native Americans against so-called Pretendians or Pretend Indians, including the successful passage of a national law prohibiting non-Native people from marketing their art as “Indian.” Smith found her voice within that protest movement in 1991 when she published an essay in Ms. Magazine calling out white feminists and New Agers for co-opting Native identities. “When white ‘feminists’ see how white people have historically oppressed others and how they are coming very close to destroying the earth, they often want to disassociate themselves from their whiteness,” Smith wrote. “They do this by opting to ‘become Indian.’ In this way, they can escape responsibility and accountability for white racism. Of course, white ‘feminists’ want to become only partly Indian. They do not want to be a part of our struggles for survival against genocide, and they do not want to fight for treaty rights or an end to substance abuse or sterilization abuse.” It was the kind of article that would have gone viral, if viral had existed back then, and it hinted at the forceful voice that would define Smith’s activism and scholarship. Patti Jo King, a Cherokee academic and later one of the first people to confront Smith about her identity, says she taught that essay in her university classes for years. Before questioning Smith about her ancestry at a private meeting in 2007, King actually opened by saying how much she had enjoyed her article calling out fake Indians. Smith’s intensity and singularity of focus was obvious the moment she showed up in Santa Cruz in 1997. David Delgado Shorter, now a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, remembers that she was successful academically and quickly gained the ear of most of the professors, but she used that access to criticize a student Native Studies group that he was part of, complaining that it had no Native American leadership, and after that it fell apart. Kauanui said Smith’s zeal rubbed other students the wrong way. Simultaneously an “old guard Marxist,” a born-again Christian and an animal rights activist, Smith was the kind of person, Kauanui said, who once commented multiple times on the feelings of shellfish after someone ordered shrimp at lunch. But as the years passed, Smith mellowed. Kauanui thinks she realized that her dogma was off-putting. Easing up on her doctrinaire Marxism, she also developed a new fascination with celebrity gossip. “People in our program, they were doing cultural reads on Hollywood,” Kauanui said. “But to go from there to talking about which Hollywood star was bonking whom was totally another extreme. So she really went there and really committed. She knew about that stuff, and it was kind of her discussion fodder at conferences. And it made people laugh.” It was in 2006, during their collaboration on a collection of essays by Native American women, that Kauanui first heard rumors about Smith’s identity. By then, the two had grown close, even as the trajectory of their careers had diverged. They had both graduated with doctoral degrees and landed jobs at well-regarded universities: Kauanui at Wesleyan University and Smith at the University of Michigan. But while Kauanui was developing a narrow expertise on Hawaiian indigeneity, Smith had become nothing less than “an icon of Native American feminism,” as the publication Colorlines later called her. She co-founded the national organization Incite! Women of Color Against Violence; was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for her advocacy work; and aligned herself with prominent activists, including her dissertation adviser Angela Davis and Winona LaDuke, who later wrote the introduction for Smith’s first book. That fall, a friend of Kauanui’s — aware of her friendship and ongoing collaboration with Smith — reached out and asked whether Smith was really Cherokee. “Oh, no, she’s totally Cherokee,” Kauanui told that friend. She wondered whether the concern was that Smith was “not Native enough” because she grew up off the reservation. But the next year, Kauanui was shown confidential emails that complicated the narrative. In early 2007, an official from the Cherokee Nation began emailing Smith, asking about her connections to the Cherokees given that she wasn’t enrolled — a word used for citizens in a tribal nation. Smith’s responses were evasive, and reading them, Kauanui couldn’t figure out why she didn’t just clarify who her relatives were. It was, she came to realize, the first moment she really doubted Smith. But as so many others would later do, she brushed her concerns aside. **In the months** that followed, Kauanui was distracted by her work helping to organize a conference that spring at the University of Oklahoma. The conference was a step toward starting a national organization to bring together scholars working on Native and Indigenous issues. Smith was at the conference, too, and one afternoon during a panel session, she pulled Kauanui outside, saying she needed to talk to her about something serious. “I just went home to Long Beach, and I found out from my mother that I’m not actually enrolled,” she said, according to Kauanui’s memory of the conversation. “I have to try to figure this out because there are people from the Cherokee Nation who are going to meet with me here.” The two were on a bench on the Norman campus. Smith seemed anxious and Kauanui wanted to help, but again she was confused: From the emails, she knew that Smith had already been told she wasn’t enrolled. Kauanui couldn’t mention them — she’d been sworn to secrecy — and she still thought there had to be an explanation. She told Smith to share the names of her relatives with tribal officials, sure that they would be able to straighten things out. But Smith told her that it wasn’t that simple

. And indeed, it wasn’t. Being “enrolled” in an American Indian tribe essentially means being a legal citizen of that tribal nation. It’s a status that can be passed down by parents who are also enrolled but also one that can be claimed, depending on the citizenship rules of each tribe, if an individual can prove he or she is a child, grandchild or at times even great-grandchild of someone who was a tribal member. As the Cherokee genealogical researcher David Cornsilk would later tell me, Smith couldn’t even do that: She had known since the 1990s that her family had no identifiable Native American roots, because Smith had hired Cornsilk to look for them and he found nothing. Although he can no longer recall the exact dates, Cornsilk says Smith first asked him to research her mother’s side of the family in the early 1990s, when she was working as a Native organizer in Chicago. Near the end of the decade, she hired him again to look into her father’s side — around the time she was starting graduate school at Santa Cruz and introducing herself as Cherokee and also after she accepted the first of two Ford Foundation fellowships then earmarked for underrepresented groups in academia. After researching both sides of Smith’s family tree, Cornsilk concluded that she had no identifiable Native American relatives, enrolled or unenrolled or even living near those who were once enrolled. He says he sent off his report to her both times and never heard back. “She never said anything,” he told me. “But they usually don’t. Because most of the time they’re not getting the answer that they wanted.” Kauanui knew none of this that day in Norman. All she knew was that, after Smith came back from her meeting with a tribal official and Patti Jo King, the Cherokee academic, she said she had agreed to stop identifying publicly as Cherokee. Smith implied that her enrollment status was a mistake and that she was still Cherokee, just not officially so. It was an explanation that made little sense to Kauanui, but she believed it because she didn’t want to consider the other option: that Smith was lying to her. In the months that followed, however, Kauanui’s doubt grew into something harder, something she might have eventually verbalized if in February 2008 Smith hadn’t found herself in the middle of another crisis. She learned that the University of Michigan had denied her tenure, a decision in academia that is akin to being fired. The reasons were not stated — tenure decisions are confidential, and no one I’ve talked to knows why — but Smith’s supporters were outraged. They organized a petition to overturn the decision and held a one-day conference in Ann Arbor, with Angela Davis as a guest speaker, to highlight the difficulties faced by female scholars of color. At that point, very few academics outside of Kauanui knew of the rumors about Smith’s identity, and a conference news release described her as “one of the greatest Indigenous feminist intellectuals of our time.” Their organizing didn’t change the tenure decision, but it did draw the attention of a Cherokee academic named Steve Russell, who learned that Smith was not enrolled. He decided to write about her in a column for Indian Country Today — the first of many times she would be “outed” over questions about her identity. He titled the column [“When Does Ethnic Fraud Matter?”](https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/russell-when-does-ethnic-fraud-matter) Kauanui assumed that Smith would finally defend herself or at least explain her identity claims. At one point, she and another contributor to the Native book project even tried to sort out Smith’s genealogy themselves so they could help her respond. They’d heard that she once claimed a connection to a famous Cherokee named Redbird Smith, so they dug around to see if he might be an ancestor. They wondered if her mother might have been a product of rape, incest or something else that Smith didn’t want to talk about. “We were running these hypotheticals because we were trying to do the work for her,” Kauanui said. “We were trying to help her narrate, but she wouldn’t tell us what was going on.” But eventually Kauanui could no longer suspend her disbelief. She called Smith and asked her directly how she knew she was Cherokee, and specifically Oklahoma Cherokee. Smith said she didn’t know. Kauanui asked her who her mother’s grandparents were, and she said she didn’t know. She said her mom didn’t know, either. “How can her parents both be Cherokee if you tell me that you mother doesn’t know who her grandparents are?” Kauanui asked. Smith was crying by then, but Kauanui couldn’t let it go. “I had been so fed up,” she told me. “I was really interrogating her. There is no other word for it. I was grilling her. And she just kept saying, ‘I don’t know.’ She was whimpering, like a dog, like an injured animal. It was awful. It was a horrible phone call. I was crying, and she was crying, and I said: ‘You are basically telling me you don’t even have a lineal descendancy claim. You’ve got nothing.”’

## Case

#### Indigenous people can exist in the context of civil society and sovereignty while the Slave has no ontology – discourse on indigenous people ignores and exacerbates the violence towards the slave

Woods, University of Massachusetts Assistant Prof of Sociology, Anthropology, and Crime & Justice Studies, ‘7

(Tryon “ The Fact of Anti-Blackness: Decolonization in Chiapas and the Niger River Delta” Summer 2007 Human Architecture 5 pg. 319-329 accessed: 12-26-12 mlb)

Indigenous Americans were incorporated into a world already formed through anti-blackness. Through the centuries-old trading and cultural relationships of the Mediterranean, the Moors in Spain, and then Portugual's predatory journeys down the coast of Africa in the early fifteenth century that inaugurated the Atlantic slave trade and brought dark-skinned Africans to Europe, Iberians in particular had long become familiarized (in their way) with blacks by the time they encountered the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The Spanish arrival in the Caribbean and the Mexican mainland was the occasion for a protracted and tortured conflict within Spanish society regarding the Indians. The problem for the Spaniards was how to morally justify enslaving and killing the Indians. This dilemma produced the famous debate between the Dominican friar Bartolome de Las Casas, who argued that the Indians were free subjects of the Crown, entitled to the full rights of its protections, and the Spanish jurist Juan Gines de Sepulveda, who claimed that the indigenous people were not human beings and could therefore be enslaved or killed according to Spanish prerogative. This discourse on the humanity of the Indian is revealing when read in terms of its violent juxtaposition with the African slave. Whereas the Indians gave the Spanish pause-ethically, morally, and ontologically- there was no such pause in relation to Africans. As Saidiya Hartman puts it, the black body constitutes "the position of unthought" (2003). Indeed, while Las Casas and Sepulveda were engaged in heated debate regarding whether the Indians could be enslaved, enslaved and killed, or just killed, the African slave stood bye, his or her brethren having already been extensively enslaved, killed, and profited from in order to make possible the conquest of the Americas in the first place-in other words, posing no ethical dilemma for the Europeans. What we should glean from this and other moments of ethical juxtaposition is that this black stand-bye, the position of the unthought, offers the condition of possibility for European ethics. Las Casas' "compassion" for the Indians is much celebrated. In fact, Las Casas is seen as the "father of human rights" and the originator of liberation theology in the Americas. In 1989, the current bishop of San Cristobal de Las Casas in Chiapas, Don Samuel Ruiz Garcia, a prominent supporter of the Zapatista uprising, established the Human Rights Center Fray Bartolome de Las Casas, a non-governmental organization dedicated to addressing the human rights violations suffered by the indigenous peoples of the region. The existence of a human rights center in Chiapas named for Las Casas is ironic for the present study of the relationship between the Niger Delta, historically a major port of departure for African slaves to the New World, and Chiapas, given the fact that Las Casas was himself an owner of several African slaves. Las Casas, in fact, proposed the introduction of African slaves to the Caribbean islands as a mechanism to spare the Indians the heavy labor which was destroying them (Hanke 1975: 9). Although the friar later repented his position on African slavery, he never crusaded against the mistreatment of the African as he did for the Indian. Seeing no appropriate replacement for the black slave other than the Indian, Las Casas failed to propose an alternative and thus effectively condoned the Atlantic slave trade to the Americas. If you cannot be white, at least do not be black. The Indians of the Americas were subjected to genocide, of course, despite the presence of the unthought to provide the basement of humanity to which the indigenous could not sink. In this register, then, genocide signifies an antagonism comparable to that which positions the slave because genocide of the Indian is a precondition for the idea and empirical reality of Mexico, much as the slave permits the emergence of the modern subject. The presence of the black, however, means that there are two distinct grammars of suffering available to the Indian: sovereignty and genocide. The sovereignty modality of suffering is an acceptable category of legibility for Western civil society: white supremacy can comprehend Indian subjectivity in terms of sovereignty because treaties are forms of articulation, discussions between two groups recognized as possessing the same kinds of historical currency: civility and sovereignty (Wilderson 2005: 12). The treaty relationship captures Indian communities in a clientele status, as a subordinate and powerless member of civil society. In Mexico, the indigenous communities of Chiapas must compose their imaginary and articulate their political demands through the hegemony of the nation-state. The resultant mutual recognition enables connections, transfers, and displacements between settler and Indian, between civil society and indigenous "nation."

#### Perm can’t solve – the 1AC’s discussions of other types of oppression and crowds out discussions of a Black grammar of suffering and precludes radical movements.

**Wilderson 20** [Frank B. Wilderson is a professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine] “Afropessissm”, Liveright Publishing Corporation, April 7, 2020. NT

An Asian-Danish woman asked me, “If the violence of White supremacy and capitalist, patriarchal violence is what I, as an Asian woman, suffer, and if you’re suggesting White supremacy and anti-Blackness are not the same—in fact, I hear you saying that the people who suffer White supremacy are also the people who, along with Whites, perpetrate anti-Blackness—then my question is what does that mean . . . what does that do . . . maybe what I want to say is, how do we forge solidarity in multiracial coalitions such as Marronage?” (I’d be asked the same question in two days’ time, in Berlin; but the tone and intent would be hostile, and I would say, “I don’t give a rat’s ass about solidarity.” Which wasn’t true; but the way I cared about solidarity wasn’t the way the mob that had packed its bags to meet me in Berlin cared about it.) “What we’re doing in this workshop is a form of solidarity,” I replied. “The important things **we need to understand are the ways non-Black people of color can crowd out discussions of a Black grammar of suffering by insisting that the coalition needs to focus on what we all have in common**. It is true that we all suffer from police aggression; that we all suffer from capitalist domination. But we **should use the space opened up by political organizing which is geared toward reformist objectives—like stopping police brutality and ending racist immigration policies—as an opportunity to explore problems for which there are no coherent solutions. Anti-Black violence is a paradigm of oppression for which there is no coherent form of redress**, other than Frantz Fanon’s ‘the end of the world.’ Solidarity means not crowding out discussions of Black social death just because there is no coherent form of redress on the horizon. I think that’s what we’ve done today. Your participation in this workshop with the Black people in Marronage is an act of solidarity.

#### The aff offense is minute – the only form of appropriation they condemn is mining – even if they are winning case, the K will o/w – on black grammars of suffering